



## IPI POLICY FORUM

# The Humanitarian Enterprise in an Interconnected and Globalized World Friday, May 14, 2010

*Transcript edited by IPI*

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**Warren Hoge:**

Thank you all for coming. And as you know, this is a lunchtime policy forum based on the report *Humanitarian Horizons*, a Practitioner's Guide to the Future, produced by the Humanitarian Horizons project and derived from four groundbreaking research papers. I know it's been passed out to you and there are more than enough copies to go around, so please make sure you have one.

What we're going to do is we're going to start with Dr. Peter Walker, who is the Irwin H. Rosenberg Professor of Nutrition and Human Security Director, Feinstein International Center, Friedman School of Nutrition Science and Policy at Tufts University. Peter is going to speak for about 20 minutes, and as you'll see, he has something visual to show you, which is why I'm going to go down and sit in the front row with the other speakers. And then following that we will hear from John Holmes, the Under Secretary General of Humanitarian Affairs, Dr. George Rupp, Chief Executive Officer of the International Rescue Committee; Mark Janz, Director for Humanitarian Planning, World Vision International. And Francesco Mancini, who is the Senior Fellow and Director of Research here at IPI.

Just one word about that. When the proposal first came in to do this event, what I always do is walk around and talk to people here and make sure it has something to do with our research. I showed this version of it to Francesco and he almost laughed out loud. It crosses so many areas that we do ourselves through our flagship program called coping with crisis of which Francesco is the Director. Normally I begin these things by telling you all the wonderful things that IPI is doing in this area. That will be Francesco's job today. And what I want to do right now is turn this over to Peter Walker.

**Peter Walker:**

Thanks all for coming. I want to take about 20 minutes, if I can, to give you the bare bones of this study. One of the things that's actually quite nice about talking about the future is unless you make some real big mistakes, no one can contradict you. It's not like looking at things in the past, where you can look at the evidence, but the future nobody knows about. And in some ways, even with the amount of studying that's going on about what is climate change or globalization going to do. If you had to boil it down to one statement, it's all about

uncertainty. Anybody who tells you they could predict the future is a charlatan. So, with that said, let's try and see if we can break at least little bits of it.

The big view for us when we went through this study -- we were really trying to find out what's the humanitarian world going to look like, maybe 20, 30 years down the line. It's about increasing uncertainty. It's particularly about the need for a changed type of leadership. And a changed type of attitude towards planning with the humanitarian business. And this emergence of the border lands, which is a phrase I'll get back to later towards the end of this presentation.

The study we commissioned -- essentially, there were four components to it. We looked at demographics and how those are likely to change, and that's one of the few bits that you actually can make predictions about. We looked at globalization, climate change, and change within the humanitarian system. And I want to focus on these last three if I may, and just give you a quick rundown on them, the sort of, so what? Where do we think its going.

So globalization -- it's really about understanding how money, information and people are increasingly able or not able to move around the world. It's that freedom of global movement of those commodities. And we know it's not as equitable as we would like. So if you take this graph from World Bank figures, the red line shows the growth in the per capita income in the United States. The blue one is the Euro zone, which probably drops off a bit at the moment. And then lines down at the bottom are the rest of the world.

And you don't have to be a mathematician to understand this graph. The gap between those countries that are successful in globalization and those who are not is growing. It's a growing inequality gap. If we move across to look at some of the indicators of technology, this is a graph, the different colors are each decade. So the blue is the 1990s, the reds 2000s, and the green is of today. And it's looking region by region at the growth in cell phone and landline use, right? Because we all sort of get real excited about how everybody's got a cell phone now, it's the great new way forward. And that's sort of clear if you look here, this is the United States, huge growth over the decade. In fact, you know, we have got a 1.4 telephones per person, including every kid in the United States -- it's a huge saturation of the market. But this is sub-Saharan in Africa. So that's the growth in percentage terms, it's amazing, but it's still way, way behind. Less than 20 phones per hundred. So the gap is still huge between that region, between, say this is South Asia next door. So this is India, Pakistan, Bangladesh. Still a huge gap in equality.

If we look at the movement of people, it's a similar sort of statement. The line up top here, this is looking from 1955 to today, the percentage of populations that are actually able to move around the world, migrants, if you like. On the graph here, this is fully developed countries. So essentially it's gone up. If you've come from America, or Britain, or Europe, or Australia, about ten percent of your population is freely moving around the world. That's actually quite a huge percentage. But if you go down and you look at the developing world, actually the percentage goes down. I mean, we talk in terms of the increased flow of migrant laborers, but when you look at it in percentage terms, there are less people from southern nations able to move around the world freely now than they were in the past -- many more from northern nations. So, again, the inequality gap opens up.

So globalization is bringing wealth, but with it, it's bringing this almost inexplicable problem of how do you deal with the system's seeming inevitable ability to generate inequalities.

If you want the climate change, I'll cut out a lot of the story of climate change, there are so many intriguing bits of it. But the real thing I think that's interesting is this link between the way rapid climate change puts, or adds stress to society, which causes a strain -- in other words, things start to get out of sync, and in many occasions, this in turn leads to violence conflict or civil unrest. And if we go back to the historical record, we could see examples of this. And I just wanted to share a few of them with you.

And the first one I wanted to share with you is a fairy tale, all right? Fairy tales are fun, and you know, so you'll understand this. So Hansel and Gretel, do you people know the story of Hansel and Gretel? Okay, right. So it's two kids lost in the woods, right? They have no parents and they sort of eat wild foods, stray through the woods and have to sleep out, and eventually find this wicked witch living in the middle, and she sort of entices them in and feeds them, and eventually she's going to cook them, if I remember correctly, and eat them. Now, this story was written down by the Brothers Grimm in the 19<sup>th</sup> Century, I think? But actually it comes from much earlier. It's actually a Northern England folk legend. And if you think about what you're hearing in that legend, you're hearing about a series of coping mechanisms for dealing with a period of famine. You're hearing about abandoning of children, living off of wild foods. There's an interesting thing in there about witchcraft, which is another talk, we'll come back to that. This story comes from the mid 1300's. And if you look at a graph of the changes in, this is a graph of summer temperature across Europe, 800 to the year 2000. And this period that I've highlighted, the great famine of 1315, a period of incredibly wet summers, when essentially you had a temperate shift in the climate in Northern Europe. Something like a quarter of the urban population in Northern Europe died. The church was challenged. The states were challenged for their ability to rule. And Hansel and Gretel come from this period. So when you listen to Hansel and Gretel, what you're hearing is the story of coping mechanisms in a European famine in the Middle Ages, triggered by a period of climate change.

Okay. That's folk legend. So let's move on. Let's look at some serious data. This is research done by a group in Singapore. And essentially what they've done is gone back and looked at the little ice age. This is a period from about 1550 to 1750 when the temperature in Northern Europe, and this is like the average temperature graph, went down and then back up again. You see a similar thing in China as well. So what they were interested in is what correlates with that? What are the social things that correlate with this period of climate change? So this is our sort of experimental model. What does climate change do to society? And just look at the red line (the others are for China and for other reasons). This is a graph, the second one, the same time frame, showing basically the aggregate food production. So what's its showing is during that period -- there was a lag. Climate changed, and a few years later, aggregate food production starts to go down. Now, remember, this time the economy of Northern Europe is essentially agrarian. So that line is essentially a graph of economic stagnation. So the economy stagnates, and then as the climate starts to improve, the economy picks back up again.

And then they did something really interesting. They went into the old historical records, the church records, the parish records kept country by country and started to try and graph the amount of violence in society. How many crimes

were reported. How many deaths through violence were reported. And when you graph it, again, look at the red graph, this is what you'll find. What you find is that as climate change cuts in and as it tips the economy into a downward spiral, the amount of violence -- you can see there from about 1620 -- starts to go up. And then it's almost that you adjust to a new norm. So society adjusts to that period of, you know, having less food, being less wealthy, violence goes down again. And then as the economy picks up, the violence stays down. So they have run the statistical test on this. This is not an aberration. This is a correlation that you can't explain by chance. There is something going on here linking the rapidity of climate change with economic stress with violence.

And to bring you up to date, as a possible other example, we have been just finishing some work in Northern Sudan where we have been working with the northern Rizeigat tribe. Now, these are the guys that you probably know as the *Janjaweed*. And they're pastoralists. And their economy is in dire straits, partly because of the way the environment has shifted in northern Sudan. And so one of the things we've been doing is trying to understand how their economy has changed. And so this is sort of the one graph that sums the work up. The blue columns are before the period of strong environmental change in the present crisis. And the red is today. So effectively, in the past, the northern Rizeigat, this pastoralist tribe in northern Sudan, they made their living from livestock, which is what you'd expect, from trading livestock -- a little bit of farming, a little bit of migration, usually over into Libya, to the mechanized farms. After this period of climate change, and with the conflict, you see an amazing shift. Essentially you can't make a living out of livestock in a place where the environment is changing so rapidly that all of the land use relationships and the reciprocity rights are breaking down. And effectively where you make your living now is essentially by being a mercenary, by being a salaried gunfighter for somebody.

And what is fascinating is this link between environmental change, rapid environmental change, forcing people to make decisions which push them into conflict. And when we go and talk with people in these areas, and particularly with the older people in the region, they are very clear, they understand, they effectively have been given a choice of no choice. Neither of the ways for, the old style of pastoralism, or this new style of mercenary life, is actually financially or politically sustainable. They know they're being boxed into a corner. And what they're interested in, of course, is a way out. You know, what is the third choice so that environmental change doesn't have to inevitably lead down this road towards increasing stress and the tip into violence.

So climate change for me -- yes, it's about natural disasters and more natural disasters, but it's also about understanding the stress it puts on society, and how society deals with that stress.

And one of the instruments for dealing with that stress, of course, is the humanitarian enterprise, and how we chose to react to these crisis. And I think, the story there, when looking at the future, is really around four things. It's around understanding that the mix of purist humanitarian and purist development -- it's not like that anymore. It's about understanding about what humanitarian space is. And this is again the impinging of violence. The increased role of the military, because these areas have something to do with security where we work, and maybe some rays of use about the use of technology. So I want to take you a little bit through that.

So this is, I think, one of the most fascinating graphs I've come across in ages. I mean, it maybe doesn't look fascinating to start with, but it's looking from 1995 up

to today. And it's graphing the percentage of humanitarian spending, this is OECD figures. How much of that spending goes into short-term operations? Less than three years. That's the red stuff. How much goes into medium term, that's the blue. How much goes into long term -- more than eight years. And it really hadn't dawned on me till we pulled this data out that that which we call humanitarian is no longer actually about quick operations. Almost all the money goes into long-term programs. In fact something like 30 percent of it goes into programs that last more than eight years. That's not what all the mechanisms for humanitarian operations were designed to do. That's not what the sphere standards were designed for. It's not what the modalities of ICRC were designed for. There's something going on here. There's a big change going on in the nature of humanitarian work. There's a change in how safe it is in certain regions.

This is data taken from Abby Stoddard who completed a study last year. Essentially what she did was look at all the attacks and all the sort of violent instances that had been reported against aid workers. And she looks at it also looking at the rate of attacks -- you know, attacks per thousand workers. The story there essentially is it's slightly safer to be an international worker and a lot less safer to be a national worker, which is sort of risk transfer, that's another story we could go in to. But what she found was that when she tried to get to the core of these instances, it was what you'd expect, the blue down the bottom -- you know, economic, the sort of mugging attacks, the same thing could happen on New York streets. There's the red stuff in the middle, which is sort of areas where you get caught up in somebody else's problem, in other words, you're in the wrong place at the wrong time. But the really interesting thing is the sector that's growing is where there is a sense where people were deliberately targeted because of the work they were doing. And that is growing. And we don't see that before about 2004. So it's a new shift.

The third shift is the increasing involvement of military forces in humanitarian work around the world. And just as an example -- this is a graph showing the amount of money that's available to American force commanders in the field, through their sort of emergency response program. And they have about 1.2 billion dollars available to spend on "hearts-and-minds, humanitarian-style work around the world. But at the beginning of this decade, there was nothing. This fund didn't exist. And I remember, as a community, we maybe spend ten, fifteen billion dollars a year on humanitarian work, globally. So this is big. This is like, ten percent of the budget, an additional ten percent, going by the military.

And what's interesting is when you study, you don't ask yourself, is it contributed to the humanitarian agenda? If you ask yourself the question, does it do what the military expects? And the points of doing hearts-and-minds work is doing increased security in an area, right? It's not to be lovey-dovey and do good stuff, it's to make an area more secure. And we've just finished a piece of work in Afghanistan, Pakistan and northern Kenya, where we've essentially asked that question: does this weapons system, hearts and mind, actually increased security? We don't have time for it now, maybe in the discussion, but basically what the research says is no, it doesn't. In most programs, these sorts of hearts-and-minds campaigns can actually make the area less secure. And it's due to the fact that army commanders are being asked to spend a lot of money, very quickly, with little oversight. And anybody who has overdone that knows that's a recipe for bad governance, for corruption, for protection rackets -- effectively that's what you're seeing happening. Fascinating stuff, though. Most of the military commanders get it, by the way, and totally understand that this is not the way you should do it. What they say back to us is: how do you convince people

on the hill that if you really want to help Afghanistan, the deal is, spend less money, spend more administration, and spend it slowly. It's not an easy political message to sell.

There is a ray of hope. One of the rays of hope I think is around technology. And particularly some recent developments in the way it's used. On the left here, I've taken an illustration from a new piece of open-source software that some of you may have come across in Haiti, or Chile, or it's been deployed in Sudan. It's essentially a way that allows individuals to send SMS text messages from their phones to a central number. And those messages can be about -- I'm stuck in my building, I can't get out of it, will you come and rescue me? There are so many people here under attack. Whatever the crisis is. And the software allows you to amalgamate these messages and then actually create maps of what's going on in real time. In Haiti, something like 50,000 text messages were gathered in the first few days using this system. Now, there are issues about how do you analyze that data, and how do you look at it. But the potential for giving voice to people in crisis -- because you're getting the data directly from the people who are affected. You've cut out every middle man. Tremendous potential. Not quite realized, but tremendous.

Over here, any of you been caught up in a disaster here in the United States would recognize this. This is the credit card you get from FEMA if you're caught up in a disaster. And FEMA is able to load it up with money for you to spend and sort of help yourself get out of that crisis. We're now starting to use the same system in crises around the world. So VISA company teamed up in Pakistan, with Pakistan authorities, to issue something like a quarter of a million of these cards, loaded with 300 dollars -- a way of getting money directly into the hands of crisis beneficiaries. And, again, it cuts out all the process that may have introduced corruption in the past, that introduces inefficiencies. It allows you to tweak the system. So not only can you give cash to people, and then allow them to choose how to spend it, but if it's a crisis that's going on, as many of ours are, for four, or five, or six years, you can build in a savings scheme, because you can keep ten percent of that money back, and build up a savings account for people.

And one of the most exciting pieces of research I've come across recently shows a direct correlation with peoples' ability to build up a lump sum of money, and their ability to recover particularly from a very rapid crisis. And it's sort of no surprise. It's what we all do with insurance, right? When you have a crisis, you need money there and then in order to rapidly recover. So if you can use a scheme like this, you could start to build up this ability to acquire savings. So there are potentials, particularly with these newer technologies, which in a sense, forced the technology right down into the field.

So what do we take away from all of this? Well, I think there are really two messages. The first message is about getting absolutely obsessed about programming to context. And the second message is a slightly darker one, about the sort of image and the way we perceive the world and some of the rationales that start to drive.

So let's deal with the context one first. If you take a look at the last 15 years of our business, the humanitarian business, we spent an awful lot of time trying to get systems and standards right. Standard operating systems. Consolidated appeals. The sphere standards, code of conduct, all of that, right? It's essentially about standards and systems. And it's what most businesses do when they're in growth phase. You worry about losing control, so you get into

your standards and systems. But what we've learned from the past is that that's half the story. The other half of the story is if you just apply the standards without understanding context, you end up with either really bad programs, really bad automobiles, really bad computers, whatever it is you're trying to produce. If you can't tailor to context, then the standards actually become a hindrance.

And in some ways, this is where I think one of the biggest problems is with the aid business today -- our ability to program to context I think has gone down in the last fifteen years. And this is partly because of the way it's so much easier for headquarters to keep dipping into what the field operations are doing. And field operations feel under so much more pressure to report back. And reporting and accountability is good, but if you don't get the balance right, you have a problem.

So, one of the key messages of this report is start getting obsessive about context and being driven by evidence. It's great to have standards, but you have to apply it on the ground.

The second part -- and really the main message in the end -- is about the nature of our world and how we perceive it. We used to think of our world as essentially divided into two camps. There was the humanitarian, quick-emergency camp, and there was the development camp. And you would fix the emergency and then get on with development. But, as that graph showed earlier, and as I think a lot of us realize, we've actually got an area opening up now, which is different. It can be labeled fragile states, complex emergencies, ongoing emergency, or the border lands, to use an older term. It's an area where, if you like, development just never seems to get a chance to take off, where violence is prevalent, where aid, at its best, is essentially a holding operation until something else happens. And these are the areas, in fact, it's very like the description -- if you go back to the time of Hansel and Gretel, and the sort of medieval period of Europe if you saw the old maps of Europe where you had in the middle, sort of a civilized world and around you had the rest of the world, which is rather dark and full of strange creatures. And so the borderlands were something to be frightened of, that you didn't really understand. And in many ways our imagery hasn't changed much, nor the way we deal with it. That Robin Hood film is coming out today, is it? Or tomorrow, right? So Robin Hood was a sort of a medieval humanitarian. Right? We still use his basic economic model. What was Robin Hood's economic model? You steal from the rich to give to the poor. So you get grants from the rich, essentially. So you get grants from the major economic countries. And effectively you move those grants out to the borderlands of this world, which essentially is a Robin Hood model. It's got a second part to it. If we look at how we work, in essence, development programs tend to work trying to enhance states on the ground. If we're honest, most humanitarian work is actually quite state-avoiding. It tries to find ways of doing things despite the state. Again, it's treating the borderlands differently. And for me, it gets wrapped up in our iconography of how we describe our world, this sort of us and them world. And to be naughty, as it were, iconography looks a bit like this. It's "Avatar," if you like, but it's also the way here we describe in the United States how our National Guard works. It's all about that central land, the metropolis, if you like. Which includes gated communities and economically successful places around the world. And then this rather unsure borderland of the fragile states, and the states that are moving in that direction, the regions of the states. And the real challenge, I think, for humanitarianism is, how is it going to work in those areas? Because those areas are going to increase in their numbers and their size in a way that programs for context and keeps a degree of independence so you're staying on a mission, your mission is essentially the alleviation of suffering, not

the securitization and the securing of those areas. And I think that, for me, is the main message of this report. Thanks, Warren.

**Hoge:**

That was terrific, Peter. And as we said we were beginning early today because we had a chance to have John Holmes come. So I can think of no better follow up to Hansel and Gretel and Robin Hood than to introduce John Holmes.

**John Holmes:**

Good afternoon, everybody. And I'm sorry if I messed around with the timing a little bit. I'm sorry, I missed the beginning of the presentation too, but I have looked obviously at the report. And I think it does bring out a lot of very important and useful points, most of which I agree with. I'm not quite sure about Robin Hood economics and "Avatar," but I suppose that makes it more exciting for people.

I think, in a way, the most important point to come out of the report, for me, anyway, is one which we've also been thinking about quite a lot, which is this question of how we deal with long-term humanitarian need. Because it's clearer and clearer that the current model of humanitarian response doesn't fit the world as it really exists. The model is essentially one of responding to events, to triggers, which are either natural disaster -- sudden onset, slow onset -- or a conflict. And I'm not saying we don't need to do that. Of course we need to do that. But if we claim to be, as we do, a needs-based responsive system, then how can we easily ignore the massive humanitarian needs which are in places where there is no obvious trigger, where there is no obvious conflict -- there's usually problems -- but no obvious conflict. And there's no obvious single disaster, or a single trigger of a disaster. And this occurs in different places.

I just came back a couple of weeks ago from Niger, where actually there is a trigger, which is another particular drought at the end of last year, which has tipped a large number of people over the edge at least to potential disaster, which we're now trying to deal with in a classic humanitarian response way. But it's also very clear when you're there, in that region in general, and of course the same could be said of the Horn of Africa in different ways, the underlying issues have got to be tackled at the same time -- otherwise we're simply dealing with even more so on than usual on the humanitarian front, just dealing with the symptoms, and not dealing with the structure and issues underlying it. And we're simply condemning to repeat the same exercises more and more frequently because of climate change. And that we're not actually responding, as I say, to needs, because the needs are there all the time. We're only responding when they tip over beyond a certain point, when there is a trigger.

And the same point, I think, applies, for example, when you look at Sudan, where we are very heavily engaged in the South for years, and then started to pull away from the South because we were hoping it was moving towards a development cycle. And we were putting a lot of effort into Darfur, quite rightly, because there are many, many humanitarian issues in Darfur, and there still are. At the same time, you know, people occasionally pointed out, rather uncomfortably, but quite rightly, that the humanitarian indicators in southern Sudan are much worse than they are in Darfur. And still are, and have not really changed. So these are rather uncomfortable realities we have to deal with. And there's no doubt that the combination of these global megatrends, which we've been talking about for a while -- climate change, desertification, water and energy scarcity, urbanization, and all these issues are creating this -- even more so than before -- what we tend to call chronic acute vulnerability, which we, as a humanitarian community, are not dealing with.

Now the problem with that is, of course, that we are actually not capable of dealing with it either. We don't have the resources to deal with what we're trying to deal with now -- in other words, the response to the events and the triggers, still less to tackle all the issues of global poverty in the world. So we shouldn't pretend to be able to do that. And we can't simply shift over as if we can.

But what it does mean, I think, and I think this is a point that Peter was making, is that the boundaries between humanitarian and development work, which are always artificial anyway, certainly from the point of view of the beneficiaries, now begin to look completely irrelevant in some ways. But our response models, our institutional models, are still based as if there is real significant difference you could find.

What I would say is I think people like me, but many other people, are accepting this, and are talking about it, but we're not actually doing anything about it very much. We're not changing the way we behave. So I think there is a real need to move towards, particularly to deal with these situations, the chronic acute vulnerability, which are getting worse. There are more and more people involved in it, not in the least because - I think you were pointing this out Peter - that the demographic trends in some of these most vulnerable countries -- Niger is, again, a very good example -- are against us. In other words, I think... in Niger is 182 out of 182 on the human development index. And it has also just about the highest population growth in the world. Now, this is simply unsustainable. The population of Niger was 2 million in the 1950's. It's almost 16 million now, and will be 50 million in 2050. And this is an area which cannot sustain a population of that size. So these problems are going to get worse. And we need to find ways of dealing with them. And the only way to do that effectively, of course, is the responsibilities of the governments themselves above all.

But as an international community we have to bring together the humanitarian development tactics in different ways, in new ways, to make sure we are attacking that. So I think that's the sort of biggest single challenge we've faced, this increased vulnerability, and of long-term vulnerability, and how we respond to it, and how we deal with it is a huge challenge. I don't have a simple answer. There is not a simple answer. But we need to adjust our ways of thinking and our ways of doing to that.

I'm not sure your graph, Peter, was quite as revealing as you suggested it was, because I think what that reveals is what we know already, that most of what we do is in response to conflicts. And most of the conflicts are protracted.

**Walker:**

Yeah.

**Holmes:**

So we've been for years in DRC, and Sudan, and elsewhere, and we're going to be staying for years more, I'm afraid. It's not that the programs are long-term, actually the conflicts are long-term. But we have a lot of short-term programs over a long period of time.

I also agree, strongly about what you were saying about the context, needing to get the context right, and not just trying to have too many systems and standards which are applied without the context. And I think we've seen this again in the Haiti response, which had many good things about it, and still does, but had difficulty in adapting to the context. Part of that context is -- I think it's in your report, too -- is how we deal with these issues in urban context, or peri-urban context, to use the jargon. You know, we're not good at that. We're not used to that. We're not sure how we can distinguish those affected by disaster, if you

like, from those who are not affected by disaster when it's pretty hard to tell the difference. And certainly those concerned don't necessarily see a difference. How are we going to do that is a big issue. And how we're going to deal with the way people respond to these problems -- they respond differently in Haiti from the way they do in Darfur. We need to adapt to that. And it's quite hard for us to do.

Just a few comments on some of the points you made. On multi-polarity: yes, the world is changing in that sense. I wish it was changing faster in some ways, in that yes, the relative economic strengths of countries is changing, but our dependence on a small number of donors from one bit of the world is not changing, and doesn't look like changing significantly in the foreseeable future, unfortunately. And that's becoming maybe a bigger and bigger problem. But we're trying to adapt to that, but it's an issue.

On the question of humanitarian space, and the safety of humanitarian workers, I mean, obviously I agree with you, there's a real problem here, and we've been drawing attention to it a lot ourselves, and in particular the trend of humanitarians being attacked not for what they have, or just because they're at the wrong place at the wrong time, for what they are, in other words, foreign actors in places where they're not necessarily wanted. So I do agree with it. I think we just need to be careful not to over generalize about this from a few specific cases. Most of the statistics, most of the attacks --the deliberate attacks, the deaths, the kidnappings -- are from four different places: Somalia, Pakistan, Afghanistan, I missed one. What else?

**Hoge:**

Sudan.

**Holmes:**

Sudan. Well, Sudan is not quite the same, but there are parts of that there. And that's also connected with the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in some ways, or whatever you want to call it. And it's not necessarily, you know, something that's happening more widely. For the moment. I mean, it could, I mean, we need to watch that, but I'd say let's not assume that what's happening in those particular places for particular political/ideological security reasons, or whatever you want to call it, is necessarily something that's going to happen everywhere.

On the question of the military, and this is something that obviously we follow a lot, and put a lot of effort into, I, again, agree we need to watch this. I think we should be careful about not to get obsessed at this point about the military. The military are actors in many humanitarian situations, including a lot of natural disasters, where it doesn't really pose so many problems. It's not an ideal, but it's a reality we have to deal with, certainly. I mean, obviously that was the case in Haiti, and it's the case in Southeast Asia where the military are going to be in the front line of responding to most natural disasters, which is not necessarily a bad thing, as long we can deal with that in the right way. But what I mean is that, yes, there is this big Pentagon budget, and all the concerns of what's happened in Iraq and Afghanistan.

My impression, for what it's worth is actually we've seen the peak of this already. It's not something that's growing. That budget is reducing. I think people have accepted, even in the Pentagon, that that's not really the way to go. But for all the reasons you were giving. I'm not saying everybody's accepted that, but I think, you know... let's not assume this is the inevitable wave of the future, that the military are going to do more and more of this, and those budgets are going to get bigger and bigger. I think the new American administration does not view it in quite the same way. So that emphasis on the Pentagon doing humanitarian

operations not for humanitarian reasons is less visible than it was before. I'm not saying we shouldn't be concerned about it, but I'm not sure it's the, you know, it's very easy – especially for humanitarians – to get obsessed with the military. And I think we should be careful not to do that.

Perhaps two final points. On technology -- I think that there are real possibilities there. There are real possibilities which we're not using as much as we should. For example, in urban settings, I think certain technology, like smart cards and so on, can be used effectively. We have been doing this up to a point. I think UNHCR have been doing it in Damascus and Amman for Iraqi refugees who are mixed in with the local population. So it's a way of giving them support. It's a way of avoiding transporting large amounts of food from the outside with all the costs and distortions that could introduce. They were used quite effectively by the Pakistani government in response to the Pakistani displacement last year, smart cards with cash on them, particularly for those going back home, you know, it's a sort of starter pack which is easier than providing goods.

I think there's a lot of discussion going on, quite rightly, about that how you could use technology for monitoring purposes, and evaluation. Well, monitoring particularly, you know, in places where you can't get so many international observers -- Somalia is an obvious example. But we haven't got very far with that yet. So I think there's a lot more possibilities which we haven't really exploited.

And just one last point on your graph about developing being sort of host-state enhancing and humanitarian aid being host-state avoiding, which is a nice way of putting it. I mean, yes, of course there is some truth in that. But we're trying to get away from that model if we can. I mean, there are places where you can't get away from that model because the host government is part of the problem, as it were. But in general, we would like to increase the national capacity, we would like to increase to the extent to which governments are involved, we want to sort of get away from the sort of donor humanitarian community versus the host government, towards a much more cooperative model. So I hope we are moving in a better direction on that. Even where it contains problems, and again, Haiti provides an example of a situation where, for many years, donors, I mean not just, on even particularly on the humanitarian side have tried to avoid the government, for some good reasons. The net result is negative, because it's disempowering for any kind of government, and I think one of the lessons for the future is whatever the risks, we have to be with the government, the government in front, genuinely, to empower them, too. So you'll have some long term sustainability, because without that it doesn't really work. Let me stop there.

**Hoge:** That's terrific and valuable comments, John. Thank you so much. And we will understand if you have to pick up and leave shortly that it's not because of anything somebody said here ...

**Holmes:** The lunch I was supposed to be going to was cancelled in the end. So I don't need to rush off.

**Hoge:** Excellent. Well, then stay with us, please, and listen to Mr. George Rupp who is Chief Executive Officer of the International Rescue Committee.

**George Rupp:** Thank you very much, Warren. I have to confess, I was never told about the change in time. So I apologize I heard only the last part of your presentation, Peter, but I did read the report. In fact all of the reports, including this summary

document, and I thank you very much. I think they're extremely provocative and helpful.

I thought it might be useful if we took a step back in considering the new humanitarianism that you talked about, by comparing it to reference points that we have long known and loved. And I thought I'd first compare, use as a reference point, the three standards that often are on vote for NGO's, namely the neutrality, independence and impartiality, and I'll comment a bit on how they are and aren't apt in this new situation that we're in.

First, in the case of neutrality, it does seem to me that there is a great virtue in having the International Committee for the Red Cross continue to observe the criterion of neutrality. It makes it indispensable for the work that it does. But it does not seem to me, or let me put it this way, it's dubious for virtually all other NGO's. In fact we do make political judgments all the time. And it's only in unusual circumstances that we can honestly claim to neutrality in the way in which it's exemplified by ICRC. I'm stating that a little more categorically than maybe is true, partly to be provocative, but at least in the case of the International Rescue Committee, there are very few circumstances in which we claim that we are neutral in the way in which classically it's defined in humanitarian NGO's.

The second criterion is independence, and there the IRC, and I think many of our sister organizations, are concerned that we have appropriate levels of independence in the way we design our programs, in the way we implement and evaluate them. But it's nonetheless only a qualified independence, because in many cases we, by choice, make the decision to work with local governments. And working in situations where we work, take Afghanistan, or Congo. Having working through ministries of those governance, by definition, it means we're not neutral, but also that we, after making that decision have, in a sense, sacrificed some of the independence that we'd like might to have, but it seems to me is compromised under those circumstances.

The third criterion: impartiality. I think all of us aspire to, and work very hard to, exemplify that. Namely we give, or the assistance that we provide, whether it's emergency assistance, or longer term development assistance, based on need rather than any kind of ideological or other criteria. So I would say of the three, impartiality, yes we certainly should hold to that. In the case of independence, yes but with qualifications that come when one works with existing governance. In the case of neutrality, let's hear it for the ICRC, but not kid ourselves that we're all exemplifying what they exemplify.

As long as I'm being provocative, I thought I'd also use another reference point, the Western Christian missionary enterprise, and the ways in which that does, and doesn't, capture what we're about. In the 19<sup>th</sup> Century, Christian missionaries in the Colonial world certainly had their own purposes. Their own missions we could say. But in the end, they became uncomfortably intertwined with the agenda of the Colonial empires. In the case of 21<sup>st</sup> Century humanitarian relief and development NGO's, it's really urgent that we keep in mind that history, so that we avoid to the ... as completely as we can, the fate of advancing only the interests of Western powers. And there's no doubt that that's the perception of many Western NGO's and not only ones who were formerly religiously identified. And it seems to be really important that as we think about our own role, we recognize that good intentions alone don't take care of the matter. And missionaries certainly also had their own purposes, didn't see themselves only as extensions of Western powers, but nonetheless became

uncomfortably intertwined with those powers. So it means that we need to very clearly focus on social and economic development at the local level, and on building indigenous institutions so that they clearly benefit the places where we're working and are not simply extensions of Western interests.

So the challenge for all of us is to build constituencies that support aligning the interests of the developed world with the developing world on the joint agenda of enhancing capacity and fragile states, in the indigenous institutions within those states, and specifically in Southern NGO's. Insofar as we pursue that agenda, we will avoid the problems of becoming simply subordinated to Western states, or for that matter, global agencies like UN agencies.

Now, I agree completely with John's point that we need to develop ways that we are not simply beginning with emergency responses, but rather that we work very hard at becoming involved in developing countries in a crisis prevention mode rather than just emergency interventions. I think that's clearly central, or one of the central implications of the study that Peter Walker had just recited. But having said that, and meaning it, we also have to develop better search capacity for responding in emergencies. If Haiti demonstrates anything, it's that as much as we talked about having increased surge capacity, when push came to shove, well-coordinated, well-led large-scale emergency capacity is something we still need to develop. Then, with that enhanced capacity at the emergency level -- again, I grant the point, we don't want to only start with emergencies, but we do often start with emergencies, whether natural disasters, or conflicts. Then having the capacity to respond effectively at the earliest stage, from the very beginning of the crisis, have to develop local capacity. We have to work through national ministries, and this goes back to the independence question, and national ministries, especially as they have impacts at the local level, we need to implement community driven construction, a program that seems to me has flourished in many places in the world that the IRC has been proud to be involved in. And we do have to develop and partner with local NGO's. Our goal is the transition from an emergency response, or an engagement that isn't triggered by an emergency, in order to have long-term development that's sustained by indigenous institutions, including both government instrumentalities and over time, market-based arrangements that we need to seek to develop and flourish. That's a very modest agenda for us in the new humanitarian space, but it's what I think we need to do. Thank you.

**Hoge:** Thank you, George. I'm going to reverse the order. Mark Janz, the Director for the Humanitarian Planning of World Vision International, one of the sponsors of this meeting today. And we'll go to Mark first and then Francesco and his PowerPoint presentation afterwards.

**Mark Janz:** Thank you very much, Warren. Thank you for this opportunity. I think looking at the report which was underwritten by the Interagency working group, of which World Vision is a part, and IRC is a part, is our need as an industry is to be very intentional in the reality that the future is now. Demographics are exploding in southern Africa now. The world financial crisis has affected millions and millions of populations now. The world food crisis of several years ago continues to be manageable, but again, it will come again. And that's largely to say that the future is now. World Vision, in the past several months, had six of our staff murdered in Pakistan, in an office. The future is now. And that brings the challenges to the ground here.

As we look at ambiguity and change, which was the first looking at hazard-scapes in 2004, of what the future looked like around demographics, HIV,

security, et cetera. And what we did with Feinstein and King's College this time is brought the challenge around to say, okay, that's what the future looks like, possibly. We aren't predictors, as Peter says so well. But at the same time, so what? What does that mean to our abilities as humanitarian agencies interested in the human well being of the poor, and those struggling for life every day, or in emergencies. So what? What challenges that are laid before us in Humanitarian Horizons mean about how we will do our work, how we will do our planning, how we will assess and move our humanitarian endeavor forward in an effective manner. And those challenges are well laid out in this report.

And one thing that I always really enjoy and find quite exciting when I'm reading these reports is, and I had several of those experiences where I read the first report in 2004, "Ambiguity and Change." And in that there were projections, but the projections in essence became predictions, because they were talking about things that occurred a few years later. Like a large, mega emergency, like a tsunami, was predicted well, a year, a year and a half, two years, saying -- not that we know when, but in the near future we can think about this kind of an event. What does that tell us about our planet? What does that tell us about our ability to put in place those kinds of measures, those kinds of initiatives that really bring us to a point of feeling much more comfortable about what the future may entail.

One of these, the foundational research documents for this study on demographics, very clearly there's one paragraph in the chapter on demographics. And it states clearly, we are to look for a fragile context with a huge earthquake, massive destruction, massive number of deaths, difficulty in access of the location, and responding rapidly. That was Haiti. I read that two weeks after the Haiti emergency and we had completed that study, I think it was in November or December of last year. So what does that mean about our ability? We know what's going to happen most likely, but we don't know where, we don't know when. But that makes it even more essential that we really begin to put in place those kinds of measures, those kinds of infrastructures that allow us to be effective and respond in these kind of environments. What does that mean about urban emergencies? To be truthful, World Vision and our strategic intent in our humanitarian initiatives, we've had urban emergencies on our strategy for thoroughly the last five years. What have we done? I have to admit that we have not done much. How do we facilitate learning across institutions, across NGO's, around not so much about responding in urban emergencies, but how do we do it? Our practitioners on the ground. How do we put the right kind of leadership in place that allows us to investigate these areas where we don't have large amounts of skills, where we don't have a large amount of structures and infrastructures to allow us to mobilize effectively when the emergency makes itself evident.

So these are some of our challenges. Others are when you look at collaboration, we have the Principles of Partnership, a UN and NGO agreement to come together and really partner, and really work effectively together. Where are we really on that? There's a large-scale agreement that this kind of collaboration and clusters is on a sum total, positive. But there's critical challenges and issues to really make real participation, real partnership and collaboration occur. And how do we do that? How do we begin to be able to cross between our different groups, whether it's NGO's, whether it's the UN, whether it's the military, to work more effectively together in a seamless manner, so that we can share and trade, and in the end, respond and get to the real needs and understand the real population. The context is the frame. How do we understand that context? How do we integrate that context into our thinking, our planning, our analysis, and our

preparedness for being effective in emergency response. These are some of the challenges I think that the Humanitarian Horizons bring to us, now it's time for our action to respond and say, how do we respond to those challenges, not just as individual agencies, but as a humanitarian endeavor together. Anyway, thank you very much.

**Hoge:** Thank you very much, Mark. I now invite the speakers to take their seats in the front row, and Francisco Mancini will speak. And after this is over, obviously we'll be going to you for questions.

**Francesco Mancini:** Okay, thank you. Sorry, it takes a little time to warm up the technology. As Warren earlier mentioned in the beginning I will entertain you for five or six minutes on sort of a broader picture. When World Vision brought this report to our attention, it really struck me how many of the things they were saying in the humanitarian environment resonated very well with a lot of the work we are doing here on security and development, other essential pillars of the UN system. And so I want to put these things in context in a way that resonates well with the broader UN system, and also with other multilateral organizations.

IPI has been working for a while on something we call "Coping with Crisis, Conflict and Change," which is a way to try to stimulate some of that broad thinking that we were talking about before. How basically the global environment is changing, but how it is affecting multilateral response, and how we should adapt, to react, and react to this environment. And ultimately, for me, the key question here for the UN and other multilateral organizations, is how to deliver and how to adapt in these new contexts. As you can see, many of the challenges I'm going to mention to you are quite well known, some have been mentioned and some have actually been analyzed in this report. But my point is that they have to be seen on context, because they attract each other, they compound each other, and unfortunately, these complex interdependencies are solely testing in the capacity of the United Nations.

Let me start with a global trend. We said a lot about demographic shifts. I want to emphasize three main trends in demographic shifts. The first is the increase in the world population. Over the last 100 years, this has created unprecedented challenges to human kind. In 1900 there were on average 11 people living in every square kilometer. In 1950 there were almost twice as many people in the same space. In 2000, this number grew to 48 people. And projection in 2050 it will each 67 people.

Second, the distribution of population throughout the continents is changing dramatically. For example, in 1950, the population of Europe was nearly twice that of Africa's. And by 2050, Africa's population will be nearly three times that of Europe.

Urbanization is the third demographic shift. In 1900, only 16 cities had a population over 1 million. Today, 431 cities have a population over 1 million. Indeed, in 2008, for the first time in human history, more than half the people in the planet live in cities. And while we talk a lot about failed states, this trend may soon force us to talk about failed cities. Now, these demographic trends should be taking into consideration when we discuss solutions to climate change, environmental degradation, resource scarcity, and also conflict and development at large.

Now, let me transition to more localized challenges. And I want to start with something still related to demographics. This is the increasing youth population,

which is commonly known as youth bulge, which is a condition that occurs when a disproportionate segment of the population is aged between 15 and 29. Now, in these extreme cases on the map, over 50 percent of the adult population is in this age range.

Extreme poverty, of course, is another big challenge. We all know the numbers globally, more than 1.4 billion people continue to live in less than \$1.25 a day. Even more staggering is the number of people living with less than \$2.00 a day, which is 2.5 billion people. In the 25 poorest countries on the map, over 50 percent of the population live with less than \$1.00 a day. Now, of course, we all recognize that over the last 20 years, economic prosperity has lifted many out of poverty. However, progress has generally been uneven. In fact, we're losing ground when it comes to inequality within countries. These are the 20 countries with the highest level of income inequality within their population. Inequality has not only been growing in Africa, in Central America, in South America, as you can see from these most extreme cases. But unfortunately the gap between the haves and the have-nots is widening in Asia, Europe and in North America. And, as you know, inequality has also been indicated as a potential source of conflict, especially when it aligns with other factors such as ethnicity.

Another challenge of our time is the lack of education, especially among the extreme poor. One in every six adults, which is more than 776 million people in the world, is unable to read or write. These are the countries with more than 40 percent of the adult population that cannot read and write. If we also consider the gender imbalance in these 26 countries, you see that on average, 44 percent of the men are illiterate against a staggering 67 percent of women. Gender empowerment is one of the fundamental changes I think in the last decades, but as this figure shows, there is still a very long way to go.

The next challenge I want to mention is poor public health. Unfortunately there are too many countries in the world with insufficient access to health services. Experts tell us that one of the best ways to measure health access in a country is to see how many children have been vaccinated against diphtheria, tetanus and pertussis. So on the map you could see the countries with less than 70 percent of children age one have been vaccinated. And some of these countries have rates of vaccination as low as 30 percent. This indicates very poor access to health services.

Disease is intrinsically related to food. These are the countries with the greatest food insecurity. In these countries, millions of people consume less than their minimum requirements. They lack either the money to buy enough food for themselves, or to produce enough food. Now, around the world there are over 1 billion people who do not have enough food. And this is the highest number since we started to keep records in 1970. And the numbers are growing.

The lack of food has led to the alarming overuse of water in agriculture. This in turn means an increasing number of people are suffering from chronic water shortages. On the map you can see the countries facing the grievous water scarcity. This affects one out of every three people in the world. Many have also pointed to water scarcity as a possible source of conflict. But I have to point out that a lot of the research says that water is the source of collaboration, rather than conflict. But as we talk a lot about energy security, for example, should hydro-security receive the same attention? It seems to us a very urgent matter.

Now, many countries experiencing these challenges suffer from one additional aggravation, and this is corruption. Here you can see the 23 countries with the

greatest perception of corruption. The unfortunate fact is that states suffering from corruption are weakened in their ability to respond to all the other challenges. These indicators coming from Transparency International found also that the poor are hit the most by corruption.

So I'm sure you've noticed that most of these challenges occur in the same regions, the crisis overlaps, there's a strong pattern of interdependency here. Let me just illustrate this point by geographically overlapping these challenges; corruption, water crisis, food crisis, poor public health, lack of education, inequality, extreme poverty, and youth bulge. The deeper red the country, the more crises the country has to face. And, of course, you see the most of these red countries are on the top of the UN agenda. A lot of these countries are also facing terrible security challenges -- let me just add conflict. These are the most recent numbers available, which, despite the decrease in trends, will show more than 51 active conflicts in the world. And of course many of these conflicts are also regional.

Let me just add one additional security challenge, which is organized crime. These criminal organizations take advantage of our interconnected world. Take West Africa, for example, I think this is a case that's well known to you. Challenged by conflict, corruption, unemployment and youth bulge, West Africa has become a major hub for cocaine trafficking from Latin America into Europe. And studies shows that trafficking networks are in turn supplying arms in places like Afghanistan. So the complexity of these networks is clear. And very often our international institution are not really structured and organized in a way that could address in a comprehensive way this problem.

Finally, I'd like to highlight one additional global threat, which of course is well known to you, but also has profound security implications. And that is climate change. The red dots on this map show substantial temperature increases over the past 30 years, while the black wave shows areas of severe drought. As you can see, we're all suffering from climate change in different ways. But for the deep red countries on our map, climate change becomes an additional burden, or, what is called in some literature, a threat multiplier.

So, this is the world that we have created and the world we're living in. Clearly, a very complex place, where everything we do has complex implications. From demographic shifts to climate change, the picture is quite gloomy. I think that these kinds of environments require a lot of adaption, flexibility and innovation in our institutions. Things for which the UN is not particularly well known, I have to say. Because, we have to be frank, the shortcomings are still many: disjointed policies, resource constraints, short-term national interests are all in some way undermining effectiveness.

Let me just give you sort of three headlines, and I'm happy to say more during the Q&A. Something that I think is needed is more strategic coherence, which is not just coordination. Strategic coherence is also achieved, for example, with a stronger analytical capacity. These kinds of overlaps imply the need for more analytical capacity. This analytical capacity should be across departments, across topics, regions. It also requires more communication, both internally and externally. And also, strategic partnership. I think one of the global trends that we see is more and more hybrid operations, more and more engagements of regional and sub-regional organizations, so there will be levels of strategic partnerships to manage. Of course, this is also true with NGOs and the private sector. But an effective strategy is clearly not enough. Multilateral institutions also need leadership, strong leadership, and leadership on all levels. Leadership

is at the top, in order to give an authority voice to challenges and solutions, but leadership is also needed in the field, for the things I work on every day, peacekeeping for example. I mean, peacekeeping today is not just keeping the peace. It's protecting civilians, managing internal resources, disarming ex-combatants, re-integrating them into society -- these are all tasks that require strong leadership.

Management I think is also essential. Accountability, performance evaluation, training, career path, should all be a fact of life in multilateral institutions, and particularly in the UN, and I don't think we're there yet. So, coherence, leadership and management. I want to leave you again with these three words, and I'm happy to talk more specifically on what I mean for each of them and what kind of implication they have for our organization. Thank you very much.

**Hoge:** The floor is open for questions. We have another 25 minutes to go. Just raise your hand, and I will get someone with a microphone to find you. Very good, thank you.

**Ana Paredes:** I'm Ana Paredes from the Mission of Spain. I thank you very much for organizing this interesting meeting. I thank all the speakers for their information. I would like to ask a question to Mr. Walker. I would like to know, how do you see the role of the UN peacekeeping operation on issues of protection of civilians as well, if there is any positive input from the presence of peacekeeping operations for humanitarian workers. Thank you.

**Walker:** Thanks for that. In the regions where we've been doing research, where NGOs have become, if you like, targeted, so we're doing research in Afghanistan, and Sudan, and Somalia, and as John was saying, these are the countries that are at the extreme end of the curve of this sort of violence. What really strikes us is that the issue of aid security, the security of aid workers, is essentially something that could be tackled a different way. If that population feels secure, if you're able to tackle the issue of the security of the villages that you're in, if that environment for women to be able to move around is secure, the propensity for attacks on aid workers goes down. And I almost think that it's sort of tackling it the wrong way, to say, what can peacekeepers do to aid agency security? The first line should be what can peacekeepers do to aid the security of that population, which is bearing that burden of violence, of poverty, of injustice, if you like. And that, I think, is actually the way -- because otherwise, you get caught up in an agenda which is essentially a securitization agenda, where, and I think George mentioned this, it's an inexorable linking we saw in the past between at that time the colonial agenda and the work of missionaries. And I think you've got to be very careful about that. The real security agenda is the security of the populations in those countries.

**Holmes:** Just to elaborate a bit on that, I think your question was about protecting civilians, and this is a very controversial and controversial issue, what the role of peace keeping should be. I mean, one of the interesting things about the debate about Chad and DRC which we have been going through, is that the humanitarian community, which is extremely critical of both the peacekeeping operations in those places, in both those places, for not protecting civilians enough, faced with the prospect of them leaving, is saying please don't leave, because we need you to protect civilians. So there's a recognition that while they're not doing enough, they are actually quite important in that role.

Of course, going with that, is the fact that they have, certainly in the case of DRC, been given probably impossible mandates and certainly the mandates create

unrealistic expectations of what could actually be achieved, which is not that nothing is being achieved, but you can't achieve everything in these areas. Again, from the point of view of protecting humanitarian workers, the presence of peacekeeping missionaries are quite uncomfortable in so many ways for many humanitarian organizations, particularly the NGO's, but not only. On the other hand, again, when the question is arisen in Chad, or DRC, or what impact would withdrawal have, the answer has been, please don't withdraw at the moment, because our life will be much more difficult without you. In principle, and this is certainly something I strongly agree with, the best form of security for humanitarian organizations is acceptance by the population, and by all the actors on the ground, including all the non-state actors, or whatever you want to call them. But that's only the ideal world -- in the real world, peacekeeping operations can provide some measure of protection, however, many awkward compromises that leads to. And all that is a rather complicated issue.

**Hoge:** Joe?

**Joseph Chamie:** Thank you. Joseph Chamie. This is a very good report and I want to compliment the speakers, it was a very interesting set of presentations. To Peter I have to confess, I'm one of the charlatans. I'm a demographer. And I'm very pleased to see all the introduction of demographics. When I started my career, demographer was a strange occupation, if anyone knew what it was. Over my career at the UN over many years, I've come in many times into cities, and they ask "occupation," and I say I'm a demographer. And they say, what's that? So I'm very pleased with the presentation.

But I have two points this morning. The first point, especially to Mr. Holmes, I think that Robin Hood is getting much older and poorer. With the economies, in the state they're in today, and with Europe, the United States, Japan and others aging rapidly and with their economies dependent on providing care and social services to their populations, these countries are not going to be in the position they were ten, fifteen years ago, even today, to be providing this aid. So where will we draw upon the assistance for these large problems? And the second point has to do with this issue of addressing population growth, especially in sub-Saharan Africa and south Asia, I see in the past, especially after WWII, the Western countries had a massive program to bring down death rates in developing countries. Very successful, transferring Western medicines and technologies and methods to these countries. Why don't we have a massive program to address these high birth rates? And one clear way is to address the situation of women, bringing them to schools, getting them working, and addressing it so we don't get that Niger, 50 million in 2050. Thank you.

**Holmes:** Well, very quickly, I agree on your first point, that the situation is unsustainable, where the whole weight of humanitarian assistance, and maybe development assistance, more widely rests on a remarkably small number of countries, actually. Although, I mean, for example, in the Central Emergency Response fund, we have 180 donors out of the member states, which is brilliant. Actually 95 percent of the money comes from about ten countries. So, if culture attitudes in those countries change, or their relative prosperity changes, or whatever, we are going to be in real difficulty. There's no simple answer to that, I guess, I mean, our answer is, we need to widen the donor base, and obviously the richer emerging economies, whatever you want to call them, need to contribute more. They're already beginning to do so a little bit, Brazil, Mexico, Russia, China, but really only a tiny bit. That needs to expand a lot more. There are areas in the world like the Gulf, which we think ought to contribute much more to multilateral assistance. And that would also help.

I think the second part of it is, to the extent possible, countries should help themselves. And, of course, you can see that, not in Africa, or parts of Africa so much, but in Asia, Southeast Asia in particular, where there is now a major disaster, the countries of those countries, some of them anyway, sort of the Indonesias and Malaysias, and Thailands and the Philippines, have a lot more capacity to deal with it themselves, to deal with the problem themselves, and we need to sort of shift away from thinking we need to help them a lot. We need to encourage self-reliance, help build their capacity, and let them do it themselves. So I think, you know, a combination of those two things is what we're going to have to look to.

On the question of birth rates, I mean, yes, this is one of the mysteries to me, why, when 20 years ago, maybe 30 years ago, the population growth was something everybody talked about. Now nobody talks about it, as if the problem has been solved. And the problem has not been solved at all. On the contrary, we've just been talking about, population growth rates have gone down in some places, but it's just become unfashionable, unacceptable in some quarters, to talk about it. Because it's difficult, it's seen as a Western agenda, not really a developing country agenda. It runs up against culture attitudes, maybe in some Islamic countries. Certainly in a country like Niger, where I just came from, people are aware of the problem, but they just don't really talk about it. And the measures that have been taken to deal with it are minimal. So it's just a time bomb, basically. Not exactly an original point, but again, people don't talk about it anymore. I'm sure the Bush administration didn't help, frankly, in its attitude to it. But the combination of all those things is actually extremely alarming, I would say.

**Rupp:**

I'm not a demographer, but I ... nonetheless think we have to be very careful in talking about Robin Hood as getting older and poorer. I do understand the data that Western developed countries are, in fact, aging, and as a result, have lots of needs within their own societies. But we need to be very careful to focus attention on the fact that the older Western countries are not getting poorer relatively speaking, they're getting richer relatively speaking. And it is imperative that we push back on what will be very powerful domestic constituencies within all of the developed countries to argue that we need to meet the needs of our older citizens first, et cetera, and insist on the shared interests that developed countries have with developing countries, to avert what is otherwise going to be a catastrophe in the developing world. So I think when people tell us that because we have aging populations, so we need to focus more on our own, we really do need to push back hard on that. Because that's a prescription for complete disaster, globally.

**Walker:**

John, I have a couple of hits on this one. I'm a geographer, so it's halfway of being a demographer. Worse, yes. The real issue when you look at those graphs is the ... in Europe, and in a couple of other northern areas, what happened was, first of all, death rates came down slowly, over a period of 1700 years. They came down at the same time as the economy took off, and wealth was distributed more widely within countries. And then fertility rates came down in parallel. Right? What you're seeing in many countries now, as you said, where you've got a really quite scary population growth, the fertility rates are not coming down. And effectively it's partly to do with that speed of change. So 200 years of medical history condensed into 25 years. That's a very, very rapid change. Because fertility rate change is basically an issue of economy and culture. And culture does not change as quickly as science does. And so the real issue is what can you do to allow the economies of those countries where

you see this population growth to take off in a fashion that fertility rate, by logic, will come down. It has in every other country where people have been able to make choices – it's back to choices. If you're able to make the choices, people are able then to make smart choices. So I think that's the first thing.

I would agree with George on this issue of, you know, the rich, no ... the West getting poorer. That's not really the issue for me. I think the way we've got to start looking at it is, to be honest at the moment, humanitarian assistance, and whatever it is we're doing in these gray areas, whatever we call it, is still seen essentially as discretionary add on, to people's economies. It's not something you think you have to do, you do it because you've got a bit of money left out of your other budgets. But if you really look at what's going on there, and you are serious about wanting to move forward with the globalized economy that doesn't build into the huge strains of inequality, then almost of necessity, it becomes a central part of your global economic model that you have to deal with these crises in the borderlands, the fragile states, the populations that are at the bottom. It's no longer discretionary. It's actually an essential part of an economic tenant, whether it's a particular country, the field it's under, threat internally or externally. And I think that's the shift we got to start making. And this stuff is not ... it's just not a little add on anymore, it's actually central to the politics and economics of how this planet develops.

**Hoge:** Patrick in the front.

**Patrick Heyford:** Thank you very much. My name is Patrick Heyford from the United Nations, the office on Africa. I just want to thank the presenters. You lead out a very sobering scenario for us. I am taking the floor because for what each of you said brings in Africa. And it's clear that many of the challenges ahead have their most severe expression in Africa. My general question to you all is, so what are African institutions doing? What is the AU doing? What is ECOWAS [Economic Community of Western African States] doing, what is SADC [Southern African Development Community] doing, collectively and individually, to meet these huge humanitarian challenges which lie ahead, because I think we all agree that Africans and African institutions must be at the center of the search for solutions. Now, in that context, I want to draw attention to the meeting in Kampala, in the last year or so, where Africa was able to come up with a kind of blue print on dealing with internally displaced people. I don't know whether John would like to comment on that. I think it's a major step forward. How important is that? But my fundamental question is: what African institutions, what are African countries collectively doing to deal with some of the severe challenges that you've laid out? And one final comment on population. Dealing with the rapid population growth, I think the role of women, if more and more women have access to education, have greater choices in life, that I think would play a major role in Africa in helping to bring down the rapid rate of population growth. Thank you.

**Holmes:** Part of this was address to me, I will be very quick. African institutions. I think the African institutions, as far as I'm aware, recognize these issues, obviously. The African Union certainly does. And ECOWAS, and others. And they would like to do more about them. The real capacity to do so is extremely limited. I mean, just in the field that I know, which is the humanitarian field, yes, they want to have humanitarian programs, and so on, but the real capacity is extremely limited at the moment. And of course, yes, we are being asked for help, and we are providing it. But our ability to provide that capacity building to the extent needed is actually itself limited, because our end resources are limited. So, the willingness is there, but we're not there yet in terms of real contributions. The African blueprint for IDPs as you said, is an extremely good convention. It's the

best convention in the world. And I think there's a lot of enthusiasm about it. But of course it needs to be translated into reality, because that's where most of the IDPs are, or very large numbers of them. And it's got to be ratified and then implemented. But it's an extremely good start. And the role of women, yes, obviously, but that's again, it's a rather long-term effect. But it's going to happen.

**Hoge:** Please.

**Janz:** Just to give you one example of what African nations are doing, now I don't have a whole list, but I know World Vision Kenya is working with the Kenya government around disaster management. And working on developing a disaster policy and the kinds of preparedness and pre-positioning that needs to happen in order for the Kenya government to be more effective. And I think a large part of it, though, is how do we learn as NGOs to work more alongside government and help facilitate and enable. Because I think often in the past, NGOs have displaced government as providing these kinds of roles. How do we empower government? How do we help come alongside and provide expertise and also training, build capacity, and plan together? I think that's a big key.

**Walker:** Sometimes the best way to tackle a problem is sort of sideways, not straight at it. And we've been doing some work over the last ten years in East Africa with COMESA [Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa], which is essentially the East African economic union. Many of the crisis areas in sub-Saharan Africa are also areas that are populated by livestock owners, pastoralist tribes. And one of the things that we've found COMESA has been actually really good at is turning around the image of pastoralists through a really good study of the economics. Essentially, pastoralism is sort of the untapped economic potential boom of parts of Africa, certainly in the east. And the work that COMESA has been doing on showing how, by tweaking the way the national and international markets can work, you can actually turn around the economies of those areas, some of which are the most violent-ridden and the most sort of humanitarian crisis ridden areas in the world today. So it's not always about going head on. Sometimes it's otherwise. Certainly I would say, we've also worked with the African Union over the last 15 years in our center now, and it has changed demonstrably. To be honest, the political rhetoric and posturing has gone down. The technical competence and hunger to take the lead on stuff, and to tell technical advisors to shut up when they don't know what they're talking about. That's gone up. And it's a much more collegiate relationship than it would have been a decade ago.

**Hoge:** We have time for one last question. Gentleman in the back row.

**Toralf Stenvold:** Thank you to IPI, OCHA, and to World Vision for an excellent event. I'm Toralf Stenvold from the Mission of Norway. I'm Counsellor of Humanitarian Affairs in New York. I used to be a trade negotiator, and my background is political economy. So, in relation to this event, it's a rare occasion where the humanitarian system and the humanitarian actors actually look outside their own field of palliative addressing symptoms of root problems. I believe there is a tendency of always focusing on what the problem is and how to solve the problem without looking at the current regime of globalization also creating a lot of winners. Because after all, perhaps the most striking effect of the last 20 years of global integration is an enormous growth rate and an extreme concentration of wealth and power. And as it were, those in a position to address the root causes of the problems that you presented today happen to be the winners of the current regime. So I was wondering if anyone in the panel could comment upon what

member states, individually and collectively, could do to address that problem. Thank you.

**Janz:**

I guess one of the opportunities that it brings, and this is somewhere where we have a lot of work to do is bringing in the private sector more clearly into engaging with humanitarian work. And how do we begin, not just from a philanthropy basis, but a business-to-business basis of developing those kinds of opportunities at the bottom of the pyramid, that can make a difference, and can really add to the wealth in nations, so that they can be productive, as well as build markets for major corporations. We found this to be a difficult road, because NGOs come from a social scientist perspective. The private sector comes from a business perspective. How do we meet in the middle becomes a real challenge. And there are some institutions out there that are helping us learn to do this, but it's a path that we're trying to move more clearly on. And it's interesting enough, Randolph Kent at King's College is working on some research around this, around what are the perceptions of the humanitarian workers, and what are the perceptions of the business world, and trying to bring those two communities together in a more effective manner to work more effectively in a collaborative manner. But that's one area I think there's huge hope for this globalization.

**Hoge:**

Francesco.

**Mancini:**

I just want to say one word on this. In a longer version of that presentation, I also focus on the positive aspect. And so I don't want to give the impression that we're not considering how much has been improved. I mean, you know, child mortality dropping, and number of HIV/AIDS people since 1996 I think has been decreasing 26% or something. So overall. But then Peter presented some striking data which was the mobile technology. If you remember the bar graph at the beginning, which shows this massive increase in the last three, four years, and there's a lot of things we can do with mobile technology in Africa, by the way. But then if you look at the gap with the rest of the world, it's massive. I mean it's something—it's incredible. I never really put the two things together in that way. So I just wanted to add to the private sector, the technology aspect, because I think, especially in a multilateral organization we're still quite technology basic. We're not really going to match into new tools and new technologies. I think there's a lot of things that are happening there. I see a lot of NGOs and non-profits who are becoming sort of a marketplace to match demand and supply between technology producers and the man in the developing world. So I see novel ways of doing these things. And as much as the UN system can tap and support this initiative, I think will be very important.

**Rupp:**

I think that there's been a massive abdication on the part of the developed world of the potential for trade in particular to help with the developing world. In the Uruguay round, the last completed set of trade negotiations, there was kind of a deal that developing countries would reduce their tariffs, and in exchange, the developed world would allow products from developing countries into their countries. Developing countries kept their part of the deal, and the developed world just reneged. I mean, consider agricultural imports that could take place into Europe, if the farm lobbies didn't have a stranglehold. And cotton imports into the US. I mean there are lots of examples that we could give in areas where Africans really could—Africans in particular -- could work their way out by their own efforts from the huge disadvantages that they have. So I think the collapse of the Dohar round and the inability to get a decent trade regiment globally, and one that quite consciously redresses the punitive treatment of imports that would come from the developing countries. There's really a very high priority. And it will be extremely demanding in terms of domestic politics in each of these countries

that have major barriers against imports from the developing world. But I think it could be a major ingredient in having more good news in the next 20 years than we otherwise will have.

**Hoge:** Peter, you shall have the last world.

**Walker:** All right. Let me think about that, then. Actually it's quite optimistic. Our research institute is situated within a school of nutrition, all right, so most of our graduates and PhD students end up working for Pepsi, Coca-Cola, Monsanto, Wal-Mart – you know, major, international global companies. So we spend a lot of time talking with them. And what fascinates me is that when we talk long-term, everybody we talk to in those corporations says, we know that the present model which generates these inequalities is not sustainable. It is not good for business. Eventually it will come back and bite us. And anyway, I can't sell in a market that's bankrupt and corrupt and full of violence. So it has to change. So the good news is that most people in the world aren't stupid, and most people in the world are actually well-meaning, even if they're running Monsanto, or Coke, or Wal-Mart, right? They're not aliens. They want the same things as you do. The bad news is that they, like any politician, or anybody who runs a large organization, has to do that balance between short-term necessity, long-term aspirations, and keeping their constituency on board. And that's where the trick is. At the moment, the short-term and constituency agenda wins out. Now I think a lot of the role of NGOs today is about how do you help change that balance and create the space for people who actually want to build that world which is more sustainable, be that person, that chief executive at Monsanto, or the guy who runs UNICEF, it doesn't matter. It's that balance. How can you move it so that the ability to address those inequalities, and as you said, open up that trade so it's more equitable, actually allows economies to flourish around the world, not just in one area.

**Hoge:** Thank you very much. Thank you for coming, and thank this excellent panel, all of you.