


Contributor Profile: Germany

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Active Armed Forces ¹	Helicopters	Defense Budget	Uniformed UN peacekeepers	UN contribution breakdown	Other Significant Deployments
251,465 World ranking (size): 21 Army 105,291 Navy 19,179 Air Force 44,565 Joint Support Service 57,495 Joint Medical Service 24,935	Total: 442 Transport: 293 Heavy: 80 Army Medium: 24 (16 Army, 8 Air Force) Light: 189 (145 Army, 44 Air Force) Multirole/ISR (Army): 93 ASW (Navy): 22 SAR (Navy): 21 Attack (Army): 13	2010: €32.0bn / US\$42.3bn (1.29% of GDP) 2011: €31.5bn / US\$44.2bn (1.23% of GDP) 2012: €30.9bn	193 (31 August 2012) Ranking: 52 nd (7 th largest contributor from EU states, 6 th from NATO)	UNAMA: 1 millex UNAMID: 14 (10 troops, 4 police) UNIFIL: 150 troops (8 female) UNMIK: 1 police UNMIL: 5 police UNMISS: 22 (7 police, 8 millex, 7 troops)	NATO (ISAF): 5,150 NATO (KFOR): 1,451
Defense Spending / troop: ² €128,880 / US\$162,827 (compared to global average of approx. US\$59,000)					

Part 1: Recent Trends


German experience with UN peace operations began after reunification in 1989 with the deployment of non-combat troops in Cambodia (UNTAC) and Namibia (UNTAG), as well as a larger contingent (c.700) in Somalia (UNOSOM II). Since 1994, Germany has participated actively in combat missions as well, but its contributions have been heavily concentrated outside the purview of the UN, in missions deployed by NATO and the EU. Contributions to UN-led peacekeeping operations have consisted of a steady but small number of military observers, covering for example the entire mandate periods for UNOMIG, UNAMID (to date), UNMIS and UNMEE. Other contributions have included UNMIL, UNAMSIL and UNSCOM/UNIKOM (transport) and INTERFET (medical). A notable exception to this pattern is Berlin's contribution to the maritime component of UNIFIL II; from a peak of 993 at the mission's inception, this has been drawn down to 232 in 2012.



Since 2001, Germany has consistently deployed between 6,000-8,000 troops in NATO and EU missions in the Balkans and Afghanistan. While its KFOR contingent has gradually been drawn down from 5,300 in 2001 to 1,450 in 2012, its contribution to ISAF has been significantly

ramped up from about 3,000 in 2010 to 5,150 in 2012. Germany's contribution to EUFOR Althea (formerly SFOR) in Bosnia has been reduced from over 2,300 in 2001 to 900 in 2007 and a token contribution in 2012. Over 700 troops were deployed with UN-mandated EUFOR RD Congo to oversee elections in 2006. The German Navy has also participated in maritime components of Operations Enduring Freedom and Operation *Atalanta*, as well as smaller EU training missions on the African continent.

Germany joined the UN Standby Arrangement System (UNSAS) in July 1998 and signed an additional agreement in November 2000 focusing its contributions on the areas of land and air transport, medical capacity, engineering, communications, maritime components, military observers, military police and staff personnel. Germany provides 8.02% of the [UN peacekeeping budget](#) for the period 2011-12 (4th overall).



The German Armed Forces (*Bundeswehr*) are undergoing a process of significant reduction and restructuring, initiated in 2010 and implemented beginning in 2012. Motivated by austerity and the desire to address capability gaps and operations problems, the reform has included significant budget cuts, base closures, personnel reduction, the move to an all-volunteer force, and a restructuring emphasizing flexibility and broad-spectrum capabilities. One of the reform's targets is guaranteeing the permanent availability of 10,000 combat-ready troops for overseas deployment.³ This reflects the priority status of conflict resolution operations in the German Armed Forces' mission, albeit overwhelmingly within the framework of its regional alliance commitments.

Part 2: Decision-Making Process

For historical reasons, the deployment of German armed forces abroad is a highly controversial issue. The two main Constitutional restrictions are: 1) deployment is strictly limited to participation in collective security arrangements; and 2) close parliamentary oversight is required. Two Constitutional paragraphs govern the deployment of armed forces abroad: Article 24 permits the transfer of sovereign powers to international organizations, particularly collective security arrangements; Article 87a limits the Armed Forces' mission exclusively to defense. During the Cold War, this was taken to mean that *Bundeswehr* troops could not leave German, and later NATO, territory. Accordingly, German troops did not participate in UN peacekeeping until reunification, despite a lengthy list of instances of unilateral international humanitarian assistance. After 1990, participation by non-combat troops in UN missions was permitted.

NATO's operations in the Balkans generated major controversy over German participation from

1992. Following increased *de facto* participation based on deployments authorized by the executive, the tension was resolved by a decision by the Federal Constitutional Court in July 1994 that permitted foreign deployments, including of combat troops, under the two aforementioned Constitutional conditions. The decision both expanded the possibilities for participation—it does not distinguish between mission types as defined by the UN—and places them under stricter decision-making provisions.

Strong parliamentary oversight was formalized by a March 2005 law that states any deployment of troops abroad with the expectation of combat requires the advance consent of the *Bundestag* (lower house of Parliament). Requests for consent must include detailed information on the projected size, capabilities, deployment period, and cost of the contingent. Small contingents, non-combat humanitarian missions and mission renewals are subject to an expedited process, and Parliament possesses the right to recall any contingent currently on deployment.

Government documents outlining foreign and defense policy have since the mid-1990s underscored the country's commitment to participation in military missions abroad, in the name of national defense, alliance commitments, and a broader responsibility to contribute to global conflict resolution. Maintaining this capacity is a central element of [policy planning](#).

Part 3: Rationales for Contributing

Given the consistently small baseline of German contributions to UN peacekeeping, none of the following rationales have generated many blue helmets over the past decade. Because of Germany's history, its foreign policy is normatively motivated to exercise increased international responsibility, particularly with regard to international peace and security, and to do so in a multilateral fashion. Germany's security concerns prioritize Europe and overlap with those of its regional partners in NATO and the EU, including anti-terrorism. Security and political rationales have thus prevailed in recent years in terms of military deployments *as a whole*. This explains the clear predominance of NATO- and EU-led combat missions over contributions to UN peacekeeping, which derive predominantly from normative motivations.

Political Rationales: While they are present, political rationales do not explain German participation in UN peacekeeping to the same extent as they do non-UN missions. UN peacekeeping is seen as a way to contribute to international peace and security in the absence of major ulterior motivations that might be present in non-UN missions. As UNIFIL II demonstrates, Germany is more likely to contribute in significant numbers where it is likely to be joined by its European allies and where there is overlap with alliance interests. The UNIFIL II contribution may also have been additionally motivated by its historical commitment to protect Israel. Prestige and influence are not major factors. Nor is pressure from the UN Secretariat given Germany's large financial contribution to UN peacekeeping.

Economic Rationales: As the cost of deploying German contingents outweighs UN reimbursements, there are few economic incentives for deployment with the UN, even at a lower relative cost than NATO and EU missions. Individual troops receive overseas pay based on degree of hazard, ranging from 30 to 100 Euros a day.⁴

Security Rationales: Since 2001 security rationales have provided the predominant overall rationale for German military activity overseas. However, as there are a very limited number of UN peacekeeping operations in areas of primary security concern for Germany (i.e. Europe), these are not a strong motivating factor for contributing specifically to UN operations. The country's participation in UNOMIG is one example of this preoccupation.

Institutional Rationales: Deployments abroad continue to constitute one of the major objectives of the *Bundeswehr*, and the continued ability to contribute at a significant level (10,000 troops) is a foundational principle of the Forces' long-term strategic planning and purchasing. Following the Cold War, as territorial defense has become a less pressing concern, these missions have justified staving off even larger reductions in forces and capability. As a source of combat experience NATO and EU missions provide more of an institutional rationale than UN operations. Additionally, the traumatic effects of combat in Afghanistan on returning soldiers has become a recurring element of (a historically-charged) public discourse and has begun to strain the *Bundeswehr's* capacity to provide adequate services to returning personnel. This may dampen Germany's appetite for robust peace operations.

Normative Rationales: German foreign policy is very strongly motivated by normative factors. For historical reasons there are very strong pacifist and anti-militarist currents in public opinion, and the country has adopted a strong aversion to unilateral action. Foreign and security policy is frequently couched in the rhetoric of responsibility, especially as concerns multilateral conflict resolution. Peace operations are viewed as an attractive way to demonstrate good global citizenship and Germany's commitment to international peace and security. There is, however, a strong preference to participate in less robust settings. These rationales are only outweighed by security motivations, where a preference for non-UN missions prevails.

Military deployments abroad have become a standard mission for the *Bundeswehr*, although the large segment of the population that opposes these operations has attacked precisely this point, arguing on normative grounds against the routine use of military force by the German state. Leadership of two Provincial Reconstruction teams within ISAF has led to the incipient development of what might be considered a "[German approach](#)" to peacebuilding and the mention in [planning documents](#) of maintaining the capacity to serve as a framework nation in multilateral operations.

Part 4: Barriers to Contributing

Alternative political or strategic priorities: This is the main reason for Germany's limited contribution to UN-led peace operations. While [German defense policy](#) recognizes the threats posed by WMD, terrorism and globalization-driven conflicts, its focus is Europe. Coupled with its emphasis on multilateralism, this generates a certain overlap with NATO interests, centered on the Balkans and Afghanistan, and clearly situates regional collective security arrangements as the preferred means of contributing to international peace and security.

Alternative institutional preferences for crisis management: Currently NATO and EU deployments are Germany's preferred means of contributing to international crisis management. The German constitution does not permit, and public opinion does not support, unilateral military engagements. Due to its multilateral orientation Germany does perceive some degree of overlap of its own interests with those of institutions of global governance as a whole, though these are serviced through significant financial contributions, including to both the UN operating and assessed peacekeeping budget.

Financial costs: Given Germany's aforementioned substantial contributions to the UN's finances, the losses incurred due to the gap between operating costs and UN reimbursements may function as a small barrier, but this does not play a major role.

Discomfort with the expanding UN peacekeeping agenda: Not relevant. Germany has generally been strongly supportive of efforts surrounding the protection of civilians, R2P, and democracy promotion and has been supportive of the expansion of UN mandates. The country's abstention

on S/RES/1973 and non-participation in UN-authorized NATO-led operations in Libya, however, points to increasing qualms as levels of use of force rise.

Exceptionalism: Not relevant. Germany has in the past been more concerned with avoiding accusations of negative exceptionalism in the form of “checkbook diplomacy,” and has sought to demonstrate its full commitment, including in combat roles, to major Western-led missions in the Balkans and Afghanistan.

Absence of pressure to contribute: Pressure to contribute with troops is effectively lessened by significant financial contributions to UN peacekeeping operations.

Difficult domestic politics: After ten years of little perceived progress, casualties and image-damaging scandals (see below), public opinion in Germany has turned against the country’s participation in ISAF.⁵ While arguments that appeal to security concerns and global responsibility are effective in garnering public support for operations, there is a clear preference for keeping combat roles to a minimum. There is strong aversion to casualties and increasing awareness of the psychological effects of combat on returning service personnel.

Damage to national reputation: There is general confidence in the *Bundeswehr*’s image. Soldiers receive extensive historical sensitivity training. Sensitivity to scandals (the desecration of human remains in 2006) and operational errors (a controversial air strike in 2009) in Afghanistan has been high.

Resistance in the military: The ongoing *Bundeswehr* reform process is in part designed to address some of the strain and capability gaps created by extensive deployments abroad. Beyond this, there is broad support for both UN and NATO missions.

Lack of fit with legislative, procurement and operational timelines: The *Bundeswehr* reform seeks to address procurement and operational problems. The decision-making process is rapid.

Legal obstacles: Removed by the July 1994 Court decision and the 2005 law on parliamentary oversight.

Part 5: Current Challenges and Issues

There is broad support among political parties for ongoing participation in military missions abroad at current levels. The small far-left *Linke* party is the only parliamentary faction to categorically oppose contribution to peace operations; all others have come out in favor. Very broadly speaking, the right-wing parties are more likely to justify deployments in terms of alliance commitments and security rationales; left-wing parties, while also likely to draw on security rationales, more often make use of political and normative rationales as well.

On the surface, the planning situation appears to be favorable to the availability of troops for UN peacekeeping operations. Policy documents commit the government to maintaining roughly current levels of troops ready for deployment, yet major drawdowns of NATO operations in Afghanistan, Kosovo and Bosnia have begun and are set to be completed by 2014. However, public opinion has grown weary of robust military engagements, which may complicate future appeals. Similarly, fatigue with long-term state- and nation-building missions, as well as their financial cost, may lead to rethinking preferences toward lighter, less ambitious and less frequent operations.⁶ Germany is likely to coordinate any future policy closely with its NATO partners, and austerity measures may lead to downward revisions in capabilities and ambitions.

Part 6: Key Champions and Opponents

There is broad support in both parliament and public opinion for Germany's role in peace operations, though it decreases sharply as the robustness of a mission increases. Public debate is irregular and coalesces around parliamentary approval of specific missions. Germany's historical experience has been mobilized as an argument both for and against its contributing to humanitarian interventions;⁷ opposing forces, mainly on the left of the political spectrum, are a more vocal presence. Nevertheless, the Green party was the first to effectively mobilize German history in favor of intervention, in the person of Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer with respect to Kosovo in 1999. However, left-wing support for peacekeeping will continue to center on humanitarian motives and less robust engagements.

The [Berlin Centre for International Peace Operations](#) (ZIF-Berlin) works closely with the German government to train civilian personnel for deployment with various international organizations.

Part 7: Capabilities and Caveats

The *Bundeswehr* is a highly-trained and thoroughly modern armed force. Current planning emphasis is on broad-spectrum capabilities, with a view to their deployment in peace operations of various types. Past German contributions—including those highlighted in the UNSAS agreement—focus on specialist units such as medics, engineers, transport capability (aircraft and heavy-lift helicopters) and military police. Within NATO operations Germany has gained a leadership role in police training and other rule-of-law functions, which would play an important role in increasing Germany's presence in UN operations.

The use of force by German soldiers continues to generate controversy and public support is likely to remain inversely proportional to the level of force used. Similarly, UN missions are likely to be seen as fulfilling normative rather than security rationales, and therefore to constitute a secondary goal. Nevertheless, robust peacebuilding missions might benefit from harnessing experience gained from Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan.

Part 8: Further Reading

Chiari, Bernhard and Magnus Pahl [Militärisches Forschungsamt], *Wegweiser zur Geschichte: Auslandseinsätze der Bundeswehr* (Paderborn: F. Schöningh, 2010).

[White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr 2006](#) (German Ministry of Defense).

[Defence Policy Guidelines 2011](#) (German Ministry of Defense).

Johnston, Karin L., [Germany, Afghanistan, and the Process of Decision Making in German Foreign Policy: Constructing a Framework for Analysis](#) (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Maryland, 2011).

Notes

¹ IISS, *The Military Balance 2012* (London: IISS/Routledge, 2012). UN deployment data are from the [DPKO website](#).

² Armed Forces Spending is a country's annual total defense budget (in US dollars) divided by the total number of active armed forces. Using figures from IISS, *The Military Balance 2012*.

³ See [Defence Policy Guidelines 2011](#), p.11.

⁴ [Verordnung über Zahlung eines Auslandsverwendungszuschusses](#) (German Ministry of Justice).

⁵ "[Mehrheit will schnelleren Abzug der Bundeswehr](#)," RP-Online, 16 May 2012.

⁶ Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der Bundeswehr, "[Sowi Summit 2012 in Berlin](#)," 3 July 2012.

⁷ Maja Zehfuss, *Wounds of Memory: The Politics of War in Germany* (Cambridge University Press, 2007).