There has been a significant increase in the number of unconstitutional changes of government (UCGs) since 2020. This presents a challenge for the United Nations, which has a presence in all countries that have recently experienced UCGs. In places like Afghanistan, Mali, and Sudan, it has also presented particular challenges to UN peace operations, which face the task of continuing to carry out their work amid a political crisis and using their good offices to facilitate a peaceful return to constitutional order.

The report examines lessons from the experiences of the UN missions in Afghanistan (UNAMA), Mali (MINUSMA), and Sudan (UNITAMS) following recent UCGs. It provides a brief overview of recent trends in UCGs and how the responses of member states and international and regional organizations have impacted the responses of UN peace operations. It then analyzes how these UN peace operations approached political engagement with the de facto authorities. It concludes with several lessons:

• A principled approach at the highest levels of the UN: While some UCGs may bring to power leaders with greater political will to engage with the UN, they are almost always an indicator of growing political instability. The UN secretary-general, along with the African Union (AU) and other regional organizations, should thus continue adopting a principled approach to condemning UCGs.
• A pragmatic approach for UN peace operations: While the UN should take a principled approach to UCGs at the headquarters level, UN peace operations are well-positioned to take a more pragmatic approach to engaging with de facto authorities. They should take advantage of any openness displayed by the authorities to engage despite fears that doing so might legitimize them.
• Planning for UCGs and reviewing political strategies: Even if the UN is unable to prevent UCGs, it can better prepare for managing relationships with transitional authorities. It is therefore important to consider such scenarios in mission planning for potential and current operations and to conduct strategic assessments as soon as possible following UCGs to consider how to adapt and potentially identify a new direction for engagement.
• The challenge of remaining impartial: Fears of “legitimizing” de facto authorities stem from the assumption that those authorities are inherently illegitimate. Yet not all elected authorities have popular legitimacy, and not all authorities who come to power unconstitutionally lack it. UN missions thus need to factor public opinion into how they respond on the ground.
• The need for a “One UN” response: While there is unlikely to be a “one-size-fits-all” approach to engagement with de facto authorities across the entire UN presence in a country, coordination is needed to ensure UN personnel have a common understanding of core principles of engagement and a coherent approach to communication.
• The limits of UN engagement: Ultimately, the ability of UN missions to shape political transitions following UCGs tends to be constrained by factors outside their control. Regional organizations like the AU and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) tend to adopt a more principled response, raising questions about the extent to which UN missions should seek to link their engagement to that of these organizations. Missions also face competing pressures from member states supporting different political factions.