



## TRANSCRIPT

Tuesday, October 26, 2010, 1:00 – 2:45pm  
Trygve Lie Center for Peace, Security & Development  
International Peace Institute

### ***Book Launch -- The Curse of Berlin: Africa After the Cold War***

**Welcome:** Ambassador Adonia Ayebare, Director, Africa Program, *International Peace Institute*

**Speakers:** Dr. Adekeye A. Adebajo, Executive Director, *Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town*

Professor Ali A. Mazrui, Director, Institute of Global Cultural Studies  
*Binghamton University, State University of New York, Binghamton, New York*

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**Adonia Ayebare:**

Let me, on the behalf of the International Peace Institute, welcome all of you for our event this afternoon. My job today is simple: it's to welcome everybody. Our Chair, Ambassador Gaspar Martines, the Permanent Representative of Angola. He is at the General Assembly giving us statement; he should be joining us shortly. He will be in charge of the meeting today, he will be our Chair, but of course I'll quickly introduce our two speakers on his behalf.

I will start with Ali A. Mazrui, I'm not going to say much. Everybody knows him but I will just clear one thing. Everybody calls him a native of Kenya, but he's actually a citizen of Uganda. That's where he lived most of his life and taught at Makerere. I'm very privileged, Professor Mazrui, to welcome you at IPI.

On my right -- not my ideological right, on my left [laughter] -- is Dr. Adebajo from the Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town. Ade -- all of you know him, he used to be the Director of Africa at IPI. He's my, not my immediate predecessor, but again, today, on the right note, we are setting an example of how we should be holding our predecessors in Africa. Sometimes we are not good at it, we throw them in jail, accuse them of corruption, but Ade, anyway, you're welcome here. I'm trying to set a standard of how I will be welcomed here in the future by being nice to him.

So without wasting more time, let's start off our discussion with our speakers. I will start with Dr. Adekeye Adebajo. Ade, you have the floor.

**Adekeye Adebajo:**

Thank you. Thank you Adonia. I just wanted to thank... to start with Adonia, Njambi, Beatrice, Meiko and all the colleagues at IPI. Also, just to acknowledge Ed Luck and John Hirsch and Warren, who always provide a platform whenever I publish something, and it's very nice to be able to talk to and address a UN community that I got to know very well in my time here.

I also wanted to acknowledge Ambassador Gaspar Martins, when he does come. I know he will come because I spoke to him yesterday, and since 1999, he has been one of the

most astute of the African diplomats here, so I'm glad that he will also be able to join us on this occasion.

I have three things that I'd like to do in the twenty minutes I have. First, to explain why I wrote the book. Second, to explain what I mean by the "curse of Berlin," and third, to describe the contents of the book in terms of the three main themes of unity, security and hegemony. But I'll focus largely on the security part of it.

The events of the last twenty post-Cold-War years have represented something of a personal, intellectual odyssey for this author, who entered the field at the dawn of the post-Cold-War era. I have thus tried to reflect these experiences in the *Curse of Berlin*; looking back in order to look forward. It's sort of going back to the future, if you like. Between 1986 and '87, I spent a year studying at the Frederick Schiller University in the East German town of Jena, and discovered one of my favorite cities in the world, Berlin. Two years later, after I had completed my Bachelor's degree in German at the University of Ibadan in my native Nigeria, the Berlin Wall fell, symbolizing the end of the Cold War.

This was the same year in which I won a Rhodes Scholarship to study international relations at Oxford University, and in the town of the dream inspires and lost causes, I encountered the legacy of Cecil Rhodes. The Cold War came to an end in Africa and the first Democratic Election took place in South Africa in 1994. I personally witnessed apartheid's funeral and the saintly Nelson Mandela's inauguration as president while serving as a UN Electoral Observer.

Further studies brought me to the United States to deepen my understanding of the post-Cold-War era. In between, I served with the UN Mission in Western Sahara where I witnessed a visit by the first African UN Secretary General, Egypt's Boutros-Ghali.

In the second post-Cold War decade, five more years was spent here at the International Peace Academy in New York, where I had a front row seat to the sacred drama and the play-within-the-play that is the United Nations. At a time when the organization was headed by its second African Secretary General, Ghana's Kofi Annan, the next five years saw the return of the native with my arrival at the southern most tip of Africa to head the Center for Conflict Resolution, and I witnessed the last five years of Thabo Mbeki's presidency.

Throughout this period, I had traveled widely from the Cape to Cairo, visited 26 African countries. I would later deliver the Gandhi Memorial Lecture at the Gandhi Settlement in Durban in 2008. And during a talk in Cape Town in 2006, I provocatively challenged a visiting African-American freshman senator to explain why the Congressional Black Caucus that had been so active during the anti-apartheid struggle was now so weak on African issues. Two years later, the same Senator, Barack Obama, was elected the first black president of the United States.

Thus, the past two decades covered in this book have seen tremendous changes in global affairs in general, and Africa's international relations in particular. Needless to say, my own impact on all of these events were about as effective as that of Forrest Gump had on America in the 1960s.

While studying international relations in England and the United States, I stumbled upon a Kenyan author called Ali Mazrui while looking for literature that was not written by dead white men or Eurocentric thinkers. Few have thought as profoundly, or written and spoken as eloquently about Africa as this elegant wordsmith and committed pan-African prophet. His tremendous influence on my work is reflected in this book, which I have dedicated to him, and it's particularly appropriate that he is here with us today, and he also generously contributed a twenty-page preface to introduce the book that masterfully draws together the threads of its main themes.

Despite the focus of the book on the curse of Berlin, and on Africa being carved up by avaricious imperialists, I do not in any way wish to suggest that Africa and Africans have no agency in contemporary international relations, so I'm trying to preempt some of the more conservative elements among you in terms of the questions.

This story is still on the continent trying to transform itself in Mazrui's words "from a pawn to a player on the geo-strategic chessboard." As Nigerian novelist Chinua Achebe wisely noted, "Until the lions produce their own historian, the story of the hunt will glorify only the hunter." The leadership roles of African leaders, states and institutions are all highlighted in this book. The book, however, argues that historical and structural events continue to affect and shape Africa's contemporary international relations, so we must necessarily look back in order to go forward, as I said earlier.

During the Annus Mirabilis of 1960, seventeen independent African states were born, creating great expectations for the rebirth of a continent. Unfortunately, while these countries celebrate their fiftieth birthday this year, Africa seems to be suffering a severe mid-life crisis. November 2009 marked the twentieth anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall, as well as the 125<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the start of the Conference of Berlin, significant events for Africa. The main argument here is that Africa suffers from a curse invoked in Berlin. The conference of 1884 to '85, which was overseen by Bismarck, effectively set the rules for the partition of Africa as the scramble for the continent's riches got underway.

Bismarck was undoubtedly the grand wizard of the Berlin Conference. The German Sorcerer and his European apprentices employed the western wizardry of the technology of the industrial revolution to set the rules for the scramble for Africa. Bismarck used his political magic wand to cast a spell on Africa, having earlier done the same in Europe. The European curse of artificial nation-states subsequently caused untold suffering in Colonial and post-Colonial Africa, resulting in unviable, dependent economies, artificially imported political systems, weak and balkanized states, and insecure borders.

To compound the treachery, the traveling Cold War circus arrived in Africa around 1960, further distorting the continent's political and economic development. In 50 years of independence, we must also concede ourselves, Africans have not done enough to reverse this blighted legacy, amidst profligate corruption and autocratic misrule.

As the Cold War was coming to an end, events in Berlin would once again have an enormous effect on Africa. The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 marked the end of the curse of African ancestors, the division of Germany and Europe. But the earlier Bismarckian curse remained to haunt Africa's future. Conflicts and dispute, some resulting from the colonial legacy of Berlin, continued between countries such as Ethiopia-Eritrea, Somalia-Ethiopia and Libya-Chad. Other countries had more immediate internal routes where Africa had once feared intervention during the Cold War, marginalization had now become a greater concern in the post-apartheid era.

To lift the curse woven by Bismarck's geo-political sorcery, Africa has been forced to pursue a quest for three magic kingdoms: security, hegemony and unity. After an introduction that covers this legacy of Berlin and the conference, the other thirteen chapters in this book are divided into a quest for these three magic kingdoms. Ali Mazrui's seminal work of 1967 -- actually his Oxford PhD thesis "Towards a Pax Africana" -- suggested that Africans themselves should muster the will to resolve disputes that arise on their continent. His idea of continental jurisdiction was a sort of Monroe Doctrine suggesting that outsiders should keep out of African disputes, and this was, of course, written in the shadow of the Congo crisis at the time of 1960 to '64.

In his related idea of racial sovereignty, Mazrui suggested that inter-African intervention by black states in the affairs of other brotherly states was more legitimate than intervention by outsiders. In the post-Cold-War era, UN debacles in Somalia and Rwanda in '93 and '94, led to powerful western actors abandoning Africa to its own fate. And the neglect of the continent forced regional organizations, many of whom were ill-prepared and set up to promote economic integration as development, to adopt security roles for which they were basically ill-prepared, both financially, logistically and otherwise.

According to ancient folklore, Europe's alchemist sought to turn lead into gold and in the process discovered the scientific method. Africa's current alchemists seeking to transform the OAU into an AU, most avoid the frustrations of their European counterparts and not

pursue an elusive quest in search of an illusory El Dorado. Despite the OAU failing to stem conflicts with small observer missions in Rwanda, Burundi and Comoros, the AU is still acting like an experimental guinea pig, intervening in Darfur and Somalia without the wherewithal to keep peace effectively.

Ghana's legendary leader, Kwame Nkrumah, sought to create an African high command as a common army to ward off foreign intervention and to wage liberation wars. Nkrumah's heirs in West Africa have gone furthest of any other sub-region in terms of creating a security mechanism. ECOWAS intervened five times in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire but eventually required the UN's help to actually take care of the peacekeeping efforts.

In Southern Africa, SADC has yet to establish as extensive a security structure, and the liberation leaders in this sub-region have tended to favor weak security structures. The Great Lakes have become infested with ethnic crocodiles of the genocidal species. The potential of the Congo to play a lead role as Nigeria has done in West Africa and South Africa has done in Burundi and DRC, has been diminished by the fact that the state's decay into a carcass has led to neighboring vultures feasting on it, and so the Congo has, despite its size and location and resources, failed to basically play its rightful role.

In Eastern Africa, the volatile Horn remains deeply divided, and you've had countries like Ethiopia-Eritrea, Uganda-Sudan, Eritrea-Djibouti, Ethiopia-Somalia, either clash indirectly with themselves or supporting each other's rebels. And the treachery of the Horn, I think, is underlined by the fact that Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan all ended up on both sides of the Cold War divide at different times.

Finally, the Maghreb region has been compared to a bird with Algeria, Mauritania and Tunisia, the body, and Morocco and Libya, the necessary wings for the bird to fly. But this is a bird that has been so incapacitated by conflict between its various body parts that it has difficulty lifting off. Morocco and Algeria have used the Western Sahara as a stage to play out their rivalry over leadership of the Maghreb. After a bad stealing of the Sahara, sustained by America-French support, this region has basically not been able to get its act together in terms of regional integration and development.

And oil- and gas-rich Algeria, which should also be a natural hegemony in Northwest Africa, due to a bloody civil war from 1991 has not been able to play this role. So no peacekeeping has actually occurred in Northwest Africa, and the Arab-Maghreb union has been quite a dormant body.

The weakness of African states force them to look to global institutions like the UN to protect their sovereignty and promote their interest. And global apartheid -- another Mazruiana term -- is evident at the UN in three important areas: politics, peacekeeping and socioeconomic development. A reconstituted Security Council would give Africa an enhanced presence at the top table of global diplomacy, especially as 60 percent of the Council's deliberations focus on Africa, and 70 percent of the UN's current peacekeeping troops -- about half of them -- are currently deployed in Africa. So it's important that the UN learn lessons from difficult peacekeeping experiences, and avoid an aristocracy of death in which Africans and Asians spill the blood in Africa, and the West pay some of the bills when it can be bothered.

In the area of socioeconomic apartheid, African states and their allies force the UN to move away from the exclusive security focus of the founding fathers and to turn towards the socioeconomic development needs of its poorer members. And Africa produced the first two post-Cold-War UN Secretaries-General between '92 and 2006. Boutros-Ghali, the Egyptian, was the most intellectually accomplished Secretary-General in the organization's history, but, eventually, irresponsible American politicians blamed him for everything from the death of US soldiers in Somalia to the obstruction of UN reform. Fiercely independent and courageous, Boutros-Ghali pointed to the double standards of the Western powers in supporting rich men's wars in the Balkans while ignoring Africa's orphan conflicts. His landmark agenda for peace remains an indispensable guide to the peacemaking tools and techniques in the post-Cold-War era, but in the end the Egyptian

pharaoh earned himself the unenviable distinction of being the only UN Secretary General to have been denied a second term in office.

Kofi Annan, the Ghanaian, worked with the Americans to remove Boutros-Ghali, as James Traub and Stanley Meisler, in two very good biographies, have pointed out. And the curse of Africa's ancestors would catch up on Kofi Annan eventually, and then actively promoted humanitarian intervention, taking great risks to argue that if countries and governments cannot protect their own citizens, then the international community has a responsibility and a duty to do so, and that's part of Ed Luck and Francis Deng's Responsibility to Protect mandate, which IPI has championed.

Like Boutros-Ghali, Annan's relations with Washington were badly affected by his refusal to give *carte blanche* to American policies in Iraq. Coupled with the awful food scandal in Iraq also, Annan was rendered a lame duck by the US, the country that did the most to anoint him Secretary-General in 1996. The Ghanaian finally and painfully discovered the ancient wisdom that one needs a long spoon to sup with the devil.

The second section of the book, on the quest for the hegemonic kingdom, has five chapters on the leadership ambitions of South Africa, Nigeria, China, the US and France in Africa. Nigeria and South Africa are assessed in terms of an axis of virtue while China, the US and France are examined in terms of a possible axis of evil, there's a question mark there.

I focus particularly on the presidencies of Thabo Mbeki and Olusegun Obasanjo between 1998 and 2008, and their search for a Pax Africana, to gain more autonomy within the international system. These efforts have so far yielded only limited success. Greater diplomatic and economic leverage and reduce dependence on western powers like the US and France, may result in future from China's increasing role on the continent, but it is far from certain that African governments will be able to craft a multilateral approach to engage Beijing for mutual benefit. South Africa could also increasingly find itself in economic competition with China, creating negative perceptions of both the springbok and the dragon, and that's one of the chapters in the book.

The five essays in the final section of the study analyze Africa's quest for unity and examine the roles and significance for Africa of six historical figures: Nelson Mandela, Thabo Mbeki, Kwame Nkrumah, Cecil Rhodes, Barack Obama, and Mahatma Gandhi, as well as assessing comparatively the African Union and the European Union. Africa's quest for unity has seen several of its leaders seek to promote regional integration and build global alliances using the African diaspora in the US and Europe, and the Afro-Asian coalition that was born in Bandung in 1955, to fight for the decolonization of both continents. But as with many other continental efforts, a lack of capacity and cooperation has often frustrated this quest.

In concluding this journey -- as I see the Chair moving around a bit furtively -- in concluding this journey that has stretched from the Cape to Casablanca, it is important we return to Berlin where we started the voyage. African leaders must now organize a new Berlin conference on their own continent. While the decision to freeze the map of Africa in the 1960's may have been wise in a sovereignty-obsessed era of insecure, unconsolidated nation states, Africans must now, 50 years later, muster the ingenuity to craft new arrangements that better reflect their own current realities. Federations and regional trade blocks must be negotiated, and territorial boundaries agreed in the long term that reflect the political, socio-economic and cultural realities of a vast continent and help to avoid future conflicts. So after detailed planning, African leaders must proceed to the ancient empire of Ethiopia, the seat of African diplomacy, and reverse the scandalous act of cartographic mischief inflicted on the continent by European statesmen in Berlin over a century ago. African leaders must invite the ancestors to this diplomatic, continental banquet so that Kwame Nkrumah can pass on the torch of Pan-Africanism to Thabo Mbeki and the curse of Berlin over Africa can finally be lifted. Amen.

**Adonia Ayebare:**

Thank you Ade. Let's quickly move on to Professor Mazrui.

**Ali Mazrui:**

This is really a great pleasure and a privilege to be able to chat with you about Africa and to participate in launching the book, *The Curse of Berlin*. I'm really grateful to the institute and to Ade for his enthusiasm for my participation in his different projects. I'm grateful for your own presence here in significant numbers.

Originally, Ade said I could just summarize my forward, or preface, to his book today. But I thought I'd do something different. In both cases, it's the impact of Berlin on Africa and its consequences, but I will be treating it differently in my oral presentation here as compared with what I have done in the preface to the book.

First, the big question, what kind of impact had Africa, was it a deep impact or was it relatively shallow? If European colonialism lasted in most sub-Saharan African countries for about 100 years, was that century exceptional in the depths of its repercussions, or was the Euro-colonial century no more than a mere episode in millennia of African history?

In fact there are two distinct schools, though not equally represented in the world of scholarship. The epic school of colonial historiography leans towards maximizing and exceptionalizing the repercussions of European colonialism. Those 100 years, according to that epic school, were truly exceptional. On the other hand, the episodic school of colonial historiography leans towards minimizing the long-term significance of European alien rule in Africa. The argument starts from the premise that our generation is so close to the era of colonialism that European influence looms extra large. It's exaggerated. Our proximity to the Colonial Age results in unjustified exaggeration of the colonial impact upon Africa. And then there's a third school of judging European colonialism not by reference to its impact, but in ethical terms trying to determine whether European colonialism was a positive or a negative moral force in the continent. This is the cost benefit analysis rather than impact analysis of the consequences of Berlin.

So let me just summarize some of the issues that influence these three approaches towards interpreting the Berlin impact. One is the epic vision of colonialism -- this is a century of epic proportions that its influence on the continent cannot be compared with anything else, it cannot be compared with Bantu migrations or the arrival of Islam on the continent in the 7th century, and it cannot be compared with the movement of the Semitic peoples across the Red Sea, the European impact is in a class by itself. The boundaries of the continent, although they are, themselves, artificial, it's amazing how possessive we are about them. Colonial names of countries and nationalities, only Egypt, Ethiopia and Libya are ancient names from biblical times. All the rest of African names as applied to the countries are more or less a twentieth-century phenomenon.

We have been absorbed into a new global system of nation-states. This is an absorption and enlargement of scale unprecedented in the centuries which preceded it. Then we have become subject to international norms of conduct, whether or not we obey them, and they include both conduct within countries and a law of nations which previously was regarded as inapplicable to so-called servant societies like ourselves. So for a long time, international law was regarded as inapplicable to most countries of Asia and Africa and that is why they could be governed, could be colonized without committing aggression. And then we have been absorbed into a world economy, and the evolution as a consequence of Berlin, and there is no escape in the shackles of this economic absorption.

And then into a world culture, which we probably wouldn't have acquired in quite the same manner had we not been colonized, including the fact that we are using the English language in this room, and that the language has become one of the major factors of discourse on the African... European languages have become major media discourse on the African continent.

And then our relationship with the Arabs have been deepened partly as a result of colonization, creating what some of us have called Afrabia. The tendencies towards the merging of the Arab world with the African world and creating genealogical Afrabians, ideological Afrabians, geographical Afrabians, if you want definitions, we can discuss those later on. But the issue is these two sub-regions of the continent, which at the arrival

of Islam in the continent, there were very few Arabs in Africa. Now there are more Arabs in Africa than outside. This is not entirely because of European colonization, but European colonization has been a factor in promoting awareness of identities and consequences of inter-Arab relations.

So there is more, and I'm sure you can contribute more, about the epic vision why this century has been so different. Now, what about the episodic school of viewing colonialism? This is just one more century in millennia of African history, and the argument is partly because of the brevity, the briefness, of the European colonial rule, except, even if you included Algeria being colonized from early in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, and South Africa having Europeans for sort of 300 years, in general, the bulk of the continent had relatively brief Europeanization period.

In my own country... I don't know by that whether I mean Uganda or Kenya [laughter]. Maybe both. My own country of Africa, that's a better solution. In the neighboring country of Kenya, when the Europeans arrived, Jomo Kenyatta had already been born in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. By the time British rule ended, Jomo Kenyatta was still alive and he lived to rule Kenya himself for 15 years. That's a very brief period. So Europeans come, this man is already alive, and then he lives through it all, including exercising power over Kenyans for 15 years after that. It's a very brief period, and it's astonishing the consequences, but, in general, is the depth of impact deep?

And then, boundaries.... well, we don't know, but come January, the largest African country in boundaries, that is Sudan, which shares borders with nine other countries, is going to consider whether to keep the boundaries it has inherited, so that they're going to have a referendum to determine whether the south should secede. Their neighbor, Ethiopia, has already had something like that, because Eritrea has come out, and the question is, will there be other boundaries drawn. And subject to major changes which have occurred, names of countries. We no longer have Rhodesia on the map of the African continent, and some other African countries have changed their names. And then it's clear the weakness of governance within the African continent and the artificiality of institutions of both production, distribution and exchange, and the shallowness of instruments of governance.

So Kenya just adopted a new constitution, and it's significant, the days and the attempted devolution, so the idea of just concentrating power in Nairobi, of creating disenchantment, maybe widely repeated in other areas that the original intentions of colonialism have been reconsidered.

So then there's negative epic consequences. Not all epic consequences are positive, like you've been absorbed into the world system, you've become a member of the United Nations. You've become a global actor, etc. Negative epic consequences include failed states, civil wars, breakdowns of law and order, erosion of African culture, and the arrival of alien values. And then the negative episodic consequences, too, like military coups, interfaith tensions, etc.

So the thing still hanging over us was the impact of Berlin deep or shallow? Adebajo's book on the curse of Berlin leans towards attributing depth and wide-ranging repercussions to the legacy of Berlin. But in addition to judging colonialism by the yardstick of depth or shallowness, the scale of quantity, there is the judging of Berlin by the yardstick of costs of benefit, so the scale of quality. So the impact one could be regarded as quantity in terms of weight. The second one is the cost-benefits analysis.

The pluses are familiar. We are colonized, we learned a little more about our environment. We learned about causes of diseases, control of... clinics, although our hospitals are in shambles, at least we're beginning to know that they're in shambles. And then there are diseases that are virtually already on their way out, like smallpox. And there are diseases that come and go, like control of tuberculosis. But part of that is an impact of Europeanization in Berlin. And then we become major actors in some of the global institutions including our friends Boutros Boutros-Ghali and Kofi Annan, and then outside the center of the UN system, Irina Bokova, Director General of UNESCO. We've had vice presidents of the World Bank. We've had justices of the International Court.

Justice of the Hague. We've had Barack Obama on the ascendant's seat as the most powerful black person in the history of civilization.

Then you have colonial costs. These are benefits. Colonial costs, violence at time of conquest, primary resistance violence. Then you have violence in the course of the colonial era, including wars like Mau Mau and collapses, and then violence has a legacy of colonialism where some countries have been unable to sustain any system that would not use violence. And we had for quite a while the violence of white settlerdom as part of the costs of colonization.

Technological efficiency is one of the colonial pluses but some people say no, no, that is one of the minuses. I won't argue about that on this occasion, but there are aspects of technology which may be positive and we are not in control -- is quite possible that whether we were colonized or not colonized, that technology would have caught up with us at the rate it caught up with Japan and Thailand and Iran without being colonized in the same manner.

So the Berlin Conference started in 1884. That year became of a symbol of colonization. George Orwell's futuristic novel was *1984*. That year became a symbol, later on, of the Cold War. The Bismarckian legacy of 1884 created a world in which all races were equal, but some races were more equal than others, an Orwellian formulation. The Orwellian proper legacy of 1984, created world in which all people were equal but some people were more equal than others. The contradictions are still with us to the present day. Both 1884 and 1984 produced Big Brother who was watching lesser mortals like ourselves. And some of the tests of trying to find out of which of the African countries would I settle occurred to me when I thought my career in the United States was at an end when stopped at Miami Airport, interrogated and detained for many hours. I wasn't coming from Afghanistan or Iraq; I was coming from the Caribbean, so I couldn't understand why this old man was being interrogated by different sets of people including being asked questions like whether I believed in Jihad, and what did I interpret Jihad to be. I said look, I'm a professor, you want a lesson in Jihad, sit down [laughter]. There's the armed Jihad, there's the intellectual Jihad. There's the Jihad of the person. There's the Jihad of the community. There's Jihad of defense and the Jihad of offense. Do we have time, you think? So we hung quite a while, and I was given one phone call to make, and I made it to our home. My dear wife here just happened not to be in the house, but we had a Ugandan woman student staying with us, living with us. When I told them I'm detained, and I have no idea when I will come home, she thought that detained, like "delayed," that I'm delayed, I have no idea when I will get home. So by the time she found my wife on the phone, fortunately she mentioned, "Uncle said he has been allowed only one phone call." Then my wife knew this detained was not delayed. And then she mobilized my grown-up sons, one of whom is a professor of law, one works for the federal government and the university itself. And this is ridiculous, they were following me. If I wanted to go to the toilet, I had an armed person there waiting for me. So the real issue about which country I belonged to, I believe at that time, this is the end of my American career. So where do I go from here? It is significant of how I view myself, and how Africa has been generous to me, that it wasn't a straightforward question. So I couldn't just say, the United States won't have me, so therefore I'm going to Kenya because that's where I was born. Because there were other possibilities, there was calculating pluses and minuses of the different stations. Finally, very sophisticated interrogators came, and it was quite clear they knew their business and they might also, by that time, have discovered who I was. They gave me their card, which said anti-terrorism task force. So I said, what are you doing with me? But they were very polite by that time. They told off those who had interrogated me earlier, this is an old man, did you ask whether he needed water for his medication? Did you ask him what health condition he is in? He spent hours waiting for this.

Now we can't blame Berlin for what happened to me in Miami. But if you regarded colonialism's impact on the Arab world, it may not be too far fetched. Colonialism's impact on sub-Saharan Africa may not have included my interrogation at Miami airport, but the general impact of our Arab neighbors and of the region as a whole created conditions which confront us now with all sorts of tensions between Westerners, between the Arab world, and between Muslim and non-Muslim.



So in general, Adekeye's book is part of this continuing conversation, debate, arguing about where we are going, fearing aspects of that question, and fearing indeed whether the destination would remain irreversible in its negativity, or whether it will take on the more positive consequences of Berlin. But the debate must continue between races, between civilizations, sometimes between scales of measurement, and, ultimately, between human beings. Thank you very much.

**Adonia Ayebare:**

Thank you, Prof. Let me just make one quick announcement before opening this up. The book is available in the entrance for sale, and those who want Ade to sign it, he'll be available. So let me quickly open up the meeting for comments, questions. Ambassador Tété.

**Tété António:**

Actually during that... you do understand which I'm not asking, going to ask a question to Adekeye. He's so provocative. But if I ask a question, he may provoke me further [laughter]. I am not going to ask a question also to Professor Mazrui. I want just to express my thanks to him for what he has done for Africa. He did respond very well to your question of trying to send him to Kenya, trying to send him to Uganda, and not sending him to Sudan or to South Africa. No, I didn't make reference to Angola. Angola was a colony for 500 years. So there was no brevity in colonialism in Angola. So I think those are some of the difference of Berlin.

But I was saying that we would be having Dr. Mazrui and Adekeye at the African Union, at the African Union office this afternoon, 4 PM, to discuss with the African group on Africa and the United Nations, which, or so I think, will be a very interesting thing to discuss for us. We need this refreshment sometimes. Sometimes diplomats get tired of our usual sentiment and whenever we get somebody as Adekeye coming to provoke us, if you don't take care, you may think nothing good is happening in Africa. But I do understand that in the lines, there are many positive messages also, Adekeye, and Professor Mazrui is sending. Professor Mazrui, I know why Adonia is sending you to Uganda due to Makerere. Whereas still a young Angolan in exile, I was supposed to go to study, but I didn't have a chance to go to Makerere. When I went to Kampala last time, the only thing I asked was to visit Makerere, at least, so I did it. So, thank you very much, Dr. Mazrui for his usual light you give. Whenever I will meet you, we always go from your room very well refreshed and maybe starting new ideas. It is the light for the future generations, so we thank you very much.

**Mojubaolu Okome:**

Thank you for your presentations. I guess you'd fall within the epic vision school of colonialism as defined by Professor Mazrui. But you alluded to African agency. And I'm wondering, where is that agency, either in the immediate post-Berlin conference period or more importantly, contemporarily?

**Adonia Ayebare:**

Your name?

**Mojubaolu Okome:**

Okome.

**Adonia Ayebare:**

Okay.

**Sorosh Roshan:**

Good afternoon and thank you for the wonderful presentation. A quick story Professor Mazrui. I was going to Ethiopia for a conference on genital mutilation many years ago with an invitation and an ID card, and somebody put a red dot on my passport. I was always a very good student all my life, so I thought perhaps they want to upgrade me to business class or something [laughter]. I looked at it and it says "high security alert." I just was so furious, and I went to the desk and said why, what did I do? Your birthplace. I am from Iran. Of course, I got through that experience without too much problem, and then it happened one more time in Paris. But, back to the wonderful book. I feel very connected to Africa because since 1985, my international work started in Kenya, and my travel has taken me to South Africa and many places. I think Africa, as we all know, is a very rich continent and has most magnificent, talented men and women, but especially a lot of talented women in leadership. Why is it that such a rich continent cannot get control of the corruption. And I recently am reading your book about Zimbabwe that I did not hear any mention of it. A very disturbing book about Zimbabwe and the government and

whatever is happening there. When my professional work takes me to Africa, and as part of it we need to do fundraising, the very first thing that I hear is, Africa is rich if they could stop the corruption. Thank you.

**Adonia Ayebare:**

Ambassador Hirsch.

**John Hirsch:**

This is such an exceptional event that I just want to say a word or two and then I will ask you a question, Ade. It's just for IPI, Adonia has already said this, but it's an incredible privilege to have you back here because of all the fantastic work you did over the years at IPI in this Africa program, and all of those of you who have this piece of literature in front of you should just look at it and see the number of books that CCR has put out, and Ade's really been at the front line of contemporary African scholarship. I just think that needs to be registered and his work, done to your inspiration, Professor Mazrui, so I think you are very much a part of all that IPI has done.

Ade, the question that I kind of wanted to ask you was about the very end of your remarks and about the future, on top of the question that the Madame from over here, who had been from Iran asked you. You spoke about needing another conference. What is it... and you spoke about the ancestors, I didn't quite get what this was really all about, this conference you want to hold. First of all, is there any initiative coming out of Africa for a conference of that sort? I mean there's all these meeting, which we know, summits and so on. But what is it that you are aiming for? Is this about the United States of Africa, sort of, or some kind of different approach? I know you've explained very well all of the concerns you have, and you've explained those concerns, and I think everybody here understands the concerns and empathizes a lot with them. But I thought you could clarify that. By the way, as a p.s., I was once pulled off of American Airlines because I never had flown with them. I was interrogated. I was the only person on that flight that was stopped from getting on, on both the New York and the Los Angeles end and had to do the whole nine yards of being scrutinized because I had never flown with them. So I had the triple x on my boarding pass. So that does not in any way take away from the terrible experience you had, but there's so much of this going on, I just thought I would add that. But if you could comment on what you do see as the objective of this proposed conference, that would really be interesting, and any comments you might have of anything you think African leadership should be doing over the next decade that their not doing, that would be great.

**Iftekhar Chowdhury:**

Thank you. My name is Iftekhar Chowdhury, former Bangladesh Foreign Minister and also permanent representative to the United Nations, currently a senior fellow at the Institute of South Asian Studies at Singapore. From Singapore, sir, we watch Africa, developments of Africa very closely. I want to congratulate both speakers on two excellent presentations. Professor Ali Mazrui, of course, your own intellectual contribution to even Asia's consciousness has been incalculable. You're aware of it, sir, and I want to flag this with you. Today, sitting in Singapore, one does get a sense of what you call the rise of the rest. The rise of Asia, as if it were, having shared in many ways a similar cartographic blunder, whatever you call the Berlin experience. But Asia went through a similar colonial experience and today there is a palpable sense of Asia on the rise. Is such a sense perceptible in Africa? If not, why not? Thank you.

**Adonia Ayebare:**

Let's come back to our speakers and then we'll take another set of questions. Let's start with you, Ade.

**Adeke Adebajo:**

I'll be very quick because there are quite a few questions. Thanks for all the comments.

In terms of African agencies, the question from my sister there, I think there are attempts by some leaders on the continent to try to get Africa to rise up, and I think the example I gave of Nigeria and South Africa during Embekke and Ombasanjo is an example of Africans actually trying to take their own fate into their own hands. And the peacekeeping that Nigeria undertook in Liberia and Sierra Leone, it's serious sacrifices, you know, 1,500 fatalities in peacekeeping missions that lasted a decade is real sacrifices in the history of peacekeeping. I don't think you'd be able to find any sort of sacrifices like that. And particularly in the context where the death of 18 US soldiers and 10 Belgians led to them withdrawing from Somalia and Rwanda, we really do need to know that sort of

credit. There are other instruments, like the African peer review mechanism, which 29 African countries have joined. It's not perfect, but at least it's a start. It's a recognition that you need at least to be able to monitor yourself in the field of political and economic governance and receive feedback. It's not a punitive mechanism, but at least it's an indigenous attempt to try to get governments going. And the final example I would give is the role of civil society in Africa. I consider myself a member of civil society, but civil society has tried under enormous odds, in all parts of Africa to strengthen governance, to manage conflicts, to reintegrate soldiers into local communities with very little resources often. And they've also played a role, for example, in developing early warning systems for EGADS and ECOAS in East and West Africa. So those are some of the examples I would give.

My sister over here in front, asked about corruption in Africa, and I wouldn't say corruption is an African thing. I mean in the American system, they kind of almost legalize it, if you see how the Congress is currently working, where these big firms can contribute and then lobby their way for legislators who they have in their pockets to pass all sorts of laws. But I guess it's legal in some ways. But it appears quite grotesque to some of us that such big powerful interest groups can actually control and dictate what happens in countries. And it's... development, of course, is a process, and it's not a performance, it's not an act, it's a stage which all countries have to go through, and so you have parts of Asia that are very corrupt. You have Italy that also institutionalized corruption. The president owns most of the media there. I hope the ambassadors are here from all these countries [laughter]. In Latin America, also, you see the same sorts of things as well.

But I do think there's some countries, like Nigeria, where 380 billion dollars is estimated to have been stolen in oil money, which is an absolute travesty. Because that is a country that has so much human and natural resources and should actually be in the forefront of leading countries. So that is something that we have to concede and admit. But there are many countries that no matter how good leaders they have, you had Sankara in Burkino Faso, they're not going anywhere fast, and many of these countries I think should maybe be removed from the map. I want to start naming them, countries like Benin, Togo. I don't know if the Togolese Ambassador is here. You know, there's no reason why they should exist as viable countries. The only way that they can survive is actually to harness their efforts to greater regional integration schemes, and that links to my question that John asked. Of course I don't expect John in a sort of spiritual way for the ancestors to rise up and attend the conference in Berlin. That would be a sort of out-of-body experience. What I'm talking about with the New Conference of Berlin is metaphorical. So, it means we need to actually develop regional integration schemes that work. We need to trade with each other. Not through just raw materials and resources that are competitive, but things that are actually complimentary. Hilary Clinton came out to Africa last year and noted that Africa is the only continent with less than 10 percent of trade with each other. It doesn't make any sense. So my main point is not for Togo and others to disappear, of course, that's tongue in cheek; but for them to harness their efforts in the way that Luxembourg and Belgium only make sense within a greater EU. And so I think that's what I'm talking about. We need to rationalize all these regional economic communities we've created. There's a fantastic report chaired by Adebayo Adedeji, "The Audit of the African Union in 2007," which the AU has buried for its own reasons. But that report has very concrete recommendations on how to improve regional integration in Africa, and I think that's where we basically need to go. I'll leave the very difficult question to Professor Mazrui from the Bangladeshi former Foreign Minister.

**Ali Mazrui:**

Thank you. First, thank you to those who added a word of welcome to me for being here. It is my privilege to be able to share a few thoughts about Africa with an audience such as this one.

On the issue of corruption, I also think there is epic scale corruption and there's episodic levels of corruption. And it's true that for many of our countries, we have attained epic levels of corruption. I happen to be convinced that corruption, like crime, cannot be abolished completely, so the idea that you'd have a society where there's no crime, I don't regard as a feasible aspiration. But it is indeed an imperative that we should minimize levels of crime. Similarly, with corruption, I don't think you can ever end it completely, and as in the case of crime, the duty is to minimize it. Corruption becomes

episodic rather than fully epic proportions when it doesn't engulf everybody for every little thing. That you want a license to sell oranges and you must bribe somebody else, and you want permission to send your child to school, you must bribe someone, that's epic proportions. In this country, the amounts of dollars that are involved in corruption are much, much bigger than we are, but it falls short of being epic proportion in my sense because it doesn't filter all the way down for every little thing that somebody is doing, and if we can avoid transforming the entire quality of life into a constant exercise in bribery, then we can avert the situation I was referring to.

Then there's a worry about... there are things that are positive that are happening that our African leaders should be encouraged to maintain. I do think that we've become stricter with regard to governments that come to power through military coups. That there are fewer military coups than there were in the 1980's, and that we've begun to have situations where an incumbent government can be voted out of office and not subvert the system. Unfortunately, my test is there must be two occasions when a government in power is voted out of office in Africa and it doesn't precipitate a crisis in the political order. I think Ghana has just passed that one, because twice they were governing in power and then the government that captured power was different from the one that was in power, so that did not change. I thought Kenya just made it, unfortunately, in 1997, five years earlier, a regime which had been in power since independence was voted out of office and there was no major collapse. So I was quite optimistic in 2007 as parliamentary elections appeared to knock out one permanent Kenyan after another. More than a dozen prominent Kenyans of cabinet level were voted out of offices, and I said, hey, we are coming here, this is the second test. We failed at the level of the presidency. We were passing at the level of parliamentarians, we failed at the level of the presidency.

And then Tanzania has had a situation where it's a country that is split between Muslims and Christians in almost equal numbers. It's had a Christian president, then followed by a Muslim president then followed by a Christian president and now back to a Muslim president. So they have a rotating presidency on a religious basis without changing the Constitution. An example of political pragmatism, and Nigeria hasn't had a military coup in a decade. That is a record in Nigeria -- a whole decade, and no military coup, touch wood [laughter].

And then, of course, we mustn't forget to celebrate what Ade was emphasizing that South Africa has ended political apartheid, though it hasn't effectively ended economic apartheid.

On the issue of our relations with Asia as a whole, this is definitely a sister continent which is in the struggle against the consequences of Berlin, Africa looked to Asian countries. And there's a reactivation of interest between Asia and Africa right now. My wife and I were in India soon after Barack Obama was elected. Within 48 hours, I was able to be welcomed by the Prime Minister of India, Manmohan Singh. 48 hours since my arrival, people generally sometimes stay there for weeks, waiting for an interview with Manmohan Singh, and we were there privately, just my wife and I and my assistant and the Prime Minister's assistant and have a cup of tea. There are two things which helped that. One is this great awareness and respect for Africans, and secondly, the Oxford connection. Manmohan Singh and I were contemporaries in Oxford and only after saying "Don't you remember me at the student's union?" such and such dates, oh yes, of course, come to tea. And we went to tea. So those were real effective. One is on the more positive side of Berlin. Positive side of Berlin, it generates cross-national and cross-continental elites that become aware of each other. And then on the other side, you have the notion that a major Asian power is not just interested in cultivating an African head-of-state, but is interested to talking to an African academic and scholar. That's a very interesting development.

Malaysia started an annual lecture from now on, they tell me. Again, you have an annual lecture and you have Malaysia and you are asking an African to lunches. So they asked me to go and it's promoted by the Prime Minister, so I was a guest of the Prime Minister. All these are measurements of the beginning of reactivation because we worked closely for in Asia and then there was a major decline in Asian countries, lack of interest in Africa at the end of the Cold War was in part a negative aspect, and now there are signs of

reactivation taking place and on that side of it, I hope, will be able to cultivate the giants of Africa who are emerging, India and China, but we must also cultivate the [indiscernible] of Africa, including Singapore, as a national... incredible that a country so small could exercise so much influence within the society. Thank you.

**Ebenezer Appreku:**

Thank you. Ade, I just want to join others in congratulating for your very scholarly exuberance and enthusiasm. I think the volumes of written speak to your dedication to the cause of Africa, but as you can predict, I am going to comment on your remarks on Kofi Annan, and we've done that exchange before in another forum.

**Adekeye Adebajo:**

At another place. [laughter]

**Ebenezer Appreku:**

Yes. But I want to just begin with a caveat that I haven't read your book, so it's possible that you've done a balanced reference to Kofi Annan, but judging by your oral and the tone of your oral remarks on Kofi Annan, I think as a scholarly work, you may have to maybe revise your notes on the role he purportedly played in bringing down Boutros-Ghali. Because he was a candidate for Africa, but for him, maybe the log will have fallen on somebody else at Africa. So for somebody who is reputed to have undermined an African candidate, you can be sure that Africans, by the way we work, they would not have endorsed him as a candidate to replace him. There's more we know as diplomats behind the scenes than is reported within the media. I think that the reports about his role in bringing down Boutros-Ghali are exaggerated. I remember your response to one of my state comments was that he was meeting the Americans secretly, and I was telling you that no Secretary-General wins without lobbying all the P5 members in all the countries as well. So those secret meetings are not suggestive of bribery or any unusual approaches, but I will not be doing justice to my intervention because of a time constraint and the mere fact that the diatribe is written doesn't mean a mistake does not cease to be a mistake by sheer repetition. Just because David has written, you may have other sources too, which can give you the alternate view. But I hope your book balances the question. Thank you very much.

**Adonia Ayebare:**

Behind there.

**Karen Colvard:**

I'm Karen Colvard from the Harry Guggenheim Foundation. Professor Mazrui, my mentor and your friend from Uganda, Professor Dhani Nobuderi, would say that the argument between the epical and the episodic impact of colonialism is not so settled yet and it all depends on what Africans do now and in the future to answer that question. What Nobuderi would say is the best thing that African leaders can do is step aside and let the boundaries of Africa grow again and be shaped from the communities on to other alliances, cross borders, and within countries that we have now. And Ade, my question for you is, do you see any sort of road map that goes from the small villages on up to reinvent and reshape African governance in ways that fit better and ignore the Berlin Conference?

**Adonia Ayebare:**

One last question.

**Orobola Fasehun:**

Thank you. My name is Orobola Fasehun and I'm a retired Nigerian diplomat. And Ade, thank you very much. You're always very provocative, always provoking. I think maybe perhaps you are a younger brand of Professor Mazrui [laughter]. Because actually your objectives are incredibly hard-hitting and you repeated it, let me say a little bit irreverent, but that's you.

Just a comment on what the gentleman from Ghana here said. Yes, indeed, even in his first running, Boutros-Ghali was not completely innocent either. He came to Nigeria. We said, you are a candidate, he said he wasn't, started lecturing us, and obviously suddenly he had a personality problem, which of course might have really rubbed very badly with the Americans, and so, therefore, whether between him and Kofi, of course, is a different matter, but when you meet him, and suddenly he does not come through as what you can call a diplomat. It's more as you say more of a scholar, and an arrogant scholar for that matter.

The other one, of course, is not finished yet. You've deconstructed Africa. And the question is now in a sense, I think in terms of millennia, Africa will not be the first continent that is colonized. Those who colonized us were colonized. So the question is, are there lessons which we can learn to move forward? And of course you pointed out that yes, certainly, the question of regional integration may be the path to it. And that we also say that if the people of Africa themselves are integrating themselves, of course, you've gone through the center border in Nigeria. Actually, I'm sorry to say, Benin lives in Nigeria, simply because cars imported, migration, so in a sense Africans are doing integration before the governments do that. But I think we also have to look at governance in Africa because even the so-called sturdy states in Africa, like Nigeria, we have governance issues. And until governance issues are resolved, it make it very difficult for us to be an effective example for other African countries to follow us. Thirdly, I think the effect which we had in Southeast Asia. If two or three African colonies can rise in each of the regions, I believe certain that the others will follow. In fact, the Africans who migrate to those countries that are well run, that are developing. I just find that actually the government may have no choice but to copy. Thank you.

**Sandra Ilogu:**

Hi. My name is Sandra Ilogu and I'm here really just because of personal relationships with Adekeye. We've been family friends since, and I was very impressed to know that he had an association with Dr. Mazrui as well. I just want to ask a few questions. My mother is in southern Sudan. She's a Nigerian but she actually resides there, and hopefully, or as they hope down in southern Sudan, the referendum will come and they will be separated. Are there any bodies or any groups that are helping to guide them along their governance and strategic plans so that they won't be part of this Berlin Wall problem that we've all gone through as other parts of Africans are going through? And the other thing is just as the gentleman here before mentioned, talking about how countries really are moving ahead and really trying to get good governance, is there anything or any plans for corrective actions for governances when that's going wrong out there. Are there people who, or bodies who can guide them in directions that will be positive towards the growth of Africa?

**Adonia Ayebare:**

Thank you. Start in reverse order, Professor Mazrui.

**Ali Mazrui:**

Thank you. With regard to a reference to a shared friend, Dr. Nobuderi in Uganda, on the notion whether the epic interpretation of the importance of colonialism versus the episodic is an issue yet to be resolved, I don't disagree with that. In fact, as an educator, the curse that Ade and I have sometimes talked about is a curse where the institutions we create don't work. So at first you say, okay, colonialism was brief and had this wide-ranging implications, yes, but which of those institutions are working? If they are not working sooner or later, Africa will be forced to experiment with alternative methods of solving its problems. As an educator, I am particularly intrigued by the quality of schools. The schools are deteriorating in one African country after another. The negative side is we're impoverishing the potential talent of the society and the skills that could be trained. The positive consequences is that okay, the schools were all wrong maybe. Maybe they are primarily instruments not of transmitting skills, but of transmitting values and western culture, that the schools in Africa are the most effective westernizing implements in the society and that the fact that they are not working is that there are cultural forces at work which are rejecting that. But as an educator, I am, myself, torn between those two issues, whether to celebrate the fact that wrong type of schools demonstrably not working, whether to regard that as a plus or to regard that as a minus. And I go to African institutions repeatedly, and have just stepped down as chancellor of a Kenyan University and I know the quality of libraries when I was a professor in Uganda are much higher than the quality of libraries today. So that is part of the curse of the ancestors.

I don't know whether you're asking whether people should cultivate... were you referring to Sudan specifically? Yeah. The south. Whether there should be an effort to prepare them? Yeah. I agree with that. In fact, I'm very nervous myself whichever way the referendum goes. Whichever way it goes, I'm very nervous about whether things will begin to fall apart, and what you're raising is the issue of whether preventive measures can be taken to at least minimize the risks at stakes whichever way the referendum goes. We did celebrate the peaceful separation of Eritrea from Ethiopia. But the celebration didn't last long. They were fighting each other, this time between states, and both sides

are equipped with tanks and airplanes. So one of my nightmares is you have the south becomes a separate country, then invests in weapons, and goes for tanks and airplanes and what not, and the wars between north and south cease to be just local guerilla movements but interstate wars with much larger levels of devastation. So we have our fingers crossed, and we hope that doesn't happen, but I agree with you, we should think about what could minimize the risks.

**Adekeye Adebajo:**

I'll be very quick because we're out of time. On southern Sudan, I agree with Mazrui, I really think we need to be very concerned. Sudan is the largest country in Africa as has been said, with nine borders, so if things fall apart there, it will have major repercussions. Not only for the Horn of Africa, but the Great Lakes and possibly North Africa as well. I think if a referendum does take place, though, there's only one result, independence. And the south has made it very clear that that's what's going to happen, so it's still not clear whether the referendum will take place, whether Khartoum will accept the results if it does take place, and what happens after that, whether south Sudan may unilaterally declare independence if the north is stolen. There is still a lot of uncertainties, and I think EGAD and the AU and especially the panel that Thabo Mbeki has been heading, really have been putting in more energy now, but there's not very much time left, and we had a conference on Sudan a couple of months ago, and people were really bleak in terms of the prospects. The UN does have 10,000 troops in the South and 26,000 in Darfur, which I think could play a role if mandated to do so. But one of the things that came out of the conference we had was that the US and China are absolutely key within the P5 in making sure that the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005, that they're both guarantors of, is actually adhered to, and I think this is one of the cases where the US played a very positive and constructive role. I don't think the CPA would have been signed if the US had not pressured Khartoum into agreeing to it, and China happens to be the largest trading partner of Sudan, gets a lot of oil from there. So I think a lot of action is needed, and the recent meeting that Obama had with the leaders of Sudan at the UN General Assembly was encouraging, but we need to keep the eye on the ball.

In relation to the deputy permanent representative of Ghana to the UN. That was a very patriotic defense of Kofi Annan and you're doing your job very well, but I must respectfully disagree in the sense that I think it's important that you read James Traub and Stanley Meisler, and these are not just ordinary journalists. These were journalists that were given unparalleled access to Kofi Annan and I think the sort of biography Kofi expected from them was very different from what came out in the end. And they interviewed everybody, senior officials, they sat in confidential meetings, they sat in senior management meetings, they actually quoted them. And what they said in terms of the transition was that Kofi's people actually met with officials like Bob Orr and Michael Sheehan, who were at the US Embassy at the UN or the State Department, and later came into Kofi Annan's office at the UN when he was serving there. So I think it's important to at least not dismiss these journalists and these writers that have written really very well-researched biographies of Kofi Annan. And the British and Americans actually launched a very cynical campaign telling the Africans that if they did not get on board for Kofi Annan, then it would mean that there's no qualified black African candidate. And they, of course, did that to scare the Africans to basically rally behind Kofi so that they would not lose a second term to which many believed Africa was entitled. And I happened to be around and following these issues very closely at the time. So my problem with Kofi is one that is, it's just a personal preference. I think Professor there, older brother, stated his own preference. You know, and his own criticisms of Boutros-Ghali, and I think that's very positive and that's to be encouraged. But I don't think we should say that some of these leaders are not to be criticized or attacked. There are good things that Kofi Annan did that I praised in the chapter in the book also, for example, on humanitarian intervention in terms of peacekeeping efforts in Africa, in terms of reaching out to NGOs and non-state actors and bringing more women into the UN. Those are things that I gave him credit for, but I do think that Kofi Annan did not serve Africa very well in the ten years that he spent here, and I will stand by that, despite the fact that I love Ghana and Ghanaians. But give me Kwame Nkrumah or Michael Essien rather than Kofi Annan.

I think in terms of the question on the bottom approaches that Karen was asking, it's very difficult, because even at local government level, there are not a lot of elections at that

particular level, so I think the prospects for bottom-up change are going to take quite a bit of time, but the hope that a lot of the civil society actors that are at least trying and working at those levels will have an impact higher up.

Prof, I don't think there will be another Ali Mazrui, you can't clone someone like Mazrui. There is only one unique Mazrui so I think everybody has to find their own path, and I admire and am inspired by Prof. but I don't want to be him. I don't have the triple heritage anyway.

I think your point about reconstructing Africa is also a very good one and I think regional integration, your good governance, you pointed out, but also having lead states like South Africa and Nigeria who account for 75 percent of their sub-region's economic strength, lead in regional integration and development is absolutely critical.

**Adonia Ayebare:**

Thank you on behalf of IPI, let me thank all of you for coming in large numbers to listen to us speak and join me in thanking our excellent speakers.