



## IPI POLICY FORUM

### **The Security-Development Nexus: Challenges and Policy Implications**

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*Transcript edited by IPI*

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**DR. EDWARD C. LUCK:** Good afternoon, everyone; if I could encourage people to take their seats. Thank you for joining us, and I realize that the conditions outside are not all that conducive, but I think we will find the discussion here warm and comfortable and maybe even dry at times, so I think the contrast ought to be very positive.

Today's special in a couple of ways -- not that we're having a policy forum at lunch; many of you realize we do this with great frequency, and many of you are kind enough to come back on a number of occasions -- but this is special in two ways: one, that we're actually beginning to live up to the name of this particular room here, which is supposed to be on peace, security and development. The development side very rarely gets recognized, so today is a day we're trying to look at the connections among these very important issues.

Second of all, it is a first for us to be able to co-sponsor this with the Turkish Mission to the UN, and we're very grateful to Ambassador Apakan and his people for joining us in this initiative, and the good news is, this is a first of a series of collaborations that the IPI and the Turkish Mission will have in the coming months, and we hope years. So for us, it is a particularly special occasion.

I would first like to ask the Ambassador to make some opening remarks to get the conversation going, then I'll introduce our three panelists, and we've asked them each to hold their comments to six to eight minutes. Two of them have PowerPoint slides, so that always

makes it harder to hold it to time, but I guess we can turn off the electricity if they go beyond six or eight minutes. And then that should leave plenty of time for an open discussion and, with such a large topic and such a distinguished group in the audience, I think we ought to have a lot of very lively discussion.

Ambassador Apakan -- I think of him as a veteran of the UN because we see him so often with his Security Council and his many activities here, but I guess it was only last August that we presented his credentials, but already he's leaving a mark in the institution. And Turkey has a very important role obviously to play, both in security and in development, and if you add to that looking through the perspective of a member of the Council, I think it's a particularly interesting combination.

The Ambassador has a very long and distinguished career, which we've laid out in the notes here. Through the years, he's had successfully higher, more responsible positions in the Turkish Foreign Ministry, and we're delighted to have him in New York, and even more delighted that he's joining us here this afternoon. So, Ambassador, please.

**H.E. ERTUĞRUL APAKAN:** Thank you for the nice remarks, the speakers, the ambassadors, distinguished guests. Well, personally I'm privileged to be here with you today in an IPI Forum, which is recently becoming a daily event, and indeed, there's almost not a single day passed without a meeting at the IPI, and my mission is to be able to contribute to today's event.

The topic is an interesting one, and today the focus will be on the release of an excellent publication by IPI, *Security and Development: Searching for Critical Connections*. I myself have come across this book almost a month ago while working on the linkages between peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Since then, I found it extremely useful in clearing many of the questions I had in my mind, but also very timely to bring an educated input to the ongoing discussion in the Security Council and elsewhere on this particular issue. Indeed, especially since the beginning of last year when the Security Council, for instance, is very much preoccupied with how to improve its response to the conflict situations and, in this context, is grappling with the need to establish the right connections between peacekeeping and peacebuilding or, in other words, between security and development.

The Council's debate ten days ago on the transition strategies, for example, is a product of this reflection, and there is an ever-

growing recognition that sustainable peace cannot be solely based on security or development, and that both should go hand in hand with each other so as to form a coherent whole.

I believe that a comprehensive review of the Peacebuilding Commission, which is already under way, will provide even further prominence to this debate, and will lead to an increased call for an integrated and/or better coordinated approach to security and development.

Of course, that is easier said than done. As in almost everything we're dealing with in international politics, the challenge lies in translating this rhetoric into concrete policies and actions by all the relevant stakeholders, including the Security Council. And this is precisely why I think the book we are going to discuss today makes an essential contribution to this exercise, by not only studying the general tenets of this relationship, but also testing and checking its basic propositions on a country-specific basis.

Indeed, based on a thorough analysis of seven different countries, it clearly demonstrates the critical connection between security and development by confirming both the negative consequences of conflict for development and also the economic and structural factors as causes of conflict.

After reading the book, there can be no doubt in anyone's mind that conflict stalls development, and lack of development breeds further instability and strife. Hence, the vicious circle between conflict and underdevelopment which needs to be broken through coherent and holistic strategies.

But the book also cautions us against adopting simplistic approaches and generalization, since the relationship between security and development depends on a complex web of issues, and that every conflict situation has its own peculiar dynamics and conditions that need to be taken into account while calibrating our policies.

Indeed, the case study chapters detail the unique mixture of factors that test the influence of the entire play between security and development in each country, where we see the rich fabric of local, national, regional, and even international dynamics that bring about country-specific outcomes.

Among others, I found most convincing the argument that underlies the need to pay attention to the context-specific political dynamics

and institutional features in each country as a way to ensure an environment where lasting security and development can be made possible.

In this regard, I cannot agree more with the conclusion of the book - that a major amendment to the current security development discourse should be the explicit inclusion of politics as a pivotal third element that determines a country's ability to address structural socioeconomic problems and security traits.

Indeed, as mentioned in the book, "durable and compatible security and development are achieved through cohesive and legitimate political processes that are context-specific."

Finally, I recommend the book to everyone who is interested in understanding better the dynamic relationship between security and development. This book's call to integrate security and development policies as a strategy for conflict prevention is impossible not to heed.

In particular, Dr. Fukuda-Parr's analysis of development aid strategies and their impact on conflict is truly a must-read chapter. I am very much impressed by her argument for realigning international development priorities and international cooperation instruments in a way that will factor conflict prevention into our development policies.

Likewise, the call to continue development aid even during armed conflicts, and the new suggestion to create a parallel set of millennium security goals in tandem with the MDGs are equally convincing and also intriguing.

As a member of the Security Council and as an emerging donor country, the broad policy lessons and recommendations offered in the book are of great importance to Turkey.

Indeed, rethinking development policies, investing in preventive diplomacy, building coping capacities, and integrating peacekeeping and peacebuilding are all priority issues for Turkey, which we will continue to actively pursue in light of the compelling arguments contained in the book.

Moreover, as you know, Turkey will host an LDC IV summit next year in Istanbul, and the findings of this book which confirms security as an integral part of the development paradigm will be of great guiding value in our work ahead.

Let me now stop here and leave the floor to our distinguished panelists and to our coordinator, Mr. Luck. Indeed we are privileged to have with us today, two of the editors, to lead us -- my good friend Neciâ Tschirgi, and Francesco Mancini, as well as Dr. Sakiko Fukuda-Parr. Thank you.

**LUCK:**

Thank you very much for a substantive and succinct statement. I'm not sure we need the panel. You've covered most of the ground already, but nevertheless we move forward. But we're also particularly appreciative when a practitioner gives a little plug for one of our books, so this means I don't have to do it. But it is our first book of 2010. The Secretary-General said it was the year of development, so our first book ought to deal with the development and security relationship. We have three distinguished panelists. I won't give them lengthy introductions because I think they're well known to all of them and their bios are in the materials for the meeting.

First, we have Neciâ Tschirgi, one of the three co-editors of the volume. As I recall at that point, she was vice-president of IPI, which was then IPA, and actually had the whole idea of the project looking at the development, the security nexus. So, I think more than editor, she has in many ways inspired the whole exercise. As you know, after she left IPI, she worked for a number of years with the Peacebuilding Support Office and now is serving as research associate at the Centre for International Policy Studies at the University of Ottawa. She will be followed by Francesco Mancini, on my far left. I don't often get to say he's on my far left.

Francesco is many things at IPI. He heads our largest program, our Coping With Crisis program, which covers much, much ground. He, in addition to that, happens to serve as my deputy and once upon a time was my student. So, I'm always delighted to see Francesco move forward, and he was one of the three co-editors of the volume.

Professor Sakiko Fukuda-Parr doesn't need any introduction to anyone around the UN. She was known for many years as the Chief Officer of the Human Development Reports at UNDP, which in many ways put these issues on the map and gave them a real analytical and policy character. I very much agree with the Ambassador. Her chapter is particularly interesting. As you know, many of the chapters in this book are about countries-specific situations. Hers is one of the few that takes a more analytical and generic approach to this.

So, we're delighted to have all three of you, and Neciâ, you started the project, so you get to start the discussion of the panel, and as I understand it, you do not have a PowerPoint, so I'm glad you're of my generation. So, thank you.

**DR. NECLÂ TSCIRGI:** First of all, I would like to extend sincerest thanks to the mission of Turkey and his Excellency, Ambassador Ertuğrul Apakan, for their sponsorship of this meeting. Even though I'm a proud Turk, I know that the mission's interest in this topic is directly linked to Turkey's membership on the Security Council, the G-28 and other regional and international bodies as well as its growing role as a donor government. Secondly, I'd like to thank the International Peace Institute and Vice-President Ed Luck for hosting this event. IPA's development research program was initiated during my tenure as vice-president, and generated four edited volumes and around 20 policy briefs. The book we are launching today is the fifth volume to come out of that program, and it is thanks to the efforts of Adam Lupel and the team at IPA that this final volume saw the light of day.

Now, I'm really tempted to summarize my comments into one sentence because the Ambassador has done such a superb job, as Ed said, in summarizing the book. As you know, the book is called *Security & Development: Searching for Critical Connections* and I could probably summarize the basic idea of the book by saying: What did we find? And the answer would be: security and development, the interconnections, depend on context. So, it's really important to understand that and, being an academic, I'm going to go a little further and probe some of the issues that the Ambassador raised.

Now, today's meeting formally launches our book. We hope that it will generate a broader discussion about current thinking on the challenges of bringing the UN's peace, security and development agendas together. Indeed, each of us on the panel will be approaching the topic from a slightly different angle to stimulate a larger conversation. To kick-start the discussion, let me quickly summarize the rationale for the book, the key research and policy questions it set out to address, and its main findings.

Recent research has shown that the number of wars and the lethality of warfare have been declining since 1992. However, the downward trend in conflict is the result of termination of ongoing wars rather than the result of effective prevention of new conflicts. The number of new wars has not diminished. In fact, there has

been no discernible change in the number of newly initiated conflicts. For the past 60 years the rate at which new armed conflicts emerge each year has been essentially unchanged. Now most contemporary conflicts are internal in nature and take place in low-income developing countries. Thus, it has become commonplace to talk of a vicious conflict-poverty trap and to assert that without security there is no development; without development, there is no security. Indeed, the interdependence between security and development has become a well-worn mantra at the United Nations and beyond. Like most mantras, the statement hides more than it reveals. Moreover, like any mantra, it inhibits critical thinking. So, we really want to understand whether and how security and development are interlinked and its implications for more effective policies for conflict prevention and peacebuilding.

In order to do that, we undertook a dual-track research program. On the one hand, we invited several academic experts to synthesize the current state of knowledge on how key development issues -- poverty, environmental stress, demographic pressures -- interact with conflict and security. What we know, what we don't know, and what we still need to know. On the other hand, we invited several country experts to examine the interplay between security and development in seven particular contexts: Guyana, Guinea Bissau, Tajikistan, Kukistan, Yemen, Somalia, and Namibia; all countries that have experienced different levels and types of conflicts in the last two decades. Our hope was that the thematic as well as the country case studies would provide us with a more grounded understanding of the critical connections between security and development. Indeed, our research yielded strong empirical evidence that challenges the mantra that without security there is no development and without development there is no security. Yes, the two are linked, but in multiple and varying configurations.

Since I have only a few minutes, I will quickly summarize our main findings, which will re-enforce what the Ambassador already has said. In the first place, the link between security and development is neither automatic nor simple. At the general level there's strong evidence of the correlation between levels of underdevelopment and levels of insecurity; the higher the level of development, the lower the likelihood of internal conflict and insecurity.

However, when it comes to unpacking the relationship, the results are far from clear. While development is a long slow process, conflicts are dynamic and mutate significantly over time in response to a range of domestic and external factors. Moreover,

development itself is often a conflict-inducing process, and aggregate indicators of development are not sufficient to predict a country's vulnerability to conflict. Indeed, conflict is often a localized phenomenon affecting individuals and populations differentially. Nonetheless, current research confirms several critical connections which require continuing attention at multiple levels: global, regional, national, and local.

For example, there's a strong correlation between a country's demographic transition -- the youth bulge -- and conflict; between horizontal inequalities and conflict; environmental stress and conflict. However, establishing causality is extremely difficult. These critical connections do not operate in isolation, but are always intermediated by other variables. Yet, statistically, the correlations are sufficiently robust as to require targeted policy attention, since they constitute structural risk factors which increase a country's vulnerability to instability, insecurity, and conflict. A closer look at how these factors play out in individual countries reveals a fairly differentiated and diverse picture. It is true that structural development factors cause conflict risks in each of the seven countries.

However, there's no consistent pattern that can easily lend itself to uniform development policies across different contexts. As the Ambassador highlighted, at the country level, political uncertainty and instability emerge as causes rather than consequences of development failures and insecurity and, thus, provide a key to their remedy. In other words, it is more accurate to talk of a development-politics-security nexus than a security-development nexus, since a country's political institutions and processes consistently play a defining role in managing or fueling conflict. Since all seven countries we studied are relatively new states, their level of state formation and the processes through which they have attained their independence serve as powerful explanatory factors for their levels of internal cohesion and security.

Finally, despite the current tendency to search for causes of conflict mainly at the country level, external factors -- both regional and international -- have far-reaching influence on a country's development and security prospects and requires solutions at the global as well as the country level. In all our case studies the regional environment -- the rise of transnational threats such as the drug trade or Islamic militancy or the war on terror -- emerge as serious pressures, which can rapidly undermine a country's domestic capacities to manage societal and political tensions. Unfortunately, I do not have time to tease out the policy implications



of these findings. Indeed, both of the thematic and the country's studies caution against simplistic policy prescriptions. Instead, based on its detailed analysis, each chapter offers targeted recommendations that address issues-specific and country-specific challenges.

However, as a segue to our discussion, I can simply say that the findings have important policy implications for current international policies regarding development assistance, which I think my colleague Sakiko will be addressing -- strategies for statebuilding and peacebuilding, which the Ambassador referred to, the UN's ability to support preventive diplomacy at the country level, and the need for greater assessment planning and monitoring of international policies through a local lens. And finally, there is a strong need to link the UN's conflict prevention and peacebuilding agendas.

In conclusion: yes, the new focus on holistic thinking, integrated policies, greater coherence and coordination are extremely important. However, it is the ability to design and support appropriate and differentiated development and security policies in particular settings from a conflict prevention perspective that ultimately might make a difference and that might start with doing away with the mantra that there's no development without security and no security without development. Thank you.

**LUCK:** Thank you very much. It's such a nice mantra, though. One hates to give it up. It has such a nice ring to it. But, no, we try to do our best to make simple issues complex and then, if we can, complex issues simple. But I'm not sure whether Francesco and Sakiko are going to make this simple or complex but we do know they have PowerPoints so we're going to exit the stage for the moment and we look forward to their presentations.

**FRANCESCO MANCINI:** Thank you. Thank you for coming and I'll add my personal thanks to the mission of Turkey for hosting this event. In our division of labor, I end up being the one to talk about the problem, so I'm sorry I'm going to depress you for eight minutes. All of what I'm going to say is basically trying to target one specific recommendation, which is that we have to overcome the stovepipe way that we are currently, in our international institutions, working through these problems. We need to understand that the connections at regional levels, at local levels, and at problems levels require more coordination, but also more integration in the way we work in our international institutions.

To show this point, I'm going to show you a range of data, and most of the problems I'm going to present to you are, of course, well known, and some actually are addressed in our book. Again, my point here is that a lot of the problems have to be seen in context and not in isolation, because crises seldom exist in isolation. They feed off each other, exacerbate each other, and I think that these complex connections are certainly testing the multilateral capacity to respond, in particular at the United Nations. Let me highlight some of these crises.

The first I wanted to mention, as Neciâ just mentioned, is what is commonly known as the youth bulge, which is a condition that occurs when a disproportionate segment of the population is aged between 15 and 29. In extreme cases, like those on this map, over 50 percent of the average population is in this age range.

A second problem that I want to mention is extreme poverty. Now, globally, we have 1.4 billion people continuing to live on less than \$1.25 a day, and even more staggering is the number of those that live on less than \$2 a day, which is 2.5 billion people. In the 25 poorest countries on the map, over 50 percent of the population live with less than \$1.25 a day.

Of course, we have to remember that in the last 20 years, economic prosperity has lifted many out of poverty. However, progress has generally been uneven. In fact, we're losing ground when it comes to inequality within countries. These are the 20 countries, the highest level of income inequality within their population. Inequality is not only growing in Africa, in Central America, and South America as we see on the map, but unfortunately the gap between the haves and have-nots is also widening in Asia, in Europe, and in North America. And as you know, inequalities has also been indicated as a potential source of conflict, especially when it aligns with other factors, such as ethnicity.

Another crisis over time is the lack of education, especially among the extreme poor. One in every six adults -- more than 776 million people in the world -- is unable to read and write. These are the countries where more than 40 percent of the adult population cannot read or write. Also linked to lack of education is poor public health. Unfortunately, there are too many countries in the world with insufficient access to health services. Now, experts tell us that one of the best ways to measure health access in the country is to see how many children have been vaccinated against diphtheria, tetanus, and pertussis. So, on the map, you can see the countries

where less than 70 percent of children age one have been vaccinated and some of these countries have rates of vaccination as low as 30 percent.

Disease is intrinsically related to food. These are the countries with the greatest food insecurity. In these countries, millions of people consume less than the minimum calorific requirement. They lack either the money to buy enough food or the resources to produce the food for themselves. Around the world there are over one billion people who have not enough to eat, the highest number since 1970, and those numbers are unfortunately growing. This lack of food has led to a lack of water in our culture because in turn this means an increasing number of people are suffering from chronic water shortages. Here on the map you can see the countries facing the gravest condition of water rationing. Water rationing affects one of every three people in the world. Many also have pointed to water rationing as a possible cause of conflict, an aggravation factor, such as in war. And as we talk a lot about energy security -- should hydro-security receive at least the same attention? It seems to us a very important matter.

Many countries experiencing these crises suffer from one additional aggravation; corruption. Here you can see the 23 countries with the greatest perception of corruption. The unfortunate fact is that states suffering from corruption are weakened in their ability to respond to other crises. This affects governments, which is also stressed in a lot of the cases in our book.

So, I'm sure you've noticed that most of these crises occur in the same regions; crises overlap. Many of you are familiar with this data, but each of them is to be understood within its broader context. Let me illustrate this point by geographically overlapping these crises: Corruption, water crisis, food crisis, poor public health, lack of education, inequality, extreme poverty, and youth bulge. The deeper red the country, the more crises have to face. And, of course, that's not all. A lot of these countries are facing also terrible security challenges. Let me just add conflict. Now, as Neciã mentioned, the number of wars has been decreasing since the early '90s but we still count a total of 54 conflicts around the world and many of these wars have also regional and global implications.

Another security threat is terrorism. In 2008, 90 countries experienced terrorist attacks in one form or another, causing close to 50,000 casualties. Nearly 40 percent of these originated in Iraq. Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India account for much of the

remainder. So, once again you see a strong regional dimension in this phenomenon.

The destabilizing threat is transnational organized crime. These criminal organizations take advantage of our interconnected world. Let me just take one example, which is quite familiar to you, which is West Africa. Challenged by past conflict, corruption, unemployment, and youth bulge, West Africa is becoming a major hub of cocaine trafficking from Latin America into Europe, and these trafficking networks are in turn supplying arms into places like Afghanistan. These networks are extremely complex and requires extremely complex responses.

Finally, I'd like to highlight one additional global threat which also has profound security implications, and that is climate change. I don't need to introduce you to the problem of climate change as we are all very familiar with it, but I think this map is quite interesting. The red dots indicate areas of substantial temperature increase over the last 30 years, while the black ones show areas of severe drought. Sometimes the term global warming tends to be misleading, but this really shows how different variations of climate manifest in different ways in different regions, but the key point here is for these deep red countries, climate change becomes an additional aggravation. So, this is the world that we have created, which is a world very interconnected. Everything we do has complex implications and I think the world like this requires responses that are way more coherent, coordinated, and integrated than now.

Now, before giving the floor to the next panelist, I want to add two observations. Now, showing data at national level does not really tell all the story. First, we need to understand the connection goes beyond borders. Many of these challenges originate in one country and spread over to a neighboring country becoming regional problems, like West Africa or Afghanistan and Pakistan. Sometimes we're not very well equipped to respond in that sort of regional framework. Second, many of these challenges develop at sub-national level with very localized configuration and dynamic; hence, looking at nationally aggregated data may not be enough, like the chapter on Guyana, for example, in our book explains. But I know that Professor Fukuda-Parr will have to say more about it and so I think I will pass the floor to her. Thanks for your attention.

**SAKIKO FUKUDA-PARR:** So, well, thank you very much for the invitation to this event and, when Neciã said, well, this mantra has to be put on the back burner for the time being, that development produces peace

and peace produces security is just not something that we can base ourselves on. This is actually a series of pictures that might convince you of that, because what I did is I tried to see whether it is quite true that countries with lower levels of per-capita income have higher propensity for conflict. That is absolutely true. But if you go beyond that and see what happens to income per capita, GDP, during conflict, actually it doesn't always decline. Well, in these countries it sort of declined and stagnated, but actually in these countries GDP per capita increased during times of conflict and you can see, for example, Ethiopia, Angola, Uganda. And then you say, well, maybe its GDP that's playing tricks on us, or what about under-five mortality. Well, there are many countries where under-five mortality actually declined so child survivor rates actually improved. And all of that is basically to point out not that fighting does not reduce incomes or does terrible things to human lives, absolutely not. It's just that when you look at these aggregate national level statistics, it does not really show that something called conflict reduces development or undermines development, that the country is not the appropriate unit of analysis.

So, this is a way of understanding what both Francesco and Neciã was saying, that you need to go to the local level, that the nature of these conflicts that we see in poor countries around the world today are not like big wars, like World War II. They are a different kind of war. They are much more localized and, most importantly, they stop and then they recur again. So, when you look at this history of African countries, for example, there was something like 32 countries out of 47 that experienced conflict during the last 25 years and they tended to be over a short period of time and then stopping and then recurring again, and you get into these problems of well, how do you define conflict? The way that people keep statistics about it, there's kind of a threshold. You have conflict if so many thousand people die on the battlefield. But, so, these wars are very difficult to even define and so, when we think about this relationship between conflict and development, it's very different from the kind of phenomenon that we imagine as, sort of, like big wars and that there's different experiences of different groups within a country is very important. And that has a very significant policy implication.

I want to go into the policy aspects of this because what is a policy response to all that has been written about conflicts? Well, when we say that the relationship between conflict and development is complex, well, it actually, I think, means that in economic policy terms, generating aggregate GDP growth is not the answer. You have to go beyond that. You cannot say, well, we just try to do our best to increase GDP growth, and it will just bring prosperity, and

somehow this will trickle down to a general level of prosperity and people will stop fighting and they will concentrate on productive activities. Because there are different patterns of economic growth and development, and it's that pattern of development that really matters, I think, and those risk factors that we found in all of these research findings that all of these correlates of war, like chronic poverty and all of those things that Francesco also mentioned are definitely correlates in a sense of structural conditions that are associated with violent conflict, and they sometimes cause conflict and sometimes they don't.

So, they are basically risk factors, and when you think about development policy objectives; that is, the objective of different economic and social policies, how an economic policy affects these factors, like chronic poverty, natural resource dependence, horizontal inequality, youth bulge, environmental pressure. These are not considerations that often come into the equation of policy formulation.

So, when you think about at the generic level of development aid, development aid is looking at the policy objective of aggregate economic growth or aggregate improvement in child survival, but not necessarily the distribution, the horizontal inequalities part. So, on the ground, donors are not necessarily saying, well, let's distribute aid and let's discuss with national governments how to make sure that the allocation of resources for water supply, for example, is not all concentrated in one area. And I must say that when I was in Liberia looking at the situation there, and I'm analyzing their poverty reduction strategy paper, what I found was in the post-war years all the donors were working in Monrovia because it was where they could access, and then in the surrounding areas on the coast.

Well, some of the sources of the conflict was ethnic tension actually between the Americo-Liberians who lived in Monrovia and the coast and the people in the groups, the ethnic groups, in the hinterland. So, not reaching the hinterland is actually re-enforcing those political tensions that were contributing to the political conflict and the violent conflict to begin with. And similarly I was in Haiti looking also there at the poverty reduction strategy before a year ago, before this tragedy of the earthquake struck, and there again there was a very big push for IMF-supported macroeconomic stabilization and private sector development and developing the export zone. Well, that's fine. I think these are very good approaches to develop, but there was a total neglect of the rural sector. So, the increasing neglect and disparity between the rural areas and the urban areas

was feeding this rural/urban migration and the concentration of unemployed youth in the cities, and you can understand the dynamics of how that economic policy of neglect of agricultural sector actually was contributing to increasing the risks of violent conflicts.

So, my message is that in thinking about conflict, I think there is a much greater role for economic and social policies to consider, reducing conflict risks. I don't want to use the term 'preventing conflict' because that's too much of a claim, but reducing conflict risks through certain types of economic and social policies, I think, is an exercise that should be carried out at the level of the country. I mean, I don't think we can sit here in New York and say, this is a kind of a development policy that will reduce conflict risks across the board in a 'one size fits all.' It obviously has to be in a country-by-country analysis that will identify the real things.

So, I'll stop there. I don't know how many minutes I took, but I look forward to a discussion. Thank you very much.

**LUCK:** Well, thank you to all three panelists and to Ambassador Apakan. We had four, I think, quite stimulating presentations. Some of you may have been with us a few weeks ago when Francis Stewart was here talking about theories of horizontal inequality and, for those of us working on things like responsibility to protect, that's particularly music to our ears about ways of thinking about development in a very differentiated way. But we have time for discussion, comments, questions, polemics, if they're short. Please.

**CORA WEISS:** Well, this was all very interesting but how come you don't take hardware into account? I mean, you can't make a war without guns, bombs, and so forth; right alone won't do it anymore. So, I don't understand how that was left out. I read the index, I didn't read the book, but it doesn't seem to be in there. Or military budgets, for example, the allocation of national budgets for weaponry and preparation for war.

**LUCK:** That was Cora Weiss. People, I forgot to ask if you'd identify yourselves and your affiliation. I don't know whether you can judge a book by the index. We usually focus on the cover ourselves, but the index and table of contents will do as well. Who else would like to get into this? Please.

**H.E. MOURAD BENMEHIDI:** Well, it has really been challenging to hear Dr. Tschirgi starting her presentation with challenging our old beliefs, if I may say so. I think we have long time realized that development

doesn't necessarily mean security; for instance, World War I and World War II. Development and growth and expansion of wealth may well lead to conflict; this we know. If the deterrents were not there, I believe we could continue to witness this reality, but how to apply it to today's realities? From the presentation, we have [INDISCERNIBLE] concentration of conflict you have presented as related to regions of the world that are mostly lagging behind the average growth of other regions, that is Africa and some other regions. Inside the region, I can concur that it's not always a matter of automaticity that development can bring conflict, but still, if we are to question the old dogma of connection between the development and security, we have first to answer the question: How is it so that in the least developed region, Africa, there is the most number of conflicts?

And second maybe we could add to the... in order to complicate further the debate... I mean, the distinction between... conflicts do occur when there is nothing to share, very poor regions, but also where the potential for sharing important resources are there. I believe we should also -- beyond the development versus security - - we should also... potential wealth can also trigger conflicts from our experience on the African scene at least. So, those are only comments, but really I find it very challenging to start now from the title of the book itself, *Searching for Critical Connections*, something that we all take for granted in this house, is really interesting and challenging for the month ahead. Thank you.

**LUCK:** Thank you very much. That's the Ambassador of Algeria. I could keep introducing people, but it would be better if you would introduce yourself. I saw the hand here and then please.

**CHARMAINE ALAGON:** Hi. Charmaine Alagon, World Council People's for the UN. I wanted to just ask for a little bit more clarity on the situation that was cited in Liberia. How did it actually happen that there was this kind of oversight? Who was or wasn't at the table when those decisions were being made? And, I mean, there was some reference to connecting to the realities on the ground, but I didn't hear a reference specifically to civil society, so I'm wondering how you envision the involvement of local civil society in advising on both the security and the development dimensions? Thank you.

**LUCK:** Okay. Thanks very much. I saw Ambassador Ali next.

**H.E. HAMIDON ALI:** No, thank you. The issue really, I mean, we talk about development and security – no doubt it's a vicious cycle, but I come from the premise to say that conflict is inherent in all societies. The



question is how do you manage that conflict, because from day one, and even in primitive societies, there are conflicts. Conflicts over food, over water, any resources you have, so the first point is, how do you manage it, and then I get to the second point. Here in this book, your case studies, all countries which have real conflict, but why didn't you look around at countries that are successful in managing conflict? What are those factors that contribute to success? That would be a better way of analyzing this problem rather than the other way around. Thank you.

**LUCK:** As Ambassador from Malaysia, do you have any models in mind of countries who handle conflict particularly well? Let's take a couple other questions and then we'll revert to the panel. And please right here and then in the back.

**FAHDI ALBON:** Thank you. Fahdi Albon on behalf of the Permanent Mission of Afghanistan. I'm just curious as to why you guys didn't consider Afghanistan as one of your central case studies. It seems so pertinent to what's going on right now in regards to development. Was it just difficult to gather empirical data on the ground for you guys?

**LUCK:** Good question. In the back, please.

**KESHOUR EMANDIA:** Keshour Emandia, United Nations. A couple of points. First and foremost, I heard the term horizontal inequalities and I'd like to understand a little more about how horizontal inequalities are different from vertical inequalities and how the two separately have an impact on development.

Secondly, the question of leadership and institutions in development, particularly the role of the founding leadership in formal colonial countries and whether that is a particular context that needs to be looked at.

The third point that I wanted to raise was the question of land reform, the issue of actually transferring assets on the ground. If we look at a country like India, it's a good model for development on one hand; on the other hand, if you disaggregate the provinces, and you look at the Maoist insurgency in certain parts of India, those are poor examples of development, and one has to ask the question: Why is it that in certain parts of one country, which generally looks good, but when you begin to disaggregate, why do certain parts look bad, and what are the key factors for that, despite an overall context which seems favorable to development? I'd like to sort of place those questions on the ground for you to address.

**LUCK:** Thank you. Just to add to that, I think Ambassador Ali's point and what about those countries that have pockets of rather persistent conflict but yet manage as an aggregate to keep those isolated one way or another and keep from getting out of hand. Please, you get the last one and then we'll go back to the panel.

**DR. DIRK SALOMONS:** I was astonished by the fact that in conflict GDP can go up and some indicators of health can improve. I wonder whether the GDP going up does in fact reflect an improvement in the standard of living for people or whether it means there's war profiteering going on, which benefits few, like in Angola, it's all rising income, which you think oil money stays in very limited circle. And whether the health indicators improving might be due to the enormous attention the countries in conflict get from international community where they swarm in and provide services people never had from their government. So, has there been any analysis done about these indicators? Thank you.

**LUCK:** Okay. If I could just add one more question to that and then we'll go back to the panel, we'll begin with the Ambassador. But I wonder whether any of the panelists have looked at the most recent human security report that Andy Mack and his colleagues have put together because they look at the DRC and they say, in fact, child mortality has gone down in the DRC, including those regions that are under particular strain. Now, there's questions whether the methodology is right, but they're questioning a lot of the existing methodology and the basic argument is, look, health services, other things are improving generally; there's a large trend not only there but in most parts of the world, child mortality going down and that continues even in areas affected, maybe not at the same rate, but it continues to drop, which is quite different in our normal perceptions. I think the Ambassador wanted to make a comment on Afghanistan in particular, but perhaps other things and then I'll revert to the panel.

**APAKAN:** Well, at least on our part, on the part of Turkey, and also for the international community, Afghanistan is an important subject and we also believe what we are perceiving of Afghanistan is Turkey is assuming the central command of Kabul in Afghanistan. We are contributing troops, but at the same time we are trying to develop some civil, some development projects, particularly in the field of health and education. And there has been some trilateral meetings between Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Turkey. We had recently in assembled before the regional conference took place. The focus of this trilateral meeting was education, and the respective ministers

of education of those three countries came together in order to improve the education conditions in Afghanistan because in the case of education, I believe, you invest and get the results within five years time, and it's directly also a contribution to the security environment, particularly in Afghanistan. I'm drawing on our experiences. Health is also a very critical sector. If you provide health facilities and health services and a much more modern education system, I think at the end, directly and indirectly, they are bringing some harmony to the provinces, or at least some hope for the future. That's the point I wish to make. It's not a global assessment. This is our assessment in regards to Afghanistan. But I think this should be valid for the UN efforts and UN's central role should encompass some activities with regard to education and health as well.

**LUCK:** Okay. Thank you very much. Neciã.

**TSCHIRGI:** Thank you very much for some tough questions. First of all I should say that our project did not attempt to answer all the relative questions, starting with Cora's concern. We were really looking at the development aspects and how they affect security. We did not look at a lot of other issues that fuel insecurity and, clearly, dismantling the structures of war, including small arms and others, are central to the concern, but we weren't looking at those set of issues, and there are many things that we couldn't address and many countries we would have liked to study. In fact, we thought of doing three different sets of country case studies, one post-conflict, peacekeeping, peacebuilding types of conflict. So there is a greater transition from security to peace the other way around rather than conflict prevention, development to security, and looking at successful countries, and we have actually one successful country.

By all standards, I think everybody agrees that Namibia is a success story and some of the lessons from Namibia are really useful for our purposes and some of the other case studies where we can point to successes and what is really important and I really want to underline this point. We're not saying that security and development are not linked, but they're linked in very different ways, which means that if you're really going to target conflict issues in certain countries, you have to look at the much larger set of policies and interventions.

Now, Sakiko mentioned it several times: social policy matters, even in conflict. You can do things with the MDGs, with women's health, children's health to improve those things. So, you don't have to just wait for the economy to improve so that all boats are lifted because

it's not going to happen and, conversely, there's strong evidence that the type of development assistance that we internationals support are contributing to conflict in many cases. So, we're trying to draw attention to these challenges and dilemmas. So, we cannot continue doing more of the same; we have to have much more differentiated approaches to those types of things.

I'm not going to address all of the questions, but let me address a few more and then pass it on to Sakiko and I'm sure you'll address horizontal inequalities.

Afghanistan. At the time we started this project it would have been really, really difficult to work there, but it remains a major case study for all of us because we're doing so many things and we're doing so many things that are working against each other. We're saying that we're doing X,Y, and Z, but some of the policies that we're supporting in Afghanistan are contradicting our goals. So, the whole issue of getting our strategies right and understanding how these things feed into each other and feed conflict, etc. I mean, the drug situation in Afghanistan is a classic case in point.

Let my panelists address some of these and then if there's some that are not addressed, I'll come back to it.

**LUCK:** Sure. And we should have time for another round as well. Francesco?

**MANCINI:** Yes. I'm trying to answer a few at the same time because in some way I feel there's sort of a common thread in some of these questions, which is the issue of governance and institutions. As you know, some people were asking why sometimes there are resources, there are not resources; that doesn't seem to be really correlated to conflict; sometimes conflicts are managed in a certain way. So, when I talk about institutions, of course, I'm only talking about formal institutions in societies. To me, the other big element in security-development connection is the role of governments and, of course, international community being very involved in statebuilding, generally speaking. But to me again one of the key weaknesses here is that we still need to really understand how the impact of local context, our incentive of political actors, and import social, economic and political processes within countries to achieve a better governance. And some donors are developing very specific tools to try to understand its localized mechanism and dynamics, but I think the way we tend to approach countries, we still have more of a quick kind of approach instead of models that we want to import and export in different places. Again, the importance, as we

were stressing for the security development, to understand the local trends resonates in the same way for local institutions, and it is important to also understand informal mechanisms within societies and between societies and the formal institutions.

I think these are all very important variables and, when we start to explore them country by country, we start to answer those questions, like why, for example, is child mortality in certain places decreasing? Child mortality globally is decreasing, if I'm not wrong, by 30 percent since 1990. That's rather good news. For that matter, even HIV/AIDS infection is decreasing, 23 percent since '96. So, some of these numbers are quite positive. How much are they actually correlated with conflict? That has to be seen in different context. So, it's hard to make very general statements.

**LUCK:** Sakiko?

**FUKUDA-PARR:** Thank you. Yes, and I think this is sort of a fundamental question: Well, why is the conflict so concentrated among countries of low income? Well, one explanation that is offered by Professor Collier is a low opportunity cost. I mean, other economists say that people fight because the cost of the opportunity, you go and fight because you haven't got some lucrative job to give up instead of becoming a soldier. And so you do that. Well, that's a certain assumption you make about human motivation, but I think if you look at some of the other correlates, structural factors, that have been identified, you see that they're, in fact, related to low income. So, for example, the theory that natural resource dependence, the blood diamonds and all of those things, fueling conflict. Well, it's not the fact that you have these natural resources, it's the fact that you're unable to manage them properly. So, the United States and Canada and Australia have a lot of natural resources, but they're able to manage them in such a way that they don't get into the hands of arms dealers and drug lords, and maybe they do, I don't know. In any case, they're also out of control with the hope... anyway, it's not so much perhaps as low income itself but other things that go with low income, particularly institutional weaknesses of management and governing these resources.

Similarly with horizontal inequalities, and I think there perhaps the horizontal inequalities end up being failures to meet basic needs. You have horizontal inequalities in the United States; data for educational achievements and health status of African-Americans is very much lower than white Americans, for example. But none of these basic needs are met. And so I think there are these different types of things. And the youth bulge factor, that's very much related

to low incomes and the fact you're at a certain point in the demographic transition. So, I think that's certainly one possible way of thinking about it.

Dirk's question about why GDP incomes and child survival can improve -- I think this really requires a whole research agenda, which I'm surprised hasn't taken off. And I think one good explanation, one plausible explanation, is the one I mentioned that the unit of analysis is wrong, that you're looking at aggregate national data; whereas, if you take a country like Uganda, which has been doing very well in terms of social and economic indicators at the aggregate level in the northern region where there has been conflict ongoing, the trends have been less good. So, maybe that's one plausible explanation for some cases. Another plausible explanation is that even during times of conflict, national governments invest in education and health and so forth, and that was the case, for example, in Nicaragua; whereas, in other cases, like in Mozambique, this did not happen. So, it could be driven by policy as well, but I think this is an area that requires greater investigation.

And finally, this question of well, what happens on the ground, why is it in Liberia so much was concentrated in Monrovia? Well, I don't really know. When I asked people, the donors had a very common-sense explanation that this was a war-torn economy and you are trying to do the best that you can. You do the best by delivering social services and provisioning where you can, that is where you can get access. There was no road access, for example, transport access. So, I think that's certainly the one clear explanation, and the other is that, well, I suppose that the international community can do a lot better in terms of coordination and information sharing. But it is complicated because three or four years after the cessation of fighting you still don't have the kind of database and statistical systems to plan a well-balanced distribution of your public investments. So, you do not have desegregated data. So, there are numerous constraints of technical and practical consideration as well as inadequate attention, I think to this issue that I think probably explains what happens in so many places around the world. I'm just giving Liberia as sort of an illustration. It's not like I have done a study of this nor of the particular problem in Liberia.

**LUCK:** Please, yeah.

**TSCHIRGI:** I just wanted to add to the question at the back about horizontal inequalities. The definition of horizontal inequalities as opposed to vertical inequalities is where economic disadvantages are grouped

along ethnic or identity lines so you have certain ethnic groups or religious groups that are disadvantaged as a group, so there is much more opportunity for grievances to emerge, which can lead to conflict and, of course, in many cases we see that happening across the world, and that's an issue that we really have to pay closer attention to, as Francis Stewart made a strong case here at IPI a couple of weeks ago.

In terms of the Algerian Ambassador's questions, why more conflicts in Africa? I think it's a very legitimate question and I think building on what Francesco said, it has a lot to do with political and governance issues and state formation in Africa. I think we have clear evidence that the way countries gain their independence and the way states were formed directly affected their future security. So, there's a tremendous... if you'll look at state formation across the African countries, which were the last, of course, of the post-colonial states to emerge, you see some interesting patterns, especially sub-Sahara and Africa, that require closer attention and it has implications for the current strategy of statebuilding that internationals are promoting, which are extremely counterproductive. It goes against the grain of what our research is telling us that statebuilding is a process of contract-building between a population and the government, rather than between international actors and a relatively illegitimate government that is in a capital city. So, how do you even nurture that social contract, political contract, so that you have stable governments is one of the big challenges. So, that's why we were saying security-politics-development nexus. We have to invest much more in thinking about how we support statebuilding agendas in the world today.

**LUCK:** Thank you very much. We have about 10 minutes so that's not a lot of time, but a couple of quick questions and then we'll get some responses and I actually have a question as well. Please. You don't need an introduction but nevertheless...

**KIYOTAKA AKASAKA:** Thank you. I'm Kiyotaka Akasaka from the United Nations. I'd like to address the question of coordination of dialogue between the two communities, security community and the development community. I've just been to DRC and the Eastern part of DRC as well. The peacekeeping operations in DRC have been making an enormous progress in dealing with peace and security, but often it has been subjected to critical views, particularly from the development community and NGO community and international press because of the difficulty to deal with the humanitarian issues or violence against women and all that. But DRC has a good example of discarding the coordination between

the lack of security and the lack of social development wasting one and the other further. The soldiers are not educated, both government and rebel forces. The government soldiers and rebel soldiers are not paid well. Their security has got to be first and foremost the number one priority.

While the NGO community often makes the point that if you violate some human rights of some number of people, then the government forces supported by [unintelligible] are expected to either stop that security-related operations. It may be rather too much to expect that the 100 percent, say, a nice operation of security forces can be operated in such conditions and I would just like to ask, sorry, a simple question. How can those two communities, the peacekeeping forces and the development community, particularly NGOs, would be able to enhance the understanding of this relationship further? Thank you.

**LUCK:** Great. Thank you very much. I see a lot of questions; I don't see much time. We have two quick questions. First...

**ZEKI LEVENT GUMRUKCU:** Zeki Levent Gumrukcu, Mission of Turkey. It could be a very good fall-out to what we have just heard because when, I mean, Turkey argued for dismantling the 'no security, no development' mantra, which shouldn't be interpreted as no connection between the two. On the contrary, there are many examples in the book showing those connections, but, I mean, if you say that security itself does not lead to development or vice versa, that is true, and I think the question there is how to make them mutually enforcing. That's why we are very much intrigued by Dr. Fukuda-Parr's call for realigning or recalibrating international development aid strategies to make it more conflict sensitive, to make it more conflict-prevention sensitive, and I think that's indeed the way to go. How can we then make security more development sensitive? Is the millennium security goals and MDGs the right answer, or could we do more in terms of our peacekeeping, reform our peacekeeping activities to make it more development oriented and to make the two more mutually re-enforced? Thank you.

**LUCK:** Thank you. Just one more question right there and then we'll revert to the panel.

**MAGNUS LENNARTSSON:** Thank you. I'm Magnus Lennartsson from the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, and my question is very much along the same line as the previous one. What are the general ODEA policy implications of being more skeptical about the mantra, 'no security without development,' in particular no development



without security? And my question is: In your research, do you find that there's been a tendency in recent years for international donors to approach the security-development nexus on the basis of assumptions that we're perhaps too simplistic, resulting in inappropriate reallocations, so ODEA away from so-called basis development programs in favor of more security sector oriented ODEA? What would be your general lessons and recommendations to donors in this regard?

**LUCK:** Okay. Thanks very much. I did have questions, but I won't impose them. I'll just mention them in passing. There is a question, maybe it's for another seminar, on what are the institutional implications of this for the UN system? And how would you structure going about this? Most of you have been talking about theory and a way of thinking about these things, but institutionally, would it make any difference? And if so, how? And in that sense, is the UN especially well equipped to address this sort of nexus given its breadth of its agenda, or is it particularly poorly equipped with, if I could use the term Balkanization of its bureaucracy into so many little pieces? But that was not a question. But if any of the panelists would like to respond to any of the questions that were posed.

**MANCINI:** Just a comment. What we're talking about it seems is similar to questions raised on this coordination with the security and development community. I mean, I personally believe that the UN is in theory well equipped, but in practice... Again, what I was saying before, the way we've been conceiving multilateral convention, organizing sort of silos, sort of stovepipe intervention by themes, is not really working any more, and there are too many tough battles going on to really overcome this kind of silos mentality.

Now, there might be an opportunity, which is peacebuilding review. I do believe the Peacebuilding Commission is an interesting institutional arrangement, which goes more to our what our experts call a 'network organization,' where an institution is set up based on the kind of topic on the agenda and so you create a certain degree of flexibility in the institutional arrangements, and I think this is something that's very important, and so I hope that the peacebuilding review will also go into institutional settings to see how these models can be improved and may be exported in some other context in which you can facilitate creative space. Presumably that's what it is about for the UN, I think, to create a space where different actors sitting in different institutions can actually meet and talk, coordinate, create coherent strategy, and integrate what they think is appropriate, because I think that's the sort of key element that is missing in the institutional level.

**FUKUDA-PARR:** Well, how to make security and development mutually re-enforced, I think that's sort of the strategic way in which we can think about it, and I think the Ambassador's question about well, what about success stories. Well, obviously Malaysia it is a very good example of that, where there was a very deliberate policy of reducing, preventing potentially explosive social tensions from getting out of hand through policies that equalized opportunities.

Now, I think that that kind of thinking has to be brought into economic and social policymaking. I think most politicians do that intuitively, but policymaking has been evaded by economics where only one thing counts, which is the economic efficiencies. So, we should rethink the criteria for policy selection and for policy evaluation. I mean, I keep thinking that when we talk about aid effectiveness, for example, aid to Tanzania is supposed to have incredible waste because there are all kinds of roads that were washed away or something. Well, however, if you compare Tanzania with Uganda and Kenya, it is a very peaceful and democratic country, and maybe it has done slightly less well economically, but it has certainly done better on the security front.

So, I mean, I think this integration of security and development means doing these, sort of, analytical studies that actually bring the two elements together. So, and finally, I just want to clarify that the millennium security goals that I mentioned in the chapter in this book are not mine, they're borrowed from Bob Picciotto who suggested them, but that's another way of bringing sort of the security issues on the frontline of development agendas, and now that we have the review coming up in June and September this year, and the deadline of 2015 approaching, and people are beginning to talk about MDGs post-2015, maybe this is an opportunity to open a debate about well, what about adding, setting up millennium security goals.

**LUCK:** Once we've seen that we've done wonderfully well on the MDGs, then we do just as wonderfully on the security goals. Neciã.

**TSCHIRGI:** Thank you very much. I'll have to be very brief since we're running out of time. All the last three questions are really interrelated and especially focus on peacekeeping, peacebuilding contexts, and again I think that's a very unique situation. So, some of the policy recommendations we have for conflict prevention don't apply to those types of contexts. I think we have to think differently about peacekeeping, peacebuilding transitions. I have done research on this independently of this project, and I know others have as well,

and it really requires deeper investigation on its own terms because it plays out differently in those types of context.

But I would like to mention, based on the research that we've done, that it's not just the international development agenda that is causing some problems, but it's also the international security agenda. The one chapter we have in our volume is on Yemen and I recommend it to all of you because it's called *The Security Paradox of Yemen*, and the authors argue very strongly that external pressures upon the government of Yemen to support externally-driven security agendas has actually undermined the Yemen government's ability to maintain stability in its own country. So, these things are interconnected, but they're interconnected in very complicated ways. So, many academics talk about the securitization of development agendas, which also has caused problems in Colombia and other countries. So, I guess we need another panel.

**LUCK:** We'd have a panel instead of a project so that's easier that way. But let me let the Ambassador have the last word and again thank you very much for the initiative, and for Turkey for helping us put this together.

**APAKAN:** Thank you for this discussion. It has been an interesting discussion and I think it once again showed that this is an important book, *Security & Development*, and one should read it, and we should continue with this type of academic work and coordination with the UN and our institute here. I think we should need another panel to go further in detail to the matters' intent. Thank you.

**LUCK:** Thank you very much. We always know that the next panel is going to solve the problem. That's why we keep having more, but anyway thank you all for coming. I'm sorry we ran a couple of minutes over, but I think it saved you from some rather bad weather outside. So, thank you.