Addressing Armed Violence in East Africa

A Report on World Vision Peacebuilding, Development and Humanitarian Assistance Programmes

by John Siebert and Kenneth Epps

Produced Collaboratively by Project Ploughshares and World Vision Canada
Founded in 1976, Project Ploughshares is an operating agency of The Canadian Council of Churches with a mandate to work with churches, governments, and civil society, in Canada and abroad, to advance policies and actions that prevent war and armed violence and build peace.

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World Vision is a Christian relief, development and advocacy organisation dedicated to working with children, families and communities to overcome poverty and injustice. As followers of Jesus, we are motivated by God’s love to serve all people regardless of religion, race, ethnicity or gender.

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Acknowledgements

The authors wish to thank those people who agreed to be interviewed for this report, people from communities in Kenya’s North Rift Valley, in Uganda’s Kitgum and Soroti districts, and in Southern Sudan’s Warrap State. These communities welcomed us and shared their insights, despite the short timeframe within which we conducted the research. Needless to say, we were struck by the courage and resilience of the people we met, and by their determination to work for peace in their communities despite the numerous challenges encountered.

This report was written by John Siebert and Ken Epps from Project Ploughshares. Project Ploughshares was ably assisted by Suzanne Cherry and Chris Derksen-Hiebert of World Vision Canada, which funded the research. Suzanne Cherry worked closely with Project Ploughshares and WV East Africa colleagues as they collectively developed the plan, methods and logistics for the field research and reviewed the results. She also joined the field research teams in Kenya and Uganda.

The research teams travelled in the safety and security of the trust established in the communities by World Vision. We came to greatly admire the deep concern World Vision staff bring to their work and their commitment despite the many risks they face to carry it out.

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The content of the report has been reviewed by World Vision staff in the three countries visited, in Canada and at the East Africa regional and WV international levels – in part to minimise the risk that quotations can be attributed to and possibly endanger people interviewed, who already daily face the twin threats of armed violence and economic uncertainty.

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Project Ploughshares is the ecumenical peace centre of The Canadian Council of Churches and affiliated with the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, Conrad Grebel University College, University of Waterloo, Canada.
Acronyms and Abbreviations

ADP Area Development Programme
AVL Armed violence lens
CEWARN Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism
CBO Community-based organisation
CCM Comitato Collaborazione Medica (Italian NGO)
CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement (Sudan)
DC District Commissioner (Kenya)
DDR Demobilisation, disarmament and rehabilitation
DIPLCAP Disaster Preparedness and Local Capacities for Peace
DNH Do No Harm
GD Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development
GISO Gombolola Internal Security Officer (Uganda)
GOSS Government of Southern Sudan
HDI Human Development Index
HQ Headquarters
IDP Internally displaced person
IGAD Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IPAD Integrating Peacebuilding and Development
KPR Kenya Police Reserve/Reservist
KSh Kenyan shilling
LCP Local Capacities for Peace
LDU Local Defence Unit (Uganda)
LRA Lord’s Resistance Army
MSTC Making Sense of Turbulent Contexts
NAP National Action Plan on Small Arms and Light Weapons
NCCK National Council of Churches of Kenya
NGO Nongovernmental organisation
OCPD Officer Commanding Police Division (Kenya)
OECD-DAC Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PEAP Poverty Eradication Action Plan (Uganda)
MP Member of Parliament
RPG Rocket-propelled grenade
SALW Small arms and light weapons
SCC Sudan Council of Churches
SDG Sudanese pound
SPC Special Police Constable (Uganda)
SPLA/M Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement
SSRRC South Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNMIS United Nations Mission in Sudan
UPDF Uganda People’s Defence Force
USh Ugandan shilling
WV World Vision
WVC World Vision Canada
WVK World Vision Kenya
WVS World Vision Sudan
WVU World Vision Uganda
Joint Statement

Joint Statement by Project Ploughshares and World Vision Canada on Development, Peacebuilding and Armed Violence Reduction

Project Ploughshares and World Vision Canada are pleased to publish this report based on 2008 field research in East Africa on armed violence reduction and World Vision peacebuilding and development activities. The research report itself attempts to faithfully document what was heard and seen during the three weeks that interviews were conducted in selected parts of Kenya, Uganda and Sudan. Observations are provided based on the research but conclusions and recommendations were deliberately excluded from the report proper because of the constraints described in the Methodology section.

We will not be so reserved in this joint statement. The recommendations below are intended to focus discussion with and among donors, partner country governments, government foreign and defence policy makers, colleagues in Northern and Southern non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and academic institutions on how the findings in this report can and should be used to formulate policy and direct programming to advance development effectiveness and reduce armed violence. Our complementary mandates shape the recommendations. Project Ploughshares’ mandate is to identify, develop, and advance approaches that build peace and prevent war. World Vision’s mandate is to see every child experience life in all its fullness, as we work with children, families and communities to overcome poverty and injustice.

Our research partnership arose from a common cause. The project was formed on the basis of prior commitments in both organisations to contribute to the growing body of evidence-based research documenting the important link between reducing armed violence and increased effectiveness of peacebuilding, development and humanitarian relief programming. World Vision International has made a world-wide organisational commitment to addressing violent conflict in its programming because without this cross-cutting focus, its work and investments in local community development risk being undermined and even squandered. Project Ploughshares’ research and policy work to stop the uncontrolled proliferation of conventional arms—particularly small arms and light weapons—has increasingly been focused on the demand factors in arms proliferation. Why do people believe that they need guns, and how do we find ways for people to feel safe without them? The answers generally come from development programming rather than disarmament processes.

In 2008, in an effort to assess the full scope and impact of worldwide violence, the Secretariat of the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development published the Global Burden of Armed Violence. This study affirms that the more than 100 state signatories to the 2006 Geneva Declaration “...recognize that effective prevention and reduction of armed violence requires strong political commitment to enhance national and local data collection, develop evidence-based programmes, invest in personnel, and learn from good practice.” 1

This study offers one “brick” in what we trust will become a rising wall of field-based evidence to advance best practices in reducing armed violence. But other commitments also need implementing. The Geneva Declaration calls on signatories to “strengthen efforts to integrate strategies for armed violence reduction and conflict prevention into national, regional, and multilateral development plans and programmes.” 2 Hence, our recommendations:

2 Ibid., p.4.
Joint Statement

1. That donor agencies, Southern and Northern NGOs and academics systematically invest in armed violence reduction-related research, on:
   - The relationship between programming and conflict and how aid and conflict interact;
   - Conflict-sensitive analysis of regions, sub-regions, countries, and local areas;
   - Baseline conditions and post-intervention results for long-term impact assessment;
   - Action-oriented research on field-level activity to derive “lessons learned” and “best practices”; and
   - The differential impact of armed violence on men, women and children.

2. That donor agencies develop policy and fund programming on armed violence reduction, and that these incorporate Southern and Northern NGO and academic expertise.

3. That donor country armed violence reduction policies be grounded in their foreign and defence policy commitments on the control and reduction of small arms and light weapons.

4. That donor agencies, NGOs and their local partners include provisions in their research and programming for protecting children and other vulnerable groups from reprisals related to involvement in armed violence reduction initiatives, and seek to avoid other harmful, unintended consequences of these initiatives.

5. That the OECD-DAC, other multilateral agencies, and country partners ensure the incorporation of armed violence reduction programming into Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, national poverty reduction programmes, and multilateral pooled funding mechanisms in order to strengthen commitment to implementation.

6. That long-term sustained funding be committed by donor agencies to pilot projects or country programmes linking armed violence reduction and development, in coordination with other countries and multilateral donors. These projects should ensure local ownership and participation in all phases of planning and implementation, including the development of and support to local research capacity and civil society participation. They should also take into account and plan for addressing the particular needs and considerations of specific groups, such as those of women and of children.

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Executive Summary

Despite the harmful impact of armed violence on development processes, development assistance, peacebuilding and disarmament efforts have not systematically been linked. This is changing. An increasing number of development organisations are making these connections, including World Vision, whose experience is documented in this study.

Aid delivered without sensitivity to conflict dynamics can make matters worse if underlying tensions in a community are not taken into consideration, a principle underscored within the “Do No Harm” framework developed by Mary B. Anderson. Furthermore, aid investments can be undermined or even squandered if guns are being used to injure and kill people, if infrastructure is being destroyed, if agricultural activity is being hindered, if access to markets is interrupted, or if people are in a state of debilitating fear or are in flight from armed violence.

This cooperative study between Project Ploughshares and World Vision Canada was undertaken to document how World Vision peacebuilding and development initiatives are contributing to reductions in armed violence in selected areas of East Africa. The research was undertaken in September 2008 in the North Rift Valley in Kenya, the Kitgum and Soroti districts in Uganda, and in Warrap State in Southern Sudan.

This research report fits within a wider discussion taking place among development and disarmament actors on the relationship between armed violence reduction and development processes. The 2006 Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development states that: “Living free from the threat of armed violence is a basic human need. It is a precondition for human development, dignity and well being” and that “conflict prevention and resolution, violence reduction, human rights, good governance and peacebuilding are key steps towards reducing poverty, promoting economic growth and improving people’s lives.”

The study was designed and implemented cooperatively between Project Ploughshares and World Vision staff. While it is not a formal, external evaluation, it offers some provisional and comparative observations about World Vision peacebuilding and development practices and their relationship to reductions in armed violence. The research findings are presented using the “armed violence lens” created for the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD-DAC).

This lens emphasises four elements relating to armed violence: affected populations, perpetrators, the instruments of violence, and the institutional or cultural environment. While the context varied in the three countries visited, the field research confirmed that armed violence was a substantial hindrance to development in each. In the communities visited in Kenya and Sudan, armed violence is associated primarily with pastoralist cattle raiding. In Uganda the situation is characterised by post-conflict violence in land disputes, criminality and domestic violence.

In all of the countries visited the primary perpetrators of armed violence were consistently identified as males in the 15-30 year old category. These young men were also the primary direct victims of armed violence through injury and death during cattle raids in Kenya and Sudan. This form of armed violence also had consequences for children, women, older men and their communities: injury and death, displacement from their homes, the loss of loved ones, the disruption of livelihoods and schooling. In Uganda the violence was related to theft, domestic and sexual violence, and land disputes. Each of the communities visited suffered from lost collective wealth and opportunities to build or obtain shared infrastructure.

The gender dimensions of armed violence can be complex; for example, women were reported in limited cases to be perpetrators of armed violence, directly by using weapons, or indirectly by encouraging their sons to raid. Women were more commonly reported to be important participants in peace processes, within all three countries.

The most common instruments used in armed violence in the areas visited were variants of the AK-47. Ready availability of these automatic rifles was apparent in Kenya and Sudan. Their introduction and use has profoundly distorted historical cattle raiding by escalating the intensity of the violence and the inevitable retaliatory cycle. In Uganda unauthorised civilian gun possession is actively suppressed by military and police but guns were reported to be hidden, or being used for criminal activity. Traditional weapons such as spears, arrows, shields, clubs, and pangas are also used.

Executive Summary

World Vision peacebuilding and development activities were reported by communities visited to have assuaged the level or intensity of violence in each area, but not eliminated it. One of the more interesting findings came in Kenya where the research team visited three pastoralist communities, the Turkana, Pokot and Marakwet. While the Turkana and Pokot continue in a deadly cycle of retaliatory cattle raiding violence with only some abatement, the Marakwet have fashioned a functional peace with their former opponents, the Pokot. Why? A combination of increased diversity in livelihoods, changes in cultural patterns related to marriage and dowry, social control of gun possession and use, and active peace-making by the Marakwet supported by World Vision and other NGOs, provide part of the answer. This may offer clues about how a wider peace can be secured among pastoralists in Kenya and in the broader cross-border region referred to as the Karamoja cluster.

In Sudan the post-conflict violence between cattle-raiding pastoralist communities in Warrap State has been addressed in some places through local peace negotiations, but violence returned. To be sustainable, peace agreements likely will require reinforcement through substantial investments in economic development and infrastructure as well as increased formal security and civilian disarmament that is sanctioned by the communities themselves.

In Northern Uganda, the ostensible end of the insurgency by the Lord’s Resistance Army in 2006 left people grappling with different forms of post-conflict violence. Local peacebuilding efforts were reported to be effective in addressing these types of localised violence, but people’s continuing fear of the LRA’s return led them to acknowledge that national and international interventions would be required to address any resumption of the insurgency.

Forcibly removing guns in Warrap State in Southern Sudan communities in and of itself was reported to be an ineffective solution to armed violence. Disarmament reportedly increased the frequency and intensity of armed violence where unequal weapons removal among rival groups left disarmed communities without security and more vulnerable to attack from their rivals who had not been disarmed. One person interviewed stated the problem this way: “In the face of insecurity, people retain weapons.” A range of issues must be addressed alongside disarmament for it to be effective, including: enhanced state-sponsored security through the police, military, or properly regulated volunteer protection forces; changes to cultural and livelihood patterns; increased basic infrastructure and services (roads, schools, clinics, etc.); and, most importantly, a determination by those perpetrating violence to stop.

Those people interviewed confirmed that many of the ingredients in the recipe for sustainable peace come not only from peacebuilding activities but also from development programming. World Vision activities in these two areas were consistently cited by those interviewed as contributing to peace or reducing the frequency and intensity of armed violence. One respondent made the connection this way: “Peacebuilding is not meaningful on an empty stomach.” At the same time, calls were consistently heard for greater World Vision support to education, livelihoods, health care, potable water, better roads and training for peace committees, among other interventions. These calls did not articulate a firm distinction between peacebuilding and development activities.

Additionally, people consistently spoke positively about the contribution of specific peacebuilding activities, including training and sensitisation to alternatives to violence. There were frequent references to World Vision’s collaborative approach with others, including local government officials, NGOs and community based organisations, and security services. World Vision also has worked successfully with local communities and NGO colleagues in advocating for increased government services and protection.

Project Ploughshares and World Vision Canada trust that this report will contribute to the growing body of evidence-based research calling for government, civil society and donor partners in development to understand that addressing armed violence is integral to successful development and peacebuilding programming.
I. Introduction

This cooperative study between a disarmament organisation, Project Ploughshares, and an international Christian relief, development and advocacy organisation, World Vision (WV), was undertaken to document if and how World Vision peacebuilding and development initiatives are contributing to reductions in armed violence. It also records the assessment of the impact of World Vision peacebuilding activities by people in violence-affected communities. The research was undertaken in selected areas of Kenya, Uganda and Sudan over a three-week period in September 2008.

Because it is widely recognised that assistance delivered without sensitivity to conflict dynamics can make the conflict worse, development practitioners, including World Vision, have long integrated "Do No Harm" (DNH) strategies associated with Mary B. Anderson into relief or development programmes in areas affected by armed violence. Development and relief resources represent a transfer of wealth, and therefore power, into a community. If underlying tensions or conflicts in the community are not accounted for, external assistance can favour one group over another, making tensions worse. DNH strategies would generally be expected in good development and relief programming.

It is also clear that development investments can be wasted if guns are being used to kill and injure people, if infrastructure is being destroyed, if agricultural activity is being hindered, if access to markets is interrupted, or if people are in a state of debilitating fear or are in flight from armed violence. Responding to gun violence, however, is not necessarily viewed as an important part of sound development programming – at least not yet.

Addressing armed violence through disarmament processes that focus on interrupting the supply of guns or removing them from post-conflict situations or from areas of armed criminal violence also has proven extremely difficult in practice. Indeed, in some cases disarmament has actually increased the frequency and intensity of armed violence – for example, when there has been an imbalance in weapons removal among rival groups.

To date, development interventions and disarmament efforts have not routinely been linked in building sustainable development and sustainable peace in response to situations of armed conflict.


2 The three states are politically bound by commitments under the United Nations Programme on Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (PoA), agreed in 2001. They also are signatories to the legally binding Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa, which entered into force in 2006. Under the terms of the Nairobi Protocol the three states have established national focal points to coordinate information-sharing on Protocol implementation and, in keeping with the PoA, Kenya and Uganda have produced National Action Plans on Small Arms and Light Weapons. In addition, Kenya, Uganda and Sudan have endorsed the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development (GD). Kenya is one of the original 42 signatories and is a member of the “Core Group” promoting the GD. Kenya is also one of five states subject to a “national assessment” by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT), the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the World Health Organization (WHO). The assessment will compile “systematic inventories of armed violence reduction at the country level” and conduct pilot projects (The Geneva Declaration Secretariat, Armed Violence Prevention and Reduction: A Challenge for Achieving the Millennium Development Goals, 2008, p 16, http://www.genevadeclaration.org/pdfs/GD%20Background%20Paper.pdf).
I. Introduction

The challenge of constructively linking peacebuilding, development and armed violence reduction crosses traditional disciplines and World Vision and Project Ploughshares bring different but complementary experience to this study.

Founded in 1950, World Vision has world-wide experience implementing programmes in emergency relief, community development and the promotion of justice in almost 100 countries. World Vision defines peacebuilding as “programmes and activities that address the causes of conflict and the grievances of the past, that promote long-term stability and justice, and that have peace-enhancing outcomes. Sustained processes of peacebuilding steadily rebuild or restore networks of interpersonal relationships, contribute toward just systems and continually work with the interaction of truth and mercy, justice and peace.”

Peacebuilding is principally a cross-cutting theme in its work in conflict-affected areas. World Vision uses three different conflict analysis tools to identify conflict-sensitive practices at different levels of engagement. At the macro level, WV’s custom-designed *Making Sense of Turbulent Contexts* (MSTC) workshop facilitates an analysis of the political, social and economic dynamics that fuel instability in a country. MSTC workshop participants – drawn from civil society, government, and multilateral organisations – determine appropriate programmatic and policy responses to the turbulence. At the development programme level, the *Integrating Peacebuilding and Development* (IPAD) framework gives communities and their partners (including WV) tools to promote good governance, transformed individuals, coalition-building, community capacities for peace, and sustainable and just livelihoods. Finally, at the grassroots level, World Vision applies the *Do No Harm/Local Capacities for Peace* (DNH/LCP) framework, originally developed by Mary B. Anderson and the Collaborative for Development Action. DNH/LCP examines the impact of humanitarian and development assistance on conflict and promotes the development of local capacities for peace. In addition, World Vision empowers children and youth around the world to be peacemakers, and develops and distributes peace education materials and curricula. Through application of these frameworks, World Vision has gained experience in fostering community-level efforts to build peace in conflict-affected zones.

I. Introduction

Project Ploughshares, a Canadian-based NGO founded in 1976, carries out research and develops policy on disarmament processes, particularly measures to control and reduce the proliferation and misuse of small arms and light weapons. Project Ploughshares participates in a growing network of NGOs that are exploring the policy and practice of armed violence reduction in development programming. This research builds on the findings and recommendations of a 2007 Project Ploughshares report for the Canadian International Development Agency, *Towards Safe and Sustainable Communities: Addressing Armed Violence as a Development Priority*.4

The tools and frameworks used by World Vision to integrate peacebuilding with relief and development activities are an important backdrop to this study, but no attempt has been made to evaluate the tools, the frameworks or the peacebuilding activities themselves. Instead, observations are provided in the concluding section of this study on the array of developmental and disarmament processes necessary to accomplish the goals of each where armed violence is impeding poverty alleviation.

This study fits within a wider discussion taking place in policy circles and among development donors that links armed violence reduction and development processes. In the East Africa region this linkage has been described as “an emerging – and more integrated – set of policies premised on increasing community security and development in order to promote voluntary weapons collection.”5 Globally, the discussion has been encapsulated in the *Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development*, initiated by the Government of Switzerland and now signed by over 100 countries.

The Geneva Declaration (GD) recognises that security from armed violence and the threat of armed violence is a basic human need to which the poor, the marginalised, women and children are entitled, and a pre-requisite for sustained economic development.6 Armed violence is widely acknowledged to be a major obstacle to achieving the Millennium Development Goals and the Geneva Declaration pledges of signatory states to obtain measurable reductions in armed violence by 2015. Led by a core group of states, the GD process is adopting a three-track approach by encouraging the development of concrete measures concerning advocacy, dissemination and coordination; mapping and monitoring; and practical programming.

It is hoped that this report will add to the practical programming track of the GD process. The researchers also intend that the report will contribute to the growing body of literature that informs, from actual practice in the field, the “emerging policy frameworks” on combining armed violence reduction initiatives with development programmes. It also may demonstrate in a practical manner how peacebuilding works within World Vision programming, thereby strengthening support for peacebuilding activities within World Vision itself, and possibly within the wider NGO development community.

Care has been taken in recording and reporting what people said in interviews and focus groups. Contradicting facts and interpretations of the context for violence and specific incidents of violence are deliberately preserved as they were presented in interviews. In situations of armed violence it is common that the narratives of opposing sides differ. Because enemies do not share an understanding of what has happened, who started what, and why, negotiating peace agreements and then maintaining peace are difficult to achieve. In the end, while opposing sides do not need to agree with each other on all the answers to these questions, knowing how enemies answer these questions forms one base on which peace can be built.

As the report was consolidated it became increasingly clear to the researchers that those interviewed already knew, collectively, the many elements of the broader solution required to stop the violence in their communities. These women, men, youth, government officials, traditional leaders, World Vision and other NGO staff, police and security officials did not require helpful hints from the researchers about what is needed to end violence.

Finally, World Vision staff made a commitment to report back to the communities who participated in this research. One of the most ambitious potential roles for this research report, admittedly an imperfect mirror, is that, in saying back to participants what they said in interviews, it might assist in the peacebuilding processes already begun in their communities.

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6 See [http://www.genevadeclaration.org](http://www.genevadeclaration.org)
2. Research Methodology

This study is the result of community-level key informant interviews and focus groups held in Kenya, Uganda and Sudan, undertaken in September 2008. World Vision programme and project documentation and selected secondary sources were also reviewed.

The primary objective of the research was to study World Vision peacebuilding projects that were undertaken in the context of development and humanitarian relief operations and to document their impact on levels of armed violence. This was not a formal, external evaluation or assessment exercise. All aspects of the study were designed cooperatively between Project Ploughshares and World Vision staff, including development and modification of the questionnaires used in the field research, and the conduct of the field research itself. Some provisional observations are provided but there is no attempt to formulate specific recommendations for future World Vision programming in these countries or elsewhere.

The questionnaires (see Appendix 1) drew on the experience and language of earlier related research conducted in East Africa by World Vision and other development NGOs. The questionnaires were also influenced by the “armed violence lens” usefully proposed by The SecDev Group and the Small Arms Survey in their guidance for the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD-DAC). This armed violence lens has become an analytical tool of the OECD-DAC to assist the promotion of effective and practical measures to prevent and reduce armed violence. It emphasises four key elements:

- the people or populations that are affected by armed violence;
- the perpetrators of armed violence (and their motives);
- the instruments of armed violence;
- and the wider institutional or cultural environment that enables (or protects against) violence.¹

The armed violence lens deliberately “chooses a people-centred perspective on security.”² This “bottom-up” approach is crucial to formulating what is needed to make threatened individuals and communities feel safe and secure. It is in keeping with peacebuilding frameworks and practices of World Vision, which engage programme partners at the community level and use tools such as the “Local Capacities for Peace” initiatives. Indeed, the lens is intended to be a complementary tool.³

The questionnaires used in this research focused on gathering information in three main areas:

- An assessment of the security situation in the communities visited;
- The instruments used in armed violence; and
- World Vision peace projects and their impact on armed violence.

Special attention was given to the roles of women and men, youth and children, as victims of violence and as perpetrators.

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² Ibid., p 50.

³ Ibid., p 51.

⁴ “It is important to note that the armed violence lens should not supplant existing assessment and programming tools such as conflict or stability assessments; drivers of change, governance and criminal justice assessments; or a public health approach. Rather, it serves as a complementary framework that can help to identify how different tools and data sources can be combined to enhance existing diagnostics and formulate more strategic or targeted interventions” (ibid., p 51).
2. Research Methodology

The impact of the peacebuilding projects cannot be understood without some explanation of the context in which the violence is taking place. No attempt is made in this report, however, to provide a comprehensive description of the history or current dynamics of the violent conflicts in which these communities are engulfed or the type, number and economics of the weapons used. The complexities and nuances of the armed conflicts of the region require more extensive research and analysis than was available to this study; researchers spent only one week in each country.

In consultation with WV field-level colleagues, the research team chose a three-year timeframe for posing questions about whether the violence was increasing or decreasing. This period could have been longer or shorter, but it was fixed for questions in all three countries to assist in comparing the content of answers.

The interview and focus group responses are the primary source used to summarise and synthesise a description of the context for violence and the instruments of violence used. A number of secondary resources are also referenced.

Figure 2.2 categorises the people interviewed according to age, gender and country.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Male adults</th>
<th>Male youth</th>
<th>Female adults</th>
<th>Female youth</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td><strong>104</strong></td>
<td><strong>49</strong></td>
<td><strong>102</strong></td>
<td><strong>29</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In consultation with WV staff in East Africa, the researchers agreed that youth participants should be 18 years and older, and that all research participants, youth or adult, should be familiar with or collaborating directly in WV programs. By visiting communities likely to express different points of view – for example, Pokot, Turkana and Marakwet communities in Kenya – researchers hoped to achieve a reasonable range of perspectives. WV field staff selected people to participate in the research, using a combination of convenience and snowball sampling techniques. Categories of people interviewed included WV staff in the host countries, local government officials, security sector officials (police and military), traditional community leaders/chiefs/elders, staff of local or international NGOs, religious leaders, and youth and adults from the communities. In communities affected by cattle rustling, the last group included some individuals identified as “warriors” or “raiders”.

Data was collected by teams comprising WV staff members from the host country (staff working directly at the project level and/or staff from the national WV headquarters), local translators (where necessary), and a WV Canada or Project Ploughshares staff person. All notes taken from focus group, informant and other interviews were compiled and analysed by Project Ploughshares. The OECD-DAC armed violence lens (AVL) was used to structure the sections on each individual country and the research findings are organised according to the four AVL categories.

Due to the sensitive nature of the subject matter and the ongoing violence in the communities visited, participants were informed that they would not be identified in the report, and that their names would remain confidential. They were informed about the purpose of the research, its potential benefits and what will be done with the results. They were also assured that they were free not to participate, and to decline to answer any question. Efforts were made to hold interviews and focus groups in safe places where participants could feel comfortable to speak openly. Attention was also paid to gender-related sensitivities in the subject matter by, for example, holding several “women only” or “women youth only” focus groups, led by an all-female research team. The exact research locations have also not been indicated in this report to further protect the identity of participants. In addition, the photos in this report do not show people who participated in the research and do not depict exact research locations. Instead, the photos were selected from World Vision’s collection to depict wider regions under study in the research (Kenya’s North Rift Valley, Northern and Eastern Uganda, and Southern Sudan).

Most of the community-level interviews were facilitated by translation from local languages into English. Notes were kept of the English translations, sometimes with more than one
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interviewer keeping notes to allow for later comparisons. The reported comments in the text of the report are the English translations of the original answers to interview questions. They have been rendered as faithfully as possible under the circumstances, but should only be used with the understanding that nuances of meaning and perhaps facts have been lost in the translation and rendering of quotations.

Finally, it should be stressed that much of the “hard” or “factual” information given in community-level interviews could not be independently verified by the research team. This is a significant caveat to the research findings. The information recorded indicates the knowledge and perceptions of the people in these violent conflict situations.
3. Kenya

Due to the sensitive nature of this research, the photos in this chapter do not show people who participated in the research and do not depict exact research locations. Instead, the photos were selected from World Vision’s collection to show different scenes from life in Kenya’s North Rift Valley and World Vision’s work with communities there.
3. Kenya

3.1. Applying the Armed Violence Lens to Kenya

The OECD-DAC armed violence lens will be used to analyse the results of interviews conducted in the North Rift Valley of Kenya. Capturing the security perceptions of armed-violence-affected populations was a key objective of the questionnaires used for interviews with people engaged with World Vision peacebuilding programmes in Kenya. The introductory part of the questionnaire was intended to provide a people-centred security assessment. We begin by summarizing the individual and community perceptions of security revealed by the interviews. An arbitrary three-year timeframe was used in the questions to determine people’s perceptions of whether violence was increasing or decreasing over time.

Affected Populations

The North Rift Valley area in northwest Kenya is one of five World Vision Kenya (WVK) operational zones. The WVK work in the North Rift Zone deals with four districts – Turkana, West Pokot, Marakwet and Baringo (East Pokot) – and three pastoralist communities – the Marakwet, Pokot and Turkana. There are other minority groups in these areas.

The predominant threat to peace in the pastoralist communities in the North Rift Valley is the armed violence associated with cattle raids. Stealing cattle was traditionally done by young men to secure a bride price or dowry. Stealing livestock and killing someone from another community in a raid garnered fame in these cultures. Dances and songs celebrated the deaths of those killed during raids or fights. But the introduction of automatic weapons, primarily AK-47s, irrevocably changed the dynamic of cattle raids as the number of people killed and injured dramatically increased during raids and retaliatory actions. Gun-related violence cuts across all districts in the North Rift Valley area, heightened by cross-border gun violence and gun trade between Kenya and Uganda, Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia.

One person interviewed provided a brief history of the introduction of guns in the area:

Thirty or 40 years ago the Turkana and Pokot raided each other using spears and arrows. It was part of traditional practices, and sometimes a “friendly” activity. The first guns were introduced in 1968. These were simple weapons without much power that could be purchased for 100 cows. If you had a gun you could raid many communities. The pressure was there for everyone to obtain guns, and cattle raids became rampant. Guns flooded into the area. Raiding for cattle shifted to hunting humans and then to outright banditry.

Community-level interviews and focus groups were undertaken at specific sites where the Turkana, Pokot and Marakwet live. Violence between the Turkana and Pokot continues, with substantial numbers of deaths and injuries related to cattle raids, although in the last three years the number of raids and the number of people killed and injured in those raids were generally reported as decreasing. Between the Pokot and Marakwet, however, there is a functional and relatively stable
peace. The reasons given for this peace, and for fewer guns and less gun use among the Marakwet, are among the important findings of the field research in Kenya and are described more fully at the end of this chapter. Deliberate cultural changes were instituted, including decreasing the practice of dowry or bride price; increased reliance on agriculture, thereby lessening dependence on livestock herding; and greater social control of gun possession and use.

The people interviewed reported that illiteracy, poverty and isolation had an impact on the level of violence. Illiteracy is as high as 97% in some North Rift Valley areas according to one WVK staff person. People are isolated in cattle camps, or kraals, and have not been exposed to alternative ways of settling conflicts or different livelihood possibilities. Tribal groups compete with each other over boundaries and to expand their political power. Idleness among young men, aged 15–30, also contributes to the frequency and intensity of raids.

Paradoxically, we heard that opponents will come together in times of drought to share water and pasture, but then fight again when there is plenty.

One person interviewed said that 18 of his family members had been killed in the past three years, including his father and mother. Another said that 10 relatives had been killed, but not his wife or children. One person claimed not to have been personally affected by violence, but said that a sister had had her house robbed and another had been forced to flee. One focus group member described losing four cousins to the violence.

One community member summed up his frustration over the futility of cattle raiding this way: “Go on enough raids you will eventually die. Cows are simply circulating between the communities.”

Pastoralists are not the only ones who come under attack during raids. Government officials and security personnel have also been killed and injured. A District Commissioner (DC) was reported by another government official to have been nearly killed in early March 2008. The DC escaped with minor injuries from a shattered windscreen. The interviewee in question did not believe that the attackers knew they were attacking the DC, since they were robbing another vehicle when the DC arrived.

A government official described the stress he feels living and working in the area. When he worked at the Pokot–Marakwet border there were clashes and raids from 1997 to 2003. His first house was on the border; and “when there is a crisis, you are collateral damage. It was very stressful.”

Other types of armed violence were described, including post-election violence following national elections in December 2007, land disputes between pastoralist groups, road banditry, sexual assault and rape, and common banditry or criminal acts. Post-election violence in Kenya, which was particularly intense in Eldoret, was mentioned in passing in some interviews but did not emerge as a prominent theme in this research.

Violence between the Turkana and Pokot

The people interviewed had different ideas about the frequency of violent incidents between the Turkana and Pokot. One person said that, three years ago, incidents took place 20 to 50 times a month; now maybe there is one incident per month or every 2 months. Another person said that about 100 Turkana were killed in 2008, with almost 40 in August alone.

The general reduction reported in the number of violent cattle raids between Turkana and Pokot was sometimes qualified according to specific areas within the broader territory. For example, the downward trend in cattle raids was true for central Pokot, but not for north and east Pokot where small-scale raids are ongoing, according to a government official in an interview.

Functional Peace between the Pokot and Marakwet

The general trend of stable peace between the Pokot and Marakwet was recounted, with reasons why the peace is holding. Some of the explanations included:

The Marakwet and Pokot interact together in markets.

There aren't attacks by the Pokot because the elders of the Pokot and Marakwet resolved to live in peace together.
3. Kenya

Box 3.1.1. CEWARN–IGAD
Early Warning Data

It is difficult to find reliable sources of information and data on the impact of armed violence between pastoralists in Kenya and those in neighbouring countries. The Conflict Early Warning and Response (CEWARN) mechanism of the Horn of Africa sub-regional political organisation, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), has been tracking incidents related to pastoral conflicts on the Kenyan side of the Karamoja cluster from six reporting locations since January 2004. As indicated in CEWARN’s title, the primary purpose of the data collection is to provide early warning of troubles so that appropriate state authorities and others can take action to stop incidents. The data is collected by national research institutes and forwarded on a quarterly basis to the CEWARN office in Addis Ababa where the consolidated reports are posted on the CEWARN website (http://www.cewarn.org/index.htm).

The number of human deaths reported for the Kenyan side of the Karamoja Cluster for the period January 2004 to August 2008 is 566, of which 50 were reported to be women and children. If these cumulative totals are accurate and comprehensive, they indicate that almost 92% of those killed in the violence are men. It may be possible to drill down into the primary data to get more localised results that could be related to the specific sites where World Vision or other NGOs are engaging in peace initiatives.

Each year since 2004, the CEWARN statistics have shown a spike in the reported number of incidents of deaths and cattle losses in the January–April period, which roughly corresponds to the dry season in the North Rift Valley. This would suggest that increased movement of cattle to find scarce water and pasture can be a primary trigger for violent incidents. In the January–April 2008 report the conclusion is drawn that, “in terms of early warning and early response, it therefore means more preventative interventions must be stepped up at the beginning of a new year.” The CEWARN reporting also covers indicators of peace initiatives and mitigating behaviours. World Vision peacebuilding activities are mentioned in the narrative of the May–August 2008 report: “the unhindered distribution of relief food and continued access to education and health care services in most of the areas of reporting also served to mitigate conflict. Several civil society organizations such as Oxfam, Action Aid, NCCK, World Vision, and the Catholic Justice and Peace Commission worked together with the district peace committees to promote peaceful coexistence throughout the cluster. This helped calm down the tensions that existed.”

The reported reduction in the number of large-scale violent cattle raids between Marakwet and Pokot, which could involve up to 1,000 raiders, according to one person interviewed, does not mean that gun violence has stopped. Insecurity in Marakwet areas was related to theft and highway robbery. These criminals aren’t necessarily Pokot, but could be locals from the Marakwet.

Over the past two years the trend is for small robberies of animals rather than large organised raids.”

Today, the problems of insecurity relate to highway robbers, who wait for vehicles, however, these aren’t necessarily Pokot. They could be local [Marakwet].”

Incidents of sexual violence against women and female youth were recounted in Marakwet territory but were not reported among Turkana and Pokot.

Women and Children as Victims of Violence in Turkana and Pokot

Interview participants particularly emphasised the relative impact of armed violence on specific groups within the affected communities, including women and children. Traditionally, the men directly involved in raids or in defending against raiders were the primary perpetrators and direct victims of violence. Other groups of people were left alone. Now, with the introduction of guns, the killing has fundamentally changed.

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The number of people killed has risen dramatically and, while male warriors are still killed, non-participants in the raids are now dying more often:

Women and children are on the receiving end. They bear the effects of violence. In the past, the rule was “take the animals, don’t kill”. Now this rule has been disregarded. The men fight and take cover. The women and children have no guns [and become targets]. Also, when men go out with the healthy herds they leave the weaker animals with women and children and no supply of feed.

Women, children and the elderly appear to be particularly vulnerable as they are left behind when attacks occur. The men are often elsewhere with the cattle. One person interviewed said, “There is no sexual assault, just killing.” Apparently, a traditional taboo that raiders not attack women, children and older people has been broken.

There are other costs to women, indirect but still tangible, related to the violence of cattle raids. We were told that “women are now frightened to go about in the evening. There are risks to travelling into the interior, and women feel insecure because of threats of robbery.” In addition, children are affected because their opportunities to attend school are constrained.

When women lose their husbands, their rights to property can be compromised:

When a woman loses her husband, his brother takes responsibility for her. She will lack choices as one of many women. The brother is interested in the cows and takes them and other possessions. The aim is to take over the dead brother’s possessions.

Sexual violence against school girls was recounted in several interviews in the Marakwet area. One person claimed that 11 school girls were raped in an incident, and another individual said two school girls were raped. It is not clear if these accounts were referring to the same incident or two separate incidents. This incident was also described as a rare occurrence and perhaps related to the proximity of the school to a road where a highway robbery took place. Another version of this incident, or perhaps a different incident of rape, was reported:

There was a recent incident of rape where a Nissan bus was travelling on the roads. Girls were leaving a secondary school to go home. They were removed from the bus and raped at gunpoint. The other passengers were not robbed.

Other incidents of armed violence were reported: gang rapes linked to revenge, car-jacking, shootings, people disappearing, gangs threatening businesses. Extrajudicial killings were said to be significant during post-election violence. A government operation to recover animals resulted in the deaths of five security personnel in March 2007.

The Impact of Armed Violence on Development

Part of the indirect impact of armed violence is the slowing of development processes. When questioned about the impact armed violence has had on their communities, beyond the deaths that occur in raids and criminality, people mentioned the postponement of planned meetings, school closures and the disruption of other community activities. Economic activity is affected: “Whenever there is a raid, there is confusion. We can’t grow food because we can’t get to our fields and we fear dying.” Tourism has been hampered because the region is unsafe: “At any moment violence can occur, undoing the promotion of the region for tourism”.

Other effects of the violence include:

- People are displaced when they flee violence
- Social and health amenities such as hospitals and sites for displaced people are closed because of insecurity in certain areas.
- Livestock become infected by new diseases when they are moved to new areas for security reasons. Animals subjected to raids and counter-raids are always on the move, and their milk productivity and weight gain can be adversely affected. Restrictions on movement in areas of violence make buying and selling cattle more difficult.
- People move their families to escape danger and find adjusting to their new surroundings hard.
- Unemployment rises as youth drop out of school to defend their properties.
3. Kenya

A government official said that violence restricted his travel and occupied the majority of his time: “It is my duty to keep law and order and enable the development of the community, but 90% of officials' time is spent on security issues so other duties such as development of the area are neglected”.

Perpetrators of Armed Violence

The OECD-DAC armed violence lens starts with an analysis of the impact of violence on the people most affected, and then goes on to consider the identity and motivations of the perpetrators of the violence. In the case of pastoralists, the primary perpetrators can be identified as warriors or raiders, men between the ages of 15 and 30, but these perpetrators cannot be isolated from their communities. Information gained from the interviews indicates that the violence associated with cattle raiding is embedded in a rich cultural web of long-held practices; however, cattle raiding has now been distorted by a range of factors, not the least of which is the widespread introduction of automatic weapons in the second half of the 20th century.

Cultural practice among the Turkana and Pokot requires that young men pay for brides with large dowries in the form of heads of cattle. Raiding to acquire cattle is a tradition “passed down from grandfathers.” The more cattle you steal, the more wives you can marry. The benefits of successful cattle raids do not accrue only to the raiders. As one person interviewed summed it up, “inside a community everybody benefits from a raid. Cows are used for dowries and to provide milk. It’s like you’ve gone to a bank and taken money to your home; everybody has to benefit.”

The culturally embedded nature of cattle raiding among most pastoralists provides a complex identity for the warriors. These young men are primarily between 15 and 30 years of age, but some interviews extended the age as low as 12 and as high as 40. Great pride is taken in the success of warriors in raids. They also serve as defenders of the community. To successfully carry out these functions of raider and protector, warriors must own or have access to a gun because their opponents have guns.

Possessing a gun therefore gives the owner status in the community. Guns in the hands of warriors also are an alternative source of security to the government security personnel, who were described as having failed to provide protection in these remote areas of Kenya.

In addition to being revered, we learned that people with guns are feared, particularly where guns are used for thuggery. Highway robbery was sometimes said to take place with guns. When warriors are unsuccessful in a raid, in frustration or to save face, they may stop vehicles on the roads and steal the contents.

Now people see guns as dangerous. If a boy brings home an AK-47, the parents are afraid. Now everybody fears guns. It is bad to own a gun illegally because it is endangering life. People do not boast about it. Guns used to be for defence. Now people see guns as lives lost.

Despite this fear of guns, the warriors clearly do not act alone or of their own volition. Cattle raids and the accompanying violence are sanctioned by traditional ceremonies carried out with the warriors by elders, who are called “laibons”. Sometimes, if laibons overrule the warriors, the latter can’t go on a raid; they need the laibons’ blessing. In addition, when the young men return, the successful laibon gets a share of the livestock that...
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were taken. Laibons are also seen as wielding power over the spiritual dimensions of a raid:

Dealing with perpetrators is difficult. Laibons or elders sanction raids. They have the power to rid a raider of demons from killing. It is a spiritual matter.

Raids also take place outside of traditionally sanctioned ceremonies. The raiders can be motivated by a lack of livelihood alternatives and poverty. Several people said that there are no other jobs in the area besides raising cattle. If your cattle or goats are taken in a successful raid by your opponent, you are without a means of feeding your family. When poverty is pervasive, people would rather “die trying” in a cattle raid or banditry: “In a family of six with no animals, a young person will be tempted to join with other raiders and return with 10 or 20 goats”.

A related, frequently mentioned contributor to violence is idleness, which is associated with a lack of employment opportunities: “Our boys are idle, when they have finished school and come home there are no jobs so they engage in dangerous activities.” Education levels are low and contribute both to the idleness of youth and to the absence of hope in a better future.

Politics was said to fuel raids as tribal and ethnic interests are engaged during elections. Promises are made by politicians running for national office (Members of Parliament) to support the position of one side against another, for example, on boundaries between communities. Several people interviewed commented on the negative role of politicians in the Turkana and Pokot areas: “Politicians will promise groups of people, ‘If you choose me, I’ll give you weapons to fight your enemy.’” Political corruption and nepotism were also cited.

Women, children and the elderly appear to be particularly vulnerable.

Traditional raids to secure dowries have been supplemented by commercial raids. Cattle are taken in exchange for cash, sold into the commercial cattle market and can be on trucks and in slaughterhouses near Nairobi or Mombasa within 24 hours of the raids. Selling stolen cattle for meat processing was also linked to the supply of guns: “Those who benefit from this violence are the business men who benefit from commercialized cattle rustling. They purchase cattle at low prices and sell weapons. Those who lose are the communities who lose cattle.”

The “marking and tracing” of animals could be assisted by branding animals. Apparently there was a branding programme in Kenya that has not been maintained, at least not in the past five years. The government was reportedly reluctant to bring branding back. A branding system presumes a more widely organised cattle industry with enforcement capability by government or some other association responsible to those raising cattle.

Competition over land was identified as integral to the violence between Pokot and Turkana; “today what makes people fight is politics, pasture and boundaries.” Issues related to land and boundaries between the Pokot and Turkana territories also are coming to the fore in the wake of post-election violence (Dec 2007ff). People are questioning the rationale of the national government’s assigning land to people not traditionally associated with a given area. Those who consider themselves to be traditional owners or occupiers of that land then feel aggrieved.

Another problem cited in interviews was inadequate policing and military patrolling at international boundaries. For example, the Karamojong from Uganda and the Toposa from Sudan engage in cross-border raids with the Turkana and Pokot in Kenya. In the absence of secure borders and protection provided by governments, pastoralists defend themselves and engage in retaliatory raids.

In government efforts to retrieve stolen cattle, personnel have been killed with no apparent apprehension of culprits. Raiders come to believe that they are immune from punishment; “they’ve killed officers and nothing has happened to them”. The police and army were described as being afraid of being killed by warriors, so they are hesitant to investigate or take other action, particularly in remote areas where they are particularly vulnerable to being attacked.

Gun proliferation was also identified as a cause of violence. One person interviewed said, “In the 1980s people were living together happily and government protected them better, but people from neighbouring cities and countries came to the area and introduced firearms.” There are also indications that guns were introduced into this area much earlier during the colonial period.
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Box 3.1.2. On Data

Government officials, including police, were asked in interviews if data were collected on crimes and violent incidents, including cattle raids, and if this information was publicly available. The short answers are that the data is collected, but not in one place nor easily available to the public.

Various interviews indicated that data on armed violence is recorded by police, peace monitors, NGOs, and health sector personnel. Interviews with police confirmed that crime data is kept in police records, but permission is needed to release it. This data, which is apparently neither gender nor age disaggregated, shows that violence has decreased over the past three years.

It is not clear if medical data exists on people injured or killed. Where there are hospitals and health clinics there is apparently data disaggregated by gender. Hospitals were reported to have information on dead bodies, including extrajudicial killings by police, and on rapes. However, one NGO representative said the contrary, explaining that health institutions don’t keep data because in many areas there are no medical facilities. In those regions people use herbal medicine or rely on ceremonies and cleansing.

In situations where people are displaced by armed violence, most victims are women while perpetrators are typically all male. The numbers recorded apparently are just approximations.

Another NGO representative stated that there is data at his organisation’s headquarters. Every month data is recorded of incidents between Pokot and Turkana: the number of people killed, animals stolen, and what happened. Peace monitors track cases and keep information. They collect security-related data on cattle raids and killings, and share it with organisations such as churches.

Apparently, data on the impact of gun violence on people and development processes is kept, but no details were given on the location and accessibility of the data.

However, data on disarmament does exist, and is available from peace monitors, local administrators, chiefs, assistant chiefs and security, that is, the police.

One official made the case for collecting and using data to design programmes to address armed violence and community needs: “There is a need for stats in our work because we work through institutions. [Institutions] are advised to keep statistics on conflict as it affects school children, livestock populations, and human populations. We call on local and other government institutions to keep statistics to ensure there is a sound basis for programmes.”

The measures to reduce arms were described as inadequate:

Provincial Administrators can be complacent or complicit. Some guns are owned communally. The whole community will protect a gun and stop the government from retrieving it. Chiefs come and ask for extra time to negotiate with people to buy time so that they can find older guns to hand in. Administrators are afraid for their lives.

Women as Perpetrators of Violence

The interview questions sought to determine if and how women might be perpetrators of armed violence as well as victims. People reported that women play a part in perpetuating the violence, even though among the Turkana and Pokot, gun use was described as the preserve of males: “By age 10, a boy knows how to use a gun. Closer to Sudan some girls and women also use or know how to use guns but not in the Turkana–Pokot situation.”
The role of women in perpetuating violence is mostly indirect. While women don’t take up arms, we were told that if the family has acquired a weapon it’s the duty of the mother to “brainwash” youngsters about the financial problems of the family, the cost and trouble to acquire the weapon, and how it must be used. This apparently works to convince the youth.

Male and female identities are closely allied with traditional gender roles within pastoralist societies. One person interviewed said: “Those raiders who are brave, their bravery is known. When they return successfully, they command the attention of young ladies. There are songs in their honour and the young ladies fall for them.” Another indicated there are “some lady laibons, who are very tough, very powerful. But mainly it is the men who use the guns.”

Women can also be key to making peace within and between communities. In one small urban community they have women’s groups to make peace in the community. The mothers there have sons in the rural areas, many of whom participate in raids, so these mothers get together and discuss how to help their sons. The mothers then go and talk to their own sons to convince them not to get involved in raids.

**Instruments of violence**

Identifying the instruments of violence and their sources is an important part of assessing how armed violence can be reduced or better controlled. As already noted from interviews, the widespread introduction of automatic weapons into these pastoralist areas fundamentally changed the nature and lethality of cattle raids.

People were asked where these guns come from and how much the guns and ammunition cost.

Interviewees identified guns as the most prominent weapons used in armed violence in Turkana, Pokot and Marakwet communities. Guns were considered pervasive among the Turkana and Pokot, and the research team observed while driving in the rural areas that herders of goats and cattle, some appearing to be young teenagers, carried guns.

The most prevalent guns in the area were reportedly variations of the AK-47, including the Chinese AK-47, which is increasingly available. The G3, M16 and Mark 4 guns were also mentioned. The amakada and achegere guns were mentioned but not defined. Pistols can be found in urban areas.

“Bombs” – likely grenades – are also used to kill raiders and take livestock. Rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) were reportedly used by the Sudanese. One interviewee referred to a “big gun that stands on its own and can throw a ‘bomb’”.

Also mentioned were less common but more traditional weapons such as spears, small arrows, poisoned arrows, sticks and spears. Most commonly used in post-election violence were machetes, and match sticks and petrol for torching houses. Another tactic named was to poison drinking water, such as the pool behind a dam, affecting people and livestock. As well, enemies reportedly sold sick goats to spread disease through the herds of their opponents.

The market for guns

In Kenya it was relatively straightforward to get answers to questions in interviews about the cost of guns and ammunition. The cost of an AK-47 was frequently cited as eight cows or about 50,000 Kenyan shillings (KSh) or US$625, although the quality and therefore the value of cows can vary. One interviewee put the cost of an AK-47 much lower at KSh15,000–20,000 (US$187.50–250). In one interview an AK-47 was said to cost 12–15 cows, and a better value if paid in cows than in cash. Another said an AK-47 cost 80 cows when guns were introduced in the early 1970s, but now cost seven or eight cows. Most claimed that bullets for an AK-47 cost KSh100 (US$1.25) each, while a few reported a cost of KSh150 (US$1.88). Bullets cost KSh10 (US 12 cents) in the 1990s. An RPG reportedly cost KSh70,000 (US$875), an amakada KSh30,000 (US$375) and an achegere KSh40,000 (US$500).

The Turkana interviews gave the strong impression that the Pokot have more guns than Turkana or Marakwet. One person interviewed disagreed. The Pokot live along a border supply area with Uganda where the Karamojong readily traffic in weapons. Pokot criminals were indicated as the source of guns by both Turkana and Marakwet. Sometimes the Pokot were reported to lend guns to criminals, who then bought guns with money stolen in their robberies. Turkana also reportedly bought guns from Pokot. These weapons were obtained, according to people
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interviewed, during peace time when the clans graze their herds together. It was not possible for the research team to independently verify any of these claims.

There were also indications in interviews that the Kenyan Government was providing guns to pastoralists. The claim that G-3s are being used implied a link with government forces since the G-3 is the standard government-issued rifle. Security forces also are reportedly involved in the supply of ammunition to pastoralists. This would appear to be in direct contradiction to commitments of the Kenyan Government nationally and internationally confirmed through the Kenyan Focal Point on SALW and its signature to the Nairobi Protocol.

Interviewees mentioned the ease with which guns can be sourced in Uganda: “The Ugandan soldiers leaving the military just sell their guns in markets. You can go to Uganda in a jeep and buy guns from soldiers abandoning the army.” Guns were also said to have come from Somalia during the Said Barre era (ended c. 1991) when refugees brought guns into Kenya. Southern Sudan was also identified as a source. In the Lokichoggo area near the Kenya–Sudan border there are markets in the bush. Guns also come from Ethiopia through Moiale and Masabit.

Several people stated that there are more weapons available than there were three years ago. Others said that more AK-47s have been available over the last three years and that more people are learning how to use them. But the data indicates that there is less violence and so less actual use. There is no data on the numbers of arms in any of the communities.

The apparent sale and movement of guns and ammunition from government security forces and among pastoralist opponents suggest that this trade is primarily economic rather than strategic. Guns and ammunition are seen primarily as a commodity that can be translated into cows or currency rather than a strategic resource to be kept out of the hands of those who might attack your people or steal your cows. It would make no sense to arm your opponents, even at a profit, if you were to be shot at and possibly killed by those same guns. This primarily economic motivation is in fact a common characteristic of the trade in small arms and light weapons in many conflict areas, including urban centres where ammunition in particular can pass from police and security services to criminal gang members and others.

In Kenya, civilian possession of firearms is legally permitted for people 18 and older who undergo training, provide identity documents, and register with the police; however owning a gun requires serious justification, such as evidence of a serious security threat. In pastoralist areas, a government form of community policing allows individuals to own guns to protect themselves against other groups, such as Turkana protecting themselves against Pokot and vice versa. Documentation of such gun ownership is sent to the area police chief. Guns can also be legally owned to guard animals. As well, Kenya Police Reserves (KPR) are given guns by the government for security purposes:

The government has taken the initiative for local communities to identify energetic men to provide self-defence. Then the government provides them with legal arms to protect their communities from banditry. These people aren’t paid. They work on a voluntary basis.

Marakwet and gun ownership

Among the Marakwet it was reported that guns tend to be owned communally or by clans. Communal ownership means that different people join to buy guns and keep livestock jointly.

Women and children are not allowed to have guns; men are responsible for them. Middle-aged men (35–45 years), these are the men looking after cattle, some go with guns, some don’t.

If there is a functional peace in the Marakwet area, why do people still have guns at all? Responses varied: “People sold their cows to get guns in the past and don’t want to get rid of their assets.” “People don’t believe peace has really come. They are ready for anything just in case of attack.” In interviews people said that if they go herding with guns, they have to be discreet, going through the bushes, so people don’t see them since “gun ownership is illegal”.

2 For more information, see http://www.recsasec.org.
Addressing Armed Violence in East Africa

3. Kenya

Institutions

The armed violence lens incorporates into its analytical framework the formal and informal institutions that govern community life in a given area and have an impact on levels of violence. These could be local government institutions and the police or traditional community leadership such as elders, chiefs or laibons. Disarmament exercises organised by the government are one part of Kenya's institutional response to gun violence in the North Rift Valley.

Disarmament exercises

Government-directed disarmament exercises in this part of Kenya were recalled in interviews with varying degrees of praise and criticism. Some were highly sceptical of these efforts: “The government is doing little. In voluntary amnesties a family with five guns may surrender one gun with no real impact on the overall availability of guns.” To be effective, disarmament of neighbouring communities must be done in parallel; cross-border disarmament must be coordinated with other countries to remedy problems of porous borders.

Sometimes interviewees contrasted the lax Kenyan government approach with stricter gun control in Uganda.

The Uganda government used the military to control borders and to disarm civilians in a more aggressive manner but Kenya did not match these efforts.

Comprehensive disarmament is required. Unlike Uganda, the Kenyan government also does not follow up with incidents.

With resentment several Turkana who were interviewed recalled Kenyan government-initiated gun disarmament processes that were, in their view, one-sided: “The government tried twice to disarm civilians but it was only done among the Turkana, leaving them open to imbalanced attacks from the Pokot.” “In 2005 there was disarmament. The community tried very hard to surrender illegal firearms. When their enemies realised this, they attacked them from Sudan and from the Karamojong in Uganda. The Turkana are surrounded by enemies.” Asymmetric disarmament appears to have resulted in bitterness and a quick rearming of Turkana warriors: “They hoped the government would play its role to reduce guns in the other communities but this did not take place. So gun ownership went back up.”

In the Marakwet area the government reportedly conducted disarmament exercises in the 1950s, 1960s, 1979, 1984 and 2005. Apparently, even the colonial government undertook disarmament exercises. Only the 2005 exercise, which was very peaceful, was successful, according to one person interviewed. WVK reportedly participated, as did other NGOs and the Lutheran church. More than 2,000 guns were collected, mostly from criminals who were identified by the community. Another interviewee answered:

There have been cases of gun runners arrested or dissuaded from practice. In one case where a man was arrested he agreed to give up his business and was given money by an NGO to start a business. Now he is a pastor.

The ingredients for peace between Pokot and Marakwet

The armed violence unleashed by the introduction of automatic weapons in pastoralist areas has been mitigated in some places but the overall picture is grim. By contrast, interviews with the Marakwet provided a very hopeful story of peace being made with their opponents, the Pokot. The many factors that made this peace possible and lasting constitute an example than can possibly be replicated elsewhere. One of the most compelling stories of this field research was the assembly by the Marakwet of the ingredients for peace. These ingredients are discussed in the following paragraphs.

In Marakwet territory, security was said to improve after the election of the new Kenyan government in 2002. In the calm, communities were able to come together to deal with their differences. “Since this peace, farming continues, children have gone back to schools, the pre-school has re-opened. To compensate for livestock taken by the Pokot, the Marakwet have bought more livestock and settled and now have milk.”

Economic and livelihood diversity also played a role. In addition to cattle and goat grazing, the Marakwet have taken up such agricultural practices as growing vegetables and other crops. The Pokot have come to rely on the Marakwet for food. “The Pokot and Marakwet share together in the markets; they are grazing together in the fields. Some Pokot come and farm with the Marakwet. If they are farming, they don’t have worries about gunshots. From 2005 it has been like this.”
3. Kenya

In Marakwet territory, national politicians worked together to make a significant contribution. The MP representing the Marakwet stressed disarmament, that people should give guns to the chief. She supported the formation of peace committees on both sides.

In interviews we were told that in a community with higher literacy levels, cattle rustling incidents are low. This is the case among the Marakwet, who have embraced education more enthusiastically than have the Pokot and Turkana.

Pokot and Marakwet are also culturally “closer” than the Pokot and Turkana. They intermarry more often and they can understand each other’s language. They also don’t have boundary disputes or contested areas, unlike the Pokot and Turkana, who do experience boundary disputes.

There is some evidence that cultural traditions are used to make and maintain the peace. We were told by women youth that in Marakwet tradition, there is a beaded belt that a mother gets after she gives birth, and that this belt is respected by both Pokot and Marakwet communities. They described how their MP wears this belt, and the Pokot and Marakwet respect her for it: “If a mother has spoken, one who wears this belt, we have to respect her”. The belt was said also to be used to protect people who are facing an attack: “If a mother puts this belt on the ground during an attack, the raiders believe they’ll die if they cross the belt, so they won’t cross it.”

At some point in the recent past the Marakwet made a far-reaching decision to begin moving away from the practice of requiring a dowry or bride price for marriage. This cultural change, made at the community level, appears to have had a profound effect, in that a major incentive for young warriors to commit raids has been reduced. Because there are fewer raids, tensions with the Pokot have lessened; and because Marakwet women are less “expensive” to seek as partners in marriage, Pokot men are marrying them more often, increasing ties between the two peoples.

WVK peacebuilding activities were said to have been an important part of the many processes that contributed to this peace between Marakwet and Pokot. Working in cooperation with the government and other NGOs, WVK trained peace committees, briefing the members about peace before bringing them together to preach peace:

These committees would talk to one another and make plans for their own communities. Their work was to preach peace in their communities at scheduled meetings. The arguments that they used to preach peace were that many people are being injured and killed during attacks. There is a shortage of food because farming is interrupted; school are closed; there is a loss of livestock and outbreaks of diseases such as malaria.

WVK neutrality was seen as important and respected by both parties because WVK works on both sides of the conflict. Area Development Programmes (ADPs) are implemented on both sides. An ADP is the primary vehicle through which World Vision facilitates community development; it is a long-term development programme [usually 10–15 years] implemented across a contiguous geographic area, covering numerous sectors of intervention. In interviews there was no mention of WVK’s favouring either side. When an evaluation part way through the Mapotu project (Marakwet, Pokot, Turkana) indicated that there was deliberate bias by some locally engaged WVK staff, the problem was corrected, through orientation and job training. As a result, a high level of neutrality and sensitivity toward the different communities was achieved. In addition, all ADP staff also were trained in Local Capacities for Peace (LCP).

Criminality has not stopped in Marakwet territory, but there seems to be a social consensus in both communities to cooperate in stopping the cycle of revenge. The Pokot return stolen goats to the Marakwet, and turn thieves over to police. The Marakwet and Pokot communicate with each other, advising on impending raids. WVK provided mobile phones to the elders on both sides so that they could phone each other in the event of raids. If an incident takes place, there are structured ways to punish wrongdoers and make amends.

It was agreed that when a child is found taking cattle, people concerned will come and take the livestock from the child’s family and take the child to the police. If the child is not present, the parents are taken to the police. If a child is involved in theft and the parent denies it, then old men can curse the child and the child will die.

Women were involved in the discussions leading to peace, but security concerns prevented them from going to meetings in border areas: “Women were afraid to go to certain meetings...
3. Kenya

where Pokot and Marakwet came together, because they don’t have weapons; instead, they participated in meetings held in their own villages.”

Both sides understood the disadvantages of not having peace. After raids, we were told in interviews, they faced so many problems that they decided to have peace. Although the research team did not probe this angle in interviews, there may have been an element of strategic thinking on the part of the Pokot. If they had peace with the Marakwet, then they had one less front to defend and attack. The Pokot interviewed gave no indication that they were interested in a similar peace with the Turkana.

3.2. Reducing Armed Violence:
The Impact of World Vision Peacebuilding

Introduction

The general conclusion of those interviewed was that security between the Turkana and Pokot had been improved in the past three years. This was attributed to efforts by the government and NGOs, including WVK peacebuilding activities. The functional peace between the Pokot and Marakwet was attributed to a broad range of initiatives by government and NGOs including WVK, and to decisions by the Marakwet to change key cultural and livelihood patterns. Contradictory assessments were also heard. Some said conditions were worse or only a bit safer: “We used to be killed every day; however, there has been a reduction in raids.”

Box 3.2.1. Mapotu Peace Project Activities

- Conflict-sensitive training of WV staff, staff in NGOs and Community-Based Organisations (CBOs), as well as government officials. Training was provided by WVK peace monitors or animators in conflict mediation and resolution, as well as Do No Harm (DNH) and Local Capacities for Peace participatory analysis.

- Engaging regional and local government institutions on policy issues arising from the work.

- Making Sense of Turbulent Contexts (MSTC) analysis.\(^1\) One was done in March 2008.

- DNH and LCP assessments were completed.

- The organisation of peace committees – a key strategy for engaging local leadership in defining and leading activities.

- A range of community-level meetings, including workshops with women, youth, elders, warriors, provincial administrators and civic leaders. District youth and women's forums were organised. There were mediation meetings between community leaders. Common meetings along border areas took place with Pokot and Turkana warriors, laibons and other leaders.

- International Peace Day on 21 September 2006 was celebrated with a festival attended by Turkana and Pokot.

- Turkana, Pokot and Marakwet warriors were taken on an exchange visit to Transmara to visit the Masai, who are pastoralists but no longer engage in cattle raids and fighting.

- Dialogues were organised to assist people in responding to post-election violence so that displaced people could return to their farms with their families and participate in community ceremonies.

- Youth were exposed to examples of cattle herders who varied their income generation with guiding tourists to view wildlife.

- WV organised youth and adult cultural events and sports matches that crossed community lines.

- Festivals and dance competitions were organised. Competitions were organised to write songs that stressed peace and the importance of having peace in communities. Drama was used to promote peace.

- School children participated in competitions to write poems and songs about peace.

- Children participated in music festivals and essay writing on how they can be involved in peacebuilding.

\(^1\) At the national level, WV’s custom-designed Making Sense of Turbulent Contexts (MSTC) workshop facilitates an analysis of the political, social and economic dynamics that fuel instability in a country. MSTC workshop participants - drawn from civil society, government, and multilateral organisations - determine appropriate programmatic and policy responses to the turbulence.
3. Kenya

Generally it was much easier for those interviewed to explain the security situation in their communities than it was for them to describe WVK peacebuilding activities or the impact of those activities. As is to be expected, community members who were directly involved in peace committees, as well as WVK staff, provided more detailed comments on the WVK peacebuilding activities and their impact.

A key element in the WVK peacebuilding strategy was supporting community peace committees. Because WVK worked closely with local government officials and security forces in these activities, the peace committees were not necessarily identified in interviews with the work of WVK per se.4 It was also evident that the peace committees continued to function in and between communities after formal WVK involvement had stopped, attesting to the post-project sustainability of these efforts. However, interviewees did not claim that WVK peacebuilding activities were comprehensive in their coverage or sufficient to eliminate or substantially control armed violence, particularly between the Turkana and the Pokot. When asked what could be done to improve WVK peacebuilding, many people’s responses amounted to “do more” or “go further” or “apply more pressure on the government to provide greater security”.

**WVK peacebuilding activities**

There are 15 Area Development Programmes (ADPs) funded by child sponsorship and 9 other grant-funded projects in this WVK North Rift Valley zone of operations. In a complementary fashion, North Rift grant-funded projects have initiatives in food security, agricultural recovery, water and sanitation, education, and child participation and empowerment, among others.

There are a broad range of social and economic problems in these communities such as HIV/AIDS, preventable diseases such as malaria, and food insecurity in times of drought. These problems are addressed in the work of both WVK ADPs and grant-funded projects, and have an impact on the peace and stability of the communities. However, these WVK ADP activities were not a focus of the questions in this field research. Importantly, the Mapotu Peace Project is operational within several ADPs; this project was discussed with research participants as we sought to understand its impact.

The following comments from interviews indicate that WVK has provided the vital ingredient of peace awareness and strategies for community-level action, both of which have contributed to a reduction in violence:

- WVK has had an impact in the Baringo and West Pokot Districts. The organisation of peace committees has contributed significantly to reducing conflict, using local people and local leaders. These are very good instruments for reducing conflict in the regions where the committees are active.

- WVK reaches down to the cattle rustling level, working through peace committees. During times of escalated conflict, WVK has the strength to remain on the ground when others pull out.

- WVK has been organising lots of meetings along the border of the Pokot and Turkana. It has won people over and dissuaded them from cross-border raids.

- The Mapotu Peace Project has resulted in stopping the increase of raids and related violence and was improving the situation.

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4 This finding may actually be regarded as positive. For sustainability, it is preferable for peace committees to be “owned by” and associated first and foremost with permanent community structures rather than with an international NGO – since the latter may eventually leave the community.
3. Kenya

During the time of frequent raids, Pokot and Marakwet were not even coming together. WVK were going to the people, without fear, bringing people together to talk.

It was specifically noted that WVK was “going out” to people and bringing them together. The idea of “going out to people” is important because many of the youth and men responsible for overseeing grazing animals spend much of their time in remote areas and are difficult to draw into the peacebuilding process. A group of women told us that they regard as a key peacebuilding strategy the need to travel to these far-flung areas and persuade men involved in raiding to stop the practice. This idea was echoed by a government official who underscored the value of travelling to problematic areas to bring together opposing parties. Along the same lines, another respondent commented:

[there is a] need to go out to meet with the common man, the people affected, give priority to the common pastoralist – seminars held in town aren’t getting at the real problem. [There is] need to reach the common man with necessities, with all types of help to meet his basic needs, to identify his problems and find out what he wants – we need to go where they are and experience their hardship.

This respondent also commented that people from NGOs, churches and government often do not go out to these people because they are afraid, yet “the factors for success [in peacebuilding] are to go and stay with Kraal elders, warriors, seers...and hear from them what they need”. The efforts of WV to reach people in remote areas was well-regarded by these respondents.

Some WVK peacebuilding activities were undertaken in collaboration with other NGOs or with CBOs. The National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCCK) partnered with the Mapotu project. This openness and cooperation contributed to mutual success. An NGO staff person indicated that at one time his NGO was the only one doing peace work in the region. When the Mapotu project came, his NGO helped WVK meet laibons, warriors and people from rural villages.

As a result of WVK assistance to communities in advocating for increased and better trained police services in the Turkana area, police posts were upgraded and better communications between the police and communities were reported. Government officials were described as “now speaking peace” as a result of WVK training and workshops. (It must be stressed that other organisations have been involved, particularly the Arid Lands Management Programme and the National Steering Committee on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management.) On a practical level, it was reported that WVK would fill a government vehicle with fuel to assist officials in getting to a site of potential conflict or to investigate a raid.

Respondents saw the direct provision of services by WVK to violence-affected communities and individuals as a factor contributing to peace. Relief supplies were given to victims of raids. WVK assisted with children’s school fees, medication and hospital bills. Parents were assisted financially and homes were built after attacks. WVK also helped people from both sides get to the hospital.

In remote areas with poor roads and few vehicles, WVK addressed chronic transportation needs and bridged communications gaps. WVK supplied vehicles to take people to peace-related meetings: “WVK provided us [women] with food and fuel to do awareness-raising with raiders, to get them to surrender their guns.” “WVK offered a vehicle and collected people from the far end. The WVK vehicle was respected by the Pokot. They wouldn’t attack it since WVK didn't discriminate against the Pokot.”

One government official in the Turkana area indicated that improving security requires partnership and collaboration. His office liaises with the WV ADP. Together with WVK they go around and speak about security and cattle raids. WVK provides a vehicle; he provides personnel and brings local chiefs to the meetings. They go to hot spots to talk to people. “Mobilisation is difficult because it is a sparsely populated area. They [WVK] buy bulls for a feast. This helps increase attendance.”

These remote North Rift Valley communities are poorly served by local newspapers and other media sources. National Kenyan newspapers are sporadically available. To help fill this communications gap, WVK produced publications about North Rift communities and conflict resolution, causes and interventions.

The idea of “going out to people” is important.
3. Kenya

WVK and another NGO helped people acquire mobile phones so that raids could be reported to authorities and mediation meetings facilitated. The provision of mobile phones to peace committee members in the Pokot and Marakwet communities has provided an important institutional mechanism for interrupting the retaliatory cycle of raids and counter-raids between those communities.

WVK’s contribution to organising cross-border meetings and bringing together leaders from different communities was cited as its most important contribution to peacebuilding. Meetings convened by WVK were said to be better attended and more effective than those organised by government because WVK was seen as a neutral player. Both the Turkana and Marakwet see government officials from the Pokot as enemies. As one government official said, “In conflict resolution, neutrality is key.” “WVK staff are closer to the people than the government. There is more support if WVK calls the meeting than if government calls the meeting.”

One of the key elements cited as necessary to create and maintain security was the sustained presence of government, but this has been difficult to maintain.

There was a time when no one would come out for a government-initiated meeting. Now they will. The government sent people to understand the problems between Turkana and Pokot. Peaceful disarmament began, getting people to return guns; but it hasn’t been successful because it is not continuous.

Government may put the army in briefly, but then removes it. When things are hot, their response is serious, but when the situation cools there is a lack of effort from government.

WVK deliberately worked with government officials and the police to address problems identified by the community, rather than establish parallel or competing structures and processes that could undermine weak government structures. “There have been intercommunity peace meetings and workshops that have included provincial administrators and church leaders.” “The police worked with WVK to stop raids.”

Encouragement by WVK in concert with other NGOs and CBOs for the creation of more administrative units brought administrators closer to the people.

This 2002 photo shows an elder addressing a group of warriors and calling for peace. Meetings like this one have also been part of the Mapotu Peace Project activities.
Now there is a district HQ, closer to the border of Turkana, which is a hot spot. With the District Commissioner around, the Pokot realize that their raids are pointless, since stolen animals will be recovered. Since January 2008, the people from central Pokot have not gone to Turkana to raid. There have been raids in Turkana, but not by people from central Pokot.

Government representatives were described as now being participants in meetings on security, while previously there was no relationship between the government and the Pokot and Turkana.

WVK’s work was credited with helping other NGOs to meet their goals. Many NGOs were affected by the violence and when WVK put an effort into peacebuilding, NGOs and the churches benefited from the stability. We heard reports of progress toward sustainable development:

The warriors are celebrated [traditionally for their raiding activities], but new options are needed for them. Following a trip for warriors, two of them from Marakwet found alternative activities. One began a business (a shop) and the other started a peace music club and has produced a CD “Music for Peace.”

At several points in interviews the Mapotu project was credited with providing money to warriors to start businesses. WVK staff confirmed that this was not part of the Mapotu project but they did not know which NGO may have provided this assistance. There was also a report of 100 guns being handed in by the Turkana, but again the researchers found out later that WVK was not involved in this initiative.

Suggested changes to improve WVK peacebuilding activities

When asked what WVK could do to improve its peacebuilding activities, people responded with answers that combined the peacebuilding and development themes. These were described as interconnected challenges that must be addressed in tandem. Some suggestions for WVK were:

- Train warriors for alternative means of livelihood.
- Provide greater means of transport. Vehicles are needed for WVK peace monitors because motorcycles are not safe in areas where bandits are operating.
- Support small peace committees at the community level.
- Get in touch with the chiefs to give training to the youth who are involved in highway robbery, to work with both for change.
- Encourage and supply sports teams in different age groups.
- Create more common markets that would bring Pokot and Turkana together.
- Support women to do more meeting with people to promote peace.
- Laibons could be spoken to so they can get to the people and explain the need for peace.
- Greater assistance could be given to the casualties of the raids.
- More meetings could be facilitated in the interior – not just in the towns and trading centres but at the kraals.

Box 3.2.2. Tragedy on International Peace Day

On 21 September 2006, NGOs, including WVK, organised an event for World Peace Day. Held at Kainuk in Turkana territory, the Turkana were joined by Pokot, Marakwet, and Ilchamus elders, youth, traditional dancers, media representatives and school children in a music festival about peace. The festival, which took place throughout the day, was held in a field behind the shops where the community has meetings. Travel was a challenge, requiring trucks to be hired from the different districts. Interactions during the day were successful. Near the end of the day, however, a report came that five children had been killed by Pokot warriors at a school 10 km away. The head teacher from the school brought the news. There was serious commotion. The Turkana wanted to kill the Pokot at the festival. WVK staff restrained the Turkana until transportation could be arranged and all the Pokot left in a convoy. WVK staff then went to the school and saw the children who had been killed. It apparently helped that the Turkana saw that there was sympathy for their loss. An NCCK pastor prayed with them. Two injured children were taken to get medical help.
3. Kenya

Some of the local officials who were familiar with WVK ADPs and the internal organisation of WVK provided constructive comments on how WVK could better organise itself to combine development and peacebuilding:

- Better financing and more discretion for local peace monitors in deciding how to use available funding.
- Peace monitors need a means of transportation to reach all the places that they want to go.
- WVK should mainstream peace in projects and not have two separate administration structures; have one person devoted to this, so that peace is incorporated into ADPs.

Other improvements suggested

Despite positive reports of WV peacebuilding activities, it was noted that helping people change their attitudes and increasing support for peace does not necessarily complete the package. A former warrior said that WVK peacebuilding programmes had "built peace in his heart, but he was now poor and suffering because his cattle had been taken."

The research team was interested in knowing what people thought generally could be done to reduce armed violence and improve their situation. A key role was indicated for police action in breaking the cycle of retaliation for raids, as well as lowering the number of deaths and injuries by raiders. Some people interviewed stated that there was more success in reducing retaliation between Pokot and Marakwet than between Pokot and Turkana. More government administrative units close to the border areas would help to decrease the number of raids.

In interviews people indicated a desire to increase advocacy work with government leaders, with the assistance of WVK, otherwise security issues would not be addressed. Advocacy should include urging the government to provide improved security and seal the border routes for importing weapons. The government should also be encouraged to engage at the national level to, for example, turn the local militia into trained police. Advocacy should also target the improvement of infrastructure.

Education was often referred to as part of the solution to armed violence by providing activity for idle youth, preparing people for alternative viewpoints and livelihood possibilities, and generally increasing people’s horizons. At the same time, some comments suggested that the current education system does not always suit pastoralists:

- “Education can be problematic if herders need to send their children to boarding schools. Bad experiences, such as girls coming back pregnant, discourage support for schooling. However, schools will feed children during times of food scarcity.”
- “Mobile schools with suitable curriculum are needed.”
- “When people have gone to school, convincing them not to engage in raids is easier.”
- “Adult learning centres are needed.”
- “Develop people by educating them, taking schools to them. In areas where people are fighting, there aren’t schools. We need to have one big boarding school or mobile feeder schools.”

Business opportunities are needed to provide alternative livelihoods:

- Increased cooperative activities between the Turkana and Pokot, such as shared farming, were seen as a way of building peace. The Pokot and Turkana had a joint irrigation scheme for their fields that helped them come together.
- A factory for meat processing would allow people to bring livestock and do business together.
- Upgraded infrastructure, such as improved roads, will make possible more business opportunities.

The role of women in creating awareness and spreading messages of peace was emphasised:

- “The women want more help getting out to rural areas, [to] the pastures and grazing fields where people are keeping their cattle, to talk to people with guns. They also want help to go and talk to politicians to discuss these issues.”
- "Women want to attend barazas [public community meetings] and to speak to government and ask what is being done to reduce the violence."
3. Kenya

Advice was given concerning disarmament exercises:

- Human rights organisations were identified as getting in the way of giving the government a chance to take away guns.
- “Government has legitimate cause to remove guns, but it should be done without excessive force.”
- Measures to control guns were suggested, such as registering all guns in the community.
- “People have invested in their guns and don’t want to give them up until security is better assured.”

Some of those interviewed stated a need for a deeper religious commitment to end the violence:

- “Communities also need evangelisation, the Gospel. Pastors need support to do this.”

Observations

As indicated by the variety of factors and motivations for violence related in interviews, it is not possible to reduce armed violence among pastoralists by identifying a group of perpetrators of violence and focusing on them. The violence is embedded in a rich cultural web of long-held practices now distorted by a range of factors, not the least of which is the widespread introduction of automatic weapons in the second half of the 20th century.

1. The Marakwet decision to reduce the practice of dowry or bride price seems to have significantly reduced the incentive to raid from their neighbours and has increased intermarriage with the Pokot. This and a range of other initiatives for peace give hope that peace is attainable between pastoralist communities.

2. Solutions must go beyond interrupting the supply of guns in conflict zones and removing them through disarmament processes. Forced disarmament may be counter-productive. Keith Krause from Small Arms Survey has called the needed interventions second-generation strategies:

   Second-generation attempts to deal with the small arms problem are probably more important and thornier because those of us who come out of an arms control or disarmament background have so much to learn from the development, humanitarian, public health, and crimes control communities. When you start to talk about second-generation measures, you shift your focus to the demand-side of the equation, to what drives people to seek and to hold, use, or misuse weapons whether for personal or community security or with criminal and violent intent.

   The factors influencing the escalation of violence and demand for guns among Kenyan pastoralist communities fall into this second-generation category: disease and drought, conflicts with those in nearby settled towns and trading centres along roads, remoteness from central government attention and decision making, climate-influenced shrinkage of grazing lands and water sources, few roads and public services, and increasing crime met by inadequate policing. Even the traditional motivations of cattle raiding for pride, wealth and dowry are giving way to stolen cattle ending up on trucks bound for slaughterhouses and meat exporters.

3. Gun violence is both a harbinger of change and a sign of the impact of that change on traditional societies in Africa. If the devastating violence caused by these weapons is to be reined in, the number of guns must be reduced, while the guns remaining come under strict social controls. But disarmament is only part of the solution; development and security reform are also necessary. Disarmament initiatives must be carried out in all contending communities, and integrated into community development and specific peace initiatives to create a more secure environment that in turn will allow for increased development. This is the complex reality in which WVK, with its civil society and government partners, is undertaking peacebuilding in the North Rift Valley of Kenya.

4. An inherent problem with these interconnecting sectoral initiatives is discerning the impact of each initiative and of the influence of other factors, including such imponderables as rainfall. Complex problems do not have predictable timelines or project outcomes. Donors looking to have an impact through peacebuilding programmes may need to shift their sights from results-based management and log frame matrices that predict specific outcomes in specific periods. Donors should be prepared to be flexible as the context changes.

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Due to the sensitive nature of this research, the photos in this chapter do not show people who participated in the research and do not depict exact research locations. Instead, the photos were selected from World Vision’s collection to show different scenes from life in Northern and Eastern Uganda and World Vision’s work with communities there.

A camp for displaced persons in Soroti district.
4. Uganda

4.1. Introduction

Northern Uganda has endured decades of armed violence. The insurgency of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), the dominant conflict of the past 20 years, emerged from earlier armed insurgencies that were rooted in northern regional grievances against the national government of President Yoweri Museveni. When Museveni’s National Resistance Army seized power in 1986, it faced armed resistance in northern Uganda from the Uganda People’s Democratic Army (UPDA), made up of sympathetic civilians and remnants of the army of the previous government. Local support for the UPDA was motivated by resentment against a government perceived to be dominated by western and southern Ugandan interests. The LRA “emanated from a rebellion movement.”

The costs of the armed violence have been extreme. When international attention was finally drawn to the horrors and seeming interminability of the LRA insurgency, the details of the human and social costs became more widely known. The civilian deaths and massive population displacements, the scale of the abductions and damaged psyches of children, and the prolonged fear suffered by a large region over many years all contributed to widespread breakdown of families, communities and traditions in the regions affected. An entire generation has grown up outside the influence of the established social activities and norms of the region.

A truce has stalled the LRA insurgency in northern Uganda but threats and challenges remain. Quite apart from fears that the LRA will return are the demanding needs of post-conflict reconstruction. The peacebuilding work of World Vision Uganda (WVU) aims to address the complexities of strengthening and rebuilding families and communities that have been torn apart by war. The work is occurring in an environment suffering the legacies of war, not the least being the availability and misuse of weapons. WVU’s peacebuilding is taking place in a period without armed conflict, but with ongoing armed violence. The peacebuilding experience in Uganda is consequently an important example of the challenge of securing armed violence reduction after armed conflict ends.

4. Uganda

4.2. Applying the Armed Violence Lens To Uganda

We will use the armed violence lens discussed in the Methodology section to analyse the results of interviews and focus groups conducted in two districts affected by armed violence in Uganda. We begin by summarizing the individual and community perceptions of security revealed by the interviews. An arbitrary three-year timeframe was used in the questions to determine people’s perceptions of whether violence was increasing or decreasing over time.

Affected Populations

Field research was conducted in Kitgum and Soroti districts, in the North and East Regions of Uganda respectively. For many years, both districts have been heavily affected by extreme violence perpetrated by the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and by earlier armed conflict between remnants of the army of the Obote government and the army of the current government under President Museveni. During the LRA insurgency, communities were attacked and displaced and families were torn apart by violence and abduction. Virtually the entire civilian population of both districts was affected by the violence.²

In the past three years levels of violence dropped significantly. Both districts have experienced a respite from LRA attacks, although justifiable fears remain of a possible LRA return. Other forms of armed violence have emerged, however, many of them linked to the devastation of the earlier insurgency. In addition, as discussed below, cattle raids by neighbouring Karamojong youth are a threat to parts of the districts.

The touchstone for most of those interviewed in Kitgum and Soroti districts was the LRA insurgency and its lasting impact. For many, the experience of LRA violence was still close and worrisome. LRA activities that took place several years ago were referred to before more recent violent incidents. There was some variation in perceptions of the immediacy of the LRA threat, however, as suggested by the dates given for the most recent LRA attacks. For example, one interviewee stated that

³ According to World Vision Uganda in Promoting a Culture of Peace with Partners: Peacebuilding Report 2008 (2008, p 13), “the rescued children manifested physical, social, emotional and health complication[s]. Most of them had broken down due to prolonged suffering. They continued to suffer loss of self esteem, insecurity, withdrawal, nightmares, delusions and hallucinations, guilt feelings, emotional fear, anger and aggressiveness.”
4. Uganda

The second major legacy of the LRA insurgency is the displacement of civilian populations by the fighting. In the areas in North and East Uganda where the field research was conducted, internally displaced persons (IDP) camps are everywhere. It is estimated that between 1.5 and 2 million people were uprooted following attacks by the LRA on rural homes and communities as well as efforts by the government to centralize people in encampments to isolate them from the rebels.

The displaced civilians now are returning to their former communities and lands, often after an interim stay at a satellite camp near their homes. One church-based activist told us that many people wanted to return to their communities but, because of concerns about the failed peace talks, they instead established satellite camps at an accessible distance from their former homes. This reluctance to make a commitment to return is reinforced by recurring incidents of gun violence, including from criminal thugs and government militias.

The process of returning is not always smooth, and disputes over resettled land and other issues have led to violence. However, the armed violence experienced in the two districts today is quantitatively and qualitatively different from that experienced during the insurgency period. It is less intense, more varied and, as noted above, not identified as clearly. Moreover, unlike the violence perpetrated by the LRA, the current forms of violence are amenable to peacebuilding and development intervention.

Virtually all people interviewed in both districts agreed that, despite ongoing concerns about the LRA and more recent forms of violence, the people and communities were significantly safer than they were three years ago. One government official noted that “people can now travel anywhere, and eat and drink and sleep along the roads and travel routes”, and this view was shared by many others. A focus group noted that “these days there are fewer soldiers, we don’t hear gunshots and we can move around and travel more easily”. Others pointed to the evidence of people returning to their homes after years in displacement camps.

The communities in Kitgum and Soroti districts may no longer bear the direct impact of the insurgency but research interviews pointed to the presence of other forms of armed violence. Turning to the second focus of the “armed violence lens”, we now discuss the perpetrators of armed violence and the factors of weapons demand that have emerged in Kitgum and Soroti districts in recent years.

Perpetrators of Armed Violence

Interviewees identified several forms of recent recurrent violence that affect individuals and communities in the shadow of the LRA insurgency. Most of this violence is localised and perpetrated by actors living in or operating close to IDP camps or communities. All types may include the use or threat of use of weapons, but the violence often occurs without the use of weapons. We consider first the perpetrators of the types of violence most commonly involving weapons.

Land Wrangles

Several forms of localized violence affecting civilian populations were cited in interviews and focus groups, but land “wrangles” were mentioned most frequently. Land wrangles are disputes over contested property, animals and goods. In North and East Uganda, as security improved and people returned to their holdings they discovered that the LRA had not been the sole perpetrators of abuse and theft. Sometimes fellow community members had raided properties for animals and household goods or laid claim to the land. This localised raiding, often combined with a lack of formal documentation of land ownership, has generated many instances of contested holdings.

Accusations of theft were not limited to former land holdings. We heard also that there are “problems of theft in the [satellite] camps” as some camp residents take advantage of the absence of neighbours who are cultivating land at former homesteads. Some residents who had gone to their fields returned to find their houses broken into. Some told us that, as a result of the theft, their children were unable to attend school.

Land wrangles appear to be a pervasive problem in both districts. A government official noted that most local crimes are related to land. A participant in the World Vision programme in Kitgum told us that all of his family members were affected by land disputes because “there is confusion over land
Boundaries and people can’t go back to their original land. The perpetrators of violence in land wrangles may be neighbours or even family members and disputes sometimes turn violent. In some instances disputants hire gunmen or criminals to threaten or kill their neighbours, and subsequent revenge attacks institute a cycle of violence.

Often there is a gender dimension to land disputes (see Box 4.2.1). Men may challenge women’s entitlement to land despite the constitutional right of women in Uganda to land ownership. One government official spoke of cases where the surviving brothers of a deceased man have taken property from his widow. The official also noted that “these are the biggest problems [I have] to deal with”.

Criminal violence
Informants associated criminal violence most consistently with the use of weapons. The common term used by informants to describe assault and robbery by armed perpetrators was “thuggery”. In Kitgum district we were told that thuggery targets people with money and resources such as businesses and farmers and even events such as traditional wedding gatherings. WVU staff noted that thugs in the district were in possession of small arms, which they used to carry out robberies. Similarly, in Soroti district we were told that “there are a lot of robberies and these are violent because guns are being used”.

The use of small arms in criminal violence was linked directly to the insurgent conflict. A government official noted that some former senior commanders of the LRA who took up thuggery had not gone through a process of counselling and reintegration. Informants also referred to the past organising and arming of local youth by the government to fight the LRA. When the LRA withdrew, the local youth were left unsupervised and some turned to criminal activity. One focus group spoke of a recent period when people with guns tended to be youth who would commit assault and robbery and threaten people for money. Such incidents could happen once a month.

Box 4.2.1. Gender and armed violence

It is clear that the use of weapons is heavily gendered. Informants consistently identified men, especially youth, as the more common users of weapons and perpetrators of violence. As one government official stated:

“Guns are in the hands of criminals ... hard core criminals cut across age groups [and] this group does not include women.”

The gender aspects of the impact of armed violence are less known. There were consistent responses that males and females were affected by armed violence differently, but there was a range of views on the degree of gender victimization. Some stated that women were disproportionately victims, while others noted that all were affected by violence.

The variation in responses may be due to limited data and awareness. An April 2008 report on female youth in northern Uganda noted that the “understanding of the effects of war on women and girls is especially lacking... Government and NGO officials admit that they have little sense of the true scale of the problems facing young women and the proportion of females facing particular vulnerabilities.” Based on a survey of youth in the Kitgum and Pader districts between October 2006 and August 2007, the report did establish some gender-specific data on LRA abductions, and determined that the numbers involved had been under-reported previously. According to the report, more than a third of male youth and a fifth of female youth reported abduction by the LRA.

According to a 2008 press report, “between January and June, 308 cases of robbery were reported in Gulu, Kitgum, Amuru and Pader Districts, with the first two topping the list. During these incidents, 168 IDPs were murdered as they tried to return home. ‘May was the worst month, with 67 cases of robbery,’ Arinaitwe [the regional police commander] added. ‘On average at least 30 cases of robbery are reported monthly.’ Some of the 168 suspects, who were arrested, tried in court and found guilty, included former fighters of the rebel Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA)” (IRIN, “Uganda: Too Many Guns Threaten Returnees, Say Officials”, 10 July 2008, http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/TYPE,COUNTRYNEWS,UGA,487de2431e,0.html).

4. Uganda

Security sector violence

Another legacy of the armed conflict is violence perpetrated by security forces. Several informants mentioned the violence perpetrated by armed security forces in both Kitgum and Soroti districts. According to these informants, there were no police in the North in the past and security came from militias and “Local Defence Units” armed by the government. Although there have been recent attempts to replace militias with police, the Special Police Constables (SPCs) deployed to bolster the civilian police force have become a problem. Indeed, we were told that because these constables are not fully trained, they often use guns to pursue their own interests and have caused problems in public gatherings.5

In addition, during the time that the government provided weapons to local militias, recordkeeping of distributed guns was poor. More recently, there have been incidents of local police using guns illegally – in private disputes with civilians or even by hiring out their weapons for use in robberies and other crimes. These incidents reinforced a pervasive wariness of special constables.

Cattle raids from Karamoja

In a few interviews reference was made to the use of guns by the nearby Karamojong people for cattle raiding. The threat was not only local – a government official told us that there were Karamojong attacks in the past year in other areas. Special Police Constables were deployed to stop the Karamojong after attacks at the border of Acholi territory, about 50 km from Kitgum Matidi. The Karamojong were also identified as one source of the guns circulating in North and East Uganda.6

5 In a recent survey of law enforcement agencies from across Uganda, police training and corruption were identified by agency members themselves as significant problems. Indeed, “56 percent of police surveyed felt that poor training was a major problem within the police service.” Moreover, “72 percent of respondents from the other law enforcement and security agencies reported that they perceived the police as corrupt in the discharge of their duties” (Uganda National Focal Point on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Mapping the Small Arms Problem in Uganda: The Development of Uganda’s National Action Plan on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Government of Uganda, May 2007, http://www.saferworld.org.uk/images/pubdocs/Uganda_Mapping.pdf, pp 38–39).

4. Uganda

Other forms of violence have arisen in the aftermath of the insurgencies in northern Uganda. As discussed below, reports of domestic violence and sexual violence did not typically involve weapons and consequently would not be considered armed violence. Nevertheless, both were consistently reported in interviews as serious threats to individuals and communities. They also may be seen as part of a spectrum of violence that is a legacy of armed conflict in northern Uganda and as such may be considered outcomes of earlier armed violence. At a minimum, domestic and sexual violence is perpetrated in a social environment that has been seriously degraded by war.

Domestic violence and alcoholism

Initiators of domestic violence vary – men and women fighting, children fighting parents – but most references in interviews identified men as the perpetrators and wives as the victims.7 In an interview we were told that husbands beat their wives to get the money the women have collected in the “cash box” generated by a collective women’s savings project. When the project money is distributed, some husbands want it for their own use. If the women resist, they are beaten.

The impact of this form of domestic violence goes beyond the serious problem of injuries suffered by wives. From WVU staff we heard that such thefts undermine the long-term impact of the savings programme and can result in food insecurity and malnutrition for the whole family.

Interviews also linked domestic violence to drunkenness, poverty and post-traumatic stress. So the problem could be attributed to several factors. More than one interviewee noted that poverty and traumas suffered in war significantly contributed to domestic violence. Even more informants referred to the impact of the production of alcohol and the resulting drunkenness.

World Vision staff noted that in IDP camps, women may earn necessary income by brewing alcohol to sell to men. Alcohol also represents a form of payment – “brew” is provided in return for assistance with crop cultivation or harvesting. At the same time, it is apparent that the availability of alcohol contributes to domestic violence. Thus women may be fuelling a form of violence in which they are the primary victims. However, moving from the IDP camps could break this cycle. We were told that in the camps, the alcohol is brewed nearby and is readily available. When people return to their former homes, the increased distance among homesteads and commitment to agricultural work can reduce the access to and use of alcohol.8

Sexual violence

Sexual violence was consistently identified in interviews. Many spoke of the “defilement” of under-aged girls. A civil society activist spoke of “high rates of rape” and a women’s group stated that rape occurred in the fields and in the camps. Most references were to men as perpetrators of sexual violence, men raping girls and women. But there was also reference to youth forcibly having sex with children. A community activist in Kitgum district noted the link between rape and the spread of HIV/AIDS. Moreover, sexual oppression may arise from poverty, which drives women and girls into forms of prostitution. In dire circumstances, the pressure toward prostitution may even come from within families.

Like domestic violence, sexual violence was linked to the prevalence of alcohol, poverty and a breakdown in social norms. As a peace committee member explained:

> Women are the victims of rape and domestic violence, which was present prior to the displacement but was not as rampant. People were mixed together in the IDP camps so social norms and controls were lessened. Alcohol and poverty are the main sources of domestic violence. Men drink to relieve stress when they don’t plant crops.

The instances related of domestic and sexual violence underlined a general sense that in their current forms, these types of violence affect women and girls more than men and boys. Females are generally more vulnerable and more prone to manipulation and, especially under the influence of alcohol and conditions of underemployment, men are more belligerent and violent.

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7 The problem of domestic violence was noted in the 2008 SWAY report (see note 1, Box 4.2.1): “Thirteen percent [of females] report experiencing domestic violence by a family member or husband in the previous two months.”

8 A drop in violent incidents following the return to home areas was also reported in 2008 by Kitgum women speaking to World Vision Uganda. “[A women’s] group’s chairperson said, incidences of gender based violence have reduced since they left the IDP camp. When pressed further she said it was because men are more preoccupied with working in the garden than when they were in the camp” (World Vision Uganda, Promoting a Culture of Peace with Partners: Peacebuilding Report 2008, p 15).
4. Uganda

Instruments of violence

The instruments of violence constitute another feature of the armed violence lens. Interview questions sought to determine details on the availability and use of local weapons, including sources, types, costs, users and the amount of public data relating to weapons possession and use.

Interviews in Kitgum and Soroti districts left the impression that the influence and availability of guns have diminished significantly since the years of LRA insurgency. At the same time, several sources contended that weapons were still available and used, although there were contradictory reports on the extent. For example, one informant stated that there are fewer guns available while another noted that the use of guns has increased with land problems.9

Sources of weapons

According to people interviewed, firearms and ammunition can currently be obtained from a variety of sources. Several informants noted that Uganda’s porous borders eased the movement of weapons from Sudan. The Karamojong brought weapons to use in cattle raids and pass on to other users. One informant claimed to have evidence that the Karamojong have access to Ugandan government military ammunition. Another stated that some Acholi believe that the Karamojong received guns from the government for use in cattle raiding in a deliberate effort to weaken the Acholi and make them more docile.

Informants told us that weapons are commonly hidden in the areas of Uganda that were affected by the LRA insurgency. They also said guns can be sourced from former fighters who have retained or hidden them. These include members of earlier insurgent groups, such as the Acholi UPDA in the 1980s, as well as more recent militia group members that were armed by the government in 2005 to fight the LRA. Sometimes locals have discovered weapons buried and abandoned by these groups.

In several interviews local security forces were identified as a source of weapons. Many people stated that guns can be hired or bought from “rogue elements” in the military or police.

9 In 2005, when World Vision Uganda produced a proposal to support the Tubur Area Development Programme, the presence of guns in the community was a recognised problem. The proposal notes that “while the wars seem to have ended, community based conflict remained lingering, and the instruments of violence namely guns remained in the community, to be used against the community” (World Vision Uganda, Tubur Area Development Programme: Growth Phase Proposal, 2006-2009, September 2005, p 26).
4. Uganda

Common weapons
The AK-47 Kalashnikov was consistently identified as the most commonly available gun. AK-47s were used by the rebels and continue to be held by the military and criminals. Many AK-47s were buried by the LRA in secret caches and recovery of these weapons remains a significant challenge.

Other weapons identified as available and used included hoes and sticks; pangas, knives, and axes; spears and arrows; grenades and petroleum products (to burn houses). There was some inconsistency in interviews as to the prevalence of particular weapons. Some claimed that guns were the weapons most commonly used in violence while others claimed that pangas or sticks were used most frequently. A government official noted that there were still areas affected by mines planted by the LRA and government forces.

The differing responses may be attributed to the context of the violence. One adult group told us that sticks and pangas are used in domestic violence and guns are used in night attacks by criminals.

Market conditions for guns
Adults and youth provided different information about the cost of weapons. Some stated that the cost of a gun was one bull, that is, 350,000–700,000 Ugandan shillings (Ush) or about US$230–470. Others said about US$400–600 for a gun and 200 Ush (about 13 cents) for a bullet. They also stated that the Karamojong will sell a gun for 100,000 Ush or about US$67. Some even estimated a price as low as 75,000 Ush (US$50).

In contrast, one group in Soroti stated that they did not know local costs of firearms or ammunition. This response was consistent with the reluctance to discuss the possession of firearms noted below.

The cost of a gun likely varies with geography as well as conditions of supply and demand. We were told, for example, that the cost of guns went up when markets were created on the Kenya border. Regardless of the real and changing value, the cost estimates provided by informants suggest that more is known about the gun market and availability than may be revealed by their responses to direct questions.

Gun possession
Unlike the sites of interviews in Kenya and Sudan, Ugandan sites offered little visual evidence of readily available weapons, apart from occasional armed soldiers. A recent harsh government suppression of civilian gun possession has discouraged public displays of weapons. One informant told us:

There was a local market in guns and ammunition but now the Government soldiers are very strict in arresting people and confiscating guns if they have them. The Government ordered people to hand in or have guns removed upon taking power. SPC police have arrested people in other areas with guns.

Yet we also were told that when guns are collected by the government, more may be held back than handed over.

There was a striking paucity of information on the availability of guns and a reluctance to provide any details about local possession. Moreover, reports were contradictory. We heard from several sources that there were “few guns in the community”, “civilians do not have guns” and “we hardly hear of weapons.” One male youth group stated emphatically that “we have never seen a gun here”. Others told us that guns were the most common weapons.

The motivation to possess guns varies and does not stem solely from the desire to pursue and perpetrate armed violence. Indeed, it was apparent from several sources that a general wariness about a return of the LRA was an incentive to retain hidden weapons. For some the possession of a gun was a form of security. But we were also told that some community members obtained weapons to use in land disputes. Weapons are used in thuggery to obtain money when there are few opportunities for legal livelihoods, especially for former combatants who have not been integrated back into the community. Weapons are also used for revenge.

Weapons data and data availability
In response to questions about the availability of data on weapons, we were told that data on gun possession and use was sparse or could not be found. We heard that there is little research in Uganda on security issues and hence little related data. One informant referred to the Uganda National Action Plan on small arms and light weapons (related to implementation of the UN Programme of Action on small arms – see Box 4.2.2) but noted that the associated research was just beginning.
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Box 4.2.2. Uganda’s National Action Plan on Small Arms and Light Weapons (NAP)
The National Security Committee of Uganda formally approved Uganda’s NAP in June 2004 and it was publicly launched in September 2005 by the Uganda National Focal Point on Small Arms and Light Weapons. NAP implementation is included as a priority in Uganda’s Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP).1

The NAP provides a national framework for the response to the proliferation and misuse of small arms and light weapons in Uganda. It also supports national implementation of regional and international commitments with regard to small arms control. The NAP sets objectives in 10 key areas:

1. National Bodies and Agencies
2. Policy and Legislation
3. Stockpile Management
4. Public Education and Awareness Programme
5. International and Regional Co-operation and Information Exchange
6. Border Control and Refugees
7. Human Development Planning
8. Training and Capacity-Building
9. Research
10. Critical Areas of Support

More information on the NAP is available from the Uganda National Focal Point, PO Box 7191, Kampala, Uganda, genpol25@utlonline.co.ug.

In some interviews, the police and other government officials were cited as data sources. An official in Kitgum district told us that the "police keep records of civilians who have gun licences". However, security officials appeared very reluctant to share any data they may have had. In three prearranged meetings, officials declined to answer any interview questions, let alone questions about data on weapons possession and use.

The final dimension of the armed violence lens addresses the institutions, laws and practices in a violence-affected context. These are the structures, norms and rules that formally or informally affect levels of violence.

Institutions

The questionnaires focussed on two areas of institutional intervention to reduce levels of violence in north and east Uganda. Informants were asked to describe methods or programmes that were used to control and reduce weapons, and in many instances the responses described disarmament programmes of the Ugandan government. More extensively, one section of the questionnaire explored the peacebuilding programming of World Vision in the Kitgum and Soroti districts. The responses to these questions provided insight into the impact of World Vision intervention and where and how it affected levels of violence. We consider the government programmes first.

Government intervention: Disarmament programmes

The Ugandan government recently implemented disarmament programmes in the Kitgum and Soroti districts. Informants stated that a government programme involved two stages: an amnesty (a period of voluntary disarmament), followed by enforcement. We also were told that, because guns were no longer available, a disarmament programme was now not needed. However, these comments may have arisen from a reluctance to admit the local presence and impact of guns.

According to one informant, during the demobilisation period a government programme called for voluntary disarmament and participants were given a certificate. Afterwards those caught with a weapon were considered “thugs” and prosecuted.
4. Uganda

accordingly. The programme is considered successful because many places are now calm. Moreover, people in Soroti are now working together to drive the process.

We also were told that government-enforced disarmament continues. If the Gombolola Internal Security Officer (GISO) or other officials find out someone has a gun, police confiscate the weapon. The government has tried to educate and encourage people to voluntarily surrender guns.

WVU staff stated that disarmament efforts must continue because they have not yet been universally effective. Although local leaders are engaged and issue radio messages encouraging people to surrender illegal guns, there may still be reluctance to surrender weapons, as discussed above.

Comments by informants exposed what appears to be a contradiction in government programmes related to the Karamojong. On the one hand, informants noted that the Ugandan government has been making efforts to disarm the Karamojong, although recent news reports suggest these have not been successful.10 It has also worked to prevent cross-border trafficking in weapons. On the other hand, there were references to a government-sponsored programme that allowed the Karamoja to possess guns for protection against raiders.11

4.3. World Vision Uganda peacebuilding intervention

The peacebuilding work of World Vision Uganda represents institutional intervention in a context of armed violence. The responses we received from World Vision staff, other civil society representatives, government officials and World Vision programme participants provided considerable detail on the extent and impact of peacebuilding activities in both the Kitgum and Soroti districts.

We heard that much work has been done by WVU to assist, in particular, the return and reintegration of LRA child abductees and child soldiers into their home communities. By the mid-1990s, WVU was providing people to work with returned


11 One study has noted that there have been seven unsuccessful government bids to disarm the Karamojong since the 1950s. Yet, in recent years, “there has been a de facto tolerance of small arms in Karamoja due to the ‘external threats’ faced by the pastoralists” (C Yeung, “Missing men, lost boys and widowed women: Gender perspectives on small-arms proliferation and disarmament in Karamoja, Uganda,” footnote 6).
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children and to attend to their psychological problems. WVU established centres for returned children to replace holding centres in government army barracks. (We were told that the army paraded the rescued children – and adults – during public rallies for relatives to identify and take them home.) The holding centres not only were illegal (Uganda is a signatory to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child) but came under attack from the LRA intent on recapturing “their soldiers”.12

The WVU centres became way stations for children between the bush where the LRA operated and their home communities. The children were given therapy and skills training and there were sensitisation programmes for their communities of return. World Vision also became a conduit for advocacy for returned child soldiers, who spoke in Canada (at the International Conference on War-Affected Children held in Winnipeg in September 2000) and at other international forums about the conflict in Uganda.

We now consider the peacebuilding projects in each district.

**Kitgum district**

The WV peacebuilding project in the Kitgum district (the Kitgum Reconciliation and Economic Recovery Project) began when problems arose among the people displaced by violent LRA activities into IDP camps (see Box 4.3.1). In the camps, inter-family and inter-communal conflict arose because the traditional social structures among the Acholi people had eroded. Children returning from insurgent activities were blamed for LRA atrocities. There was a need for reconciliation within and between communities.

The WV peacebuilding project in Kitgum had two phases. The first phase, from 2004–2006, involved several components. A central component focussed on children, many of whom were born during the period of the insurgency, to inculcate a culture of peace. The activities included competitive “peace debates” between schools, peace games and peace clubs. Another component focussed on youth in and out of high school by engaging them in sports, rallies and marches, and speeches for peace, making use of the United Nations International Peace Day. The work with youth also included music and drama that was showcased in communities. In addition, women were organised into groups engaged in reconciliation, using songs and traditional dances for peace. Traditional cultural leaders and faith-based leaders were engaged. Local community capacity was built through mediation and training in negotiation skills. Similar training was also given to lower-level government officials.

The second phase of the peacebuilding project was built on the lessons learned from evaluation of the first. A key lesson was that “peacebuilding is not meaningful on an empty stomach”, that is, peacebuilding undertaken in very poor communities is not sustainable. Moreover, the conflicts that arose over access to land became more prominent as improved security encouraged more people to return to their home communities. Based on a needs analysis, the project’s second phase was consequently oriented toward income generation, group interaction and cohesion, and the resolution of land disputes. The project also expanded to cover five sub-counties.

12 According to a World Vision Uganda report, Promoting a Culture of Peace with Partners: Peacebuilding Report 2008, “In March 1995, in collaboration with the government of Uganda, World Vision opened the Children of War Rehabilitation Centre in Gulu which later expanded to four centres (three in Gulu and one in Pader)” (p 13).

13 A full definition of an ADP is provided in the Glossary.
4. Uganda

The original camp population in 2005 was 466,000 IDPs. As of March 2008, all 61 IDP camps in Lango had been closed officially, and an inter-agency assessment carried out in June 2008 determined that all 466,000 former IDPs have found durable solutions, apart from about 700 extremely vulnerable individuals.

Box 4.3.1. Return of IDPs

According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, over two-thirds of the Acholis displaced by the LRA conflict have not returned to their homesteads. As of November 2008, the centre reported that only 26% of IDPs in Acholiland had returned to their village of origin. An estimated 41% of displaced people in the area remain in IDP camps, while 32% have resettled to transit sites between the camps and their home villages.1

In the Acholi region, Kitgum district has the highest rate of IDP return, according to a recent World Vision Uganda report. The 2008 report notes that “over 80% of the [Kitgum] IDPs resettled in their original villages or moved at parish level, followed by Pader, Gulu and Amuru Districts”.2

In recognition that 85% of Ugandans are involved in agriculture, the second phase has re-engaged children, individually and in clubs, by encouraging responsibility for distributing seeds and planting. Women’s groups have been given oxen and ploughs, and high-yield seeds so that produce such as tomatoes can be sold at market to generate income, encourage savings and strengthen cohesiveness. There are parallel agricultural activities with youth. One male youth group explained that they were given seeds for growing cabbages and onions that they sold at market, realising earnings of 700,000 Ush or US$470. They plan to use the money to buy an ox to assist in ploughing.

In addition, the project has built the capacity of district peace forums at the parish level. Existing traditional leadership structures, such as elders teaching youth around fires in the evening, are used. These informal settings relay important messages about history, morals and conflict resolution, and are particularly important in IDP camps where social structures are degraded. In community dialogues people discuss freely issues of peace and reconciliation, and land committees at the sub-district level are supported to resolve land conflicts. In all this work, group building is important. WV staff told us that the activities were structured to bring people together to build groups.

In its second phase, the peacebuilding project has also responded to violence between two clans. The violence arose when one clan prevented resettlement by the other, alleging an earlier betrayal that had led to an LRA massacre. The district local government has appointed a team, led by a retired Anglican bishop, to mediate the conflict between the two clans.

World Vision is facilitating the process and the work has been monitored and documented. However, the peace project has not responded to the cattle rustling that has affected eastern regions, although there has been dialogue between local elders and the Karamojong.14

We heard from local WV staff that the “Do No Harm” framework was applied to the project. A 2007 assessment helped to unpack some of the “dividers” and “connectors” related to “local capacities for peace” and to establish the programme adjustments needed to mitigate harm.15

Significantly, staff pointed out that most of the peacebuilding work was integrated into ADP programming and that community structures, such as local councils, were trained and empowered in peacebuilding, conflict resolution, and human rights and gender-based violence awareness. The ADP approach is in turn complementary to peacebuilding since it emphasises community empowerment by encouraging community analysis of problems and solutions. ADP support in a range of sectors further undergirds peacebuilding work by helping the community to address its basic needs.

14 From 2000 to 2003, WV did have a cross-border peacebuilding project implemented by both the WV Uganda and WV Kenya offices, called Pokatusa. The project title was derived by combining the names of the major ethnic groups targeted for peacebuilding in the project, groups who engage in cattle rustling in that area: the Pokot, the Karamojong, the Turkana and the Sabiny. Tragically, the project coordinator was ambushed and killed in Uganda in 2003. The project ended in Uganda shortly afterwards, although it continued for another year in Kenya.

15 Based on Mary B. Anderson’s work, Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace—or War (1999).
Soroti district
The Tubur Area Development Programme is a WVU–assisted community development programme located in Tubur sub-county, Soroti District. World Vision interventions began in 2000 with the goal “to improve the socio-economic status (quality of life) of 2000 households in Tubur sub-county by the year 2015”. The ADP undertakes integrated community development interventions in the key areas of agriculture, health, education, and HIV/AIDS. Peacebuilding is one of the “cross-cutting themes” that informs all intervention areas.

According to World Vision staff, in 2005–2006 Tubur ADP began implementing the peacebuilding project as one of its responses to the violent and disruptive activities of the LRA. The peace project was originally slated to begin in 2003 and last one year. It was delayed two-and-a-half years by the displacement of the Tubur ADP by LRA violence. The project was particularly challenging because participants lived in several IDP camps where social cohesion is weak. As one NGO representative noted, “with peacebuilding, people need to stay together”.


17 WV local staff told us that, because of LRA incursions, the whole ADP was displaced and had to move to and operate from town, beginning in July 2003. All the projects, including the construction of the school, were affected when workmen were abducted by the LRA. Agriculture in the ADP was no longer possible and resources such as cattle intended for farmers were taken by the LRA.
The goal of the peacebuilding project was to build sustainable, local capacities for peace through schools and community structures, creation of awareness and community dialogues. The objectives were:
1. peaceful reintegration of ex-combatants, especially abductees, some of whom were considered traitors.
2. discouraging the use of guns abandoned by rebels by creating awareness in the community.
3. supporting other means of resolving such conflicts as land disputes and domestic violence by involving local leaders and councils.
4. creating a framework for peace in 2006. Structures like clubs and drama groups continue today and have been mainstreamed into the ADP.

To disseminate peace messages to the community, the project established and used such structures as peace clubs for children, football and netball teams for youth, and radio talk-show programmes. These structures are still active. One focus group noted that World Vision advances “sensitisation” for peace through radio programmes. This medium is particularly effective because almost everyone has a radio and there are five FM stations available, some in local languages.

The Tubur peacebuilding project also undertook
- Training of peace committees to address and settle domestic violence and land “wrangles”;
- Awareness training and sensitisation of community groups, which included teaching women and children about their rights, assisting participants to accept returned displaced people, and discouraging the use of abandoned guns;
- Psycho-social and other support to ex-combatants to facilitate reintegration.

The testimony of the majority of interviewees familiar with World Vision projects formed a prevailing image of constructive peacebuilding in both the Kitgum and Soroti districts of Uganda. Peace project activities in both districts were reported to be welcome and effective. We summarise their positive impact below.

We also explore the contributions that the projects were said to have made in reducing armed violence in particular. We conclude with additional considerations for peacebuilding programming (and indeed development programming more broadly), which were solicited from interview informants.

Peace project activities in both districts were reported to be welcome and effective.
4. Uganda

4.4. Reducing Armed Violence: The Impact of World Vision Peacebuilding

Interviewees in the Kitgum and Soroti districts of Uganda commonly expressed the view that the constructive techniques of World Vision peacebuilding projects provided positive and tangible results. At the outset, it should be noted that it was not possible to construct a complete picture of project impact in the visited districts because responses were obviously guarded in some instances. Several peace project participants appeared reluctant to reveal all that was known, especially about gun availability and use in the districts. Nevertheless, it was generally apparent that the WV peacebuilding projects enjoyed considerable support and success. Participants consistently noted that the projects had affected positive changes in their communities.

Informants identified peacebuilding components and activities that they believed had strengthened and unified the communities, and contributed to the capacity of local people to reduce and resolve violence. In Soroti district we were told that the peace project built community trust and unity and improved relationships among residents. According to one local NGO representative, the sports, music and dance activities went a long way to building bridges among schools, especially between schools where “there were problems related to unexplained conflicts”. A focus group told us that when youth meet in football games it creates friendship. Traditional dances also build unity and help to resolve inter-clan conflicts. Local members of a ADP committee18 in the Kitgum district noted that, as a result of peace project activities, there was more unity among school children and youth, especially among the ADP youth, who are assembled from many places.

School peace clubs, whose activities included performing for children and adults, reinforced messages of peace for children and parents and other members of the community. We were told that the poems and songs of children touch the parents and encourage discussion about ways to resolve domestic conflict. The peace projects also helped to sensitize parents about their responsibility to engage with their children’s schools. These interventions helped them to move away from the idea that the government must do everything when it comes to peacebuilding.

18 An ADP committee is comprised of community members (volunteers) who work closely with WV staff in the implementation of the ADP.
4. Uganda

Respondents noted the importance of peacebuilding activities that drew on and strengthened traditional culture and knowledge. There were a number of references to the importance of youth learning and practising traditional dances as a means to build community and inter-community understanding and unity.

In Soroti district WV staff noted that the peace project was designed to create a sustainable local capacity in the community to promote peace. Several respondents described the training and capacity-building features of the peace projects, especially the assistance provided to community leaders and committees to peacefully resolve conflicts. We were told that the projects provided opportunities for community leaders, such as head teachers, to come together to address common problems such as land disputes and fights between clans. Indeed, the ongoing operations of peace committees are a manifestation of successful project capacity-building. One peace committee assured us that, following WVU training, it continues to respond to a range of domestic and land disputes.\(^{19}\)

The projects successfully used radio to build capacity and raise awareness. A community activist lauded the WV-sponsored radio programmes as learning tools. For example, people learned how to handle land disputes and were educated about gender-based violence. Moreover, the benefits were far-reaching – the radio was widely accessible in the district.

It was apparent from interviews that many respondents attributed reductions in violence to WV peace project activities. Respondents cited a range of project elements as constructive in building peace, from the basic provision of agricultural inputs to “sensitisation” about peace and conflict issues to training in conflict mediation and resolution.

In Tubur ADP in Soroti district there was a strong view that peacebuilding had contributed to a decline in the number of land wrangles arising from contested ownership of land by those returning from displacement. The process for settling land wrangles had also improved. Today many land disputes are settled independently of the formal court system. The former distant and expensive system has been replaced with a cheaper, local and timelier one.

\(^{19}\) This claim is corroborated in the 2007–2008 Annual Report of the Tubur Area Development Programme, which states that “there is now more commitment among the local council, opinion leaders, and ADP committee to work together with the peace committee in helping to find peaceful solutions to problems in the community, following the refresher training of the community leaders in peace building and conflict resolution”.

Northern Ugandan children from different schools attend a peace tournament organised by World Vision.
4. Uganda

Box 4.4.1. Respondent suggestions for peacebuilding and armed violence reduction linked to elements of the armed violence lens

Support to affected populations
- “Stepping up” peace club activities – more drama and music more frequently
- Peace committees – more groups and refresher courses
- Additional training – especially focussed on domestic violence
- Social controls on alcoholism
- Regular community meetings on security
- Trust-building exchanges between community and police
- Healing ceremonies to encourage ex-combatant returns and sense of safety
- Awareness-raising about disarmament, peace sensitisation
- Development support – skills training, income-generation activities, school programmes
- Widen the project to cover larger area

Working with perpetrators of violence
- To reduce Local Defence Unit robberies, government should pay LDU members
- Local government activity to deal with rebel remnants and the hiring out of guns for criminal activity
- Greater social controls to prevent sexual violence

Dealing with instruments of violence
- Landmine clearance in former rebel operating areas
- Government programmes to motivate people to surrender weapons, rewards and amnesty programmes

The role of institutions
- Civil society peace committees should accompany government to violence-prone areas like Karamoja
- Sustain a secretariat for a community peace forum [Joint Forum for Peace in Kitgum district]
- Improve the numbers, welfare and operational abilities of police
- Provide community or local government agency to consult regarding security issues
- Provide courts at the county levels and near to accused people and witnesses
- Strengthen the judiciary, including “crash” programmes to create magistrates

We were told that there was less violence in the IDP camps and resettled communities. People cited the satellite IDP camps and home villages where there had been armed violence (with spears and arrows), and where WVU programmes had helped to build good relationships and a greater sense of unity. There also has been success with reintegration of ex-combatants into former villages. According to WV staff, the former fighters have been forgiven, supported psycho-socially and, in some cases, have received material support. They have been made to feel part of the community again.

The peace projects have helped families involved in domestic violence. Peace training was credited with reducing household violence because people went from conflict to negotiation as a preference. Now fights are no longer in homes. Now in families there is more sharing of plans, and central planning, compared to before when a husband would act independently.

Also, we were told that gender-based violence has subsided in some villages. There were reports that the project training helped reduce the number of incidents and project materials had been used to document and settle cases.
Strengthening armed violence reduction: A return to the armed violence lens

Interviewees were asked to identify additional tasks and measures that could be taken by World Vision or others to advance peacebuilding and to reduce armed violence in local areas. The responses suggested initiatives that can loosely be grouped under the four key elements of the armed violence lens (See Box 4.4.1). Most suggestions were related to affected populations and communities and to institutions (i.e., government and nongovernmental institutions, especially World Vision). With regard to the “affected populations” element of the armed violence lens, the majority of the relevant recommendations expanded or extended existing or recent WV peacebuilding activities.

It is worth noting that informants provided the fewest suggestions about instruments of violence. This may have been due to the general reluctance, already noted, of interviewees to discuss weapons possession or use in Uganda. However, this result may also have been due to less-than-warranted attention to firearms and weapons dynamics in the design and implementation of the peace projects. This point was conceded by World Vision staff, who suggested that the issue of firearms could have been a more integral part of the peacebuilding project. For example, government and security forces could have been given the task of training community representatives to resolve “conflicts that emerge when people take up arms against each other”. We will return to this point below.

The interviews regarding World Vision peacebuilding projects in the Kitgum and Soroti districts of Uganda provide a rich and multi-faceted picture of what may be summarised as effective peacebuilding in north and east Uganda. Responses to interview and focus group questions provided strong evidence that peacebuilding – and broader development – programming has made significant contributions to reductions in armed violence in these districts. In addition, common themes and issues that arose from the interviews struck the interview team as particularly noteworthy.
4. Uganda

4.5. Observations

1. The information gathered from interviews and focus groups in Uganda indicates the changing and challenging nature of armed violence that communities face as they attempt the transition from armed conflict to post-conflict reconciliation and reconstruction. It was apparent from interviews that the armed violence in north and east Uganda during the period of the LRA insurgency was horrific and widespread, and will haunt residents and communities in the region for years to come. For many in the region, the LRA insurgency defined armed violence, if only because it had occurred on a scale far exceeding that of subsequent violent events. Valid concerns about a possible return of the LRA continue to dominate perceptions of risks of armed violence.

The LRA is not currently operating in Uganda, yet armed violence continues to affect the Kitgum and Soroti districts. This violence is in large part a legacy of the insurgency period, but it is also of a very different nature. The current forms of violence pose immediate and real challenges that must be addressed differently from the violence of armed conflict. The World Vision peacebuilding projects have responded well to these challenges by using engagement frameworks that reinforce local capacities and knowledge. The peacebuilding training and activities are assisting communities to use their own strengths to address problems that arise in their own families and districts.

2. The transition in the nature of violence in northern Uganda may be seen to parallel the transition from external aid for emergency relief during the insurgency period to the reconstruction and development assistance of today. In other words, just as the nature of aid intervention changes when armed conflict declines, so the nature of violence also changes. A decline in the level of violence associated with armed conflict reduces the need for emergency assistance and introduces new challenges arising from post-conflict reconstruction and development investment. At the same time, the post-conflict environment can create new forms of violence that may be influenced by the new development initiatives. There may be linkages to be explored and lessons to be gained from these parallel transitions that are relevant to implementation of the “Do No Harm/Local Capacities for Peace” frameworks to which World Vision subscribes. It could be, for example, that the delivery of emergency assistance may need to be guided not only by prevailing conditions but also by conditions likely to emerge following an emergency. It may also mean that the DNH/LCP frameworks – or adapted versions thereof – should continue to be used in post-conflict environments once development programming is underway. By way of example, WV applies conflict-sensitive approaches to its development programmes in conflict-affected areas, known as the IPAD (Integrating Peacebuilding and Development) tools. The relevance of armed violence reduction initiatives may need to be considered – and undertaken where relevant – in every “chapter” of programming in conflict-affected communities.

3. In Uganda the questionnaire process failed to accumulate any significant quantitative evidence of changes in levels of armed violence because relevant data was unavailable or nonexistent. Consequently, the commonly reported decline in violence levels could not be substantiated by statistical evidence. The unavailability of data was at least in part due to the reluctance of police and other authorities to share what was perceived to be sensitive security information. There is also a strong likelihood that much of the needed data does not exist. We suggest that attention is needed to assemble personnel and procedures to collect information necessary to assess remedial measures and to ensure that there is a sufficient level of transparency so that those with the greatest stake in building peace – local citizens and communities – can gain confidence in these measures. An open willingness on the part of security authorities to collaborate with civil society on the collection and reporting of data on violence could also be an important source of community-level confidence-building and cooperation.

4. To a significant degree, the peacebuilding frameworks and practices used by World Vision Uganda coincide with the “armed violence lens” approach to armed violence reduction. The use of Do No Harm/Local Capacities for Peace exercises in particular are clearly a people-centred approach to assessing security concerns and formulating community-based responses. These techniques assist in identifying, addressing and engaging both the perpetrators of armed violence and the institutions and institutional processes that are or should be at play. We noted that the training and work of community peace committees in particular are aimed at addressing the perpetrators of current forms of violence. There were many reports, for example, of WV training
4. Uganda

assisting with the settlement of land disputes or with the problems of domestic and sexual violence. There was also significant evidence of WV engagement of local government authorities and traditional leaders in peacebuilding activities.

The coincidence of WVU peacebuilding work and the armed violence lens approach is best illustrated by the Tubur ADP peacebuilding project objectives (see page 48). Each objective of the project can be seen to correspond to one of the four elements of the armed violence lens.

The “instruments” of armed violence is the one element of the armed violence lens that arguably requires additional attention by WV peacebuilding programming in Uganda. Although WV staff and projects have assisted in government-led amnesty and voluntary gun-return programmes in the recent past, significant evidence exists that the informal possession and stockpiling of weapons – especially firearms – remains an unsolved problem. There appears to be considerable scope for peacebuilding activities that directly respond to the issue of weapons, such as increasing awareness of the threat of firearms availability and encouraging voluntary disarmament as a component of greater community security. Efforts to address small arms possession and misuse could be a potential area of collaboration with police and security officials.

5. World Vision is well-placed to advocate for coordinated efforts by all levels of government to strengthen peacebuilding and arms violence reduction programming across Uganda. At the national level, for example, the Ugandan government has formulated the National Action Plan on Small Arms and Light Weapons and Kampala hosts the National Focal Point to coordinate national level SALW policies, in keeping with commitments made at the United Nations. These national–level instruments should be consistent with peace and violence reduction activities at the local level. The challenge will be to provide demonstrable linkages between national, regional and local programmes so that the work and interests of all governance levels can be mutually reinforcing. Here World Vision could play a very useful role in bringing the peacebuilding experience at the local level to national planning and implementation of small arms commitments.

6. Perhaps most significantly, the peacebuilding and violence reduction experience of World Vision in Uganda is an important and extensive body of work that could and should be shared with other actors engaged in contexts of conflict and former conflict. The evidence from interviews points to effective use by World Vision of peacebuilding frameworks to advance peace and reduce real and potential violence in Ugandan communities. The successes of these programmes, especially in environments that for decades have been known to the outside world almost exclusively for horrors, is worthy of wider attention. The methodologies used to produce the successes are worthy of more widespread practice. World Vision could provide an important service by publicly documenting the methodologies, activities and results of its peacebuilding work in Uganda.
5. Sudan

Due to the sensitive nature of this research, the photos in this chapter do not show people who participated in the research and do not depict exact research locations. Instead, the photos were selected from World Vision’s collection to show different scenes from life in Southern Sudan and World Vision’s work with communities there.

Internally displaced women in Southern Sudan.
5. Sudan

5.1. Applying the Armed Violence Lens to Sudan

The OECD/DAC armed violence lens will be used to analyse the results of interviews and focus groups conducted in Warrap State in Sudan. Capturing the security perceptions of populations affected by armed violence was a key objective of the questionnaires used in interviews with people engaged in World Vision peacebuilding programmes in Sudan. The introductory part of the questionnaire was intended to provide a people-centred security assessment. We begin by summarizing the individual and community perceptions of security revealed by the interviews. An arbitrary three-year timeframe was used in the questions to determine people’s perceptions of whether violence was increasing or decreasing over time.

Affected Populations

Although the research questionnaire for all three countries used a three-year timeframe with which respondents could compare relative security at the start and end of that period, in Southern Sudan, this timeframe made particular sense. After the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between Northern and Southern Sudan was signed in 2005, the negative interference of Northern Sudan in the south had reportedly diminished.

The field research in Sudan took place in several towns in Tonj East County. Tonj East is in a post-conflict stage in which the most pervasive causes of insecurity are longstanding social and economic factors.

Over the previous three-year period (2005–2008), security in Tonj East was generally characterised as improved. From an operational point of view, an NGO staff person reflected that “it is easier to work in the area now”. Prior to 2005, regular security briefings were required from the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) to plan staff travel in the area and avoid hostilities. Shipping relief and medical materials was more difficult.

Still, another interview respondent explained the relatively small amount of NGO activity in Tonj East as due to the lack of physical security in the area and overwhelming development needs throughout rural Sudan: “It is not safe because of the conflict. No one feels safe. Nuer on one side and Agar on the other.” Besides World Vision Sudan (WVS) the only NGO visibly operating in the area was Comitato Collaborazione Medica (CCM), a primary health care NGO. And the report of a general trend toward better security was qualified by respondents who described a spike in cattle raiding violence in 2008 that made security “much worse compared to last year [2007]”.

Interviews were undertaken only among Luac Dinka, who identified their cattle raiding opponents variously by ethnic group or by geographic location, such as Agar (a Dinka sub-clan) or Nuer, or as being from Rumbek North County or Koch County. In 2007 Tonj East went through a disarmament exercise initiated by the Governor of Warrap State and carried out by the SPLA. Relative stability was reported for about a year. In March 2008 Rumbek North was said to have attacked Tonj East and Tonj East subsequently retaliated. The SPLA was deployed to separate the sides. In addition to the armed violence associated with cattle raids, one person interviewed said, “People are also dying by gunfire in families, through banditry in the community, theft, rape, adultery and murder. These problems can all be related to each other.”

There are multiple intersecting layers to the conflict dynamic in Tonj East. Traditional tensions between interspersed communities of Nuer and Dinka – the dominant tribal groups in the states of Warrap, Unity and Lakes – are centred on cattle raids for dowry and competition for land and water. There are clan and sub-clan conflicts within the Dinka related to cattle raiding as well as tensions with smaller or minority ethnic groups.

The long-running civil war in Sudan, the latest phase of which started in 1983 and formally ended with the signing of the CPA in January 2005, exploited traditional Nuer and Dinka rivalries, with the north providing financial support and arming factions and militias in the south.

A key event recounted in interviews was the Wunlit people-to-people peace agreement in 1999, facilitated by the New Sudan Council of Churches with the participation of WVS. It reunited the Nuer and Dinka and brought considerable relief from violence. Wunlit remains a touchstone for conflict mediation in this area. A peace negotiation in 2008, that was organised and facilitated by WVS with the Sudan Council of Churches, was described as a child of Wunlit. The Wunlit agreement envisioned the need for such continuing peace negotiations at more local levels.
5. Sudan

One person interviewed conveyed the sense that the end of the civil war in 2005 meant the end of a common enemy – the Arabs from the north. At the same time, it resulted in the unleashing of latent cattle raiding tendencies and internal disputes that were too often settled with guns and inevitably resulted in a cycle of retaliation.

The Wunlit Peace agreement in 1999 brought a measure of peace in the area. Disarmament took place in 2007, but the cattle raids started again. The youth were taking cattle to water and pasture. The Nuer and Agar raided the cattle. This is where the conflict started.

The north-south conflict was largely credited for the pervasive presence of small arms and light weapons in the area, although guns appear to have been a factor in cattle raiding irrespective of the civil war dynamics. Traditional cattle raiding practices were distorted through shifting alliances and the introduction of automatic weapons, primarily AK-47s, in the second half of the 20th century.

Primary Victims

The personal impact of the violence on people interviewed was stark. One person said that in 2006 two of his sons were killed and all his cattle were taken by Agar. In 2008 some of his more distant relatives were killed. Now he has no cows and he has lost two sons. A police officer said that his brother had been killed and his cattle taken, but as a police officer he was unable to pursue the raiders responsible because he had a public and accountable position that did not allow for retaliation. Another interviewee said, “All are affected when the cattle is taken. Recently 50 people were killed, including four children and three women.”

Other respondents shared similar stories of tragic loss. A local WVS staff person said that his stepbrother had been recently killed in a raid. A woman described losing her husband in 1994, killed by Nuer. Another lost three members of her husband’s family in the past year. A “brother pastoralist” was killed in a cattle raid in February 2007. An older brother was killed at a cattle point, allegedly by a Nuer who took the cows. Two people were killed in the market last year by soldiers. One person spoke about the fighting that accompanied an SPLA disarmament exercise. The SPLA took one of his bulls and his brother was beaten by the soldiers and still suffers from paralysis.

Estimates are that up to four million people were displaced during the civil war. After the CPA, people began to return but encountered dangers on the return travel and when they arrived. One returnee, who had been in school in Nairobi, described arriving in Juba and being identified by an SPLA soldier from another ethnic group as being from Tonj East and therefore his traditional enemy. This soldier was going to kill him but another SPLA soldier, who was also from Tonj East, intervened and prevented the killing. Another returnee described coming home from school in Yambio and having all his goods stolen en route because he was identified as an enemy. One person interviewed described being caught and beaten by his enemies.

Government and security forces have not been spared in the violence. “Police are also affected by the presence of guns that are everywhere. Police can be killed.” Three police officers were reported killed during the past year in Tonj East. A county administrator was also reported to have been killed.

An incident described as taking place in February 2008 involved Agar raiders who killed 49 people and took 19,000 cattle. We questioned the figure of 19,000 cattle raided several times. For example, we asked if this were a numerical error and did the respondent mean 1,900? However, the respondent insisted on the number 19,000. People familiar with the area indicated that it was unlikely that the number was that high; the logistics of moving 19,000 cattle in a raid were far too difficult.

Another respondent reported that, in February 2008, 36 people were killed and 12,000 cattle were taken by Nuer. Again, we questioned the large number of cattle taken but the interview participant did not change the number. A further incident in April 2008 was described in which 300 people from one side and 96 from the other were killed. In yet another incident, in August 2008, raiders reportedly from the Nuer were pursued and 20 were killed. Finally, another respondent reported that “in recent fighting, last month, 900 people were killed and 9,000 cattle taken”. The number of people killed and the number of cattle taken could not be substantiated by external sources.
Women and Children

Several people said that women or children can be killed or injured if they are caught in the crossfire during raids, but they are not specifically targeted. Generally young men, warriors, commit the violence in cattle raids. We were told, “Young men start the violence and young women are killed in the retaliation attacks.” Most people live in tukuls, which are low mud-wall houses with conical thatched roofs. These offer no protection from automatic gunfire when a cattle camp is raided and so women and children can be killed. As one person interviewed said, “Even the cattle can be injured or killed in the crossfire.” One person described how, at a water point, conflict erupted and the children and elderly could not run. They were killed in the crossfire.

Surviving women, children and the elderly then suffer from the ongoing impact of the violence, including food insecurity. “Youth are killed in the fighting. Women are killed in the crossfire. The children are left without milk.” Women were described as living in fear. If their sons and husbands are lost and their cattle raided, there is nothing to feed on. The children then do not go to school and, lacking milk, develop malnutrition and become more susceptible to diseases.

Retaliation for killings in cattle raids or inter-clan disputes can happen anywhere and even long after the killings: “If people are travelling alone to a place like Rumbek, if the person dies alone the family has suspicions and will do revenge killing.”

Indirect Impact of Armed Violence

Displacement

The violence from cattle raids has resulted in significant displacement of people within the county. When people are displaced from their homes they then need emergency food rations and temporary shelter. One interviewee claimed that the numbers of those recently displaced from five specific areas added up to more than 10,000 people: “All people are affected by the cattle raids – women, children, elderly. Houses were burned and people were left without food or shelter and displaced from their homes.”

The violence from cattle raids has resulted in significant displacement of people within the county.
5. Sudan

One respondent described moving to [name deleted] because of the violence. Her house near the border had been burned down in the last year. “Lots of bad things happened in the community, including the school closing.”

According to several people interviewed, recent large displacements of people would also result in more hunger in the area once the dry season started in December 2008 or January 2009. The displaced people could not plant crops and would need food rations after the rainy season.

Development Delayed
The high level of insecurity generated by the violence of cattle raiding has affected development in Tonj East by deflecting the time and attention of government officials and apparently discouraging or frightening other NGOs from working in the area. Government officials spoke of spending their time responding to violent incidents and therefore not being able to concentrate on programmes to improve roads and markets. The violence has also prevented the digging of more boreholes. School construction stopped because NGO support was missing. WVS has withdrawn from certain areas because of ongoing violence and risk to staff. People who indicated that they had relocated to gain access to schooling also risked death because they had left the protection of their family and clan.

Perpetrators of Armed Violence

Youth in cattle camps use weapons. Only youth are cattle raiders and they are the most common users of guns. Last year’s attacks and revenge attacks were by youth. Many people were killed because they had no guns to fight back.

The primary perpetrators of gun violence in cattle raids were consistently described as young men aged 18–30 years. They are also the primary victims of the violence, but they are not the only people injured or killed.

Young men participate in raids to acquire cows for paying dowry. The community is proud of youth who successfully steal cattle from others, thus giving successful raiders prestige. Male youth can marry women if they are successful. Stolen cows can also be sold for money to buy sorghum.

The complex identity of the young male warriors can be seen in the prestige and material rewards available to those who are successful. Deep cultural patterns related to pastoralist family formation, adult initiation of young men, and wealth and standing in the community prompt cattle raiding. Local leaders, including elders called spear masters, play important roles in blessing cattle raids and other attacks.

While these leaders could also be voices of restraint to stop raids or retaliatory violence, people indicated that a breakdown in traditional authority sometimes led to worse violence. The generation-consuming civil war disrupted the social structures, so that those with the guns – mainly youth – suddenly had the authority. As a result, elders’ voices were no longer heard when they counselled others to refrain from raiding.

Clan Conflicts over Women and Marriage

There are disputes between clans and families over the “elopement” or pregnancy of girls, when the family has not approved a union or has not been paid the required dowry price. If girls are taken from their homes, sometimes the abductors are attacked. If a man and woman elope, the groom is often found and killed by the bride’s family and then the groom’s family seeks revenge, triggering a cycle of violence.

Conflicts over Water, Land and Borders

Tension and insecurity are particularly pronounced during the dry season, when the cattle are moved to areas where there is water and pasture. “When the cattle drivers from different communities see each other they raid.” “During dry periods there is competition for water and grazing land and guns are used.”

Competition for grass and water are compounded by unmarked and unacknowledged borders between pastoralist communities. One person, drawing pictures in the dirt below the tree where he was interviewed, said, “The boundary between the Agar and Luac has not been set.”
5. Sudan

Box 5.1.1. Data

Police indicated that data is kept on violent and other crimes. Monthly reports are sent to the courts. In one interview we were referred to a large blue book that reportedly recorded crime in the area. The frequency and intensity of violence is “very bad this year.” Forty-two major crimes such as murder or rape were said to be recorded in this book in 2008. Three hundred and two people were reportedly killed by the Agar in a recent raid. Two were women and the rest were male youth who are the main fighters.

For internal purposes, the NGO Comitato Collaborazione Medica tracks violent incidents, particularly those that hinder its operations, and provides quarterly reports to its donors. If an area becomes too insecure CCM would need to close its clinics.

Local officials indicated that the Assistant to the South Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (SSRRC) has data on violent incidents and that it is publicly available.

Police indicated that they do not have records of civilian possession of guns. Another official interviewed did not know if the police, army and prison guards kept data.

The conflict has been over grazing land and water points claimed by the two sides. Also there has been conflict among individuals when guns were used. The conflict is normally based across the border with people moving to water points.

Disputes over land and borders are closely related to cattle raiding.

Breakdown in Traditional Authority

In remote areas traditional governance mechanisms have become weaker in the course of the civil war, and formal state governance institutions have not developed sufficiently to replace these traditional mechanisms. This in-between stage was described by one government official: “Socially, local people disturb each other and there are still tribal conflicts. Security is not well established, nor is it entirely collapsed.”

The research team observed gatherings of (primarily) men under trees that were described as traditional courts for settling local disputes. On the formal state side, we were told there are few courts available for enforcing the national and Southern Sudan laws that do exist, as well as inadequate numbers of prisons and police that, together, would comprise a justice system. Plus the cost of travel and the expense for accessing the formal courts make their use prohibitive. In the absence of well functioning traditional or formal justice systems, people settle conflicts between themselves, apparently contributing to levels of local violence.

Common Criminality

Cattle theft also takes place because of poverty and hunger. “When all the cattle are taken from a family or community then people have nothing. They may go and steal to feed their families.” Sometimes common theft by individuals can escalate into clan fighting in which people die.

Guns motivate and escalate violence

Guns themselves were described as integral to the cycle of perpetrating violence. “Before, the fighting was with spears and sticks and the level of violence was not high. Now the use of guns escalates the violence.” Guns can give inflated confidence: “They had guns that made them feel superior so that they attacked.”

The easy availability of weapons can be an inherent risk: “SPLA weapons can be picked up by children and explode.”

The influx of guns encourages fighting, particularly when gun collection has been unequal and those with more attack those with less: “There is more cattle raiding because disarmament was done in Tonj East County but not among their enemies. If you do not have guns you ‘become like a woman.’”

The context for potential disarmament is affected by cultural realities. Cattle represent material wealth and prestige in the culture. Children sometimes are given a “[cow] colour name” of the father’s most prized cow. The exchange of cattle has importance in cementing family connections at marriage. Cattle have symbolic and ritual importance. They are used in sealing peace agreements, and in restorative justice. To some extent
guns have become associated with cows in the pastoralist cultures of the Nuer and Dinka because guns offer a means of successfully raiding from others and protecting one’s own. While guns have a material value that can be related to Sudanese currency, guns are generally traded for cows and thereby seem to have acquired some of the symbolic and ritual importance associated with cattle.

Informants indicated that the presence of guns in the communities during the civil war made acquiring illegal guns easy. And so, while guns represent a threat to communities, they also are the means by which an individual in the community can defend and protect himself.

Instruments of Violence

Many of the government and traditional leaders interviewed took great pains to deny widespread civilian possession of guns: “No one here has a gun. The soldiers are being supplied by the government.” Posters trumpeting small arms disarmament were taped to trees or walls at several of the interview locations. They represented an organised attempt by local government officials to tune the messages received in the interviews along particular lines: there is no civilian possession of guns here, cattle raiding was initiated only by others, the road needs to be improved, and more development assistance is needed.

Although respondents claimed that civilians didn’t have any guns, the research team, travelling along roads in Tonj East County, observed many cattle herders with guns (and other weapons such as spears). As well, many interviews described extensive and devastating losses from the use of guns in cattle raiding and other types of violence.

The research team could only speculate that someone, presumably a local official, had put the posters up and instructed interview participants to answer questions about civilian gun possession in a certain way. The explanation for this “preparation” may relate to the community’s negative experience of disarmament exercises that they saw as one-sided and which exposed them to attacks from their still-armed neighbours. Whatever the explanation, the responses to questions about guns and other instruments of violence must be understood in this context.

While at one time pastoralists used mainly spears in cattle raids, now they use guns. The AK-47 is the most popular. Machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades are also used: “The Agar have them.” The AK-M was mentioned, but it was not clear what this referred to. “Raiders also use machine guns, RPGs, 12mm and 130mm guns brought using a vehicle and then two or three people carry it.” It was emphasised that “people have always had guns.” Apparently guns are passed down in the family.

Fights within communities may start with sticks and spears and then escalate to guns. Pangas (mачetes) are also used. CCM staff indicated that recently one of its clinics treated a young man with a spear through his eye.

People gave different answers when they were asked if there were more or fewer guns in the area now, as compared to three years ago. Some said: “The number of guns has increased in the last three years.” “There are many more guns available now than before.” But another said: “Guns are less available than three years ago, and there is reduced use of guns, but the situation is unpredictable.”

Market Conditions for Guns

When asked, most people responded that they did not know the cost of a gun or a bullet: “Only the Agar purchase guns.” “We have been trying to ask how much the guns are worth. The youth don’t give proper information so we don’t really know the price.” Only one interview yielded some information on the value of guns and bullets in this area: “An AK-47 costs two cows, or 1,000 Sudan Pounds (SDG) [US$500]. A pistol costs 1,800SDG [US$900]. A bullet costs two or three SDG [US$1 or $1.50].”

Where do the guns come from? Most interview answers were not very concrete. Guns were said to have been collected or captured from adversaries, or to have come in with people at the borders involved in inter-clan or tribal fighting. Some said that guns came from the SPLA. Apparently guns are also sold at a market in Juba.
Guns were described as legacies of the war, which were then passed on by relatives or bought and sold:

When the SPLA fought the Sudanese government, cows were stolen by government forces and militias and people were encouraged to own guns for their protection and the protection of cows. Guns have become prevalent in the community.

Before the CPA was signed, North-South fighting brought an influx of guns into the area. The Sudan government armed militias and they pursued cattle and burned villages. Guns became available and their use for protection was encouraged. Later the guns were not handed in.

Institutions

Interviews clearly illustrated that there are only a few concrete peace benefits from the CPA at the community level. A lack of economic and infrastructure development is one reason that authorities are not able to respond in a timely manner to incidents of armed violence. To illustrate, the 100km trip taken by the research team from Tonj Town to one interview location can take from six to 10 hours, depending on the rains and the mechanical state of the four-wheel-drive Land Cruisers that frequently break down or get stuck because of the rough conditions. Rather than a road, for much of the way, there is a route through the landscape that must be navigated by experienced drivers.

Governance and Security

The security apparatus in the area is generally weak. The police are often drawn from the ranks of retired SPLA officers, who were described as under-trained and ill-equipped.

Domestic violence is increasing. The rule of law and courts are not functioning. Fines are paid in money or in cows. The police are not properly trained; there are few proper prison facilities, and no proper judges. This encourages and escalates violence when people think nothing will be done.

If people cannot rely on either traditional clan-based courts or formal state court processes when they have a dispute, justice may be handled personally. One person interviewed said, “A marriage and the division of cows can lead to gun violence. These days nobody wants to go to court and guns motivate people to take the law into their own hands.” Another commented, “When judgments are unsettled, or not accepted, violence arises or escalates.”

Apart from the influx of guns, frustration in the community motivates violence. When a raid takes place or there is a grazing dispute, the cases are not resolved formally. Then revenge attacks occur. “There is violence among individuals. There are
quarrels over the elopement or pregnancy of girls. People take the law into their own hands including shooting. Then revenge escalates the violence."

Lack of proper transport for security forces and poor roads inhibit an official response and escalate conflict. Security forces can take days to reach situations in which violence has already escalated.

Sometimes security forces are part of the problem. “The SPLA soldiers are not organised and can be encountered in the market, drunk, and shoot a civilian for no reason.” While travelling along a road the research team passed a uniformed person, identified by a WVS staff person as a prison guard, who raised his rifle and pointed it at the vehicle. This careless handling of a weapon indicates a lack of training or discipline.

Politics

Wider political machinations reportedly affect events in such remote areas as Tonj East County. At least one respondent accused the government in the north and elites based in Juba of continuing to manipulate tensions about the development of natural resources. Warrap and Jonglei states were described as the worst areas for instability in Southern Sudan. People expressed the hope for disarmament for the purposes of development and CPA implementation but they don’t want the guns too far away in case the CPA goes off the rails. “Another motivation is the people in government who supply their supporters – they are supporting community conflict. They are more sympathetic to our enemies.” Unlike respondents in Kenya, no interviewee in Sudan mentioned a state or national politician who supported and worked for peace in this region.

Disarmament Exercises

References to the failed 2007 disarmament exercise in Tonj East were stated in many interviews. This exercise also appears to be related to the broader initiative of the GOSS in cooperation with the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) to carry out demobilisation, disarmament and rehabilitation (DDR) of former combatants in the civil war. Here, as in much of Southern Sudan, the DDR process has been slow. Questions are being raised about the commitment of the GOSS to disarming people other than their identified opponents in the south, pending the outcome of the 2011 referendum on separation from the north as stipulated in the CPA. “Demobilisation and arms collection have not taken place. Soldiers need to go to barracks and get formal training. The government and UN are responsible to do this.” It is also difficult to identify combatants from the civil war since both the north and the south armed civilians in what was really a broadly based insurgency in the south against the north.

The fact that a disarmament process spearheaded by the then Governor of Warrap State took place is not in doubt, but the details of how many guns were taken and, more particularly, what happened to those guns, were vague or contradictory. One person said that “the 2007 disarmament programme obtained 5,000 guns from Tonj East only”. It was consistently and bitterly noted that only one side—the Luac—was disarmed. When asked why the government did not disarm the Nuer and Agar at the same time, participants in one group interview responded that “the Governor of Warrap State took the initiative for disarmament but not the Governors of Lakes or Unity States.” The 2007 disarmament took place within the context of peace discussions involving all three states, but a stable peace was not sustained.

The results of this one-sided disarmament were recounted in interviews: “The community was less safe after disarmament because the Nuer attacked.” “Last year after soldiers collected guns, the youth were left without guns. This led to bad results including the theft of cows and people being killed.”

In one interview the disarmament effort was praised: “4,500 guns were taken by the government”. However, the respondents did not know if these surrendered guns had been destroyed. Another interview provided the information that “the Chiefs collected guns and these were kept in a shipping container at a
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site for the Governor”. Again, they did not know if the collected guns were destroyed. In yet another interview the story unfolded a bit further: “The guns collected in the disarmament process were taken to Marial-Lou, then given back.”

It appears that the collected guns were stored in a shipping container until the Luac were under siege from cattle raiding attacks by their Nuer and Agar neighbours, and then the guns were effectively given back so that they could defend themselves. Again, it should be stated that the research team was not in a position to independently verify any of these details.

As the story of the 2007 Tonj East disarmament unfolded through a series of interviews, critical comments about the process were also recorded: “Communities are not told about disarmament. The SPLA comes in and uses force as they see necessary in disarmament processes. The SPLA are violating people’s rights.” The details of the “forced” disarmament and “rights violations” by the SPLA were not probed in interviews, but this view reinforces comments made by another person that beating or torture was used by the SPLA in confiscating weapons.

A more optimistic assessment of the 2007 disarmament process suggested that more time is needed: “The disarmament programme will not become effective for at least two or three years. It has taken a long time to collect [the guns] to date and more time is needed.” It was also suggested that sufficient time, personnel and disarmament resources, and monetary incentives are necessary for effective disarmament: “The problem is to collect weapons in such a vast area. Some form of exchange is needed for gun collection efforts.”

5.2. Reducing Armed Violence: The Impact of World Vision Peacebuilding

Introduction

Comprehensively understanding the current armed confrontations in the area was not a primary goal of this research. The interviews tried, however, to determine what people in the visited communities understood about the contribution of WVS peacebuilding activities in addressing armed violence in the area.

WVS Peacebuilding Activities

It should be noted at the outset that there are no WVS Area Development Programmes (ADPs)1 in Sudan to back or reinforce peacebuilding activities as there are in Uganda and Kenya. WVS provides humanitarian relief and some transitional programming to pave the way for longer term development programming. WVS has been carrying out peacebuilding activities in the area since 2006, has completed two phases of projects and at the time of the field research was about to start the third, which incorporates disaster preparedness.

Impact of WVS Peacebuilding Activities

Thanks were expressed in a number of interviews for both the services provided and the peace initiatives that WVS had undertaken in the area, but another message was clearly stated: the needs far exceed the resources being committed by WVS and other NGOs. Services are too few and too far between, or are underused. “Some clinics, schools and meeting halls are being built but are not being used because of the insecurity.”

Respondents praised WVS peacebuilding for resolving conflicts at a local level through the work of the peace committees and services: “The youth dialogue in the WVS protection programme helped to reduce violence in the community.”

THE NEEDS FAR EXCEED THE RESOURCES BEING COMMITTED BY WVS AND OTHER NGOs.

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1 The ADP, or Area Development Programme, is the primary vehicle through which World Vision facilitates community development. ADP design and implementation is based on community needs and priorities, involving multi-sectoral interventions. Sectors might include education, health, water and sanitation, agriculture and so forth. Through ADPs, World Vision usually commits to long-term funding and involvement - from 10 to 15 years, and sometimes even longer. See the Glossary of Terms for further information on ADPs.
Addressing Armed Violence in East Africa

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Box 5.2.1. WVS Project Initiatives in Tonj East

- One year of basic literacy and numeracy training targeted towards male and female youth (aged 15–30 years) who had never been to school, or who had been demobilised.
- Youth aged 15–30 years were given vocational training in masonry and carpentry to provide basic skills for livelihoods.
- Human rights training was provided.
- Assistance was given for the integration or reintegration of returnees from the SPLA.
- A youth centre was built to provide a place for youth to meet and interact. Workshops and training for livelihoods and long-term income generation are held there. There were also plans to rent out the hall for community gatherings and to build tukuls on the grounds for simple accommodations for travellers, but the money ran out before the tukuls were built.
- Health clinics and schools were built. “The school is running to Primary 4. People want more classes added.”
- Bore holes were drilled.
- Food security activities were promoted.
- Earth-work berms were constructed along waterways to prevent flooding in the rainy season. Flood-resistant crops and early flood warning systems were also provided.
- Assistance was provided to returnees who wanted access to land for cultivation. The status of returnees to the community who had been in Khartoum, Uganda or Kenya is contested. Since they left and didn't fight in the war, they are now struggling for legitimacy in the community.
- Initiatives were carried out to bridge the growing gap between elders and youth.

WVS tried to unite youth [who were] in disagreement. The peace committee from the WVS DIPLCAP [Disaster Preparedness and Local Capacities for Peace] project has helped the community. It was formed from youth in the cattle camps and it reported to other groups the missing people who went to steal cattle. The peace committee has developed relationships and they inform each other. It has created trust and built peace.

Peace committees started or encouraged by WVS have increased people’s confidence in resolving their own difficulties. For example, a problem in moving goods to markets was reported to a peace committee who took it up with local authorities. “Peacebuilding projects build awareness. The level of candour and interaction has increased among the participants.” In an interview a woman said that she had seen WVS projects that built a community peace centre, a primary school and a small clinic. “Not all of the activities materialised as expected, but at least it was a start.”

The opposite view was also expressed. One traditional leader said, “People came and interviewed and then nothing was done.”

One person had not been involved in WVS activities but had seen the results: the construction of the youth centre, the training on human rights, and the food security work providing ox ploughs and planting mangoes. Even then, his assessment was negative: “WVS has not done much in this community, mostly in other areas.” This frustration may reflect people's disappointment about the slow realisation of the benefits that were expected to flow from the CPA.
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Another person indicated that he was aware of WVS activities but not peacebuilding initiatives. He knew that the feeding programme for children went well, as did primary health care and the building of a school. He said that the changes were not explained to the community; he knew of activities but not why projects stopped and why the community was not informed.

Some people interviewed were aware of WVS activities in the area prior to 2005 when the civil war was still on. A security problem in the town of Thiet forced WVS to move its compound to Tonj Town. “WVS was based here during the war. The planting of mango trees was a good thing and so on, but the community was not informed about the pull-out and the timing.” On the issue of advocacy, one interviewee made an interesting comparison illustrating the role that WVS can play in bringing the needs of the community to the attention of authorities: “WVS is like the SIM card in a mobile phone. The hardware won’t work without it. WVS can send messages ahead to others.”

The Wunlit peace agreement in 1999, facilitated by WVS and the New Sudan Council of Church, was often positively recalled as a precedent during interviews: “In 1999 the Dinka–Nuer agreement took a long time but the communities had trust and free movement for a time. When fighting resumed it took a year before the agreement broke down.” It was also noted that the Wunlit agreement was not a once-and-for-all event but envisioned smaller, more localised peace agreements where necessary. Thus, in 2008 WVS and the Sudan Council of Churches facilitated the Madol peace agreement.

Some of the people who had attended the Wunlit peace conference in 1999 had also reportedly taken part in the Madol peace meeting. The assessment of the 2008 peace conference was positive in some regards: “Safer movement on the roads resulted for trading. More recent peace talks resolved some tensions between some communities.” This view was qualified by another respondent: “The level of violence is increasing in one county, but in the two others [Tonj East and Mayendit] cooperation has increased. There is freer movement of people that assists trading and broader economic well being.”

World Vision and community volunteers work together within a Food Assistance programme in Warrap state. Gaps in access to food can occur when there is drought and when cultivation is disrupted by cattle raiding violence.
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Suggested Changes to Improve WVS Peacebuilding Activities
The interviews confirmed the low state of development and the lack of infrastructure and services in this area, and the connection between low levels of development and violence: “Not only is peace missing, but there is poverty, drought and food insecurity.” Many appealed for more to be done by WVS in this area, and the county office sought more funds to bring more activities and facilities to the area. The researchers were left with the impression that working relationships, particularly with officials in the area, were inherently challenging because the needs are so great.

Under the protection programme, there was the construction of youth centres, one in [name deleted] and one in [name deleted]. The youth helped with the bricks. There were also other programmes targeting youth. But there is still much to be done. WVS has done more in other counties than in Tonj East. It has provided boreholes and schools elsewhere.

Many offered suggestions of what WVS could do to curb the violence and improve the lives of local peoples: “WVS can do more. It is a vast area and the challenges are great. You need to start small and then diversify.” Other suggestions included:

- Many basic services are needed, such as boreholes for water.
- One person claimed that creating services encourages negotiation, which leads to violence reduction.
- More educational opportunities are needed: “Children are not getting a good education like in other counties.”
- Medical services are badly needed. One person said, “Women are suffering from birth complications. There are no hospitals here.”
- WVS was strongly encouraged to advocate for a stronger government presence at the peace talks, and for the government to provide continuing security: “Police need to be put between the borders.”
- Similar advice was given on disarmament: “The government can work with WVS to talk to the community to bring in or surrender guns from all three communities.”

Suggested Changes to Improve Peacebuilding
Suggestions for WVS to improve conditions in the area were balanced with criticisms and suggestions as to what the government and particularly the police and security forces should do.

Effective Disarmament
- Disarmament needs to be done in all three communities to be effective. “Guns were collected here and our rivals raided cows and killed people based on knowing that disarmament had occurred here. When disarmament is done, it should be balanced, equalised.”
- The road needs to be improved between [name deleted] and [name deleted] to improve the ability of the government to respond through the police and army.
- “Disarmament has not worked because the issues have not been settled. People want guns for protection. We need other means to settle disputes.”

Roads
“Better roads” was a constant answer to questions about what should be done to improve the prospects for peace in the area:

- “Roads should be improved so that when a violent incident happens the government can travel and intervene.”
- “The three communities involved have no linkages. Thus a road is necessary to build things in common. If the level of interaction is high, it helps to reduce tensions because people will be present to reduce attacks. If the roads are connected, children can learn from other communities.”
- “There is a need for a road in this county. The county is too isolated from the rest of the country. WVS used to exchange blankets in cattle camps for road repair. Better roads would mean better development.”

Police Training and Equipment
The lack of formal security and deficiencies in policing were also emphasised. If people either cannot or will not rely on the police to respond to cattle raids, clan disputes and common criminality, then they will retain guns to provide their own protection:

- "Police need to be placed between the borders of the Agar, Luac and Nuer."
- Currently the police are not properly equipped, trained or empowered by the government. There is, for example, no place to detain a prisoner. One police station visited lacked a roof and a water source. They do not have the proper equipment to respond to crises, including motorised transport."
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- People also asked that the police be empowered to intervene with a strong force: “The police must be trained and given the power to stop violence.”
- There is a need for more military and police stations to build safety in the community.
- The government security forces should arrange for someone from outside the county to be posted here so that there is cross-county experience.

Peace Talks

Respondents made suggestions about peace meetings and conferences, including the structure of the 2008 peace conference. It should be noted that these comments do not necessarily represent either the facts about the peace process or widely accepted views in the communities:
- “The people attending did not include the Agar who were doing the attacking. The Nuer and Agar are still attacking.” (In fact the Luac, Agar, and Ngok [Nuer] were equally represented at the peace conference.)
- WV peacebuilding has reduced tensions between the two communities, Mayendit and Tonj East, through the DIPLCAP project, although there still are some criminal activities. A similar project is needed in other districts/counties/communities.
- “To make real peace you need to talk to the Nuer and the Agar.”
- “People from selected communities that are fighting each other should be brought together with white people [outsiders to the process] there to witness.”
- Only the Chiefs went to peace talks but there are others at the community level who could attend and serve as watchdogs for the implementation of the process. They could be trained as well.
- Despite the generally negative experience with disarmament, it was still seen as necessary for long-term peace and the safety of the community. Disarmament needs to be agreed to in peace negotiations and the community needs to be sensitised and educated. After disarmament occurs the guns have to be taken where the community cannot get them back. Furthermore, guns come from outside the community and something needs to be done to address this supply of guns.
- A greater role for government and traditional authorities was advised: “Involve high government levels to speak with the community and encourage peace mediation.”
- Follow the CPA process. Bring together the conflicting communities and see that each side gets justice. Bring the executive Chiefs of the three communities to a neutral place and ask them why they fight and encourage them to negotiate in good faith.

More Services

In addition to roads, virtually all services and infrastructure are in great need of improvement. Respondents closely connected these improvements with peacebuilding:
- Three things are needed to help to reduce violence. This area suffers from poverty, which leads to violence. WV could support violence reduction by providing food for peace and helping to increase cultivation, which has declined because of the violence. It could also help those who are currently raiding cattle to find alternative livelihoods. More boreholes are also needed.
- Youth need something to do to combat idleness and loitering. More community centres would bring different communities together.
- When Dinka girls elope without the payment of cattle as dowry, they upset a social pattern and violence often results. Girls should be educated to understand their role in their culture.
- Laws must be changed so that theft can be punished. Legal boundaries must also be recognized. Respect for laws will make the community safer.
- Development programmes that build big hospitals and schools can help. Interaction around development projects is important to build trust.
- Providing food will also reduce violence because people won’t need to move in search of food when crops fail. There will be famine and poverty next year because of drought and because the displaced did not cultivate crops.
- Schools could be opened to reduce illiteracy, which causes people to fight. Boarding schools for the poor are needed. Primary schools could bring together children from other regions. Schools will help provide a different next generation.
- People need training about peace. The peacebuilding programme should expand beyond the two areas and involve the neighbouring counties, which are part of the problem.
- Churches should be established so people learn about God and not to kill each other.
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5.3. Observations

1. There is no readily available baseline data on armed violence to assess the relative security in Tonj East County over the past three years. WVS peacebuilding efforts have contributed positively to the security situation according to the testimony of those interviewed, who, for the most part, praised these efforts. The demand for development inputs is so high that any NGO’s humanitarian relief and transitional activity can make a positive contribution unless it provokes competition between opposing communities. There was no indication in the interviews that WVS activities had provoked conflict; WVS Do No Harm analysis has likely played its intended role as part of the delivery of programmes.

2. Interviewees drew strong connections between relief and training initiatives and WVS peacebuilding activities, clearly showing the close relationship between development and security. The complexity of the links between development and security was also illustrated by the absence of development NGOs other than WVS and CCM; where there is insecurity, there is no development. Even WVS programming has had to be modified and the WVS compound at Thiet closed, because of the lack of security.

3. WVS and SCC support for the 2008 peace discussions was both ambitious and responsive to the desire of participating communities to enhance peace. A positive history in this part of Sudan for peace agreements such as the Wunlit agreement in 1999 had created a definite willingness by at least some of the leaders in warring communities to engage in negotiations. WVS and SCC cannot be faulted for responding to these community-level requests to facilitate
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peace. However, the quick unravelling of the peace after the 2008 conference should encourage all parties to consider the broader conditions required for lasting peace. A common enemy—the “Arab” government from the north—provided a rallying point for unity for peoples in the south during the civil war. The agreement between Nuer and Dinka at Wunlit was assisted by identifying this common enemy. Without such an external enemy around which to rally, localised peace agreements in the south will likely need substantial improvements to security, provided by police and military, and a number of other conditions to have a chance to succeed.

4. There will always be an underlying sense of futility to peacebuilding activities while the cultural imperatives of cattle raiding and retaliation are intensified by high levels of civilian gun possession. A necessary part of the stage for successful and sustainable peace negotiations will only be set when pastoralists come to the point of the “hurting stalemate” and realise that they can only lose by continuing to engage in violence. Pastoralists themselves must address the cultural compulsion to engage in cattle raids. But there was no indication in the interviews in Tonj East that this reconsideration was taking place, although direct questions on this subject were not part of the formal questionnaire.

5. The disarmament challenge must be integrated into development and peacebuilding programmes, such as those of WVS in Tonj East. The resentment over forced disarmament of only one side is understandable. If personal guns are removed but no credible police or military protection is provided, a community’s insecurity increases and violence can and will escalate, as it did in Tonj East County. Control and reduction of gun possession will be possible when all sides see the losses from violence as unsustainable, and when the incentives for social control of guns are increased. Development and relief organisations such as WVS do not need to become disarmament experts to contribute to this necessary ingredient in the recipe for sustainable peace. They can incorporate greater sensitisation about gun control into their community training and advocate for community-acceptable processes for control and reductions of guns and gun use. They can also advocate for successful disarmament processes with state, national, and international authorities.

6. Sudan continues to implement the CPA in the period before the 2011 Southern Sudan referendum that is to determine if the South will separate from the rest of Sudan. The pressure is great on the Government of Southern Sudan to maintain a civilian force of armed combatants until the outcome of the referendum is known. Thus, prospects for substantial disarmament of pastoralists in areas such as Tonj East are low at present. In the face of such obstacles, WVS programming is still desirable, but WVS staff and donors who support this brave and necessary peacebuilding work should keep these factors in mind.
6. Concluding Observations
6. Concluding Observations

In the face of insecurity, people retain weapons.

In each of the areas visited for this research it was confirmed in interviews that armed violence was a major impediment to development. The pervasive presence and use of small arms increased the number of casualties and set off intensive retaliatory responses. That being said, government-directed disarmament was not considered to be the solution to the violence unless significant development and security issues were first addressed.

Past disarmament exercises were consistently described as failures, except where community leadership itself played a substantial role in first organising and encouraging the social control of guns and then reducing the numbers, but not striving for across-the-board disarmament. This was the case with the Marakwet in Kenya, and even there control and reduction of guns was described only as one ingredient of a broader recipe for sustainable peace. Disarmament had to be properly balanced in relation to the extent of gun possession by opposing communities. It also had to be sequenced with a wide range of other initiatives, from increased quality and coverage of formal security, to economic development for alternative livelihoods and to meet food insecurity, to social investments to raise formal educational levels. Effective disarmament also requires intensive training in mediation and alternatives to violence for people at the community level.

Comparing the Contexts for Armed Violence

Undertaking field research in these three countries in East Africa provided the opportunity to compare World Vision peacebuilding strategies and programmes in different contexts. While each of these areas is affected by armed violence, there are important differences that are worth identifying:

- The armed violence in the North Rift Valley region of Kenya is primarily from pastoralist cattle raiding. The strong, underlying cultural and economic rationale for the violence has been distorted and amplified by the proliferation of automatic guns on all sides. Post-December 2007 election violence was not a major factor in the communities visited. Civilian gun possession is widespread and formal disarmament exercises have largely been ineffective. There is apparently effective social control of gun use and possession among one of the three peoples visited – the Marakwet.
- Pastoralists in Warrap State in South Sudan also contend with debilitating cattle raiding violence, but as part of the post-conflict circumstances following a decades-long civil war that ended in 2005. Although civilian possession of weapons is visibly widespread, many of those interviewed in Tonj East County felt compelled to deny this in interviews.
- The north and east/central regions of Uganda continue to suffer the effects of armed violence in post-conflict circumstances. Land wrangles, domestic violence and criminality are the major sources of local violence, while armed violence arises from gun possession by Karamojong warriors in nearby areas. The insurgency by the Lord’s Resistance Army has effectively ended for these subsistence farmers, who had been massively relocated to IDP camps, although fears remain that the LRA will return. Gun possession among civilians is actively suppressed by Ugandan security forces, both police and military, and gun availability and use appear to be considerably reduced since the active insurgency ended. However, there were indications that guns remain hidden or buried by former combatants.

In all three research areas the violence was not politically directed per se. The motivation for engaging in armed violence was not, for example, to install a different set of local or national political actors. Politics were described as background factors that impeded or, in the case of the Marakwet in Kenya, assisted in peacebuilding. In Uganda there is a long and complex history of internal political conflict that is related to the insurgency in the North, but current violence does not have an explicitly political justification.
6. Concluding Observations

It is also important to note that the nature of World Vision programming varied in these areas. In Kenya and Uganda, the peacebuilding activities generally occur within broader, integrated Area Development Programmes that have been operating for years, many for more than a decade. In Sudan, however, WV peacebuilding is taking place within humanitarian relief programming that has only some elements of longer-term development. As a result, WV efforts in Sudan are considerably smaller than WV efforts in Kenya and Uganda. The level of infrastructure and human development is also much lower in Warrap State. There is relatively little activity by other NGOs in this part of Sudan, while in Kenya and Uganda the national and local WV efforts take place with many other NGO and CBO colleagues. These distinctions necessarily influence the peacebuilding approaches and results.

Improvements and Sustainable Peace are Possible

Although in Kenya armed violence between the Turkana and Pokot continues, in the last three years the number of cattle raids and the number of people killed and injured in those raids was generally reported as decreasing.

Between the Pokot and Marakwet there is a functional and relatively stable peace. In Marakwet territory there are strong indications that the possession and use of guns is moderated by internal social controls. Increased reliance on agriculture has opened livelihood and trading opportunities. Cultural factors, including the reported softening in the requirement for large dowries among the Marakwet, have lessened incentives for cattle raiding and increased intermarriage with the Pokot. Institutional mechanisms – peace committees linked by cell phones to report planned livestock thefts – have been set up to prevent new or widespread armed violence from reigniting.

Encounters in Uganda also provided encouraging news that land disputes, family violence and, to some extent, common criminality can be addressed through community-level peace committees. While these committees have limitations – as informal processes they may not address legal formalities, for example – their positive impact was mentioned repeatedly. Yet, it also was apparent that the potential return of the LRA and insurgency warfare could not be met solely with local peacebuilding efforts, but would require national and international action.

In Warrap State, Sudan, the success of the 1999 Wunlit people-to-people peace agreement and the limited success of more recent localised peace agreements indicate that there is potential for peace between or among Nuer and Dinka. Unfortunately, there is an extremely low level of development and infrastructure, and a paucity of potential resources to provide the economic and other supports necessary to curb and stop deadly armed cattle raids and criminality. These realities make the prospects for enduring peace in rural Sudan much less likely.

Gender and Armed Violence

Young men were described as the primary perpetrators of violence in the cattle rustling in Kenya and Sudan. Traditionally, women and children were not targets, but they have increasingly become the victims in raids and retaliatory actions since the advent of automatic weapons. Women and children also experience the economic and social impact of armed violence. They are left without husbands and fathers and without livestock to provide milk. Women with their small children are subject to dislocation, poverty and discrimination, without the aid and protection of their partners and sometimes their extended families. In Uganda women suffer disproportionately from domestic abuse and sexual assault. Although there was no direct evidence that these forms of violence were linked to widespread possession and use of guns in Uganda, it was apparent that they are part of a breakdown in social norms and a legacy of armed conflict and insurgency.
6. Concluding Observations

In some cases women perpetuate armed violence by encouraging sons or young men to raid or by using weapons themselves. But women were reportedly also key participants in peace processes that encouraged their sons and other young men not to raid or engage in criminal activity. This variety of roles suggests that cultural and other contextual conditions should be factored into a gender analysis of violence.

World Vision Peacebuilding Practice

The majority of people interviewed in all three countries said that WV peacebuilding activities were a welcome and necessary factor in lessening or stopping armed violence. They also expressed thanks in different ways for WV efforts and requested continued and increased WV support.

Those who spoke positively about WV peacebuilding programmes cited the components of building local capacities for peace (without necessarily using the phrase) and lauded the peace training, peace committees, “sensitisation” and other mechanisms as important instruments in building peace in their communities. There was frequent reference to WV’s collaborative approach in training elders and women in conflict mediation and in working with local government officials, other NGOs and security services such as the police and army.

The distinction between specific WV peacebuilding activities and development and humanitarian initiatives was rarely made by respondents. All activities were seen as addressing basic needs, building peace and reducing tensions, consequently lessening the demand for weapons. There were positive references to WV’s work in drilling boreholes for water and in constructing schools and health clinics, thus creating resources to be shared by antagonists. At some sites peace committees had continued their work after formal WV activities had ended, offering evidence of post-project sustainability.

WV peacebuilding participants were united in their call for WV to expand peacebuilding and development programming. But while some respondents were prepared to take on the work themselves and expand peacebuilding efforts to neighbouring communities, others wanted WV to do more. This was particularly the case in areas of Sudan visited where WVS is one of two operating NGOs and needs are so great.
6. Concluding Observations

World Vision Interventions as One Ingredient of the Peacebuilding Recipe

It is difficult to say whether security is better or worse because the nature of the conflict is spontaneous and triggered by varying issues. When the trigger issues are addressed, the region becomes safe. Some causes are cultural. If an organisation can help curtail cattle rustling in some seasons, this leads to greater safety. When this doesn't happen, the region is unsafe. [Kenyan informant]

The role of WV in the peacebuilding processes in each of the three areas visited appears to be significant. WV has functioned as a key catalyst for violence reduction through its deliberate, neutral, focused peacebuilding activities and more broadly through its development activities in support of peace. WV has provided peace capacities and strategies for community-level action. But it seems clear that NGO peacebuilding activity cannot on its own secure sustained peace. The participation of many others, starting with the people who are engaged in armed violence, is essential.

Despite the loss of life and injuries from guns, the cattle rustling traditions of the pastoralists in Kenya and Sudan remain profoundly embedded in their cultures and economies. For change to occur, either exhaustion from the violence, highly effective and trusted alternative security from the state (police, military or local deputised militia), or convincing economic or other incentives must at some point result in a determination by pastoralists to modify or abandon the practice of armed cattle raids. To be effective such a decision would need to be widely accepted by all the relevant competing cattle-raiding communities. Without such acceptance, interim peace arrangements will face unstoppable pressure from ungovernable “spoilers” in what are largely remote and difficult-to-police areas. Yet a primary lesson from the practical peace currently in place between the Pokot and Marakwet in Kenya is that a move away from armed cattle raids is possible.

Many suggestions encouraged WV to initiate or expand its current work with community spokespeople in advocating for increased government investments in security, development and infrastructure. Respondents also requested greater engagement by, and direction from, local government and security officials and institutions, and also traditional tribal bodies, in ongoing peacebuilding work. WVK, working with others, was reportedly successful in advocating to local government officials for increased police presence in the Turkana area. More generally WV was praised for building bridges between the police and people so that trust was increased in the police.

Disarmament Experience

A result of violent conflict in all the regions visited is the supply of readily available automatic firearms. Many respondents pointed to the ease with which weapons crossed borders or moved within or across communities. They noted the need for better control over the supply of weapons, including better border controls. Despite national and sub-regional commitments such as the Nairobi Declaration and Protocol, the field–level research left the impression that closing porous borders to the gun trade among pastoralists in the Karamoja Cluster is a distant dream.

Disarmament among civilian populations is a complex process. This research reinforced the emerging consensus among advocates of small arms disarmament that there are political, cultural, economic and gender factors to armed violence, and that these must all be recognised and addressed in successful civilian disarmament programmes.
In regions affected by armed conflict, people need to feel secure before they will voluntarily relinquish weapons. "Protection" was consistently identified by informants as a powerful motivation for acquiring or retaining small arms. A forced civilian disarmament process may remove weapons temporarily but add to insecurity. In Sudan and Kenya we heard the resentment expressed by people when they, but not their rivals, had been disarmed by the government.

The movement of guns and ammunition in this region appears to be highly influenced by an economic rationale that is at odds with strategic considerations. How else can one explain the reported sale of weapons and bullets between the Karamojong, Turkana, and Pokot, who fight each other in cattle raids and retaliatory actions? How does one explain similar actions by the military and police forces when they sell or give weapons or ammunition to cattle raiders and criminals?

At some point in a successful peacebuilding process, disarmament must take place under the auspices of government (or in some cases the international community). However, WV and similarly engaged NGOs could play a larger role in setting the stage for successful disarmament processes. The interviews pointed to a general lack of attention in WV peacebuilding and development activities to reducing the number and use of small arms and light weapons. One WV staff person pinpointed the need for increased attention to strategies in WV programming that would aid disarmament at the community level.

Data

The field research produced very little usable quantitative data and significant variations in the details of responses to interview questions. Responses to identical questions varied within focus groups and across interviews. Numbers assigned to, for example, incidents of gun violence, were rarely consistent. This should not be surprising in situations where communication and travel constraints complicate the relaying of information about incidents of violence.

Some of the research questions were intended to identify sources of quantitative data on perpetrators, victims and weapons of armed violence. Respondents pointed to security services, medical services and even civil society groups as sources of such data, but, in the end it was not possible to access this data, or to confirm if and where it existed. In Uganda several people stated that the police were a source of useful data on incidents of armed violence, but police and security personnel declined to be interviewed in Uganda.

Designing and implementing effective interventions to address factors that give rise to armed violence are dependent, at least in part, on compiling knowable facts into a coherent picture and making this information public. A person interviewed in Kenya made this point well: “There is a need for statistics in our work because we work through institutions.... We call on local and other government institutions to keep statistics to ensure there is a sound basis for programs.” Police and other security actors who need to deploy finite resources for maximum effect need this information. So do development actors, governmental and non-governmental, who are working with local people to address poverty and provide alternative livelihoods in the midst of armed violence.

The lack of publicly available and reliable data on deaths and injuries, combined with the relative isolation of the communities where this violence is taking place, contributes to the inadequate attention by national governments to the causes and consequences of armed violence. This lack of information is a factor in the shortfall of investment in a broad range of needed security and infrastructure initiatives that may result in controlling and reducing armed violence. While good data and transparent reporting to the public will not by themselves create these investments, they will strengthen the case of advocates when they make the case for the commitment of more government resources. Reliable, publicly accessible data will also provide benchmarks against which progress toward sustainable peace and greater control and reduction of guns can be measured over time, and celebrated.

Security Forces and Governance – Presence and Reform

The perceived absence of reliable or trustworthy state security was a key reason that communities in Kenya and Sudan armed themselves. If a police officer is from a different clan, he is often not trusted by the community. Engaging local militias to assist police appears to be effective in some of the areas visited, but the lack of discipline among armed militia or volunteer police reserves carries its own risk of indiscriminate gun violence.
6. Concluding Observations

In Sudan it seems that police were primarily demobilised soldiers, now relocated to their home areas. But while these police know their communities, a lack of training and equipment for patrolling outside of urban centres hinders their effectiveness.

Conclusion

Respondents in the three countries visited consistently reported on recent reductions in levels of armed violence. While it is not possible to conclude that WV peacebuilding and development initiatives were primarily responsible, it is possible to state that those interviewed considered the WV programmes instrumental in reducing violence.

The national and multilateral peace processes in Uganda and Sudan that were central to significantly reducing armed conflict have not to date been capable of addressing the forms of armed violence in the post-conflict period. From the field research, WV peacebuilding tools and activities appear to be well suited to addressing a variety of post-conflict and other types of armed violence.

The circumstances of post-conflict armed violence in Sudan highlighted the difficulty of initiating peacebuilding where development organisations are in transition from humanitarian relief to development. It was evident that WVS in its humanitarian relief mode, with only some aspects of its programming focused on development, was not able to more adequately respond to the overwhelming array of needs in Warrap State.

WV cannot over time be the primary motivating force for peacebuilding in the visited areas. There was widespread agreement among those interviewed that responsibility must rest with local bodies if it was to be sustainable. WV formally recognizes this in its policies and its operations; however, WV staff may need gentle reminders from time-to-time that achieving sustainable peace through peacebuilding and development programs is their goal but not ultimately their responsibility. That responsibility rests with the people perpetrating and supporting armed violence, and the governments in place that have a positive obligation to meet both the security and development needs of their people.
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Appendix I: Interview Guide

Field Research in September 2008 – Kenya, Uganda, Sudan
Interview Guide – Questions for partners/participants in WV programmes

A: Security assessment

1. We would like to know what kinds of violence occurred here in the past 3 years (or since 2005):
   a. Did violence come from groups? If so, describe the violence.
      (For example, revenge attacks, raids, banditry, other)
   b. Did violence come from individuals separate from groups? If so, describe.
      (For example, assaults or beatings, murders, other)
   c. How were women affected specifically?
   d. Are the acts of violence linked to a bigger problem? If so, give details.

2. Who are the groups or individuals committing these violent acts?
   a. Why are they using violence? What motivates them?
   b. Have groups changed over time?
   c. Are they organised, what is their make-up?

3. Are men or women, boys or girls, affected differently by the violence? How?

4. Have you or a family member been affected directly by violence in the past 3 years (or since 2005)? If so:
   a. Give details of the kind of violence; and
   b. What was the personal impact?
      (For example, injury, death, displacement, preventing work).

5. We would like to know about security in the community:
   a. Do you feel safe or unsafe in this community? Why?
   b. Do you think others in your community feel safe or unsafe? Why? What have been the impacts?
   c. Are safety problems discussed in community gatherings?
   d. How would you compare community security to 3 years ago (or since 2005)?
   e. Do you have ideas for how personal and community safety could be improved? If so, how?

B: Instruments of violence – Small arms and light weapons

1. What weapons are used here in violence?
   (For example: spear, knife/panga, stick, handgun, rifle, machine-gun, other)
   a. What are the most common weapons used in violence?
   b. Are there more or less of these available than three years ago (or since 2005)?
   c. Are they used in violence more or less than three years ago (or since 2005)?

2. Who uses the weapons in violence? (For example, armed groups, police, soldiers, bandits)
   a. Are the weapons used by: Men? Women? Youth? Children?
      (Ask for the age of youth/children.)
Appendix 1: Interview Guide

3. If there is the threat of use, OR use of guns, does this happen against some groups more than others?
   a. Who is affected more – men, women, or children? Why?

4. Where and from whom are the guns obtained?
   b. How and where is gun ammunition obtained?
   c. How much do bullets cost?

5. What methods or programmes have been used to control the use of weapons, or to reduce the supply of weapons, in the past?
   a. Were they successful in removing weapons?
   b. What has the government done to reduce or remove weapons?
   c. Did these interventions make the community safer?
   d. Have there been any community initiatives to control or reduce the use of weapons?

C: WV peacebuilding (and protection) projects and armed violence

1. Have you been part of a WV peace project?
   a. What were the activities that you were involved in?
   b. How were you or your family impacted?

2. Are there any changes that the peace project has brought to your community? If yes, what?
   a. Did they change relationships among people and groups? Which groups?
   b. If yes (to first question), what are the most significant changes that the project has brought to the community?
   c. Have these changes been experienced by all community members or only by some?

3. Did the project affect the level of violence committed with weapons? If yes, how?
   a. Did it affect community awareness of, and skills for, reducing armed violence? If yes, how?
   b. Did the threat or use of weapons change as a result of the project?

4. Were any project activities affected by armed violence? If so, how? (Directly or by threat?)

5. What would you change in the peacebuilding project to make you and your community safer?

6. Do you have any questions for us?
Appendix 2: Glossary of Terms

Area Development Programme

The ADP, or Area Development Programme, is the primary vehicle through which World Vision facilitates community development. While ADPs vary significantly in structure and size around the world – in accordance with the wide diversity of local contexts in which World Vision works – they also have many common characteristics. Generally, ADPs cover contiguous geographical areas such as local government administrative units. ADP design and implementation is based on community needs and priorities, involving multi-sectoral interventions (for example, sectors might include education, health, water and sanitation, agriculture and so forth). The facilitation processes WV employs within communities seek to build the capacity of the local people themselves, empowering them to carry on their own development processes. Importantly, WV takes a child-focused approach to development, where children are included as agents of change in their communities. Through ADPs, World Vision usually commits to long-term funding and involvement – from 10 to 15 years, and sometimes even longer (definition quoted and adapted from the World Vision Canada website, http://www.worldvision.ca/Programs-and-Projects/International-Programs/Pages/Regional-Programs.aspx).

Armed Violence

Armed violence can be defined as the intentional use of illegitimate force (actual or threatened) with arms or explosives, against a person, group, community or state which undermines people-centred security and/or sustainable development. This definition covers many acts, ranging from the large-scale violence associated with conflict and war to inter-communal and collective violence, organised criminal and economically motivated violence, political violence by different actors or groups competing for power, and inter-personal and gender-based violence (Global burden of armed violence, Geneva Declaration Secretariat, Geneva, 2008, p 2, http://www.genevadeclaration.org/).

Armed Violence Reduction


Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)

The CPA is the 2005 treaty that ended the civil war in Sudan, a war that began in 1983. It was signed by the Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement, representing Southern Sudan, and the National Congress Party representing the Government of Sudan.
Appendix 2: Glossary of Terms

**DDR—Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration**

According to the United Nations Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Resource Centre:

The objective of the DDR process is to contribute to security and stability in post-conflict environments so that recovery and development can begin. The DDR of ex-combatants is a complex process, with political, military, security, humanitarian and socio-economic dimensions. It aims to deal with the post-conflict security problem that arises when ex-combatants are left without livelihoods or support networks, other than their former comrades, during the vital transition period from conflict to peace and development. Through a process of removing weapons from the hands of combatants, taking the combatants out of military structures and helping them to integrate socially and economically into society, DDR seeks to support ex-combatants so that they can become active participants in the peace process (www.unddr.org/whatisddr.php).

**Karamoja Cluster**

The Karamoja cluster covers the cross-border areas of Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan and Uganda. It is a region affected by seasonal patterns of drought and famine; seasonal movements of armed pastoralists and livestock within districts and across borders; and a continuing degradation of the environment, leading to food insecurity and increased competition for scarce resources, mainly water and pasture. The characteristic features of the region are marked underdevelopment when compared to regions within each country of study, and high levels of insecurity and violence leading to a lack of investment and to marginalisation. The pastoral communities that inhabit the region live in poverty and insecurity due to the proliferation of small arms. The poor infrastructural network hampers the provision of services while curtailing the capacity of security forces to respond to the increasing violence and cattle rustling, factors that have a devastating impact on the livelihood of pastoral communities (Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, http://www.cewarn.org/index.htm).

**Kraal**

A cattle camp.

**Laibon**

An African traditional leader who exercises authority in religious and other matters in a community.
Appendix 2: Glossary of Terms

NAP (National Action Plan)

The governments of Kenya and Uganda have developed national action plans on small arms. The *Kenya National Action Plan for Arms Control and Management* and the *Uganda National Action Plan on Small Arms and Light Weapons* were approved in 2004 to address the proliferation of small arms in the respective states. Following national assessments of the extent and nature of the small arms problem, each NAP was drafted by the National Focal Point on Small Arms and Light Weapons established under the terms of the 2001 UN Programme of Action on Small Arms. Each is a comprehensive national framework which takes into account regional and international agreements and identifies priority areas of action.

OECD-DAC

The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) is the principal body through which the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) deals with issues related to co-operation with developing countries (www.oecd.org/dac).

Panga

Also referred to as a machete. A common garden tool used for cutting down vegetation.

Payam

A municipal designation for an area smaller than a county in Sudan.

Peacebuilding – World Vision’s approach

Peacebuilding is principally a cross-cutting theme in World Vision’s work in conflict-affected areas. WV uses three different conflict analysis tools to identify conflict-sensitive practices at different levels of engagement. At the macro level, WV’s custom-designed *Making Sense of Turbulent Contexts* (MSTC) workshop facilitates an analysis of the political, social and economic dynamics that fuel instability in a country. MSTC workshop participants – drawn from civil society, government, and multilateral organisations – determine appropriate programmatic and policy responses to the turbulence. At the development programme level, the *Integrating Peacebuilding and Development* (IPAD) framework gives communities and their partners (including WV) tools to promote good governance, transformed individuals, coalition-building, community capacities for peace, and sustainable and just livelihoods. Finally, at the grassroots level, World Vision applies the *Do No Harm/Local Capacities for Peace* (DNH/LCP) framework, originally developed by Mary B. Anderson and the Collaborative for Development Action. DNH/LCP examines the impact of humanitarian and development assistance on conflict and promotes the development of local capacities for peace. In addition, WV empowers children and youth around the world to be peacemakers, and develops and distributes peace education materials and curricula. Through application of these frameworks, WV has gained experience worldwide in fostering community-level efforts to build peace in conflict-affected zones.
Appendix 2: Glossary of Terms

SecDev Group


Small Arms and Light Weapons

A United Nations group of experts has categorised small arms and light weapons as follows:

**Small Arms** – Revolvers and self-loading pistols; rifles and carbines; sub-machine guns; assault rifles; and light machine-guns.

**Light Weapons** – Heavy machine guns; hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers; portable anti-aircraft guns; portable anti-tank guns, recoilless rifles; portable launchers of anti-tank missile and rocket systems; portable launchers of anti-aircraft missile systems; and mortars of calibres of less than 100 mm.


Tukul

A type of African conical hut built with a low mud wall and a thatched roof.
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