Francesco Mancini: Good afternoon everyone. Thanks for joining us today. My name is Francesco Mancini. I’m the IPI Director of Research. It’s my pleasure to welcome all of you to today’s policy forum, Breaking the Cycle of Conflict and Fragility – a 2011 World Development Report. The 2011 World Development report released in April of this year is an important document for all of us working in the area of peace, security and development. Its main message is that developing effective and legitimate institutions that promote security, jobs, and justice is essential to breaking cycles of violence, fostering development, and building sustainable peace. In the UN context, the report enriches the ongoing debate concerning the interplay among peacekeeping, peacemaking, peace-building, and the need for more coherent, flexible and integrated strategies for addressing threats to international peace and security. All of this of course is easier said than done, but the report offers several strategies that can help improve our understanding of how to increase jobs, enhance security and strengthen justice in fragile and post conflict countries.

As chair, I will not go into the details of the report. However, allow me to highlight at least three reasons why the report is of particular interest, in particular for the UN community. Hopefully, this will set the stage for our presentations and for the excellent panel that we have today. First, the report provides striking evidence of the devastating human and economic impact of criminal violence and the relationship between criminal and political violence. Post conflict countries like Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador, which suffered civil wars in the 1980s and 1990s, are still struggling to recover and have some of the highest murder rates in the world. It also shows that conflicts often are not one-off events but are ongoing and repeated. Ninety percent of the last
decade’s civil wars occurred in countries that had already had civil wars in the last 30 years. The report also includes an excellent review of the factors influencing conflict. Having spent considerable time investigating the correlates of war, I recommend this section as one of the best summaries of the vast, and at times contradicting, literature on the subject.

Second, the report makes a very clear argument for the need for a long-term horizon for improving developments in fragile and post conflict countries. International actors are keen to see quick results. This is understandable, as donors have domestic constituencies to cater to, and budgetary responsibilities to meet. The report however, helps to temper our expectations of what can be achieved in the short term. Even if everything goes well, it can take fifteen, sometimes thirty years, for a country with weak institutions to obtain robust ones.

Third, the report calls for a layered approach in post conflict and fragile states. Many of the challenges facing us - conflict, organized crime, and drug trafficking, to name a few, are interconnected and go beyond discrete borders. This means that we need to address challenges at the local, national, regional, and international levels. We will need to be imaginative and think beyond the country-specific approaches for many of our engagements in fragile and post conflict countries. These will have important implications, I believe, for how the Peacebuilding Commission operates – especially in its country configurations.

Enough said. Let me now introduce our excellent panel. First, Steve Ndewga will present the main findings of the report. Steve currently works as an adviser on fragile and conflict affected situations at the World Bank. In 2010, he served as a member of the core team, writing the 2011 World Development Report. He will be followed by two discussants, Graeme Simpson, the Director of Policy and Learning at Interpeace who also serves as Director of Interpeace in the US. We will then hear from Henk-Jan Brinkman, who is the Chief of the Policy Planning and Application branch of the UN Peacebuilding Support Office. Their full bios are included in the programs at your seats.

Steve, thank you for being with us today. You have the floor.

**Steve Ndewga:**

Thank you. It’s a delight to be back and to see such a room full of eager minds to feed – so I’m looking forward to the exchange later on. What I would like to do in the next 15 minutes or so is give you a few highlights of the findings, but I also would leave you with a lot of richness from the report to consume on your own – and then move a bit to the implications of the report on how we do our business to support fragile, conflict, and violence-affected states.

I would like to start with just a couple of facts and figures, some of which Francesco has presented, because there’s a richness of that in the report. But this gives you a bit of flavor of the nature of the problem we encounter in the 21st century with violence. First is that for countries in the lower income group that are affected by conflict or fragility, none of them have, and none of them will achieve any of the MDGs by 2015. It’s a spectacular failure for something we have been working on for quite a number of years.
Second, for those people living in countries affected by conflict – they are twice as likely to be under nourished and 50 percent are more likely to be impoverished compared to other low income countries. The children in those countries are three times more likely to be out of school. So the developing challenge is immense for these countries. Just to provide nuance to the data point that Francesco provided, there is the fact that 90 percent of countries that have encountered conflict once will have it in about another 20 or so years. We also found that countries that have had conflict before and has been resolved – as he points out in Central America – have significantly higher homicide rates than comparable countries. For the case of Guatemala, the criminal violence kills more people per year than the civil war. In fact, nearly double the number of people killed in the civil war. So even when you work yourself out of a conflict, you’ve had peace processes, you might even have put in place a robust but developing democratic environment; you still face tremendous limitations to the development objectives of a country and institution building.

Clearly, this is a topic that invites attention from all of us. It is also a challenge to middle income countries that are now beginning to admit that the weight of violence – especially criminal violence – has a significant impact on their development ambitions, and sometimes degrades actual developments that they have achieved over the last couple of years. On the other hand, there’s some good news that the WDR highlights. And the first piece of good news is that the international architecture has done a very good job of containing civil wars over the last two decades in particular. But it still has a challenge in addressing new forms of violence – violence driven by international criminal networks, much more dispersed violence that is not really often seeking to control a state but simply tries to seek to control smaller territories or small segments of the economy. Those are things that we need to work on going forward.

We’ve also begun to understand better – and the WDR is really just the beginning of this agenda that inequality, unemployment, and political exclusion are significant risks to inviting violence in the public’s fear in many countries across the income spectrum. So for countries in the Middle East, we know part of the pressure of the transition is not simply because people are jobless or young people are jobless. It’s also because there’s an intense critique of the exclusion among all groups in society or lack of transparency and lack of sharing of the development gains that those countries have had. This asks us to try figure out how we arrange ourselves and our resources to respond creatively to these problems that are affecting all manner of countries, including countries that at one time we consider very stable and cushioned from violence, but then quick turn of events on the ground made them quite violent prone.

What the WDR leads us to is a discussion around building legitimate institutions – institutions that are responsive to what citizens want, that provide voice to citizen complaints, and that provide access to a more shared paradigm of resources and power within a country, and we’ll talk a bit more later about how we as an international community can enhance those claims that citizens make, and oftentimes that governments want to provide but might not be able to provide given sudden political economy realities that they have to contend with. How is
it that we can be supportive in those environments? The third sort of larger points the WDR points out to is that successful countries throughout history have stabilized the institutions, built robust environments of governance through multiple transitions – so there’s no one event that prescribes anew the reality on the ground. There’s no one event that changes a country that’s underperforming in terms of its governance or its economy and moves it from a B minus country to an A plus country. So you do not move from being Kenya – this is my country, so I can use that – to Sweden, overnight. There are multiple stages through which you work out, you have various conflicts in society, arrange your resources to be more supportive to a particular set of commitments that you as a country and citizens make.

Understanding those multiple transitions is something we as an international community, but also in the research community, have not actually done a good job about, and we need to think about what are the typical transition points that countries go through as they encounter challenges as they move from one equilibrium to the next and how can we be supportive to that. You won’t find this in the report, but some of us in the political science community do believe that in fact oftentimes violence is an ingredient to changing institutional structures, so we cannot look at violence entirely as a problem in itself. Sometimes it’s actually an ingredient of social change because pressures are simply too heavy for the arrangements that are in place. So in a sense, violent confrontations and other like confrontations would provide an opportunity for us to provide a more creative alchemy in that situation, rather than simply responding to it as a challenge of switching off the violence. It’s one that invites us to think about from this conflagration, what can you grow as a new set of expectations between the state and its citizens.

Let me turn to what we think are the implications for international action to support national action. What I want to do is just take you through a couple of commitments that the Bank has made internally and that we invite others to think about as part of the arena for change – some of the things we have to rework to support our partners. The first one – and some of this admits our own mistakes, so we want to be very clear about that – is to really approach countries that we seek to support with strategies that are informed by a more conflict-conscious lens. Part of this means that we understand the broader political economy of a country, but we also understand the very specific challenges that they are going through that are defined by their particular history – the particular anthropological underpinnings of context in society and where that country has a vision to go to. This will be very different from one country to the other. The resources available to create a political compact, the resources available to make nascent institutions work and not be overridden by intense competition are very different. But what it calls upon for us is to understand much more clearly, much more specifically, much more context sensitive ways on how we can actually define a strategy to support those countries, and in some cases, that might mean having to live with situations that we don’t consider as immediately supportive of, let’s say, an ideological commitment to democracy. So we have to just rethink what works in this particular configuration, but also supports the opportunity to actually change and induce some new momentum to change over time. It’s not saying that you find some optimal situation and simply support them blindly, it’s to really identify what is it in this country that can drive change, can reduce
the opportunities and risks to violence and can produce immediate short-term results for citizens but also build in a momentum for more credible and predictable governance.

Now for us this has meant revisiting our country’s system strategies, and we’ve challenge all our teams to think more creatively about invoking political economy analysis in what they do, think about finding more country-specific knowledge to inform our strategies rather than simply thinking about what is the best practice out there that can simply inform this problem. So you don’t move from Uganda to Tanzania with the same solution. You might be facing the same problem, but the underpinnings of that problem are very different and you have to be appropriately responsive.

The second comes out of this idea that conflict oftentimes reveals a multifaceted set of conditions that drive the conflict. The way we tend to respond – different organizations – we respond with a hammer that we are used to. So if it’s a bank, we think everything is an economic problem – that economic tensions are what really drive violence or economic calculations. If it’s the diplomatic community, the tendency is to think, ‘let’s gather the most important voices here and get them to agree’. These we think are important, but they are incomplete. What you really need is joint action, a step-wise action that is conscious of what others are doing and builds up on each other’s strengths. Now, we at the Bank will admit that we’ve been among the culprits of deciding that we know it all and we’ll push it forward. There’s a new humbleness – and I hope my colleagues will find this in some of the work we are doing with them on employment generation – that in fact we don’t have the solution and none of us has a single solution. We have to work in partnership. The strongest push on the partnership that we are thinking about is a convergence of the forces around development, security, and justice, to think about issues and invoking the kind of resources we have to address. The injustices that citizens feel, whether they’re economic or from political exclusion to security, including working with partners who actually have the legitimacy, such as the UN, to work in fairly insecure environments that we might not be able to walk in. So, stronger partnership both at the global level but also the country level. The challenge really is not one of sequencing – which is the big theme in most of our reform efforts – but simultaneity and thinking about how do we respond creatively to that.

The third one is one that we are very comfortable about, is this notion of creating jobs, and jobs here are really a shorthand for broadening economic opportunities. That opens up a whole set of different issues – whether it’s managing natural resources in ways that are rewarding to citizens, managing public accounts in ways that are accountable to citizens so that services are delivered, or growing a private sector that is both profitable for the holder of shares but also profitable in other ways for citizens. This is something we’ve been pushing very strongly. In the last couple of months, we’ve been working with the UNDP with ILO, with the African Development Bank to devise a common platform to support employment generation programs in partner countries. Again, combining both the substantive interest in promoting jobs and economic opportunities, but also going back to this notion that what we need is to work together in partnership rather than thinking that the Bank has the
solution to this. I think we are happy to report that we are actually in quite a bit of an advanced step in that.

The fourth one has to do with how we approach risk, and I’m sure this is true of many other organizations. At the bank the biggest threat is to make sure that the risk to the instrument – which is money – is addressed. So if you are going to lose money, the challenge is to then acting ways that risking money becomes quite prohibitive. What we have discussed in the Bank and gotten some very strong endorsement from senior management, is that this risk calculus needs to change. We need to balance risks to the instrument against the risk of inaction. If you are going to imagine that you would lose a set of money then you have to think about will inaction either induce more violence or produce results that over a fairly short period of time might endanger the entire peace configuration that you have put in place. That rebalancing is of course not something easy to do, and it's not easy for us. I'm sure it's not easy for those of you in the political realm, but it's something that we have to rethink. Privileged action, even though it might be imperfect, but action that begins to provide a bit more confidence from citizens that in fact the questions and the challenges that they face are being addressed. Now, what that looks like on the ground will be different in different situations. It might mean being more ambitious in providing budget support in situations that are not entirely calm, where the legitimacy of the government actually needs the ability to deliver services and therefore gain the confidence of citizens. It might mean working with local communities where capacity is very weak, but then bringing in intense external capacity sometimes regional, to effect change on the ground. It basically means a bit more creativity than the standard paradigm that we’ve adopted.

The last point I want to talk about – I’ll leave the sixth one for later because it has more to do with internal organization – is to address the volatility of financing that most of these countries face. It's really two ways: One is the fact that when a country is really facing difficulties that are leading to violence, or you've had an election problem, you have this confrontation. There is typically less money going in than when you've had a collapse. So if you are tethering on the edge of collapse for two years, you will not get much support, but if you actually tip over, there will be massive support coming in. So if you think of, if this was your cardiologist, and she sees you’ve got problems with your heart and she doesn’t insist that you come in and check yourself out every three months, and so on, and waits only for when you have a heart attack, and then she’ll turn up at your house and tell you, "Well this really sucks but we could have done something before, but now we have the opportunity to do this and we will visit you every day for a week." We’re trying to reverse this, and think about, can we get more support to countries that are going into situations that we know can trigger conflict? Again, go back to my country Kenya. We know they had a post-election conflagration a few years back. We know there’s an election coming up in 18 months. What should we do? The challenge is: can we put even half the resources that went into fixing the last problem into addressing what we know induces the same kind of tension?. What we also know, that at least 80 percent of the characters involved in the last fiasco are at play, can we find a creative way of supporting such a country so that when you get to December 2012, you won't replicate this. It's a challenge because we can’t be sending ambulances to every person who looks like
they might have a heart attack. What’s the judgment we went? What are the metrics of judging whether in fact this is the country that requires an intense intervention as we see things developing, or later on – which is much easier to deal with. So that’s one part of it.

The other part of it is what the WDR documents as – and we all know from most practice – the intensity of resources that come in right after a crisis, whether it is a humanitarian crisis or a political crisis. But then it seems to die out just when the government has oftentimes gotten its act together and is actually able to deliver either on its own or with a little less support internationally, and that funding typically dries up either because there’s fatigue in that particular country or another crisis hits. How do we induce a bit more of an even and more predictable part in accessing resources for these countries? Now this is not to say the Bank has figured this out, but this is something that we are keenly thinking about. I know there is an idea working group to think about these issues and propose what might be a solution that does not also induce a moral hazard, where everybody who has an election coming up claims that they’re going to have a problem if they don’t get an extra 50 million dollars. This is of course a challenge, but that’s why we are in these jobs.

Let me suggest to you that at least from the World Bank perspective, we have embraced the WDR as an opportunity to shift or to change the paradigm. There’s been a lot of internal thinking about what to do in response. It’s the first time that the bank has produced an Operationalization paper in tandem with the completion of the WDR – never been done before. It’s a paper that has been endorsed by the Bank in the spring meetings, and it’s now at least the roadmap for us to move towards changing our own practice, but very strongly changing it in partnership with others – and in particular the partnership with the UN is one that at the working level and the leadership level is strongly endorsed. We haven’t gotten it perfect as our colleagues will tell you. But I think we’ve gotten a perfect energy now behind that relationship at all levels of the Bank and we will push forward.

What I would suggest is that in the coming two or three years, if we try to focus on a couple of areas working together – and for us in particular, working with some really challenging countries like South Sudan where we can model a different way of operating, a different way of creating the strategies to support the country, a different way of marshalling our financial resources so that there’s predictability, but intensity also, in a couple of areas so that you actually change practice on the ground. We might be able to revolutionize how we work in this field. We think the WDR has been a revolutionary document. It’s an analytical foundations, but it will be incomplete if we don’t change the patterns of our engagement going forward.

Francesco, I’d like to stop here and be happy to invite questions later on.

Francesco Mancini: Thanks a lot Steven. It was great. I think you really made clear how this report is relevant for a lot of the things we are doing here, not only peacemaking, peacebuilding, and mediation that were mentioned before, but also prevention. So thank you very much.

We will now call to our discussants. First let me call on Graeme Simpson, who has spent the past decades in the field, working in
numerous conflict and immediate post conflict environments around the world. We look forward to hearing your views and comments on the report. Thank you.

Graeme Simpson:

Okay. Thank you very much for the opportunity, and we really welcome the support. For me, it was great to have this as an incentive to try and to find my way through the tomb that it is. It’s long. I have to confess upfront I didn’t quite get through all of it, so my comments will be slightly selective and by no means exhaustive, but it was a pleasure to see what I interpreted, at least in part, and that’s reinforced a little bit what Steve said, is that is an exercise in reflective practice for the World Bank. A healthy exercise in reflective practice.

Also, I’m very enthusiastic about this as a way of catalyzing a dialogue rather than ending a conversation about these obviously very pervasive issues. A strong emphasis on an interdisciplinary approach throughout the report which I think is extraordinary and very helpful. In addition to that, a very obvious welcoming of an understanding of the delicate balance between long term objectives and the need for shorter term confidence building measures. I’ve had the misfortune to be one of the primary drafters of South Africa’s National Crime Prevention Strategy which I thought was, at the risk of sounding immodest, visionary and powerful, but probably failed dramatically to recognize exactly that, that vision-based policy making without a set of deliverables that build confidence in the longer term vision is problematic. These are all very important things.

What I do think is that there’s also a need for a corollary emphasis in a report that really looks at fault lines and fragility that is articulate on the cyclical nature of violence, very importantly does not talk about peace as a linear process. It talks about risks and reversals in multiple transitions et cetera, articulates a concern with the shifting patterns of conflict rather than presuming too much continuity. But nonetheless, there may be a real gap in a failure to articulate in a more positive way what the factors are that enable peace to gain traction where it does. The questions of what constitute durable social cohesion – how reconciliation is built in societies which don’t return to conflict in the same way. In all those respects, this is exciting because in some ways for me, coming from a history of work in the peacebuilding and justice sectors, I think there are some of us who would gladly say we have been saying this all along in terms of multifaceted approaches.

So what I would want to do is just talk about the three key areas and some responses. They are not critiques, but they are an encouragement for us to think in an ongoing way critically about some of these things rather than take the conclusions as given – in relation to jobs, security, and justice or institutional reform, state building in some senses as a critical umbrella to all of us. I’m just going to make a few provocative points on each of these.

On the broad issue of institutional reform or transformation and state building, which is really a critical lens – the role of institutions – in the whole report, there are one or two things that I would encourage us to think about: The first is, there’s a really grave danger in the assumption that the objectives of building durable peace and the objectives of state building are necessarily or inherently complementary, that actually the
process of state formation is itself historically an exercise in violence. It is about violence very often. But more importantly in a very pragmatic way, we need to recognize that democratization, the institutionalization of our politics, constitutionalizing of it and the building of the new states, or strengthening of embryonic states, often serves as a magnet for power brokers to seek to use and access the state as a new way of organizing their patronage and systems of control. And that legitimacy itself in the way in which state formation takes place and the building of state institutions is not always enough to fend off corruption to deal with the ways in which these stakeholders use and try to access the state as a source of power and that this itself can provoke very significant violence.

The second issue in relation to this is that we tend to focus at the front end of these processes and then think very little about state delivery capacity. So the emphasis on elections, the structures of negotiated settlement et cetera, et cetera, tend to be the foremost concerns as we kind of go in thinking about these as emergency situations. I think that there’s this much too little emphasis on the critical foundational framework of institutional credibility and legitimacy, particularly in the form of inclusive process-oriented constitution making that elections don’t exist outside of constitutional frameworks, and that the constitutional arrangements in these societies, and the inclusive process by which they are made, rather than the constitution as documents or as normative frameworks themselves are absolutely critical to acquiring the kind of bind in society and legitimacy that hopefully make embryonic democracies more durable. In that process, we need to think very much about the alternative groups in societies who are not necessarily politically articulate or organized and therefore are often inaudible in the processes of democratization and yet to have a fundamental interest in peace building, whether it’s women as peace builders or whether it’s youth, children – those groups who have a stake in peace building and yet are not often organized and audible politically.

The third issue is on the question of legitimacy, trust, and accountability as the key foundation stone of institution reform. Here I just want to emphasize the importance of the balance between accountability based on legitimacy, the relationship building exercised between citizens and a new state and its institutions, and the issues of accountability based on the quality and effectiveness of the services provided by states. This is real important, because we should not be naïve about the limited reach of government institutions and the extent to which with the best laid plans for rebuilding legitimacy based relationships. Nonetheless, failure to deliver on services can quickly discredit embryonic states, cause new citizens in embryonic democracies to lose confidence in those and the risks of reversal are dramatic.

Lastly, on the whole issue of institution building and particularly state building, I just want to emphasize the obvious, which is the absolutely dire consequences of an exclusively state-centric approach, not just in relation to the critical issue of civil society and the importance and role of civil society as key stake holders in these processes – often as service delivers and providers in context where the reach of the state doesn’t provide those services, but also those non-state actors that may be more sinister: organized crime, the drug cartels et cetera, et cetera, many of which mimic the operations of states and often outdo fragile states in the delivery of these services and in the establishment of a sanitized,
laundered, and legitimate presence. There is also a critical need to think about the role of transnational corporations and the regulatory framework which affect them in these contexts as well. So much for institutions and state building.

On the question of justice and security, there’s a little bit of a tension for me in the report between the very important commentary in the glossary which talks about justice being used in two ways: Just societies, the issues of fairness and the creation, and justice writ [Phonetic -0:42:59] – small exercise of justice largely through the criminal justice system. What I do worry about a little bit is that that language gets abandoned in the substance of the report and that the focus on justice is largely a focus on justice writ small. Justice by reference to security, justice by reference to criminal justice, institutions et cetera. There is some very important and positive dimensions to this which I’ll come to in a moment, but there is a danger that we lose sight of justices as a transformative agenda. The reparative dimensions of justice, which are about a language that the Bank may not be as comfortable with, the issues of distributive justice. What this does, I think, is it also suggests largely a risk of an emphasis on enforcement and justice, and predictable justice, as enforcement at the expense of a prevention agenda, a social crime prevention agenda, et cetera. But this is just the danger and a balance that I think needs to be kept in place. It is not absent. The glossary is very clear and articulate on this.

Again, the danger of state-centric notions of security and enforcement at the risk of social crime prevention could be counterproductive. I think there’s also an additional risk which is a template, or a set of tools, an assumed set of tools jus as instruments that are largely oriented around post conflict situations or dealing with past conflict at the expense of thinking about these through the lens of what the new challenges and fault lines are that the reports so smartly articulate. The critical need to recognize that justice systems are very vulnerable in their ability to deal with new and emerging fault lines and threats, rather than just testing them by their capacity to deal with past violations. Having said that, hugely valuable and very affirming for those of us who argued it in national context to talk about an integrated justice system that recognizes policing, justice, corrections, education, welfare in a sense as parts of a holistic system in engagement. An invaluable recognition of the relationship between human rights violations and other forms and patterns of violence. A critical understanding of the importance of transitional justice as both a backward-looking and forward-looking tool, and of course this vital issue which is recognizing the need to both deliver short term confidence building in these societies at the same time as addressing the longer term issues – the necessary tension between long-term goals and short-term objectives.

Very quickly on the whole issue of jobs – and I’m taking a convenient route here of categorizing this as development in aid effectiveness because I think that’s the language in the report a lo – I think there’s a danger that we pay lip service to, or perhaps don’t delve deeply enough into what we mean when we talk about conflict sense of development issues. There is in the report, and in all graphs, a really interesting – for me at any rate – tension between where we talk about correlation, and where we talk about causation. We correlate certain things, but we of course struggle all the time with whether or not we are actually talking
about a causal relationship. The consequences of development that provoke violence, and new patterns of violence and conflict, the injection of resources into societies that are divided over resources et cetera, et cetera. To what extent does development cause some of the violence and conflict, and to what extent is it the deficit of societies in conflict – all the statistics about how poor a society is that’s suffering from high levels of violence, et cetera.

There are some additional challenges that I think are really interesting. We talk about an integrated approach, and yet there’s not much which actually challenges the development community on its very segmented approach to funding the [PH] dormant community where democratization, security, development tracks or separated from each other and hardly ever integrated. That seems very counterproductive and yet it’s not really articulated. The dangers that issues of regulation and deregulation in societal development and economic development can promote huge competition over resources that provokes violence, especially in societies where [PH] exit.

The one issue that I want to raise here is really essential, particularly in the context of thinking about job creation – is the grave danger that we don’t recognize the resilient nature of war-based subeconomies, the illicit economies, not just the organized crime and the drug cartels, which is critical – but the trade in small arms, the trade in assassination, even in a minor way, though extent to which slumlords rely on impoverishment and marginalization for their power base where they control small areas. These are resilient economies that hold people, and I have very graphic recollections of talking to young juvenile offenders in South African prisons, who said, “So you’re gonna give me a job as a street sweeper and you would like me to earn a pittance once a month, well actually, we were earning every day.” The extent to which the illicit economies actually hold huge sectors of population is a real challenge because what it suggests to us is that the development and agenda is both destructive and constructive, that it needs to deconstruct these existing systems. Wars do not produce starvation, always. They often produce very vibrant subeconomies. I must say I felt like this to some extent was missing. I won’t go into that any more.

Lastly – I will be brief on this – I think there is a really critical component to this which is about the recognition of the changing character of violence and conflict. In some respects, I have to say I think that the report was very – maybe it sets the agenda which we need to pick up, on the nature of violence in the societies in which we are operating, and an understanding of the functionality of violence in many of these societies. You mentioned that in your introductory comments and I think it’s very important. There’s something very important here and it’s about two things. One is the grave dangers of the assumption that conflict will reemerge along the same lines of social and political fissure that characterize the previous phase. The ability to understand the way in which patterns of violence and conflict transmute and change is very important. The relationship, for example, between political and criminal violence. We also have to be very careful of being naïve about the criminogenic character of many of the conflicts in which we are talking, that political conflicts provide the perfect veil under which all manner of nefarious activities take place.
So, we have to be very careful of presuming that there is a sequential relationship between political violence and conflict and the new patterns instead of seeing these as process of continuity and change. I think in the peacebuilding world and perhaps in the development world, we have an enormous amount of work to do to better understand the traction, character, and transmutation of patterns of violence in these societies rather than just conveniently saying we are talking politics or we are talking about crime or we are talking about the slide between the two. Again, young men – and I haven’t talked about the gender issue that I really wanted to focus on – but young men who in my experience – thinking about access to in control of women more than anything else, who in societies which deny them of any form of access to recognition, status, authority because of the exclusion and marginalization that you talked about so powerfully, very easily gravitate between political and criminal underworlds both of whom fill that void through the status and power that acquires progenitors of violence. Very often, their orientation is essentially gender. It’s about masculinism and masculine identity, et cetera, et cetera. So we need to dig a little deeper.

I’m going to leave it at that and simply say that I think that the importance of understanding this as both a phenomenon of the relationship between citizens and state in relationship state building, but also the horizontal relationships of how we reconstruct social relationships between people and groups in society is absolutely critical. I think it is embedded in the report, but we need to extract it a lot more.

Thank you

Francesco Mancini: Great. Thank you very much. I think you remind us the complexity of the societal mechanism we are dealing with. It is not just building institution but it’s social change.

We now ask our second discussant to take the floor. Before joining the Peacebuilding Support Office, Henk-Jan Brinkman worked in various capacity within the UN, including the World Food Program, advising on food security and socioeconomic factors leading to violent conflict. We look forward to hearing your views on the report, especially on the possible impact on the UN peacebuilding activities. The floor is yours.

Henk-Jan Brinkman: Thanks a lot. I think it’s a great piece of work. The previous speaker has said it already, that multidisciplinary approach is really absolutely necessary – bringing together sociology, political science, peace and conflict studies, and of course economics as well. The problems are multifaceted and we really need a multifaceted approach. The report did really a remarkable job to putting all these strands together. Just to quote you one line, “Military only, justice only, or development only solutions will falter.” I think that’s very clear.

I have one big issue with the report. It really under-emphasizes the social protections issues, and again, like Graeme said, it’s buried in the report in footnotes and stuff. But I really wanted to have seen it in the messages. Security, justice, and jobs and social protection – that’s what it should have been. I’m really sorry about that.

I have structured my comments in three areas. What’s new? What’s not so new? And where it is wrong headed? So what’s new, and I really
applaud them for that, is an emphasis for example on inequality. Public works as a means to create jobs, particularly in the short term. And for example putting a political economic analysis really right at the center of this. I also think the humility is new for the Bank.

Steve Ndegwa:

Thank you.

Henk-Jan Brinkman:

To quote you again. "Our knowledge is partial." What's also new is: it's not the economy stupid. That's coming from an institution that is dominated by Anglo Saxon educated economists. That's quite an accomplishment I think as well. Also, I think what is important is we go beyond greed and grievances. The Paul Collier debate I think was really wrong-headed. I think he was simplifying the issues and particularly just focusing on economic causes I think was really problematic. Going way beyond that and much deeper and much broader I think is really quite an important step forward.

On the inequality, I've actually sat on a panel with Paul, arguing about this. He didn't think that inequality was an issue in conflicts and I have argued that it is. I think he looked at the wrong kind of inequality. He looked at vertical inequality, and you really need to look at horizontal inequalities. In the report, there is some great work summarized on this. The other thing that is new, and it's a very important, is this inclusive enough coalitions. I don't think Steven had mentioned it, but I think it's an important concept that really is very critical to move forward.

Second area, what's not so new? Actually the Bank does a great job in making the point again, or even better than others, and is of course saying – this is reminding of me of my philosophy teacher that all philosophy is a footnote to Plato and all economics is a footnote to Adam Smith basically. So, what's not so new is a very really relative point and I won't go into detail, but the nature of the conflicts and the violence is a very important point. I do regret that they didn't narrow it down again to criminal and political violence rather than just keep it at violence and have this great concept that's also buried in a footnote where you have multifaceted approaches to violence. They did a great job in documenting the impact of violence, that it is really quite dramatic, and the cycles of violence.

On institutions, again this is not new, but I do think that they did a great job in integrating that whole literature on institutions and how important institutions are, not only economic, but also for political and for preventing violence – they really did a great job in that – and that they take a long time to make. I think it's really probably one of the most important points the report makes. It reminded me of the World Hearings on Development that the general assembly president organized in 1994 where [PH] Julius [INDISCERNIBLE] was on the panel. This was just before the turnover of Hong Kong to China and he was criticizing the UK: "You took 200 years to get your country democratized and you are forcing Hong Kong to do it in just a few years." It was completely unfair requirement. That they do take a long time and often more than a generation is a very important point.

What's also not new but important, again – and I just mentioned them – the best-fit approach, although I would have called this the good fit approach because it's not just finding the best fit. It's not about best
practices, but trying to find a good practice that is specifically addressing the circumstances of the country. The finance volatility is a very important point – Steven mentioned it. The risk management, Steven also mentioned. I think it’s very important. We need to accept the fact that things might fail and we still have to try. The multi-country and regional approaches on top of, you cannot just look at these things at the national level.

Thirdly, where I think it’s wrongheaded or disappointing or areas that were absent. Well, what’s wrong headed is the size – 352 pages is just too big.

Cruel and unusual punishment. Graeme and I were emailing yesterday, and I said I was trying to work through it and I just gave up and I went for a bike ride yesterday. So that’s why I only have one point to make.

One area where I think it’s really unfortunate that they didn’t cover – this comes from my background on WFP where in the disaster management there is a real clear concept about risk and vulnerabilities and that risk is a function of the hazard, the shock and the vulnerability. That model that is widely accepted in the disaster community could have been very easily applied in this report. I think you basically ignored it. I think that’s unfortunate.

What I think is also missing is bringing the peacebuilding and conflict sensitive approach into microeconomic policy. I mean, this is your bread and butter, microeconomic policy, and it’s barely touched upon, if at all, in the report. So, how microeconomic policies can affect distributional issues, equity. The speed of reforms I think is absolutely critical. Do you do sharper approach or do it gradually? This is what really the bank is all about, and it’s absolutely critical how the impacts of the shock are distributed across different segments of society and what that means for conflict.

I don’t mind so much what the report also does to translate development and development outcomes to just jobs. I think that’s okay. I mean jobs are really critical. But again, and I completely agree with Graeme, it’s one of my points as well – I really find it very unfortunate that justice is just translated into the legal issues. Again it’s in the footnotes. It’s buried in the report, but the social justice aspect is lost in the translation.

They do talk about how injustice and horizontal inequalities are important drivers for conflict, but then not enough in addressing these issues to reduce the risk and rebuild societies. That’s kept me to my only point really, it’s about the social protection systems. It’s a way, I think that you do with the internal and external shocks that the reports layout out so well. It can deal with the root causes of conflict of the horizontal inequalities. It can be a very important instrument to build a trust in government and there are actually examples in the report. For example, in South Africa about the water and maternal and child healthcare, how the new government after 1994 tried to do it, or in Lebanon tried to do it with social sectors. That’s I think examples from history. Wars have been real great pushers to build social protection system. The biggest movements to social protection systems were in Europe after World War I and after World War II. Bismark explicitly was uniting Germany by providing social protection. Bismark was leading social protection
systems, in the world actually, he was the first about disability insurance and old age pensions, and he did that explicitly to take the wind out of the sails: out of the radicals, the communists, et cetera, and to keep the country united. You pay taxes, you get something back. I think that’s really a missed opportunity.

As for Ashraf Ghani in his book about failed states that he did on Afghanistan, really he laid it out very nicely as well, and I’m really sorry it’s lost in the report. It also provides the link with the MDGs which I think is perhaps also a little bit lost. This is a way you can really use the MDGs to build peace and to reduce conflicts. So that’s it. Thank you very much.

**Francesco Mancini:**

Thank you very much for your insightful comments. I think I would like at some point to give opportunity to Steve to reply. But if this is acceptable for you, I would go to the floor first and take a few questions and then we address some of the points that are being raised by the commentators. So the floor is open. John?

**John:**

First of all, thank you all very much. My comment is really about your comments here, rather than about the reports, since I’ve not read your report. I have one comment and one question.

Your comment about greed and grievance being wrong, I actually think greed and grievance took an issue forward that was absent totally before that idea came out. I’m not talking about Paul Collier specifically, but about that work because [PH] Collier was all seen about who was in power. Is it Idi Amin, or his opponent. It was also simplified down to who’s the head of state and the army et cetera. So I think they moved it forward, and maybe you’re all trying to move it forward now more. I’d like you all to say something about what can be done about corruption and about the points that Graeme made about the resilience of illicit economies and war economies and so on because I kind of got two different senses. [INDISCERNIBLE] of this macro ideas development and jobs and so on. But even in your very brief comment about Kenya, you didn’t say anything – at least I didn’t hear anything – about corruption and how all these politicians are crooks and doing very badly which is what our work at IPI, Peter Gastrow, and others have done. So you’ve already alluded to an election coming in 2012 and how do you get ready for it. But I didn’t hear anything from you or anybody else here about what can be done possibly about dealing with the resilience of these war economies, the resilience of the gangsters, the sex trafficking, and all these points that you all made. So maybe you could, all three of you, somehow say a little bit more about what you think can be done about these kind of power problems. Thank you.

**Moderator:**

Thanks.

**Erin McCandless:**

Thank you. Erin McCandless from Journal of Peacebuilding and Development in PBSO. I just want to build a little bit on some of the points both made by Henk-Jan and Graeme, all excellent points. Obviously this report does take us forward quite a long ways, so it’s a really good basis to move forward on a lot of important issues.

The security, economic and political stresses – which I guess is the way you’re talking about conflict causes or drivers of conflict – is quite
interesting. I just worry that, again, this notion of global inequality and injustice in treatment of ethnic or religious groups, which is I guess how you're describing horizontal inequality, and the part that bothers me of it is ‘perceived’, because I think that we have accepted through plenty of research that it’s real and not just perceived. And I think that those weren’t different kinds of approaches, as well. And even in [INDISCERNIBLE] literature which is cited – he talks very much – it’s not just perceived inequality. And I think that does point to, as well it’s also economic and you have it just in the justice area. I think it indicates some of the ways, again building on both points of Graeme and Henk-Jan in terms of perhaps some of the economic drivers of conflict that are left out. So while it’s great that we are moving beyond Paul Collier in terms of reductionistic approaches to understanding cause of conflict, I think that we also need to recognize the ways in which they interact across justice and economic realms.

Again, as Henk-Jan said, there really is an absence – at least I didn’t see it – and I also have to confess I didn’t read the 350 pages. But I didn’t see the response that the strategies for addressing horizontal inequality, given the kind of crime-justice oriented approach rather than one that’s more of a social justice oriented approach.

I really like, Steve, that you talked a lot about context sensitivity, political economy, analysis and so forth. But I guess I’ve always wondered – within the Bank it seems that the unit you work in is quite divided from the rest of the bank and the economic policy approaches and strategies which is obviously led by economist. So I’m wondering to what degree in the forward action you see a real willingness and humbleness on the part of the economist to actually change the way things are done in terms of thinking about having that extra lens of conflict and context sensitivity in terms of driving policy prescriptions. Thank you.

Francesco Mancini: Thanks. Can we take another question there?

Andrew Tomlinson: Andrew Tomlinson from the Quaker United Nations Office. I just wanted to thank the panel. Thank Steve for coming back here again to brave the world of the UN in this sort of strange place. It’s only a couple of hours north, but it’s a very different place. So, thank you.

One observation – and I have made it all the way through the overview, so part of the way there, is that, what was stunning to me was actually the analysis in the report and what’s most effective and what’s most breathtaking and the bits that I have copied most to people in emails and other ways have all been from the analysis section. Because in a couple of different ways, one is the breadth of the definition of violence. It takes us, at least in a UN context, we tend to be in specific silos. So some of us sort of post conflict world. Others are in different places, and the ability to bring all of this together – the post conflict peace with the urban violence peace and the criminal violence piece and the other aspects – was really very, very important and represents a potentially quite critical way forward for all of our institutions.

Secondly, that the breadth of the analysis of the root quarters of violence to include the issues which have come up here already such as inequality and a lack of political space. Yet when one then moves from the analysis to the prescriptions to what the suggested solutions, it’s a
very different matter. It’s a much narrower set of thoughts, a much narrower set of proposals. The world seems to have largely shrunk again to a sort of post conflict, Subsaharan Africa kind of field of view. We’ve left out all the wonderful breadth we had before. And the issues around politics, the issues around the people, seemed to have largely disappeared as well, so that in the summary – which was provided, for example – the word ‘reconciliation’ does not appear at all. There’s a little bit of comments on political issues upfront and then again it doesn’t appear in the back end. So I think there has been an opportunity. The dialogue and the whole discussion in this field has been moved forward, but to me it has been moved forward in the analysis section. And I think there is still a lot of work to be done in terms of finding a broader set of future action items that can really answer this wonderful broadening of the discussion which we see upfront. Thank you.

Francesco Mancini: Thank you. I think you have enough on your plate. Steve, you want to address some of these points, and then maybe also our discussant you want to bring something in.

Steve Ndegwa: What was that point about humility? Well, these are all very rich observations, I thank Graeme and Henk-Jan. I will remind you Hank-Jan, that these 350 pages is an improvement over the climate report, which is a two volume WDI. There is an overview that’s actually quite – but more seriously – I’ll start with Erin’s question.

There’s also, I guess, a political economy of producing a report. So I won’t say too much about that. I think it’s important, because we are in a sense speaking to various audiences, so things like ‘perceived’ make sense, but we think it does not neutralize the fact that people revolt on both actual and perceived grievances. So we don’t think it diminishes the analysis and the prism through which one can view options. But I would just would like to ask for all for some forbearance given the political economy of report writing in international organizations.

On the political economy analysis and where our unit sits and so on, I would push back a little bit on that because part of the reason I stayed in the Bank was precisely because we were beginning to do more political economy work back in the early 2000s within the economist family, the [PH] PREM family, the poverty reduction economic management family. And that has grown in substance and in rich. I think it’s fairly mainstream now. It’s actually seems to us – and I was actually quite taken aback when I found, at least the intensity of political economy work on the countries in conflict and fragility – was not much more than where we do political economic in the Court, sort of normal situations. Especially in this notion of having a continuous assessment as you go, because the rapidity of change in those environments is much more significant to the options that you have to play with. I would say we’re certainly not there fully, but it’s much more mainstreamed.

I think part of the indicator of success is I remember when I joined the bank, we would have to convince country directors that it’s a good thing in fairly obvious places. And now we have come to directors asking for political economy analysis to underpin their strategies and I think that’s an important turnaround.
On John’s question on Kenya and corruption, I guess it’s an oversight that’s not necessarily a neglect. If you talk about politics in Kenya, you must talk about how corruption and other forms of malfeasance drive choices, but also drive the relationship between citizens and their political representatives. So changing that is really something that, to go back to this notion of long-term institutional building – is an effort to really change the dynamics of the social contracting in that particular environment, and introduce a bit more of a regard for more transparent allocative decisions. I would argue in the Kenyan case – the introduction of something that many of us in the development community, especially the economist side, are unhappy about – the Constituency Development Fund has actually been quite innovative. In the beginning it became evident. It was also a part of the cesspool of corruption. But because it introduced a very important platform of exchange between citizens and politicians, and a very transparent one, it quickly morphed into an instrument that politicians could be penalized for not delivering on the promises. So even though it’s very problematic in the beginning, in the last two cycles of the elections it’s actually become an avenue for accountability between citizens and politicians. I mean all to say that you are not going to be able to fix these deep-seated corruption problems by one prescription, and oftentimes I think there’s a social lining expectation that we have to build into our programming support that begins to undermine the strength of the criminal and the subterranean economies.

Let me turn a bit to my colleagues at the table, and I’ll also ask them to respond to some of the questions. But I wanted to respond to two things that came up. One is this notion of – and as a political scientist, I entirely believe this – but it’s also a problem that the state is about violence and taming and institutionalizing violence. And that’s how we’ve operated as international institutions, as the UN, and so on. But what this report reminds me of, is the state is also a moral space and a space for contracting. I think that needs to be brought much more into our thinking about development – that we actually induce new exchanges. We induce new rules of exchange between citizens and state actors, and it’s not entirely about violence. The one important way we found through history of taming violence is building institutions which are essentially contracts. To us, that’s where we need to really return to and think about the state as a space for moral exchanges and expectations.

There was a discussion about inequality, globally. What we really suggesting here is that the way international actors and more and endowed countries act internationally has repercussions in how people see the international environment as either conducive to justice or not. For us in the international community, we need to also think about that and hold each other to account in terms of how we act in different situations, oftentimes in very contradictory times. I think that’s an important thing for us to think.

Now, the bank cannot act in all these. I think we can raise these issues, perhaps more analytically than we can prescribe to others about what they need to do. I think the report provides an opportunity to precisely raise those questions and those debates and let others act according to their competencies and leverage if that’s important in different situations. So, humility is what we started with, isn’t it?
Francesco Mancini: That’s great, thank you. Can I ask our two discussants if they have something to add. Do you want to add something Henk-Jan or Graeme?.

Henk-Jan Brinkman: Not much. I completely agree on your point of Collier. He did raise an incredibly important issue to the fore and really moved that area forward. I agree.

On corruption, I do think that there are some interesting recommendations actually. One of the thing, if I remember correctly, get some of the big fish first and focus on them and don’t try to do everything at once because it will take a long time before you really do it. I also agree that it’s a complex issue that you have to attack at several fronts, and increasing the opportunity cost really helps by increasing and focusing on jobs, by focusing on livelihoods and income-generating activities really can help in the long term. We have to do much more on the front.

I’m not anybody mentioned it yet, but the agricultural sector in a lot of countries that are really struck by violence, really need to be focused on because that’s where 80 percent or so of the people get their livelihood from. So we have to work on the value chain and bring more value to the actual producers that increases the incentives for corruption.

On Erin’s point, I didn’t read it that – I think it’s an important point that perceived injustice can be as important as actual justice. I agree that actual can be. But what really I think is often the problem is that you get politicians involved who make a big issue out of inequalities that coincide with regions or ethnicities or religion or whatever and then make a big issue out of it. I think that has happened in too many cases where you have these factors overlapping of economic and social political inclusion and then you get somebody who is making an issue like Milosevic live in Yugoslavia, talking suddenly about a war in, what is it, in 1346 that everybody had forgotten about. So perhaps I’ll leave it there.

Francesco Mancini: Graeme?

Graeme Simpson: I don’t have much to add. I think the assumption here for me that is very important is that what the report does do is it encourages us to move beyond a very narrowly conceived root course of discourse, which I think is a trap we in the peacebuilding field often fall into, which is that partly because of the narrow parameters of what was being addressed before, we keep on saying but what about ‘x’ and ‘y’ and ‘zed’. And it moves beyond that to start articulating challenges and notions of monocausal explanation and implicitly suggests very strongly that we need to start thinking about coherence and integration in our strategy and I’m deliberately not using a word which comes up in the report, but ‘coordination’. Because I actually think coordination is how you failed to do this. It’s about coherence in programming. It’s not about salving the wound by trying to coordinate between these kind of diverse strategies.

What I think is really interesting and important in this is that actually I think that the issue of perception is very important for that very reason – that we need to grapple more with the relationship between economy, polity, and identity, and identity is about how people see themselves in the world in relation to others, a discourse which is about economic empowerment and development but which doesn’t engage with the
experiences of relative deprivation is very problematic. Because you have some societies that are extremely poor and don’t display the levels of violence that other societies do, et cetera. So let’s not – and this is why – my concern about these issues of correlation. I’m not suggesting that you should deliver, albeit it in 300 and whatever many pages, the Holy Grail on this. But we actually have to start engaging with the issues of testing causation rather than letting correlation speak for itself, because it doesn’t.

The last issue on this is actually methodological, and it was sort of the last thing that I read and I did try and get through a lot of the report. But when I looked at the methodology section and who spoke and the who we spoke to, and who was in the meetings, I have to say – and this is a challenge to all of us – it’s not to the bank or to the report – no one has clearly articulated the path that young men take into criminal and political underworlds, the ease with which they migrate between the two and indeed how in both those worlds violence against women is almost a currency that is normative rather than deviant for many of them. No one articulates the triggers and the factors and the relevant issues better than the young juvenile offenders themselves, in my view. They are very articulate about how their lives took them where they took them, and yet in a way we talk to the politicians and we talk to the policy makers and we talk to the range of stakeholders that you do. And I think we are very bad at accessing those voices. And I think they are very hard to listen to. They often require shining the light in the darkness corners of the society but in the midst of it what you discover- and this is my big thrust on this – is that the flip side of all the fault lines and risk factors around fragility is also understanding where resilience is, where social cohesion is, how young people make alternative choices in the example I’m using. And I think we are not accessing those voices. I think that we’re not popularizing the way in which we think about these problems, so we end up talking about perception rather than allowing these voices to be directly audible.

**Francesco Mancini:** Thank you. I think I have one more question that I would like to take. Let’s see. If they are short, then I want to give a chance to the panel to wrap up.

**Ken Johnson:** Thank you very much. My thanks to the panelists. My name is Ken Johnson, principal of [INDISCERNIBLE] which is an international cross cultural development firm focused on Subsaharan Africa.

First of all, let me just thank the World Bank for its interdisciplinary, multidisciplinary approach. That’s a concept whose time has come. There is an assumption that underlies many institutions and I believe that the central message of the entire report tends to support this assumption, which is that strengthening institutions in governance is almost a precondition to development, goals and jobs creation. Coming from a private sector, I want to reverse that and my concept, my position, is that enabling jobs creation and the fact that we reduce poverty will necessarily create the kind of good governance organically, mind you, organically creates the kind of good governance that’s necessary, creates the kinds of strong institutions that are necessary. And I just gave you a couple of brief examples.

**Francesco Mancini:** Only one.
Ken Johnson: Okay. KAM, the Kenya Association of Manufacturers, played a significant role in stemming back what could have been a much worse situation in Kenya during the last elections. They held meetings with various political parties. They played a central role in making sure that some sort of a resolution is met. The lack of jobs, the lack of economic fairness in many of these countries, especially in Southern Africa, I think then creates the environment where they become susceptible to radical ideas and that they become susceptible to underground economy et cetera. And when we talk about jobs creation, just very briefly I want to say that it is not necessarily about giving women 200 dollars to start a microfinance project. While that has its place, we need to be looking at the industrialization of many of these countries. We need to be looking at ensuring that we are developing scalable, sustainable businesses that truly, truly not just create jobs but also increases their livelihood. Thank you.

Francesco Mancini: Thanks. I think we are running out of time. I’m sorry for the couple of people that I can’t take. I want to give Steve the last word. If you want to address his point and make a few concluding remarks. Thank you.

Steve Mancini: Thank you. On this point, what I might have failed to underscore is at least for the Bank perhaps, not for others, our approach to supporting job creation is enhancing the private sector, although we have now also moved to being a bit more ecumenical about accommodating that in fact public sector jobs and public sector-created jobs can be an important tool in securing the peace while the private sector works itself out over time, because sometimes it's just difficult to attract both local and regional and international investments to come in.

I like the way you've put this in terms of scalable investments, and that gets you also out of this preoccupation with only the extractive industries as the places to press for economic benefit. But it also invites an investment in the broader governance environment for entrepreneur activity, which we think is important. So, how does information get shared? How do government processes operate to encourage private citizens from the small-scale women investors to large-scale industrialist men and women? How do you encourage them by securing their own investments? But also how do you invoke regional players, which are – half of your Kenya violence reaction was actually regional player, business people in Uganda and Rwanda saying, “You know guys, your trouble is actually causing us bigger problems, so fix it so that we don’t suffer.” And that’s pretty important to think about.

Let me close by sharing with you where we are going with this, and how at least on the knowledge level we are trying to build some of the mechanism that will stop the isolation that we as policymakers or practitioners on the ground, face vis-à-vis the knowledge that Graeme was pointing out to. We are moving to try to create a knowledge platform. We are working various actors, including partners in the UN, to create a collaborative space where in fact we can crowd in all this knowledge that we can't access as easily that government officials cannot access this easily both from practitioners. So if you're sitting in Haiti and you are, let’s say you used to be a women church leader but suddenly because of the crisis you are now in charge of recovering your district. Where do you go for help? I mean you can't just wait for the UN. You can’t just
wait for the bank. But you can connect through these platforms with people who have worked on this in Turkey after the earthquake, in other countries and crowding more knowledge that’s not mediated by us and it is more direct. Again we try to sort of invest in these activities that actually will shift the practice. We are working with other partners including PBSO on this employment platform that we want to be operating together. So we are not saying these are all going to be successful, but I think the dynamic is changing to really take advantage of the various kinds of knowledge that are out there and not simply focus on the expert best practice that we can induce out of our own technical analysis.

Having said that I’m very grateful for the opportunity to share with you and your questions and the comments from my colleagues at the table here, and I would be happy to return hopefully to report on how we are changing practice.

**Francesco Mancini:** Great. We would be happy to host you. Thank you very much to you and to our discussants. I think we have enough now to go back to our 325 pages and dig more deeply into it, or maybe we got enough substance for not going back to the report. I think it was a very good discussion. Thank you very much. I hope to see you soon again at IPI.