Good evening, I’m Warren Hoge, IPI’s Vice President and Director of External Relations, and I want to welcome you to this Beyond the Headlines event with Parag Khanna, and what you will shortly see is his informative and audacious moving map show.

Parag burst upon the scene in 2008 with his best selling book, *The Second World: Empires and Influence in the New Global Order*. I first learned of the book and of Parag one Sunday morning last year when I saw an excerpt from the book on the cover of the New York Times Sunday Magazine. Now I used to be editor of that magazine, and I remember how difficult it was to get people who could write about world affairs and world politics in a page-turning manner, so I plunged right in.

“Plunging right in” might be a good way to describe Parag’s modus operandi. In the book, he ranged rapidly across countries and continents, and this talk and the accompanying graphics come from that peripatetic research for the book. My old New York Times colleague, Biff Grimes, in reviewing the book, called Parag “a geopolitical tour guide,” and it’s an apt phrase.

As you will see, there’s a bit of the circus Barker in Parag, and a bit of a magician, too. Watch Parag Khanna tonight as he makes existing countries take
on new shapes and contours -- watch out, it may be your country -- and entirely new ones spring to life.

Parag, now all of 32 years old, comes to geopolitics naturally. He was born in India and raised in the United Arab Emirates, the United States, and Germany. He has filled those years with a lot of travel and a lot of study and writing and media appearances as the biography in your program shows.

The book was about how Parag believes the emerging powers, what he calls "the second world," are redefining global competition in the 21st century. Parag argues that we are living in a time of apolarity where the traditional centers of gravity no longer hold. It’s a world in which U.S. power is diminishing, but Parag doesn’t consider that so much a decline as he does a realignment.

It’s a world in which he argues that economic power is more important than military power, and three distinct superpowers: China, the European Union, and the U.S., compete on a planet of shrinking resources. In the book, he writes, “to a large extent, the future of the second world hinges on how it relates to the three superpowers, and the future of the superpowers depends on how much they manage the second world.”

Now since border conflicts can, in his words, “derail so much of the progress we hope to achieve in the world,” Parag thinks the lines to follow, as you will see, in the future, are the curvy ones that track oil pipelines and trade patterns, rather than the straight ones that mark national borders.

I always like to mention IPI’s work when I can, and I want to note that we have just begun a program here looking at climate change and security, the role that climate change plays in exacerbating violent conflict, mass displacement, and migration. This is a Parag quote: “Geopolitics is a very unsentimental discipline. It’s constantly morphing and changing the world like climate change.”

Now the basis of Parag’s presentation tonight, I caught sight of in September when he sent me a link to the version he delivered in Oxford this summer to the TED global conference. Then came my struggle to catch up with Parag in a world with borders that Parag seemed continually to be crossing. I proposed staging the talk here in November. "Oh, boy!" he messaged back. "November’s the toughest. Korea for pre-G-20 briefings, Berlin and the American Academy for the 20th anniversary of the fall of the wall, London for lectures, Dubai for WEF, then Moscow for Thanksgiving. How about early December?"

By the way, Moscow for Thanksgiving?

So we made a date for December 2nd, and then came another email. “Just yesterday, I found I need to be in Singapore through December 2nd, so that might not be the best date anymore.”

Parag, I’m glad we finally tracked you down and got you here. The floor and the screen are all yours.

Parag Khanna:

Thank you so much. Is the microphone working? Can everyone hear me? Great. I’m glad that Meiko’s standing ready in case there’s a technical malfunction, but this has worked before, and hopefully it will work tonight.

It’s really wonderful to be here. I’m very glad we did find this date, and I’m looking forward to a fun evening of conversation with all of you. This will probably be the
toughest audience I ever give this to, first of all, because you are more aware than any other audience that the answer to this question is “no.” And the other reason is that you represent so many different nationalities that I’m certain to insult at least half of you over the course of the next 20-25 minutes with the things that I’m going to show you. I don’t actually want to even sort of give any more caveats. I think that what we should do is actually jump right in, and as Warren mentioned, my motivation in doing this was originally for the TED Global Conference, which is a sort of high flying group of business and media types who do tend to believe that we live in a borderless world.

They tend to view the world like this, and this is this famous image of, satellite image of the earth at night, and these cities that light up the world are those nodes, these are the connected spaces, and people who go to conferences like TED see the world in terms of connected and unconnected spaces. They don’t see borders. Only 40 of these cities alone make up about 80+ % of the global economy. So one can be sort of forgiven for thinking that, for quite a few people, we live in a borderless world.

But in fact, what I wanted to sort of illuminate for them was that about 90% of the world’s population will never leave the country in which they were born. So for those people, borders still matter a great deal, and as all of you know, working in this diplomatic community, border conflicts matter quite violently often, so I wanted to bring geography back into our thinking, and this is a quick recap in a way, just to drive the point home that really, we should never take our border arrangements for granted.

This was the world in 1945 with 100 nations. Of course, the waves of decolonization that took place over the 50s, 60s, 70s, and 80s added another 50 or so countries, you can see that French West Africa, British East Africa have been split up, you can see that South Asia as well has resulted in the creation of India and Pakistan, and then of course, you have the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union, which gave us the republics in Eastern Europe and the –stans of Central Asia and so on.

So the point there is clear. The map that you have on your wall at any given time, is only a snapshot. You cannot, the word that you quoted earlier, “unsentimental”, you cannot be sentimental about it, because it is going somewhere, and you can’t drag it and hold it back. The question is, where is it going, and why is it going there?

So what I’m going to do now with this blank map, because as you know, there’s no place in the world that is not claimed. There’s no territory left that is not claimed. That applies to the sea as well, as we’ll learn in 2010 with registrations of maritime exclusive economic zones through the Law of the Sea Convention, everyone claims a piece of the Earth, so does that mean that someone’s gain has to be someone else’s loss? So now we’re going to go around the world and see just how not blank the map really is and just how borders are moving.

We’re going to do that by zooming in first on this very strategic zone of Eastern Eurasia. As you know, Russia is still, even after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the largest country in the world, China, of course, the most populous country in the world. What is happening in this part of the world that you don’t see on the map, what is happening over here?

So the question is, is Russia still the largest country in the world? Well, in fact, what this line represents is what remains of Soviet-era infrastructure, and what
little Russia has done in the last two decades to repair that infrastructure. As you know, during the Soviet era, Stalin, Khrushchev, and so forth, forced many Russians eastward into forced migration camps, labor camps, gulags, what have you. Now, of course, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, many of them are moving back westward. The Russian population, due to poor health and other considerations, is shrinking towards around 120 million people, some people predict it might level off at about 100 million people in the year 2020, 2025. So as Russians move westward, what is happening to Eastern Eurasia?

So before we look at Russia itself, I want to use as a microcosm of that, Mongolia, or, oops, what you could call Mine-golia, and the reason people call Mongolia Mine-golia – any Mongolians in the room? Again, I apologize. But it’s because what’s happening here is that the excavation of Mongolian resources: copper, gold, and so forth, is heavily driven by Chinese companies, and they are extracting the resources and shipping them south or east into China, so they’re not conquering Mongolia as one might imagine in an age of colonialism and imperialism, but they are buying Mongolia, and the punch line of my second world book is that countries were once conquered, or colonies were once conquered, now countries are bought, and Mongolia is very much an instance of that happening today.

So now let’s look at Russia and Siberia. This is most certainly what many of you think of when you hear the word Siberia: cold, desolate, unlivable. But factor in global warming, and you have a totally different picture. In fact, the permafrost of Siberia is thawing. Agribusiness is in fact one of the fastest growing areas of the Russian economy. So you now have wheat fields and so forth across Russia. But who are they going to feed? We’ve just looked at what is happening to the Russian population shrinking, and it’s moving westward. But, of course, there are the Chinese. The two provinces of China, the Heilongjiang and Harbin on the Russian border in the eastern part of the country, contain just the two of them, over 100 million people. That alone is about the same size as all of Russia. They have been at a rate that is controversial, but estimated somewhere between 60 and 100,000 per year, moving northward across the Amur River. In Eastern Russia, Chinese establish their own businesses, their own bazaars, their own health clinics, their own way of life, basically. They, too, are not “conquering” Russia, they are “leasing” its territory, and Russia has been willingly doing this. Timber forests, all sorts of natural resources are being exploited, by many accounts, over-exploited by Chinese, and Russia is not doing much of anything to stop it.

I say history rhymes here, because this map, and again, this is stylized for effect, but the map of the Chinese Yuan Dynasty, led by Kublai Khan, the grandson of Genghis Khan, roughly corresponds to this map. That, of course, was 700 years ago, so the joke being – although it’s not so funny if you’re Russian – history doesn’t repeat itself, but it does rhyme.

So again, all of this is happening in a way that is invisible that is not on your maps, but I believe that it totally changes the way that we think about that geography.

Here, what I want to do is apply a similar principle, sort of looking at East Asia. What are the ways in which China is building what some might call – for those of you who remember your history class, what was it that Japan had sought to build during World War II? It was a greater Japanese co-prosperity sphere. There’s a debate, and it’s a very heated debate among scholars and political analysts as to whether or not what’s happening in East Asia could be a balancing effort of
countries like India and Japan or Australia and the U.S. against China, or whether China is establishing a certain hierarchy in the region again, and we won’t be able to settle that debate tonight, but I will say that from my many months traveling around the region, I’ve concluded that something like a greater Chinese co-prosperity sphere is emerging.

And this is how. It begins with the global hubs. Global hubs are those capitals, those nodes of the global economy, trillions of dollars finance flow through them. In the Western Hemisphere, we think of London, Paris, New York, São Paulo, and so forth, but in fact, Asia today has more global hubs than any other region in the world -- in fact, a couple that are still left off of here, like Sydney, of course.

So Seoul, Tokyo, Beijing, Shanghai, Hong Kong, Taipei, Singapore, Sydney, each of those cities is filtering so much money around and into the region, and so much of it relates to business with China, and that is step 1 in the process of building this invisible greater Chinese co-prosperity sphere.

The next method in the strategy is trade. China trades heavily with all of its neighbors, but it particularly focuses on American allies: Japan, Korea, Australia. Australia, for example is heavily dependent on exports of everything from uranium to natural gas, to China.

There’s a different strategy for poorer countries in the region, particularly in Southeast Asia: lowering tariffs, offering credits, canceling debt, and so forth. These are all ways in which trade is used to bind countries into this greater Chinese co-prosperity sphere.

Then, of course, there’s diplomacy. East Asia’s become an alphabet soup of institutions, sort of second only maybe to the EU, though lagging far behind in the sense of unity, but you’ve gone from just having ASEAN to ASEAN+3, the East Asian Community, and now some are talking about an Asian Union of some kind, so diplomacy is a pivotal factor, there’s, for example, ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, which is essentially a non-aggression pact, and even American allies like Korea and Australia have signed it. Kevin Rudd, the Prime Minister of Australia, was on CNN the other day, and he said, “Having an alliance with America doesn’t mean compliance with America,” which is a very cute way of saying that if there’s ever a conflict over Taiwan or anything else, Australia is just going to sit it out, and so is Korea.

And they say that, of course, because again, the financial stakes that they have with China are just too massive to ignore. And then there’s the demographic angle to all this, which is sort of a different version of what’s happening in Russia. But China, willingly or unwillingly, exports people on a scale that no other society in history has obviously has had the capacity to do.

For anyone who’s ever studied geopolitics, when you’re calculating or measuring how much power a state or some empire has, demography is one of the pivotal factors, and in China, it’s an unprecedented variable. In the countries that border China, particularly actually Myanmar, and other countries, you find ever more Chinese people. Ethnic Chinese elites already occupy the commanding heights, the economies such as Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia.

China also, you know, has a policy of cultural export. Soft power is developing. We know there’s a Confucius Institute here in New York. There are everything from nannies to schoolteachers that now sort of fan out, really, and are helping to
promote Chinese culture. Chinese language education, which used to be a very sensitive issue around the region in places like Singapore, for example, is now widely embraced, and dual language education.

One thing that I’ve been talking to some Chinese officials and scholars about recently is China’s citizenship policy. One of the things that countries do to lure back diaspora and to strengthen their loyalty and to have them bring in more, contribute more money to the economy, is to liberalize visa policy or even offer dual citizenship, something that India has started to do. China could one day undertake similar measures. It already has in the purely economic realm, but I think that if China were to offer some form of dual citizenship to ethnic Chinese in a variety of countries around the region, it could have a massive political ripple effect in these countries where the ethnic Chinese populations are already so important and powerful, and it would further shift their loyalties back towards China.

That all is part of a strategy in a way of overturning what happened in the Chinese Civil War, which forced, actually, a lot of Chinese out of the country, those that of course were nationalists, and now they are being won back over. So if you think about the trade, financial, demographic, diplomatic, and other sorts of strategies at play, the collective result is a map that looks a lot more like a greater Chinese co-prosperity sphere under a certain kind of soft hierarchy than what you would see on a map of individual nations with rigid borders as such, and that’s the importance of thinking about different ways of mapping the world beyond just the lines that we see, and I think that, again, China and East Asia is a fine example of that.

All of this so far is happening without firing a shot. This has so far been a fairly nonviolent process that I’m describing, but of course, if we associate geopolitics with one thing, it’s conflict. So let’s look at the region of the world that we most associate with that term, and that’s, of course, the Middle East.

When I wanted to rethink how we look at the Middle East, it was actually fairly obvious to begin with a critique of borders, because as many of you know, the post-Ottoman decolonized Arab world is very uncomfortable with the borders that were thrust upon it and into which it was carved after World War I and beyond, and fundamentally, I wanted to focus on how we should rethink about state building. State building, not just of new states, but of the Arab world in general and how that can play a role in making it a more peaceful region.

And one can’t help but begin with the issue of oil. These are just some of the pipeline networks in the region, and I really wanted to hone in on Iraq right now, because in terms of Arab geopolitics and borders, one has to ask whether or not Iraq really even exists. In my opinion, as someone who’s spent quite a bit of time, it to me exists more on the map than in reality, so I believe that the future of the country and the region will not divide itself according to these pipelines, but will be better understood by these pipelines than by the political borders, and the best case in point for that is Kurdistan.

Now the Kurdish conflict, or rather, the Kurdistan dilemma is really about 3,000 years old, and we’re on the threshold of potentially solving it, which I think is a very good thing. For many years, or at least certainly since 2003 with the U.S. invasion of Iraq, people have said, well, the Kurdish people are sort of self-governing, and they have been since the early 1990s with the first U.S. invasion and the imposition of the northern and southern no-fly zones, but the Turks will never allow them to be an independent country. We’re starting to see change in
attitudes towards Kurdistan all across the region, and what we see today, in fact, in Kurdistan, is that because the population is overwhelmingly young, under the age of 20-25, almost all Kurds, you'll be very, you'll be hard pressed to go to Kurdistan and find a Kurd who's ever been south of what was the no-fly zone. So Kurds are, they're non-Arab, Kurdish-speaking, and have never been to the country that we identify them as being part of, which is Iraq. They overwhelmingly want independence. I think that they're likely to have it, and it really hinges, not necessarily on border disputes in the region, but their ability to manage the oil resources that they have located in Kirkuk and other areas.

Now Kurdistan is a landlocked territory, so in fact, if we think about how to peacefully resolve this sort of cartographic dilemma, it rests in understanding that, in order to reliably export that oil, Kurdistan has to be friendly with all of its neighbors, with Turkey, in fact, with Syria, with the remaining Iraq, and so on. Now the question is, what becomes of the rest of Iraq, and should we fear that assisting, potentially, the creation of an independent Kurdistan is such a bad thing? Iraq actually would still be the third or fourth largest oil producer in the world, and so to me, the consolidation of Iraq and the birth of Kurdistan wouldn't necessarily be a bad thing for Iraq, but we again have this opportunity to resolve a 3,000 year old regional dilemma.

So moving to a conflict that we all know all too well, Israel/Palestine. Of course, this territory is a cartographic anomaly. You have two parts, Palestine, one part Israel. What do we do to bridge that, to get beyond what we know to be such a painful stalemate and headache that we face all the time? Rather than focus again on just the borders as such, what is happening today, and many of you might be familiar with this, is an effort to create what's called "The Arc."

The Arc is this corridor of rails, roads, and other transportation means to link the West Bank and Gaza so that there can be a unified, a somewhat unified or at least connected Palestinian geography. I believe that independence without this infrastructure is futile, and that rather than focus on who controls which lines on the map, we have to be building these infrastructural lines that connect the Palestinian territories to make them economically viable. Again, independence, autonomy, without this really means nothing until they can have a functioning port and transportation network and to get their economy going, so I think that it would be, we'd all be better served, in a way, focusing on these infrastructural lines, rather than the borders as such.

I want to apply this principle of focusing on infrastructure to the region as a whole. Who remembers what this is? Anyone? What is this railway? Anyone? The Hejaz Railway, right. The Hejaz Railway was meant to ferry pilgrims from Istanbul via Damascus to Medina, and it's not on this version, but during the Ottoman Empire, there was even an offshoot of the Hejaz Railway that reached Haifa in what is today Israel, on the Mediterranean Sea.

To me, the Hejaz Railway represents this crossing of borders, blending across them, infrastructure linking people. Today the Hejaz Railway is a wreck. Jordan attempted to put a couple million dollars into refurbishing one section of it. It's still a comical operation. So much, it wouldn't cost that much, but so much more effort should go into this kind of infrastructure, rehabilitating the cross-border networks, so that once again, the Arab world could have that kind of organic unity that it has lacked in the past.

And what isn't on here, but what I'm doing in a subsequent version of this is looking at actually the Persian Gulf states. For those of you who looked in the
newspapers lately, there are several border disputes right now in the Persian Gulf area where Saudi Arabia has been conducting raids inside Yemen, where it has closed the border with the UAE, and so there’s a line of trucks right now, about 20 miles long trying to conduct trade, but what they’re also doing is planning a high speed railway, or at least a freight corridor that links Kuwait all the way to Oman and passes through each of the GCC countries. That’s the kind of infrastructure I’m talking about, and that’s the kind of thing that could help to alleviate some of these absolutely pointless border disputes that actually happen in this part of the world.

Now let’s go to a very complicated region, the –stans, every country that ends in –stan. Central Asia. Landlocked, oil-rich, post-Soviet Republics, not all of them oil-rich, how do we understand this region in its post-Soviet context? What I’m going to do is click through and open up and show, these are the existing, planned, or potential sort of future pipelines that are going to cross this region, but let me just pause for a second, because it may seem like I’m just talking about oil, oil, oil all the time. I want to emphasize a very important point, which is there’s a difference between the way Dick Cheney, kind of Washington audience might talk about oil in the sense of “There’s some oil, let’s go get it!” for us vs. what I mean now when I’m talking about newly independent countries that have energy resources that are landlocked and their economic future depends on it. Oil is not any less important just because it’s not the object of western imperial or American sort of great power strategies. Oil is absolutely essential to defining the identity of these republics in Central Asia, and pipelines are the way, pipelines are the lines on the map that are going to help us, that are going to help these countries define themselves.

`Just take Kazakhstan. In the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan was often labeled on maps as often South Siberia. Its independence was never thought of, or not even its autonomy. Today, Kazakhstan, as you all know, is the most successful of the post-Soviet republics, and oil is a big part of the reason why. It’s managed to create new pipelines going east to China, refurbish new routes that pass through Russia to Western Europe, and is considering cross-Caspian oil shipments via tanker traffic that would link up with the Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan pipeline which flows here from Azerbaijan through Georgia into Turkey. So for Azerbaijan already, for Kazakhstan now, and potentially for Turkmenistan, oil and gas pipelines are an absolutely vital way for them to express their geopolitical identity, to be considered to important, to earn revenues, and so forth. And notice how a lot of the pipeline routes do cut across or pass through Iran, not least from Turkmenistan via Iran to Pakistan and India or potentially across Afghanistan, even. I think that this is revealing about the diplomacy with respect to Iran, which for many of us, at least when we read the news, it’s all about the nuclear issue.

But in fact, so much of it is actually about energy and oil, and it is so illogical to be planning new pipeline routes that last obviously for decades and decades in the region to make them circumvent Iran, that costs billions of dollars more, it’s completely cartographically illogical, but that’s of course a tenet of U.S. foreign policy today. To me, it should be the exact opposite. The ultimate incentive to bring Iran back into, whatever lofty term the Secretary of State wants to use on any given day, Community of Nations or something like that, is in fact to focus on creating a sensible energy infrastructure that leverages Iran’s geography rather than tries to avoid it, and I think this is a, not oil and gas, these pipelines are not being used correctly in diplomacy with respect to Iran today.

So what is the region of the world where bringing down borders has done the most to enhance their geopolitical leverage? That is, of course, Europe. So I’m
going to quickly recap the story that many of you know, which is that the European Coal and Steel community began as just six countries in the early 1950s and gradually grew just to 12, and then one fine day in 2004, became 27 countries. Now the European Union has a population of close to 500 million people, is the largest free trade zone, the largest single market in the world, and Europe’s global voice is dramatically enhanced as a result of having done away, effectively, with so many of the lines on the map.

How does one understand the future of Europe? I know that a lot of people could be cynical about this, especially given what’s happened in the most recent elections there, but I believe that the future of Europe is not to be understood by looking at Brussels politics. It’s to be looking at the periphery and the trends there. In the center, you have the European Empire, you could, I think in the next version, I’m changing it to Commonwealth, that’s the term that Robert Cooper, who is one of the strategists in Brussels, prefers, the light blue regions are all at least 75% or more dependent on the EU for their foreign investment and for their exports and trade. Russia, of course, it’s the oil and gas pipelines.

Now let’s look at North Africa. What’s emerging right now in this region is what Nicolas Sarkozy has been touting for some years. He calls it the Mediterranean Union. It’s in fact happening in the invisible lines on this map are actually the undersea pipelines, oil and gas, that have been funded by Italy, Spain, and France that are creating really a physical connectivity across the Mediterranean between North Africa and the EU. This is a region that tends to increasingly not think of itself as “the Middle East” the way we conventionally define it. It’s precisely because of the economic magnetic sort of appeal, not least also the demographic factors, remittances, and so forth, that one can actually see a Mediterranean Union emerging. Not that North African Countries will ever become members of the European Union as such, but to me, that’s largely irrelevant.

That’s particularly the case, actually, with Turkey. When it comes to Turkey, I believe that people have a somewhat false understanding about the current dynamics between the EU and Turkey. When people in the west read about that situation, they get the impression that Turkey’s sense of self-worth hinges on membership in the European Union. I don’t believe that that’s the case. I think that what’s happening is to the contrary. In fact, Turkey’s relations with Europe over the last four decades have so dramatically strengthened Turkey and its economy and its confidence that Turkey now is the one that really holds the cards. Turkey is a very independent-mind foreign policy. What it’s pursuing is actually what I call neo-Ottomanism: wanting to expand its influence in all directions and not taking dictates from Washington or from Brussels. If Europe wants to actually be a superpower, in my opinion, it has to be actually a Euro-Turkish superpower, a real partnership with Turkey because of its incredibly important geography and its role as a conduit for so much of the western Energy supply.

Let’s go back to Southwest Asia and look at some of the hotspots of today. People are always wondering, where the new states will be created, what are the new lines on the map, the new borders, if any. Now today, what the struggle to tame south central Asia is so much about is this question of Pashtunistan. My personal belief is that right now, the politics or the strategies that are being pursued by either the U.S., the Afghan government, or the Pakistani government, are highly insufficient in settling the Pashtunistan question. I don’t believe that Pashtunistan will necessarily be born as an independent country as such, but one has to appreciate that this is the flag that flies in the minds of so many
people, 15-20 million, in this part of the world today, straddling the Afghan/Pakistan border, which as many of you know, is more or less meaningless in reality.

There’s another one, though, that is widely neglected but mentioned a little bit more and more these days, and that’s Baluchistan. Again, will Baluchistan and the Baluchis ever have an independent nation? Likely not. However, the violence is increasing in that part of Pakistan. Over the summer, Baluchi rebels attacked a Pakistani military garrison, and they actually did raise the flag of Baluchistan there. To me, this region will remain highly unsettled, no matter how many western, NATO troops are there, so long as the question of Pashtunistan, the question of Baluchistan, again, lines, demographics which are not portrayed on our maps, are resolved in a more fundamental fashion.

And one can go over here now to Africa, of course, the joke about African political geography is that it has so many suspiciously straight lines on the map. How are those being resolved? Many parts of Africa reflect, much as Pakistan does, what I call post-colonial entropy. After several generations of independence, one finds that this sense of national unity that independence era leaders sought to create has really faded. The ability to capitalize, or the investment in capitalizing on the infrastructure that was inherited from the colonial era has also been a failure. So for a variety of reasons, you find the unraveling, the entropy of the post-colonial world, and countries like Sudan, one of the largest countries in Africa, is a great example. Will South Sudan become independent? As many of you know, there’s a referendum that will take place next year, but it seems like things are moving in that direction, and of course, as you know, there are two other civil wars in Sudan alone, that’s just one country with three civil wars going on: Darfur, and some wouldn’t call what’s happening in the East a civil war, but it’s most certainly an internal territorial conflict.

What’s not on this map either, but that’s a relatively recent development, is that China has signed an agreement with Kenya to create a new pipeline that will link South Sudan to the Indian Ocean. I think that, again, that constitutes a step which, if and when completed, would be something of a fait accompli for independence for South Sudan, potentially allow it to be more economically viable.

And one more geography, not just for fun, is Greenland. Long neglected, but some of you may know that earlier this summer, Greenland, which only has 60,000 residents, voted itself self-governance rights from Denmark. And as you also may know, there’s some estimated, several, tens of billions barrels of oil and trillions of cubic feet of natural gas located in and around Greenland, and so, of course, the population would like to control it themselves rather than passing it off to Denmark, which could become a whole lot smaller in the next few years if Greenland does, in fact, become an independent country. So what does it all mean? And again, we come back to geopolitics being highly unsentimental and always operating around the world and all of these places, just like climate change.

The question is, should we fear it? And so many of us here, particularly in the business of diplomacy and conflict resolution, we fear changes on the map. We fear obviously the violence that can ensue, and as those borders change, some people just fear having to learn the names of new countries.

But I think that we have to embrace the process, not always having sort of a conflict for the sake of it and allowing every possible secessionist group to attain
independence, but we have to be open to the idea that the map of the world is not an accurate reflection, or is not the ideal that it could be.

What we're pursuing is equilibrium. We're pursuing a world in which there is a balance of demographics, of territory, of resources, and so forth, across the world, and we haven't achieved that yet.

This process of geopolitical change, of borders, is going to continue despite our best efforts, and the question is, how can we steer it in the direction towards equilibrium, but my belief is that clinging to the borders as they are today, is in fact a driver of violence. The smartest thing we can do, though, is to, as in the case of the Hejaz Railway, or The Arc in Palestine, to focus on building lines that cross these borders, such as infrastructure, rather than the borders themselves, and then maybe one day we will have that borderless world. Thank you, I'll stop right there.

Hoge:

Parag, I just want to ask you one question, and then I want to throw it open to the audience. It's a very general question, and it starts with a slight little anecdote. A year- and- a- half ago, Jean-Marie Guéhenno, who was then the retiring, after eight years, Under-Secretary- General for Peacekeeping, came here and gave a bit of a farewell talk, and somebody said to him, “What is the most important thing you’ve learned in the eight years?” and by the way, these were eight very significant years, a growth in peacekeeping like we had never seen before, and he said, “The most important thing I learned was the importance of sovereignty.”

Now I think something all of us in this community run into all the time, and at a time of globalization, and at a time when people talk about multilateral diplomacy in a favorable way, you keep bumping up against this increasing nationalism in the world, and the illogical, very emotional desire people have to cling to their borders and to declare almost the sanctity of sovereignty. That seems to be at war with this, or this is a very abstract version, meaning it's abstract by its very nature, the way you’ve done it. But what I wonder about as I look at it, it seems sort of bloodless when I think about the passions across the street in that United Nations building, a building dedicated to something of a global order, and yet a building in which you have all these national rivalries that vie all the time.

Do you hear a question in that, and could you respond to it?

Khanna:

Well, the term “sovereignty” is obviously so often bundled with “the state,” and when people think about the relationship between globalization and the state, you often hear people ask almost rhetorically, “Is the state still relevant? Is the state withering away? Has globalization done away with ‘the state?’” Again, they might as well be saying sovereignty.

And my answer to that is that there is no answer. And so, quite frankly, I’ve been, and many of you have probably as well, these pointless academic conversations about the future of the state, and the truth is, there is no one kind of state. We have just now looked at states that exist really only in name in so much of the post-colonial world, one thinks of Congo, we’ve looked at, certainly strong states that are actually empires masked as states, like China. We’ve looked at states that are shrinking in a variety of ways, like Russia. There are quasi-states like Kurdistan or Pashtunistan or Palestine, and then there are states that have blended together by choice, like those of the European Union, so is there one type of state or one type of sovereignty in any of that? Not really.

Then there’s the market states, such as the Persian Gulf statelets of Qatar or UAE, so heavily dependent on being just market nodes for the export of their resources and being globalized as such, so to me, there’s just no one answer to
that. One bumps up against sovereignty, yes, but it depends on the issue. So many states embrace the removal of that sovereignty, or at least of those borders, so I don’t think that there’s any one answer to the question.

**Hoge:** Great, I’m going to go to the floor. By the way, I should have checked with you beforehand. You took a very interesting guest with you on this recent travel that I described, country to country. Do you happen to have that slide in your box or not?

**Khanna:** Oh, it’s embarrassing to show it, but sure!

**Hoge:** It’s worth it!

**Khanna:** This is, okay, prepare yourselves. Special guest, little baby. She’s been, she’s a borderless baby! She’s been in 11 countries, and she’s 6 months old.

**Hoge:** I’m glad you saved it! I think you can put it up now. If anybody had any questions or wanted to make comment, I’d love – wait for the microphone, introduce yourself please.

**Maria Binz-Scharf:** Hi, Maria Binz-Scharf, City College of New York, thank you very much for this exciting talk. You paint an intriguing picture, and I seem to understand, and I’m oversimplifying, that you have one prescriptive and one descriptive part of that talk, where you say, the descriptive part is oil or other reasons are driving states to cross borders, and you prescribe that infrastructure is the answer to that. Do I see that more or less correctly, you can answer that. My question is, how does it happen? You have different states who should be, that should be paying for that infrastructure. What is the incentive of any given state to participate in that, and how would that negotiation happen?

**Khanna:** It’s interesting. I find that one of the most promising geographies for the notion that building infrastructure, transportation and energy kinds of links, can help to resolve outstanding border disputes and national rivalries, is actually in Africa itself. In the future version of this, I go into what are called trans-boundary parks, so across sub-Saharan Africa now, you have game reserves and sort of safari parks that are being co-managed along many borders, such as South Africa and its neighboring countries, jointly managed by the governments and by their tourism boards and by private companies. So to take advantage of the natural assets of the region, particularly the game reserves and the wildlife and so forth to attract tourism, and focus not at all, really, on the political boundaries between the countries.

The same can be done through road and rail networks. This is one of the most controversial things that actually, if we sort of take this issue and link it to China, China’s role in Africa, which has become so controversial today, one of the things that China is doing is building a lot of this infrastructure that post-colonial rulers have not built. Of course, it’s building it with a very explicit purpose in mind, which is to extract resources efficiently to the Indian Ocean, but this is also infrastructure that African governments can take advantage of. Ultimately, it’s still their sovereign territory, and if they get their governance right, they can take advantage of the economic growth through the sale of resources that’s taking place and make this infrastructure their own and use it to actually build up a more borderless and more economically viable Africa with fewer truly landlocked states, because the more infrastructure links you have from landlocked countries outward, the more those countries become economically viable as well. So where is the incentive, I mean really, everyone wins. Transit states win through,
even landlocked transit states win through the passage of oil pipelines through their territory, and strong states can become huge investors in these resources and their extraction, and poor countries need this more than anything else.

Hoge: Please, front row?

William Verdone: William Verdone. There’s a growing movement called peak oil, and that indicates that we’re running out of this resource. That kind of throws the map into a little bit of a quandary, because if everything is dependent on oil, and if it disappears, where are we? That’s really not a question, it’s merely a statement, but there are some countries that are disappearing from the world, the Andaman Islands, the Seychelles, where do we put them, and how does global warming affect that?

Khanna: We should distinguish the debate about peak oil and what it means for the ways in which geopolitics is going to change. In other words, if Central Asia had no oil and gas resources, and it in fact has a finite supply which we know will only last until about 2020-2025, would there be such competition over infrastructure in that region? Probably not. But we also know that even if oil is diminishing in supply, the demand is going to persist for quite a long time. So if anything, the prophecy here in terms of competition for the resources in Central Asia and other regions will continue to grow even as oil supply shrinks because we are still so dependent on it. Our transition is much slower than the continued sort of struggle for the resources.

Climate change then is a different side of the issue, and what it is doing as we sadly know in terms of desertification and the migration, the notion of environmental refugees, which is not a notion, it’s very real, is already having a huge impact on political stability in any number of countries. Of course, rising sea levels, the various small island states that are affected by this, Maldives and so forth, but I think that those are geopolitical problems that are being treated as if they’re two completely different things, and they may be connected in the environmental/ecological sense, but the political weight that these different issues have is just so different today in our diplomacy.

Hoge: Have a question here on the aisle.

Patrick Hayford: Thank you very much. My name is Patrick Hayford from the United Nations. Thank you for giving us a very thought provoking talk about this new borderless world. What about the impact of international migration in this new borderless world you’ve described? There are some countries which are losing population rapidly, there are others that are growing population very fast. How is international migration going to shape out in this new borderless world you’ve just described?

Khanna: Well, I looked at migration, I think, you know, when people speak about international migration or global migration, they would like it to be attached to some notion of a regulatory framework for migration, or some kind of global migration regime. Let’s face it, there’s no such thing. Not in the least. Not even close. Different geographies, or any two set of geographies, have completely different relationships when it comes to migration and so forth, and there will never be, as far as I can tell, any binding framework of any kind. Now I looked at changes in demography and migration that are happening just de facto, the China-Russia example, and so forth. So I think that it’s an issue that really varies by, from region to region. I think that there is a particular European-North African migration dyad, and European countries are grappling with policies on that and
working on a variety of things to deal with it, such as opening up and finding employment centers in North African countries to try and keep people at home.

There’s other interesting demographic cases where reverse migration is being strongly welcomed. I had Kurdistan up on the map. Kurdistan is attracting back a lot of Kurds. Actually, because it offers a certain amount of stability and economic opportunity, and it still is the homeland for the Kurdish diaspora. The Balkan countries, actually, small countries like Serbia, I think, attracted back some of the Serbian diaspora from the post-1990s war period.

The U.S.-Latin American relationship when it comes to migration and illegal migration is going to have its own resolution. The U.S. may be putting up a fence, or it may use, it actually, the United States uses these aerial drones, the kind that you know from Iraq and Afghanistan, is using them to watch this border as well. Clearly, there’s no international regime governing how the United States deals with migration from Latin America, so I quite frankly believe that much like aid policy or farm or agricultural policy and subsidies, these really crucial areas that would have a big impact, actually, on global development, it’s really individual nations that are going to make their own decisions on how they deal with it.

Hoge: In the back.

Necla Tschirgi: Necla Tshirgi, I’m a researcher. Thank you very much for the stimulating talk. I want to pick up on Warren’s earlier question and push it a little bit further. I just came back from a 5-week research trip to Egypt, Yemen, and Palestine, and the world I saw does not quite correspond to your analysis. I think there’s a lot of ideology, there’s a lot of passion, there’s a lot of religion, and how do you build these human dimensions into your analysis, and how would they affect the way the world changes, and a footnote, a small question, what happened to North and South America? Did you talk about it, or did I miss it?

Hoge: He promised me he was going to talk about Brazil, and I was going to bring it up, because he hasn’t yet.

Khanna: I forgot about that. No, not that I forgot about it. In fact, when I was writing this book, I had to really fight with my publisher to include the very long chapter on Latin America that I do have, because they said, “Latin America? No one thinks about Latin America!” I said, “No, it’s really important, truly from a geopolitical standpoint,” particularly because of the ways in which, with globalization, you have the access to Latin America’s natural resources more available to the world than ever before. You have China moving in to acquire those resources more than ever, and you have this growing sense of a geopolitical identity in Latin America, and this notion that Latin America wants to be treated as a more equal partner with North America, and to me, some of what I describe with respect to China, building this co-prosperity sphere, you have an analog in Latin America with what Brazil is doing and the ways in which Brazil is exercising influence around Latin America as well. So there is plenty to depict on a map, and the next version will actually have some of that. This version was made for about a 15-minute sort of delivery, so I had to be very choosy about what zones to focus in on, but I’m working on a version that includes the Arctic and North America, South America, the rest of Africa, India was conspicuously absent from this, but there’s a lot that one could show that isn’t on the map when it comes to India, such as the Maoist Naxalite movements that are having a devastating impact on the local stability around India, the border conflicts that India and China have over Arunachal Pradesh, and that’s been flaring up, and you’ve probably seen it
in the newspapers the last few weeks, so there’s a lot, lot more, and I’m doing a much bigger version that will include all of those things.

But in terms of human elements and passions, as you’ve described them, those very much have a place in here. It’s just a question of how one depicts them. I did not, I’m not attempting, I did not try, I did not make the argument that there is a borderless Middle East. To the contrary. I’m trying to show what would create a more sort of borderless Middle East, one that wasn’t about national rivalries and passions and so forth. But those are very strong, as you described them.

However, I want to point to one thing that I dwell on at great length in my book, and as Warren and I were talking about earlier, Vali Nasr, who you are having come in, who spoke this morning elsewhere about his new book, *Forces of Fortune*, the notion of a, what I call a new Arabism, and he calls an Arab middle class, is something that is totally underappreciated by those of us who go to the region and see religious radicalism, conservative values having a greater role in society, and so on and so on. To me, the fact that there’s a very, the Arab demographic is extremely young, there is a certain trend, not just towards the things that you’re pointing to, but actually to what Vali and I examined, which is the ways in which there is an intra-Arab globalization going on. Places like Dubai, for example, have become this sort of Arab melting pot where a younger generation of Arabs are able to interact with each other and see the linkages that they have. There’s sort of this invisible Arab labor market, there’s a common language, a common culture, a common religion obviously, all of these things that, in fact, a younger generation of Arabs see in common with each other that is very different, actually, from their parents who were, sort of lived in the legacy of nationalism and Nasserite nationalism, and that is changing, I believe, so it’s something that isn’t captured in projections or visions of a clash of civilizations, but it’s actually quite prominent if you think about the kind of trade and economic linkages that Arab states are beginning to have with each other.

And a lot of that, interestingly enough, is a result of 9/11. What happened after 9/11 is that, for decades, Arab oil wealth was reinvested in Europe and in the United States in western banks. But the Bank of International Settlements in Switzerland has calculated that since 9/11, Arab states have kept maybe 80+, maybe 90% of their oil profits, and that’s why you have Dubai, that’s why you have infrastructure, investment, hotels, jobs, all sorts of new projects that have been taking place from Morocco to Iraq and elsewhere. Most of the money comes from a source that, it shouldn’t surprise you, but it’s Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia, for all of the things that we know that it does in terms of its support for certain religious actors around the world, is also the driving force of an Arab economic modernization and internal globalization, so there’s a, it’s a very, very complicated picture that’s happening in the region, but it’s important, from my point of view, to emphasize this generational shift and this economic and cultural Arab globalization that’s taking place, which I think is a good thing, and it’s not just about nationalism and historical passions and rivalries.

Hoge: This will be the last question.

Nosizwe Baqwa: Nosizwe Baqua, from the Norwegian Permanent Mission, thank you very much for a very thought-provoking talk. You speak a lot about nation-states, and there’s been a lot of questions about identity, but I feel that all of this presupposes an actual, what shall we say, operational ownership of these natural resources. What about international corporations and marketing strategies, business strategies that perhaps don’t have so much to do with the state, but are profit seeking "overnational" companies that have an entirely different agenda,
and perhaps then see these borders in a completely different way that don’t necessarily trickle down any sort of resource development in these countries, borderless or not?

**Khanna:**

There’s a very interesting shift underway when it comes to the management of natural resources. It used to be that, we used the term “oil curse” to apply to just about every place except Norway, and that’s not the case anymore. The Persian Gulf countries, Malaysia, Kazakhstan to some extent, are starting to prove that non-western countries can, potentially, with a lot of help and luck, and hopefully in some case, and some decent leadership, are capable of managing natural resources to the benefit of their populations.

There’s another parallel trend which relates to the ways in which these countries, these resource-rich but new states deal with western multinational energy companies, and that, and this is something that I almost sort of applaud in my book, is that they’re renegotiating big time, whereas it used to be that because the west brought the technology, they had to give up 90% ownership over the profits, they’re now saying “It’s ours, and we’ll cancel the contract tomorrow unless we get 90% and you take 10%,” and this is happening from President Correa of Ecuador to Azerbaijan to Kazakhstan, you name the country, or just take the Russia-BP relationship over Sakhalin oil fields and other areas.

Everywhere in the world, you find that emerging markets, these second tier countries, poorer countries that are fortunate enough to own the resources are becoming very confident. So for the first time, they actually have the potential to take advantage of this resource wealth on their own. They’ll still need the western technology, and so forth, to be able to extract resources efficiently. There’s a potential today, though, to develop these resources to the benefit of broad-based economic development in ways that we would never have thought of before when these states were so weak and were geopolitical pawns and oil companies had all the power, I think those days of just pure conspiracy kind of thinking about the role of energy companies are over, and I think that’s a very good thing, and there’s so many examples, I’ve only pointed to 5 or 6, so many examples of how that’s the case, I think it’s a hopeful development.

**Hoge:**

The bar is staying open, we’re about to reopen the balcony, so don’t leave right away, stick around, talk, Parag, I think, is going to stick around a little bit. Thank you so much.