



## IPI AFRICAN ELECTION SERIES

### Côte d'Ivoire: A Test for the United Nations and the International Community

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Trygve Lie Center for Peace, Security & Development  
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*Transcript edited by IPI*

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### TRANSCRIPTION

**Chair:**

**Edward C. Luck**, *IPI Senior Vice President for Research and Programs*

**Speakers:**

**Atul Khare**, *UN Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations*

**James Jonah**, *former UN Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs*

**William Fitzgerald**, *US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of African Affairs*

**Youssoufou Bamba**, *Permanent Representative of Côte d'Ivoire to the United Nations*

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**Edward Luck:**

Good afternoon, everyone. We appreciate such a large turnout. And I was asked on one of the media shows the other day, well, with all that's going on in Tunisia and Egypt, presumably no one is paying any attention to Côte d'Ivoire anymore. And I said, "Well, that's actually not true." And all of you being here today is very good testimony to the fact that the international community remains very much focused on the crisis in Côte d'Ivoire.

I was pleased when I saw the title given today as a test for the United Nations and the international community. And I think this comes in several layers. Obviously, it's a major test for the people of Côte d'Ivoire, for ECOWAS and the sub-region, for the African Union itself and its unity, and obviously for the UN and its deep, deep engagement in trying to work this through.

We have four excellent speakers today. Each one could tell us half-an-hour, an hour of quality things. But, unfortunately, I'm only going to give them six to eight minutes each. And I'll try to be rather rigorous and consistent about that in the hopes that we can have two or three rounds of questions and comments from the audience. We still have I think two seats up front if any of each one of you would like to try for those two seats. And this obviously is on the record with so many people here today.

This is a first in a series of meetings we're having this year on elections in Africa. We hope that they won't all be crises. But, obviously, one of the reasons people are very concerned and interested in the outcome here is with so many other elections coming up in Africa this year.

I will just very briefly introduce each speaker before he goes forward. We're very pleased to start with Atul Khare, who is the point person for the UN heading the effort at headquarters in terms of getting all the pieces together. He is Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations; before that, was Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Timor-Leste. He had a long experience in the foreign service of his native India. And from what I've seen, he's doing a terrific job of keeping the UN focused and keeping the pieces together here. So Atul, I know six or eight minutes is not a enough for all that you're doing, but if you could start with us, that would be terrific. So thank you for being with us.

**Atul Khare:**

Thank you, Ed. Let me begin by saying how honored I feel to be with this illustrious panel chaired by you, with colleague, illustrious James Jonah; of course, my dear friend, Youssoufou Bamba, the Permanent Representative, and of course, Bill Fitzgerald, from the US State Department. I'll try to stick to my limited time of six to eight minutes that you said. As you can see, I have my watch in front of me. I just want to make a few brief points. And then, of course, we can come back during questions and answers to any one of them.

First and foremost, the certification mandate exercised by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. I want to stress and underline this is not something which was imposed externally by the United Nations, this is something which was voluntarily undertaken by the parties in preparatory agreement which was concluded on 29<sup>th</sup> of August, 2005. And, in fact, the parties themselves requested the Secretary-General of the United Nations to appoint the high representative. And later on, the mandate of this high representative was transferred to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. So rest assured that whatever the United Nations has done has been at the request of the parties to the Ivorian conflict.

Secondly, an issue which has been raised again and again, that is the unimplemented parts of the peace process, particularly the reunification, the demobilization exercises, and I want to point out to you that it is clear that these tasks were not completed. But President Gbagbo, then-President Gbagbo, had insisted that he would not confirm the election date until he was satisfied that the security conditions were conducive to the conduct of clean elections. And the fact that he actually agreed to the date of elections implies that he was satisfied with the result of the process on reunification, on demobilization, and so on. Coming to the situation in the country itself, of course, we remained quite concerned as DPKO and as United Nations that to date, nearly two months after the conduct of the elections. And here I want to point out that President Gbagbo actually was quite satisfied with the way in which the UN has assisted in the conduct of the first round of elections, and praised the certification of the first round undertaken

on the same principles by the SRSG as he undertook the certification for the second round.

But despite all this, we find that the situation continues to be in a crisis. The team of experts of the African Union-appointed panel have arrived today morning in Abidjan. They will be assisted by the United Nations both to the provision of security, as also to the availability of the SRSG to provide any information that may be required, and by a senior United Nations official which will participate not in the panel, but continue to do work of the team of experts and to the panel. I hope that there will be positive results emanating out of this process, which, inter alia, as the African Union decided, reaffirms the previous decisions of the African Union Peace and Security Council, and those of the ECOWAS; and indeed, if I may say so, of the United Nations, which implies, inter alia, acceptance of President Ouattara as the legitimate winner of the elections, assisting him in the implementation of his new mandate, and of course, calling on President Gbagbo to cede power in honor and dignity, with grace, acknowledging the contributions that he has made over the past ten years.

I want to reflect in the next four minutes on human rights violations. You are well aware that over 270 dead and several violations of human rights have been reported over the past two months. And, in many cases, the mission has been impeded by regular and irregular forces bearing loyalty to former-President Mr. Gbagbo. This I believe is something which the Secretary-General has condemned, has called for removal of such obstructions. The Security Council has done so. And I believe that this is also the requirement of the international community to continue calling upon all parties to make sure that the United Nations peacekeepers, which work in an impartial fashion for the mandate, for the benefit of the Ivoirian people, can actually continue to do so.

You are aware that the Security Council has authorized additional troops and additional helicopters for the mission. We are in the process of generating these additional troops, and we are also streamlining the manner in which UNOCI [United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire] implements its mandate, including through discussions with two contributing countries on what I would call smarter patrolling mechanisms. For example, going in greater force than the case before, undertaking patrols in a manner which is more conducive to obtaining information, but also in reassuring the population that the United Nations is there to protect the civilians within the measures of its deployment and its capabilities; and also, of course, as called for by the Security Council to protect the key political leaders, particularly, the government.

This situation, of course, is quite unprecedented for a UN peacekeeping operation. But, at the same of time, I think it brings to the fore the challenges we face elsewhere as well. For example, how to ensure that the peacekeepers are recorded, freedom of movement, how to bring about political solutions, while obviously avoiding military confrontation. As Ed mentioned before, a lot is at stake. The respect for the democratically-expressed will of the Ivoirian people, the stability of the country, and indeed, the sub-region. You are well aware that there are close to 33,000 Ivoirian refugees which are now in neighboring Liberia. And, of course, finally, the prospects for democracy to take root and other democratic transitions and elections in countries in conflict or divided societies.

I want to point out that Côte d'Ivoire, in some ways, is an exception. There have been positive electoral outcomes in other conflict countries. Timor-Leste is one example. The country was facing 15 percent internal displacement and major political differences when we conducted elections, when we assisted in the

conduct of elections in 2007. And those elections actually lead to a positive outcome. And the country has been stable for the last four years.

Similarly, for example, today, I must welcome the positive outcome of the South Sudan Referendum Commission, where 98.3 percent of voters voted in favor of succession, even though unity under the CPA was supposed to be the goal towards which they strived for. But the fact that this democratically-expressed will has been accepted by both CPA parties, the NCP, as also the SPLA; by the Government of Sudan and also the Government of South Sudan, indicates that if political leaders take on their responsibilities which are incumbent upon them, then we can achieve significant outcomes. Unfortunately, in Côte d'Ivoire, that has not yet been the case. But I trust, I hope, that with the efforts of the African Union, we will see positive change. I should stop there, sticking to my 7.5 minutes.

**Luck:** You had a perfect 7.5 minutes. And you set a shining examples for our other three speakers. I am very pleased to introduce another longstanding friend, James Jonah, former Under Secretary-General for Political Affairs, at one point, Permanent Representative of Sierra Leone to the UN; at another point, a minister in his native Sierra Leone; and now, of course, the highest accolade of all, Senior Fellow at the Ralph Bunche Institute. So James, you have the floor for six to eight minutes. Thank you.

**James Jonah:** Thank you, Ed. I am very pleased to be participating in this meeting. I think I'll start from where you left off. Particularly, I must express my concern that the action of the African Union last week has a potential of unraveling what I believe is an unprecedented consensus internationally on Côte d'Ivoire. In my judgment, I think it's misguided but not surprising.

Because it was unique that you have the ECOWAS, you have the United Nations, and I must say in passing that I was very surprised by the firm position of the United Nations on this issue and the way the Security Council has acted. And why is it I'm worried? I'm worried because the heads of state that put together the high-level panel have their own worry about what is happening in Côte d'Ivoire. They do not want a precedent to be set whereby external powers insist on the legitimacy of an election. That is it. And I think they're on the road to success. Because it is wrong, in my judgment, to reopen the issue of who won the election. I think people confuse the issue: the United Nations did not endorse the electoral commission; it independently carried out its own counting. The figures are different. They came more or less to the same. And I think this is not understood by many people, that this was a separate exercise by the United Nations.

And what has happened after the high-panel was established confirmed my fears. In the first place, Gbagbo's supporters objected to Burkina Faso as a member of the panel. And then, subsequently, they said, and people say to get publicity, that we would not accept any judgment of the panel which says Ouattara has won. So what is the point of setting up a panel?

And I think because people have not taken note of who Gbagbo is. I think Gbagbo should not be seen only in terms of this last election. Gbagbo, for the last five years, has been able to bamboozle the international community and has stayed in power for five years without any money from the people of Côte d'Ivoire. This is very important. So it's not just what happened last year. He has been successful. And I think they are very convinced, and I happen to know some of his supporters, they are convinced they have a particular skill to out-

maneuver the international community. They really are convinced about it. And I must confess, they are doing it. And they may succeed, unless there is a change of action. Because if you operate, if you open the issue of counting, then forget about it. And that's my concern.

Secondly, I think that... the use of force has been mentioned. I want to deal with that part of it. Use of force is the last resort, not the first resort. And the fact that you have disagreement amongst ECOWAS heads of state is not unique. I did a BBC interview about ten days ago. And I said, in Sierra Leone, we are deeply involved, in fact, managing it. There were only two governments that supported use of force: Guinea, and Nigeria and Abacha. All the others opposed it.

I can tell you there was a very interesting incident. I attended a meeting in Secretary-General's office. And there were ministers from ECOWAS, and we sat them down. They were trying to convince me that force will not succeed. It will lead to bloodshed. We advise you to incorporate these AFRC [Armed Forces Revolutionary Council] into your government. I said, "No, we cannot do it." I was so incensed by the discussion, I left the office, left my deputy in a meeting, went back to my office, called the commander of ECOWAS. I said, "Move, please." Within 24 hours, everything was calm. We took over the government. Very minimal bloodshed. So you are going to always find people who do not want to use force, similarly within ECOWAS.

And I have one concern which is not our subject, but the failure of Africa to deal with Rajoelina. When Rajoelina took over in Madagascar, I gave warning in some of my commentaries in VOA that this is very dangerous. Because he was adopting a procedure which was used mainly in African in the '60s and lies between politicians and the military to make rules. That was a pattern which was stopped at a later point. So if we do not deal Rajoelina, the man was just a mere disc-jockey, who got a couple of military... and he has been there for two or three years now in Madagascar. So if we fail to uphold the legitimate reaches of the people of Côte d'Ivoire in this last election, then I think Africa is in for a rough time, particularly, when we have two elections coming up in Nigeria, Cameroon. So I commend the way the UN has handled this situation. I commend the way ECOWAS has handled it. But I am skeptical about the way the AU has been acting. Thank you.

**Luck:** Well, thank you James for being provocative as always, and for being so succinct. So that was excellent.

Our next speaker is Bill Fitzgerald. He's the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. Before that he was Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of Population Refugees and Migration. He has as wide background in African Affairs. He served in many parts of the continent. And we're delighted that you can join us today, Bill.

**William Fitzgerald:** No, it's my pleasure. Thank you Mr. Luck. And I'm pleased to be on such a guest panel. And, in fact, the audience is impressive – I was going over the list – so I'm especially pleased that you were all able to come out. There was that great sucking sound as the problems in Egypt, and in many ways, Laurent Gbagbo himself has hoped that Sudan would be the one crisis in Africa that everyone was going to focus on, and fortunately, it hasn't proved to be the case. But I'm sure he's doing his best to make Egypt similarly something for him to hide behind.

In any case, I'm going to give you the US policy and the US government's foreign policy attitude toward Côte d'Ivoire and how this became... I'm not going to

repeat what my predecessors have said. I would say first off that this policy comes straight from President Obama, who early on, congratulated Alassane Ouattara because of the unique circumstances of the UN counting the vote itself. There was no question at all that Alassane Ouattara won by 54 percent. President Obama's chief foreign policy goal in Africa starts out, he has five, but I'll give you the first one, and it's democracy and human rights.

There is no way that the United States could accept Laurent Gbagbo's craven and ambitious attempts to remain in power. It's important to allow the Ivorian people to get what they've been yearning for, for ten years, which is a democratically-elected government. I would say that talking about the international community was, as Under Secretary Jonah said, an unprecedented consensus on the part of the international community. And I dare say it still remains a very, very strong, unified--except for certain countries--mechanism against Laurent Gbagbo. I can tell you that the financial sanctions that have been enacted by the European community and by the United States have already begun to affect Mr. Gbagbo's hold on power. I would also underline that the West Africans themselves, through the West African Regional Bank, have closed off accounts to Laurent Gbagbo, which makes life for him very, very difficult. He normally needs approximately \$100 to \$125 million dollars a year, sorry, per month, to pay civil servants and to pay his military officers. Traditionally, he's done so through electronic transfers to their bank accounts. That has stopped. The electronic services no longer work.

So at some point in the future – and I think this is really the most important thing – at some point in the next few months, his soldiers, his civil servants will not be paid in cash. They can receive the electronic transfers, but when they show up at the banks for cash, there won't be enough cash to cover their payments. And I think that is ultimately the most powerful thing. And, again, it depends on the consensus and the strength of the international community to force this to its rightful end. I would say that, for instance, travel bans have their place. And we are all using travel bans on certain people. My friend and colleague here is an example. I'm pleased to say that the new Ambassador to Washington, Daouda Diabate who will be arriving tomorrow. The world has basically said to Laurent Gbagbo, "You can remain protected by our security forces, but they won't be there forever." And I just want to come back to one point, which is that President Obama's foreign policy in Africa is based on democracy and human rights.

But to me, certainly equally as important, and perhaps even more important, is the question of regional stability. I'm pleased to say that it's not only ECOWAS which is unanimous but also the Mano River Region. And we all know the Mano River Region—I know Under-Secretary-General knows it very well, because Sierra Leone is a member of the Mano River Region, we've just gone through success elections in Guinea which, for a long time, has been a difficult place. Obviously, the conflict and the insecurity in Liberia and Sierra Leone is a thing of the past. There's a great deal of reconstruction to do. But it is absolutely essential that we bring Côte d'Ivoire to a democratically-elected government in peace so they can begin to work on their economy and rebuilding the country. That's absolutely essential, regional security.

I had the opportunity to meet the Liberian ambassador to the United States and the foreign minister last week. And they're beginning to receive refugees. This is a dangerous, dangerous thing. For a country like Liberia, which is just emerging from the conflict to have to handle, at this point, more than 100,000 refugees. This is a very, very troubling thing. So I'm going to close there, and I'm happy to take any questions when we get to that point. Thank you.

**Luck:**

Thanks very much, Bill, and thanks for adding some additional insights to this. Our next speaker is Youssoufou Bamba, who is the Permanent Representative of Sierra Leone [sic] to the UN.

I'll wake up any day now. Are there any other countries you'd like to represent? We can offer you several others. In any case, he had this position a little over a dozen years ago under different circumstances. You'll have to tell us later, compare your experience now with that point. But it has to be one of the more challenging and interesting times to serve as a permanent representative. His diplomatic service for Côte d'Ivoire – I don't know what it's like for Sierra Leone – but for Côte d'Ivoire is very wide and very distinguished, having been ambassador in Vienna to Austria and to the UN office there, and the IAEA, at an earlier point, at Addis Ababa, to the OAU, and many other places in between. So Ambassador, whichever country you'd like to represent, we're particularly interested in your views on Côte d'Ivoire. And sorry for the slip. Thank you.

**Youssoufou Bamba:**

Thank you very much indeed, and I'm very honored to be here at this impressive gathering. And I recognize many dear to me, as Minister Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, and of course, Minister James Jonah in our experience in crisis management in Africa. So I think after this presentation, we'll have a fruitful discussion in the Q&A session.

Let me start with another perspective to see, to tell what this crisis, what this crisis is not. Clearly, it's not about constitutional debate. No, it's not about controversy on the election process counting, no. This election has been the most free with most transparent, the most inclusive, the most democratic we have ever had in Côte d'Ivoire. The people of Côte d'Ivoire have waited, have strived for ten years, which demanded of them a lot of sacrifices, a lot of suffering to reach that very point.

On the 28<sup>th</sup> of November, the people went to the ballot, not to mention, the first round, they went. The turnout was 84 percent for the first round, and the second round, 81 percent, which is a reflection of the will of the people of Côte d'Ivoire for a change. That's an indication.

And secondly, after the election, the condition in which the procedure of counting has happened should be clearly stated here. Nothing happened, everything went very well for the first round. The same pattern arise. The SRSG made the certification, thirdly to mean as international amnesty and diplomat electoral committee made this proclamation, then they Security Council made this proclamation.

And thirdly, the SRSG came and certified in a scientific manner. It did the same the second time. But I will come back a little bit on the condition of the proclamation of the result by the IEC [Independent Electoral Commission]. The headquarters of the IEC was surrounded by armed people from Gbagbo camp. They dismiss all the international media. Their proclamation was broadcast live. And suddenly, they said to the mobile station of RTI [Radiodiffusion Télévision Ivoirienne] to leave. Now we were in sort of blackout. Anything could happen. That's why the president of the IEC felt insecure and looked for a more secure place to proclaim the results. I don't mention this show of disgrace displayed by this Gbagbo supporter who came in to strip the paper. To say there is a clear intention of Mr. Gbagbo to make a *passage forcé*. A few indication in the middle of the debates, the historical debates between Mr. Ouattara and Gbagbo.

Abruptly Gbagbo declared, "I will impose a curfew." For what? You have to think because he has the preparation of what he intended to do.

So I will stop there. This crisis is not about that. Mr. Ouattara is a clear winner of a clear election. That has to be acted upon. That should be understood once and for all. What this crisis is about is a real test for democracy in Africa. Because I would like to quote the Article II for the Charter for Democracy in Good Governance in Africa. It said, "The inter alia objective is to promote the ordering of regular, free and fair election, to institutionalize the legitimate authority of representative government as well as democratic change of government." Article II of the charter. This charter has been ratified by Côte d'Ivoire Parliament in June 2009. One month before the election.

So this crisis is about a test. And as you said, there is eleven elections taking place in Africa this year. So that's why we think the unity of action displayed by international committees should be maintained, should be strengthened. That's why I don't understand the position of certain delegation in the Security Council. I'm speaking freely here. Because, as an African, I think we deserve for democracy to take root in our country now. There is a powerful tide going on... you know in Tunisia, in Egypt, elsewhere again. Because that's the very aspiration of the people. Why is it expressing itself like that? I was in Addis Ababa and inside the corridors, I met many people, people from the media, but they spoke to me as personal African. They said, "Take good and we will prevail." And I will assure you, the day Mr. Gbagbo will leave office, there will be celebration from Mauritius to Angola. Because there is a real thirst for African people's democracy. And the election in Côte d'Ivoire, this crisis, is a real test. Everybody's watching to see the outcome of it.

So I come back now to the position of people from Security Council. Delegation like Russia, I don't understand. The United Nations Security Council has a responsibility to maintain peace and security and stability wherever this security is unrest. But the Ivoirian people as clearly expresses will I think. This simple thing for every delegation, particularly, the permanent member of Security Council, is to support that. How could it be otherwise? This Ivoirian election is, let's say, sui generis to some people. Because as Mr. Atul Khare put it rightly, it has been agreed upon among all stakeholders in this crisis. Mr. Bédié, Mr. Ouattara, Mr. Gbagbo and Soro after Pretoria 2005, and has been endorsed by subsequent relevant Security Council resolutions, namely 1765. So what is this about? And this has been embodied in the Ouaga political agreement signed by Mr. Gbagbo himself. So this crisis is not about that; it's about the determination of the international community to support the advancement of democracy in Africa whether they want it or not. That's the question they have to address.

And I will end it to conclude--you're talking about economic development: that's the basis and prerequisite is democracy. As long as Africa won't establish democracy, unless democracy takes root, never ever will we have a sound, real economic development. We have formidable potential, formidable resources which demand to be developed. Africa wants to take part also in global economic growth. We want to have a better share in world trade, but we need to make democracy work, and work in African being able to play ours. I would like to thank you.

**Luck:**

Thank you. Thank you Ambassador Bamba. And thank you again for being so succinct. We have four views on the table, one or two provocatively said. I presume we'll have more provocative things said from the audience. Please identify yourself. You're welcome to make comments as long as they're short, or



questions. And if you'd like to address your questions to any particular members of the panel, please let us know. So who'd like to begin? Okay, John?

**John Hirsch:**

John Hirsch. First of all, thank you all very, very much. I want to draw you out on these broader issues that, Ambassador, you have just mentioned. IPI has done a publication about a year ago on dealing with election-related disputes. And, of course, as everybody here knows, there were disputes in Kenya, in Zimbabwe. We now have this dispute in the Ivory Coast. Other elections are coming up. What are your thoughts, drawing on all these experiences to what more the international community can do to prevent these disputes in the first place, and then to respond more effectively at the moment of the election to see to it that we don't have these long, protracted approaches? And there's even a big question about whether these power-sharing things – this is not happening of course in Côte d'Ivoire – whether that's even a good idea. Because that was actually a compromise post facto to accommodate Mugabe and the President, Kibaki, in Kenya. And people now think even that's not a very good idea. So could you all gentlemen say something of the broader ideas for the future? Thank you.

**Luck:**

Okay. Let's try to take a couple of questions, the last one was a large one. Please, right here.

**Eduardo Ulibarri:**

Hello, I am Eduardo Ulibarri. I am the Permanent Representative of Costa Rica to the UN. First of all, thank you to the IPI for putting together such a nice, enlightening panel. It was particularly uplifting for me to hear Ambassador Bamba reflecting about importance of democracy in Africa and the close interrelationship between democracy and development. My question is this: it seems very difficult that Mr. Gbagbo would stay for so long in power to the extent that the international community keeps its current strategy together. But what would the long-term implications for Cote d'Ivoire be of this process to the extent that it has already gone, and to the extent that he might be able to stay in power, I don't know, a couple of months more in terms of the unity of the country, of course on the long-term economic prospects, in terms also of the context of the African continent as a whole? Thank you.

**Luck:**

Terrific. Is there one more in this round? Please, our friend from back stand there?

**Hammad Dogar:**

My name is Colonel Hammad Ahmed Dogar, I'm a military advisor to Pakistan's Mission to the UN. I would like to begin by thanking IPI for arranging this and all the distinguished speakers who gave us very in-depth views on ending crisis in Ivory Coast. I have two questions. First one is a little political. We know Gbagbo requested for the certification. He agreed to the schedule and appreciated the result of the first round. Then what went wrong? Why did he went back on his words? This is important, because we have more elections coming up. So it somewhat relates to the first question which was just asked. So we need to understand what exactly went wrong so that we take matters elsewhere.

Second is about economics. We know in certain neighboring countries there is an economy in place where the actual military of that country was not able to feed itself. And this resulted to other means. They became parasites on the local population, like something happening in DRC. So if there will be no cash going to the regular military, is there a fear that the Ivoirian military can take a direction towards that particular mode of their existence? And if there is some such threat, what can we do to prevent that? Thank you.

**Luck:** Great. Excellent group of questions. If I could just add one more and then go back to the panel. If we could start with you, Ambassador Bamba, and work the other direction of the panel. I noticed that James suggested that Gbagbo is particularly skillful at playing off the international community and buying time. And I think we saw that with the five-year delay in this election to begin with. So that sort of implies that time is on his side. I think Mr. Fitzgerald said, "Well, no, no. The sanctions are biting and they're going to bite more. He's not going to have money to pay for the soldiers, et cetera. And so time is on the international community's side." Where does this lie? Who really does have time on their side? But, Ambassador Bamba, if we could begin with you, I think some of the questions were definitely in your direction.

**Bamba:** I think I will pick the last question. Of course there is the military force in Côte d'Ivoire, the 55,000 soldiers, the FDS [Forces de Défense et de Sécurité]. And I think the *force navale* are 30,000-something. But the core of Mr. Gbagbo's army, 5,000 people, the Republican Guard. And they are well-equipped, and of course, well-fed, and well-paid. But they are not experienced, actually. Because most of them have been recruited under 2004; they don't have this what military calls "baptism of fire." So that's for the case where there is some military intervention. So things could be dealt with very rapidly. It's not a question. But the rest of the army, let's say Republican... and, actually, many officials want to make allegiance to what they are prevented from, because of the blockade of the Hotel du Golf. But you have contact with them. And, actually, there is lots of possibility for them. Because they are concerned. They are part of the population of the country. They are suffering as well as the rest of the population. And they are very concerned by the killings, the violation of human rights. Because that's not the honor of the army. The Ivoirian Army is a fine army. They have a lot of good officers, but unfortunately, in this situation, they don't... I mean, they're taking as hostage, so to speak. That's what I can say for that question.

**Luck:** Bill?

**Fitzgerald:** As far as the military goes, the first question you asked is, with all these agreements in effect, why did Gbagbo remain in power? Why did he not accept the results of the election? I think we know the answer to that pretty easily. He lost and he doesn't want to give up power. As far as the military, I share Ambassador Bamba's view that, by and large, certainly in the past, the Ivoirian military has had a strong, big reputation for discipline and obeying orders. So as far as the Ivoirian Army becoming something like the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo, I think that's very unlikely.

I would say on the question of who has time on his side? It's tough to say. We all know the limitations of sanctions. However, in this case, I think certainly ECOWAS has helped to accelerate the impact of sanctions. I think the European Union, frankly, has done a great deal to apply sanctions very, very quickly. In fact, there's sanctions against any European vessel using the Port of Abidjan. And these are very, very important revenues that Côte d'Ivoire needs. It also goes to the question that my Costa Rican colleague asked about the long-term impact. There will be a long-term impact on the economy. But, frankly, with Laurent Gbagbo in power for the past five or six years, there has been a tremendous negative impact on the economy. What Côte d'Ivoire needs is easy, peaceful transition to power so a real government, the true government, can stand up and take over. Thanks.

**Luck:** James?

**Jonah:** Two issues. The first I would like to talk about is Gbagbo. Again, I think you have to know Gbagbo. You cannot understand Côte d'Ivoire until you know Gbagbo. He plans very carefully. And he knew... because you have to remember that the issue of the crisis in the Côte d'Ivoire began by Ouatarra. They knew, and anyone who knows that he will win... and the only way they could stop him winning is to say he's not Ivoirian. That is how the issue...so what happened then? But again, this is a tactic in Africa which is very dangerous, to declare your own countryman. The most ridiculous was Kaunda was said to be a zombie. And I mean it's crazy.

**Fitzgerald:** He was from Yassa land.

**Jonah:** Yeah. So we have to be able to see where it is. So they knew that he might win. He was Prime Minister, he was a popular man, he has very good international cont... So they built in safeguards. The second was the council. And they knew the council can negate. As I said to one of his supporters who I knew very well, I said, "Look, compare what happened in Guinea. The Supreme Court took a lot of time to look at the papers, and in a very objective way, satisfy the election." In Côte d'Ivoire, it was not done; it was just impose something. So that was one thing one has to take into account. When this was planned, it was no surprise.

Secondly, on the issues which was addressed by my friend here, my experience was that I was involved in planning for Angola's election, for Mozambique election, for South African election. And what I learned there was that the electoral commission, even though it's independent, must adopt certain procedures so you don't have any dispute. What I was doing was to have every week to speak in a meeting with all political leaders you knew where there. And this went on for five, six months. I won their confidence. I wanted people's confidence. Everything we did was transparent. I gave them the document, "This is what we are going to do. This has to be adopted." In Africa, when we discussed they felt the need to have... I think it was three international participants in the electoral commission. Three were there. And I think Africa should try to have extra non-country people as in the commissions. I think Guinea has a very good electoral commission by virtue of the fact that they have been there for a long time and they are experienced. This I think is very important.

But the dispute, you cannot avoid it. Because, frankly speaking, most African politicians are not going accept any result where they lose. Because the issue of elections in Africa is do or die. The gains of winning an election is enormous in Africa. Unless you begin to try to separate powers, you are going to have it... I can tell you, I know it's the international community, but not very consistent. You see this idea of regime change, at times the international community would support a regime change even when there is some questions about it.

I'll give you two examples, if we turn to Sierra Leone and Kenya. In Sierra Leone there was a dispute about the electoral commission. There are five members of the electoral commission. Two of the members did not agree with the result of the election. But the international observers said, "We accept it even though you have two of the three." In Kenya they have a larger number of members. But one-third of the members did not accept the election. And they said that is not a legal one. The third international community... what I like about Côte d'Ivoire is to give the UN an independent status to determine the election. That to me is a very good one. So that is the reason why I don't think you can stop dispute of elections. You wouldn't until you get into Nigeria. You will see the problems in

Nigeria. Because I've never seen a country where money plays such a huge role in elections. So you're going to stop it. Thank you.

**Luck:** Thank you. Atul?

**Khare:** Well, after the three illustrious speakers, very little left for me to say. But three very quick points. I really don't believe that this is an electoral dispute. The election has gone perfectly as indeed Youssoufou Bamba just said. And I think the challenge is more the unacceptability on part of one political stakeholder to accept the result, what Mr. James Jonah has been saying. And I think we need to find ways and means how to fix it.

I've been delighted to note that President Ouattara, from the very beginning, has indicated his policy of inclusion in order to run the country the better, in order to promote the rule of law, in order to promote socio-economic development. And presumably, as elections are held, I'm sure that reasonable numbers of FPI [Ivoirian Popular Front] would become members of parliament and excise a certain check and balance on President Ouattara and his cabinet.

Second, on the issue of military becoming a parasite, I sincerely hope that that will not be the case. We in DPKO we tend to believe that there are rogue elements within various military or police. But we do not wish to sort of give a blanket disapproval check to the entire military, be it of DRC, be it of any other country. In fact even in Côte d'Ivoire we remain in contact with General Mangou, and of course, on the other side, with General Bakayoko. Because it is an important part of the mandate of the United Nations to ensure that the ceasefire is respected and that other elements which had been agreed in Pretoria and later on in Ouagadougou continued to progress. So I hope that the rogue elements of the military which might become parasites in certain isolated communes, in certain isolated areas, they will be dealt with by their superior officers and we will continue to progress this. That is the only way to prevent such an occurrence. Thank you.

**Luck:** Terrific. Let's take another round. There may be even time for two. I saw right here first in the middle here.

**Sunday Ochoche:** Good afternoon. My name is Sunday Ochoche from UNDP. I was just going to ask whether the issue is substantially really one of one individual rejecting the outcome of an election or to be seen more deeply, to look at the whole role of elections in Africa and a process of democratization, and how it really been seen just in instrumental terms as simply as symbolic gesture towards satisfying certain elements in power. And when certain elements are there, able to do it successfully, then the tensions that we are talking about don't arise. And this matter, it's just somebody or some groups have failed. And what has been the consistent process in many African countries of simply using elections to justify and ratify themselves in power. I think the whole process and the relevance of the way and manner elections are conducted and how they determine the distribution of power, who has access to power, and who is kept out of power. I think in my view is what is fundamentally manifested.

And if we look at all the other elections, the number of them we can really say have been credible, reflecting the will of the people and references have been made to Nigeria, and it's good to watch that, and whether they end, we are really going to see the outcome has been the result of the will of the people. Shouldn't we really look more fundamentally as international... how can we support the

whole electoral process as a means of developing the democratic process in Africa? Thank you.

**Luck:** Thank you very much. I think the point of having democratization first and then elections is not a bad one rather than the other way around. Please, just the second row here. That's right.

**Paul Seger:** Hi, thank you. I'm Paul Seger, the Swiss PR. As my colleague from Costa Rica has said, Gbagbo is still in power despite the fact that whatever has won, and that there were strong statements both from the Secretary-General but also from the Security Council in the beginning. I now have the impression that the international solidarity is waning out a bit. And I see a little danger for the reputation of the United Nations if this goes into a stalemate which will last for weeks and months. Is there already something which already now we can take as lessons learned but could have been done differently from between then and now to avoid such a result we have now? And which likely to continue?

**Luck:** Please, right here.

**William Awinador:** Thank you very much, and thank to our distinguished panelists. William Awinador, Deputy PR Ghana. Okay. A quick comment and also a question for Jonah, senior ECOWAS citizen, and Mr. Khare.

The Swiss PR has just mentioned something that I want to write on about lessons learned. Just before the second round of the Ivoirian elections, Ghana was privileged to host the International IDEA Conference. And the theme was prophetic--incumbency and elections. And the Secretary-General of IDEA made reference to elections in Haiti and the elections in Côte d'Ivoire and the UN role, and expressed some concerns.

Now the issue about what has happened now. If you take the AU position, I would like to differ a bit with my senior citizen, ECOWAS citizen Jonah, to say I think the AU position within the current conflagration of things is about the best way forward to handle the Ivoirian situation if we tie in some amount of lessons that have been learned. Because I'm of the view that we may have seen some faux pas from virtually all corners. The intention to send a clear message, but in terms of operationalizing that a number of faux pas committed perhaps in the eagerness to send a clear and strong message.

And that is what is going to bring me to the question, which has already been asked in part, but what would the UN have done differently given the current situation in Côte d'Ivoire? Particularly, that people had warned of the difficulties. Now when Mr. Jonah says that President Gbagbo and his group have been very smart, we suggested that in knowing that group was smarter than the rest of the international community, then it means they deserve their award if that is the case, which I don't think is the case.

And that brings us to the issue of, what could have been done and done differently so that we learn lessons? The AU position takes into account the difficulties in moving the process forward. And I think that the international community should ride with it and help the AU to bring the lessons learned and bring us forward. Because, as was hinted, the issue is not so much about the outcome of the elections; it's about dealing with the distractions. Because the AU statement makes it clear who won the elections. So that is very clear. But when, in dealing with the situation, ECOWAS comes up front and puts in the clause about possible military intervention, and possibly playing into the hands of those

who will detract from the issues--and the discussions on the Internet was focused on the military intervention, not on the outcome of the elections. That was the focus of the discussion.

So I think that we should support the AU position and bring any lessons that have been learned, although this time is very short. But it's doable. I understand the experts are already in Abidjan. Whatever help the UN and other partners in Abidjan can give them to bring along everybody. Because at the end of the day, President-elect Ouattara needs to rule a country. And that is critical and bottom-line. It's not so much that he has won an election. He needs to rule Côte d'Ivoire, that Côte d'Ivoire will emerge as a really strong part of the ECOWAS community and the international community. And I think that is what everybody is looking forward to. So the question is, what could have been done, and as Ambassador of Swiss said differently, to inform the ongoing process. Sorry for being so long.

**Luck:** Thank you. Please, one more on the end here, and then we'll go back to the panel.

**Neil MacFarquhar:** Hi. It's Neil MacFarquhar from *The New York Times*. Just a comment for Mr. Jonah. I think the United States or some people in the United States might have learned something from African elections since there's a whole bunch that keep calling Mr. President Obama a Kenyan. But on the Côte d'Ivoire front, you said that using force is a last resort. I wonder--any of the panelists take the question - - when you could imagine it coming to that, how long do you wait? And would you actually get the consensus among all the parties that are now agreed to actually use it? How would you envisage it happening?

**Luck:** And I'd like to just add one comment to the question about lessons learned, is it a little early to start worrying about lessons learned? I mean, assuming if you have international unity, this can work. But we're already assuming that we can't have international unity. And then I wonder if that's the foregone conclusion or if might in fact become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Atul, you start?

**Khare:** Thank you. With your permission, Ed, I would not reflect on the last question from my distinguished colleague from *New York Times* because as the Secretariat, I work within my mandate. And my mandate precludes absolutely any discussion on this topic.

**Luck:** Your mandate excluded any discussion with *The New York Times*--I thought that was a general rule in the house.

**Khare:** No, no, not *The New York Times*, but any discussion of the question which was asked. I joke sometimes, and it is true. By mandate, we are given a mandate of protecting the government and key political leaders. So tomorrow, in my mind, if Mr. Gbagbo requests protection of the UN, that should be granted as far as I am concerned. That is the mandate given to us by the Security Council. He was and is a key political leader.

So on the question of democracy and elections, I think it's very important that a culture has to be built in all countries where you have elections, from the smallest to the largest, that in a democracy, the outcome of an election does not determine who has power. The outcome of an election only determines whose shoulders are overburdened and slouched, or with the responsibilities which he or she carries on behalf of all the underdeveloped people to remove poverty, to remove misery. And if we think of responsibilities towards the people, service towards the people, which is really the basic ideology behind public positions,

then I think perhaps this question of continuing to hang on may be a bit less. It might be wanting to give over this responsibility at the first opportunity.

On the question of international solidarity continuation, I believe that the discussion in the Security Council, the resolutions adopted unanimously by the Security Council, and including, inter alia, the decision of the African Union Peace and Security Council, later on reaffirmed by the submit, as my colleague William DPR of Ghana just said, actually reaffirms all the previous decisions, which to my mind, implies that key decisions like endorsement of election results, recognition of President Ouattara as president-election, demands that President Gbagbo must cede power, are all non-negotiable. The question is how to move forward thereafter. And there I agree with you that we hope that the African Union panel produces solutions which assist President Ouattara in actually completing the uncompleted elements of the peace process in taking this country forward both in a social-economic and in a political sense.

On the question of lessons learned--of course, to a certain extent, we learn lessons every day. As I was just mentioning earlier, that we have now started discussing with the TCC's and PCC's what I call a smarter patrolling mechanisms. I give you an example. For example, we would go out in greater force rather than in small groups of one car or two cars. And there are other mechanisms which are under discussions. So it's a continuous process of improvement.

But insofar as the election process is concerned, with 81 percent participation, with most of the electoral observers having felt that the elections were broadly free of fraud, there were very few irregularities, I don't think what more could have been done, or what could have been done differently. I think what should have been done differently, perhaps to some extent, was to ensure that the Constitutional Council, as for sealing the preparatory agreement, should also have incorporated elements of the United Nations. And that they never did. That is the problem with the Constitutional Council. The Independent Electoral Commission and the National Institute for Statistics actually accepted cooperation with the United Nations and did good work with them. But the Constitutional Council, from the very beginning, for the last five years, has been actually controlled by people who have been extremely supportive towards former president Mr. Gbagbo. And perhaps we could have done a bit more on that. Thank you.

**Luck:**

Okay. James.

**Jonah:**

Maybe you can understand a little bit. Most of my time, I spent consulting with some of the political elites in Africa, traveling a great deal, dealing with that. You reflecting the views of President Mills. In fact, when President Mills made that statement, I was very surprised. Because I respected him before, but I said, why did he make that statement? In the past, they have not disapproved of it, but never made a statement. So I was trying to find out from some of my colleagues when I saw one of your papers, *The Chronicle* in Ghana, which went exhaustive into this whole thing. And then decided it was misunderstood, that he didn't mean what he said.

The reason why I do not approve is this: Before the meeting in Addis Ababa, two heads of state questioned the result of the election--Mugabe, South Africa-- they questioned the result of the election. And they were participants in forming of the panel. You see, I try my best to know what others say. So, therefore, I don't think it was a wise move. When you open up this consensus, you are in a dangerous

zone; it is very hard to recreate that consensus. It was unique. That is why I said I really do not feel that this was a wise move. I don't think there was any faux pas. There was no faux pas at all. This was a clear court situation in Côte d'Ivoire, not like you have in Kenya. That's definitely not the same. And that is why the Prime Minister of Kenya, who went to... I'll explain. I criticized the power-sharing agreement in Kenya when it was announced back with Kofi Annan. I say, you causing for trouble. After one year, all of them said the same thing. And he is a man who is suffering on that power-sharing. What Gbagbo people's would like is a power-sharing in the Côte d'Ivoire where he will remain as president. And that to me is not democracy.

Now my colleague asked, democracy, election does not guarantee you democracy. When I was with Kufuor when he was president, I went to give a keynote speech in Ghana on this whole issue. Your institutions must be democratic. If you don't develop your institutions, it's a waste of time. And I said something at that meeting where people laughed. I said, "There is no guarantee that election produce good leaders. The only good thing about elections is you have another round, and kick the last guys out." Understand. So I don't believe I agree with you. People manipulated, why? Because maybe the IMF said, the EU said you must have elections to get assistance. Okay, they go through the process. That is happening all the time.

What I do agree that we have to try to foster democracy in Africa. We have no choice. And, at times, it's a painful exercise. As the ambassador was there in Sierra Leone--I had to sleep many times in his house. He will tell you. I had to sleep in his house because my life was put in danger. I was called a CIA agent. And this is very serious. When I was calling election, all of West Africa, all the leaders were either military in civilian clothes, or they were the military government. And they told me, "You are bringing foreign ideas to West Africa." He was there, he will tell you that. Boutros Ghali begged me to leave. He said, "Now you must leave." I said, "No." So if we don't do it... what you see in Egypt, and again, I'm a board member in a group in Egypt and I go regularly. I was always telling them, you cannot go like this. There are risks involved. If you have an election, maybe the Muslim Brotherhood will come. And, again, but you have no choice. So this is what I'm just suggesting in Ghana. Well, you have your election. There was a dispute. But you found a way to solve it.

Now why is it that Ghana is posh compared to many West Africa? Because you have stability, because investors know there is a rigid system of change of government peacefully. So that is why I think it is not something which we should trade for anything. It's a very difficult thing. And then there was one, the use of force.

**Luck:** Quickly if you could? Yeah.

**Jonah:** Yeah. Well, the use of force, I really believe that you have no choice. There are risks involved. As I said, in my country, we had no choice but to use force. And the bloodshed was minimal. Believe me it was minimal. But if you prolong it, you get more suffering in the long run. So that's my personal view. When it will happen, you'll need a lot of logistical planning. And it might take one or two months to do that. But when you do it, you should be successful and avoid bloodshed. Thank you.

**Luck:** Thanks, Bill?



**Fitzgerald:** I'll just go very quickly. On the question of democracy and whether it's one person, or an institutions--well, clearly we need the institutions. But you're not going to get there without a democratic society. I, frankly, am scratching my head. My Ghanian colleague was eloquent, but I guess I'm just a simple American when it comes to democracy. You count the votes up at the end of the day. That may not be a pretty process, it may not be very clean, very transparent. But really, this one is a no-brainer. It's 54 percent for Ouattara. That has been checked again by the UN, by the Independent Electoral Commission. Yes, this is precisely the sort of thing that former-President Gbagbo loves, this indecision, this lack of consensus, the wobbly nature of this consensus. But really, at the end of the day, it's perfectly clear I think to most in the international community. And really, what is democracy about? It's a big question. It has imperfections, Lord knows. Look at the United States in the year 2000. I was serving in Togo at the time, and the Togolese offered to come over to the United States to serve as electoral observers if they felt we needed their help. But the truth is, as the presidential candidate in 2000 decided, I will give up fighting this for the sake of the country. We saw Cellou Diallo do the same thing Guinea. "For the sake of the country, I'm going to give up." It's a shame that some people refuse, even when they swear before the election, that they will accept the results, as did both Alassane Ouattara and Laurent Gbagbo, that some reneged on that promise.

As far as the US and where we stand, we follow the African lead. We are strong partners to the African Union, to ECOWAS and to the Mano River. We continue to work with them.

Mr. MacFarquar, the question on when we would use... we defer to the Africans. It's ECOWAS that put in their resolution that they would use all necessary force. And so we continue to coordinate with them on a daily basis. Thank you.

**Luck:** Thank you. Ambassador Bamba?

**Bamba:** Very brief, because I concur exactly with what has been said from the panel. I will just put it that democracy is a process; election is a building block on that direction, that objective. But the objective ultimately is to foster, in our countries, a rule of law. Imagine one instance when you came to Mr. Yao N'dre, the President of the Constitutional Council. If he had only decided to be independent and proclaim the results based on the facts that Mr. Ouattara has won, we have spared all this crisis. And Côte d'Ivoire will have done a formidable leap forward in democracy. That's what it's about. Now President Obama said in the Congress that Africa doesn't need strong men, but needs strong institution. That's what it is about. And President Ouattara has promised to make constitutional changes to introduce more checks and balances, more transparency, and more accountability in the leadership at every level of that administration. That's what I can say. Thank you.

**Luck:** Perhaps Africa needs strong women. But that's another matter.

**Bamba:** Some person, I should say. Sorry, I apologize...

**Luck:** We have about ten minutes left. That's probably time for a couple of quick questions. And then we'll go back to the panel. I see quit a few in the back there, and then up here.

**Andrew Sinclair:** Hi, Andrew Sinclair from Center on International Cooperation. I wanted to ask kind of a more specific question. I know a lot's been talked about for lessons learned. I know at the UN there's been some discussion on preventative

diplomacy and kind of crisis prevention. How well was the UN prepared for this and did their mechanisms work? I know the conflict is ongoing or the crisis is ongoing, so it might be premature, but do you think these discussions, some lessons learned, could be gleaned from this? Thank you.

**Luck:** A good question. I saw one here.

**François Traoré:** My name is François Traoré. I'm an intern at the SSR unit. And I have a question on the source of power of Laurent Gbagbo. Because what is happening today in the Côte d'Ivoire, we know about the north and the south. And I would like to direct my question to Ambassador Bamba, about the mechanism on the ground that you are taking to change the situation. Because what happened in Tunisia is not the military, it's the people. And what is going on in Egypt, we can see people in the street. So do you have any medical needs on the ground just to mobilize the people and to change the power like what happened to Mr. Gbagbo in 2000 against General Guéï? Thank you.

**Luck:** Thank you. I saw one more back here. I think Robert?

**Robert Afriyie:** Thank you. My name is Robert Afriyie. I'm from Security Council Report. Mine is just a little food for thought. We are talking about the implications of what is happening in Côte d'Ivoire for the UN and international community. And I'm thinking about the implications of this for international arbitration. Because this is very much akin to what happened with UNMEE [United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea], which ended up with the folding up of the mission where there was not acceptance of the arbitration of a boundary commission, which later on lead to the UN being asked to pull out. And now we have a situation where the UN was clearly requested to certify the election results. I mean, in any arbitration, the outcome may not be very good for one party. But acceptance is another issue. But here we have a blatant refusal to accept it. And it's just food for thought. You can choose to answer that.

**Luck:** Thank you. I have another question, which I guess you can refuse to answer. But if you want to be invited back here, answer it. No it's a simple question though. If you look at the numbers, the estimates of casualties in Côte d'Ivoire, it frankly hasn't changed very much for quite a few weeks. Is this because of our reporting? Or do we think this is accurate? And if it's accurate, is it because the parties have actually been listening to the international community about atrocities and other kinds of violations? What is the situation now? Because we don't see this sort of escalation. And Francis Deng and myself and the UN heads have sort of warned about the dangers of mass atrocities given the history and given the incitement and the way different groups have been targeted. But the numbers haven't seemed to have leaped. So is the UN patrolling making a difference? What is making the difference here? Or have people decided we're just going to keep this as a political problem and try to keep it from becoming a conflict problem? Atul, will you go first? And then we'll go the original order.

**Khare:** Let me try to answer your question. I think it's a combination of factors which is keeping the number of casualties... although, of course, even one single dead is a bit too much. But overall the fact the numbers have not changed is due to a combination of one. It's not the patrolling, more frequent patrolling. Second to the fact that, the people as a whole, generally, do not wish to sort of take it out on each other. Thirdly, there are vast areas of the country, and I would be guided there by Ambassador Bamba. But there are vast areas of the country where people really supported one candidate or another as a preponderant majority. There are only a few areas which are sort of mixed areas. And violence basically

occurs in mixed areas. And that is why we know we try to go more when we talk of patrolling in Abidjan, we really talk about Anyama and Abobo. We are not really talking Plateau, which is, relatively speaking, an area broadly controlled by Mr. Gbagbo's supporters. So that is one more reason.

Finally, I think it is equally possible, and I think I would like to believe that, the very strong statements by the high commissioner for human rights, by the Secretary-General, by the Council, have helped and have had an impact.

On the question of preventative mechanisms: well, I think, in some ways, the fact that we have had a comparatively low level of violence indicates that the preventative mechanisms seemed to have work. The idea of creating joint human rights protection teams even before the elections were announced, having our own radio station, to some extent, effectively counteract the hate and media broadcasts by Mr. Gbagbo's government-owned RTI [*Radiodiffusion Télévision Ivoirienne*], the fact that we maintain channels of communication, which started, again, before. We organized what we used to call Four Generals Meeting: the General of Licorne, our force commander; the General of *Forces Navale*; General Bakayoko, and General Mangou. And even now we are trying to bring back again those four general together. So there's some mechanisms which have worked better, there are some mechanisms which could have been improved for communication. In fact, we had to put in a 24-hour hotline with six telephone lines to ensure that the people could report their human rights complaints to us. But this was put in place nearly about three weeks, after the 3<sup>rd</sup> of December. But this could have been done before. So as I said earlier, that we keep on sort of undertaking smaller lessons learned exercises, and keep on technically improved.

But the broader lessons learned I hope would be that with the solidarity of the international community, with the commitment of the African leaders, and with the work of the Ivoirian people, we have a good result which takes the country forward.

**Luck:** Terrific. James?

**Jonah:** Well, I think the UN is commendable in this issue that it has been handled very well. And, in fact, the last statement of the Secretary-General was extremely very good in reacting to what happened in the AU. So the issue is... how do I put it? We just have to see that a game is being played. And we have to stop that game. We really have to stop that game. And we don't talk about Rajoelina. You see this is another case. Why don't we talk about it in Madagascar? Why don't we talk about Rajoelina? Because it's so far away. These are the things which make it difficult. So I just want to say here the UN has handled it meticulously. If I didn't know you were involved in the committee. What else I can say? There's been no mistake; no mistake has been made. This was never intended. When Gbagbo said, "I'm going for election," he never intended to give up power. He never knew he would lose it. He knew the council, in the end, will come and rescue him and say he's the winner. Simple. That's all I have to say.

**Luck:** Okay. Thank you, James. I believe that when you first, in an earlier response, had said that the UN had done well, I believe you said you were surprised. Better to be surprised. Bill, it's your turn.

**Fitzgerald:** For the United States government, we share the opinion, we were not surprised. We fully expected UNOCI to do the right job, and they did. They did a fantastic job and they continue to do a fantastic job. I would take issue with you, Ed.

However, I'm not quite sure I would share the optimism that, in fact, the number of atrocities going on is static. I think that, in fact, there is a great deal of conflict and insecurity in the western part of the country. We saw just last week grenades being thrown into a mosque in the eastern part of the country. And this is typical Gbagbo reaction. He is going to play the religion card the best he can. At the end of this, when the situation is finally resolved and Laurent Gbagbo steps down, there will be an accounting. There must be investigations. To date my understanding is that UN has not been able to investigate allegations of mass graves. It's absolutely essential. That's it.

**Luck:** Yeah, well put. Ambassador, you have the last word.

**Bamba:** I also agree with you. We have our death toll, as of one week ago, was 480 people killed, 1,000 wounded. And actually you have to take into account the wounded who have passed away. And I warned one month or six weeks ago that we are on the brink of genocide. Unfortunately, that's true. Because what happened now, there is some armed group preposition in certain area. They are waiting in the event, for instance, ECOMOG [Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group], it started killing on those pre-targeted victims. That's true. This information is really taken seriously. Because that's an indication of Mr. Gbagbo's total denial of human life. Since this crisis erupted, we have 480 person killed. I don't know if Phillip Bulifion is here. He's a Human Rights Watch Director.

**Fitzgerald:** He was here.

**Bamba:** He was here. We met before. They made a very, very documented report on the situation of violation of human rights. That's what we are really concerned. And there is a dilemma: the longer we wait, the bigger the death toll is increasing. What to do? Gbagbo is buying time with negotiation. We know this one month panel activity. I'm afraid. I don't know what will be a difference, what will be more threatening, what will bring Mr. Gbagbo to accept. Because the term of reference has been clear. This panel is going to negotiate how Mr. Gbagbo will be leaving, what composition will be granted to him. That's clear. You have the seventh mediation group is coming in. What's new? I'm asking the question. But in the meantime, people are dying. They are killing people. And all these people hasn't already identified. I mean, General Dogbo, General Fassigno, and General Bi Poin. And there is also the mass grave, six of them has been identified. And United Nations has prevented to contact, to make the investigation. Myself, personally, I met with the procurer, Mr Ocampo. And we are preparing to raise that case. Because we owe that to the victims. They are paying the ultimate price for democracy. Something should be done for that. And next week, the specialist of human rights will be coming to New York. And we'll have some discussions here. So I will complete with that. Thank you.

**Luck:** Well, thank you. I think we all understand that it's a very dangerous situation potentially. And I think we owe a particular debt to all four speakers for being very much to the point, raising, I think, very important questions, and being very succinct in their comments. And thank you everyone for a very good conversation. We look forward to seeing you at the next in our series on African elections. So please join me in thanking our panel.