Edward Luck: Good afternoon, everyone. Thanks for coming. Thanks for coming in such large numbers and for us settling rather efficiently. We usually don't manage to start quite this early, but there's a lot to discuss and three terrific discussants. We're here partly to launch this book of Ade Adebajo's, "From Global Apartheid To Global Village: Africa In The United Nations." But we're also here to welcome Ade back. I notice we do that quite often. He was a one-time director of the Africa Program here at IPI way back when it was IPA, back in the dark ages. He did a terrific job with that, and he's done a terrific job at the Center for Conflict Resolution in Capetown, and IPI has often had the privilege of co-sponsoring meetings with him. It's surprised me, but Ade actually has a distinguished background. He was a—he got his doctorate at Oxford where he was a Rhodes Scholar. He has served a number of U.N. missions, and he is a very, very prolific author. As you noted from the title of this book, and if you've ever met Ade before, you know he has a certain tendency to be provocative. He's promised to be very dull and uninteresting today, but he just might slip into that provocative mode if we let him.

Let me just say a quick word about the book and then introduce the other two discussants. I think it's a volume that was one of those things that really was necessary, necessary for the U.N. to have a volume focusing on the many ways in which the U.N. is engaged in Africa, and as many of us say, I think the future of the U.N. lies in Africa. I think it was very important for all the member states, including the African members, to think about the breadth of that relationship, and not only the engagement of the U.N. in Africa, but the engagement of Africa in the U.N. Unlike many books about Africa and the U.N., this does not pick a particular slice. It has a very, very broad and ambitious scope to it. It's a rather big book, as you'll see if you've ever tried to lift it, but given the number of topics it covers, the number of authors in it, it could've been many times that size. I think it's highly readable, and I do recommend it to you. We don't normally plug and sell books, but I've been told that there are copies in the back for the dirt-
cheap price of $20. Apparently you can get that across the street at the U.N. bookstore for that same price. When we think of academic books in the U.S., it would probably be $200, not $20. It is published in South Africa by University Press, so you might want to pick up one here or go across the street to the U.N. bookstore. But I do highly recommend it to you.

Ade would be our first speaker, and we’ve asked each of them to do about 10 minutes so there’s plenty of time for discussion. Let me quickly introduce our other two speakers, neither of whom need much of an introduction to this audience. After a lot of wrangling up here, we decided to go in alphabetical order, which does mean that A.A., Ade, will go first, and Francis Deng will go second. As you know, Francis is an Under-Secretary General at the U.N., the Secretary General’s special adviser on the prevention of genocide. He himself, of course, is a prolific author. His chapter in this book is about sovereignty as responsibility, an item that some of us have spent a lot of time on. I see Ambassador Abdul Aziz smiling in the back there; I think that’s a smile of positive recognition, I think. After yesterday’s vote, we’re all on the same side of these issues in terms of R2P and sovereignty as responsibility. Francis has served as the Sudanese ambassador to the Nordic countries, to the United States. He was Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Sudan. He had many years at the Brookings Institution, and we’re just delighted that he’s here in New York and we’re able to work with him.

Our last speaker, Augustine Mehiga, is the permanent representative of the United Republic of Tanzania. He is known as one of the most eloquent and experienced voices in the U.N. Diplomatic Corps on any number of issues. I take it is because he, like everyone else at this table, at one point was a college professor. He was also a high-level adviser in the Tanzanian government, and spent, I think, a decade or more with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees. His chapter in the book is about U.N. HCR and its involvement in Africa.

So we have a good cross-section here of topics and three terrific speakers. Let me get out of your way and turn it over to Ade for a dull and boring presentation.

Adekeye Adebajo: Thank you very much, Ed, and just to thank everybody for coming. As Ed has noted, I spent five wonderful years here. I want to especially just thank [Adonia], [Mashood], Beatrice and all of the IPI team that helped put this together. It’s such a pleasure to see so much of the U.N. community and also some of the Fletcher mafia that I went to school with.

So the title of the presentation is the title of the book, “From Global Apartheid to Global Village,” which I think needs explaining, since, as I was having dinner with Francis Deng yesterday, we sort of discussed it in some detail as well. And I wasn’t completely convinced that he was clear, so I’ll try to do it a bit better now. The concept of global apartheid describes the political and socioeconomic inequalities that exist between the rich North and the poor South. These inequalities are deeply embedded in the world’s first truly universal organization, the United Nations. The paradox of the world body is that, while it embodies ideals of justice and equality, the power politics embodied in its structures often means that the powerful, aristocratic Brahmins of international society, the great powers, can manipulate the system to the disadvantage of the Dalits, the wretched untouchable, in an international caste system. Ali Mazrui and Thabo Mbeki and others, both intellectuals and politicians, have used this term to describe these inequalities. So this tale is thus a sacred drama in which Africa has sought to transform itself from a pawn on the chessboard of the great powers to an influential player in global geopolitics. Global apartheid is examined here in
three important areas: politics, in which Africa and Latin America remain the only major regions not to have permanent membership with veto power on the Security Council; peacekeeping/human rights, and you'll remember Rwanda very well, probably one of the worst cases of racism in international politics, when 800,000 people died in an utterly preventable genocide in 1994; and socioeconomic development and some of the issues of aid, trade and debt. The book has 30 chapters, and is the first comprehensive attempt to examine the U.N.’s political, peacekeeping, and socioeconomic roles in Africa over the last six decades. Despite the importance of the U.N. to Africa, it’s amazing that there are surprisingly few studies and centers of excellence on the U.N. on the African continent itself. So this volume is a conscious and deliberate effort to correct this deficiency. Twenty-eight of the scholars are African, joined by an American, a Dutchman, and a Swede. Seventeen of the thirty-one authors have served themselves, as my two co-presenters show, on U.N. missions or in important U.N. offices. There are others like Adebayo Adedeji, Ibrahim Gambari, James Jonah, Mary Chinery-Hesse and also Ali Mazrui, who unfortunately could not join us today, who are in this book. We think it’s important that these authors bring a wealth and depth of experience and insights to this study that is so critical for understanding the sometimes Byzantine workings of the U.N. sphinx. And talking of sphinx, we were particularly grateful that the Pharaoh, Boutros-Ghali, the first U.N. Secretary General and my favorite African U.N. Secretary-General, contributed a worthy foreword to this book. I know that many in the West like “Coffee” [Kofi Annan] as they call him, but we tend to prefer Boutros.

Okay, so we start with political apartheid, in terms of the three apartheids that we’re dealing with today. Africa played an important role, along with allies from Asia and other Southern countries in the Group of 77, often with the Soviet bloc, the Nordics and the Canadians, on issues such as decolonization, sanctioning apartheid, promoting socioeconomic development. African states at the U.N. and their allies established new concepts in international law in areas related to self-determination, decolonization and the right to use force in wars of national liberation, racial discrimination, particularly in declaring apartheid in South Africa to be a crime against humanity, and permanent sovereignty over natural resources. The death knell was finally sounded on the notorious European legal concept of colonial territory being described as res nullius, since these territories were inhabited by native savages in an era of a perverse Western mission civilisatrice that could be seized by and carved out among European colonial powers in the gluttonous imperial feast which took place in Berlin in 1884 to 1885. It’s important to note that much to the horror of the U.N.’s largely Western founders, the Africans and their allies sought to transform an organization fashioned for peace into one supporting just wars of liberation from colonial oppression. Between 1945 and 1960, forty African and Asian countries with populations of 800 million, over a quarter of the global population at the time, won their independence in the famous revolt against the West. The unspoken Afro-Arab pact at the times, in terms of decolonization, was that the Arabs supported the Africans on apartheid, while the Africans gave their support on Palestine and those other issues.

So there are six key organs that are covered in the first section of the book: the Security Council, General Assembly, ECOSOC, the Secretariat, the Trusteeship Council, the International Court of Justice, and then the role of the Secretary-General. We also look at the U.N. reform process of 2004 to 2005.

Moving from political to peacekeeping apartheid, between 1948 and 2008, 40% percent of U.N. peacekeeping was in Africa. Today, 70% of the U.N.’s peacekeepers, seven out of 17 missions are in Africa. In the first sort of decade
and a half of the U.N., it had one of its most dramatic experiences in the Congo, of course, from 1960 to 1964. The common refrain after that was “No more Congos.” It took another two decades for the U.N. to return to Africa. There were relative successes in Namibia, Mozambique, and eventually Sierra Leone, and catastrophic failures in Somalia, Angola, and Rwanda. I think one of the key issues is to avoid an aristocracy of death in which the lives of African peacekeepers are worth less, and Africans spill the blood and the West pays some of the bills. It’s important that you actually have peacekeeping not become an apartheid system where Africans and Asians are the ones deploying mostly in Africa. These are some of the issues that this book explores. There are 17 peacekeeping missions in five African sub regions that are examined.

The final apartheid is socioeconomic apartheid. From the 1960s, African states and their Asian allies sought to use institutions of the U.N., specialized agencies, funds offices, etc., to promote their own socioeconomic development. The global South thus forced the U.N. to move away from an exclusive focus on the peace and security issues of the great powers to the socioeconomic needs of developing countries. The Southern barbarians, in the form of what Martiniquan scholar Franz Fanon described as “the wretched of the earth,” was finally at the gates of the hallowed mansions and manicured lawns of the exclusive Northern gentlemen’s club to challenge the rules of global apartheid which they had played no part in setting. This book covers 16 of the U.N. specialized agencies, funds, and offices in the areas of economics, agriculture, health, education, labor, environment, women, refugees, children, and humanitarian issues.

Finally, in conclusion it’s important to note that in the last six decades, Africa has, through its decolonization and anti-apartheid struggles waged through its Third World, Soviet and Western allies, as well as through its diplomats, international civil servants and two U.N. Secretaries-General, helped to humanize the world body from one focused on the destructive power politics of the great powers to one that has promoted the socioeconomic needs of the world’s poorer inhabitants. It was Ali Mazrui that noted that Africa, which had once believed that its village was the world, is helping to shape the idea that the world must become a more humane global village. Socioeconomic development, human dignity, and peace must be the hallmarks of this village. Africa, of course, was the site of the Biblical Garden of Eden, which is now a garden that has fallen into decay. Ending political, peacekeeping, human rights and socioeconomic global apartheid is the surest was to reverse this decay and enter the paradisiacal global village. Amen.

Edward Luck: Thank you, Ade, for a typically understated commentary. I’m very impressed that you were able to get through so much in ten minutes, that really is disciplined. Francis.

Francis Deng: After what Ade said about what happened last night at dinner, you will understand my saying I’m an added-on. The only justification for that is that I contributed just one chapter out of how many? Thirty-some. So you will forgive me if what I say doesn’t live up to the provocative, and I should have said actually, Ade has another characteristic. He entertains as he teaches, and you could see from his talking, the other person who would have entertained, and whom I say, does both teach and entertain, is Ali Mazrui, who unfortunately is not with us.

Now when I was asked to contribute a chapter, I didn’t realize the book was going to be so heavy. Coming today from my office, I decided to put only this book in my briefcase, and yet, as Ed says, it was really heavy, coming from…and beautifully produced, I must say. I was asked to contribute this chapter partly
because at Brookings I had established a program looking at Africa in the post-Cold War era, as the Cold War was coming to an end. In dealing with that project, the question I asked myself was, what are the main priority areas on the continent that jump at one? Coming from the Sudan, I guess it should be no surprise that I thought conflict resolution should be highest in the order of priorities, issues of democracy, human rights, and development. Then, looking also at the continent as very much characterized by diversity accompanied with disparity, which is one of the reasons for the conflicts, identity conflicts, and looking at the way the world was running during the Cold War era, the question I asked myself is, how is the end of the Cold War going to affect the way we see these conflicts and these other priority areas?

During the Cold War, we used to see these conflicts, regional and even internal, as proxy wars of the superpowers. By and large, they were managed, aggravated by the rivalry of the superpowers. But as the Cold War was coming to an end, and this was in the late 80s that I started the project at Brookings, the question is, how is that going to affect the way we see conflicts and the way we manage conflicts? Clearly, the responsibility would shift. Superpowers would disengage, there was considerable concern in Africa that Africa would be marginalized, and it would be a good thing that we would begin to see the conflicts in their proper context, as regional or national. But again, the question is the support that Africa used to get from their superpower allies would go, and therefore Africa would be called upon to assume greater responsibility for its problems.

So we started a series of case studies, both regional and country-specific, and concluded that in this day and age of withdrawing strategic concerns, Africa would assume its responsibility for its situations, but at the same time, Africa would not be left alone, because human rights and humanitarian issues have taken the front line of international – bases for international relations. So the book, the last volume in the series, was titled “Sovereignty As Responsibility.” Now the essence of sovereignty as responsibility is that the states assume the front line of responsibility for its own people, to protect its own people. But it needs help. If the state needs help, it will call on the international community to assist.

But there’s a third level, and that is, if the state fails, does not call on the international community and its people are suffering and dying, the world is not going to sit and do nothing. They will find one way or another of getting involved. So sovereignty as responsibility has the three layers of state responsibility and state accountability, not only to its own people, but to the international community.

I was telling Ed before that talking about this topic, after we have just gone through the debate on R2P, seems to be a hazardous thing to do, and especially with Ambassador Maged here, as was pointed out. But it does connect with the Responsibility To Protect. It has been documented, as Ed is always kind enough to point this out, as having fed into the work of the Canadian-sponsored Commission, the High Panel of the Secretary-General that it led to, and the final outcome of the 2005 summit, the Responsibility To Protect. Like the Responsibility To Protect, or rather like sovereignty as responsibility, Responsibility To Protect as three pillars, exactly the same pillars as Ed has always pointed out, and I have asked Ed to pick up on that since he really has been very, very much engaged in this and has written a remarkable report of the Secretary-General which has just led to a resolution that was adopted yesterday.
One of the problems of sovereignty as responsibility, and the Responsibility To Protect, is that it is construed as very much linked to foreign intervention by major powers in the weaker countries, particularly of the continent. But as I often say, Boutros-Ghali used to say that this is a misplaced fear, because if anything at all, as Ade has indicated now, the major countries of the West in particular are quite reluctant to put their young people in harm’s way. So Boutros was saying that the problem is, in fact, the reverse, it’s indifference rather than eagerness to intervene. Finishing from Brookings, or rather while I was at Brookings, I was given the assignment by Boutros-Ghali to be his special representative on internally displaced persons. By definition, it’s an internal matter and very sensitive, as it touches on the sovereignty of the state. I realized that if I were to adopt a rather confrontational approach, I would almost certainly not be allowed into the countries, I would not be able to see the conditions of the displaced populations, I would not be able to help those who need help. We in the U.N. system used to write reports about situations in countries, sometimes even without going to the country, the reports are taken note of, and you’re thanked or complained against by those whom you touch upon. So I decided that the concept of sovereignty as responsibility would be the best way to deal with the states. Using exactly the same approach of saying to—the first five minutes with the president I would say, “I realize this is a problem that is internal, I recognize that it falls under your sovereignty, I am respectful of your sovereignty, but I don’t see sovereignty negatively as a barricade against the international community. I see it as a positive concept of state responsibility for its people, or, if necessary, with the help of the international community.” The subtext being, “But if you fail, and your people are suffering, you will not be left alone.” So that, for 12 years, was the concept that helped guide my work on IDPs, and I think with relative constructive engagement with governments, and I believe to have been able to render some help to those who needed help.

I will stop here and will hopefully call on Ed at the right time to build on that in the light of what is now going on with respect to Responsibility To Protect. Thanks.

**Edward Luck:**

Thank you, I’ll pass on that invitation, there’s probably been enough to date on R2P for everyone to last a lifetime. But thank you for the opportunity. I did note that you also referred to Boutros-Ghali, so I think you have an obligation here, Augustine. He didn’t talk about global apartheid, but he did refer to Boutros, so surely you can fit him somewhere into your discussion of U.N. HCR and Africa. So Augustine Mahiga, please.

**Augustine Mahiga:**

--by congratulating Professor Adebajo for this very Herculean effort to produce a really fat volume, and the first of its kind on Africa at the United Nations. I want to congratulate all those who participated in this. When I was told, when I was co-opted this morning, actually late yesterday evening, to be one of the presenters because I have a chapter in this, I was also told that because Professor Mazrui wouldn’t be available this afternoon. I said, “For heaven’s sake, there’s no way I can fit in the shoes of Professor Mazrui,” as you all know. The old scholar, veteran scholar, is highly respected and continues to be a very powerful and influential intellectual voice in Africa and elsewhere in the world.

But I thought I could also contribute something to this discussion this afternoon, because I have a chapter there on refugees. It’s not very often that we sit and discuss about refugees here at the United Nations. Because refugees, IDPs, are really the product of conflict, and it sounds like it’s more politically attractive and maybe intellectually more stimulating to talk about conflict resolution, about peacekeeping, and not so much about the humanitarian consequences of these conflicts. It wasn’t just the desire to narrate my experiences with the U.N. HCR
for 11 years, but I did this for a number of reasons. The first one is that, indeed, the end product of conflicts is human suffering, and this cannot be ignored. The numbers of people killed, displaced, wounded in any conflict is so tremendous, and yet international attention comes only as a last resort. It is very important that we continue to think of the human dimension of wars and conflicts and those consequences. It is even more depressing that a response or interest in the human dimension of conflicts comes as a delayed reaction. Yesterday we adopted a resolution on R2P which is a stage to further the discussion. But really the challenge of protection of civilians goes way back more than 10, 15 years ago. It’s only now that we are grappling with these kinds of issues.

The protection of refugees, fortunately, has an international instrument, but it was because of the necessities and the challenges of post-Second World War Europe that we had an instrument under the United Nations. But in Africa, it proved to be not very relevant, because the U.N. Refugee Convention is actually individually centered. The protection of people from persecution because of their belief, because of their faith, because of—it is individualized. And when this instrument was being applied in Africa, especially at the time of decolonization, it wasn’t very relevant. Because you are dealing with massive numbers, and therefore even the recognition of refugees, if you are to base it on individual recognition, you didn’t do justice to the hundreds of thousands and sometimes millions of refugees that were displaced in Africa, not only during decolonization, but ongoing conflicts that we are witnessing.

But there was also another imperative that this instrument, international instrument, had to be adapted to African conditions, because there wasn’t any focus on the causes of conflict apart from what we had witnessed in Europe. Colonialism, apartheid, people fleeing from apartheid and colonialism, had to be included in the definition of refugees. Interestingly enough, there was resistance from the rest of the international community, and they said, “Africa, do define your own, have your own definition.” And we were having problems incorporating the African Union or the Organization of African Union convention pertaining to the refugees, which was adopted in 1969, where it recognizes the need for mass recognition of refugees instead of individual recognition, but also taking refugees who were victims of the decolonization process and of apartheid. Now that decolonization has been accomplished, more or less accomplished in Africa, and apartheid has been ended, still this definition, I think, has to be retained. This is Africa’s contribution to the normative thinking about response, the humanitarian response, to the consequences of war.

But also focusing on refugees is itself a barometer of the international community state of not only the political stability and instability, but of the extent to which the United Nations and similar organizations are responding to these. One of my agonizing experiences in the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees was to overcome the reluctance of states to fund resources for the protection of refugees. When we are talking about assessed contributions, contributions—Maged yesterday was talking about system-wide incoherence and the need for funding, I was just thinking of the tough negotiating we needed to go through to persuade countries to contribute funding for refugees. We are using a concept that is called burden sharing. It already tells you that refugees are a burden and over time, it has improved. Now they are saying, responsibility sharing. But for many, many years, they were saying, “Okay, we shall give you X number of dollars as part of our contribution to burden sharing.” These are the attitudes that have been developing.
But there is another thing I thought is important to focus on refugees, especially two main reasons. The first is that the United Nations and the international community for a long time have used the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees as a substitute for political action. We have seen this in the Middle East, we have seen this in the Balkans, and certainly we have seen this in Africa. When the Rwanda genocide took place and almost a million people died in three months, there was, of course, the refugee problem, some of whom were those who perpetrated the crime of genocide. Two hundred and fifty thousand refugees in 24 hours fled to Tanzania, and about a million refugees fled to the then Zaire, or now the DRC, in 48 hours. In that group there were the perpetrators of genocide, especially in the DRC. And we as protectors of refugees were in an acute dilemma. After the failure of the United Nations to stop the genocide in Rwanda itself, we expected the United Nations to take a proactive role to look at not only the humanitarian aspects, but also the political aspects among these refugees. The mixture of refugees and the genocidaires. We appealed to the Security Council, Madame Ogata and said, “I need to separate these genocidaires, Security Council, please give me a small force.” It didn’t take a really big force. The Security Council said, “It’s too expensive, it’s too dangerous.” And we were left and condemned to leave with those perpetrators of genocide with bona fide refugees. It took the courage and determination of Rwanda to come and separate, singlehandedly—but that is the product of the problem we are facing today. If MONUC, if the Security Council is failing to resolve the problem in the DRC, I look at it and sometimes laugh and say, “You should have done it earlier.” They have could have finished that problem in 1994-95, but now those elements are deep in the forest and there. So that is one thing.

The second thing is the normative contribution by looking at refugees. I think Africa not only has made a contribution, but also it is proceeding, and many thanks to Professor Deng, next month the African Union will be organizing a meeting in Kampala to come with a new international instrument related to the protection of internally displaced persons. This is an area again, in the world today there are close to 35 million IDPs, or internally displaced persons, and this is twice as many refugees as there are in the world. Almost half of those are in Africa, and Africa has seen the need to come with another international instrument because of the resistance, I can’t understand, that resistance is money. The international community doesn’t want to take responsibility on IDPs because they say it’s going to be expensive to take this responsibility. Of course now we are talking about R2P, the Responsibility To Protect, which I think as a normative debate is very good, but ultimately it will again boil down on mobilizing the necessary resources.

So that’s why I took interest in this, and I hope this will generate further discussion. I should have discussed also about the role of the African countries and the United Nations, which I was invited to talk about, but I’ve gone beyond my 10 minutes. I would only summarize by saying look at the decolonization period where Africa, I think, was vocal and effective. Look during the Cold War period, what was the role of Africa at the United Nations, particularly on issues of development? It wasn’t effective. It was only after the end of the Cold War that we are beginning to address certain issues at the United Nations. Not in New York, for that matter, maybe in Geneva, and UNCTAD. Africa’s role can most be effective through the Group of 77 and China and the non-aligned group at the United Nations. But also, for the first time, we are beginning to see the United Nations take an interest in the Organization for African Unity, which was really marginalized and nobody wanted to look at it. But now with the African Union, the United Nations is beginning to recognize the role of the African Union, and the
African states at the United Nations have the added advantage of bringing the weight and clout of that organization in articulating their interests.

I hope this book and this volume and this discussion will further generate and merit another time to reexamine these phases of African presence, role and effectiveness at the United Nations. Thank you.

Edward Luck:

That was terrific, Augustine, really excellent. I did note that both Francis and Augustine stressed some of the normative areas where in fact Africa has been in the lead. It’s interesting with the global apartheid scenario and framework, it may be in ideas, and it may be sometimes in norms, and in terms of organization as well, that Africa in fact can play a larger role, Ade, than we’ve seen, if you simply look at pure, hard numbers in terms of power.

I would make two brief advertisements. One, Rwanda has been mentioned several times, and Paul Kagame, the president of the Republic of Rwanda, will be hosted by IPI next Monday. Not in this room, it’s too small, but across the street at the Millennium, 10:30 next Monday morning. We encourage all of you to join us there. Also, Adonia Ayebare, who’s acting director of our Africa program, is working on a side event in Kampala next month for the signing of the IDP convention. Again, as Augustine very rightly pointed out, an area where Africa is showing real leadership. Sometimes I guess leadership comes out of necessity, but whichever way it comes, it’s nice to see Africa in the lead on so many of these ideas and so many of these principles.

Who would like to begin the discussion? John, you seem to be the first. John Hirsch, we’ll do a couple of rounds, three or four questions each.

John Hirsch:

First of all, I really would like to thank all three of you for your presentations just now, which I thought were just superb. I want to congratulate you, Ade, not only for this volume, but for your extraordinary scholarship, leadership in African scholarship both here at IPI, as Ed alluded to, and at CCR. It’s just been extraordinary.

I want to draw you all out on this global village. From your discussion here, there’s been at least some progress. You talked about the end of decolonization, the end of apartheid, and you’ve all referred to these steps on the Responsibility To Protect as normative efforts. Ade, what, if you could just kind of say, what do you think are maybe one or two of the most major constraints still out there to achieving what you all might regard as a global village, and what strategy would you suggest for addressing those specific constraints. Maybe Francis and Augustine might like to address that too. But just as a very broad effort to understand how far you think things have gone and possible next steps.

Edward Luck:

John, if you could set the precedent by identifying yourself?

John Hirsch:

I’m with IPI.

Edward Luck:

I know you’re embarrassed to say that, but…

Agostinho Zacarias:

I’m Zack, I used to be part of the furniture in the dark ages of IPA. Now I’m just an economic refugee in some way in Africa. I have a question for Ade. Congratulations for this volume. The issue is as follows. With the manipulation and the discriminations that you described in your introduction of the U.N. institutions, and the use of these institutions by the powerful countries to achieve their own interests, are you claiming that the boundary between the national
institutions of the powerful countries and those international organizations are getting thinner and thinner? And if that is the case, how does one stop it? Thank you.

Edward Luck: Thank you, great. Anyone else at this time, please?

Boniface G. Chidyausiku:

Thank you. I am the Ambassador of Zimbabwe to the United Nations. I would want to thank the presenters for their presentations. When we talk of refugees, have you thought of going beyond just refugees as products of conflicts? There's a new concept of refugees, economic refugees. We find Europe is flooded with refugees from Eastern Europe, the United States is flooded with refugees from Latin America, Southern Africa, Europe, everywhere. Eventually, can we go beyond refugees as a result of conflicts and look at refugees as a result of imbalances in the economic development that is taking place in the global village?

Edward Luck: Thanks very much, very clear questions. Why don’t we have this one here, and then we’ll go to the panel. Right in the center here, please.

Helmut Bley: Helmut Bley, Department of African History at the University of Hanover in Germany. First, a general remark, I think it’s an African tradition, of course, to look into the colonization and the decolonization process, but doesn’t the world changed in the way that the strong states like China, Brazil, and other newly industrializing states have to play an important role, and have left that Third World area, and that you will have to address their interests as well? That's not just a novel type of approach to the old North. That’s one question. With regards to these very impressing remarks on the refugee system, and you have complicated the issue a lot. We did post-war studies in a number of African states, and we came to the conclusion that of course, where masses of refugees fled into northern Tanzania, then the normal population in terms of water, wood and other resources is heavily affected by these things. Or look into the city council of Johannesburg when their type of anti-immigration riots are taking place. So the internal situation of the population that is touched by the refugee or migration system has to be taken into account, and I don’t see the point how the United Nations system of refugee management can approach that internal dimension.

Edward Luck: Thank you very much. So those are four quite diverse questions for our panel. If I could just add a second part to your first question, our speaker from Germany. When you’re speaking about Brazil and China and other rising powers, I don’t know whether Ade or others would want to comment on this coalition, in a way, among South Africa, Brazil and India, where rising powers within Africa are looking for allies or partners from other parts of the world and not just from within Africa. What does that do to the identity and to how the power situation fits in terms of the global architecture? Ade, why don’t you go first, and we’ll go in the same order, I think, as before.

Adekeye Adebajo: Thanks. All very good comments. I think the one point that is worth noting and emphasizing is the fact that the quality of African representation has declined quite a bit from the 60s—

Edward Luck: Present company excluded.
Adekeye Adebajo: Of course, there are a few—there are a few—there are a few stars still, and I think that many of them are here. But there’s no way that African ambassadors should be accepting P4 positions in peacekeeping missions. That sort of thing should stop. So it’s quite important for the credibility of Africa that the governments actually start sending quality people to New York. Because you see, with all the other regions, that this is serious business. So I think that’s important. The fact also that Africa’s representation has gone from a third during the Cold War to a quarter is quite an important thing. So it’s not just quality but quantity as well. It’s a point James Jonah makes very well in his chapter, the fact that during the 60s and 70s, not much happened in the General Assembly without Africa. Africa’s voice was listened to, even on the Security Council, if they’re credible countries on the Security Council as part of the rotating three African seats. They tend to be listened to. But if you have small countries that are just territories with flags stuck on them, it’s a lot harder to actually get progress. I won’t name any this time, although I could, very easily.

I think, in terms of the other question, John Hirsch, there’s some structural problems that I think progress could be made on to improve this global apartheid I talked about. Africa’s 290 billion debt, as you know, I always bang on about this, needs to be scrapped, because everybody knows you’re just recycling it. UNCTAD put out a study which actually showed that between 1970 and 2002, Africa paid $550 billion out of $540 billion. So you keep recycling it and you keep paying both the principle and interest. With countries spending 25% or more of their foreign exchange earnings on servicing debts that everybody knows cannot be repaid, instead of actually improving health, education, those sorts of sectors, it’s a game that I think is quite cynical.

In terms of trade, as you know, the EU spends more on a cow than it does on an individual African in terms of aid. So the grotesque subsidies that are paid to farmers, both in the EU and in the U.S., is something that also needs to stop. You know, the agricultural subsidies, a few years ago, that the EU was giving to its corpulent farmers to grow fatter, $311 billion, was more than the entire economy of sub-Saharan Africa. So these are some of the grotesque distortions. Then we know that in 1970 the U.N. set 0.7% of GDP in terms of aid, we know that it’s the Nordics and the Dutch that are meeting this, but nobody else really is, which is why books like that of the Zambian economist Dambisa Moyo calling for aid to end in five years are so wooly headed and dangerous, it’s amazing that this is the sort of literature that titillates Western audiences. I think it’s important to actually look at what African economists like Adebayo Adedeji and others, and his chapter here is really one of the best, because he was head of the Economic Commission for Africa from 1975 to 1991, and challenged a lot of the orthodoxy of the World Bank and IMF on structural adjustment programs, and called for an alternative that will actually be self-sustaining and increase trade between Africa. Because as Hillary Clinton pointed out in her recent visit to Africa, there’s also a responsibility on Africans themselves, of course, we’re not trying to just focus all the attention on external actors. The fact that less than 10% of trade is inter-African trade after 50 years is quite shameful. Africans have to start actually promoting genuine regional integration. It’s not enough to declare an African Economic Community in 2028, it’s important also to try to reverse those kind of colonial-type patterns. I think mechanisms like the African Peer Review mechanism, which 29 African countries have joined as a way of trying to improve democratic governments, are also quite important things.

In terms of Zack, I’m not sure I completely understood what you were saying in terms of the international organization and nation states. But I think the main issue for me is that the Security Council is clearly the most powerful body within
the U.N., it’s the only one where the decisions are binding on all the members, it can make laws, it can take decisions very quickly. It’s a crying shame that we still have a Security Council now that is the same as 1945. So Britain and France could have claimed to have been great powers, although arguably in the case of France in 1945, but they certainly cannot claim that today. So it’s important—it’s not that if you have two permanent African seats, everything is suddenly going to change, but I do think Africa needs to be at the table in order to at least fight for its own interests. You need strong African voices, particularly with 60% of the discussions on the Council being on Africa. But I think, in this book, a couple of authors, Musifiky Mwanasali and others, pointed to the fact that the Council has even adopted treaty amending powers, like in Cote d’Ivoire, trying to change the constitution of Cote d’Ivoire, which some saw as really quite a dangerous trend. So I think it’s important, the great powers will do what they will, but it’s up to the developing countries, I think, to try to within their own constraints, work with the strength that they have, which is numbers, tactics, and actually trying to make sure that there’s a more democratic Council that can at least fight for their interests.

In terms of the question by the German professor, I agree with you, some of these countries have moved up the international caste system. So you have some nouveau riche who behave like nouveau riche in normal societies. They start noticing the stench of the poor and thinking they no longer want to belong to that group. So I do think that China’s interests could converge more with the West, as it develops, and it’s already the third-largest economy in the world, and diverge more with that of the developing world. But China is playing an interesting role also in Africa that has put the West’s nose out of joint. It’s become the third-largest investor in a decade, it’s providing infrastructure that much of the West and the Breton Woods institutions don’t want to provide. Again, it’s up to the Africans to try to use China, not ignoring some of the more negative aspects of the Chinese presence in Africa. But it’s quite unpalatable and unacceptable that today you have an apartheid system where an American always occupies the head of the World Bank and a European the IMF, and that China, which is putting in a hell of a lot more resources into the IMF and keeping even the American economy afloat, has something like four times less voting power in these bodies than the U.S. does. Even Germany, France, Britain have more voting power. So there will need to be a re-ordering of the world, and I think institutions like IBSA could possibly play a role in doing that. That’s India, Brazil, South Africa. But of course, you can’t ignore the Nigerians.

**Edward Luck:** Some Nigerians won’t be ignored. In fact, I’m going to have to have two lists now. I’m going to have the list of those who want to ask questions, and those who want the right of reply. Let me turn to Francis, and then Augustine, then we’ll get back to the right of replies.

**Francis Deng:** Well, I just want to underscore or underline what I see as a paradox. On the one hand, talking about moving from global apartheid to global village implies a certain degree of integration into the world order. At the same time, in this linkage, Africa remains marginal. The question is, is this marginalization or marginality going to be corrected by getting deeper and deeper into an inequitable world order, or into digging into ourselves to find out where the solution should not emanate from within?

When we talk about colonial legacy, I think there’s a distinction between blaming the past and by recalling history just to blame history, and understanding the problem and its roots so that you can then build your own future. I consider the system of governance in Africa is fundamentally flawed. And, let me try to explain
why. At independence, most African countries received European-model constitutions, constitutions that were not even applied by the colonial powers during the colonial system, systems of governance totally external to the African realities. I see one of our main problems on the continent to be how we manage diversities that were actually created by the colonial states. Colonial state carved groups out, divided groups, brought groups together, governed them as one country but separate within the one country. So that diversity became entrenched. It is not just a matter of differences; it’s a question of the implications of the differences, what I call the disparities of the system. And, it has to do with certain groups that are “in” groups, who enjoy all the rights of citizenship, others who are so marginalized, discriminated, excluded, denied the rights of citizenship. And the system of governance that you have with the notion of democracy being largely seen as elections, different from the African consensus approach to governance in the traditional society. So you have this issue of diversities created, entrenched, and being mismanaged, and generating conflict. Because people obviously, if you are grossly disadvantaged, you are going to react, and the reaction will generate another reaction, which could easily develop into genocidal conflicts. So I think there is need for us to revisit the fundamentals of our governance system, the fundamentals of our constitutional systems, and be able to generate from within with a certain degree of confidence and strength—when I went to China in the 80s, every Chinese I came across was talking about wanting to develop, taking science and technology from the West, but developing the Chinese way. It wasn’t very clear what the Chinese way was; when I asked them, what exactly is the Chinese way, they said, “You ask difficult questions.”

Edward Luck: And that’s the Chinese way.

Francis Deng: But now we know that they have found themselves and are coming to the world with a sense of identity and confidence, not just emanating from size, but from knowing who you are and what you bring to the global village.

Edward Luck: Very thoughtful, thank you. Augustine, a lot of questions about economic refugees and other things, whatever tempts you.

Augustine Mahiga: Before I address that, let me contribute to the extent to which Africa itself can define the terms of belonging to that global village. It’s very true, Ade, that we need to build capacity among our diplomats and all the actors that interact internationally with the other countries and international institutions. If you look at the training that goes into some of the diplomats from the developed countries who you have to interact on a daily basis and negotiate and argue with, a lot leaves to be desired. I think capacity building in Africa for multilateral interaction and politics needs to be improved. I challenge IPI to contribute to Africa’s using resources in training, whatever kind of training or contribution to the training and the preparation of African diplomats.

Secondly, when a country is stable, it elicits respect and people can reckon with it. When Nigeria is stable, it de facto becomes a leader. When it is unstable, not many countries, even in Africa, have time for Nigeria. So the issue of conflict and stability and leadership are very crucial. When Africa is united in terms of economic integration and defining its role in the world, the world goes to Africa. Europe wants to talk to Africa. China every year wants to talk to Africa, now. Japan wants, Turkey has joined; South Korea has joined the bandwagon. Everybody now wants to talk to Africa, because there are certain signs of cohesiveness and a voice that can be articulated by Africa. It’s a long order, it’s a long-term order, but I think if there is going for Africa to be accepted
internationally, it has to be able to define its role in the world, and to articulate and defend its agenda in the world. That is not easy. But if conflicts and substandard training continue to be part of our interaction with the world, nobody will take us seriously. I think I should be talking this to fellow Africans rather than sharing this to you. But, I think this a challenge.

Now, refugees. I would want to remind to the definition of a refugee as somebody fleeing from persecution, from violence, from human rights violations as such, and to make that distinction from economic migrants who move from one country to another because they want greener pastures and economic opportunities. But there has been this gray area where the international obligation to receive genuine refugees who need asylum by countries that have signed the International Convention, have bolted the door for providing asylum. Whether it’s Europe, or America, or Africa. Then the economic migrants pose as refugees because there is no channel where you can have just the refugees, that is bolted. There is no regime that needs to address economic migration and economic migrants and international migration. We are just beginning to discuss this issue at the United Nations, that migration is becoming one of the issues. But economic movement of people and mixed movement of genuine asylum-seekers and economic migrants, and the means they use to beat the system because there is no defined way of managing this movement of people, is where you get the abuse and the misuse of asylum. Where you get the risks of people dying in high seas and going into doors posing as refugees, or if not posing as refugees, they just cannot move within. A situation where a country like Italy really needs labor because they cannot replace their own population, but there is not a defined policy in that country or in the European context where there could be genuine ways of accommodating these kinds of movements. It is what can be discussed at the United Nations, and this mixed movement. Recently I was reading that Europe has really eased the ways of receiving refugees and migrants, but we still have a long way to go, whether we like it or not, this global village is going to produce movements of people. We cannot bury our heads in the sand and refuse to discuss this. The future, some people say, of wars is going to be over water. I’m saying the future of wars is going to be over people’s global movements, unregulated, where there’ll be clashes and conflicts of people who are moving. But this is a manageable thing. This is an issue we can discuss and put on the table, and see. It's not easy, but over years, we can discuss about it. Certainly, my country, Tanzania, received the first refugees in 1959 from Rwanda. We were not even independent then, we became independent in 1961. Since 1959, Tanzania has hosted refugees until today, 2009, a total of 6 million refugees have come and gone in Tanzania. Today, we are beginning to see light in the tunnel. Refugees are going home to the Congo, to Burundi, and those in Southern Africa left. Not only are we saying they are going, we have offered citizenship to those who want to become Tanzanians. This is the so-called responsibility sharing. If you want to go to Burundi, and you have been in this country for over 20 years, you don’t even know where your village was. Tanzania here is a big country, come and stay with us, here is citizenship to you. But we are also telling the world that the impact of hosting refugees needs to be an international responsibility. One of our national parks was totally wiped out, completely, during the crisis of Rwanda and Burundi refugees. Forests were completely devastated. And of course, the administrative load of the work of hosting refugees is a difficult one. When you talk to some who are my friends in the international fora, they are, “I am a donor country, no? We give so much money.” And I said, “Can you quantify the cost of hosting refugees and put into dollar value, I'll be a more greater contributor than the money you give.”
So what I’m saying is that it’s true, these responsibilities again to respond to refugee problems again depends on the leadership of the countries of asylum, but there is scope and need and responsibility for international burden sharing. We need to talk a little bit more and more about these humanitarian aspects of protecting people.

**Edward Luck:**

Thank you, excellent. I see lots of hands. If I could just respond very briefly to this question about quality of African diplomacy here, and the challenge that Augustine said, what is IPI doing about it? One, I thought, frankly, Ade, that you were a little too sweeping in your comments about the quality of African diplomacy here. Francis and I have been spending a lot of quality time in recent months going from delegation to delegation, regional group to regional group, and I can’t say that my impression is that somehow the African group is not as strong as others. I think in many ways, it is a particularly strong and particularly diverse group. We’re a little prejudiced because in the area of Responsibility To Protect, they tended to be on the same side as we were, so we maybe had more sympathy with what they were saying. But I think the quality is not so bad. Obviously, with that many countries in any regional group, there’s going to be some variance. What worries me, is I see the great quality of people here, not only in the diplomatic corps, but in the Secretariat as well, how many of them are going to go home, and when will they home? We look at the African Union, and we look at the RECs the capacity building, it seems to us, is more needed there than it here in New York, at least that’s my own impression. We’ve had a lot of quality time with the AU as well. I would say one small thing that IPI is doing in this regard, along with King’s College in London and with some of the other non-governmental organizations here, is a leadership group that comes each summer of graduate students from Africa who promise to go back to work in their home countries, or even preferably in inter-governmental organizations in Africa. If these people are in any way indicative of the upcoming generations, the future looks very promising; these are just terrific, terrific people. If we could do it in larger scale I think we very much would like to. We’re quite dedicated to working with the African Union and the RECs, not in substituting capacity, but helping encouraging and helping facilitating getting more people, particularly on the intellectual side, analytical side, involved in their work and in their Secretariat. So we see the challenge and we appreciate it. With [Adonia] and [Mashood] and others, we will hopefully be making some contributions.

I see lots and lots and lots of hands. Let’s begin right here. It’s coming, the mic is coming for you.

**Patrick Hayford:**

Thank you. My name is Patrick Hayford, I work in the U.N. Secretariat. First, a very big thank you to Ade and to all the panelists, this is a truly magnificent effort, path-breaking effort to look at Africa in the U.N. A specific question to Ade, what do you say to those who might argue that the term “global apartheid” is too emotive? Apartheid is a very specific, highly—well, let me just put that on the table. Some might view it as a little too emotive in discussing this subject.

Then, on the question of Africa and the U.N., and African representation, I think it’s important to remember that the African group of ambassadors, or the African group generally, has been the most efficient group when it comes to candidatures for U.N. bodies. Where some other groups we could name often end up squabbling, the African group has consistently shown skill and reached consensus on almost all major candidatures over the years. So as a group, as a functioning group in the U.N. system, I think the African group deserves a lot of credit for having been an efficient partner of other groups in the normal business of the U.N. system. I think that requires some recognition.
Now, the issue of the evolving relationship between the United Nations, especially the Security Council, and African institutions like the AU, I would be very interested in the comments of the panelists, the views of the panelists, on this problem of trying to get the U.N. Security Council to make special room for the AU in terms of the financing of peacemaking and peacekeeping operations in Africa. There are ongoing discussions, we had the Prodi report, etc. What are the views of these eminent panelists on this issue? But again, I would like to thank, congratulate Ade. Some of his views are very controversial, but he’s an excellent spokesperson for an African perspective on these issues. Finally, Ade, on Dambisa Moyo, I think she makes a number of very valid points. Perhaps she takes them a bit too far, but I would plead with you to be a little more gentle with her. Thank you.

Alfred Ndabarasa
I’m from Rwanda, and I’m also congratulating our panelists, particularly Mr. Mahiga, who shared our frustration. Let me go straight to the issue that I want to raise with Professor Adebajo. Africa is trying to get into the international political game, yet I don’t see—there is no incentive for leverage to negotiate. The Africans are not that united, they have resources that they don’t control, and its population is not that big, nor a valuable market. How do we negotiate to get into the international power game? Thank you.

Edward Luck:
Right here and then Jeff in the back, then we’ll go back to the panel.

Erin McCandless:
Hi, Erin McCandless from Journal of Peace Building and Development, and the New School. This is a question for Ade. The views and kind of discourse that you’re espousing is consistent with some of the more, we could say, progressive social movements in Africa. I’m just wondering to what degree you see leadership in Africa supporting these views or promoting these views? And related to that, do you have a strategy for, we could say, radicalizing the United Nations system, including the Breton Woods institutions towards these views? Thank you.

Edward Luck:
Jeff’s in the back, Jeff Laurenti.

Jeff Laurenti:
Jeff Laurenti with the Century Foundation. This has been a very rich discussion, and I have to say Ade, in particular, is the kind of rich in cholesterol that would induce heart attacks in Washington, I think. But he did, in his last intervention, put on the table—and this is another side to the Africa representation question that Patrick looked at so warmly—the practice in the African group of strict, even rigid rotation, everybody in turn, regardless of size, even for the Security Council, which does reflect a fundamental value, a value of equality that is particularly understandable among those who have been—among the poor, the weak or the looked-down-on, but it does produce the effect that Ade suggested of putting representation on a powerful body that isn’t taken seriously because it doesn’t itself deliver. You think of Rwanda’s Hutu government having been on the Security Council precisely at the time of the Rwanda genocide, of Libya and Sudan in turn, even while under Security Council sanctions, being the officially endorsed candidate for seats on the Security Council, Benin is sitting on the Security Council at a time when it couldn’t even vote in the General Assembly because it was under Article 19, a situation the U.S. was almost on the point of being in itself at about that time. But you see some of the problems with this kind of political practice that’s taken root. So I would be a little less sanguine about it than Patrick. Ade also called our attention to Western countries deep allergy to serving in peacekeeping operations under the U.N. almost anywhere, but most of all in Africa, and they only broke the allergy a little bit on Lebanon. So I wonder, if
all the members of the panel could offer us their thoughts on what they may see as a possible need for, and what the incentives would be for, either both changing the African group's strict regional rotation policy, and changing Western countries negative view to being part of U.N. peacekeeping operations, especially on the continent.

Edward Luck: Of course, there are those on the continent who are not exactly welcoming Western contingents either, so I think it's a two-way street at this moment. Let's wrap it up now in opposite order, because I think we're about to run out of time. So if I can ask you first, Augustine?

Augustine Mahiga: Patrick I think you are quite right. Africa—one aspect. Africa has evolved a very elaborate institutional and a structural provisions which is really a golden plate for the United Nations to work with the African Union. In areas of peacemaking or mediation, in the areas of peacekeeping, in the areas of political development, and even humanitarian response, if you look at some of the decisions that Africa has made, you only need to begin to implement them and the United Nations has a goldmine in this regional organization to maximize its work, especially the Security Council. Whether it is resolving conflicts politically or peacekeeping or preventing conflicts, there are all these elements in the African peace architecture. And the Prodi report, I think, is a good beginning where we are going to answer—the Security Council is responsible for international peace and security. They take a decision that Africa, go to Burundi, or go to Somalia. But Africa, produce your own soldiers and your own money, or if there is no money, we'll ask oh, Country X and Country Y, when they can, they can give you. There's no predictability. But that mandate you're implementing is a Security Council mandate. And we are saying, Prodi is saying, there must be a way where the keeping of international peace and security in Africa or in Latin America, is the responsibility of the United Nations. And we are beginning that kind of thinking. There are countries which are saying, well, we are not sure about accountability and transparency, but this is an issue of capacity building, and I think it should be addressed. The United Nations should use this opportunity to strengthen its presence and partnership with the United Nations in Addis Ababa in order to be able to utilize on all these opportunities that the African Union offers.

It's very interesting, yesterday we were trying to adopt a resolution of partnership between Africa and the United Nations, and the donor countries are saying, we have no money to strengthen the presence of the United Nations in Addis Ababa. Honestly, what a contradiction! It would be not only create the effectiveness of the United Nations and the Security Council, but when everything is seen through the prisms of dollars and cents, which it's not even much, really. I don’t know, this mindset and thinking, especially in the more endowed countries, I think. If we are serious about strengthening the United Nations, the opportunity is with a regional organization, the African Union offers a lot of that opportunity, I think, than the others.

Edward Luck: Thank you. Having just come back overnight from ECLAC in Santiago, Chile, where there’s several thousand U.N. employees, and given there’s what, 3500 or something like that in Addis Ababa, it’s not that the U.N. lacks numbers there. There may be other problems, but I’m not sure that numbers has been the problem in terms of representation.

Francis Deng: I don’t really have much to say, except to point out what I consider to be another paradox, and that is we often hear from our colleagues in the peacekeeping operations, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, that there is no role for
the United Nations where there is no peace to keep. That you can only keep peace where there is peace. On the other hand, if there is real peace, then you don’t need peacekeepers. So this is a paradox in the sense that so much is needed for peacekeeping, when in most cases, they themselves will be the first to say we are not good at protecting civilians, that’s not where we are good. We are good where there is peace to keep, and we are there, then why do we need them if there is peace to keep? I think what this means is Africa should put its top priority in the question of conflict prevention and management, conflict resolution. I was part of a panel put together by the OAU to help advise the OAU transition into the AU. One of the remarkable things I think we all felt strongly about was that Africa should go beyond the old notions of keeping sort of sacrosanct the principle of sovereignty and nonintervention of the affairs of the states. That is why there is a provision in the constitutive act authorizing the AU to get into countries to intervene in order to end conflicts and protect civilians. Yes, it’s a small step, yes, it is still to be developed to have teeth, but I think it’s a very significant progress. [Salim] once said to the AU, to the OAU at the time, that we in Africa must realize that in our traditional practice, we are our brothers’ keepers, and that if our brother has a problem in their house, you don’t say, this is an internal matter, you get involved. Therefore I think that while we look into what the U.N. can do for Africa, I think our first question should be what we do for ourselves, and put our priorities right.

Edward Luck: Thank you, we’re having a lot of eloquence for the final round, so I hope you feel challenged, Ade, you get the last word.

Adekele Adebajo: Yeah, I may actually lower the level of eloquence. Patrick [Hayford], what do I say to people that say “global apartheid” is too emotive? I say get over it. I think it’s important, you know, that we be moved by the appalling inequalities that you see in the world. Where you see an HIV burden in 70% of cases in one particular region, and then you see, you know, different levels of wealth in another part of the world. I think when you also have a situation where none of the African countries are on track to meet the Millennium Development Goals, which were such a sacred cow here when I was around a few years ago, as limited as they are. And when Lula, the president of Brazil, who is from a working class background, said that the financial crisis recently was caused by white men with blue eyes who saw themselves, he seemed to suggest, as masters of the universe, everybody, including yourself, Patrick, perfectly understood what he was talking about. The Western media may have been aghast at the political incorrectness of a global statesman, but that is the very essence of global apartheid. The fact that we have an Afro-Saxon as the most powerful man in the world should not actually deter us from seeing that there are these inequalities. Seriously, though, Patrick, the point is that it’s a metaphor for some of the inequalities in the world. I do recognize that both in South Africa and in the U.S. before the civil rights, there was apartheid that had a specificity in a certain time and certain location.

Dambisa Moyo, I agree with you, she has some good points in terms of, for example, the role of China and using that as a leverage, the agricultural subsidies she criticized. But I think focusing too much on aid in an ahistorical way, treating aid as if it’s the cause of conflicts without looking at some of the distortions of Mobutu stealing $5 billion, and actually using some African knowledge by African economists that have written about this so that you contextualize it more. I find Wangari Maathai’s book far more sophisticated in this context.
Then, in terms of like just tactics, strategy, etc., African leaders, I mean I think it’s important, as I’ve said that Africans actually have to be strong at home, and then use regional integration to increase their strength, because there needs to be something to integrate before integration can happen. Then some of the things I’ve talked about, like Security Council reform, leveraging the role of China on the continent and how much it’s investing in there, using some of these other fora that we’ve talked about, like the IBSA, those are some of the strategies. But I don’t think you are really going to have radical reform in the U.N. or the Breton Woods institutions, because these global institutions don’t work in that way, unless there’s a world war which Europe has caused again. That’s not likely to happen, nor is it desirable. But I think things are changing in the sense that China has recently stumped up $40 billion to recapitalize the IMF, they’ve agreed to discuss this whole idea of Americans and Europeans heading the IMF and World Bank, and it’s clear that your Chinas, Singapores, South Koreas, Brazils, India and others will inevitably have to have more of a voice and play more of a role in these international institutions. It doesn’t mean that things would change.

But I think the last point I want to leave with is that, you know, we often don’t have a choice, like poor people in societies, because the status quo is clearly not working for us. So revisionism, by its very essence, is a necessity, really, as a strategy. So that’s why the title cannot be too provocative, it’s actually where we stand, looking at the world.

Edward Luck: Thank you very much, Ade. Ade told me before we started that my longsuffering assistant had told him since I spent two of the last three nights flying south and then north, that he’d have to be lively today in order to keep me awake. I must say, he’s done more than that. All three panelists, I think, have been very profound as well. I think sometimes, Ade, you’re so entertaining, we forget that actually you’re saying things that are actually quite thoughtful and important. The combination is really quite extraordinary. But all three of you, a terrific panel, terrific comments. The questions were excellent—

[END AUDIO]