Dr. Edward C. Luck: Regarding the question of new hope in the title, one doesn’t always think about hope and Somalia in the same sentence, but then again, that seems to be quite characteristic of the UN: hope in any number of cases seems to be quite intransigent. I am quite encouraged that we have a fair cross section of expertise on Somalia in our two speakers. I don’t know how many people have great expertise on the subject, but I know these two certainly do. And we had a very useful prelude this morning, a small breakfast meeting for the members of the Security Council to talk about the subject and to inform experts from the council.

I’ll introduce our two speakers very briefly. Ken Menkhaus will be our first speaker, and then Jabril Ibrahim Abdulle. Ken is a professor of political science at Davidson College. He taught earlier at American University in Cairo. He was with the UN in the Horn on Somalia on two different stints. Among his many, many works are Somalia: State Collapse and the Threat of Terrorism, and an article on International Security in 2007 on “Governance Without Government in Somalia,” I think a very catchy and apt title.
Jabril has, I think, an even more challenging position than being a college professor, if I might say that. He is the Director of the Center for Research Dialogue in Somalia, the CRD, which must be a fairly challenging position to be in. His center, which is based in Mogadishu, is an independent not-for-profit corporation. I keep thinking, having worked for a lot of nonprofits, what does it mean to be a not-for-profit corporation in Somalia, but he can explain that for us. And it’s devoted to promoting the social, economic, and political rebuilding of Somalia. In that role, he’s a leading civil society activist.

I discovered this morning, not surprisingly, that they have done this dog and pony show together and worked together as a rather seamless dynamic duo. I did have to mediate before, because they couldn’t decide who was going to start first. I guess they have scenario A and scenario B. I don’t know if this is scenario A or scenario B, but Ken either won or lost the coin toss, and he’s going to receive. He’s going to start first, and we’re very much looking forward to this. I’ve asked them to speak maybe ten or twelve minutes each to open it up, and then we have plenty of time for back and forth. And before I forget, let me give an advertisement that tomorrow, same time, same place we have a sort of dual book launch for Mahmoud Mamdani and Francis Deng talking about the future of the African state. I guess in many ways, Somalia is the epitome of the question about the future of the African state, so I think it’s a fairly logical sequence. So with that, Ken, if you can begin, and then Jabril. Thank you.

Dr. Ken Menkhaus: Thank you very much. Whenever I’m involved in drawing a large crowd, I usually presume it’s free food, but maybe it’s the topic itself. And just for the record, it’s not a dog and pony show. I think it’s camel and goat? Is that how we do it? We have some good news today. I think there are opportunities in Somalia, and that’s what we’re here to talk about. In order for you to fully appreciate the fact that there’s good news, I’d like to start with a reduced Shakespeare company, five minute summary of all the bad news that precedes this so you can fully appreciate where we are today.

Somalia has been a country in a state of complete collapse for nineteen years, and for sixteen years, that was more or less uninterrupted with the exception of the UN intervention in 93-94. In 2006, for a six-month period, an umbrella group of Islamists known as the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) were able to consolidate power over the entire capital of Mogadishu and then most of southern Somalia, and for six months, they governed, and they governed quite effectively. They were popular among Somalis as a result. But this broad alliance of Islamists, which included moderates, including the current president of the current federal transitional government, Sheik Sharif, and hard-liners had a power struggle. The hard-
liners marginalized the moderates, and baited Ethiopia next door into a war. Ethiopia intervened in late December of 2006, ousted the Islamic Courts Union, and established what had been a paper government (the federal transitional government) in power and occupied the capital.

2007 and 2008 were disasters as a result. There was a predictable insurgency that arose against prolonged Ethiopian occupation. That insurgency, a complex insurgency, came to be led by one group, known as the Shabab. This had been a militia under the hard-liners in the ICU. The Shabab took on a direct political role, as well as military role as the head of this insurgency and succeeded in conflating their radical Islamist ideology with a nationalist anti-Ethiopian, anti-foreign occupation ideology that played well among many Somalis who didn’t like their Islamist ideology at all, but who saw them as a legitimate expression of national resistance to foreign occupation.

The Transitional Federal Government at the time was widely perceived as a puppet of Ethiopia—that’s not entirely fair, but that’s how it was seen. It was deeply unpopular in Mogadishu, principally because its security forces were uncontrolled and preyed as paramilitaries on the local population. The result in 2007 and 2008 was a disaster in and around Mogadishu. There was massive fighting, the displacement of 700,000 of the 1.3 million residents of Mogadishu, leaving much of the capital a ghost town, and a total of 1.3 million Somalis displaced in central and southern Somalia. Somalia was rendered the world’s worst humanitarian crisis according to the UN. (Currently 3.2 million Somalis are in need of emergency food assistance.) There was a rise of radicalization in the country manifesting itself in multiple ways, including anti-westernism, anti-Americanism, and anti-UN sentiments that were very strong. That was where we stood not that long ago. In late 2008, things were not looking particularly good there.

Since then, we’ve had several very positive developments, and Jabril will talk about some of the details of these developments in a few minutes. The first is the Ethiopian withdrawal from Somalia in late 2008 to January 2009. It’s now complete. That’s now diffused a lot of the insurgency. That was their main objective. With the Ethiopian withdrawal, we’re seeing a reduction in the level of support for insurgents in Somalia. The second major development was a peace process. We call it the Djibouti process. It is very much a process, a set of talks that produced a power-sharing arrangement between moderates of the Islamist opposition and moderates in the Transitional Federal Government. That culminated in a unity government, a very awkward one with 550 members of parliament. That’s a lot of parliamentarians, but that’s how they did it. A new president, replacing a hard line president who was very unpopular in much of Somalia, that is Sheik Sharif, the moderate leader of the old Islamic Courts
Union. So he has come full circle back into power. And there is a new cabinet.

These two things are really important: a new government that is not a full unity government, but a broad based government, and one that is reaching out to negotiate with groups that are still outside the agreement at this time. And again, the Ethiopian withdrawal leaves us with a new political dispensation, a new hope that we can see progress, both with the Transitional Federal Government, and with an end to the fighting.

That is not yet the case. The Shabab and other hard-line Islamist groups, currently control, in varying degrees, most of the territory from the Kenyan border to the outskirts of Mogadishu, up toward the Ethiopian border, so they control much of the countryside in southern Somalia. The new TFG does not. By contrast, it controls very little territory and is very much nascent but promising. Before we get to the details of this current political dispensation from Jabril, I wanted to flag a couple of broad policy issues that I know a group that is either working directly with UN or indirectly with the UN is probably going to want us to discuss, and this is really just to flag these issues, and we can follow them up later with Q&A.

These are the policy issues that I think are going to command our attention in Somalia in the next year or so. The first is humanitarian. Make no mistake. While there has been some political progress, the humanitarian crisis in Somalia is still enormous and severe. It is the perfect storm. We’ve got 3.2 million people, that’s half of the population in southern and central Somalia, in need of emergency food at a time when food prices have gone up, when insecurity has blocked commercial flows, and when food aid is largely unable to get to populations in need because of very high levels of security. Somalia is the most dangerous place in the world for humanitarian actors; a third of all humanitarian casualties in 2008 occurred in Somalia. At the same time, purchasing power is declining because of hyperinflation, which has hurt the poor disproportionately. And because of a decline in remittances, evidence is starting to trickle in that there are 10-20 percent declines in remittances from the large Somali diaspora back home because of the global economic crisis. So we are going to be seized with this, and the key issue is going to be humanitarian access and monitoring of food that is getting in. Both of those are sore subjects right now.

There are other issues as well, both in terms of humanitarian aid agencies either working through a weak Transitional Federal Government or around it. Who do you work with at the local level? Do you work with the Shabab when it is in control of areas? The answer, for some aid agencies, has been yes, we work with whoever we find. Those are all big humanitarian questions that are not going to go away.
The second has to do with the insurgency itself. It is fragmented. It is weaker today because it no longer has things to fight against. Now it has to explain to the Somali people what it stands for, and what it stands for is not particularly attractive to most Somalis, so it has encountered resistance, communal clan resistance. In Somalia, when the Ethiopians withdrew, that did not create the strategic vacuum that we feared would be filled by the jihadists. Instead they have not made inroads. Many of us think that late 2008 may have been the high water mark for Shabab and affiliated hard line Islamist groups in the country. Recently, Osama bin Laden issued an eleven-minute video exclusively devoted to Somalia. In that, he called on the Somali people to overthrow the government of Sheik Sharif, because he was colluding with the West and with Ethiopia and was compromising, doing all these terrible things. I think this was very much a reflection of the weakness of the movement in Somalia, and a real misstep on the part of al-Qaeda.

The international community, including the UN, and most of its member states now are standing on the right side of history in Somalia, promoting state building and reconciliation, compromise, co-existence in the region, all the things that are music to the ears of the vast majority of Somalis who are weary of the war, weary of state collapse, and not inclined to hear foreigners tell them that they need to kill fellow Somalis in pursuit of a global agenda about which, they have little interest.

Finally, a point about statebuilding. Another major pillar of international policy in the coming year will be devoted toward the question of how do we assist this fledgling and promising Transitional Federal Government in expanding both the size of its constituency, and make it a broader unity government, and make it more effective. And here there are many things we could discuss. Let me just flag a couple.

First, it’s important to calibrate assistance so that we are not making mistakes that we’ve made in the past. We have to be very careful about how much money we throw at a government’s security sector, for instance, in the absence of an ability to be accountable for how those security forces behave. That was a major problem with the old TFG. There are ways that we can help this government. It does need assistance, but we also need to make sure that it’s not wholly dependent on foreigners, or there is a real legitimacy crisis that the Transitional Federal Government will face, vis-à-vis its own people.

Finally, we need to remind ourselves, and the government, that it is a transitional government, and that the focus, much of the focus of our assistance, needs to be on promoting a political transition. There are lots of reasons why this is a good idea. First and foremost, the political transition
isn’t about who rules, which is a zero-sum game, but it’s about what are the rules of the game that will determine who rules. And that attracts pretty much all Somalis to the political table. It is a question about which everyone has a strong interest in Somalia, and needs to be. It’s also a place where we have expertise that we can bring to bear that the Somalis really need. I’m going to stop there, even though there are many, many things that we can talk about. I hope they come up in Q&A. I turn over to Jabril.

Dr. Luck: That’s terrific. You said it couldn’t be done in ten or twelve minutes, and you did it in a little under, so congratulations. I hope it’s the only time you’re wrong today. Jabril, please.

Mr. Jabril Ibrahim Abdulle: Thank you, thank you. I would like to express my deep appreciation for the commitment and renewed interest in what’s happening in Somalia, and this crowd really shows that there is a sense of renewed interest in what’s happening in Somalia. I’m encouraged by it, and thank you very much for it.

I would like to just pick up where Professor Menkhaus left, and that is the issue of opportunity. I think Somalia has never had a lack of opportunity. What transpired was not taking advantage of the opportunity itself, and this is another round of opportunity. Eighteen years later, each time when you go back, presented its own unique opportunity. But somehow, we Somalis, as well as international community, missed those opportunities. But this time, it seems, we really have a serious, very good opening for real change to take place in Somalia. And I would like to take the reasons as to why this is in line with what Professor Menkhaus just talked about, of why now, perhaps, you have better opportunity than before.

One is that, I think for the first time, there is, a revolution taking place in Somalia, and that revolution is in a sense a silent revolution. The people of Somalia, eighteen years later, are really tired, weary of fighting. Period. I think now it doesn’t matter who comes to power, whether Sheik Sharif, or someone else. Whoever comes now and promises security will get 100 percent support, and that is what you have. So people, when they generally reach this stage, at the end of the rope, they can no longer take it. A new generational group is born out of it. So that is one.

There is a political opening also, political space. For the last five years, political space was closing. The Djibouti process has generated a new goodwill. There were challenges and risks taken by the ARS, Alliance for Reliberation of Somalia, which broke up from the smaller group and pursued a peace process under the leadership of SRSG Ould-Abdullah. That also shows a serious political opening. Also, the Ethiopian withdrawal has really also generated goodwill that, for the first time, the leverage to fight has been taken away from the opposition group. There is
nothing to fight. If the idea is to liberate the country, Ethiopia is finished and out of the country. Therefore, there is no need for the opposition groups to fight, and therefore, you really have weaker opposition groups across Somalia.

But also, and finally, also there’s a threat, for the first time. Traditional elders felt that their way of life has been threatened. There is tradition. Both a religious as well as a cultural aspect has been challenged. New ideas that Somalis did not see before have infused Somali culture lately, and therefore, there is also urgent engagement, or commitment from the traditional elders, particularly of south and central Somalia, where traditional elders have played very little role. It seems now they are picking up the pieces and playing a role, asserting their authority, so to speak. So given those reasons, I think there is a sense of urgency. There is an opportunity that we all need to take advantage of.

But I would also like to go back to the issue of the Djibouti process. I think the Djibouti process has produced an institution, the Transitional Federal Government, or unity government, that has its own problem, one way or another. You have a large 550 inflated membership of parliament, and then you also have thirty-seven cabinet members, and now they are about to appoint deputy ministers. This is very large. A Somalia of 8 million, 9 million people cannot handle that amount. But given the reasons I was telling you, people are offering goodwill to the TFG with open arms. I think they have received support, and the initial action taken by the TFG or the new government was very encouraging. They called for dialogue and stopped responding to violence with violence. When the president arrived in Mogadishu, a number of mortars was fired at him. He never responded. I think, unlike the previous administration, which responded in kind, that was a good sign that, even if you want to fight the TFG, there is no one to fight. Fighting only has meaning when the other side really wants to engage. So that was a good step taken by the new administration.

Opening up reconciliation, I think the president, the prime minister and the cabinet have called for dialogue. That has resonated with the people of Mogadishu, and much of southern Somalia that this government, perhaps, is quite serious and would like to move forward the issue. There’s also a sense of public accountability. I think for the first time you have a group of people trying to allocate and make sure that funds and revenue generated from the ports and airports are now properly accounted for for the last six years. Therefore, they’re showing the public that they are very much concerned and committed. And finally, the other encouraging sign is that they are also empowering traditional elders. When the president came to town, his view was that he would like to engage traditional elders as well as religious leaders. So they mediated between the two group. That was also a good sign.
Having said that, there are also a lot of gaps within the institution itself. Both the president and prime minister, given all this good will, have no experience of governance. And there’s no institution to support them as well. So that is a real gap itself. There is a large, unsustainable institution of governance, as I indicated to you, and allegiance to individuals rather than the institution. I think because of the nature of the alliance that was created, there’s a sense of giving allegiance to individuals within their institution rather than the institution as a whole. And that has a damaging effect of the institution itself. There is a lack of economic support, and no funding allocated. There is nothing available. As a matter of fact, when they left from Djibouti and headed to Mogadishu, they had very little. Their transportation was covered by the UN, so there is a lack of resources in the sense of doing it. And also, finally, their authority is limited to only Mogadishu, in the real sense. They don’t know beyond Mogadishu in terms of authority.

All these are very critical challenges. But there is one challenge right now also that the new Transitional Federal Government is facing—the opposition group—which I tell you is divided and weaker at this point in time because people are tired. There is one man whom I spoke to myself who would say to me, “I have six children, six kids: three of them were killed to bring Sheik Sharif and his group to power. Now someone is telling me to let the other three die to bring him down. I’m not interested in that.” So people are saying enough is enough. Give me a reason to fight. And therefore, the opposition is weaker. So they come up with three conditions in order to (inaudible) through the elders. One condition was that this government is not Muslim enough. They are running away from the Islamic Sharia. In response to that, the president has announced, not implemented it, the imposition, of Islamic Sharia in the government. One might argue that this is a very dangerous trajectory itself. But the fact is that, in Somalia, particularly in part of south central Somalia, what people have utilized over the last eighteen years was Islamic Sharia anyway. So this is not really a new phenomenon itself. But if someone looks from the perspective of radicalism, one might argue, we have a bad beginning of this government. But the fact is that it is not really much. I have attended dozens of peace processes, and the first agreement agreed by both clans, or both communities, is that Islamic Sharia Court, or Islamic Sharia, will be the foundation for justice. That has been there. It also takes away from the opposition group that challenges that, well, one condition was that you have to have Islamic Sharia court. I just did that. So why do you have to fight again?

The other issue is trying to make the Somali conflict a large outside globalized Somali conflict, so to speak. That argument was that AMISOM
presence in Somalia is very dangerous. They’re unwelcome. They come through a process that is not supported by Somalis. Therefore we want it to be removed. What the president and the prime minister and the government has done is that they appointed, supported it through an informal process, a group of elders and religious leaders who came back and said that AMISOM will leave in a few months. But the idea was, actually, that ammunition was taken away from the Islamist road, the opposition groups. So they really did it well in that sense.

The problem then is that people are expecting this government to provide security. Given all these measures they have taken, people expect the government to respond and provide service, and one of the services was security, and that hasn’t been done yet. So, therefore, it doesn’t matter how much they appease the other side. If there is no change in the security of the people of Mogadishu, particularly, the concern many people have is, can the TFG deliver? And finally, given the institutional mandate and expectation, I think the TFG and transitional federal government do have a serious problem. That is a lack of resources and support. You just cannot expect an institution to be set up and right away go back to Somalia, and at the same time, doesn’t have even a transportation to basic services. And therefore, unless the international community provides some sort of support, particularly institutional building support, nothing can be achieved.

And there are a number of areas that one can look into. One is the issue of institutional building. The capacity is not there. The will might be there and commitment. Failure of this institution has serious consequences. In the past, when Somalia has something fail, or the process fails, you go back to clan. For the first time, Somalia might disintegrate into sectarian conflict, something that we never envisioned in the past. So therefore, the cost of failure of this group is quite significant, and the impact would be greater than ever expected before. So therefore, failure has to lie within, but someone has to provide the sort of support one needs. There are various stable regional institutions in Puntland. They have done a successful election for a new president. The power transition was very effective. Therefore, someone has to provide some support. You cannot just simply let go and think about the national. Somaliland as well is doing a good job in terms of preparing for the upcoming elections. So those areas that perhaps really are saving the country need to be sustained and supported, rather than linking up with it. Probably I will stop here and open some discussion and answer questions and answers. Thank you.

Dr. Luck: Terrific. Thank you. It’s nice to have two such seasoned performers who stay within their time limits and cover a great deal at the same time. I have a lot of questions of my own, but let me open it up instead first, and I would appreciate it if people were to identify themselves and keep their
questions, comments, fairly brief. Please, back here, and back here. Please sir, and they’re bringing microphones.

**Question:** Could the two participants, panelists, discuss the whole question of piracy and how that plays in their very nuanced discussion of internal politics in southern Somalia?

**Question:** First of all, let me thank you, the chairperson, Mr. Luck, I’m sorry I came late because I had other functions to attend to. I have listened to Mr. Menkhaus, Ken Menkhaus’ presentation, at the tail end, and I really appreciated it, because he has expressed more of our concerns, and also mentioned how to remedy the problems. Then, Mr. Jabril Abdullah, he also touched upon the points I would have touched upon. So first of all, I have no additional information to give you, because you have listened to the best [unintelligible] too. Now my question is, apart from the piracy, which was mentioned, I don’t know, I didn’t hear about piracy and what now. So apart from that, both of you have mentioned that this new government has no security forces. It’s agreed that you will have 10,000 joint securities from the former transitional federal government and the religious groups. Now that needs training, equipment, supplies, and so on. We don’t know how long it can wait. All the governments that succeeded in these last eighteen years have failed because there was no security to maintain law and order. Any peacekeeping operations that come, later or now, even AMISOM, they cannot fulfill that function. That function can only be fulfilled only by the Somali security themselves. So I would like to know how you would, from your own prospects, how, as researchers, how would you help in this case? Thank you.

**Dr. Luck:** Thank you very much, Ambassador. I see a number of other hands, but I think he’s raised a fundamental question, and if I could just add to that, Ken, since you’re a professor of political science, so we have something in common there. The theory was that, one of the things that distinguishes a state is a monopoly of organized violence. It gets, I think, straight to the question that the ambassador asked. In some ways, both what you and Jabril were saying sounded to me at least like the strength of the new government is its weakness, just as we often say, the strength of the UN is its weakness. But how do you coincide that, Jabril, what you said, the people are waiting for security. How does the government provide the security, simply by conceding, conceding to one side or the other, and let others really dictate the agenda? I mean, don’t they at some point have to have this kind of capacity in order to be an effective government that has legitimacy and respect from the people? So if we could, the two of you respond to that collection of questions, and then we’ll get on to many others, so thank you.
Dr. Menkhaus: Somalis have never waited for others to provide security for themselves. They have been extremely adaptable to nineteen years of state collapse. They do provide themselves all manner of security, whether it’s blood payment compensation and the deterrent factor that that provides, neighborhood watch groups, municipal police, and Sharia courts. I mean, there’s an array of mechanisms that Somalis have used over the years to try to provide for themselves some modicum of security in a very insecure environment. There have been two cases, well let me back up and address the question that the ambassador, the very important question that the international community be directly involved in providing resources to Somali police and security forces to provide that order, which Jabril correctly points out is going to be the pivotal benchmark, yardstick by which Somalis judge the legitimacy of this government. My concern is that if we get directly involved in careless ways with providing support to security sector forces and police forces that aren’t carefully controlled, we are going to repeat the mistakes that were made over the last two years, in which we were paying the salaries of police, who were the main source of insecurity in the capital, and an important source of radicalization. There has to be accountability. I am worried about direct payments to security forces of any type in Somalia for that reason. I think there are ways that we can provide assistance, but I think that’s something that the Somali government and the Somali people will find a way to support adequately themselves, and I would point to two instances in Somali recent history to back this claim up. The two places where we saw very impressive improvements in security that were overseen by a large scale political authority, are in Somaliland, and in Mogadishu in 2006 for 6 months under the ICU, and in both cases, public security was provided with very little external support, actually. They did it themselves. The international community has a very important role to play, but I think we need to be careful and calibrate our assistance to the new government when it comes to security forces, or we run the risk of unintended consequence. Do you want to hold off on the piracy until Jabril has a chance to respond to that question?

Dr. Luck: Yeah, why don’t we –

Mr. Abdulle: Thank you, [unintelligible] but in terms of funding, I agree absolutely with Ken that you cannot give 100 percent of funding for a police force of 5,000, 10,000 for a period of time. I think the ownership has to come from the Somalis, and someone has to contribute to it, and as a matter of fact, the transitional federal government, the new one, has succeeded of providing some salary, limited salary to security just last month out of their pockets. So the sense of urgency and the sense of commitment from their part, and therefore, it will be a partnership, rather than 100 percent coming from outside. The problem you do have, though, is that you cannot
really build security sector when the leadership of that sector is corrupted and had all the indications of bad leadership, and now you have that problem. What they need to do, the TFG, they will have to come in a very strategic direction, in which they will say, this is the amount of money we need, and this is the amount we can put into it. So it will be Somali owned partnership. But you cannot also expect them to simply build a security force without outside support. Training was another issue. The critical element right now is a lack of trust, and I think one of the easiest, in a very strange way, I’ll share with you this, one of the most easiest work in Somalia to do is security, by the way, and the reason being is because people have a clan connection. There is a system of social structure in place. You just cannot come and do it. The problem is that people take advantage when anarchy prevails, and there are spoilers everywhere. But the 6 months that Islamists had succeeded in providing some security, that basically involved local people. And now, even part of Mogadishu, where you have security right now, there is no police force, nothing, but you can walk in the night and go to school. Specific places in Mogadishu, because that community has taken, so it’s a question of strategy, where you combine the two, funding for it—the government says that we can collect $2 million from the port and they can use that $2 million as initial—but also encourage the community to do it. This is not only in Somalia, but also Iran and Afghanistan where initially police were said to be corrupted and violent and so on, but there has been a mechanism. There is a lesson to learn. Security sector reform has to be deeply rooted into the community setting. If you cannot do that, then it will be real artificial to bring those things together in Somalia.

Dr. Luck: Thanks so much. On piracy, Ken, I think you wanted –

Dr. Menkhaus: Just some big picture themes on piracy in Somalia. As I think all of you know, Somalia is currently the site of the world’s worst epidemic of piracy. It’s been the case over the last couple of years. It’s been a site of serious piracy for longer than that. The short story on piracy is that, while it may have initially been a manifestation of legitimate grievances along the Somali coast about illegal fishing, today it is a mafia business that involves people at the highest levels, politically and economically, in parts of Somalia. It earns between $20 and $40 million a year, which is a lot of money in Somalia, and needs to be seen as such. There is no link, no notable link between the piracy and the Shabab, or terrorism, or al Qaeda, and I don’t think that that’s going to develop. The international patrols, which the UN Security Council has authorized over the past year—the naval patrols by a dozen or so countries—has helped to deter some of the piracy, but is not a solution. I think we all agree that the waters are far too vast, and there are too many ships, and the incentives are simply too high for Somali pirates for this to end. The solution is going to have to be on land, everyone agrees to that. And as a final point, the naval attacks that
have occurred against the pirates tend to be a real irritant in Somalia. Somalis have legitimately asked the question, “Why are you shooting and killing our young boys? They may be criminals, but this is $20-40 million a year. How much does it cost to run a dozen destroyers in those waters per day? Why are you spending so much money on that and not on providing assistance to our security sector to provide that on-land solution, and then you can all go home?”

Mr. Abdulle: The issue of piracy is real, but sometimes we Somalis on the ground question the disproportional response by the international community as such. Of course, when you talk about, you know, the Somali coastline, a thousand ships go through that line, and we can imagine the impact it has on global economics. But, on the other hand, the level of, when you are in [unintelligible] or somewhere in Somalia, where, you know, in the middle of the night, you see the entire shining town off the coast of Somalia, because you have so many vessels out there just waiting the right pirates to capture. People sometimes, it’s quite amazing, when $6 million needed for the security sector is not available. It’s just really, either it was a deliberate attempt to, we don’t care about containing these, keep them there in the cage, let them eat each other, and we still watch it, and if they come to us, we’ll deal with it, rather than saying that, can we really help them where they are, and at the same time, save resources. As a matter of fact, it becomes a folk tale right now. There was a program on BBC English, where a child talked to her mother, saying “I want to talk to a pirate.” It just becomes heroic. And then she spoke to a pirate on the BBC program, pirate and child speaking to each other, like *Pirates of the Caribbean*. I’m not really loathing the parents, but this upsets me personally, because we feel the pain. The economic impact is significant, particularly when WFP, vessels are attacked. People are dying for it, so it’s not a joke in that aspect. But also, why, if you can only maintain one vessel sitting outside, and $20 million, $30 million per month, whatever, and then you only need $6 million, $2 million, $1 million to deal with this problem, what is this? Is it that the international community’s priorities are messed up? Or simply, this is part of the containment, the way we deal with Somalis, the ironic way of the international community coming to the sea of Somalia just playing a bit. , And by the way, I’ll give you a quick example, the other day I saw a picture, and apparently one of the guys who happened to be on the ship was part of a process where conflict took place in the central region of Somalia, and we had given training when the fighting stopped to young men, and one of them, apparently, whom attended that training, was on the ship. I couldn’t believe it. This guy, I know him. He was in that conflict, and got training, and now suddenly becomes a pirate. So for me, I tried to figure out, that conflict moved to that level. What happened in between? Could this be an employment issue? Could this be something, I mean, what other element? The problem is that you see the problem, the root cause of problem, and you’re
deliberately ignoring it. It just doesn’t do any good to anybody! So what needs to be done is that the problem lies on the shore, on land. That is where people originated, and that is where, if you significantly invest time, energy, you can help resolve the problem. Thank you.

Dr. Luck: Fascinating. I guess one could say, well, it looks like the Council’s very selective. The two things that have moved the council are counterterrorism and piracy, and you could argue, those are clearly things that are threats to international peace and security, and you’re right, maybe they let the rest simmer along. I saw many, many hands.

Question: Thank you. I speak in a personal capacity, whatever I’m saying does not represent the views or opinions of the organization that I work for. Just on Somalia, I thank the presenters for that elaborate overview of the Somalian situation, and I agree that there is an opportunity that presents itself in Somalia. But my perspective is, we had the Djibouti one, and there was a window of opportunity, and we went out on it, and there was an opportunity, and TFG was formed then, and we [unintelligible] a problem and went back to Djibouti, and now we have come to a second Djibouti, and we say it’s a window of opportunity. But I think it will boast of good to look at the regional approach to the conflict in Somalia, that as long as the certain regional interests are not harmonized, or there’s no common approach towards solving the problem in Somalia, possibly, we might see another Nairobi, or another Djibouti, or another this [unintelligible] coming up, and we are saying there’s an opportunity. But what is the international community possibly doing or focusing on looking at resolving some very outstanding issues in the Horn of Africa? That is actually, possibly, there is a proxy war in Somalia, and that is why the spoilers are handing over big ground to spoil whatever agreement has been there. At the same time, we see that Sharia has been there in Somalia for quite some time, yes, but what are the regional concerns? Some of the countries within the region, are they just going to sit back and say, fine, we support the whole process, we support the strong government, we support strong Sharia in Somalia, without necessarily taking certain actions, thinking that their interests in the region are threatened. How are you going to address these concerns from some of the key members of the horn of Africa? Thanks.

Dr. Luck: Thank you very much.

Question: I wanted to ask you about the Somali Diaspora, and we know that Somalis have a record of performing in a very entrepreneurial fashion when they go to other countries, and some of those countries are African countries. My question is the positive developments you are reporting on today, are they yet enough to provide Somalis of talent and skill to return to
Somalia? Is that something to be hoped for in the future, or will that depend on the establishment of security?

Dr. Luck: Great, and then right here, please.

Question: Thank you very much. I am former UN staff, and the last time I was in Somalia, I was part of the TFG. I’m no longer part of it for many reasons. I won’t go into it right now. But I remember, some of you, I see that this is the third generation of the Somalia problem. I remember in the 1980s, ’90s, mid-90s, 2000, Somalia went through succession, internationally, through a succession of perceptions. I remember in the early ’90s, the attitude was, something must be done. Nobody knew what to do, but the famine and hundreds of thousands of people dying, treated as sort of sympathy to do something. That something was the UNOSOM-1, UNOSOM-2, and we know what happened. Then the next five years, the attitude was, nothing can be done about Somalia, and let them stew in their own vices, and that continued. Now this is the third generation. Now we’re back to something must be done about Somalia, and I think we have to understand the nature, Somalia remains the same, problems remain the same, so we have to understand the shift from something must be done, nothing can be done, and back, something must be done.

I think it was alluded, the reasons for the international interest. One, the piracy. Two, the Shabab, terrorism,, call it whatever you like. So I think we have to understand the reason why we’re here and why there’s so much interest. It is not about the nature of the Somalia problem as much as it is the perception of Somalia internationally. So I suggest, I think we are lucky, we have a moment, again, one more time. You get a moment, your 15 moments of fame, and you’re gone. We’re back to, we have brief periods of international attention, and whatever else I may think of the hopelessness and the messes everybody has made of us, I cannot ignore the fact, we are now, we have the international attention. The question is, the international attention is not enough. We must find a solution to the real problem, and therefore, we must define the nature of the problem, the domestic, the internal.

If you look at the history over the last twenty years, and summarize it in terms of obstacles and issues, I can think at least of five critical issues that are the obstacles to finding solutions. One is dispute among the Somalis on the nature and approach to reconciliation. The reason every attempt has failed, there was no, it was ill conceived, poorly designed, and there was no consensus on the matter, and therefore all of them failed: Djibouti 1, Djibouti 2, Djibouti 3, Nairobi, this one. So that remains the problem. Second, there is a dispute among the Somalis on the role of the external actors, whether it’s Ethiopia, the US, the UN. There has always been a difference, and that remains as well. And international involvement has
become part of the issues, obstacles, and social dispute, another layer of conflict. Then there are the substantive issues, which are, which many of you are familiar with, and that is, if you look, the current attempt is to form a government in Mogadishu that can consolidate and show peace in Mogadishu. Forget about the rest of the country, just get it right in Mogadishu, and I think that a lot, there’s a lot of wisdom, and practical wisdom in that. It’s the capital, without a solution to the Mogadishu problem, there can never be a complete comprehensive solution, so it’s a starting point, but it’s not a complete comprehensive solution. We have Puntland, we have Somaliland. We have Islamic groups that cover the lower Juba, Baidoa. These are the forces that are contending. So I think the question, what we need is how can we translate the international interest less in terms of the Shabab and the piracy, and more in terms of addressing solutions to Somalia, because once we solve that, only a practical solution to the Somalia problem can solve the Shabab and the piracy. Thank you very much.

Dr. Luck: Thank you. Before we return to the panel, it seems to me, in your phases, I’m not an expert in Somalia, but it seems to me that this is a different kind of phase, because I don’t think it’s returned to the early ’90s. It seems to be, from what you’re saying, the Somalis themselves are finding their way to a solution. How can we be supportive of that, and that solution has to be a political governance solution more than anything else. It seems that’s a different phase. Whether the international community is capable of handling with the subtlety that our two speakers have asked for, I’m not quite sure, but it seemed to me it’s a different message and a different time. Who would like to begin with responses?

Mr. Abdulle: I’ll take the easiest one, probably, and that is the Somali diaspora issue. I think, yes, Somali diaspora, the total amount they send varies, but usually it’s about $2 million a month of money that comes to Somalia. So that is a substantial amount of money, and therefore, the impact of the Somali diaspora, the life you see in Somalia today is due to the Somali diaspora. That is a fact.

And as a matter of fact, there are two areas that Somalia has been able to grow in the Somali diaspora. One issue is the political level. As a matter of fact, if you look Puntland right now, the President of Puntland, Abdirahman, is an Australian citizen. And then you go all the way to the people who run the cabinet, chief of police, and so on. So all of them can be diaspora, you know. At the TFG level, the deputy prime minister is Australian, the prime minister is Canadian, the foreign minister is British, and the minister of defense is French, so you go on and go on. So it’s quite dynamic itself. So on the political level, their presence is felt. It is quite obvious there. But also, if you look at the issue of the economic aspect, they play a big role. The media, for example, of media now taking place
throughout Somalia, the diaspora has a role to play, particularly in the regions that are stable. And in the classic example, Somaliland, all the activities are more or less run by the diaspora. If you look at the Puntland administration, the same thing. And in south central Somalia itself where there’s insecurity, still you have a serious diaspora engagement and contribution to it, even though nowadays, Somali security becomes fundamental. Some areas, when people cannot be secure, they take their money to somewhere else, which is very sad, because you become, you know, the Somali businessmen then moving. Kenya now has the largest Somali investment. [unintelligible] was saying they receive about $42 million per month from Somalis who live in Kenya as refugees and various businesses. And you have South Africa, you know, Eastern Africa, Uganda, now even some countries in East Africa, they’re giving what they call incentive to bring Somalis to the region. So the Somali diaspora is playing a role, but absolutely security is very fundamental. Without security, they cannot engage.

On the other hand, there’s a negative side. There are people who live in the diaspora Somalia has brought, actually perpetuating the violence. They’re contributing money to it, they support the radicalism on a number of levels. As you hear, some people actually went there to become suiciders. So you have both ways. But the majority of Somalis outside have a big role to play. But security is the key challenge. If you don’t have security, you cannot really go and invest a substantial amount of money. Somalia’s problem has always been linked into the regional aspect of it, and you cannot really isolate and separate it, and I think that it’s now even more challenging regionally. Uganda, Kenya, and Djibouti, as well as Ethiopia are now, thinking very carefully about Somalia, because for the first time, the civil war has done something unique that hasn’t happened for Somalia. It didn’t bring back nationalism, so to speak. What it does, though, the Somalis who are good in business, they now work across the board. So you have Somalis in Kenya who are immensely influenced by Somalis. Economic interaction is great. In the Ogaden region, you also have the same thing. As a matter of fact, some businessmen are now opening factories on the Somali side. You have also, in Djibouti as well, the government has given large land to the Somali business community; they have opened a bank right now. So you have, that link has a positive, but also, one day or not, sooner or later, if you manage properly, and you don’t perpetuate the violence, this could be a source of stability. But also it could be a source of instability, because the link is quite significant both ways.

Dr. Luck: Okay, Ken.

Dr. Menkhaus: The questions that have been raised are excellent ones, and they give me an opportunity to put on my academic hat for a second and step back a
little bit from the day to day situation analysis. We have trouble understanding Somalia. Somalia is, in many ways, breaking new ground in a lot of ways. In terms of the conflict, it is certainly incomprehensible from the perspective of the state itself; it is part of a regional conflict complex that involves Eritrea and Ethiopia and involves the insurgency between the ONLF and the government of Ethiopia and Eastern Ethiopia. Those three conflicts are inextricably linked. It’s going to be very difficult to solve one without addressing the other two. And that’s quite a challenge for diplomats and analysts, but it is what it is.

Secondly, we have, as I think Jabril just illustrated brilliantly, a great deal of difficulty now understanding the Somali nation. This is a diaspora state – a million Somalis live abroad, and they’re Somalis who are playing lead roles at every level of society, economically as the top business people, political leadership, civic leadership. This is a country where everybody is holding multiple passports it seems, and holds multiple citizenships and different claims on rights in different territories. We’re really struggling to understand, how do we understand Somalia as a diasporized nation? It’s not the only place in the world that’s doing this, but it’s one of the most advanced that way.

And then finally, to get back to some of the comments about state building and frustrations in the past, we have a great deal of difficulty understanding the nature of the state in Somalia today as it’s being revived. One thing we know is that this is not a place where a conventional Weberian state with a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence within its sovereign borders is going to happen anytime soon. That’s a myth everywhere in the world. You know, right here in the United States, you can find police departments that negotiate deals with gangs to, you know, rules of the game for their turf. This is how it is everywhere in varying degrees. In Somalia, in some ways, the Somalis may not be so much, as some critical commentators have claimed, falling back to the nineteenth century. But they may be on the cutting edge of the twenty-first century in rethinking the state on their own terms, a post-post colonial state in which the kind of political systems of governance that are going to emerge are going to be very unfamiliar to us. They’re going to be mediated relationships between a relatively weak central government because it doesn’t have much money, and a messy mosaic of local authorities, Sharia courts, clan elders, and municipalities. This is likely to be how we’re going to see them revive governance with the TFG or beyond, and it’s up to us to learn to work with that rather than insist that the Somalis remake themselves in our own likeness politically.

Dr. Luck: And there comes your title for your *International Security* paper! Sorry you can’t sell that, but please, you had your hand up for a long time here.
Question: So I came a bit late. I missed a bit of Dr. Menkhaus’ presentation, but I want to hear your inputs and your thoughts on the business community, because the way I understand it, and as also someone who’s studying Somalia from an academic perspective, I see the business community as kind of key to the conflict. I mean, yes, the diaspora provides cash flow, but you also have the business community that provides potential cash flow to the security forces. Now I’m just, so you could say you have a mosaic of different actors who contribute to the Somali security situation, but I’d like to hear how significant the business community is in the overall equation of security on the ground within the political infrastructure you have. Thanks.

Dr. Luck: I wonder in that regard which businesses profit and which don’t from the continuing conflict.

Question: I actually want to pick up on the thought that Professor Menkhaus had laid of the post-post-colonial model of governance for the twenty-first century, and given that most people outside have the sense, as Mr. Abdullah had described, of Somalia as basically just caged off and everything as totally disintegrated—even the most basic minimal functions a government supposedly provides in much of the world had disappeared. Can it be true that nobody goes to school in Somalia? That is, if you could give us a sense of what the daily life is. Are there parts of Somalia where people still go to school in some way, or where health services are given? Is this simply what’s delivered by international humanitarian agencies, or kind of indigenously provided, where agriculture goes on, and things go to market? Has this become a kind of Milton Friedman-ite paradise of private enterprise? And I take this to the question of what the transitional federal administration is going to be able to develop some lines of authority over. Are international donors willing to chance anything to the TFA at this point in terms of these kind of functions of some kind of authority, and would it have any credibility in the short term at trying to exercise any? Do those shattered pieces of community life have a prospect of being reunited vertically into some kind of administration?

Dr. Luck: Yeah, in that regard, how do civil society activists manage to function? Way in the back there, please.

Question: I wonder if the two speakers could, I guess, just say, how you would assess the performance of the UN’s envoy, Ahmedou Ould Abdullah, who’s been obviously very involved in the Djibouti process. There’s this controversy where he called for a moratorium on reporting from Somalia after the AMISOM troops fired into the crowd after an IED about a month ago—something that Human Rights Watch and Reporters Without Borders said he should retract, but he didn’t. I just wonder what you sort of think of the UN, whether the UN’s been impartial in the process? And
also the UN sanctions committee, which has done various reports on outside influence into Somalia. One time they said that Somalis were being trained in South Lebanon, which made a lot of reporters to laugh. Whether you think they’ve been sort of direct enough on Eritrea, and they mentioned Saudi Arabia and others as having funded the conflict in the past? And also just who in the UN, you mentioned the UN funds the Somali government? I was asked Friday in front of the Security Council, like is it UNDP, where are the funds coming from, who are the donors, and what’s the transparency that should be expected in terms of funding the government and security sector? That’s it.

Dr. Luck: I’d caution our speakers that we are on the record today. [Laughter]. So who’d like the privilege of starting? Jabril?

Mr. Abdulle: I give you something to laugh with. I was away. I left Somalia a long time ago. I went, one of these people who run away when I was young to Canada. So I lived there for a number of years. When I went back to Somalia, I have all this myth of what the Somalia that I left looked like. So I had a laptop, a Toshiba, a very old one, from Ottawa. So I landed thinking about what is going to happen to me when I arrive. So I put, take back, under the plastic bag, so people will see, this is the garbage I have with it. So rather, people are not going to attack me when I arrive at the airport, Baledogle airport outside Mogadishu. So I took the back, put the laptop, and then I arrive at the airport. So as soon as the aircraft landed, I just got out, thinking that somebody’s going to nab my laptop. I saw, under the trees, people are having the latest model and playing with it. So I just took my bag and put it back under my arm, so no one wanted even my old one. I think the idea is, I think there is a myth that Somalia is a very dangerous place, and that is absolutely true. No one can take away from that. But the fact is that, but Somalia on the other hand, is quite amazing. People go to the university, by the way, and there is a university, functioning university, very highly sophisticated. There’s a doctor in Kalkayu, central region of Somalia, who specializes in mental health and [unintelligible] and so on. People come from Ethiopia to attend that. So you really have a sense of institutions functioning. Very badly, difficult environment. We call it learning under the gun, you know, but six kids graduated medical school in Mogadishu just about 3 months ago. And then you have university [unintelligible] so there is, life goes on. It’s not as though this is, you know, an area where life doesn’t. So there’s a functioning life. We call it coordinated anarchy.

Life goes on, not as such, so you have more flights coming into Mogadishu than some African countries. As a matter of fact, even if you look at the index of UNDP, there are countries that fall behind Somalia. So we’re not that bad! [Laughter] We have some challenges. And I think because, that has its own problematic for us, because once, when you get
used to the idea of anarchy, the idea of this environment, it becomes normal, and when it becomes normal, it becomes a liability itself. When first I arrived, I remember that the cars went in two directions, and I yelled at my driver. I said to him, “use only one direction!” But a few months later, I said “that’s too long, so go through, cut the line,” because that culture prevails. That’s what worries me as a Somali. You have kids who haven’t seen a traffic light. But that’s life. But do you really want to have that people identify the world? So there is a gap. There is a danger, a difficulty. But that life goes on. It’s not as though nothing’s happening, you know, universities have been opened, doctors are operating, telephone is the cheapest. So there’s a number of things happening in that aspect of it, and I was telling this morning, earlier, that Somalis are very much risk takers. They have aircraft landing in the middle of gunfire. They have a Boeing landing. I travel to Mogadishu, and whenever I travel, there’s gunfire going on in Mogadishu. So when is this going to come down. People get used to that life goes on. So it’s not a pleasant environment, but at the same time, we’re surviving on that.

The business aspect, very quickly, I think the business is fundamental. I think business was sustained over the year. The problem that you have, though, the business itself, is so unregulated that it has a negative consequence, particularly if you look at the environmental degradation that has been inflicted on Somalia. It’s enormous! So the more money you make, this is a paradise of capitalism, so to speak. It is so risky. But on the other hand, over the years, business has been successful. Right when UNOSOM left Somalia, the business jumped in and set up a local police force. Islamic Sharia Courts, that you hear of it, come from business. Businesses felt threatened, and they created the Islamic structure, so business is fundamentally important here. And by the way, this government, they give $3 million. , They want to go [unintelligible] is a promise to give $3 million, but it’s not free as they said. What they said to them was that we will turn over the port to get back our money, so there’s not a free lunch after all. But the idea is that without business, Somalia cannot sustain itself, and cannot play a role in the sense that business is fundamentally important here. The question also, as you said, is that there are individuals in the business community who want to see anarchy prevail, because that’s where they make money out of it. If you happen to be a millionaire, uneducated, this is an environment where you make money. In this environment, you are really afraid of paying taxes, or going through the process of legal systems. So it’s like both edges of the knife. In one sense, they are sustaining life, but on the other side, they have difficulty. But in any way, government has to come to regulate them so that they will be better useful to the government and the people rather than the way they are right now.
Dr. Luck: I liked your term “coordinated anarchy,” but I don’t know that it’s reassuring, Jabril. On a good day, we describe the UN as coordinated anarchy, but Ken?

Dr. Menkhaus: Just to build on what Jabril said about the business community, their interests have evolved over the years, in some very interesting ways, and it is by no means a monolithic group, and it’s not even a category. People wear multiple hats in Somalia, so you can find a warlord, who’s also a businessman, who’s also an elder, who’s also an engineer. So it defies easy categorization. But people who have investments in business do tend to fall into these different camps that Jabril referred to. There are some spoilers that are involved in illicit activities. They have no interest in any kind of rule of law whatsoever. There are not many of those, but there are a few involved in that kind of activity. There are others who are very interested in public order for their businesses to function, but they may not necessarily be interested in the revival of a state. We tend to conflate the two. They don’t. So you can have cases like in years past, where they would support the running of local Sharia courts, because that provided a good operating base for their businesses. And they would have their private security forces, which were quite robust to provide security in an area. But they were reluctant to see a state revived, because the state might make claims on their activities, might try to appropriate it. Unfortunately, the old TFG made a couple of actions that reinforced that fear. What we’re seeing today, though, it seems to me, and Jabril knows more about this than I do, but it seems to me that most of the business people are actually really behind a revived government now. They see that they have to have it. They’re also very much opposed to the Shabab. They know what would happen in a worst case scenario in Somalia where the Shabab and other hard line Islamists would consolidate authority and provoke more security incidents in the region. That would be a disaster for their interests in Somalia.

As for the question about the UN, let me focus just on, well first of all, in terms of the UN panel of experts. If you want to see some really, really excellent analysis of what’s going on in Somalia, read their last report. It is state of the art on armed groups and arms flows into the country. So I think they’re doing an excellent job. What happened in the distant past is another matter. In terms of the UN, there are some issues that are really important that we haven’t had a chance to raise yet. One is the question of who actually helps? Who provides the assistance to a transitional government? Much of this responsibility has fallen on the shoulders of UNDP as the flagship organization for development in the UN family. And in Somalia, this has created both opportunities and dilemmas for UNDP. The opportunity is it got to be the flagship organization on a major state-building enterprise in Somalia, and that was great. The downside was this: when you become a direct supporter, and when I mean direct, I mean
not just training, but handling money for salaries for police to a transitional government that is a party to an active conflict, it may be post conflict on paper, but it’s in fact an active conflict on the ground, you become a party to the conflict itself. You are not seen as neutral. And the insurgents who are fighting that government will eventually target you, and that’s what’s happened with UNDP, and by extension, the entire UN family in Somalia. As they have been targeted by various sides, not just the armed insurgents, the Islamists, but by a number of different sides. And that culminated, of course, in the terrible attack on the UNDP compound in Hargeisa in late October, the suicide bombing attack there. And so what we’ve had now is UNDP suspending operations, pulling way back for security reasons. And as we now have a new transitional federal government, new leadership, much more promising, and funds start to flow and programs start to be conceived again to support this government, the question arises. And yet, it’s still a government that’s very much in armed conflict with a robust insurgency, when you go in, are you putting your people in harm’s way? Will you be seen as a party to the conflict? I don’t know that UNDP and other organizations like the World Bank are going to be willing to take on that responsibility. If they can’t, who does? This is a major problem in transitional governments that are still in a state of armed conflict. And I think when we get to the point of, finally get to the point where programs are funded and implemented, that will be a real question of implementation.

Dr. Luck: Great, terrific. Time for another round? Please, right here.

Question: Gentlemen, if I might ask a fairly straightforward question –

Dr. Luck: That sounds like a Somali accent, as I understand it. [Laughter]

Question: As you’ve been aware, the Security Council is due to make a decision on a potential peacekeeping operation on the first of June. On last Friday, we heard the SRSG, the AU, both call for a peacekeeping operation to take over from AMISOM. Could I ask you both on your views, noting the issues we’ve already discussed about the security situation, and also foreign occupation?

Dr. Luck: If I could ask a corollary to that, we haven’t heard much about the advantages and disadvantages of regional peacekeeping and UN peacekeeping. From some of the questions, it sounds like the regional solution really is not a solution, and that perhaps one has to look globally, both in terms of mediation and in terms of peace operations, but I’d be interested in that. Another Somali accent.

Question: Two questions I was going to ask, actually, so I’ll pass.
Question: Thank you. Just a brief question on Al-Shabab, and maybe you can say a little about that and how, say, it relates to external groups and what are the internal dynamics driving it. I mean, is it purely a terrorist organization, or you read in some places that it has a political agenda also? Thank you.

Dr. Luck: We didn’t hear if there are any Irish accents in the cabinet or not. Anyone else? Wow. Who would like to begin? Ken?

Dr. Menkhaus: When one contemplates the advisability of a UN, a re-hatting of the AMISOM forces to a UN peacekeeping mission, or an expansion of the AMISOM mission, an extension in the time of the AMISOM or UN mission, there’s really a simple question to be asked. And that is, what benefit will this bring to Somalia? And what will the costs be? And when you do that cost/benefit analysis, in my view, I don’t understand the logic behind pushing hard for UN re-hatting of AMISOM. And here’s why. They are playing a useful role right now. It is a very limited role, nothing like its expansive mandate. They’re keeping to a few key things, one of which is they are protecting the seaport and the airport and a couple other vital installations. If they weren’t there, there would be fighting over that. It would be heavy fighting. It would be disastrous. So, for the moment, that’s enough reason to keep them there. They may not need to be there for many more months, but they do need to be there for that. If you were to re-hat them, or expand them, or both, all you’re doing is giving the Shabab and al-Qaeda and affiliates fodder for their cannons. The only card they’ve got left to play in Somalia is the “us vs. the foreigner” card. And that’s one of the reasons why they’ve been so preoccupied with AMISOM, insisting that AMISOM leave, attacking the AMISOM troops, trying to provoke a response in which civilians are killed, to elicit a response from the public to get the foreigners out of our country. Why play into their hands? They’ve got almost no cards left. This is good! Let’s not do exactly what they want us to do, and re-hatting them with the UN would be used by Shabab to argue that the UN is a Trojan horse for other interests that are coming in to, fill in the blank, to re-colonize us, etc. I just don’t see the logic. I think we need to do a very cold cost-benefit analysis and make sure, and this is really critical, the law of unintended consequences in Somalia, it’s not a theory, it’s the law. A lot of times, the things that we think are going to help are actually going to make things worse, and this could be one of them.

All right, there was another question about Shabab. And the answer is, as best we know, and by that we mean, when I ask Jabril and others about this, Shabab has never been a particularly united movement. It is fractious now more than ever. It is divided over leadership, ideology, tactics. So you get Shabab in one place threatening to kill aid workers, and another place negotiating to secure their release from kidnappers. This is not a very united movement. Many of the rank and file fighters of Shabab are just
kids with guns, very young kids in some (inaudible). They are not hardcore indoctrinated mujahideen, and they can be negotiated with, weaned away, either by business people who are paying them to become their security forces, or by the TFG negotiating with their leaders. And that’s certainly the hope. I think everyone’s expectation and hope is that the TFG leadership will negotiate as far as they can with as much of the opposition to bring them into the fold, either as members of the Transitional Federal Government, or at least to provide them space to be a loyal opposition as opposed to being an armed opposition, which is a whole other topic in Somalia we could go into. There are, however, hardcore members of the Shabab who are not interested in any of the above, and who will probably need to be marginalized and defeated militarily, because they’re simply not going to be negotiated with. And those are individuals who have links to al Qaeda. They’re known links, and again, it’s a relatively small but dangerous group.

Dr. Luck: Please.

Question: Could you go into greater detail about the Shabab militia? In other words, one person just asked the question about training abroad. What evidence do we have of that kind of training, in other words, trained cadre, as force multipliers, to come back in? And how are they actually structured? I covered UNOSOM2, so I remember that rather vividly, and I remember how that was structured. Have they advanced from that? If there is a UN peacekeeping force of some type, what are they going to encounter on the ground?

Dr. Luck: And I think this is probably the final question.

Question: Yeah, just to follow up on your comments on AMISOM. Given that the African Union is already heavily tied up in Sudan and can barely deploy the troops there and doesn’t have the logistics, and given the situation it’s facing in Somalia, number one, do they need more troops in AMISOM? And from where those troops might conceivably come, or is it sufficient? And secondly, is this only for a few more months that AMISOM will be needed there? Whatever a few months means, towards six months? Or do you think really, analytically thinking this will have to be there for a significantly longer period of time? And how will that be funded and organized?

Dr. Luck: Great, if I could add two quick questions? One, Jabril, you put great emphasis on how exhausted everyone is, and people are just tired of fighting. Is there anything that people would find worth fighting for at this point? I mean, do they just say, well let us give some sort of order, some sort of government, some sort of values, or are there things that still could make people think, prolonging some kind of conflict might be
worthwhile? And then what about the humanitarian imperative? What do you tell groups? You mentioned at the outset, Ken, that a large percentage of those humanitarian workers worldwide that have been killed have been killed in Somalia. But still, the humanitarian imperative doesn’t change just because there’s more discussion in Mogadishu among these groups. Do we just tell them to wait? That sooner or later there will be a political solution. And after a political solution, humanitarian involvement would be more feasible. And these things would eventually be worked out.

People talked a bit about accountability for local political leaders. What about accountability of international leaders, or those in countries of major donors, or those where there is a large public concern in terms of the public welfare within Somalia? Is it enough to just tell them to wait, and eventually things will be worked out? So if you could answer all those questions in the last few minutes, that would be terrific. Thank you.

Mr. Abdulle: I’ll take the humanitarian one. I think there is a tendency for the humanitarian agencies to separate humanitarian and politics, and in the Somalia context, it’s very hard to do so. I think, just referring to what Ken talked about, you just cannot expect to say that we’re not going to talk about politics, and we’re not going to engage in politics, where dealing with humanitarian itself alone might not be enough. In Somalia, I think they might be interlinked. Maybe UN agents have different roles to play. But the humanitarian issue is going to stay with us for a long time to come, and I think people, particularly in the southern part of Somalia, south central Somalia, cannot comprehend the kind of devastation that this thing has caused over the years, particularly over the last two years. The number might be varied, 1,300,000 IDPs [internally displaced persons] and so on. But the fact is, when you go to these countries and meet with these people, the very little support that they have, you would be shocked to see the kind of difficulties they live in it. And the problem that you have, though, the UN agency also give a credit, but do you respect their decision? Because if you look at the amount of money that is spent in Somalia, the percentage spent in the most difficult area is very limited compared to the other areas. So more money is spent in the stable area than the real area that needs. The justification here is that we cannot go and can’t help. So therefore I’ll take the money somewhere else where it might be useful and helpful. But it is a moral issue then. What do you do? Do you really watch from a distance, and particularly, when you operate out of Nairobi, and you link with local people, a third line, you know, you’re not first to observe. You’re not second. You are third. And therefore, you are active and sending resources through a third party. It’s going to be very difficult. I’m not diminishing the difficulty and challenges the international community and UN agencies particularly have. But the fact is that you really have to come very creative while delivering it. And if people in Mogadishu, or people in other areas, the most difficult areas, central region area, people are saying that we will
have to die for it. We will have to sacrifice to provide these services. Let Somalis, use Somali Diaspora, traditional elders, business community. There has to be a different way of delivering it. You just can’t simply ask for $1 billion, and that $1 billion be sent somewhere in Nairobi with substantial overhead cost. It’s a moral wrong, and I think it cannot be tolerated.

What needs to be done, and I think the logic is obviously clear to us who are on the ground. And I see everyday people on the ground. The difficulty is there. We’ve been targeted. People get killed every day. And I don’t want someone sending the kids from Mogadishu to some other part of Somalia to be killed, because they’re providing services. The reality here is that there can be another way to deal with it. There has to be a mechanism whereby it can be done. If the political will is not there to create a green zone or whatever in Somalia because it is too distant. We don’t care. We don’t want to invest in it. We’re not ready to give that much effort to just peripheral difficulties on a minor issue, then at least you have to come up with an alternative model. And believe me, Somalis on the ground are ready to sacrifice, to deliver and provide the service to their fellow Somalis. If you’re trying to manage from a distance, the Nairobi side, or some other part of the world, and send a third party, it’s going to be very difficult. And I’m not saying that these don’t deliver on their part. It’s a challenge. How can you deliver when you’ve been accused of siding with the government? Or warlords? If you have a deal with the Shabab, you’ve been accused of dealing with the difficulty. And if you deal with TFG, you deal with the same problem. So you’re in the middle of nowhere. Someone was telling me in the Nairobi side, “You know, it becomes a human rights issue.” I cannot withdraw salary for that much in the middle of doing nothing! Moreover, I cannot sleep! And I think, and the money side has to happen the same thing. If you just cannot deliver, just don’t exist it. And I’m speaking on the people that I saw. The sense is that people are in need on the ground, and an institution wants to deliver, really wants to deliver, but cannot deliver it. It needs a different way of doing business. And if a different way of doing business takes a new shift of a delivery model, let it be. But you just cannot simply stick the same ideas for the last ten to fifteen years and say, I cannot go, I cannot deliver. I’ve got one hour, ten hours, twelve hours flight, and come out, and say that I saw a couple of people in the middle of somewhere, less than a couple of. It doesn’t really do. That’s not fair to Somalis. So it has to be some way, a mechanism, that works on it.

I think Somalis are ready to fight for peace. I generally believe that. I think the issue of commitment to peace process is quite serious. The problem you have is a longer term. One of the most disappointing issues I want to raise also, to conclude this, is the issue of cultural impunity. People are killed, and people who kill our walking away with it. Fifty-six civil society
people are killed last year alone. And you know what, if two people are shot in the middle of Nairobi, the whole world will collapse. Everybody talks about it. 56 people are killed, who cares? I mean, this is another critical issue. Is it because Somalia does not have a friend to speak on their behalf? How can you expect when cultural impunity prevails, to talk about justice or reconciliation. I cannot! Because people who kill are now ransacking along. And people, there’s nothing to prevent them to do the same thing. So there can be a lesson to learn from Sierra Leone, and Liberia, and other parts of the world. That somehow the UN and other agencies with a level of power and authority, if you only arrest one Somali. And believe me, one president was told, you will not be able to travel to East Africa, and we saw the consequence. He just walked away from power. Let alone, if you bring a few Somalis who are guilty of killing, mass murders in the middle of summer and put them in jail. Even call them. That could really shift the whole dynamics! It resolves the Somali conflict 60 percent, perhaps almost 80 percent. But I’m telling you, people are just fed up of. Somalia’s different. But maybe in other parts of the world it isn’t as serious. So therefore, if that happens in that sense, I see the sense of people who want to see justice. When they see justice, they will do it. And this is a people who really want to have exit strategy. There’s an analogy I use. With Somalis, what fails is the Somali state, not the Somali people. The Somali people are doing well everywhere you go. That’s a fact. What fails is the state itself. But I always use the term, analogy, that there is a dark room in the middle of it, you know, and the lights are off. We all Somalis are in the middle of it, and each of us trying to find our switcher of the light. The problem is it takes so long. Someone knows how to do it, probably. I don’t know. But that is where we are right now. We really want that light. But the problem is getting there is more difficult every time that problem goes on. Thank you.

Dr. Luck: Thank you very much. A question is whether the TFG at some point would not want to make any referrals to the ICC. But we won’t raise that now. Ken, you have the last word.

Dr. Menkhaus: Your question about humanitarian and political wills. The simplest way I can answer that is by saying this: humanitarian aid agencies cannot avoid the intrinsically political nature of their work in Somalia. Yet one must not politicize humanitarian aid work. And there’s not enough time to go into the nuances of that, except to say that there have been times in Somalia, as elsewhere in the recent past, where there’s humanitarian aid agencies that have been under enormous political pressure from various parties to work through and with authorities who are illegitimate, and the partnership with whom puts them in harms way. And that’s something that I think the UN family needs to continue to work on, because that has been a very sore subject in Somalia over the last few years. Tensions at times between the political and humanitarian agencies have been fairly intense, and the
stakes are very high. I do think that we can’t privilege one over the other. That’s usually how this works. Yes, we have to harmonize, so you coordinate with me. There’s a difference between subordinating and harmonizing humanitarian and political priorities. And the country simply doesn’t afford us the luxury of one or the other. We have to respond to this massive humanitarian crisis effectively. And we have to respond to the political crisis effectively. And you just have to hold hands and do it together.

Shabab and the training and tactics. There are Shabab leaders that have trained abroad, we know that, mostly back in Afghanistan in earlier years. Most of the training that they have gotten from outside tends to be trainers coming into the country, we believe. We don’t know a whole lot, at least I don’t know a whole lot about this, as someone who does not have access to classified information. They do tend to work in small cells. And much of their tactics would mirror what you saw by General Aideed’s militia in 1993-1994 —asymmetrical urban guerrilla warfare using mainly low-tech weaponry, AK-47s and mortars. The Shabab has mastered the use of improvised explosive devices. This is a technology transfer from Iraq and elsewhere and have put those to deadly use. And then we have seen the rise of a limited amount, but a very worrisome amount, of suicide bombing, attacks which were unknown historically in Somalia. Suicide was taboo culturally in Somalia, so that’s a new development. Again, nowhere on the scale that we’ve seen in places like Iraq, but certainly present there.

And then finally, the AMISOM question, should it be bigger or not? A lot depends on the political context that will emerge in the coming 3-6 months in Somalia. If the transitional federal government succeeds in broadening its base, if it wins over most of the population in southern Somalia, the insurgents become less of a factor. Then a larger AMISOM presence, even a UN presence at that point, with an expanded mandate, would be, it would be up to the Somali leadership if they thought they could put that to good use. Then by all means. But if we are looking at a situation in which a government is besieged, and it’s looking for AMISOM or UN forces to protect it, use it as a shield against insurgents, that’s a recipe for big trouble. I don’t think the African Union needs another one of those kinds of missions right now, and it would be ill advised.

And it points us to something unfortunate we probably should have started with and we’re going to conclude with. And that is the observation that Somalia is facing several very different scenarios in the coming year. The best, and all of these discussions are going to be contingent on those scenarios. The best case scenario, or the one that we hope for, is that the TFG does, in fact, continue to improve, both through its capacity and its breadth of participation. And the hard liners are gradually marginalized.
The worst case scenario is that the TFG fails. It does face enormous challenges. Shabab and others consolidate control over most of south central Somalia. A terrorist attack or two occurs in the region that draws the external actors back in a heavy way. And Somalia is thrown into the kind of turmoil that we saw in 2007-2008. And then there’s the status quo ante scenario. And that is Somalia just kinda muddles along, much as it is now, as a group of, or as a collective of fiefdoms controlled, in some cases, by hard line Islamists, in some cases by other Islamists, in some cases by clans and warlords and municipal governments and self-declared transitional governments. And that’s the tricky one, because that one is harder. It’s harder to know when to pull the plug on a transitional government, what kind of support to provide. All three are scenarios that are quite realistic that we have to be prepared for and will produce very different political and humanitarian challenges.

Dr. Luck: Well, thank you very much. We are now much better prepared than we were two hours ago. And we appreciate your information, analysis, and most particularly, your candor. So thanks very much to both of you.

[applause]