



IPI POLICY FORUM

"DEVELOPMENT AND ARMED VIOLENCE REDUCTION: EAST AFRICA EXPERIENCES, PERSPECTIVES AND PROSPECTS"

When:

Thursday, November 12, 2009, 12:30 – 2:30pm

Where:

Trygve Lie Center for Peace, Security & Development
International Peace Institute
777 United Nations Plaza, 12th Floor
(Corner of 44th Street and 1st Avenue)

Agenda:

12:30 – 12:45pm Buffet Lunch

12:45 – 2:30pm Presentations and Q & A Session

Warren Hoge:

Good afternoon. I am Warren Hoge, IPI's Vice President and Director of External Relations, and I want to welcome you to this policy forum on the subject, "Development and Armed Violence Reduction: East Africa Experiences, Perspectives, and Prospects." Joining IPI as co-host today are World Vision International and the Permanent Mission of Norway to the United Nations. Norway is a major supporter of IPI, and, I'm happy to note, a frequent collaborator in events such as this.

World Vision is a Christian relief development and advocacy organization dedicated to working with children, families, and communities to overcome poverty and injustice.

Framing our discussion today is a new study undertaken by World Vision and Project Ploughshares. Project Ploughshares

is an operating agency of the Canadian Council of Churches, with a mandate to work with churches, governments and civil society to advance policies and actions that prevent war and armed violence and build peace. Now, since IPI defines its own mission as promoting the prevention and settlement of armed conflict, we are pleased to be able to present this discussion here in this space, which, by the way, we call the Trygve Lie Center for Peace Security & Development, named for the first UN Secretary-General, who was, of course, Norwegian. The report posits a simple question at the outset: "Why do people believe they need guns? And how do we find ways for people to feel safe without them?"

The answers which the study examines in-depth generally come not from disarmament processes, as one might expect, but from development programming. The study was conducted in three parts of Kenya, Uganda, and South Sudan, and found that in all three, armed violence was a major impediment to development. And the report goes on to say that aid delivered without sensitivity to conflict dynamics can actually end up making matters worse.

Starting off the discussion today will be John Siebert, on my right, the Executive Director of Project Ploughshares, who is a co-author of the report. I will be brief with my introductions today, since his biography and those of the other speakers are in your programs on the tabletop as you entered. As discussants, we have Morten Wetland, the Permanent Representative of Norway to the United Nations; Bill Lowrey, World Vision International's Director for Peacebuilding; and Daniel Prins, who heads the Conventional Arms Branch of the UN Office for Disarmament [Affairs], and is responsible for the new Secretary-General's report on armed violence and

development that will be debated next week in the general assembly.

So, welcome to all of you, and John Siebert, the floor is yours.

John Siebert:

Thank you very much, Warren. It's a pleasure to be here, and thank you, on behalf of my colleague Ken Epps, who was the co-author of the report, and also on behalf of World Vision, our partner in this venture. And I want to thank the International Peace Institute for so graciously hosting and providing lunch. It's a matter of great urgency for all of us to consider that the poor, in addition to suffering from the deprivations inherent in poverty, also disproportionately suffer from violence conflict. Project Ploughshares has been doing an annual conflicts report since 1987, and in 2007, we did some cross-referencing with the human development index of the UN development program, and we found that 1.6% of the countries in the high development states experienced one or more armed conflicts in the last -- previous ten years. When you go to the middle income -- median human development states -- that figure rises to 30.1%, and in the low human development states, there is again a rise to 38.7%.

We're increasingly aware that even outside of conflicts that may be formally recognized as wars, insurgencies, etc., that armed violence affects societies beyond those conflicts. And it's also, for most of us, I would say, self-evident that armed violence stops and frequently reverses development processes and opportunities; yet it remains a point of sensitivity, particularly with development practitioners, that hard security or disarmament processes, while necessary, not be confused with official development assistance. I have had quite matter-of-fact discussions with some development colleagues in which I've asked, "Well, what does your organization do when armed

conflict violence is affecting the places where you're doing development programming?" Two of the responses have been, "We withdraw." A second one: "We ensure that our staff are safe."

And I'm sure that it is much more complicated at the field level, but for development -- for disarmament practitioners, of which I count Project Ploughshares and myself -- a focus on hardware has traditionally not meant that the intricacies of social relationships or economic realities and conditions behind the demand for weapons are attested to.

This has been expressed -- the solitudes between disarmament and development in the millennium development goals themselves -- in that there are eight, and, quoting from the recent Secretary-General's report, "There is MDG that deals with conflict, violence, and insecurity, but it's a major factor affecting development processes."

In 2006, with the exemplary leadership of the Swiss government, and the UNDP, along with a definitive contribution of our NGO colleague, Small Arms Survey, the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development began to bridge this gap, at least at the level of state commitments. And you could consider addressing the impact of violence on the poor as an informal ninth MDG.

Project Ploughshares, being primarily a disarmament organization, hosted the founding meeting of the International Action Network on Small Arms in 1998, and we continue to be an active member of that coalition in support of the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons. We currently manage the U.K. Foreign and Commonwealth Office, financial support for the arms trade treaty civil society

accompaniment process, and these international efforts on the control of small arms and light weapons conventional arms are vital. But they aren't enough.

Within the Geneva Declaration framework, we've been working with our CSO and NGO colleagues to explore the so-called demand side of small arms and light weapons. Why do people feel they need to have them? And David Jackman, our colleague from Canada, who is working with the Quaker UN office, is coordinating the civil society accompanying process to the Geneva Declaration process. He is here in the audience today. You might have questions for him later. Next week, as was mentioned, the UN Secretary-General's report of 5 August will be tabled in the general assembly, with debate to follow.

In terms of World Vision, as one of the largest development NGOs, it has made a commitment to integrating peace-building into its development in humanitarian programming to address the impact of armed violence at its grass roots. And Bill Lowrey, who will be speaking later, is here today, and he can talk more about World Vision. With the Advocacy and Education office of World Vision Canada, and our colleague Chris Duerksen Hebert, who is here today as well, Project Ploughshares put together this field research process, and produced the report cooperatively.

We hope that our cooperation between a disarmament organization and development organization exemplifies the need to cross the divide between these two disciplines. And we see the report itself, that you have on your chairs, as a contribution to the growing body of evidence-based research that will inform policy development around the Geneva Declaration process. Now, the heart of the report, if you've had a chance to just even look at the introductory -- or the table of

contents -- are three country-focused reports as previously indicated: Kenya, Sudan, Uganda. And we went for one week to each place and interviewed people in those communities -- both the victims, but also the perpetrators of violence -- and that included, in cattle raiding situations, raiders or warriors, as well as police, military, local government officials, and NGO and civil society staff as well. And we used the armed violence lens of the OECD-DAC to organize our findings. And at the center of that is the people affected by violence, and then you look at both the agents-perpetrators, the instruments used, and the institutions that affect these communities, and these could be traditional as well as formal state institutions. Now, there are a lot of reports that are more comprehensive and actually more pointed in terms of describing what is happening in each of these areas in East Africa in terms of armed violence, and I highly recommend Small Arms Survey, Safer World, and other organizations doing that kind of reporting.

We think ours is unique in the sense that we're actually trying to document what is being done to mitigate the armed violence in those areas in relationship to development programming, and so we hope this is unique in that sense, and helpful to people who are both making policy and implementing these things in the field. Now, looking at Kenya, we're in the North Rift valley, and the predominant threat of armed violence came from -- was related to cattle raiding. There are upwards of eight million pastoralists who have evolved a very rich culture across borders: Uganda, Kenya, Sudan, Somalia -- the so-called Karamoja Cluster -- and they live by herding cattle, goats, donkeys -- some planting horticulture -- but they've evolved a rich culture based on their relationship to animals. And these are incredibly proud, resourceful, and resilient people. You cannot visit without . . . *admiring* how these cultures have evolved.

We visited three pastoralist communities: the Turkana, Pokot, and Marakwet. And we saw that the gun violence was embedded in deep cultural traditions, that focused on cattle rustling, that have now been distorted by a range of factors, but including the civilian possession and use of automatic weapons, primarily variants of the AK-47. And people are wounded and killed singly, groups of 10, groups of 50, in groups of hundreds, or more, in single raids, often not documented. And you can understand if you travel in those parts -- and we did so under the shield and protection of the goodwill that World Vision has built in those areas -- they are remote. And it's difficult. There's very little policing -- military activity -- and often exact numbers are not available.

We found that while the Turkana and the Pokot continue in a cycle of increasingly vicious retaliatory raids around cattle rustling, that the Pokot, and the Marakwet had worked out a functional peace between themselves based on an array of factors that we gathered as we spoke to people in those communities. And if you only have time to read one part of this report, I'd suggest page 24-26 that talks about this example, where a functional peace has been created. And I'm just going to list off, quickly, some of those factors.

In 2002, the election in Kenya provided increased security in the area. And particularly the member of parliament nationally representing the Marakwet, whose name we never heard from people but was constantly referred to as a woman who supported peace. That has helped. The Marakwet have increased horticultural practices so they are less dependent on herding; they have increased their livelihood possibilities. Markets have opened along the Pokot-Marakwet border areas, and so that's increased trade. Marakwet have embraced

education, more enthusiastically, it appears, than their neighbors. And there are also cultural traditions within both communities that have been invoked to talk about how we create peace when things have gone awry.

There is also internal social control of guns. That is, guns seem to -- were described to us as being owned by a family or a clan, and they were used for certain purposes and not others. So, there wasn't individual wielding of weapons in the same way that we found elsewhere. There was also substantial training of peace committees on both sides, and then they were connected by cell phones. And this is very important. If you've traveled in those parts of the world, the landline phone technology has sort of been skipped. You have satellite -- or, you have towers relaying telephone services, and so the elders in the peace committees on both sides -- Marakwet and Pokot -- have telephones so that if raid is about to happen, they phone ahead and say, "It's coming. Protect that area." If a raid takes place, they can phone and say, "We know who took them. This is the compensation process. We'll deal with it." And so, thereby, an appropriate institutional way of stopping the retaliatory cycle that seems to be so predominant in people's description of pastoralist violence.

There was also a significant decision in the Marakwet community to reduce the reliance and practice of marriage dowry, which is a primary incentive to cattle raiding. In other words, to marry, you need X number of cows, maybe a hundred, two hundred. If you don't have them, you steal them; this is part of the traditional practice. And in that process, it is also encouraged -- intermarriage between the Pokot and Marakwet -- thus increasing family ties. We heard often that women were actively engaged in the peace process at the community level. We also heard people say things like, "We got

to a point where the violence was too much. We needed to stop it." And this sentiment, which -- if you're talking in military strategic terms: the herding stalemate -- really drove a consensus, it appears, socially within the Marakwet to work on this functional peace with their neighbors, the Pokot. Now, I speculate there is also some calculations strategically on the Pokot side. We've got enemies through the Turkana -- perhaps the Karamojong from Uganda -- that it's not a bad idea to have peace on one flank. But who knows?

The World Vision peace-building activities, which had similarities and differences across the three countries --I'm just going to highlight the ones in Kenya -- included conflict sensitivity training at the community level; conflict analysis: making sense of turbulent situations; do no harm, and local connectors for peace assessments.

Within the OECD-DAC armed violence framework, any number of different types of conflict analysis or peace-building sorts of activities fit within the analysis. It's a fairly simple structural analysis. And so, we took not -- we didn't want to evaluate those tools, per se, but we wanted to hear from the people who were in the communities -- "Did it work? What happened? How'd it go?"

And so, they also engaged in a lot of meetings. Women, youth, elders, warriors, government officials, and all of these had their cross-community lines. And a very important point was that World Vision took these meetings and took these various peace processes beyond the urban areas -- the town sites, the main sites along roads -- out to the corrals, the cattle camps themselves, cited as very important in this process. There was also alternative livelihood assistance, cultural and sports events for male and female youth. When you consider that armed

violence, virtually the world over -- main perpetrators are men between the ages of 15 and 30. They are also the main victims, although we tracked the impact on women, children, and seniors as well, the elderly. But, sports -- it can be very helpful in both soaking up the energy of the youngsters, but also bringing them together to play sports with their putative opponents in the [corrals].

Peace debates, songwriting, dramas for youth. So, support to the formal education system. Musical festivals, essay writing in schools on peace . . . some of this, from a disarmament standpoint may sound like soft measures, but they're not. Well, they are, if you think about a computer analogy, I mean, the hardware is useless without the software. And this is really where people focused on the strength of World Vision programming. And World Vision, working with other NGOs and colleagues in those areas.

I'm going to quickly say something about Uganda and Sudan. Uganda was more post-conflict situation, de facto post-conflict starting in 2006 with the start of the Juba peace talks and, effectively, the LRA raids in Northern Uganda and Eastern Uganda stopped. I'm not saying that it's a complete blanket statement. By and large, they stopped, and the IDP camps, which have ranged from between 1.5 and 2 million Acholi, primarily, in Uganda, started to -- I don't know where they got the word: "decongest;" it's probably a formal term for somebody that I don't understand -- people started moving home. And the kinds of violence that started to be shown was more related to land disputes. You know, it used to be that, 'Our plot was by that tree. Unfortunately, the UPDF cut those trees down for lumbering purposes, and that tree's not there; now, whose land is it?' And, there was also considerable testimony from people we interviewed about domestic violence and sexual violence.

And so, the peacekeeping activities of World Vision and others focus again on peace committees, but also training to sensitization, and providing a range of services, including psycho-social support for LRA returnees. We heard at one point that World Vision, over a period of time, helped to readjust, through their transition camps, over 12,000 LRA returnees. It's a phenomenal contribution to the peace process.

In Sudan, again in Warrap state, we were talking to people who were engaged in cattle-raiding, pastoralist violence. And, here, I cannot tell you a story similar to the Marakwet-Pokot story, of where a functional peace had been gained, although peace had been negotiated at a local level, referred to as a "Child of [Wunlet]," which Bill Lowrey was directly involved in, in 1998, that brought together the Dinka-Nuer during the middle of the -- during the civil war in Sudan. This Child of [Wunlet], a more localized peace agreement, was facilitated by the Sudan Council of Churches and World Vision Sudan. The agreements were made and were signed off by elders on various sides; it broke down within a month. And part of our learning in this -- what we heard from people as we talked to them was that all of the other supports, like development supports that are necessary -- infrastructure improvements, the benefits of the peace dividend of the CPA -- just weren't getting to these very remote places. We saw only evidence of one other NGO active besides World Vision in this particular county that we were in, and people weren't going, because it was unsafe.

Unfortunately, since the research was done in September of 2008, particularly in 2009, the cattle-raiding-related violence has escalated phenomenally in these areas, and throughout southern Sudan, to the point where it's estimated the UN -- the last figures I read -- over 2000 people have been killed just in

2009. And this is actually a larger death rate than the annualized deaths from conflict in Darfur, currently. So, it's a very serious problem going on. Observations and then some conclusions, and then I'll finish.

In the people we spoke to, the relationship between development / peace-building activities were twinned in their minds. They talked to us about them at the same time. They talked to us as if one couldn't be done without the other, and that they were both extremely valuable. People naturally wanted more, particularly in Sudan, where the development inputs are so small. Sudan was the one place among the three that we visited where World Vision was not involved directly in area development programs, or their long-term community development inputs, which can be from 12 to 15 years in a particular location. It was humanitarian assistance, transitional, some areas that were developmental in nature, but the inputs were much smaller, and clearly, other NGOs weren't engaged in the same way, yet.

We found a paucity of data. There's a press, and I understand it; I'm a researcher. I'm in favor of evidence-based research, but there are not uniform data collection processes in any of these places, to start with baselines. So, there's a lot of work to do in terms of helping us understand how this coming together of peace-building and development actually plays out in terms of data. We were told in each country that violence had been lessened over the last three years -- we just chose an arbitrary three-year period -- because of World Vision's presence and peace-building development programming.

Can we prove it? We don't have baseline, and we don't have ongoing data to show it. So, there is something there for the research community. We also saw that disarmament

processes, in at least two instances -- this was very forcefully spoken about -- disarmament processes can be very, very harmful. In effect, the 'do no harm' analysis hasn't been done in some of these processes, so that one community is disarmed, and another community that has seen that goes in and steals all their cattle and kills people. And, disarmament -- the guns are taken out of the community -- are immediately put back in either through trade or through theft or what have you, so disarmament processes have to pay attention to that.

We have a number of recommendations in the front of the report under the joint statement -- we have a joint statement, we have an executive summary, we have an introduction. If you're not asleep by the time you read those three, [laughter] I'll see if we can get a prescription for you. But, for policymakers, and the kind of people who are sitting here today -- donors are increasingly taking notice of these things. The Geneva declaration process is providing a framework about which to talk about this for coordination among donors, and also the international, inter-governmental systems -- the UN systems. We also need NGO community-based organizations, civil society organizations, engaged in these processes. It's not enough. The kind of sensitization work can't necessarily be done by governments, and we have -- we track some of that kind of interaction by talking to people at the community level, where World Vision was cited as providing the base on which people had the confidence, then, to speak directly with their own government officials about increasing security, looking at alternative livelihoods, and those sorts of things.

The Secretary-General's report that will be tabled next week says, "Just as there is no single cause of armed violence, there is no single solution." From my vantage point, we're very much at the front end of understanding these dynamics, how

development programming and armed violence, peace building, disarmament twin come together, we need everybody involved. We particularly need the non-government side to be supported and bolstered in this process. I am grateful for the opportunity to have traveled with World Vision, and I think they are discovering some of the solutions. We hope some of those are tracked in the report, and we're grateful for their leadership. And, thank you.

Warren Hoge:

Thank you, John. I actually have read the whole report, including those first three sections, and that was a brilliant twenty minute summary of what goes on for about 80 pages. Thank you very much. I'm now going to ask Ambassador Morten Wetland if he would speak.

Morten Wetland:

Thank you, Warren. And, I'm glad to represent Norway among such distinguished participants, which are seated next to me, or at this table. I come to this meeting from a background of long-term involvement in the humanitarian disarmament by my country, Norway. And, I see the current issue, which we are dealing with today as a continuation of something which we can date back -- well, we can start earlier -- but let us take the mine convention, for example, which regrettably did not develop as a UN-driven project. But it came to be an interaction with the United Nations, many of us here, and it is today seen as having a legitimacy, I would say, on par almost with the UN convention in the fields of disarmament. The membership in that treaty is not ideal, but the [body alone] cannot be neglected, and it leads, and will lead, to saving of lives and reduction of human suffering all over the world where we see armed conflicts still going on.

The next generation of initiative landed against -- I would say not against all odds -- but against odds, with the adoption of the

cluster munition treaty, which at times was controversial, which many didn't believe would see the light of day yet, and still, we got that one adopted, and even if also the membership of that one is not ideal, it is a set of norms which cannot be neglected, and which will influence what we see as a reasonable use of force in armed conflicts, and set standards which no one can ignore. Whether or not they subscribe to the treaty, or not, it will be there, and it will have a moral power which will influence state affairs.

Now, a true weapon of mass destruction is, really, small arms. I've been given figures which indicate that three quarters of a million people die each year, mostly because of random use of small arms in local conflicts of the nature that was so vividly described by our speaker today. And, we all know that in the UN, there has been a sluggishness in getting us to really start a process which would lead to a result. I'm thinking about the arms trade treaty, where you had long discussions about procedural points, and there is little optimism to hear from the experts who deal with that. And, is that tenable?

So, what my foreign minister did, when we had elections in Norway about a month back, and the government got a new mandate to continue for another four years, with a solid majority in parliament -- it is in the policy program of that government that we will work to improve the control and handling, possession and use, of the kind of weapon that causes that kind of violence that we're discussing here today. Now, that also may be a tall order and we may see that it has about the same realism as those pioneers and idealists had that started the mine movement and the cluster munition movement.

So, how do we go about that? When Helen Clark of the UNDP visited Norway about two weeks ago, she and the foreign

minister announced that we would convene a high-level conference in April of next year -- on the 20th of April, the 21st - - and the ideal that is to try to develop, between now and then, a substance which can be incorporated in a kind of framework for action. It might well be that it will not be right for copying too much of the processes in taking on the other humanitarian weaponry affairs -- mines and cluster munitions -- and one reason is that control of these things is more a policing question in many countries. And even this country, where it has a sort of ideology with respect to possession and use of arms which is not shared by European countries, for example, we have all these various attitudes.

So, a lot of what is taking place today to reduce the random and harmful use of such weapons happens on the local level. And, one thing that we've been looking into is if one could in some way engage chiefs of police around the world who have, whether or not it's in line with the government or capitol policy or legislation, have done their very best to curtail harmful uses of such weaponry. And the report before us is extremely useful in the sense that it goes down to the very community level, and contains a great deal of practices. And, I think what we need now is to collect evidence and testimony about policies that work on the various levels of society, be it on the level of government, regionally or even down to the village and community level that was discussed and laid out by you in your talk, sir.

Then, of course, we will always -- even if the challenge is regional, community level, or what -- we will always need to work with the national level. And we will probably not be able to address the situation effectively unless national institutions are strengthened in those countries who are most severely affected by what we would say is illegal use, or which is there perhaps

not illegal, but is nevertheless harmful and definitely reducing the room for civilian and productive economic activities in these countries.

And there, we may look to some countries -- we know that the UN has tried out a variety of different polls, and I hope we'll hear a little bit about this when you get to speak, soon -- tested out, with or without headquarters support, various policies that have had results. Sometimes good results, sometimes not so good results, but at least there have been trials by committed and dedicated personalities working for the UN -- but of course also for the NGOs -- without that policy being derived from something that has been adopted at the national level.

I think we need to bring these various practices and experiences to the attention of the concerned people around the world, and governments, and our modest effort to that effect has been the convening of the conference, which will take place -- note the date -- April 20th, 2010, when you will be also heartily welcome. Thank you.

Warren Hoge: Thank you, Morten. And I noted, first of all, the 21st of April, but you changed it. The 20th of April is the correct date of that upcoming conference?

Morten Wetland: It's a two-day conference.

Warren Hoge: That's a good answer to my question.

Warren Hoge: Bill Lowrey, could I ask you to speak now, please?

Bill Lowrey: Thank you very much. I'd like to thank John for not only his presentation, but also the work of Ploughshares and doing this type of research in the field, and giving feedback to all of us.

And it's certainly instructive, to me, in World Vision, and I appreciate -- I didn't know what would come out of it. It always makes you a little nervous when you've worked on something for years and then somebody checks it out to see what might be there.

I'm basically coming at this from the field perspective, as the Director of Peace Building for World Vision International, and my focus is on helping equip the field to integrate peace building and conflict sensitivity with relief development and advocacy. In one sense, I see today's research as a milestone in a long journey that international NGOs have been on. I would trace it back to the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, when many NGOs had never seriously considered peace building or conflict sensitivity as a major part of what they did. In one sense, you might say that they were working without regard to conflict, or some would call it working *around* conflict, just not really paying too much attention to it, trying to go about our business.

Rwanda forced all of us to do some rethinking about that, and that was true for World Vision as it was for many other agencies, and during the next few years after the genocide in Rwanda, World Vision came to the conclusion that they should look seriously at how to integrate peace building and reconciliation into its work. During that same time of the NGO journey, my journey was in Sudan. From '91 through the nineties, through '99, I was engaged just as a field worker in Sudan and also drawn into the tribal conflicts in southern Sudan, and ended up studying the indigenous methods of the Nuer peoples for my PhD work to see how they do conflict resolution, and to learn everything I could from them, and then from that process to propose that maybe those indigenous methods could work for the Dinka-Nuer war that had been going for seven years at the time.

And, in fact, they did work, and the people could resolve their conflicts given just some support from outside to help them get together and to use their own methodologies. After that -- the Wunlet peace accord in '99 -- World Vision by that time had concluded they wanted to do something in peace building and reconciliation and they found me and asked me if I would come be the guinea pig to try to figure this thing out. And so, it started off as just a pilot project. Also at that time, the Do No Harm framework was being developed by numerous NGOs under the leadership of the Collaborative for Development Action in Boston with Mary Anderson.

So, when I got to my work at the beginning of 2000 with World Vision, Do No Harm was an important framework that was being tested, and some were thinking of mainstreaming it, and it mostly was for the relief context, not for the development context. At the same time in 2000, [Philippe Le Bon] wrote a stinging article attacking, I think properly so -- criticizing, I should say, rather than attacking -- NGOs for frequently trying to do good, but not understanding the macro-context in which they were working and frequently stumbling over themselves and making some things worse. My own boss at that time said he thought that was a legitimate criticism and a challenge, and therefore, he thought that since we were a large organization, we shouldn't just say, "Well, we can't do anything about it. We should try to figure out a way to do macro analysis." So, we started that process in 2000.

At the same time, in our development stream, the conclusion had been reached that the three major risks to development -- threats to development -- that we were facing were natural disasters, destructive conflicts, and pandemics like HIV and AIDS. And the question was, "Is it possible to integrate within

development disaster mitigation, peace building, and responses to HIV and AIDS ?" So, all those streams were working together at the same time for me, in the beginning of that. Through the process, then, our focus was on learning how to integrate conflict sensitivity and peace building with all types of programming.

Over the years, then, several things have happened for us. One is we have taken the Do No Harm framework and initially began to apply it in the development context, and it had a much more nuanced kind of application for that, and we published a book a couple of years ago about learning from that process.

Secondly, we developed what is known as the MSTC -- Making Sense of Turbulent Context -- which is a community-based set of tools to examine the macro analysis. And now, we've done this twenty-six times in seventeen countries as we try to learn how to look at the overall context, including conflict -- major players -- and then how do we try to operationalize the understandings in our work. And the missing ingredient we found was at the mezzo level, or what we call area development programs or community development, and that is how do you integrate peace building in that kind of level, which is quite different than Do No Harm, which is more project specific. And development would be multiple projects. And in the process then, we developed what we've called IPAD, for Integrating Peace Building and Development, and the framework for that includes five different aspects, all of which you will see in the Marakwet-Pokot analysis that was done if you have in your mind that framework. Generally, you wouldn't have that in your mind, but let me just mention these.

The five different areas are creating a culture of good governance. So, all types of participatory methods, as well as

working with local government, trying to build capacity of government, working with governments wherever possible, and also working with the people so that they are making decisions themselves.

The second is transforming persons, recognizing people have a capacity to change -- change behavior, change attitudes, and to work on that kind of behavioral change.

The third is working in coalitions across common differences and barriers, and we found that as an NGO, so often we don't work with others. We just do it ourselves. Peace building cannot be done that way. It needs to work with others, and so that means NGOs need to all work together, government needs to work with NGOs. Also, people in their communities need to work with those who are different from them. So, how do we find the ways to bring those who are different from each other across those differences to work together? You'll see that in a number of these peace committees that were formed in these different communities with meetings.

The fourth is enhancing community capacities. I know a lot of this comes out of my study of Nuer traditional methodologies, but my deep belief that people have great wisdom and traditions that need to be discovered by outsiders and need to be enhanced and encouraged -- that people can resolve many conflicts themselves. Sometimes this means the chiefs have to be more involved, elders have to be more involved. Discover the rituals that have been used in the past, the traditional methods of resolving conflict, and the traditional kind of dialogues, and not just impose sort of Western methodologies.

And the final is to have sustainable livelihoods and just distribution of resources and power. All relationships can be

improved, but if there are no livelihoods there that can be sustained, people will eventually go back to conflict. Both power and resources can drive conflicts. Resources from an NGO are just as important in many ways as the resources that are there locally. And so, people need to perceive there is a rough fairness or equilibrium to the way those are distributed, and that also must be true in terms of power. So, these different methodologies are used -- or frameworks are used -- and then looking at the tools from a micro, mezzo and macro level, and then we have developed networks in regions around the world, about forty countries now, and five different regions of the world for our peace building staff so that they can be developing their skills, applying those to programming, and we're constantly losing staff, so it's training new staff and keeping all of that going. It's a major commitment of an NGO to say, "This is important for our work -- conflict sensitivity and peace building in the midst of development -- and we would hope that that would bring about some kind of reduction in violence and armed conflict." Thank you.

Warren Hoge:

Thank you. NGOs working at cross-purposes; what an exotic thought that is [laughter], but I'm glad to know it's on your list of five things you're trying to put an end to. I want to call on Daniel Prins, and just to remind you, because some of you weren't here for the original introduction, Daniel is responsible -- Daniel Prins is responsible -- for the Secretary-General's report on violence -- armed violence and development -- that will be debated next week in the General Assembly. Daniel?

Daniel Prins:

Well, thank you very much. There was one person responsible for that report, and it's not me, it's the Secretary-General, but I did have a role with other UN partners in getting that report done. Thanks. And I also apologize for not contributing to the gender balance behind this table.

I'd like to actually build on what Mr. Lowrey stressed -- one of the things he stressed. And that is, "How do large or smaller bureaucracies organize themselves." Certainly, when it's about themes, and, you know, all of us I think are familiar with the interconnections between themes that we've seen emerging, certainly in the past, let's say twenty years, more than ever. And so, how do you organize yourselves. That is -- that remains -- a central question we're trying, the UN is trying, many governments are trying, ministries are, large NGOs are, perhaps smaller ones are also.

But basically what we are talking about today is that there are development issues here, so to speak, and then there are conflict issues there, and traditionally, different people have covered the development issues separately from those that covered the conflict issues. We've also seen that, of course, arms control -- arms control as a whole belongs very much in this conflict issues silo, so to speak, up to now, and have been treated in -- let's say, in context of national security, by those from defense ministries, foreign affairs, others that work on those themes.

And we certainly have concluded, in the past couple of years, that that is simply not good enough. It is not good enough. We need to integrate the work on these very traditionally distinct fields of work much more seriously than we have up until now. I'm not saying that we haven't tried yet. I think that we've made good progress already, but we certainly would need much further steps.

At the same time, we see -- let's say from the analytical point of view of what's, say, what is happening outside there -- that we see much better how crime-related issues are so, let's say, central to what we traditionally used to see as conflict settings.

First of all, we see that in post-conflict areas, crime is very high. Not only crime is high, but also arms circulation is often much higher in post-conflict settings than in areas of conflict. So, there's more arms often in regions coming out of conflict than in those regions that are actually in conflict. But also, in regions that are not in let's say traditional forms of conflict, there is tremendously high circulation of arms, and we think of areas like Guatemala, Brazil, South Africa -- you know, countries that have had, for quite a number of years or decades, not seen war. It depends a bit on what country you talk about, but still, you know, those are not countries -- and they are not the only ones -- but they are not countries that are just emerging out of conflict. But they have very high issues with armed violence and arms in their societies.

We see also in areas that are in conflict, or are just coming out of conflict, how there is not a clear dividing line between, let's say, those armed groups that work on political goals and others that basically could be called 'violence entrepreneurs' or are showing predatory behavior -- often perhaps the same groups that one day have their political goals high in their agenda, but the next day show basic predatory behavior facilitated often by elite patrons. So, the, let's say, difference between -- there's conflict areas here, and there's crime areas there, also don't work anymore. And that means that we have to also, of course, change our approaches, our answers, our policy settings to what we see in the field, and that basically means -- and I think that links into what we have heard here already today -- that you need to develop very different interventions to get those things right, so to speak.

The traditional arms control approach to work on -- with national institutions and not focus too much on community -- security protection, because that is something that, you know, in the

international arms control field is not traditionally dealt with, doesn't work either, anymore. And I think the process that deals with armed violence and development is a very good example of, let's say, an attempt -- a very serious attempt -- to make sense of these, let's say, blurring lines between crime, conflict, and development, and trying to approach it more holistically, as a whole, and much more -- and I stress that -- with local elements in the interventions as a central part to it.

That's not easy. We see that working with local governments -- and I don't talk for the Office for Disarmament Affairs because we don't work much at the local level -- but I think in general, the UN system sees that local governments sometimes work very well, but there is also regions where they are weaker. For instance, in Latin America, there is -- some research shows that there is some parts of it where local government is very good, where it includes things like tax generation capacity, where it can actually work very well with local -- with communities and local governments, whereas in parts of Africa, it is much more challenging to do that.

Also, and perhaps in request to one of the issues that Ambassador Wetland raised, I think that also other research shows that what we call DDR: Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration -- a classic acronym within the UN for two decades now, I think -- that actually, if we're honest, rarely leads to durable reintegration. And we've seen good results from it, but also a lot of, let's say, questionable results in the sense that we don't simply see proof of results. And that typically is also a good example, I think, of the UN system and governments -- donor governments -- but also affective governments struggling with these issues and needing to further address it in a more holistic way.

If I just, very quickly, can sort of sketch how this integration of development and security took place, and will further, perhaps, develop. Central, certainly from the UN's point of view is of course the concept of the millennium development goals, developed in 2000, which, as we've heard already today, do not contain any serious reference to security. That's not a millennium development goal that deals with the issue of security in a country, in a community, whatever, and that is a hole, a gap that we have recognized. I think member states have done that too, conceptually, five years later. At the 2005 UN summit outcome, the member states agreed that development and security are interlinked. There can be no development without security, and no security without development. So, conceptually, it's there. Again, I stress we need to organize ourselves around this much better than we've done. Up to now, we're still way too compartmentalized.

I think a good example is that we have this program of action on small arms, which again is traditionally something dealt with by delegations from countries that are recruited from, let's say, your security affairs department, and your ministry for foreign affairs, and in many countries also the defense people that come to the meetings and simply don't have, necessarily, the background of adding the development angle to the issue. At the same time, we see in the, let's say, the development of the Peacebuilding Commission perhaps, a bit, the other side. I do recognize that a Peacebuilding Commission and its different configurations of course focuses on security issues, but the arms issues, the violence issues are not yet part of it. I think the Ploughshares report that we have in front of us stresses that, too -- that, for instance, in the Uganda context, there is very little attention to the arms issue, and we notice also -- you know, I notice from my point of view -- that in the Burundi,

Sierra Leone, all other contexts, it's absolutely central to pick up on it, but it's not yet part of the debate, so to speak.

So, we need a much more holistic approach in the Peacebuilding Commission as well. And I think the first real attempt from the UN system to bring those parts together was last year's Secretary-General's report to the Security Council on the small arms issue, which really is an attempt to holistically bring all these issues together and come forward with recommendations that make sense. And actually, it's the first time that within the UN system this Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development is mentioned and is fostered.

And it's also the first time that the Secretary-General went on record saying that after 2015, when we have finished, hopefully, the millennium development goals, which would now already work towards -- you know, what comes after that, actually? And shouldn't we include in whatever is the follow-up of the millennium development goals, shouldn't we include in that follow-up, let's say, a security-related goal, because we are sure that after 2015, we'll continue working on, let's say, measurability issues in relation to development, and we better include security questions in that as well. I think I'll leave it at that. I also prepared some, let's say, outcomes of the S-G's report on armed violence and development, but I think it's more interesting to hear a bit of your views.

My very last point would be that listening to Ambassador Wetland's, let's say, exciting views on how the UN, or not the UN, could work with these themes of armed violence -- I think one of the concepts that we really need to develop further is what I would call self-identification. If we have global meetings on issues like armed violence, we often see that it's difficult to get progress done because some states may not be centrally

interested in the issue. And I -- it depends a bit -- but for some states, you know, I don't blame them, necessarily. There may be states for whom these issues are not central.

And I would see much merit -- and that's what I call self-identification -- in building into the processes of making progress possibilities for countries to step forward and say, "I am affected by this, and I need help on this. And this and this and this are my priorities; these and these are, let's say, issues I would want to work with -- with donor states, with others -- but I recognize that I, myself, as a country, have a problem with this." And then we focus on those that need the assistance, but also that have made the commitment to work on this. Thank you.

Warren Hoge:

Thank you, Daniel. I'm going to go to questions in one moment, but John, as the male moderator of an all-male panel, I would like to mention something that is in the report which didn't come up in any comments here, and that is the role of women who sometimes end up particularly as victims, but often, more interestingly, end up as avenues, or instruments, of the integrations we're speaking of today. Could you speak to that please?

John Siebert:

Yeah, the whole process of gender analysis, which I'll admit, we are not expert in, was certainly engaged in our questioning, and we found women who were both victims, but also in some cases direct perpetrators or supporters to perpetrators. And this is part of this embedded cultural understanding of the role of cattle raiding and sons going off and enriching the whole of the family through these kinds of things, but people told us, in various ways, that women were also key to then also saying to their sons, "Stop. It's gone too far. We can't keep going this way."

And sometimes, the role of World Vision was as simple as providing a vehicle to get, you know, mothers out to talk to the raiders who were their sons. And it's complicated, because these folks who are raiders are also heroes in their communities. They have a multiple identity, and so women were very, very important to the peace processes, too.

Warren Hoge: I'm going to go to questions now. If you would wait for the microphone and identify yourself. John Hirsch, here in the front row?

John Hirsch: John Hirsch, IPI. First of all, thank you all very much, and I want to also congratulate World Vision. I knew many of your colleagues in Somalia and Sierra Leone years ago, and you've done great work. And I loved the five themes that you developed. I have two questions: one for Ambassador Wetland and one for Mr. Lowrey. I came in a little late on Mr. Siebert.

I wonder, your comment about talking with police chiefs about controlling arms, whether you're also going to talk to defense ministers. And I also think about that because we have one of our colleagues, Peter Gastrow, who is in Kenya working on police reform, and often the police have been part of the problem in these countries, so not all police chiefs are necessarily the best place to help bring arms under control.

And then, with regard to your five themes that I thought were really fantastic, I wonder if you could just give an example or two of what you've done in creating a culture of good governance in some concrete situation, so that you could illustrate this a little more. But thank you all very much.

Warren Hoge: Were you directing that question at . . . ?

John Hirsch: I asked Ambassador Wetland one question about police chiefs, and I asked Mr. Lowrey another question about the governance.

Morten Wetland: Yeah, now I'm -- what you said, that some of the chiefs of police are part of the problem and not part of the solution -- can you hear me? -- I think we hopefully recognize that as much as you and the IPI do. And the idea was that there is a mixed picture out there. And by using networks among chiefs of police, and the associations where these meet, you might be able to identify those members of that distinguished groups of officials who have done more than others.

And sometimes using their own creativity to specific solutions, and it's not at all sure if that kind of experience or knowledge reaches far enough out there in the world and could serve as an inspiration for others, or even be taken down and incorporated in the catalogs of best practices. When you then turn to defense ministers, then it might be in a country where they have 'x' chiefs of police that there are 'y' chiefs of police among these 'x' who are worthwhile talking to. Defense ministers, you used to have one, and they, well, I think you can do both things, but the idea of chiefs of police was to use the networks among those who really care about the issue more than others, and who have experience, and results that might be shared with a wider audience.

Warren Hoge: Interestingly, in this country, chiefs of police are very much against the ideology you spoke of, Morten Wetland, of individual gun ownership, but it doesn't seem to be able to change the practice in this country.

Would you take the question on good governance, please?

Bill Lowrey:

Ok, just some examples of how to move forward on good governance. I think there are multiple levels. All of it still falls under the category of creating and encouraging a culture of good governance. For an NGO, which always is doing projects, one of the starting places is, "Who manages the project? And how are decisions made in the project?"

And so, you begin to teach participatory processes and empowering people when the community owns their own development process, makes the decisions, sets the priorities, creates the criteria by which various projects are run.

Secondly, we can honor and support some of the traditional governance processes which frequently have been marginalized, either in a militarized context or just by the political structures of a particular country. Sometimes, local elders can make decisions and resolve conflicts in an informal process that becomes a form of strengthening good governance, especially when those traditional methods and relationships are linked to the more formal government, so that rather than creating parallel or competing, somehow or another working together.

Then, of course, there is plenty of things that you do locally in terms of administration. In this particular research piece, you'll see among the Marakwet that one of the things World Vision did at the request of the community was to advocate with the administration of the Kenyan government to get administrators closer to the people and security folks closer to the people because there was such a distance, that it was as though it was a frontier territory. And as those new offices opened up, and as also those people became a part of the training processes, it improved the governance.

And then of course we do have responsibilities at national and global levels for advocacy, as well, that relates to good governance.

Ebenezer Appreku: Ok, thank you, and good afternoon. Also, I appreciate the presentations. I'll try and be very quick. Picking up from the cue given by --

Warren Hoge: Could you please -- I know who you are, but could you introduce yourself to the rest of the room? Thank you.

Ebenezer Appreku: Ok. Ebenezer Appreku is my name. I am from the Ghana mission. Picking up from the cue given by Mr. Prins on self-identification, I just want to request, if it's possible, for Mr. Wetland's programs to factor in what we are doing in the West African region. You might have heard that we've adopted a convention on small arms. And it has come into force. As a matter of fact, the momentum for getting it into force was led by an NGO, a civil society group called the West African Network of Small Arms [unintelligible], so I wanted to suggest if you sort of target in the city the chiefs of police you could look at such grassroots or community-based organizations in getting things done.

The other point is the point made about the absence of DDR in peace building. And there, I suppose that in the Peacebuilding Commission in the UN, the DDR is normally located in the security sector reform. And it is not highlighted because UNDP is considered to be the lead agency for DDR in the conflict areas, but the problem we have identified is the lack of money, training, or [evolution]. Because, after five years, the reports we read on DDR is that several years of DDR have failed, and we don't want to wait those five years, six years, to read the report:

an effort in DDR has failed. So I think monitoring is very important.

And finally, I wanted to find out from Mr. Lowrey whether -- I mean, what is your link with the Peacebuilding Commission? Because from what I have from you, you don't seem to be doing a lot with the Peacebuilding Commission, when in matter of fact, the issue of development and peace is very crucial in our work, and I thought given the [unintelligible] is going to be a review of the Peacebuilding Commission mandate, you may have some thoughts to share with us. I think the time is limited, so I will end it here. Thank you.

Daniel Prins:

Well . . . short and easy to answer. That, of course is what you referred to is one successful story, and I take it as a self-evident thing, that the regional treaty, which actually succeeded in the goals [unintelligible] and ratifying and so on, will be among the lucid examples that need to go into the preparations when we try to generate, let's say, one coherent global preparatory process to highlight these things.

I don't know, as I speak now, how far it has come, but I will check and come back to you individually in the course of the week down there.

Bill Lowrey:

Now, just a couple of comments on the relationship with the Peacebuilding Commission. We have had meetings here in New York with the Peacebuilding Commission. I recognize that in one sense, that's a -- from the top down commission -- most of our work is from the bottom up, but it is very critical that we meet in the middle. And so, we've tried to encourage our staff in the field in those countries that are prioritized countries to be engaged with the Peacebuilding Commission from the civil society side.

And then, from the New York side, we have tried to advocate for the Peacebuilding Commission to be very engaged with civil society and to make civil society a strong partner with that. I think we still got a long way to go from our World Vision side of that, and I hope we'll all keep working together to make that more collaborative.

Warren Hoge:

Daniel?

Daniel Prins:

Yes, thank you. Just to respond on the West Africa context, because West Africa is, I think, one of the best examples of what I tried to talk about. We have a couple of peacekeeping operations, isn't it, in the region. And peacekeeping traditionally has been having its focus on, let's say, responding to military confrontation, isn't it? Rather than transforming illicit political economies and working against illicit arms trafficking and gangs operating.

At the same time, we've seen in the past years -- and that's a very recent development -- that things like the re-rooting of intercontinental drug supply lines now using West Africa much more as a hub between Latin America and Europe and other parts of the world than before, when it was mostly through the Caribbean. And, you know, we're talking about a region that is, in part, well organized but in part is also not well organized. You know, a country like Guinea-Bissau doesn't have customs. So, you know, if your choice as a drug trafficker is to work through, let's say, well-developed now, anti-drug, let's say, organization, by countries in the Caribbean or through regions where often there's no RADAR, there's no coast guard, or very limited ones, and in some countries not even customs, still -- you know, I would know what to choose.

So, this typically is something that needs to be addressed quickly and again, not in a traditional arms control or a security context only. It is very, very centrally development-linked. And that is why I think it's important to just mention -- I won't go into what is called the West Africa coast initiative, which is exactly a type of response that is needed here. It's very much at the beginning, but it's an attempt to work together within a number of UN institutions that traditionally, perhaps, don't work together on these things. I am speaking of United Nations Development Programme, the UN Office for Drugs and Crime, and others that, in this context of West Africa, try to really develop a joint program to deal with this, let's say, cluster of issues. Thanks.

Warren Hoge:

Very good. Here, in the front row?

Yael Danieli:

I am professor Yael Danieli. I am trying to speak from four hats at the same time right now, one of which is being a chair of the NGO Alliance on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, helping to plan the next world congress on crime prevention and criminal justice in Brazil next April, the week before your meeting [laughter]. And none of these issues are planned to be discussed there, and this congress happens every five years. It might be a good idea, perhaps, through ancillary meetings, which we organize, to introduce these issues. Of course, all of us, forever, [paying] the lack of coordination of bureaucratic institutions in general, and the UN in particular, that [paying] to create a long-term delay in problem solving that makes sense according to issues.

But I wanted to ask Bill also -- we've collaborated with World Vision as the International Study for Traumatic Stress studies that I represent, as well -- you made a, you mentioned almost in passing the turnover of staff. Could you speak more to that, because I was wondering how much of that is a function of the

difficult circumstances of the work? And what is done about that? I have about five more questions, but I think that we can do those later --

Warren Hoge: Just one. Who would like to address any one of those questions? Go ahead, Daniel.

Bill Lowrey: I can speak to turnovers.

Warren Hoge: Please.

Bill Lowrey: I wish I had a solution to turnover staff -- staff turnover. There's a normal turnover rate that everyone experiences, and so we always have to anticipate that we should be training the next generation of workers, and so that's just a normal part of the process. In NGO work, when projects are grant-funded, those are usually time-related. Might be a one-year grant, might be a three-year grant. Frequently, that grant doesn't pick up with a new grant just at the right time. And staff are let go at the end of a grant time, and sometimes a lot of capacity has been built into those staff, and they are lost, in a sense.

However, there is also the turnover of staff that comes to different NGOs. Now, that is not a loss, in my view. It's just a moving around of assets. And some people benefit, and sometimes you benefit and sometimes you lose in that, but that's a normal process, I think, that goes on. The other thing is, within these conflict contexts, the stress level is extremely high, and this relates to trauma and the emotions of it, psychology of it, and the need for support systems for people to be able to sustain themselves over a long period of time. Basically, to build resilience, and how you train staff to deal with their own human well-being so that they can be sustained and also, how to get them out when they have reached their limit or maybe

gone past their limit, so that they can actually survive, get some healing, come back in.

As one who went through post-traumatic stress, faced being taken by boy soldiers, facing death threats for a period of time, seeing lots of children die -- eventually it got to me. I needed to get out for a period of time -- get some healing -- in order to be able to come back in. So, these are things we just have to work at all the time, and we have to, I think, have that in our mind, that that's part of it, and have the resources that can be committed to it.

Warren Hoge:

Great. Is that Ambassador Rugunda in the back of the room? I'm going to anticipate your question just telling you one thing for a minute -- and the audience.

We had an extraordinary evening here a month ago featuring the author of a book on Uganda. And it's a book about how Uganda -- some countries choose Truth and Reconciliation Commission, some countries choose prosecution -- Uganda had another way of dealing with the aftermath of violence and chaos. And the author of the book came, but the reason I mention this right now is we also had the protagonist of that book, who is a Ugandan, who now serves in the Ugandan mission here. I think he's a First Secretary, named Duncan Muhumuza Laki, and he spoke eloquently, and it was his pursuit of the murderers of his own father in 1972 that was the story the book told, and that led to a larger examination of forgiveness and reconciliation.

The reason I bring this up is I have an opportunity right now, which I will probably never have again, of asking a Permanent Representative to be a messenger. We have downstairs on my desk an extraordinary photo -- a portrait -- of Duncan

Muhumuza Laki and his entire family, who came that night -- three children and his wife -- and I very much hope you will take it back to the mission when you go. Now we will hear your question.

Ambassador Rugunda: I will gladly be your messenger. I would like to commend the presentations, and the research made. I think it is authentic research. And while I was very happy to see that the time [unintelligible] spent with [unintelligible] people had come with very down to earth conclusions. Quite often, governments in Africa and NGOs, mainly from the West, take it as if we have all the solutions, and tend to work in disregard of communities, to try to have the answers and sort of problems when in fact they have not made a correct diagnosis of the problem, and hence, problems that could have been simplified, sorted out within a relatively short time if the local communities had taken a central role. It ends up taking a very, very long time.

I would like to -- after having made that comment -- I would like to commend the World Vision. World Vision has done very commendable work, especially in northern Uganda, in helping people who have been abducted and subsequently rescued. And I think we have been impartial interlocutors in this situation, and both the government and the rebel groups commend the work that World Vision has done.

Now, on small arms: small arms are important, but I think they are a secondary factor. They merely categorize the process. They don't cause conflicts. They are just innocent weapons that are used, so whereas I support the control of small arms, I would not want it to be taken as if small arms are the cause of the conflicts. They are merely innocent weapons that are used, and they can be used for a good cause, or for a bad cause. And if it is a question of the distribution of small arms that we are

concerned about, I think the country that we should be concerned about first is the United States, because I am not aware of any other country that has got small arms so liberally distributed in the country, like the United States.

Therefore the critical point is rebuilding institutions that will be able to control these arms, and I must say that governments are already doing good work in Africa in that direction. More work could be done, but I think the critical point is for us to talk with the root causes of these conflicts so that we don't even have to use the small arms. For example, the Karamojong. And I was very happy that the research has done good work on the Karamojong. The Karamojong I sense are a good people, but people who live only on [cattle]. Half -- part of the year -- it is, there is a lot of drought. And there is no water for cows, so the Karamojong, whose existence depends entirely on the cow, must go out of their normal area of habitation to the nearby areas for two things: pasture and water.

Of course, in the face of resistance, and that creates conflict. Therefore, the government of Uganda has been endeavoring to do -- to make water available for the Karamojong as one of the ways to sort out this problem, and I agree with Lowrey that the question of sustainable livelihood is a critical factor.

The last comment I want to make is that NGOs -- most of them are doing good work, but some of them are doing negative work. So there is need to have a mechanism, perhaps within the civil society, to manage, to help NGOs or civil society organizations conduct themselves appropriately. Avoid the assumption that they know everything, take into account that the people in the communities know their interests, and that any solution must involve the local population. Avoid the danger, which some do, of suddenly ignoring government and working

with opposition groups, and then you become a suspect, and you get into problems, but otherwise, I think this has been an excellent presentation. Very good research, and we are looking forward for more work from civil society, but look for better coordination with local communities, local governments, and we'll be making good progress to help the population. Thank you.

Warren Hoge: Thank you very much, Ambassador. I'm going to ask John to --

John Siebert: Thank you very much for your cautions to NGOs, and I think we do need to hear those again and again, and incorporate those into our processes. I'm kind of honor bound to address the issue of 'guns are just neutral; they're neither good nor bad -- it's the use to which they are put.'

The stories that we heard, at least in the two pastoral situations that we were engaged in was the introduction of automatic weapons. And this goes beyond single-shot. They've had single-shot weapons since colonial times, the nineteenth century in some of these areas, but the introduction of automatic weapons qualitatively changed the nature of the violence, and the presence of those weapons in and of themselves escalated and severely compromised those communities.

And I would also note that the government of Uganda has taken major steps to control small arms in their country.

Eddie Mandhry: Eddie Mandhry here, from Kenya. I work in New York with Global Kids [Inc.]. I thank you very much for a very compelling presentation. I had a question about some of the research methodology information in the talks about, you know, how many respondents you found. And the number seems low, and

particularly for Kenya, there were no young people, no youth, no male youth who were interviewed.

Now, you know, there's been allegations that there's potential for communities that are engaged in post-conflict election violence looking for small arms as opposed to crude weapons like, you know, spears and bows and arrows. What could be the implication for, you know, the upcoming election in 2012 if these arms get into the hands of other communities ?

Warren Hoge: Did you have a question as well? We'll take a second question, and that may be the last question.

David Jackman: My name is David Jackman. I work with the Quaker United Nations Office, and particularly helping civil society to engage constructively with the Geneva Declaration process, and I wanted to mention, just in short, that the -- with as much conversation here, in discussion of the need for new structures to assist all of us to work outside of our usual silos with others who we need, desperately, if we're going to be successful -- so, there are many different ways to do it. One is a multi-stakeholder action dialogue process. And in a way, that is what the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development is. It links states, UN and other agencies, global agencies, civil society, together in a conversation about how to act in the world. It's also, of course, a higher level political momentum process, but in fact, for that to be real, all the rest of us have to give vibrant practical activity and work together on that.

So, it's interesting. And, in fact, almost everyone at the head table is part of the Geneva Declaration as a state, as part of a global institution, or part of -- two of my NGO colleagues, as well. So, it's not the only way to work, or the only grouping, but it is significant that already, out of other conversations at the UN

that were less successful, like the Small Arms Programme of Action and its relationship with demand issues, what has resulted is a group of states and other actors working together to make a change. And what I would like to do is invite you all to a meeting on next Monday, the 16th of November, in the UN in conference room 4 -- lunchtime meeting -- light lunch provided, where the Geneva Declaration core group has organized a meeting of our many different actors to say, "How do we view the report from the Secretary-General? What do we see as valuable within it? What kind of guidelines does it offer for action by all of us, states, agencies, NGOs, together, in the future?" And all of our points of view will be represented at that meeting. So, I'll be here for awhile. Also, we do have materials at the back that you might be interested in, as well, from many of the actors within the Geneva Declaration. Thanks.

Warren Hoge:

Thank you very much, and I'll get you an answer, and it'll be the last words from the panel, but while we're in the inviting mode, I want to tell you that through a strange concatenation of events, we have an event tomorrow. I suspect many of you have been invited to it, because we basically sent out the same list. Tomorrow's event deals with northern Uganda, the DRC, and the Lord's Resistance Army, and we will have Ross Mountain here, who is returning from being the SRSG, or the deputy SRSG there in the DRC. We will have Sir John Holmes here, the head of OCHA, and we will have Ann Veneman of UNICEF. So, I think I'll answer these two questions in the order we began. John, will you start, please?

John Siebert:

Thank you very much on the methodological question of -- we were very careful and made a decision prior to going into the research that we would not interview children -- and children identified as being eighteen and under. It's difficult, because sometimes youth don't know how old they are, and there may

have been youth actually interviewed in Kenya, so there were ethical restraints in the research process itself. We probably spoke with -- what is a youth? Thirty and under? I just turned fifty; I think it's fifty and under, but, you know, it's a problem.

Yes, um, in terms of post-election violence in Kenya, and guns, obviously that wasn't part of this research, and the North Rift Valley wasn't a factor that was raised by people that we interviewed. I'd make a comment, an observation, that I was actually quite surprised, when the violence started in December 26th, 2007, how little gun use there was, and where guns appeared to be misused, it was predominantly by the police. Now, in a replay of full-blown conflict, again, involving the various political parties, etcetera, I don't know. People who know Kenya better may be able to predict what the gun use might be. I don't know.

Warren Hoge:

He will pass on the answers. Please, Bill, do you have anything you would like to add? This is your last moment. [laughter] Daniel, it's up to you.

Daniel Prins:

Well, thank you. Actually, I was triggered by the Ambassador's interesting remarks, to which I -- most of them, I fully agree. It is, I think, good to notice that small arms are a special category in the sense that they are the only weapons that can be owned by individuals in most countries, not all. You know, you cannot own a battle tank, or an attack helicopter, but, you know, a gun, you can own. That poses a responsibility on you as an individual, but certainly also on governments to control that.

And I think it's true what you say, that there's no direct link between the number of arms in circulation and, let's say, levels of conflict. A couple of countries, including Norway, Switzerland, Canada, have very high per capita arms ownership, and are not

necessarily seeing that as a big problem, but controls are very diff -- let's say central to it. And also, it widens the options for other, let's say, acts, and if that is the case, and I think often in our organizations, we talk about low-hanging fruit, you know, what can we achieve easily. And I think that many others may also talk about low-hanging fruit, including those, let's say, predominantly youths, in societies with lax controls and with little outlook for jobs for a good future, and then the low-hanging fruit may be that not only your government cannot provide you the security that you need, but also doesn't exercise the monopoly on violence, and there may be low-hanging fruit in -- with a gun, having alternatives that are not necessarily, let's say, beneficial for security. And so, that's why, I think, we work on alternative livelihoods, especially for youths and male youths in most of these regions, and that is what this is mostly about. Thank you.

Warren Hoge:

And Daniel, thank you. Thank the entire panel. Thank you, audience, for being so engaged. I hope to see some more of you tomorrow

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