



## Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict: Understanding Group Violence in Multiethnic Societies

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**Chair:**

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**Speaker:**

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**Discussants:**

**H.E. Mr. Peter Maurer**, Permanent Representative of Switzerland to the United Nations

**Dr. Susan L. Woodward**, Professor of Political Science, Graduate Center at the City University of New York (CUNY)

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**Ed Luck:**

Welcome everybody. When we started planning this event, we thought we'd be welcoming you to a small, intimate roundtable, but that's, of course, because we didn't properly estimate the drawing power of one Frances Stewart and the great interest in her topic here of horizontal inequalities and conflict, understanding group violence in multi-ethnic societies. Given my work with the Secretary General and the responsibility to protect, this was an issue area that I, at least, couldn't resist, and I see many others had the same feeling. We have -- and I think this is an innovation now -- speaker biographies in the back of the list of participants, so you have that information before you; that's a practice we'll follow in the future, so let me just say a word or two. Professor Stewart, as you know, is director of the Center for Research on Inequality, Human Security, and Ethnicity at Oxford University, and at one point chaired the Department of International Development there. She's done important work for the UN through the years, including on UNICEF's study on the "Justifying it with a human face," which we all remember was one of the landmark studies, and I was very impressed that she was just awarded at the 2009 UNDP Mahbub ul Haq award, and for those of us who remember him and all of his contributions, the fact that they're recognizing her lifetime achievement with that particular award I think says it all. She will speak for 15-20 minutes, in part, I think, maybe making a reference or two to her book. If she doesn't make a reference, we will point out that it exists. This is not a book launch, it's been out for a little while, but if you haven't seen it, we very much recommend it. We have two excellent commentators, neither of whom need much introduction to this audience. First would be Peter Maurer, who not only has been the very articulate and insightful permanent representative of Switzerland, but he asked me not to say it, but if you haven't heard, he has now been appointed as state secretary for the Swiss Foreign Ministry, so he, I guess,

will be transitioning over the next several months, but I think Bern's gain will be New York's loss. I don't know how you weigh Bern and New York, but he'll be a very big man in Bern, and we'll still think of him as a big man in New York as well. He will be followed by Susan Woodward. Everyone knows Susan, professor at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York, one of the great experts on the Balkans and has written and commented on every issue that I think is being taken up today, so we have an all star lineup, and I will get out of the way and let them proceed, and so Frances, thank you very much for being with us, and we look forward to your comments, and then we have a lively discussion no doubt following it. Thank you.

**Frances Stewart:**

Thank you, and very much. It's almost always the case that everything you ever say has been said before, and this is a wonderful quotation. Remove the secondary causes that have produced the great convulsions of the world, and you will almost always find the principle of inequality at the bottom. Either the poor have attempted to plunder the rich, or the rich to enslave the poor. If, then, a society can ever be founded in which every man shall have something to keep and little to take from others, much will have been done for peace, and that really is a nutshell of what I'm going to be saying. But I'm talking about a particular type of inequality -- not what we often call, what we call vertical inequality, not the normal inequality we often refer to with Gini coefficients and so on, which is inequality between individuals within a society -- but what I'm going to be calling horizontal inequality, which is inequality between groups within a society. Now, in recent years, actually the number of total conflicts has been declining, I'm pleased to say -- and I'm sure everybody here knows -- but the proportion which are depicted as ethnic, have been rising, and it's that sort of conflict that I'm talking about. Maybe religious, maybe ethnic, maybe race, but conflict between culturally identified groups.

Now there's a big debate, we all know, between these sort of primordial, and analysts that say that people can't live together, that it's the clash of civilizations and there's nothing much we can do about it, and then a whole lot of economists say it's nothing to do with culture at all, nothing to do with ethnicity, is to do with individual people wanting to make money out of war: greed, it's called.

I think what the horizontal inequalities approach does is to bring these two together. It says, yes, it is about culture, but it's also about economics. It's about, if groups have fundamentally unequal relationships in politics, in economics, in culture, in the way their culture is treated in the society and the way their religions are treated in society, in social assets, in all these different aspects, then the people who are deprived have a very big motive to challenge the government. And the people in government, if they're a different group, have a big motive to suppress the others and retain their privilege, and that's fundamentally why horizontal inequalities as distinct from vertical inequality tends to lead to conflict in our view.

I think what one needs to do is to differentiate the motives of those who lead a conflict or orchestrate it and those who support it or follow it, and the motives of leaders are very often a question of political access. If leaders have political access, if all groups in a society are represented in government, then they don't have any particular method, motive, for leading a conflict. They, as leaders, they're satisfied. Now it may be, they're excluded from power, and then they do have a strong motive for rebellion, possibly. But then who has a motive for supporting them? Supporters are probably more interested in the socioeconomic situation and whether they've got jobs relative to other people, where they have access to housing relative to other people, and less interested -- though

interested in the political aspect -- but where we have a really dangerous situation is where you have both political exclusion and socioeconomic exclusion. In other words, horizontal inequalities on both dimensions, and if you add to that cultural exclusion, cultural disrespect, your religion which is not allowed or is not given due recognition, then you can imagine you have a very explosive situation, because culture is really what binds people together. If their culture is not respected, then people feel their culture much more strongly than if it is respected. At the same time, economic deprivation, lack of jobs and so on is obviously a strong motive, and then you have the problem of political participation.

So what we find is that where you have economic and political exclusion, where you have all three types of exclusion, that's when you have a very explosive situation, and I can illustrate that, say, with the Côte d'Ivoire, a country in which, for many years, in fact, there was political inclusion, everybody was in Houphouët-Boigny -- Boigny-Houphouët, actually, I may have got it the wrong way around -- his cabinet, and that was an inclusive situation, and the society was regarded as a sort of model. Many people said this is the way to go. But then after he died, there was total political exclusion, and at that point, there had always been a lot of economic deprivation in the north -- a lot of social deprivation in the north -- but people have been generally respected and included in terms of politics. After he died, they started excluding people politically, and it was at that point that they called, they quite explicitly pointed to the economic and social deprivation as well as the political deprivation, and the civil war broke out. And even today, we've got a very uneasy peace, and it's not going to be solved unless people address both these things, the politics and the economics.

Now which type of economic exclusion matters to people is obviously very much dependent on where you are. If you move to my part of the world, Northern Ireland, land doesn't matter very much. I'm always surprised how little it matters, because there's a lot of land inequality. But housing matters a lot, and jobs matter a lot, and it was huge inequalities in housing and jobs combined with political exclusion which was the problem. But we move to another part of the world, like Zimbabwe, and obviously, housing is not such an issue, jobs are probably a big issue, but there, land is the big issue, and land is so critical. I mean, if we now move to another part of the world, Kenya, the conflict is very much about land. So we have the general situation that horizontal inequalities are important, but the way they display themselves is going to vary.

Now in our research, CRISE is a unit that has been researching these issues for 5-6 years, and we looked specifically at three different parts of the world: we looked at West Africa: Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire, and Nigeria, and we were comparing the more conflictual and the less conflictual societies, and we looked at three countries in Latin America: Bolivia, Peru, and Guatemala, and we looked at Indonesia and Malaysia, plus a few others. That's part of what we did, and in addition, we did some global work, so that's what we were doing; investigating this hypothesis. And the first thing we found was that you find systematically that there is support for the view that as horizontal inequalities rise, just socioeconomic without the political, you find conflict is more likely, and we did this with cross country research, and also with in-country research. For example, looking at districts in Indonesia, where you have the sharpest inequalities, for example, in child mortality, you found that the instance of conflict was much higher. And so, also, in Nepal, and in West Africa -- a whole lot of different societies, we looked at with econometrics. Now econometrics, of course, tells you there is something systematic going on. The case studies were much more revealing about when it happens and when it doesn't because what you find is, it

increases the risk of conflict. It doesn't necessarily lead to conflict. We're talking about risks and probabilities, and why does it in some cases and not in others, and one of the reasons I've already given you, which is there's political, whether there's political exclusion, so that's one of the major reasons why it doesn't but another reason, which is not to do with this particular hypothesis, really, it's to do with the nature of government. Now some governments which, when there is a major problem, manage to handle it in a sort of good way, deal with it, go and try and sort the situation out, and there are other governments which, when this sort of things happens, actually make the thing worse by taking sides, and we found that very, very strongly in our cases. So you find Guatemala and Indonesia where, for many years, not now, but for many years, the government was fueling the conflict, making it much worse, and then contrast that with Ghana, where there was quite often the possibilities of conflict breaking out, and indeed, there was a conflict in the north for a few years, but the government was very good at accommodating people. And we also found the same thing when we looked at particular local areas. So in addition to the underlying reason for a conflict, of course, there are these many other reasons why a particular situation burst into conflict, or not, as the case may be.

Another thing we found is that citizenship is a very important aspect of the whole situation, because citizenship, whether you are a citizen or not, confers all sorts of benefits, and so if you're a citizen, you have rights to not only voting, but all sorts of other things. You often have economic rights and so on. If you're not a citizen, you're excluded, so that's obviously a key source of exclusion, which can be very important, and again, in Côte d'Ivoire, it was very important. It also can be very important locally. In Nigeria, there's the sort of concept of local citizenship. You're an Indigene, a local person, or a settler, you've come in recently, that is sometime in the last 200 years, then you don't get the rights, and that is a very big source of conflict, because with this sort of citizenship exclusion, you get the horizontal inequalities. So in Nigeria, you find a lot of local conflicts fired in this way.

And then we find that natural resources, everyone often says natural resources create conflict, and we know they raise the risk. We find one of the major mechanisms by which they do so is because they tend to create horizontal inequalities. They tend to be located in one particular part of the country, for example, and therefore create big regional inequalities. They tend to be monopolized by one particular group within that part of the country, like in the delta regions, or a lot of the local people are not receiving the benefits, and that causes conflicts, so we began to trace through natural resources the same sort of thing.

Now we also found that horizontal inequalities are very persistent. They're not always, but very often, they last centuries. We found inequalities obviously, take the lesson of American and indigenous people: they've been there since the settlers went in, and very bad, and a very good book's been written by one of our colleagues, Rosemary Thorp's written a very good book about Peru, and the way in which horizontal inequalities have persisted over the years in a very sad, moving way in Peru. So that means that they're very difficult to tackle.

Now coming to policy, one really obvious finding is that in international terms, this is not an issue which is very often addressed, particularly in development policy. The macroeconomic policies, you never hear about it. Poverty reduction strategy papers, not really. Most of the policies which the international community are delivering are not taking this into account, and in fact, often worsen it. If you look at aid distribution, tends to go to a particular group, and very often, it worsens the

situation within a country. So this is really one reason why I'm very keen to talk to people, because I think it's very important that this should not be the case. When it comes to national policy, there's much more often recognition of this issue. We find, because people live with it, that they use it much more, and in fact, most of our policy findings, in a way, derive from our research into what government's actually already doing, which is a good way of doing policy research, because at least you can see that they're sort of feasible sort of policies, because people are doing them. I've talked about the economic policies. On the political side too, the need for inclusive government.

Now I think increasingly, it's recognized, when you come to a real conflict situation. I mean, it's clear in Iraq or Afghanistan, that you should bring all groups together, but when you talk to people about constitutional issues, it's not normally thought about, sort of, "You ought to have democracy." You have multi-parties. Now multi-party democracy, unless you think about it and constrain it, can lead to very sharp inequalities. If there's one group that's in a majority, they can win the presidency, they can win all, they win everything. Not a suitable system for a multi-ethnic society, and yet again, it's part of the international discourse that that's what we mean by democracy, and I think it's a healthy development that we begin to recognize in countries we're dealing with which have recently been in conflict, that that's not a reasonable way of going about solving issues, but in general, that's what we do.

Now turning to policy. We identified three different types of policy, and that can apply across the board. One is direct policies, in which you target particular groups, so say, economic, you have certain jobs which certain groups got to have access to certain jobs, employment. You actually label the groups. Then there are indirect policies in which you don't label the groups, but you think of other policies which effectively would be more inclusive, like you have progressive taxation, and automatically the richer group gets taxed more. You have comprehensive education, everybody gets education, so you've eliminated your inequality. So there are various indirect policies. And finally, there are integrationist policies, which is to say you try and dissolve the group distinctions by making people feel more national and less local, and that really is very idealistic, but doesn't seem to work very well. Very often, it suppresses identity rather than actually making people feel national.

I'd like to end just by saying there are two examples of countries which have really been pretty effective in bringing these policies together. One is Malaysia, which in 1970, recognized these issues because they'd had a lot of anti-Chinese riots, and they had very deliberate and systematic policies to improve the position of the majority population, the Malays, and they did really, were very effective, but now we're beginning to see that the policies are resented, and the relations are not good between the communities, so it's clearly not something that you should go on with indefinitely.

Now the other one is, again, Northern Ireland, which many people say, the Northern Ireland situation was solved by the brilliance of Tony Blair and the interventions of Clinton and Mitchell, you know, but they don't look at the underlying economics. There were huge horizontal inequalities between Catholics and Protestants for centuries. From about 1975-80, the British government and European community deliberately but very quietly corrected those inequalities, and if you go today, you will find they're very small, the inequalities between Catholics and Protestants, and indeed, the Catholics now have more education than the Protestants. And I think that is the underlying story of the peace in Northern Ireland, and the interesting thing is, if you look at the

data, everything's been corrected except one dimension, and that's the police, and if you read the papers, it's that which is really holding up the progress of peace. So that, you can do something about these things. Now the politics of it is another issue which I won't get into now. Thank you.

[applause]

**Ed Luck:** Excellent, and just barely over 15 minutes! I know both discussions are very disciplined, so we should have time for a good exchange. I actually have a few questions that have arisen from this, I'm sure many others do, so Peter, you're first.

**Peter Maurer:** Thanks a lot, and thanks for having me over again at IPI. I must confess, when I first was asked to say a few things on the Frances Stewart book, I was not aware of the breadth and depth of the concept of horizontal inequality, so I make my remarks kind of with the temptation of the unknown with which I approached the reading of the book, and also the innocence of the layman. I'm not a social scientist, so I looked at it in terms of what does it say to me here as an actor, as a diplomat in the UN context. I found it a very interesting template you're putting forward, not least for one reason you mentioned in your introduction as well, Frances, but it brings us somehow out of this collective neurosis of the post-Huntington area where many are opposing the clash of civilization, and in doing so, neglect the relationship between cultures and conflict and taboo it. So you bring somehow the issue at the table, and you try, as you said, to reconcile, and this is certainly one of the very strong messages we get through the book and through the storyline you are presenting here.

Also, I must say, coming from where I'm coming from, this is a book, bringing a set of non-reductionist explanations. While we see nine examples and details elaborated within one framework of horizontal inequality, there are distinct situations in each and every country, and I think distinct policy mixes which we are confronted with, and I think one of the temptations and interests of the approach and of the book, and of the way forward and the examples you are bringing forward is exactly that you are not proposing one measure for all, but it's more a framework, it's a template on which to look at the relationship between culture, economics, state institutions, and the dynamic which is unfolding between them. Coming from Switzerland, of course, I read with a particular interest, Frances, your recommendations, and I thought most of the time in our past, by policy or fortune of local geography and cultural geography, we managed to escape some of the difficulties of horizontal inequalities. If I read at your recommendation, I found it very interesting that inconsistent horizontal inequality or cross-cutting horizontal inequality, this is exactly what we have in Switzerland, not inequalities which would increase and get explosive, but this is sometimes by policy, but sometimes also simply by local geography and cultural geography of the country, that you escape a conflict situation. In the policy choices you offer, and you mention it in one or two parts of the book, and quite interesting for me with a cultural background I'm coming from, we are certainly, with Belgium, amongst those countries, having opted for non-integrationist policies and keeping culture separate.

I reminded Frances before this meeting started that one of the famous writers in Switzerland of the 20<sup>th</sup> century mentioned in one of his diaries that probably the country was so peaceful because the different cultural groups do not understand each other. So this is also a way of not getting into conflict, separating cultures in a way and organizing minimal contact and political systems around, defuse power as much as possible to the different parts, in the service of escaping

conflicts. Now in policy terms, let me just make a few remarks why I think this is important reading for us here in the UN context also. I think, rightly so, and Frances mentioned it briefly, you highlight the fact that most of our programs and policies and aid policies we run are irrespective of the problem of horizontal inequality, and I think you, the book, gives a compelling example that we have done gender sensitivity of programs, we have done human rights sensitivity of programs, we have, you name it, sensitized aid programs, but we haven't focused on horizontal inequality in aid programs, and I think rightly so, you put up the red flag that many of those programs tend to increase horizontal inequalities and not to decrease, and I think the book gives a number of examples which just puts red flags for all of us. We should definitely look at what our activities and programs in terms of development programs mean with regards to horizontal inequalities. I also think this is true for all work on conflict prevention and peacebuilding. I don't think that horizontal inequality is in any way an operational concept which is used in any of the programs of the UN I know of. It's simply not a template used, and I think you give compelling example on how important this is to do so. Some of the policies you are advocating from some of the issues are, clearly to me, as a person engaged in the specific configuration of the peacebuilding commissions, reading like a checklist on what to do and what to look at and what, eventually what policies to try out when you are confronted with complex peacebuilding situations. We all know, we have this usual template of democracy, rule of law, protection of human rights, macroeconomic stabilities, DDR, SSR, we run through the ten points list when we look at peacebuilding situation. Now Frances gives a completely different list, and the interest, I've found, is that this different list is the very list we have to look at. How is the electoral system organized? What about quotas, seat reservation, how are power sharing arrangements organized in a specific context? How do we do organized system of winner doesn't take it all? How to design voting system in order, not to increase, but to defuse tension? How to operate anti-discrimination legislation in the context of peacebuilding? How to compose bureaucracies, how to compose key posts in bureaucracies in peacebuilding contexts, how to embark on diffusion of power and decentralization policies? If I should say what are the five or seven most important things I'm looking at in Burundi at the present moment is exactly those points, and how to negotiate in a political framework those points, how to position a external actor towards those key areas, and those who are interested, I mean, Frances does it in a similar way with regard to the economic and religious and cultural factors.

I think your book puts a heavy burden on the design of international action and international aids because it puts forward a lot of areas to look at, and while I fully agree with the sort of general line you take, I nevertheless, and this also for the discussion wondered, how do we do it exactly, then? Just to mention, you say how often international aid reinforces inequality, but how exactly do we prevent that it is doing so? How would we monitor the results with regard to horizontal inequality? What are the key factors? What are the key issues? What's struck in the nine examples? I mean, you use very different indicators from one example to the other. This is the specificity of the situation. But what are the tools we are using here as an international community when looking at program? What are the indicators we should monitor? You say be careful with possible negative impact of affirmative action approaches. Yes, but how careful, and how do we manage care on affirmative action? So there are, I think, the big challenge I've found is, I would agree that this is an extremely useful concept to embark upon. I'm still struggling a little bit with the operationalization of what you are proposing. Rightly, you say it's difficult to overcome opposition by the privileged, but how do we overcome opposition by the privileged? A danger is to increase tensions by specific policies. It's important to ensure that advantaged groups do not lose in

absolute terms. So there is a lot of sort of general policy line I would agree upon, but at the same time, I'm also feeling a little bit at a loss, for god's sake, what should I do next week in the board meeting of UNDP, UNICEF, UNFPA when confronted with a country program, and I'm asking myself, how would I make this, and with what kind of intervention would I make it less unequal in terms of the concept of horizontal inequality? I think I'll stop it here.

**Ed Luck:** Very good. I knew when Peter said he was running back and forth in Bern and in the new post, wouldn't have any time to really give any thought for this, I knew it always turns out just the opposite, but a very thoughtful commentary. Susan, he was, I think, actually fairly gentle in his comments. I don't know whether you'd be more pointed or not, but I look forward to them.

**Susan Woodward:** A challenge! Well, first I wanted to say that – it's not on – that Ed and Warren were particularly acute, I think, in asking Peter and me to be the commentators. Peter from Switzerland and me from the United States and a specialist on former Yugoslavia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia. In other words, countries, three countries or more, in the Yugoslav, post-Yugoslav cases, that have all been dealing with this for centuries, and not all successfully, but not for not wanting to try, and so one, the first thing I wanted to say about this book and the projects that Frances has spun off on around horizontal inequalities, is to notice their sensitivity to the tradeoffs, that these are not choices you do. You support reducing horizontal inequalities regardless, and we need to be sensitive to that.

The second point I wanted to make is a Rodney Dangerfield kind of comment. For those of you who know American culture, this, "I get no respect," which secondly, really important about this study is that an economist is studying it. Why do I say Rodney Dangerfield? I'm a political scientist, and we have been saying these things for a very long time. There's a huge literature just, for example, why it is, and under what circumstances, proportional representation does and doesn't work, why it is that you have to focus on political mobilization, political leadership, political organization as a component of this, not just the risks.

But it's important that an economist be saying it, because they're the people who are listened to, and so I want to just add a plea that as we go forward, we begin to have the sensitivity to the political that is already in Frances' study, but on the part of international organizations, which I think is less common than we would like, certainly I would like, and that leads me then to be a little, here's my less diplomatic comment, which is to remind you, for those of you who don't know in the audience, what I at least think of as the genesis of this idea of horizontal inequalities, which was a reaction to the work that the team on conflict at the World Bank lead by Paul Collier in the mid to late 90s were doing on the causes of civil war and conflict, where they identified in their aggregate statistical analysis that economic inequality did not cause rebellion, so that we then get a question about what does, and this idea that it's profit motive and criminal activity that is the explanation. What Frances is doing is saying, "Well, there are lots of ways of measuring inequality. Let's go back and look at the data," but it's very important to recognize what she's saying and why, because of the influence of that other work at the United Nations and on policies, whether on resource flows, on sanctions, and so forth, even though it's wrong. The third thing that's really interesting about this study is that the policy recommendations are truly actionable, unlike a lot of the work in this field, and the bottom line, as she has already said, is we need to take distributional effects into account in what we do, and we might begin the conversation to say, and Peter has already said this, how do we do that? But until we do it explicitly, I don't think we'll get very far. It's very



interesting when she mentions, on the economic policies that are recommended, macroeconomic policies, though we know what the effect of austerity policies are distributionally, we just ignore them, PRSPs, poverty reduction strategy papers. If you look at debates within countries over PRSP, over and over again, the civilian input is to talk about inequalities, like let's say, land in Mozambique, land privatization and the effects, and those are then run roughshod by the people on the outside who are in charge of these processes. So there's a lot here to be worked with.

So then my fourth and final point is, also the way people, what role for the United Nations. One of the interesting points, she mentioned this, but it's even more richly stated in the book, is that she rightly says that national governments do better than international organizations on this, and we know, after all, that these issues are the heart and soul of domestic politics, so what role for the United Nations? And I also agree that we need a very open conversation and debate about this, or we won't get anywhere.

I have four suggestions of ways to think about it, but I don't have any recommendations. The first is, in line with a book that's just come out from IPI and then edited by Necla Tschirgi on the relationship between security and development. This is, the relationship between conflict on the one hand and economic, political, and cultural distribution within countries on the other is at the core of the relationship between security and development as it came to be defined. That still has not been confronted in the relationship organizationally at the UN between the economic and social agencies such as ECOSAC on the one hand and the Security Council on the other. Perhaps we really do need to revive that conversation.

Secondly, it's very interesting that the UN is very effective in setting standards. I have in mind at this point a UN-related organization, the International Labour Organization. ILO, research on the rights of indigenous peoples in Latin America, show that over the last 20 years, indigenous peoples have been able to take standards in ILO norms in order to fight for constitutional change within their countries. So the relationship between what standards can be set there to be available for domestic political organization in action, I think, is worth thinking about, but again, it's very sensitive.

Third, the issue of social inclusion. The European Union has been focusing greatly on social inclusion. UNDP increasingly, as Frances emphasizes, has been in its, especially in its national human development reports, doing beautiful studies in the countries I know about on social inclusion, and that's a way of indirectly getting into looking at distributional effects when these are sensitive political issues. I've just been looking at the policies that the Department for International Development of Britain has been doing on social exclusion, and therefore inclusion in Nepal that's been very effective. We've been learning about that, but I don't see the UN in general doing as much on this as I think we need to talk about, and in that regard, I have a question for Frances, is once we began, go in that direction, the question is, what kinds of data that are not politically sensitive, political scientists know that there are countries that don't have censuses for decades for exactly this reason, we don't want to know the proportion of different groups in that country, but what kind of data could be useful that aren't politically sensitive. For example, why is it that child mortality ends up having the result that you had in your data? What is it a proxy for that we could then study?

And the fourth and final comment I have about the role for the UN is the most problematic from my own experience, that is to say, the link between culture, economics, and politics as access and equality, and she rightly says, is tied above all to citizenship. There's a great deal of literature on civil wars in the last 10-20 years that emphasizes, as she does, that something happened between 1989 and 1991 in transforming the issues over which people were willing to fight violently, from ideological struggles to ethnic struggles. I have a huge allergy to this divide, I think that's wrong, but the extent to which it is is because ethnicity is a proxy for fights over citizenship, whether you can change the constitution, whether you get federalism instead of unitary states, but above all, whether you choose a secessionist approach, and these are issues that the UN has a great deal of difficulty studying, and I think we need to confront them directly.

**Ed Luck:** Wow, that was terrific. I feel like saying amen after your last comment on culture and the UN. Three quite stimulating presentations. They provoke 3-4 questions that I have, but I'll hold those aside on the assumption that you have better ones. Who would like to start? And please identify yourself. We'll start here and then here.

**Shamina de Gonzaga:** Thank you. Shamina de Gonzaga, and I had one point and one question. The point was, I was struck with your reference about the role that aid distribution can play in at times deepening these divides, and one pattern that I've noticed in different areas, especially that are in conflict, for example, in the West Bank. I had visited an organization that was basically set up by the World Bank of just a few people that had a million dollars sitting in the bank account versus a lot of grassroots organization that stem up from the community that struggle to survive economically. So in terms of the role of large organizations and making these funding choices, how does that play in? And my other question was just more of a thought going forward, in terms of holding up mirrors to societies, and thinking particularly about the debate around immigration in this country where many groups whose ancestors immigrated here and benefited from the ability to settle and make their lives today might hold very conservative views towards recently arrived immigrants. How can we as a society hold up a mirror and try to look at the different circumstances that allow for some communities to integrate and succeed and for others to be mired in kind of a social inequity? Thank you.

**Ed Luck:** Thanks very much. I saw one right here, and then Anne Phillips here.

**Paul van Syl:** So my name's Paul van Syl, and I'm interested in –

**Ed Luck:** I'm sorry, if people could identify where they're from as well.

**Paul van Syl:** I'm on my own. So –

**Ed Luck:** The best place to be from, yes.

**Paul van Syl:** Exactly! So I want to answer a question about, your Northern Ireland example struck me as very interesting, because the policy sort of takeaway you could take from that is a massive investment in Catholic communities in order to reduce socioeconomic disparities seems to have been one of the most significant drivers of peace in addition to the constitutional staff and the policing, etc, and I wonder how that squares with some of the studies by Ashutosh Varshney, looking at Muslim-Hindu conflicts which seems to argue that associational life is one of the main explanations for the radical disparities in ethnic conflict in India where there's the highest amount of inter-ethnic association and PTAs and chess clubs and businesses amongst Muslims and Hindus, the violence goes down, and

where that's fragmented, the violence goes up, which seems to suggest the sort of stuff around integration, which you are slightly skeptical of, and I think Peter, in some ways, was slightly tongue-in-cheek, saying, keep cultures apart and you're safer. How those two things work, because I think you can create an argument about how those two things go together, but at least, they seem at some level to suggest choices.

**Ed Luck:** Thanks very much. Ann Phillips.

**Ann Phillips:** I'm a little hoarse, so forgive me. Ann Phillips, I'm on the board of IPI. I was just interested, Ms. Stewart, in your feelings about the role of civil society in helping to resolve these horizontal conflicts. Two examples come to my mind: the society of Sant'Egidio that was very responsible in resolving the civil war in Mozambique, they're an Italian group, and I'm sure you know them, and then I was vice president of National Committee on American Foreign Policy, and we got very involved with Northern Ireland conflict, and we facilitated, we were very responsible for getting Gerry Adams's visa the first time when he came over. You remember he was not permitted in this country, and we had a conference where the first time, Catholics and Protestants were in the same room discussing these issues, the first time. Now I'm not saying that we're responsible for resolving, but we played a very significant role, and there must be other civil society groups that have been involved and helped to resolve this and could be turned to, perhaps, in the future to help resolve these horizontal conflicts, so I'd like to hear what you think about that.

**Ed Luck:** Okay, we have Warren Hoge, and then we revert to our speakers.

**Warren Hoge:** Warren Hoge, International Peace Institute. Susan, first of all, it was not a condition for your appearing here that you plug an IPI publication, but we're very grateful you did. Frances, I also have a question based on Northern Ireland, a place I spent a good deal of time in, and it's this: the Protestant majority is now acting like a minority, and the reason it's doing that is that a certain equality has been achieved. The Catholics, the nationalists in Northern Ireland, used that time to go off and get educated, and suddenly, when the thing was over, the Protestants that had hung back on the expectation that nepotism would get them those same jobs that their fathers had on the docks, that was no longer working. It was the educated people, largely who were Catholics, who were getting the jobs, and as a result, we have the majority now acting like a minority, and the Protestant majority are the ones who are standing in the way of the settlement of the whole policing issue that you mentioned. My question is, is it inevitable, or is inequality the normal state of things? Is it inevitable that, in a settlement like this, and I agree with you that the Northern Ireland Peace Process was a, relatively speaking, very successful one, due to the involvement of the British and Irish governments, but in the end, we now have this problem where the previous majority, it's still a majority numerically, but they've had their expected rights taken away, and so they're acting like grievants now. Is that inevitable that that happens that way? Is equality unachievable?

**Ed Luck:** I'll revert to the panel in the same order before, Frances, Peter, and then Susan.

**Frances Stewart:** Okay. Well, thank you very much for the comments, and I didn't really disagree with them at all. I think your big point was, how do we take it forward in a specific case? And I think there's a whole bunch of things we can do, but you really have now two things you need to do in general. One is, we need much better monitoring of this situation, and it needs to become routine in such a way that it's not sort of political sensitive, like now gender data is collected routinely, it's not

regarded as really a difficult thing. In the UK, we go to huge efforts to get data on every single ethnic group you can imagine. We don't like to get data so much on the economic inequalities, but we're getting data on that, so I think if we could do this in a routine way, then we would know the situation. But when you get to a real situation, you need to look and see where the real inequalities lie, and you can't say that sitting here. I could say it about types of country, but then you go to a real situation, and then you could, I mean, the point is really to have an objective that this is an important thing to look at, we should be monitoring it, and then we should be thinking about the impact of our policy on it, but then what we do is going to depend very much on what that impact is, and one in Africa, generally, the regional dimension is very important, so it's relatively easy that you can just look at where the regional distribution of your expenditures are and make sure that they're not all in the capital and not all in the privileged areas, but do something to compensate for the inequalities. So that's sort of rather straightforward. In other situations where there isn't a regional dimension, it's more complicated, but there may be in industrial specialization, very often huge educational inequalities, and if you can make an objective that everybody should have education, then you will do it. So I think that when it comes to a real situation, you can think of real things to do, but in a general way, monitoring and being conscious of the need to do something are the two points.

As far as Varshney's concerned, very interesting study, and quite consistent with what I'm saying, because basically, if you take, let's take India, huge horizontal inequalities between Muslims and Hindus. So a big risk of conflict breaking out. Now then, as I said, it doesn't break out everywhere, it doesn't break out always, then it becomes interesting when does it break out, when does it not, and I think then things like associational life and Varshney's findings, although they are a little bit controversial, because some people think they had good associational life because their relations were good, not that the associational life caused good relations, but whichever, things like the flourishing of civil society may be able to prevent a conflict breaking out, even though there's a risk of it because of the big inequalities. But coming to your point about the role of civil society, again, the same thing is true, civil society I think can play a role, but if you have this huge political and economic motivation, underlying motivation remaining, civil society is like being in a canoe and holding up the waves, and maybe can hold up the waves for a bit, but it's not going to be able to hold it up altogether, so it's very valuable to do that. But at the same time, in my view, you have to address the underlying reasons which are very fundamental, and then the interesting question about the Protestants, not the which at the moment, a bit of a, because of the events of the Chief Minister. Everyone laughs about at the moment, but that's another matter.

Yeah, I think, I mean, when you correct inequalities, you always have losers as well as gainers. You can't really avoid it. Of course, if you can do so in a growing economy so people are losing relatively but not absolutely, that's better. But you do have losers, and I think the Protestants are losers, and you said interestingly, they're losing their rights. They're not losing their rights, they're losing their unjustified privileges which they got before, which uneducated, they were able to nonetheless get all the jobs and things like that. But yeah, there is a problem, and that's why -- I know it sounds sort of, like you say, do it sensitively, and that sounds like just adding a caution, very difficult to know exactly what that means -- but clearly, you shouldn't do it too quickly, you should try and encourage the Protestants to keep up the education, and so you get equality, not new inequalities emerging. They've suffered in many ways, I think it's true, and so it's not surprising that they're rather resistant, and in a different sort of way, the Chinese in Malaysia, who incidentally are still hugely privileged. That's the

extraordinary thing: they're still hugely privileged, and the fuss they make about the policies is ridiculous, because they are so privileged when you look at the data, but they do resent it, and they do make a big fuss about it, so again, you need to... I think in the case of Malaysia, they need to be brought into politics much more than they are, and then they would feel a little bit of ownership of the whole thing, because the interesting thing about Malaysia at the beginning was there was a national consensus included in the Chinese that they had to do something about the situation, because they were endangered if they didn't, and now, we're now, 35 years, 40 years later, that consensus is gone, and that's really what you want, is that consensus.

**Ed Luck:**

I might say, your last comment about Malaysia, as an American, it sort of reminds me of responses to civil rights, affirmative actions, and other things here. Gee, us poor whites! Not doing so great. Peter.

**Peter Maurer:**

Just very briefly, and picking up on your last comment, Frances, just to highlight one point you mentioned in the book, which seems to me crucial, but changes from the present situation is the crucial issue, not necessarily framing it in terms of privileges and losing privileges because, what is a privilege and what is a normal situation is not necessarily seen by everybody the same, but obviously the big challenge on many of those issues is how to manage change and how to design change processes; you have a whole chapter on it, and I just wanted to draw everybody's attention to it. It's also my perception that, from those experiences, I know there is little objective on many of the conflicts related to horizontal inequality, and there is a lot of perception, and a situation which is perceived as, by one group or the other as losing out or having a quick change to the negative is a dangerous and explosive situation.

Maybe just very briefly to Paul's, to come back to your question of integration as toward a distinctionist approach, I don't think we really have the choice today on the one or the other. The example I mentioned is, we have developed, as a country, distinctionist over the centuries, but this is not any longer a choice today. I mean, you have migration, and therefore, you're forced to deal with integration of migrants into society and to design processes here as well. You can't put migrants in one part or the other part of the country, and then start a new area of distinctionist policies. This doesn't work. So both elements have to be combined. There is actually no choice on that.

And my last comment, just to highlight once more, because there was a discussion and question around majority/minority perceptions and behavior, what strikes me most is how important for having non-explosive situations the intersection of horizontal and vertical inequalities at the end of the day is. If you have horizontal and vertical inequalities which intersect, then you have a big chance that majorities and minorities continuously change, because then you don't have fixed patterns, but if they go into this, in the same direction, if you have horizontal inequalities in the same directions, this is what Frances mentioned in the books, and you have, you compound this trend by vertical inequalities, then you, most of the time, have big problems. I'll stop it here.

**Ed Luck:**

Thank you. That last one actually raises a question in my mind, which I think logically goes to Susan. What about societies, and I think of Bosnia and Herzegovina, where there's an enormous amount of intermarriage before the violence occurred. You know, you would think that is one way of getting rid of some of these distinctions of horizontal inequalities that has emerged in some ways, and yet, it didn't seem to work. So maybe you can tell us why.

**Susan Woodward:**

In two sentences or less? I think briefly on Bosnia, just to say, there wasn't that much intermarriage. People would, if you were in a small town, and you wanted to get higher education and have a profession, you would move to a city, because the limits of what you could do in terms of upward mobility were constrained in a small town or in a rural area. But you would go to the city, but you were also constrained culturally in the small town where the kind of intermarriage and cultural mixing wasn't local practice. Everyone stayed in their own cultural universes but shared coffee, shared rituals, they respected each other as neighbors, but it wasn't integrationist. It was in the cities, among the professional class that people intermarried, which is a version of this distinction between horizontal and vertical inequalities, and the question is, can you, under economically downward times where the other, the economic inequalities are rising, can you protect whatever you've had before? I think it's a very complicated question.

But I would like also, therefore, to add a couple more distinctions in what's come out of the comments from the audience which are very helpful, and to ask, maybe this is not something for Frances to do now, but to think about, for all of us, is first of all, are there differences in the kind of policies in regard to horizontal inequalities and conflict, that component of it, depending upon whether you're trying to prevent conflict, whether you're trying to do peacemaking, to use Boutros-Ghali's terms, and his distinction from post-conflict peacebuilding? I would suspect that there are, and that's, in a sense, an extension of the question you asked me about Bosnia, what could have been done before to protect the universe of those who intermarried and the urban culture vs. what to do now, where people are, as a result, this scholarly work has been demonstrating clearly, as a result of the way in which the international community has tried to knit Bosnia back together with power sharing, with electoral systems that try and be integrationist, all of the different instruments that are in this package, what people have been doing in the three major groups, Bosnian Muslims or Bosniacs, the Serbs, and the Croats, is retreat ever more into their own universes out of sense of protection. They feel under siege from these outsiders who are trying to force them together before they're ready, so it's had exactly the counterproductive result.

But that would not necessarily have been true before the war, so I think it would be worth distinguishing on the policies, not just direct and indirect integrations, but depending on what kind, what stage in conflict, although I say stage carefully, the second is that, then, relates in a sense to Varshney, because he's made some very interesting distinctions, as you know, in some of his other work between inequality that is perceived as injustice versus that, on economic grounds, and that which is a result of not feeling recognized, a kind of psychological one, and the big differences in the way people act politically, and both, one would say, would be horizontal inequalities. But it's worth looking at that, and Frances's work says recognition is one of the ways you can think of addressing it, but one would want to distinguish that from redistributive policies that are more direct, and the other thing that's interesting for me about Varshney is that study, what I find much more interesting about that study on whether people are more inclined to be supportive or not of conflict, depending on how antagonistic they are, whether they interact or not, is that the mechanism that it's a conflict prevention mechanism that he's actually going in. He's got the data you've got, but then you say, does it lead to Amritsar or not? Do you get huge violence in India or not? And the mechanism is the extent to which the police are informed early enough to act, that the integrationist mode, to use Frances's term, people will tell the police. Something's going to happen. Rush to the scene.

Now you can get Paul Brass's work that says, well, the police are the part of the people who were the problem in India, but at least it tells us that some of the instruments that the United Nations and the Rule of Law unit, for example, in DPKO, are doing on police, are something that one could introduce into this universe. And the fourth and final point I wanted to make and comment is, in the literature on rebellion in political science, there have been stages of knowledge, and we're at what Jack Goldstone calls the fourth stage. It gets pretty complicated, because all four stages contribute something, but in the fourth stage, what we've learned is that rebellion can't happen; that is to say, no matter how much some individual wants to lead a rebellion, they won't get the support and be able to mobilize the numbers and the staying power for the violence without a perceived sense of injustice, and the sense of justice and its counterpart of injustice is completely culturally specific and local, and it also is wrapped up with long, often decades, generations, even centuries-old traditions of what you think is just or not, what's tolerable or not, and what the cultural scripts are for how you demonstrate against that. So that then comes back to Frances's point in measuring perceptions, as opposed, not just to actual data that can be monitored, and that it has to be locally specific, which I think is very much your point about the Palestinian case that we're thinking, as we all are, so sadly about Haiti, is that if you don't work with what the people in that particular environment think is tolerable, if not acceptable, because it doesn't go against their sense of injustice, which is very specific, then you can do something in the reverse. In other words, that aid agencies need to look at the distributional effects, but also talk to people locally about what the meaning of those distributional effects are.

**Ed Luck:** Good, thank you. More and more nuanced conversation. We'll start with Ebenezer here, and then take a few more, and then go back to our panelists, probably the final round.

**Ebenezer Appreku:** Thank you. Good afternoon. Having mentioned Ghana in a post –

**Ed Luck:** I'm sorry, could you just introduce yourself?

**Ebenezer Appreku:** Oh, sorry. My name is Ebenezer Appreku, I'm from the Ghana mission, and I just say that this is huge opportunity to serve the compliments you've paid about our country. I was impressed by the point you made about the fact that inequalities only increases the risk, but doesn't necessarily cause conflict, and I want to agree with you, because those we have to fear are the politicians who manipulate inequalities and create what probably some of us would say, a sense of injustice in that they court inequality always to injustice on the part of a particular group, when in actual fact, sometimes, inequality has been as a result of historical circumstances. For example, as is said, at the time of independence, and so on and so forth, and so what I preach with like minded people is that we should take national integration equally as seriously as regional integration, because you can't have regional integration when the components are disintegrating. And having said so, I just want to say that, in the case of Ghana, constitutional policy also played a part in that rightful independence, when some ethnic groups wanted to secede, the first president, political party, ensured that the constitution says that no political party were based on tribal lines. So what is our saving grace from my personal perspective is that, in Ghana, almost every family is divided between the political parties, the governing political parties. So your wife may not agree with you, your husband might not agree with you, your mother-in-law may belong to another, so it doesn't matter which part of the country you come from.

And then I just want to conclude by recognizing the need to maybe establish a link between the international policy and national policy by introducing the regional dimension, in that because of the ethnic groups which straddle our boundaries, in the AU context, for example, under the African peer review mechanism, the question of ethnicity and distribution of resources was a very important question when we were addressing the Kenyan situation. The Kenyan situation was foreseen, and it was addressed in June in Gambia, and he promised, but unfortunately, he couldn't address it before the conflict actually broke out, so let us also pay attention to the regional policy. I know there's not time, but if I can make my final remark, I agree with you that the UN must do more, and I think Mr. Maurer made a point, should do more to address these things. For example, I see that we are not calling the protection of civilians in armed conflicts by its name. The civilians are not just civilians. It is almost always within the context of an ethnic or tribally motivated conflict, one group targeting the civilians who are not just civilians, but another ethnic group, so you see there is not, it's innocent bystanders on the streets which have been targeted, but actually a particular group on both sides targeting the ethnic group on the other side. Thank you very much.

**Ed Luck:** Thank you. You saved us time, because the regional was one of my questions, don't have to deal with that. Sebastian over here, and then there's one back here.

**Sebastian von Einsiedel:** Thank you. Sebastian von Einsiedel with the UN Secretariat. My question for Professor Stewart, you mentioned direct and indirect policies, the direct ones targeting specifically the disadvantaged groups and the indirect ones being blanket policies. I wonder whether it's possible to generalize a little bit what the tradeoffs are between the two, and in which type of situations you think one would be more appropriate than the other. I recently spent some time in Nepal, which in terms of horizontal inequality, must rank somewhere in the top globally, not in terms of income inequality, but certainly horizontal inequality, and there was quite some discussion in the UN country team there on designing social protection measures specifically as a peace dividend and as a peacebuilding measure with the fact in mind that horizontal inequality was a root cause of the war there, and for me, somewhat counterintuitively, where they came out was on, you know, pilot projects on universal child benefits rather than targeted ones. Given finite resources, does that make sense?

**Ed Luck:** Please, in the back here.

**Brian Abelson:** Thank you. I'm Brian Abelson from the Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation. My question is also for Professor Stewart, and I was struck that, within this concept of horizontal inequality that all of your examples were very state centric, and you were talking about horizontal inequality within nations, within states, and so I was wondering if you saw there being any utility in expanding this concept globally and talking about horizontal inequality between, in the global north and the global south, and if so, what do you see as the implications of such an expansion of that concept? Thank you.

**Ed Luck:** Any more before we close this? Please. Necla Tschirgi, one of the editors of the volume referred to, Francesco Mancini is here, another of the editors of the volume, and the third is not here. So Necla.

**Necla Tschirgi:** Thank you very much. Necla Tschirgi. Frances, we're all very grateful to you for introducing this concept. We've been probing it in all of our work and our case



studies revealed the relevance of the horizontal inequality thesis in several countries, and in our thematic work, we've also identified it as a key factor. Now since you've dug into that a little bit more, I was wondering if you're coming up with more differentiation. For example, is there a difference between religiously based inequalities versus ethnically or language based inequalities? And this has, of course, implications today for other types of insecurities, globally, in terms of the changing role of religion in security, etc., so I was wondering if you have any more insights into how identities play out and interface or interplay with economic factors.

**Ed Luck:** Thanks very much. Anyone else? Going, going... please, right here.

**Raza Bashir:** Thank you, Professor. Raza Bashir from the Pakistan mission. Just, in the context of inequality, and this is not particularly directed at any particular person who I would like to answer it, do you think there is any value in special allocations or like reservation of seats in parliaments for disadvantaged groups which, left to their own devices, can never hope to get any political power? Thank you.

**Ed Luck:** Great. No more? I have, I'll give you a couple of my questions, I've been threatening to do this, and then we'll go in reverse order with the panel so that Frances can have the last word. You mentioned, Frances, that many of these horizontal inequalities could last for centuries and centuries. If they last for centuries and centuries, they sound like they might be rather stable situations. So how does that fit into the theory about change, and about instability and crisis and conflict? And second, and perhaps related -- it's touched on here and there in the conversation, but not very much -- so if you have, let's say, something like a global turndown economically, or a global surge in trade and development, or a regional one, in which many of the boats rise with the tide or fall with the tide, but not necessarily at the same rate, how does that dynamic factor tend to change these things? Because, you know, we've talked a lot around the UN, and particularly with this global recession, if that's all that it is, all the problems you're going to have with civil conflict and strife and other things because of it, but I must say, the evidence, at least anecdotally, doesn't seem to be so overwhelming that that actually has been the case. Now maybe it hasn't gone on long enough, maybe it wasn't deep enough or maybe these changes have affected many, and maybe we'll find out a few years from now when we begin to see the results, but I'd be interested in thoughts about that.

And then I wanted to take off a little bit on Ebenezer's point on the African peer review mechanism and regional organizations, because I think it's important, it's a little left out of the earlier conversation. What about neighbors? And often ethnicity of one sort or another crosses borders, and the neighbors, in terms of conflict, can be helpful or decidedly unhelpful, and in terms of resolution as well, and the question was asked before about civil society, but what about transnational civil society in this regard, and the effects they might have on this, and if we look at individual societies as a point of analysis, it doesn't tell us very much about the neighborhood, and sometimes some neighborhoods are a little better for these things, some neighborhoods a little bit worse, so I wonder, to the extent you've been able to factor that in as well. So Susan, Peter, and then Frances. And thank you all for excellent questions.

**Susan Woodward:** Yeah, I wanted to reinforce that last point of the richness of this discussion is very heartwarming, because there was a lot we could all work on and things we would study and propose. I do want to add a cautionary note: approaches to this problem, whether to call them solutions or not, approaches to this set of problems, at one level, does presume a well-meaning political leadership, and

that's not necessarily the case. That is, if there is political advantage within a country to be inclusive, they will do so. The literature on Western European proportional representation systems is that they are, if they're politically PR in terms of, for example, the electoral system, they tend to be coalitional governments and highly stable over time. Even if the coalition changes, there's always coalitions, and they're highly egalitarian in world context in terms of the distributive effects. But that's because there is a political advantage to doing so, to cooperating, and it has to do with the rules, and so the work that Lippard has done on that set of instances has the results it does for reasons we can identify, but that's not always the case, so that the Horowitzian ideas are applied to other sets of circumstances. So I think what we need to do is to think, I think, under what circumstances can we still have positive effects from the political leadership? Politicians do not find an advantage in being this way. That's why I mention the ILO standard that is being used by indigenous peoples in Latin America, and the peer review mechanism is a very good one, and maybe also, I'm fascinated by this idea of regional solutions that countries themselves, knowing when you're in an environment where there are cross border minorities or ethnic groups, as for example, West Africa is so classic, that you can do preventive action yourself by saying, let's talk among ourselves as leaders about how we address this and prevent destabilizing developments. Those are things that, if a project like that is done, or more, they should be given wide study and notice so that people say, "Oh, here's something that can work."

**Ed Luck:** Terrific. Peter?

**Peter Maurer:** Just very briefly, from my side, I have the impression from the questions which came from the floor, and also from the examples in the book that we should not look at solutions as sort of recipes for one or the other situations. I think there are 100 possibilities on which you can deal with the one or the other horizontal inequality. There is not one solution which is the sort of golden bullet. What strikes me and has struck me when reading through the book, this might be, deserve a little bit more of our attention, is at the end of the day, it's how, the question is how to design legitimate and inclusive political processes, because this is what produces whatever result is coming forward, and in whatever context, be it national, regional, or global, or be it this or the other solutions. So my impression is, we, all the examples which you mentioned, and which I really so positively highlighted as being innovative ways of looking at certain approaches, these are approaches and possibilities, and not really, not really solutions. At the end of the day, the solution is whether you have a political process which produces legitimate results, and if it's not legitimate, you can have the best theoretical solution whatsoever, it will not be accepted, and it won't make the trick. So I'll stop it here.

**Ed Luck:** Perfect, so the last word: Frances.

**Frances Stewart:** Thank you, and very interesting questions. I want to start by saying a little bit more about integration, because I sort of skirted over it and just sounds like I disapproved of it, and I think Ghana's a wonderful case in which Nkrumah put national identity, indeed, he wanted to move on to African identity as being the all-encompassing thing, and he was very against any sort of tribal identities being brought to the front, and I think his legacy has something, but it must be something else to do with Ghanaian society as well. It was, obviously, the constitution and what he said, so there's a very good example of integration being positive.

Where I'm negative about integration, I would cite three cases. Peru: we started our work in Peru, and people said, our co-researchers said, "There is no problem in Peru, we're all Peruvian, we're all mixed, there is no difference in identity," and then they started working and looking at the inequalities and found it was apparently untrue, obviously untrue, and we also carried out perception surveys, and we found that the degree of racism perceived by indigenous people in Peru is incredibly high, much higher than in almost any other country we looked at. So this is integration concealing difference, and that's the thing that I'm against. I'm not, genuine integration of people really are coming together, fine, I mean, there's something to be said for cultural difference also, but it's fine. Another example would be the Soviet Union which suppressed the identities of people and talked about a common identity for 70 years, and what happened at the end of the 70 years? They all turned out they had their same old identities even more strongly felt than before, and the third example is France, where you're not even allowed to collect data on these issues, national data is, everyone's French, and divisions of class are not, ethnicity, and yet that is blatantly untrue, and it's not a terribly helpful way of looking at things and solving them. So integration, yes, if it's genuine, but so often, integration policies are sort of a veneer, which tries to conceal the problem.

Second very interesting question was direct versus indirect interventions, and what sort of tradeoffs are there, and when is one appropriate, and when is one not. Well, the big advantage of direct is that it's, first of all, it's very politically obvious, and sometimes you've got a political situation in which you want the group you're trying to help to see you're trying to do something. It's desperate. And you could say affirmative action in the U.S., you really needed to do something, people were rioting, it was a real danger of the society disintegrating. You needed to do something quickly and be seen to do it, and I think the same was true of Malaysia, so that's a plus for the direct. The indirect, the advantage of the indirect is that you don't see it, so there are cases when you want to do it by stealth, and in a way in Northern Ireland, they did do it by stealth. There was a little bit of direct, but a lot of anti-discrimination and clever industrial policy and things like that, and so mainly indirect, you didn't necessarily want it to be seen what you were doing, but it tends to act a bit more slowly, also indirect.

On the other hand, it's also more robust over the long run, I think, because no one – well people do complain about progressive taxation, but fair regional policy, comprehensive education, it's difficult to be too much against those, whereas you can be much more against having affirmative action on education. So there was tied up with the idea of the social protection in Nepal, in fact, they seem to have combined, in my reading of Nepal, some direct policies, sort of, just for some reasons, some just for some occupations, and definitely meet, direct policies, and then the general social protection. And of course, a society like Nepal, it would be very good in a way, because it would mean that the group, the so-called losing group would not be losing that particular benefit, and they would also participate to an extent, Nepal, so I can see a role for it.

We then had a question on, can this be global? And I'm very excited by that question, because I've been working on the global side, not north/south, you need to be thinking of an identity which people really feel, and the north/south identity, I don't think people feel, but the identity they feel is Muslim vs. Non-Muslim, and I really had a fascinating time tracing Muslim vs. Non-Muslim inequalities throughout the world. They're everywhere. They're within developed countries. Always, almost always disfavoring Muslims. They're within developing countries. They're between Muslim countries and non-Muslim countries. Chronic. At the same time, there's a very strong identity with very strong links, you can

trace the links through media, through travel, through the religion, and so you've got a real horizontal inequality issue going on, and incidentally, there are strong political inequalities too, at global level and also at national level, so I think it's a very powerful way of viewing a lot of our present international problems, and if we viewed it in that way, we would think, well policies toward this issue, yes, there's security and all that, but it's not only development in Afghanistan, it's development in the UK, it's development in France, and so on, in an inclusive way, which is going to contribute to solving the problem, and its political incorporation in the UK and in France, and not just thinking it's all out there. So I think, and of course, there's the big Palestine/Israel division, which is huge, but I think globalizing it actually improves our understanding hugely of the present issue, so I think it's a very important point, and I've written a working paper on this, which is on our website, if people are interested. Is there a difference between religion and ethnicity?

Yeah, it's very, very interesting when you begin to think about this. I think what, the identity which is important tends to be the one which is politicized, the one in which political resources, according to which political resources are given, so we found in West Africa, it was fascinating, when you asked people how they saw themselves, they said religion was far more important than ethnicity, and they didn't mind people intermarrying across ethnicity, but they did mind them intermarrying across religion, they didn't like to socialize with people from different religions, they did socialize with people of different ethnicities, and ethnicity came quite low down, but then we turn to political questions, "Do you think the government allocates jobs according to ethnicity, or according to religion?" Nobody thought they allocated jobs according to religion, and they all thought – not all, but a large proportion thought they allocated jobs according to ethnicity, so ethnicity is the political one, and that's, on this mobilization in conflict, that's the issue they're going to mobilize on, because that's what they care about in these sort of political movements. So I think the answer is, it's going to depend on which one is politicized, which one is important. It's not the nature of the two, it's not that they're different, intrinsically different types of identity, but more that they're politicized, that they lead to inequalities in different sorts of ways.

Let me see, anything else. Yeah, should you have special allocation of parliamentary seats? I think the short answer is very often, yes, I think that is an important, one of the many important policies that you can have. Then the centuries, they last for centuries, therefore they don't matter politically. I mean, it's very interesting, I do recommend when it's out, you read Rosemary Thorp and Maritza Paredes's book about this, because the indigenous people in Peru, yes, they've had inequalities for centuries, they're not in conflict all the time, but it comes up all the time, so it's always at risk. Even now, there's a new risk of Shining Path or something like it emerging. So the fact that people are not fighting all the time doesn't mean that it's not going to bounce up and hit you at any moment, and then there's the global downturn and the rise and fall, that's a tricky one. It's difficult.

Incidentally, I don't think that the global downturn, another part of me has been looking at the global downturn, not really, not this part, but the adjustment with a human face part has been looking at the global downturn, haven't hit many southern countries nearly as hard as we thought, so we're not really seeing it. It's hit Latin America badly, but other regions haven't been that hard hit. They've been protected by age really, which hasn't changed, and commodity prices only went down for a minute and then went up again. But I have found that horizontal inequalities does seem to be related to fluctuations. We've done some statistics,

but that's a big step from answering your questions, but this particular instability, I don't think is affecting it that much. And then, finally the neighborhood thing, I haven't all that much to say, but clearly it is important when groups are on both sides of borders, and we only have to look at Rwanda and Congo and Uganda and Sudan to see how much these issues are not just national ones.

**Ann Phillips:** May I add something?

**Ed Luck:** Is this short?

**Ann Phillips:** I'm, right into my question before, and I neglected to express to you my gratitude for the panel today. It was really excellent, superb panel. Each of you made such a significant, substantive contribution, and I think it was a great privilege for all of us to be there, and I thank you very, very much.

**Ed Luck:** Thank you. That leaves me very little to say. But thank you, Frances, you're a terrific draw, if this is a roundtable, it felt like a roundtable discussion, it just was a lot bigger one in a different format, and excellent comments throughout, and thanks very much, Peter and Susan. Excellent commentaries, and I do recommend the book, if any of you don't have it.

**Frances Stewart:** Oh, and it's going to be paperback, too. It's a soft launch, because it's about to come out in paperback.

**Ed Luck:** So we can't show the paperback product, but you can be assured, it's cheaper than the hardcover. But anyway, thanks very much, and look forward to seeing you next time.