Edward C. Luck: Good afternoon everybody. On behalf of IPI, let me thank all of you for coming. We appreciate such a large turnout. It's a nice way to start the Fall season.

We're very pleased, for once, to be actually pushing one of our publications, though we enjoy pushing other people’s as well. But this is a first of a series of publications from quite an ambitious study, and I must say, a little more academic study than we sometimes do here, on the question of compliance with decisions by the Security Council related to civil wars. It's quite a large, comprehensive study. I can't understand all of its quantitative parts, but Christoph can explain them to us. He and his colleagues have put together quite a large data set, which they are analyzing quantitatively. They are also conducting qualitative research on a lot of individual cases. We think that this is a nice study that combines both academic rigor on the one hand and real policy applications on the other.

We have really an outstanding panel, two terrific commentators. Before starting with that portion of the program, since Christoph is going to have a PowerPoint presentation, we thought that he would start off here, and then the panel will go to the stage. Christoph Mikulaschek is a senior policy analyst here at IPI. He actually is a former student of mine. That was the low point of his career so far. He’s trained both in law and in international relations, both in his native Austria, in France, and at Columbia. He’s done a number of very interesting and helpful things for us at IPI, covers a lot of ground in many issues, but has been one of the stalwarts in this very important study. You'll note there two other authors on this study: James Cockayne who is no longer with IPI, now with the Global Center on Counterterrorism Cooperation, and Chris Perry, policy analyst who’s
right here if you have any questions for him. We’re delighted to see the first of these publications come out. As I say, there will be others along the way as well. But with that, let me give it back to Christoph Mikulaschek and thank him again for his terrific work on this.

Christoph Mikulaschek: Thank you, Ed, for your very nice words of introduction. Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen, for more than two years now, IPI has been undertaking a major research project on the role of the UN Security Council in resolving internal armed conflicts. The report I’m going to present to you today is the first written output of the study. It aims to quantitatively map the evolving approaches of the UN Security Council to the resolution of contemporary civil wars over the past two decades. The data presented today and in the publication, which is available in the back of the room, is derived from a new data set Ed has mentioned that we have compiled here at IPI.

Over the next 12 minutes, I will briefly address three key trends analyzed in this publication: First, the movement of the Security Council from a stance of non-engagement with civil wars during the Cold War to a stance of systematic engagement with the majority of all major internal conflicts that broke out during the last two decades. Second, the question which recent civil wars the Security Council did address in its resolutions, and which ones it chose not to formally address on its agenda. And third, I will describe recent evolutions in the repertoire of conflict management strategies of the UN Security Council.

But first of all, I would like to address an important methodological and terminological question: what actually does constitute a civil war? For this study, we define a civil war as an armed conflict between a government and one or more opposition groups that concerns the government and/or the territory in the state where the fighting occurs, and that causes more than 500 battle-related deaths during any given single year of the conflict. According to this definition, the world witnessed 44 civil wars over the first 18 years after the Cold War, between 1989 and 2006. Over this period, the Security Council adopted 617 resolutions dealing with 27 of these 44 civil wars.

Chapter VII of the UN Charter authorizes the Security Council to engage in the management of civil wars when they constitute a threat to international peace and security. When the continuance of a civil war is likely to endanger international peace and security, the Council is empowered to take action under Chapter VI. During the Cold War, as we all know, the Council largely refrained from formally engaging in the management of internal armed conflicts, just as it frequently chose a passive stance on inter-state crises. This pattern quickly changed after the Cold War. On this chart you can see the number of resolutions the Security Council addressed to all civil war situations in every year since the end of the Cold War. It shows that in 1989, for the first time, the Council adopted three resolutions addressing civil wars. That’s the beginning of the red line.

Just three years later, the number surged from 3 to 69 resolutions. This unprecedented surge in activity abruptly ended in the midst of the conflict management crises in Bosnia, Rwanda, and Somalia. In the wake of the second surge of UN peacekeeping after 1999, the Security Council once again increased the number of resolutions it addressed to civil war in the world. Between 2006 and 2009, the number of Council resolutions related to civil wars has been declining. Over the same period, however, the average length of each Security Council resolution more than doubled. In 2008, for the first time, the Security Council formally spoke to 40% of all active civil wars in the world, and the figure
remained at a similarly high level last year, high in comparison to the historical levels.

The growth of the portion of civil wars on the active agenda of the Council becomes apparent when active civil wars and post-civil war situations are considered together. The blue line on this figure shows that between 2003 and 2009, the number of civil war situations, both active civil wars and civil wars in the post-conflict phase taken together addressed by at least one resolution per year doubled from 9 to 18.

The Council did not only increase the extent to which it engaged with civil wars, but also changed the manner in which it sought to resolve internal armed conflict. During the first 18 years after the Cold War, the council became increasingly willing to issue complex sets of demands to civil war parties. During this period, the average number of demands of specific exhortations to civil war parties in each resolution increased sixfold. After 1993, the council adopted more demands to civil war parties addressing governance issues than demands dealing with the conflict parties’ military behavior. So there was also a substantive change in the content of resolutions. What this shows is that once the Security Council started to engage with civil wars in the early 1990s, it did not merely seek to end the fighting, but it also encouraged the conflict parties to reach and implement political and governance arrangements that would prevent conflict relapses and build self-sustaining peace.

All these trends depict a gradual shift of the Security Council from a stance of non-engagement in civil wars to one of active engagement with the majority of all civil wars that broke out after the Cold War. The Council’s civil war response strategies did not evolve evenly over time, and they also greatly varied between different civil war situations. Between 1989 and 2006, the Council addressed more than 600 resolutions to 27 civil wars. At the same time, it did not issue a single resolution to 17 other civil wars.

Many factors, indeed, explain this pattern. Under the Charter of the Council is deliberately invested with a great amount of discretion in choosing a strategy to maintain international peace and security. To some extent, the Council’s selective approach is even rooted in the Charter itself. Some civil wars may lack an international dimension and therefore not be viewed as a threat to international peace and security, despite their obvious implications on human security. Chapter VIII of the charter assigns a prominent role to regional arrangements, which have become much more active in the area of peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding over the last two decades, and which may sometimes have a comparative advantage over the UN in taking the lead in conflict resolution. And last but not least, the veto power of the permanent members under article 27 of the Charter has also constrained the council from engaging in the management of conflicts on the territory of P-5 states and in areas of their perceived vital interest.

Overall, as you can see on this chart, between 1989 and 2006, the Council tended to engage more quickly and more actively with civil wars in Africa and in Europe than it did in Asia and the Americas. The slide shows that 88% of all specific behavioral requests included in Security Council resolutions and addressing civil war parties were addressing warring factions in Africa and in Europe, the two continents depicted in green and light blue. At the same time, Asia and the Americas did account for more than 40% of all civil wars in the world. These regional variations undoubtedly defy simple explanation. Peter Wallensteen and Patrik Johansson reason that this pattern may reflect different
nature of linkages between Europe on the one hand and conflict areas on the other. According to these two scholars, the Balkans, the Caucuses, and to a lesser extent, conflict areas in Africa are more geographically, culturally, and economically linked to Europe than conflict areas in South and Southeast Asia and Central America. This closeness, according to the two scholars, combines with Europe’s strong representation on the Council.

The Council’s smaller engagement may also be due to another reason. In Asia and in the Americas, many governments display a marked tendency to consider domestic political violence a purely internal affair.

In addition to variations in the Council’s civil-war related activities by region, differences in political regime characteristics in the civil war country can explain some of the discrepancies in the Council’s involvement in civil war management. The figure on this slide depicts the average political authority characteristics of states undergoing civil wars that were addressed by at least one resolution during the entire conflict cycle in blue. The average regime characteristics of civil war countries to which the Council never formally spoke in a resolution are depicted in red. We display three different indicators of political regime authority, regime characteristics developed by the University of Maryland and Freedom House.

As you can see, on all of these indicators, conflicts on the active agenda of the council tended to occur in countries that were more autocratic than conflicts the council did not formally speak to. What this seems to indicate is that the Council’s conflict management strategies tended to be linked to broader strategy of encouraging democratization in war torn countries. Recent studies suggest that the Council pursued post-conflict democratization, not as much as a goal in and of itself, but rather to promote democratization as a means for achieving national reconciliation and the prevention of conflict relapse.

Since the end of the Cold War, the council has developed a diverse repertoire of conflict management strategies. The Council borrowed from, and added to, its past practice in inter-state war, and thereby it adjusted its toolbox to the special circumstances of civil wars.

One of the important conflict management strategies of the Council has been to reinforce existing peace processes. Its engagement in the resolution of civil wars often takes the form of an iterative process designed to reinforce existing bargaining between the parties. Some 44% of all the demands the Council issued in its resolutions to civil war parties requested the parties merely to live up to commitments they had already made themselves in earlier agreements. So almost half of the Council’s stipulations to civil war parties did not impose any new obligations on them, but only reminded them of their own promises.

Our data confirms that sanctions have remained an important tool in the Security Council’s repertoire of conflict management strategies. Between 1989 and 2006, more than half of the Security Council’s demands to civil war parties were made at a time when sanctions were imposed against these warring factions. This suggests that one of the preferred strategies of the Council to obtain leverage over warring factions was to impose sanctions and then use the removal of these sanctions as an incentive for behavioral change. But rather than merely using sanctions as a bargaining chip, the Council also sought to impose, to raise the cost of continuing belligerence for recalcitrant civil war parties. Arms embargoes can dramatically increase the costs of war fighting, and arms embargoes, indeed, were the type of sanctions most frequently imposed on civil war parties.
The impact of sanctions, threats of sanctions, positive incentives, different types of peace operations, other kinds of field presence, monitoring of compliance by civil war parties with the demands of the Security Council, and a whole lot of other civil war management strategies were not analyzed in this present presentation, but as Ed pointed out, they will be at the center of our, of the next phase of this research project. What we'll analyze is to what extent, and under which circumstances civil war parties tend to comply with Security Council resolutions.

Our hypotheses are that the more complex the conflict management setting at the time when the resolution is issued, the less likely compliance is to occur, all else being equal. And in a similar way, we hypothesize that the commitment of the United Nations as a whole to the course of action the Security Council demands from civil war parties has an impact on the likelihood of compliance. But at this point, these are just hypotheses, and I hope that I will have a chance to present our findings on these two hypotheses in the future. Our findings will be published in an edited volume and further policy reports. We will also publish a major database of Security Council resolutions, which we have gathered for this present publication.

I hope that you will remain interested in this important topic, and in future outputs of this project. Let me conclude by acknowledging my two co-authors, Chris Perry and James Cockayne. Chris is here with us today and ready to take questions. James is unfortunately on an important overseas assignment. I would also like to thank the members of the advisory group of this project, some of whom are here with us today, and IPI's own editors, Adam Lupel and Ellie Hearne. Thank you.

Edward C. Luck: It always makes me happy when Christoph does the easy version that I can understand as opposed to the highly, highly quantitative version, which is slightly beyond me.

We have two excellent commentators, and we've asked them to do about 8 or 10 minutes each. We have one of the premiere diplomats at the UN who also has a bit of an academic background, and we have one of the premiere academics who also has a bit of a policy background. So we'll see if you can tell which is which as they speak.

Gert Rosenthal, as many of you know, is the Permanent Representative of Guatemala to the UN. This is the second time he's had that position. In between, he's served as a foreign minister of Guatemala. He has had pretty much every post one could imagine around the UN, from head of the UNDP governing board, head of both ECOSOC and the Fifth Committee, which I guess he's going to take up again. I don't quite understand that, but some people are gluttons for punishment.

Before working as a diplomat, he was an academic. He was executive director of ECLAC at one point, and he was an economist and professor at an earlier stage. So he's one of the most thoughtful diplomats I can think of, and we hope he will talk among other things a little bit about how Guatemala fits as one of the cases where the Security Council has, in fact, looked at a civil war situation. I thought it was quite striking, Gert, how that chart about the geographical diversity in the early years, ’89-’90, of course, the Americas are very prominent, and after that, not much, less so.
Our second commentator is Michael Doyle, who, at one point, was a Vice-President of IPI, but he is now a professor of many things at Columbia. He is so versatile that he’s a professor of political science, international relations, and law. He also served as Assistant-Secretary-General and Special Advisor to Kofi Annan, and he has written very widely on these topics, including an important book in 2006 on peacekeeping operations, which also had a rather unpleasant quantitative side, which scared some of us, but had very sensible and sound policy conclusions nevertheless. Michael has been a long time collaborator and friend, and we’re delighted that he would join us. So we’ve asked them to do about 8 or 10 minutes each, and then we’ll have plenty of time for discussion, I think. So Gert, if you’d go first. Thank you.

Gert Rosenthal: You asked about the change in the geographical composition of conflict, and the answer’s really very simple. And that is that civil war in Central America were really proxy wars with an east/west connotation. So assume, as the Berlin Wall came tumbling down, the civil wars in Central America were doomed. It took a while, but that’s the simple explanation.

Anyway, thanks for inviting me. I’m happy to be here as a speaker instead of my usual role as a participant, and I am surprised you invited me, because I’ve never been a member of the Security Council, although we’re now trying –

Edward C. Luck: What better reason?

Gert Rosenthal: Maybe. But I don’t have first hand experience in the Security Council. I have followed it, and of course, Guatemala is mentioned in the very first page of the report, but one has to say that the Security Council had very little involvement in the Guatemala Peace Process. It really fell under the aegis of the General Assembly.

But be that as it may, I found both the reading, and now the oral presentation of the report fascinating, and I would like to complement the very lucid presentation Christoph made with a few general comments. To start with a positive side, I believe that the analysis of trends in the nature, scope, and quality of Security Council engagement over time is timely, interesting, and illuminating. The same can be said for the analysis of the evolution over time of how the Council has decided where and when to engage in any particular civil war, and also for something you barely touched on in your presentation, the change over time in the strategies of the Security Council, which I found very interesting.

I really don’t have any particular criticism of the report, but rather comments or a few questions I would raise, and in order to keep within my 8 minutes, I’m going to make seven very brief points.

First, the document is a little bit like seeing the preview of a movie. We are informed that to see the really good part, you have to wait for the movie itself!

Edward C. Luck: And we will charge admission.

Gert Rosenthal: Right! Thus while we are promised a more complete analysis on calls or relations between Security Council demands and the level of compliance, we are told that this will be the object of a future analysis. Having said that, the report certainly has intrinsic merits of its own, but how much it will contribute to our knowledge of the functioning of the Security Council still depends in large part on the future findings.
Second, my personal professional deformation as an economist makes me very partial to quantitative analysis. As I read and re-read the document, and now as I listen to the oral presentation, I have the distinct impression that the authors are on to something. But it was never quite clear to me exactly what they were on to. The different types of demands in Security Council resolutions listed in Annex 3 could lead to a very complex matrix on interdependent relationships. Indeed, so many variables were put on the table in each of the three parts of the report, and such a wide range of outcomes in compliance or Security Council demands were described that the reader, or at least this reader, is left somewhat confused regarding what the qualitative analysis really proves, if indeed it proves anything at all.

Third, most of us go around saying that each civil war is unique and that each Security Council response is made to order or tailored for each specific situation. In other words, no one size fits all. On the other hand, we also go around saying that there are lots of lessons to be learned from the cumulative Security Council engagements, which, as the report states, do not offer a single template, but they at least offer a framework which has elements of universal validity. One would hope that the qualitative analysis behind this work would distinguish between the unique responses and those that appear to be universally valid or valid for at least most civil war situations.

Fourth, one would hope that this type of analysis would contribute to a better understanding of the elements in civil war situations that predispose them to success or failure, such as levels of development, levels of institutional development, size, depths of cleavages, historical considerations, etc. It isn’t clear to me that this was the intention of the authors, but at any rate, the analysis so far does not contain any predictors of success. On the other hand, maybe this is not such a bad thing, since it raises a risk of the Security Council taking on the potentially most successful cases, rather than the ones that pose the greatest risks to peace and security.

Fifth, the trends described in the report show the Security Council moving increasingly from its natural role in the areas of peacemaking and peacekeeping into the areas of peacebuilding, where its mandates are less clear. This feeds into the tension generated by real or purported intrusions of the Security Council into the turf of the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council, and the Peacebuilding Commission. On the latter, the Peacebuilding Commission, the report has surprisingly little, virtually nothing to say, adding credence to the generalized feeling in the house that the Peacebuilding Commission has not lived up to its original expectations during its first five years of existence, and in that regard, as most of you know, there is a letter of the permanent representatives of Ireland, Mexico, and South Africa, which contain sort of an analysis, the five-year review of where the Peacebuilding Commission is.

Sixth, I found it very surprising that no mention is made of the peacekeeping budget as a possible element in the decisions taken by the Security Council on what civil wars it decides to engage in. It seems to me to be a relevant consideration. Indeed, the only reference at all to budgetary matters in the whole report is made when alluding to MONUC, and how it comprises one fifth of the peacekeeping budget.

Finally, I could not agree more with the observation made at the end of the report regarding what it calls new conflict drivers, such as organized crime, a huge problem in my own country and region, and climate change. This suggests that the considerable evolution in the way that the Security Council engages with
conflict will continue to change in the future, perhaps radically. Could we contemplate the possibility of the drug cartels acquiring so much leverage that the international community will regard them as a threat to peace and security? And what implications does this hold for the future? Overall, perhaps the most important contribution of the report, at least in my opinion, is that it shows a Security Council which is continually evolving in many areas. This contradicts the common perception of a rather stagnant organ, which is set in its ways and resistant to change. All that is needed now is to reform the structure of the membership to complete the panorama. Thank you.

Edward C. Luck: That was terrific. I forewarned it'd be hard to tell whether you were a diplomat or an academic, but I think you did both sides of your professional life very well with that, so thank you, we appreciate it. Michael, I don't know if you're going to be the diplomat now or the professor, but either way.

Michael W. Doyle: I'll try to be both. Thank you. It's a real pleasure to be here at IPI, and I want to start by joining Gert in congratulating the three authors. I think they've done a remarkably meticulous piece of basic research, and that's interesting, because IPI is a policy think tank, and this is the kind of basic research that more usually would be done in universities with a big grant from the National Science Foundation or from a federal or an international funding agency. But I think it reflects a longstanding commitment by IPI that even though its focus is policy and improving policy and monitoring the UN, that where it sees a gap in research that's not being done or hasn't been done well enough, to step in, and in a number of cases in the past, the IPI has done that, and I congratulate these authors, because they've done the same thing over again. That is, to fill in an important piece of basic research.

What they've done is they've superbly begun a documentation of the evolving role of the Security Council, the institution in which the member states have placed primary, but not sole, responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. I think most importantly, they're very careful not to argue beyond their data, which is a very important thing to do, one of the first basic rules of academe, and they don't confuse correlations with causations, another very important rule in academic research. Nonetheless, I should say that the data that they do document whet our appetite to begin to do the kind of assessment of the Security Council in its role in peace and security that their research facilitates, but by providing us this wide range of information. So I'm going to take a little step out onto that platform that may be hanging out over the side of the boat, and hopefully it won't crack off, but I want to try to draw a couple of inferences from what I see is very interesting material here, and I may be going a little bit too far, but I will do so nonetheless.

I want to make three points. One is that there's a mixed record here when we've tried to assess the Security Council. We see, on the positive side, a great deal of institutional growth that is, in some respects, surprising, and on the negative side, we see problems with effectiveness, and both of those are documented here. And then I want to make the suggestion that this mixed record partly reflects the limited role the Security Council has in international peace and security. It's not the whole show, and we can't therefore judge its resolutions as hypothetically determinative causal drivers of peace. So those are my three points, and I'll try to make them briefly.

First, let's look at the positive side to start off with. The Security Council, in this crucial age, 1989-2006, the post-Cold War period, has not been a bystander to the world around it. And that's a larger piece of praise than it sounds, because it
might have been a bystander. If we think about the history of the UN’s predecessor, the League of Nations, in the 1930s, and especially after 1935, we have to conclude that the role of the League was basically pathetic since it was not able to head off the expansion and the spiral of war in East Asia and in Europe. Despite the fact that the Security Council is a committee of 15, soon to be perhaps more if we can agree on the reform agenda, that it has a very small staff, though a very able staff, historically, that it has extremely diverse interests that comprise it, and that, on top of all of that, it’s been stuck with five veto wielders without any standard to be employed for when, in their own discretion, they can wield their veto, nonetheless, and in a literal reading of the Charter mandate, restricts the UN from internal affairs under article 2 (7) and to international peace and security under article 39. Despite all of that, the Security Council was very active in attempts to try to resolve civil wars during the period 1989 to 2006, and that’s really quite special, and I think worth noting. It reflects the ability to engage in institutional growth, internal development, flexibility, the ability to react to the world around it in innovative ways that try to come to terms with that world and make the institution, which might not have been relevant, relevant. For all those reasons, I think the Security Council deserves a great deal of praise.

Secondly, it innovated, not just in what it tried to do, but in the strategies it brought to bear. It moved from more traditional monitoring and peacekeeping through multidimensional peacekeeping with large civilian and military elements co-deployed, hopefully working together, to peace enforcement, and then to post-conflict peacebuilding. It, in this case, was reviving some strategies that had been explored, admittedly in the past, but this revival was both witting and unwitting. It’s not clear that the Council’s members knew what they were doing, but a lot of this was done earlier in the Congo in the 1960s. But coming back to the Congo lessons was itself courageous, because the peace operation in the Congo in the early 1960s bankrupted the United Nations, both financially and politically. So this was a courageous set of decisions to take on this kind of a mandate using these kinds of strategies and tools.

And moreover, to the credit of the institution, given the problematic record that it experienced in the 1990s and the early 2000s, it developed a sense of its limitations, re-emphasizing the importance of partnerships with regional organizations and other international organizations. It stretched out the notion of conflict resolution from prevention to post-conflict peacebuilding and began to develop institutional measures, at least for the last, not for the first. And for all of that, it deserves a great deal of praise, I think. This was an institution that developed and thrived, and if we compare it to many private sector institutions now long gone, and some public sector institutions, now also long gone, its survival and development, I think, is quite significant. So there’s one big praise.

The flipside of this, however, is that parts of the record are quite negative, and there are serious signs of trouble there. Almost half of these Security Council resolutions, as the study points out, reiterate past commitments that the parties in the civil war have already made to deal with conflict and move towards peace, and they repeat earlier Security Council resolutions. To put it a little bluntly, but I think accurately, much of what the Security Council does is nag. It’s a nagging institution, and that’s not a sign of great institutional strength when it has to come back and time and time again say the things that it said once before. It therefore is trying to repair previous failures, which mean there were previous failures: commitments in peace treaties or earlier Security Council mandates were not complied with, and that’s, again, not a sign of institutional success.
What I think this reflects is my third and last point: the limited role that the Security Council, in fact, plays in world peace and security. Much of the success and failure of civil war settlement takes place in the field. Clearly, it’s the parties, to be very clear and straightforward, that are responsible for the mayhem, and are responsible for correcting the mayhem and constructing a peace. On top of that, the peacekeeping operation deployed in the field takes Security Council resolutions as legal authority, but on the other hand, they are only indicative of what genuine leaders will do in the field when Security Council resolutions are treated as either floors or ceilings, and sometimes there’s quite a bit of space in between a floor and a ceiling when the leaders in the field decide what to do.

I remember Kofi Annan once complaining to one of his most successful special representatives, “please tell us before you plan to start a war!” The level of connection between the field and headquarters is not perfect and not 100%.

Okay, at the very worst, Security Council resolutions are often even harmful for the resolution of a conflict in the field. The most notorious ones that come immediately to mind are the notorious “safe areas” resolutions for Bosnia in the early 1990s. One of those resolutions mandated the peacekeepers in the safe areas to deter attacks upon the safe area, but they were only allowed to use force if they themselves were subject of a direct attack, which meant, of course, that General Mladić, who can read a Security Council resolution as well as anybody else, knew that in order to overrun Srebrenica, you walk around the peacekeepers, surround them, they now had an indefensible position, they’re forced to surrender, and then you can engage in your ethnic cleansing. That resolution was quite irresponsible, to put it mildly.

In Bosnia, the country was basically papered in Security Council resolutions through much of the 1990s, reflecting the ineffectiveness as perceived in the field. When one French general was asked by a reporter what the Security Council could do, in issuing resolutions, to help improve the prospects for peace in Bosnia, he commented both on his own sense of Security Council resolutions and on the difficulties of toilet facilities in deployed military operations. He replied to the reporter, “please print them on softer paper.” So that’s at the low end of effectiveness of Security Council resolutions.

At other times, the resolutions haven’t been harmful, and indeed, they’ve been institutionally and strategically innovative, but they’ve been a little irrelevant. The report mentions a resolution passed that tied foreign assistance to Cambodian factions to their compliance with the Paris peace agreement, a very good innovation that offered some carrots to encourage compliance with the peace agreement. Good strategy.

The problem, of course, is that in the field, there was no real foreign aid that was available to be distributed. The World Bank and the IMF at this time did not regard temporary governments, like the Supreme National Council, as having the legal authority of a sovereign, so they couldn’t engage in borrowing. So there wasn’t much World Bank or IMF assistance coming to Cambodia. The U.S. had on its books a law that precluded any aid to communists. Everybody, except for one tiny little faction, was a communist or previous communist in Cambodia, which meant that none of the major factionaries could get aid. The only one that could was a tiny remnant of left over Lon Nol soldiers who had been wandering around Indonesia for a while and had a presence. They had one village up on the Thai border, and that village was paved with U.S. foreign aid. It had highways and buildings. It was a wonderful little Potemkin village, but that was the only real source of aid during those particular years.
Japan, of course, had an aid program, but the Japanese like to build roads and bridges, and it takes a long lead time to build a road or a bridge. They were just basically doing the planning during the peace operation.

The only aid that was really coming through was refugee resettlement aid to bring the Cambodian refugees back from the Thai border to resettle, and Sérgio De Mello wisely decided not to politicize that aid. He said it was available to any refugee who would cross the border, which meant, of course, that a great deal of aid funneled to the Khmer Rouge, which were not complying with the agreement. Of course, nor were some of the other factions either. But then he says, using aid politically was a fantasy in New York, not a reality in Phnom Penh or in Cambodia.

So when it comes to this assessment, the key thing we need to remember is that we will want to assess Security Council resolutions, but obviously, as these authors well know, and at points, state within their publication, the Security Council is only one part of the process by which a sustainable peace is established for a country that has suffered a civil war. The real responsibility is, of course, with the parties, and then with the implementation on the ground that can provide them incentives to comply with their agreements, and the resolution is one part, a vital part. It has to write a coherent mandate. It has to, most importantly, provide the resources in terms of a budget and capabilities on the ground, military and civilian, that a peace process managed by the peacekeepers is something other than a pipe dream. So there is a role, but it's just not the whole role.

In a sense, one other thing I liked in the report, and here's where I wrap up, is that the report is reflecting what I think is this reality of only partial capability on the part of the Security Council, and that is, in the description of the iterative quality of Security Council resolutions. Iteration, in addition to being ineffective nagging, can be a learning process in which a party that does not control all the chips learns what the terms of progress are, makes limited claims, and then comes back to them to try to reinforce success and hopefully move that process toward a peace that someday becomes self sustaining. That's a classical learning by doing iterative process, building upon small success, hoping they turn into large success, and the way you do that is by iterating, coming back to the problem one time after another time after another time, and I think that that may be showing up somewhat in this pattern of resolutions that Christoph and his colleagues have begun to present to us in a way that they later will dissect and analyze an outcome to which we all persuaded and tempted by this, by this trailer, look forward with great eagerness. So thank you very much.

Edward C. Luck: Thank you very much, Michael. That was very helpful. If this was a trailer, and if we are going to charge admission when we show the full feature, we don't promise popcorn, but we'll think about that. I think already we can hardly handle the number of people here. So there's a lot to talk about. We have about 40 minutes to do so, and I open it to the floor. Questions, comments, whatever. Who'd like to begin? And please identify yourself when you speak, and there are mikes to be passed around. No one ever wants to go first! Everyone wants to be last! Richard, thank you. And then Joseph, and Richard, if you could identify yourself when you get the mic. Thanks.

Richard Gowan: Richard Gowan from New York University. Picking up directly on Professor Doyle's last point, you emphasize the role of the council as a receiver of peace agreements in terms of reiterating commitments already made, and in terms of
formalizing agreements made in peace processes on the ground. Have you looked at who negotiated those peace processes on the ground? Is the Council more likely to formalize a peace agreement negotiated by the Americans or those mediated by other actors? And when you go forward to looking at the implementation and compliance issues, will you study the extent to which it might actually be those original negotiators, be it the U.S. or whoever else, who enforce compliance rather than the Council?

Edward C. Luck: If I could just add to that question for Michael or for anyone, why is it so bad that 44% of the demands are asking people to live up to their commitments under peace agreements? I mean, I would assume that the Council being consistent in trying to reinforce existing peace agreements that have been arrived at by the parties is better than a Council that’s going off and reinventing its own architecture for solutions in the particular conflict situation. And in fact, this suggests a certain amount of coherence and attention by the Council to the peace agreements that exist and the commitments that have been made. I don’t see why that’s necessarily a bad thing, but I think the question that you raise, and of course we hope the study would answer eventually is how much do they affect the way parties act, and how much compliance is there really? Joseph Stephanides, rumor has it you had something to do with the Council once upon a time.

Joseph Stephanides: Thank you. Thank you very much. This is a very commendable project. I’m sure you will speedily finalize it, because I think it will be coming at the right time in the debate in the Council and among UN member states.

First, I want to make some points before I forget them, and then I’ll come to the last point that you raised. I think Ambassador Rosenthal, in his presentation, with his very lucid critique, did acknowledge the inevitable, namely that the Council, sooner than later, will have to deal with global issues akin to the one that you mentioned, i.e., the activities of criminal cartels operating across borders, weapons of mass destruction, of course, and terrorism issues. That’s where my optimism lies, that even the most reluctant members of the Council, two of them permanent, would eventually play ball, and we will see in the next ten years a much more cooperative and effective Security Council, because every power is recognizing that no matter what capacity it has, it cannot by itself deal with these transnational problems and the global issues. Therefore, we should be optimistic, and what you are doing, Christoph. It’s very valuable, because never expect the policymakers in the Council to produce policies. We produce the policies and sell them to them, and they believe they have invented it. That’s very important. These are very heroic 15 men and women, exhausted with the daily onslaught of work. They have no time to apply strategic thinking. And sometimes when they try, it creates suspicion by another rival permanent member, so they cannot deliver. We’ll have to sell strategic thinking from outside, and then the Council members present it as their own by endorsing the policies, so on and so forth. Global issues are going to be on the table, perhaps as early as Guatemala will be on the Council.

Now, the second point I wanted to make, it is not the members of the Council who initiated the resolutions to deal with the failed states and civil conflicts. It was a barrage by the humanitarian community playing very strongly on the failures in, as you mentioned, Michael, in Bosnia and in Rwanda, and that hero we lost was the one who convinced the Council, along with Mary Robinson, the then High Commissioner for Human Rights, to start debating and agreeing to put provisions on state failure in the operative part of the resolutions. But the members of the Council have never been able to reach the conclusion that they
would be able to follow up on their pronouncements. They knew that their resources are overstretched. The capacity’s not there to deal with this explosive phenomenon of failed states. There is a very limited capacity to undertake missions and spend resources, and that is why we don’t see that willingness. Thank you very much. I think I’ve said enough.

Edward C. Luck: Thank you very much. Right here, and then these two, and then we’ll go back to the panel.

Catherine Dumait-Harper: Catherine Dumait-Harper. I used to work for Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), and I was first really shocked to hear Michael Doyle talking about the great deal of praise of the Secretary-General and the Security Council. In my experience with presenting MSF in 1993, and 1994 as well, I don’t think we have any praise for the Security Council, but a lot of frustration. We have all the information from the field, and we were talking to members of the Security Council, the ambassadors. I’m glad you mention later on Srebrenica and Rwanda, because even the first resolution on Rwanda was certainly insufficient. We were very disappointed in the field and in our offices. I personally believe that if there is not a major reform of the UN Security Council, including the veto process, nothing will change, and there could be a genocide tomorrow as well. We went through that in 1994. Very early, we came, and testified about what we saw in our hospital in the field and everything else. Even in June in 1994 at the U.S. mission, they said that they had an emergency with Haiti and, I don’t know why it was in Washington, and that the ambassador only had 15 minutes to spend with us.

So obviously I don’t think I have a great deal of praise. I will not agree with you. Even if you talked about the protection of civilian in conflict areas, it’s still not different. I’m sorry I haven’t read the new report yet, but as they said in the presentations, conflicts like those in Chechnya and in Colombia have not been tackled by the Security Council. In 2002 or 2003 we at MSF also tried to bring the protection of humanitarians in the field on the agenda of the Security Council. That was at a time when we had some colleague kidnapped, and obviously no one wants to talk about it, especially not some member state. We approached the Secretary-General, because if you read the UN Charter, you see that he can put items on the agenda of the Security Council, but even Kofi Annan at the time refused to put that on the Security Council. That was a big disappointment for us humanitarians. Thank you very much.

Edward C. Luck: I saw Angela Kane and then Tom Weiss, and then we’ll go back to the panel.

Angela Kane: Thank you very much. Angela Kane from the UN Department of Management. I wanted to come back to two comments, and one was first made by Michael Doyle who was talking about how good it was that the Security Council has adapted to many changes over the last 10-15 years. I would totally agree with that, but I also wanted to say that there’s another development that hasn’t really been commented on, and that is the shift from peacekeeping to special political missions, and I think this is one of the major transformative events. I think that also follows onto the previous speaker in terms of what is the Security Council willing to look at?

And the other interesting aspect of special political missions that really needs to be looked at is the fact that in some areas special political missions are somehow less threatening politically than peacekeeping missions, which have blue helmets, which have much more robust mandates. It’s kind of the soft version,
really, of peacekeeping, or the advanced version of it, based on the hope that it will never come to a more robust version.

The other aspect that I wanted to bring up, and this is the other interesting part is that special political missions always have a General Assembly mandate. I mean, I remember the first Haiti missions were under the General Assembly, not under the Security Council. That implies a shift in how special political missions are financed, and that relates to Gert Rosenthal's comment about the financing missions. We have seen an increase in the budget of special political missions within the last eight years from 100 million to over a billion dollars a year, and that is financed, not by the Security Council peacekeeping assessment budget, but by the regular budget. This is something that kind of falls by the wayside, it's not looked at, and I think it's a very interesting phenomenon that really should be looked at a little bit more closely, so maybe there's a third installment of the study that could come. Thank you.

Edward C. Luck: On the budget for special political missions, obviously having Afghanistan and Iraq there sort of throws the calculation off. I think that sort of raises the question of what we're measuring. Let me have Tom Weiss, and then you'll start the next round, sir.

Thomas Weiss: Thanks, Ed. This is a terrific study for those of us who look at data, or are capable of looking at data, which eliminates Ed and me, of course, but I just think the context of this is really important, and I want to pose a question to Gert. That is, in the early 1990s, there was some question as to when the Security Council should or could get involved in civil wars, or get involved in humanitarian operations. In fact, as late as 1995, the Commission on Global Governance actually proposed a Charter amendment that would authorize the Security Council on occasion to go into humanitarian affairs. So we've really come an enormous distance, but Gert, I think that point of yours might have gotten buried. What do we do when there is nothing that is not on the Security Council's agenda, which is, I think, where we're headed now with climate change, AIDS, drugs, what else cannot get on the agenda?

Edward C. Luck: Kashmir? Sorry, I don't know where that came from! Michael, would you like to go first in responses?

Michael W. Doyle: I'd be happy to. Christoph is the person who should be up here first –

Edward C. Luck: He's going to go last, because you may have other provocative things here.

Michael W. Doyle: Okay. On the point raised about whether nagging is good or bad. I think this was your point, Ed. It also came out of the audience. On the one hand what I was trying to convey is that it's bad. It means that you didn't succeed the first time in putting forth either a mandate or enforcing a commitment. Therefore, you had to get back to it. But on the other hand, if you did fail the first time, it's really good if it's important that you come back to it. And that's where what I see in this report about iteration looks very attractive to me, that this might be a reaction to a weak position. Now, which is the problematic character: why do you have a weak position in the first place? Because you haven't adequately budgeted or mandated, but once you do have a weak position, the willingness to come back to it is a positive. It was raised in the far back by Professor Gowan, I think, about the –

Richard Gowan: [INDISCERNIBLE]
Michael W. Doyle: All right. The point was equally good. Does it make a difference if the Council is handed the content of its resolutions or are deeply involved in the terms of a peace process? It is the case that we do see different origins. The Paris peace agreements for Cambodia were very much a Security Council product after the regional efforts failed, and the Council, in various iterations, was very much involved in the design of it, and I think that was important for the sense of ownership that stayed with the Council. On the other hand, you can also get mandates that are just basically handed to the Council -- the Dayton Peace Agreement, for example, was shipped over and delivered. Now some key members of the Council helped shape those agreements, but it was handed to the Council, and then the question is, what role does the Security Council play in implementing it? And there, it was such an enormous and complicated mandate that the UN was naturally cautious of being handed the whole thing, and therefore succeeded in dividing up the bits and pieces of it so that it was an all hands on deck. You name the issue, and some other, a different organization had it, and in the field, that caused very considerable challenges. So those are some of the patterns.

I think that unless some permanent members really care about it, it's important to have the UN, the Security Council, and mediators from the UN involved up front in the design of a peace process. You know, the Rwanda peace process, for example, was very much OAU-led in its negotiations, and I'm not sure that the UN ever really absorbed it as its own responsibility until the genocide occurred. We then saw the consequences in April of 1994.

With regard to the management, the second part of your question, there is another innovation we didn't mention here. It's an innovation in the field. Various mandates have required groups of friends that have been associated with them -- that is, states that have a stake in the success of the peace and may have been involved as mediators, which will help to provide resources for the peace operation. Institutionally, there's an interesting innovation where these friends meet in New York on a regular basis, they're also paralleled back in the capital of the peacekeeping operation, for instance in San Salvador for ONUSAL. So in New York, the most involved ambassadors met, and the ambassadors of the same countries met in San Salvador, and that improved communication beyond what would be the norm.

With regard to our colleague from MSF -- yes, I think the Security Council did innovate institutionally in the way I described, but I think Srebrenica and a lot of other weak resolutions are ones that seriously caused harm. So there are actual acts of harm, and there are failures to act, and both these things are pretty significant, and they're relatively well known. And so I'd stop there, and those are the points that I think I have something to contribute to.


Gert Rosenthal: Well, I only have one question: Tom Weiss' question. Will the Security Council continue to encroach on other forums? I think no, for mathematical reasons. The Security Council has 15 members, and the other, the General Assembly, has 192. So there will be very strong pressures always to contain the Security Council's natural bent to get involved in new areas. What I think will happen, though, is we're going to have more cooperative arrangements between the Security Council and other organs of the United Nations.

The very quick comments, which don't address questions to me, and the lively nature of this debate, I think, underline the usefulness of this study. First,
because it obligates us to look at the Security Council with a new lens. Instead of looking just at a picture in time, we have to look at it evolving over time, and the Security Council looks very different when you look at it that way. And the second is, I’m not sure I would agree with your comment on the division of responsibilities between the Secretariat and the intergovernmental machinery. If I understood you right, you said that it’s the Secretariat that formulates policy, and then it goes and tries to convince governments.

Joseph Stephanides: [INDISCERNIBLE]

Gert Rosenthal: Outside actors, I’m not sure. I think the proper role there is that the members of the Security Council are influenced very significantly sometimes, both by the Secretariat and other actors. That’s the role of the Secretariat, to give the Council elements to take intelligent decisions. However, in the final analysis, it’s the sovereign states that are members of the Security Council that do take the decisions, so I think there is a very important ingredient of policy-making and sometimes individual policy-making, and it’s also a very interesting exercise to look at how the different stakeholders involved in the general business of peacekeeping and peacemaking relate to each other, and again, that’s the merit of this study, which we’re told we have to wait for the second element to get more inputs, but it’s a very interesting take on the work.

Edward C. Luck: Thanks very much, Gert. I don’t think there have been any things you’d want to respond to, I suppose, Christoph, in the last hour or so, but just in case.

Christoph Mikulaschek: Well, I think there’s been enough of a preview. Let’s keep some secrets for the next installment. No, I would like to comment on the Council’s ‘nagging’ and the value of ‘nagging.’ Is it positive or negative?

In our publication, we identified four possible mechanisms by which the Security Council’s repetition of previous commitments by the conflict parties can have an added value. I’m not claiming that they all apply in each situation, but there are four possible mechanisms.

First, the Council attaches its own legal and political authority to a peace process as soon as it reiterates civil war parties’ commitment in one of its resolutions. It thereby signals to donors that the UN is behind this peace process, and, as a result, the donors may increase their support for that peace process. Maybe that’s wishful thinking, but resolutions reinforcing field-driven peace processes sometimes may send a signal to support outside of the conflict theater. To those who did not sign up to the commitment, who stayed out of the peace process, a Security Council resolution may signal that the UN is behind this peace process, and the terms of the peace process are pretty much set in stone, and this is what Steven Stedman characterized as the ‘departing train scenario.’ They’d better get on the train of the peace process now; otherwise they will be left behind. And finally, to those who did sign up to these commitments, a reiteration of these commitments in an international text may decrease domestic costs of compliance. It’s sometimes easier for civil war parties to implement a hard, a difficult compromise in response to a request by the United Nations, rather than as a compromise with a vilified enemy deeply resented by the domestic constituency and the diaspora of the conflict parties.

Richard’s question was particularly interesting. So who does negotiate these texts? There’s been a great variety across conflicts. For instance, when you look at the Central American peace process, the Council did not make a single stipulation to civil-war parties that did not reiterate their previous commitments.
When you look at the resolutions the Council adopted on civil wars in the early 1990s on Azerbaijan, Iraq, and Yemen, the Council did not issue a single demand to the civil-war parties that had been previously accepted by them. So there’s a vast discrepancy. I can’t go into too much detail on this point, but what is clear is that it is not enough to adopt the resolution, and everybody on the Council is obviously realistic enough not to expect full compliance as soon as a resolution is adopted. What is generally needed is a compliance-management strategy, and that needs to be fitted to the circumstances at hand, and this may contain monitoring, field presence, or different types of incentives and disincentives described in the report.

Finally, to Tom Weiss’ question, which is very provocative: is the Security Council going to take over too much space from other Charter organs? It is quite interesting that while the Charter authors in San Francisco and Dumbarton Oaks certainly had international conflicts in mind, they never limited the scope of activity of the Council to these circumstances. As the Chinese representative in San Francisco lucidly observed, it would be wiser for the framers of this Charter to leave some questions to the future, and this way, the Security Council and the General Assembly would be able to respond to the needs of future times. And this is precisely what we have seen over the past 20 years: the Council has seen a spike in the number of civil wars in the world, and it has seen their dramatic implications on international security, and it has responded. Still, one may say that the Council has not dramatically increased over the last, at least, 10 years the number of resolutions. As you said, there is a natural limit to what the Council can do and a natural limit to what it can claim as its own turf.

Edward C. Luck: Terrific. There’s one in the back here first. Then we’ll come down.

Osoronko Nana-Yabani: My name is Nana-Yabani of the Olof Palme Peace Foundation. It looks like we are all dancing some kind of musical chess, because the leadings arms manufacturers in the world happen to be the five permanent members of the Security Council. The gentleman was talking of mayhem in the several civil wars in the third world. The question is, if the five permanent members are the world leading arms manufacturers, then who is fueling civil wars? Thank you.

Edward C. Luck: It is interesting now how often they impose arms embargoes, the main arms manufacturers. Please, right here.

Alberto Turlon: I am Alberto Turlon from the Burma Fund. My question is about the non-state armed actors. For sure, when you study civil wars, you came across non-state arm actors, and my question was how the Security Council is handling contacts with them, and if you see any specific favorable conditions under which the Security Council feels free to approach them, or instead, if there are conditions which are preventing the Council to act, especially bearing in mind the principle of national sovereignty.


Andrew Tomlinson: Andrew Tomlinson from the Quaker UN office. Just one quick observation and a question. First the observation is on the Peacebuilding Commission, which the Ambassador referred to. This observation may spring a little bit from a Quaker imperative to spring to the defense of the unloved, as I understand it, the period covered by this study is up to 2006, and the Peacebuilding Commission sort of got underway in 2005 and has never been accused of springing hastily to its task through the first year or so. So I would just suggest that maybe the data simply doesn’t speak to the involvement of the commission.
The other thing that was striking me here that would be interesting to know is how much of the time of the Council, as represented in the data set, has been taken up with dealing with particular chronic conflict situations that have come back on, and stayed on, the Council’s agenda year after year after year. In the current day, we would think of a Somalia or a Congo, and the question then is, are the current mechanisms in the Council and those bodies associated with it appropriate and effective in dealing with those kinds of situations. Thank you.

Edward C. Luck: When you said, Andrew, that it’s natural for Quakers to spring to the defense of the unloved, I thought for sure you were going to say something about the Security Council. Well let’s revert to the panel then on these or other things you might want to comment on. Michael?

Michael W. Doyle: The gentlemen over on the side over there raised the question about the P5 as not the best police in the world. There’s something to that, needless to say. The reason the P5 are there and have their veto power is not because they’re virtuous, it’s because they’re dangerous! That is, that the P5 have a veto is because they’re the five countries, in prospect China in 1945, not at present, that would be so dangerous that you would never want to have the UN fight a war against them. That’s the operative justification, if you will, of the veto, and it is unfortunately the case that the P5, in various periods of history, most importantly the Cold War, as Gert mentioned in one of his remarks, were very much the instigators of proxy wars in various parts of the world. In the period after the Cold War, the global regimes that are maintained are not the most conducive for the furtherance of international peace and security. So in addition to being a fire brigade that addresses civil wars and other conflicts in the world, the Security Council could well take upon itself a broader notion of its mandate to dealing with some of the big general issues that contribute towards international peace and insecurity, not in any particular case, but overall. These are things like development, the spread of small weapons, and one could go on listing issues that will create an environment that is conducive to civil wars, and that would be a nice part of their agenda as well.

Edward C. Luck: Gert? Christoph?

Christoph Mikulaschek: Well, I would concur with what Michael Doyle said about the origins of civil wars, and who is fueling them. It’s quite interesting to note that 45% of all the civil wars that occurred during the 18 years after the Cold War actually are part of the legacy from the Cold War. I would not say that they all are legacies of the Cold War, but at least they’re a legacy from the Cold War era, and certainly the superpowers had their role in many of them, as we heard with regard to the case of Central America.

Regarding the Security Council’s contact with non-state actors, I would like to highlight the emergence of Security Council missions as a valuable tool of interaction with local actors. The Council went on 36 missions to date, all of them after the end of the Cold War, and it visited 73 civil-war countries – 73 countries undergoing or emerging from civil war. During these country visits, the Security Council often interacted with a wide range of actors from parliamentarians to media and to representatives of armed groups. However, certainly states seek to circumscribe international contacts with illicit actors, non-state armed groups, and sometimes they insist on acting as the intermediary between the UN Secretariat, for instance, and the armed group, and whether they act as an honest broker and an honest intermediary or not depends on the circumstances. It is far from obvious that the government would act as honest
intermediary to the armed opposition group. Chronic conflict is certainly a huge problem, and when you look at the number of conflicts since the end of the Cold War, it is quite striking to see that some countries just seem to be in a persistent conflict trap. As the brilliant study by Oxford University showed in 2003, the conflict trap appears where conflicts deplete the resources of a state, and then, once the country’s out of the conflict, it's still incredibly poor, destitute of infrastructure, there is an abundance of weapons and of intercommunal tensions, and conflict relapse is extremely likely. Conflicts associated with state failure are also imposing huge costs on the regional actors. Almost 90% of the material cost of state failure is borne by the neighbors of the country experiencing state failure, in the form of refugee streams, diminished economic growth and trade, increases in transnational organized crime, and so on. And that obviously shows the salience of this problem for regional stability and also for international peace and security. I’ll stop right there.

Edward C. Luck:

Sure. If I might make a couple of comments. I think one of the interesting things about this study and every other study is what it doesn’t look at. I think some of the comments and some of the commentary here relate to judging how the Council is doing, while the new publication refrains from that. That is because it’s a quantitative study, and it relies on things that you can measure, and so it emphasizes some things like resolutions, a number of demands and resolutions and this sort of thing and de-emphasizes other things. I mean, I would argue myself that the Council is most important as an ongoing dialogue forum among influential countries on a very wide range of security issues. And you can’t quantify that, but you think of what the absence of that kind of dialogue would mean, and I think that the implications would be extremely worrisome. So even if they never came out with resolutions, but they’re talking all the time and trying to work out things, that might have some value.

The report also doesn't have much to say about the thematic resolutions and PRSTs from the Council. A lot of people would say that these are sometimes interfering in the General Assembly’s territory, but it's not unimportant to the normative side of the Council’s work. Again, people say, why should those 15 be more involved, but it’s been, I think, very significant over this time if you look at the content of the resolutions in recent years and the fact that, yes, there are fewer Council resolutions, but they’re much, much longer, and the word count actually is still going up. It’s largely because of the protection side of the Council’s work and all that’s being added to that, which I think is not unimportant in that regard. There’s no recognition really in this kind of a study of the relationship between the Security Council and regional organizations and the interaction back and forth, obviously, with the AU Peace and Security Council, and the African Union in particular, but to lesser extent also in other places. These relationships, it seems to me, in fact, are very important, but you can’t have much Chapter VIII in this kind of a study, and it also, in that sense, can’t really capture the partnership.

I think Richard’s question about who’s responsible for the substance of resolutions and some of these other questions pointed at this. Who are you talking about? More and more of the UN and the Council is working through partnerships, and it’s the only logical way to get things done. But if you have a partnership that actually works, it’s probably going to be hard to tell who gets credit, who shouldn’t get credit, who gets blame, who shouldn’t get blame, and particularly when you’re looking at the Chapter VI parts of the Council’s work, and that, again, I think it’s sort of underestimated in this kind of a study. I think article 34 on investigations and other preventive mechanisms implies that the Council, in fact, would have a much more anticipatory role in terms of looking at
things that might turn into conflict, and I think many provisions in the Charter point in that direction. But that’s hard to capture in this kind of study as well, and you also can’t capture the changes in the structure of the Council and how much more time is spent on all the subsidiary bodies, most of which didn’t exist at the end of the Cold War. Now there are roughly 27 subsidiary organs and an enormous amount of time and energy is involved in subsidiary bodies and sanctions and many other things, and that, in some ways, gives a depth to the work of the Council and involves it in numerous things, brings more panels of experts and investigations than it would have otherwise. Again, this is sort of missed in the study.

So again, I think there’s great strength to this kind of study. I’m very proud that we’re doing it. I think it adds to our knowledge, and with the data set, it provides a basis for many researchers. Many places can benefit from it in the future, but you know, at the outset, when you’re doing this study, I think it’s very important to remember what you’re not asking, and what you can’t measure, and which things matter. So I just say with some of the comments I think we should be a little careful as to whether they provide a litmus test as to whether the Council is doing a good job or not such a good job. We know it’s doing a much bigger job. Some people like that, some people don’t like it, but we know it’s become much more expansive, and I would say, this is partly because other UN organs aren’t doing their jobs. The Council moves into other areas because people aren’t handling them in an effective way, and I think your comments about the GA’s role in Guatemala and several other comments angles on special political missions initially going through the assembly point at this problem. I think that in another study, which I really haven’t seen, we could ask what is the Assembly’s role in peace and security and how has it evolved. This would be a really good kind of study, maybe there’s less to work with. But I do think it’s very interesting for the future, particularly for an area like the one I work on, the responsibility to protect. We know about the Council, we don’t know much about the Assembly, and we’re testing the waters, but there, I think it is going to be very interesting to see. Anyway, thank you all for coming, and thanks to all three panelists for a terrific job.