



EVENING FILM AND DISCUSSION

The Nuclear Tipping Point

Hosted by the Permanent Mission of Norway to the United Nations, the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) and the International Peace Institute

At the International Peace Institute's
Trygve Lie Center for Peace, Security, and Development

Thursday, May 13th, 6:00pm

Transcript edited by IPI

Warren Hoge: Very good. At this point, I'm stepping aside and turning it over to our two co-chairs, one of whom is Knut Langeland, Ambassador for Disarmament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway, and the other co-chair is Joan Rohlfing, President and Chief Operating Officer of the Nuclear Threat Initiative in Washington D.C.

Knut Langeland : Thank you very much. Ladies and gentlemen, thank you for being able to attend this very interesting and important meeting. Also would like to express appreciation of the film which is, to put it mildly, thought provoking.

There is, indeed, a new momentum with respect to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. This process started in the aftermath of the failed NPT 2005 review conference, and the fact that it was impossible to agree on anything regarding nuclear weapons at the world summit the same year. In the fall 2005, we got a new government in Norway, which was significantly more explicit on the objective of reaching a world free of nuclear weapons.

In 2007, NATO started to revisit its disarmament policy, and we had, of course, the articles, the famous articles in *The Wall Street Journal*. In

February 2008, the NTI, Hoover Institutions, and Norway organized an international conference on achieving the vision of a world without nuclear weapons.

Two years ago, the vision of a world without nuclear weapons was seen to be bold. Today, we are well beyond talking about the vision which may never be achieved. Today, the discussion is how to reach zero as soon as possible. As we heard from [Senator Sam] Nunn [in the film], we are in a race between cooperation and catastrophe. There is indeed a race between disarmament and proliferation. In the future, the question is not whether we will have status quo, but rather if we have zero or many nuclear weapon states.

Today, it is a stated policy objective of the Presidents of the United States and the Russian Federation to reach zero. In many ways, it could be said that we're back to the 1995 and 2000, where there was a consensus on moving forward on the disarmament agenda with the view to achieve elimination.

It should be recalled that the interpretation of the Article 6 of the NPT has been interpreted in different ways. Some believe that we need full disarmament in all spheres before we can do away with the nuclear arms. In other words, there must be near harmony before we get rid of the last bomb. From us, this perspective is not realistic. The NPT entered into force in 1970, which was during the Cold War. From our perspective, the pursuit of nuclear disarmament was seen as a precondition for the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995. Remember when the NPT entered into force in 1970, it had a duration of twenty-five years. Twenty-five years later, the Cold War was over, and the deal was work with zero or there will be no indefinite extension of the NPT.

Fortunately the deal was reached, and we got an agreement on principle and guidelines for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. There were other parts of that deal which I can come back to later, and in 2000, at the review conference, the NPT disarmament obligations were further elaborated through the thirteen practical steps. It should also be recalled that since 1970, there has been an evolution in international humanitarian law, and on the understanding of what sort of weapons are acceptable or not. Since 1970, we have prohibited two categories of weapons of mass destruction through the Biological Weapons Convention, and the Chemical Weapons Convention. We have also banned certain categories of conventional weapons, which cause unacceptable human harm, such as anti-personnel mines and cluster munitions. Other weapons, conventional weapons, are prohibited through protocols through the convention of the certain conventional weapons.

There can be no doubt that nuclear weapons are the most inhuman, indiscriminate, and disproportionate weapon ever created. That is why the International Red Cross committee is now questioning the nuclear weapons in relation to international humanitarian law. It is interesting to see that nuclear weapon states are now increasingly, nuclear weapon

states are now increasingly eager to argue, or at least some, that the purpose of their arsenal is to deter others from using them. The traditional military utility is therefore almost none. The mere existence now poses an increased security risk by accidental use, or that terrorist groups manage to get their hand on some of these weapons.

Continued possession of nuclear weapons will, in the long term, lead to proliferation. When some countries affirm that nuclear weapons are essential for their security, others will demand the same security coverage. Nuclear weapons have moved from being a source of pursued security to real insecurity. As [Former Secretary of State George] Schultz said in the film, nuclear deterrents worked in an easy way during the Cold War, but not now. That is why more and more Nunn calls for the full elimination of nuclear weapons. This is not done out of altruism, but out of realism. Today, new groups are joining the call for abolishing nuclear weapons, such as we saw in the film, Republicans in the United States, and conservatives in my country. Nuclear disarmament is good realpolitik. Some affirm that it will take time to get rid of nuclear weapons, and that was also a message in the film, but it should be remembered that since the end of the Cold War, more than 40,000 nuclear weapons have been dismantled, if we compare today with at the height of the Cold War in the 80s.

Reaching zero will therefore, within an adult person's lifetime, absolutely be doable. Yet we can learn from the experience from other disarmament treaties that one can put the ban on use, possession, and production, and when these bans have been set, then the next implication would be stockpile destruction. Some falsely hold disarmament up against nonproliferation. From our perspective, the Norwegian perspective, they are closely interlinked. We need further strengthen IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] safeguards. We must implement and enhance the nuclear security program, which was adopted at the Washington summit last month. Norway has been a strong advocate to minimize the use of highly enriched uranium in the civilian sector, and we hope that this will lead to a ban in the future. Norway and the IAEA organized an international symposium four years ago in Oslo. One key observation from the Oslo symposium was that converting civilian research reactors which produced medical isotopes, for instance, from using highly enriched uranium to lowly enriched uranium is both doable and desirable. The same can be said of nuclear disarmament. Thank you.

Joan Rohlfing:

Thank you very much, Ambassador . I want to thank the International Peace Institute as well as the Norwegian Foreign Ministry and our colleagues on the panel and in the audience for joining us this afternoon. I should probably introduce myself. I'm Joan Rohlfing. I'm the president of the Nuclear Threat Initiative, and we are very pleased to have been able to show you this somewhat shortened version of the documentary film "Nuclear Tipping Point." The film is a key component of a major project called the Nuclear Security Project that we have underway at NTI, the Nuclear Threat Initiative. This nuclear security project was launched by

George Schultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn in 2007 in the months following the first *Wall Street Journal* op-ed.

For those of you who would like to take a copy of the film with you, we do have, you may have seen in that back alcove, copies of the film. Please feel free to take one for yourself or your family or friends. Our goal is to disseminate the film as broadly as possible and facilitate and build the global dialogue and debate around the issues raised in the film.

The Nuclear Security Project has the key objective of trying to expand and internationalize the dialogue, support, and action toward the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons and the steps necessary to get there. We're also working through the project to try and close some of the gaps in our understanding of how we get from where we are today to the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons, and we've been working to achieve the objectives through a series of activities which, in addition to our film, include outreach by the four senior statesmen to both U.S. and international political leaders.

We've also been working to engage broader international network of partners and NGOs around the world, and I'm very pleased that we have several of our project partners on our panel this evening, Irma Arguello from NPS global, and Sasha Pikayev from IMEMO. I believe we've got several other representatives from partners represented in the audience: Vladimir Orlov from the Pir Center in Moscow, and I think somewhere, maybe Nobu Akiyama from Japan, JIIA in Japan.

International partners play a really important role in broadening this dialogue, and in our project, and in helping to build political momentum for the objectives of a world free of nuclear weapon. You all have a role to play in stimulating dialogue, and especially within your own circles of influence, and we all share, broadly, responsibility for helping to build very real momentum that was discussed in the film behind the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons.

Despite this promising progress, there's a lot more work to be done to move us closer to the ultimate vision, and the only way we can achieve this success is by making this a truly international effort. So I want to conclude my introductory remarks and thank you all for being here and for your activities, and as I give you a very brief introduction of our speakers, because you should all have the biographies in the handout, I will say, in the interests of time, I'm going to try and ask and manage the time for our speakers, but ask that you all limit your comments to 10 minutes a piece, and I've even got my handy iPhone timer, so I'll be keeping track of everyone, and I think we're meant to go in the order of Irma Arguello first, Rebecca Johnson second, and Sasha Pikayev third, and let me just say very quickly, by way of introduction, Ms. Irma Arguello is the founder and chair of the NPS global foundation, a private and nonprofit initiative in Buenos Aires, Argentina, committed to help reduce risks derived from proliferation and use of arms, with special emphasis on weapons of mass destruction. Dr. Rebecca Johnson is the executive director and co-

founder of the Acronym Institute and editor of the journal *Disarmament Diplomacy*. She's many other things as well, but I'll let you read that in the backgrounder, and Dr. Sasha Pikayev is Director of the Department for Disarmament and Conflict Resolution at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, otherwise known as IMEMO in Moscow. So thank you all very much for being here, and Irma, I'd like to ask you to offer your remarks first.

Irma Arguello:

Okay. Thank the organizers for inviting me. I'm delighted to be here. I'll try to give you a little picture about South American situation on policy priorities concerning fulfilling the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons.

First, it's important to remark that policy priorities in South America should be read from the kind of countries composing the region, and as a region as a whole, I think, is a low level of conflict region, and perhaps there are regions in the world which right now, a region free of highly enriched uranium. So concerning the countries of the region, it's important to remark that in one way, we have Argentina and Brazil that have a long tradition in significant nuclear development, including nuclear fuel cycle and advanced reactors. For those societies, Argentinean and Brazilian ones, nuclear energy is a value and a matter of national sovereignty and pride, and they don't want to lose what they have achieved so far. So any kind of plan involving the reduction of risk of nuclear weapons or of nuclear energy worldwide should consider this aspect.

The other South American countries, well some of them are considering suspending their nuclear activities, but they are a long way behind seeing nuclear energy as a national priority. So when we analyze South America region, we are used to analyze Brazilian and Argentinean situation. There are still gaps we have now, and we will be required to effectively promote the vision of world free of nuclear weapons, and in fact NPSGlobal, many others, are trying to close or to help close in such gaps.

So we have so far said the relative achievements throughout the region. South America is a sub-region in the key part of the first nuclear-weapons-free zone – Latin American, Caribbean, since 1967, established by the Tlatelolco treaty. And Argentina and Brazil, the verification system is based on full scope safeguards implemented by the national agency, ABAC, and the IAEA. An innovative system behind the verification is based on the neighbor-to-neighbor control. Brazilians go to control Argentine facilities, and Argentine inspectors go to control Brazilian facilities. Both countries have a well-known nuclear industry and non-development capabilities on key sensitive technologies. And we positively notice an increasing participation in the worldwide nuclear debate, and it has been perceived right now here at the NPT Review Conference with key South American interventions.

So there are several gaps to close within the region to define policy priorities for fulfilling the vision of a nuclear free world. Concerning

Tlatelolco, there are unilateral interpretive declaration by defined nuclear weapon states who ratified the treaty, reserving for themselves the right of using nuclear weapons and there are certain circumstances. This is an argumentation that today could be unacceptable in the light of reassessed role of nuclear weapons.

Other points of discussion concerning Tlatelolco treaty are the circulation of nuclear weapons in the region and the responsibilities for the nuclear arms state beyond the P5 nuclear states. Brazil has stated international defense strategy that they refuse to take more non-proliferation commitments until the nuclear weapon states give concrete steps, steps towards disarmament. This is a key point. It was declared without establishing which milestone could be satisfactory for the country to change its mind. And it is a core issue that we need to consider when we analyze nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation as well as peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

In my view, the additional protocol has not been enough discussed within and between both states [Brazil and Argentina], and not through a system of international approaches to nuclear fuel site -- it could be a kind of same consequence of the, that position.

Recently, we have perceived some high-risk moves such as the Brazilian President Lula's offer of mediation with Iran's nuclear issue. This has raised internal and external controversy, would mean that it is not a coordinated move.

Another not good news is progressive deterioration of democracy, institutional quality, and increase of corruption in several countries throughout the region. Populace and totalitarian regimes in close relations with supposedly or proven non-compliant regimes, such as the case of Venezuela and Iran, and this also posed a challenge.

So that concerning priorities, in my opinion, should be for South American states, the issue as a whole, and this concept could be extended to Latin American and Caribbean countries, give disarmament and non-proliferation a top priority on governments' political agendas is needed to advise the priority, increase international cooperation on the three pillars, plus terrorists as a multidimensional threat, achieve concerns to firmly promote the removal of nuclear weapon states interpretive declaration to Tlatelolco treaty, avoid directly or indirectly promoting or endorsing or given some kind of international legitimacy to proliferators or recognize non-compliant states, adopt a more proactive role in promoting nuclear disarmament to help nuclear states to disarm. For example, participate and promote international initiatives which could suggest paths toward a world free of nuclear weapons. In this sense, I remark that the initiative of Norwegian government concerning the verification of this mantle of nuclear warhead together with United Kingdom.

And finally, rid this whole paradigm of nuclear weapons as a symbol of first-world prestige or pride, helping societies understand the meaning

and connotation of nuclear weapons today by means of education on disarmament and non-proliferation and an open debate. And of course, working on reinforcing democracy and improving institutional equality in the region to reduce other risks. Thank you very much.

Rohlfing: Thank you very much, for remaining within the time constraints, too. I'll turn now to Dr. Rebecca Johnson.

Rebecca Johnson: Thank you very much, Joan. I'd like to start by thanking the government of Norway and NTI and IPI very much for hosting what I think is a really timely and important meeting, and I was struck watching the film which I'm seeing for the second time, in fact, by the role played by these, to use their own term, Cold Warriors for nuclear disarmament, and it's not so much that the ideas or proposals that they're making, the steps -- they're not new. They're very familiar to most of us. They've been on the agenda, really, for at least 15 years. But the role that they played was that in talking, in being leaders that had been in charge of nuclear policy in this country, by talking about the dangers of dependence on nuclear deterrents, they opened up a space. They demonstrated that being committed to national security meant being committed to working for a world without nuclear weapons, and they made it respectable to discuss how to turn that vision into a reality. Now I've been asked to talk about the UK and NATO and a little bit about what's going on across the road in the Non-proliferation Treaty Review Conference in 10 minutes, which is a tall order, but I'm going to try, and I'd like to start to start with the UK --

Rohlfing: We'll have time for further discussion in Q&A.

Johnson: That's what I hope. But I'm going to start with the UK, because we're confused too. Labour, which kind of deep down, and historically wanted nuclear disarmament, is out, and in some ways, that's almost a relief, because there's been a real trauma in the Labour Party about their divisions on nuclear policy that have actually led to some pretty incoherent positions. And now we have what we've kind of never really had before, which is a coalition between the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats, and as part of that coalition agreement, I just want to read to you the couple of sentences that relate to nuclear policy, because I think they're rather interesting. "The parties commit to holding a full strategic security and defense review alongside the spending review with strong involvement of the treasury. The government will be committed to the maintenance of Britain's nuclear deterrent," -- why they can't talk about nuclear weapons, but there we are -- "And have agreed that the renewal of Trident should be scrutinized to ensure value for money." Hmm. "Liberal Democrats will continue to make the case for alternatives. We will immediately play a strong role in the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty Review Conference and press for continued progress on multi-lateral disarmament."

So this is kind of interesting, because we're not quite sure what it means, except that something that the Acronym Institute, and if you look -- this is a little plug -- but if you look at the Liberal Democrats' recent study of

alternatives to Trident, because they themselves as a party have made a clear commitment not to replace Trident, you'll see quite a lot of fingerprints from our organization on there. We've long argued that there needs to be a strategic security, and not just a strategic defense review, a strategic security *and* defense review, and the fact that they're involving the treasury, I think, is important, because there are some real problems about the kind of cost of replacing Trident compared to the overstretch in the defense budget, particularly as there's been a lot of criticism, not least from members of the House of Lords, who are former admirals and generals, about the poor equipment of the young women and men being sent to Afghanistan to fight a war that really we shouldn't be fighting at all, and so the treasury issue is really, I think, a rather interesting one.

So we're going to have to see how that pans out, and I'm going to spend the rest of my time talking about what's going on over the road in the review conference, particularly on the disarmament issues, and bring in the NATO issue in that connection, because it's interesting. We're nearly at the end of the second week, and people keep saying to me, where's the group that's going to play the role that South Africa played in 1995 or the New Agenda Coalition of non-nuclear states played in 2000? And I have to say, it's a very different dynamic, and a lot of the agenda has actually been forged by the United States.

The Obama vision that was talked about in that film is very much where... a lot of the debate is around recognizing the need to enable Obama to do a lot more, which means recognizing the need to deliver a successful review conference. Now that doesn't mean that everybody's just sitting back, but it means that the kind of demands on disarmament are on reaffirming the nuclear disarmament commitments that were already made in 1995 and 2000 and which were reneged on, which were not implemented, which were rolled back upon by the previous administration and by other governments, particularly in one or two of the nuclear weapon states.

So we're seeing a lot of states calling for the reaffirmation, and indeed, the implementation of the thirteen steps, and some of the other commitments. But we're seeing two other issues coming to the fore at this conference that haven't as much been talked about.

In talking about the need to reaffirm, reducing the role of nuclear weapons, we're seeing two kinds of arguments: the de-alerting issue is coming up. There's a group of states: New Zealand, Switzerland, Nigeria, and others, I'm not going to try to reel them off, because I'm tired, but there's a group of six states that are actually known -- five states -- known as the "de-alerting group" which have put resolutions to the UN General Assembly and are now bringing that here to the review conference.

We're also hearing a lot of states talking about the need to reduce the role of nuclear deterrents, in fact, the need to reduce dependence on nuclear deterrents, we're hearing at a far higher level, not just from the non-aligned states, although we are hearing it strongly from the non-

aligned states, but from quite a lot of others, calls on NATO to end nuclear sharing. Calls on the U.S., together with NATO, to withdraw the nuclear weapons from European country soil, to take them back, to put them into storage, but at the same time, the whole issue of these very vulnerable small portable short range tactical nuclear weapons -- whether you call them theater nuclear weapons, substrategic, nonstrategic, tactical -- I know this was an issue that was discussed, but is very strongly discussed in NTI, was discussed in the film. This is an issue that has very definitely come home as an issue that, it's really felt that the NPT needs to send strong signals to NATO countries and to Russia about the need to address these issues, to address these weapons, to take them in the first instance, to get them out of Europe, to pull them back, to take them out of deployment, to put them into storage pending their total elimination. They have no strategic rationale, and this message is coming clear.

And the other bundle of issues is that in taking this idea, this vision of a world free of nuclear weapons, there's a growing number of countries -- and indeed, this is something that civil society has talked about a lot, but we're seeing at this review conference a significantly larger group of number of countries, saying we need to talk about the treaty based way in which we can turn the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons into the practical steps.

And so we're hearing more and more states talking about a nuclear weapon convention, the need to start the preparations that would lay the groundwork to negotiate a nuclear weapons convention, to prohibit nuclear weapons in the way that chemical and biological weapons have been prohibited, and at the same time, therefore, within that instrument, to strengthen the tools for, the safeguards, the security tools, the prevention of access for terrorists -- to do all of those things in one coherent comprehensive set of negotiations. We're seeing a lot more talk about that whether countries are deliberately using a term like a nuclear weapons convention, or whether they're calling for support for the UN Secretary-General's five-point plan, in which he talked about that, or some other means.

So these are issues that, in a sense, are new, and the last thing we want to say finally is that it's important to recognize a nuclear weapon convention is actually consistent with President Obama's vision as expressed in Prague, and with the Nuclear Security Project's mission and vision of a world free of nuclear weapons. What the idea of a treaty does is it puts it within the diplomatic sphere. It says that, in framing that objective, we need to think about the negotiations and the steps that need to be negotiated, and the way to frame the steps on the current thirteen-step agenda from ten years ago and the kinds of steps that I know NTI has been talking about a lot. So to frame those, not as a distant aspiration, but something that we really can start preparing for and begin to negotiate sooner rather than later, and perhaps, and I hope, certainly, and I'm older than President Obama, achieve within our lifetimes. Thank you very much.

Rohlfing: Thank you. Thank you Rebecca. Dr. Pikayev.

Sasha Pikayev: Thank you very much. Again, like my colleagues, I would like to express my gratitude for opportunity to speak here across the historical UN building in this historic time of the 2010 review conference, which we hope would be more successful than the previous one, which again, would be considerable achievement given the situation.

We are now... so that it is especially exciting to speak about further nuclear disarmament after the film. It's my first time I watched it, and after that, I slightly changed my presentation.

But first of all, let me speak about this new START treaty, and maybe I would be not very popular, but I know the attitude to this treaty among the community sitting here in this hall, but I think it is important to take into account that it was the first real strategic arms control agreement signed in this millennium, so that after twenty years, twenty years after the end of the Cold War, we didn't have any major arms control, strategic nuclear arms control agreement between Russia and the United States, and as we saw in the past decade, it created significant problems, including problems for nuclear non-proliferation regime. So this is the first nuclear strategic arms control agreement, signed between Russia and the United States, it's a real treaty, which is not certainly that encyclopedia-like. The START I, which expired last, in December, but it is not a Moscow treaty as well. This treaty, as you probably know, is sort of like all of the treaties. Like somebody described, they're just two sheets of paper without any verification regime.

This treaty, by the way, replaced the Moscow treaty. It is around 200 pages long, so that it's like an elegant novel, which you could read with some excitement, so on the one hand, it's not that complicated like START I, but on the other hand, it has real verification and transparency regime, and it means that for this decade, both Russia and the United States would have predictability on developing modernization of the nuclear forces, they would have reasonable transparency, and certainly would stabilize nuclear deterrence. Unfortunately, we're in a situation of nuclear deterrence, we here may want to go out from the situation, but it is peculiar reality, but as a treaty, at least, would help us to regulate that deterrence relationship, it would make U.S.-Russian nuclear relationship more transparent, and much more predictable, because without this treaty, START I expired, and no verification would sort of violate. Now if, I hope, or I have reasonable hopes that the treaty would be ratified, both in the U.S. and Russia, and after the ratification, certainly, transparency in the verification would resume, and this is very important achievement.

Also, this treaty includes some arms reduction, so they are not dramatic like, if you look at the paper, because devil is in details. I don't want to go into them, maybe during question-and-answer sessions if you like, but still, the treaty first legalized what was done by the sides unilaterally, they voluntarily moved below the ceilings of the former START I treaty, and in

Russian case, considerably below, so that these now voluntarily reductions were legalized, and if the treaty is ratified, they would be legally binding, so that they would not be... it would be difficult to reverse them back, and the treaty requires some further reductions which, again, is better than zero. It also requires a considerable de-alerting -- I think Senator Nunn spoke about de-alerting in the documentary. De-alerting is very important, and this treaty requires de-alerting of considerable proportion of both U.S. and Russian strategic forces, which again would help to stabilize nuclear relationship between the two countries, and certainly it would help to make the world not that dangerous as it was before and remains now.

And finally, what is probably the most important, this treaty should be considered as a first step to further nuclear reductions. Without this treaty, the whole process of the nuclear disarmament could be halted, could collapse, but with this agreement, we have reasonable hopes that we would go further, and here, we already have several scenarios debate so far on academic level, on expert level, on NGO level, but still we already started to think what to do after this new START treaty is ratified by both United States and Russia. I hope again that it would enter into force this year, before 2011.

Regarding further reductions, again, as I said, we have several scenarios, one of them is further strategic reductions. The Russians are ready to go further down in strategic nuclear reductions, and during the negotiations on this new START, Russian position supported lower ceilings than was finally incorporated into the treaty. So I believe that Moscow would not have any problems to go further down to maybe thousand strategic warheads associated with strategic nuclear delivery weapons. So it would be a reasonable step further down, which I think should be further elaborated.

Secondly, of course, non-strategic or tactical nuclear weapons -- it is an issue, and it is now under discussions, particular in the Nuclear Posture Review. There is an interesting idea to start talks on non-deployed warheads, which might include tactical nuclear warheads and non-deployed strategic nuclear warheads, and implicitly, there is a sort of proposal for a deal between Russia and the United States. The Russians are concerned about U.S. predominance on reserve strategic nuclear rockets, which could be quite quickly returned back to nuclear delivery vehicles, and the Russians, at least according to American estimates, possess predominance in tactical nuclear weapons.

However, for Russian hardliners, exactly the fact that this idea -- I think actually good idea, which also deserves further elaboration -- but for Russian hardliners, the very fact that this deal was already incorporated into American domestic document is an anathema. They could say that we could not, we should not follow American instructions, so that I am afraid this logic in NPR was a bit counterproductive. It was good in terms of academic, if it was an academic document. It was good, but for diplomatic reasons, probably this language was counterproductive.

But certainly tactical nuclear weapons could be, should be negotiated in other scenarios, probably that Russians believed that their tactical nuclear predominance must compensate their conventional inferiorities vis-à-vis NATO so that if there is a parallel process of conventional reductions and tactical nuclear weapons, arms control, it should be more workable for Moscow -- and by the way, Article 6 of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty requires not only negotiations of nuclear disarmament, but it also requires disarmament in the whole, which does not necessarily include the nuclear one. And also, we probably need to think about that, so here probably I finish, since I don't have more time.

Rohlfing: This is amazing. Thank you very much. All three of you finished in good time, and I appreciate your observing the time limits. I think we'd like to open it up to some questions and answers now, and I have a question that I'd like to pose, but I think we'll go to the audience first, and I saw a hand go up in the back first. Yes, please.

Seyed Vahid Karimi: Thank you very much. My name is Karimi, I am from the Mission of Iran to United Nations. I really enjoy it. Thank you very much. But I would like to clarify two points. The fact is that I was expecting more from the panelists to focus on the issue, because as you have seen in the film, the politicians, they talk and talk and talk, from President Kennedy to President Obama. How much it is? Half a century, they talked about it. I think the problem is that the countries who have the nuclear weapons have become the champion to eliminate it. That doesn't work. For half a century it didn't work. Two points I would like to have the view of the panelists, because although they say that they want to remove it, in fact, they are trying to eliminate the old weapons, nuclear weapons, to modernize it. It is a kind of vertical proliferation. And the second point is that I would like to bring to your attention this Nuclear Posture Review of newer strategy of United States. They are clearly, openly threatening to attack with nuclear weapons to some country! It is a danger! And I wish that some NGOs, these panelists, which after our hard work during the day, we come over here to learn more, apart from what the politician, they talk. Thank you.

Rohlfing: I know Ambassador Langeland would like to address that first, and then I'll ask if other panelists would like to address as well.

Langeland: Thank you very much. When we talk about nuclear disarmament, it is also a fact that all countries have a responsibility to contribute to nuclear disarmament. That is clearly part of the thirteen steps, and this goes also for my country. We try to contribute to, we had a presentation with the United Kingdom today on the verification of nuclear disarmament. I think that one important aspect non-nuclear weapon states can do in fostering a climate conducive for disarmament is through safeguards and showing transparency, and I hope that also Iran will be part of that process and implement additional protocol, which is called for by the IAEA, and also heed to the calls by the IAEA, I will not say security council now, but at least IAEA board of governors, to suspend sensitive nuclear activities,

and then enter a cooperation with the agency and the international community. With respect to U.S. policy, of course, I'm sure that the U.S. is best to defend its own policy, but at least from Oslo perspective, we noted the Nuclear Posture Review and the notion of negative security assurance is really progress if you compare it with the statements given in 1978, '82, and '95, and the last one when, in dealing with the extension of the NPT Review Conference, but of course, the different point of views on that one, but if we could, from this review conference make progress on the idea of negative security assurances, that would at least be a good thing.

Rohlfing: Sasha?

Pikayev: I think it was quite good question, but however, I think... of course we would like to have more in the area of nuclear disarmament, and of course we understand disappointment of many non-nuclear nations that not that much was done during the last 50 years, but however, a lot was done, and I could give you a figure that, according to the recent declassified U.S. data, the United States had 30,000 nuclear warheads in its arsenal at its peak, the Soviet Union, according to estimates, had around 50,000 nuclear warheads.

Now, according to the most conservative, most maximal estimates, they -- both Russia and the United States -- have no more than 20,000, but most likely around, between 10-15,000. So during the last decades the reduction of arsenals of both states was very significant, at least by four times, but maybe even more. Maybe by eight times. So that Russia and the United States did not ignore nuclear disarmament. They did not ignore their obligations under Article 6 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and it is also important to mention they did this disarmament in times when some others became nuclear.

When Russia and the United States disarmed, India and Pakistan and North Korea became nuclear power. So it is also important to mention. And regarding NPR, I'm not American, and for me, it's difficult to make judgments, but looking from Moscow, I think... of course in Russia, we are not very satisfied by NPR, we expect more from that, but one of the most important positive elements was that, for the first time, nuclear terrorism was mentioned here, was mentioned there as the major, major security threat, and this is a very important departure from the logic of the Cold War. So for the first time after the end of the Cold War, U.S. Nuclear Posture Review reflected new threats, new realities which emerged during last ten or so years, and this is very important, and this evaluation provides the common ground which would unite everybody else, because nuclear terrorism is a threat to everybody, including Iran. By the way, imagine if some Sunni fundamentalist, jihadist, Taliban obtain nuclear bomb from one of countries which is direct neighbor of Iran. Wouldn't it be a threat to Iranian security? I believe so. It would be threat to Iran, to Russia, I believe to the United States, and to any other country, including Pakistan itself.

Rohlfing: Thank you, Sasha. In the interest of time, what I'm going to do is, I'll take three questions, and then we'll try and do kind of a group of answers. The woman in the green.

Francine Lindberg: I'm Francine Lindberg, I live in New Mexico, and I've been an activist for abolishing nuclear weapons for about two years now, and I received, in the mail, one of your glossy packaged copies of this film. Actually, this is the first time I viewed it. I didn't actually watch it at home yet. And I'm just wondering where the funding came from for this particular project?

Rohlfing: Yes, thank you.

Lindberg: I might mention that I didn't solicit it, it just came.

Tarja Cronberg: Tarja Cronberg of Finland, Former Minister of Labor. I wanted to ask, I think it's a very good idea, this nuclear free world, but once you start looking at it more closely, then you come into other problems, and I find out that it's impossible, and also in this NPT Conference, we have seen that there are all kinds of hindrances, and I would actually like to ask the question about missile defenses, and Dr. Pikayev, because the question is that in the American NPR, Nuclear Posture Review, it is said that no, there should be no limitations to missile defenses, and on the other hand, Russia and China have put it as a precondition that in order to go to nuclear free world, we need limitations to missile defenses and to weapons in space, but particularly, missile defenses. So what about this question of missile defenses. How, is it a hindrance, or what?

Rohlfing: Okay, let me gather one more question over here.

John Hallam: John Hallam from Nuclear Flash Points, and I've worked for the last ten years on trying to lower the operational readiness of nuclear weapon systems and held a panel just today about that very subject. I was delighted to see the prominence given to that in the film. However, I do note that both in the new START treaty, and in the NPR, particularly actually in the new START treaty, lowering operational readiness does not figure. I note that in the NPR, there is, on the one hand, a statement that we are not going to change the status of the operational readiness of our nuclear weapons systems, but on the other hand, there is considerable attention given to increasing Presidential decision-making time, which can only be done by lowering the operational status of nuclear weapon systems. There simply isn't any other way to do it. I wondered if you might, if that's, particularly Alexi, but also any others of you that want to, might like to comment on that particular aspect of the move towards zero, it's a step which I believe is of literally apocalyptic significance in getting rid of nuclear weapons.

Rohlfing: Okay, why don't we stop for the moment, anyway, with those questions. I'll tackle the first one. I think it's very simple on the question of funding for the film. It was NTI, my organization, was the executive producer of the film. The funding, we got some funding for the film from the Carnegie Corporation of New York, some funding from the Macarthur Foundation,

and the balance is, comes from our general accounts. We have a wide diversity of donors at NTI. Let me ask, on missile defenses, we'll save the operational readiness question for you, Sasha. Do any of my other panelists want to volunteer on the ballistic missile defense issue?

Johnson:

Well, I'd actually like to have a chance to respond to the very first question, because I think, I think it's very important to make a distinction between arms control reductions and nuclear disarmament, because as South Africa, Ireland, and various others raised in, during the debates yesterday, countries -- governments can choose to reduce nuclear arsenals in many ways, often very, very substantial, for a variety of different reasons. At the end of the cold war, at least four of the nuclear weapon states, very, very substantially, and by and large, unilaterally, cut their nuclear arsenals really down to much smaller sizes, and yet if you look at their doctrines, and you look at their policies, you're quite right. They haven't committed themselves to nuclear disarmament. They were still very dependent on nuclear deterrents.

There wasn't time in this brief panel to be going into all those issues, but I do urge you to look at the briefings in this pack, which, if they're not in the back still, I know some were, are available on the Acronym website, because we actually try to go into quite a lot of depth about the need to devalue and marginalize nuclear weapons, and that's part of the text, the subtext, as well as the text, that is going on in civil society in particular, and also in the NPT.

And if we sort of could talk about kind of being stuck on Cold War rhetoric, let's be honest that your country and quite a lot of your colleagues in the NAM [Non-Aligned Movement] are also, I'm sorry to say, really stuck in Cold War thinking about certain issues, including, I have to say, things like security assurances. I welcome that the Nuclear Posture Review has returned to, I shouldn't say it's significantly, it's returned to a narrower role or narrower set of options for the potential use of nuclear weapons, but the NAM keeps wanting legally binding security assurances. Now were they possible in the 1960s, that could have, I think, been a very important contribution in the NPT, but they were not. Now, all that you would do, if you ever sat some countries down to negotiate for legally binding security assurances, is that you'd actually have the unintended consequence of providing a legal place, a legal sanction for certain kinds of uses and threats of use of nuclear weapons, that frankly do not exist today under international law and international humanitarian law. The ICJ [International Court of Justice] was pretty clear it was very difficult to see anywhere in the nuclear doctrines where use of nuclear weapons could be consistent with international law, but if you do legally binding security assurances -- that's what you would create. So you need to be very careful what you're wishing for, too, and what this argues for, and I didn't have time to go, is actually what we... the real step we should take, and I think it'd be absolutely consistent. I know Max Kampelman, who was referred to by George Schultz in the film, has this view, we had him speak to the [NPT] Prep Com in 2009 on this.

The real task now, while we're trying to get a hold on issues like nuclear materials and security and reduce, within a framework that actually is leading towards the elimination and abolition of nuclear weapons, what we actually need -- and it's a step that could be rather quickly taken, does not require negotiation of a treaty -- is the recognition that the use of nuclear weapons, any use of nuclear weapons, would be a crime against humanity, a war crime. Now this is actually consistent with what was in the Nuclear Posture Review that President Obama wanted this norm against the non-use of nuclear weapons that has very precariously, but nevertheless, in a fragile way, held since 1945, for this to be extended in perpetuity forever. Now the only way you're going to do that is actually by having the use of nuclear weapons declared a war crime. Don't go down the road of security assurances. Go for what you really ought to want, which is no use.

Rohlfing: Thank you. I realize we're still looking for someone to tackle the missile defense question, but let me ask Sasha.

Pikayev: Thank you. I think we discussed that in some details in Helsinki, if I don't mistake, but yes, this is a problem. Missile defense is a problem. But let us go back to 1960s. At that time, it was Johnson, the Johnson administration talked to then Soviet leaders that strategic defense was a bad thing, because the Soviet Union believed that defense was good and offense was bad, so even strategic defense was a good thing, and strategic offense was bad, but maybe unfortunately, the Soviet leaders became good pupil of maybe bad teachers, and now the sides turned, changed their position, and now the Russians believe that missile defense, strategic missile defense, unlimited strategic missile defense is not a good thing, and they believe the more defense, the more strategic defense, the more strategic offense. The position now is that, thanks to changes Obama administration made on missile defense posture in Europe, the Obama plan does not represent immediate threat for Russian strategic nuclear deterrent, therefore the new START could be implemented, but, according to Obama plan, by the end of this decade, European missile defense deployment would have to obtain strategic capability, and if it happens, well, it certainly would make, would create a very different strategic picture, and it might trigger some reaction.

Already this missile defense idea presses the Russians to make some bad plans, particularly, it was officially announced that there is a plan to resume production of heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles, starting from 2016, and those CBMs are considered as best possible countermeasure to missile defenses, but it will happen in the future, so that the fourth stage of the Obama administration plan, the decision will be made, not by Obama administration, and very likely the decision on ICBM production would be made, not be recent administration in Moscow.

So I think still we have maybe five years, maybe more, to discuss this issue, and in the NPR, I think there is a very important positive element that there is readiness to discuss that issue, to have consultations, possibly we might have some cooperation there already in non-strategic

area, there is some advanced stage of consultation, particularly through Russian NATO council, so hopefully, there is Mr. Putin plan, whatever you think about that, but still, it gives a ground for further discussions on strategic defense area.

So hopefully this discussion made in a more cooperative environment comparing to what happened after Mr. Bush decided to deploy Minuteman II in Poland, because you know this missile defense was based on Minuteman II, Minuteman III stages. Certainly now it is a very different situation, and this is a more cooperative environment, and we probably... what we could do is cross fingers and hope that these consultations will produce some positive results and would not bring us to another disaster in six or ten years terms. But this is difficult question which, unfortunately mars the bilateral, bilateral relations so far. We have to admit that.

Rohlfing:

I think we have time for just a couple more questions, and I want to take my prerogative as chair to pose one of the questions to our panelists representing nuclear weapons, who come from nuclear weapon states. I'm struck by the fact that we have all been talking about the importance of disarmament and working toward a world free of nuclear weapons, and yet we have really no ability to measure our progress against a baseline, because we have no baseline declarations of the number of nuclear weapons possessed by those states that are nuclear weapons capable. We also have no baseline of the quantities of weapons-usable nuclear materials that we have in the much larger set of states that have highly enriched uranium or plutonium. So it strikes me that it's time as part of this dialogue of how we build a system, and the steps toward the vision of zero, to be talking about declarations of baseline inventories, and I was very encouraged to see the U.S. government last week announce the number of nuclear weapons in its stockpile, or at least those that are in the categories of active and inactive, that is a really big positive first step. So I guess the question for our two panelists from the UK and Russia is, what are the chances that the UK and Russia might be willing to follow suit, and how can we encourage all countries who have either materials or weapons to announce how many they have so we can begin tracking the reductions?

Johnson:

I think in many ways, the UK has actually taken the lead on this, and it is one of the good things. They haven't said exactly how many weapons -- they've set a ceiling, and the ceiling is 160, which is enough, plus some more, to equip three fully nuclear armed submarines, each with 48 warheads, which is ridiculous! Absolutely ridiculous when you actually think of Britain's security situation as a group of islands of the west coast of Europe, but at least it's taken that step, and it's also in terms of the declaration of fissile materials, together with France. They're fairly open about those things, and I agree with you that I think... for a long time, there's been a kind of UN conventional arms register, and it used to be a demand headed by Egypt, that there ought to be a kind of nuclear arms register, and it was always pooh-poohed and shoved to one side as absolutely ridiculous. But you're absolutely right that, if we're serious

about this, this is something, this is a starting place. But it's not only about the materials and the weapons, it's got to be also about the doctrines. You know, there's quantitative disarmament, and that is very, very necessary, but we're not going to get very far, and I do agree with the question at the back on this aspect. We're not going to get very far unless at the same time we really have scrutiny about the doctrines, and what they stand for, and my feeling is that if you actually made each of the nuclear weapon states identify far more precisely the role that nuclear weapons play in their security doctrines and their military and nuclear policies, you'd find that it sort of shifts like the emperor's nakedness, the new clothes that don't really exist for them, except in ephemeral terms as kind of status and Security Council, and if they have them, we have to have them, and all those sorts of things. So let's also require the nuclear weapon states to be much clearer about what role they assign to nuclear weapons.

Rohlfing: Thank you. Sasha?

Pikayev: Well, again, I agree with Rebecca. It's very good and timely question. I have maybe couple of points here. One point is that Russian nuclear arsenals, like the U.S. nuclear arsenals, are probably much more transparent to each other than nuclear arsenals of other powers because of strategic nuclear arms control, which requires very intrusive verification and requires very intrusive visits of inspectors to very sensitive nuclear related facilities of both countries. Secondly, for instance, American inspectors even visited Russian storage sites of nuclear warheads, which is top secret in Russia itself. Russian leaders are so afraid of Russian hardliners that they didn't want to disclose that information.

And the second point is that, of course, the decision of the Obama administration, which I think was very timely decision, to declassify a total number of American operational deployed nuclear arsenal, would establish significant pressure on the Russians, and I believe that the Russians could easily disclose their numbers of operationally deployed weapons and somebody would be very surprised how low that level is. I believe much lower than American one, but maybe this is the reason why the Russians hesitate to make such unilateral declassification, but the further we would go in our bilateral arms control, the more transparency third nuclear powers would demonstrate, the sooner the Russians will disclose the figures.

Rohlfing: One final question. Vladimir Orlov?

Vladimir Orlov: Thank you very much, and actually I would like to make a brief comment on what just was discussed. Congratulations with the film, and I will speak now actually as a member of the Russian delegation, because what NTI does, and what we got from the Norwegian statement and the plenary is something which is positive on the things we have at the Main Committee I right now across the road, and probably for our discussions during later this and next week on disarmament issues. Idea of base camps and mountaintop is very helpful. Ideas our Norwegian colleagues expressed

are also very helpful and practical. I think that there are issues in disarmament which can and should be addressed right now, right away, and should be included immediately in the recommendations for already this conference. There are issues. We should work and prepare for the next round, but we should have the list of that issues, we shouldn't put them on the shelf, and issues like de-alerting, like tactical nuclear weapons, definitely transparency and consensus-building should be there. I think this should be a good time for the next few months after this conference also, to have a round on discussions on each of these issues which are clearly maybe not now on the agenda, which will, should, and must come on the agenda very soon.

And just as a footnote, I think in all this discussion, we missed one point, I'm sure you would agree with me, how non-proliferation education and disarmament education is important as a core element of disarmament and non-proliferation activities, and I should say that we're happy to inform all the colleagues here that forty nations now, more than forty nations made a joint statement on disarmament and non-proliferation education, and Russian Federation, for the first time, joined this statement. So far, we are the only nuclear weapon state who joined that statement. I don't know why, but I would be happy to see others to join and to work together, not only on nuclear disarmament, per se, but also on educating on the importance of this issue. Thank you.

Langeland:

Just to respond. I fully agree with you that we need also some concrete output on de-alerting, and de-alerting is also, if I recall correctly, recapped, part of the thirteen steps from 2000, and the de-alerting community, which has tabled the resolution in the UN general assembly some years ago over the last few years, at least my country has voted for it, and we have got also other NATO countries to follow that vote, and we think it is essential to proceed on reducing the operational status of deployed nuclear weapons, not as an alternative to disarmament, but as a step in reducing their salience in security policies, and contribute towards disarmament.

The same on tactical nuclear weapons or short-range nuclear weapons, or substrategic nuclear weapons. We think that it is essential to address this issue, which also was part of the thirteen steps, and some of us have made a statement in the Main Committee I, Poland, Norway have also worked on the paper, we had an initiative in April to seek progress on the tactical nuclear weapons in Europe through balance tech-wise, and I would say quite realistic approach, trying to look, go through steps with the transparency, confidence-building, then withdrawing our weapons pending the full elimination, which should be the goal, and bringing tactical nuclear weapons into the traditional legally binding arms disarmament process.

Orlov:

Thank you very much.

Rohlfing:

So I think that brings us to the end of our session this evening. I want to thank all of you for attending and for your perseverance through an

evening that's gone later than we had originally expected, and I'd like to ask that we give a hand to our panelists and our hosts. Thank you very much.