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IPI
INTERNATIONAL
PEACE
INSTITUTE

## IPI POLICY FORUM

# Environmental Migrants: Climate Change and Human Migration

**Introductory Remarks:**
**Ambassador José Filipe Moraes Cabral,** *Permanent Representative of Portugal to the United Nations*

**Ambassador Miguel Berger,** *Deputy Permanent Representative of Germany to the United Nations*

**Chair:**
**Mr. Warren Hoge**, *Senior Adviser for External Relations, International Peace Institute*

**Speakers:**
**Mr. Udo Janz,** *Director of The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, New York*

**Professor Susan Martin,** *The Donald G. Herzberg Associate Professor of International Migrations and Executive Director of the Institute for the Study of International Migration in the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University*

**Ms. Michele Klein Solomon,** *Permanent Observer to the United Nations for International Organization for Migration*

**When:**
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*Transcript edited by IPI*

## TRANSCRIPTION

**Warren Hoge:** Good afternoon, I'm Warren Hoge, IPI's Senior Adviser for External Relations, and I'm happy to welcome you here to this policy forum on Environmental Migrants: Climate Change and Human Migration.

IPI is pleased to be joined today in sponsoring this discussion by the Permanent Missions of Portugal and of Germany. We are webcasting this event live and we will be posting the video on our website so, in that context, can I please ask you to silence any devices you have that may make noise.

We're privileged to have with us today, Ambassador José Filipe Moraes Cabral, the Permanent Representative of Portugal, and Ambassador Miguel Berger, the Deputy Permanent Representative of Germany. I am the chair for our conversation and will shortly introduce our subject and the three distinguished speakers who will be addressing it, but first, to begin our discussion, I'm pleased to call

on Ambassador Moraes Cabral and then Ambassador Berger for introductory remarks. Ambassador Moraes Cabral, the floor is yours.

**Ambassador José Filipe Moraes Cabral:** Well, distinguished members of the panel, colleagues, ladies and gentlemen, as co-host of this event, I would like to start by thanking you all for having accepted our invitation for this debate and, also, to thank IPI for their work in putting together this panel of experts and for the organization of the event. Our intention is to have a lively, interactive discussion. In a moment we will hear the presentations of the panelists, but I do encourage all of you to share your views on what we believe is an under examined link between climate change and migrations, as well as on ways and means of advancing this issue in the UN framework.

Allow me a few ideas as food for thought in this debate. We obviously do not want to promote a discussion on adaptation and mitigation of climate change. These are very important issues, indeed, but they are being discussed in specific negotiation forums, which we hope will arrive at the long term solutions that, if properly implemented, will guarantee the sustainability of societies and ecosystems.

Climate change, however, has the potential to amplify already existing challenges to international peace and security and, therefore, deserves our collective attention as already recognized by various UN organs, namely the General Assembly and the Security Council only last July under the German presidency. It is now our intention to look into concrete areas where the implications of climate change are visible and, therefore, the focus on the issue of migrations and environmental migrants.

Human migration, forced or otherwise, will be one of the most significant consequences of environment degradation and climate change in decades to come. The immediate effects of this phenomenon have a particularly serious impact in countries and regions already facing other security and governance challenges. The question, therefore is, how can a better knowledge of climate change patterns contribute to more capable international responses to situations of human migrations? Also, from a conflict prevention perspective, which tools should we have that will allow us to deal with environmental migrations in a way that mitigates challenges to peace and security, promotes social and economic development and protects human rights?

These questions are valid for several regions, but I would underline, in particular, the acuteness in low-lying island states of the Pacific and in Africa. Low-lying island states are already dealing with important losses in their territories as a consequence of sea level rise and change from maritime resources; problems which directly affect the populations of those countries. If and when the permanent displacement of population from Pacific island states becomes necessary, there are a number of questions that remain unanswered, but which the international community must start to address. Those questions are mostly related with evacuation, resettlement of populations and have important legal implications. When and how will populations be resettled? Will other states cede their territory for evacuated populations? What about the citizenship of populations evacuated to the territory of another state? How to diffuse tensions that resettlement often entails and how do we address the legal consequences of the loss of territory such as a definition of borders, economic zones and continental shelf rights?

In Africa, on the other hand, we witness dramatic changes in patterns of food production as a direct result of more frequent extreme weather and the degradation of ecosystems. This, in turn, affects the sustainability of whole communities leading to situations of increased vulnerability and, often, to mass displacement of people.

In countries and regions affected by conflict or undergoing complex post-conflict reconstruction, such patterns are particularly worrying. What are the implications of these trends to humanitarian actors as well as to the development agencies? How does an environmental migration link with other dimensions of conflict prevention and resolution? These are all questions for which there is no easy answer, but I do hope that our discussions today will contribute to a reflection on how we can enhance our understanding and our capacity to deal in a systematic and coherent manner with such challenges.

This is a discussion which Portugal proposes to take forward next month during our presidency of the Security Council as part of a high level briefing on new challenges to security. I look forward to hearing the ideas and proposals of our panelists, but, also, the views of all of those present today who wish to contribute to discussion. I thank you all very much.

**Hoge:** Thank you, Ambassador; and now Ambassador Berger.

**Ambassador Miguel Berger:** Your Excellency, colleagues, let me also start by thanking IPI and Mr. Warren Hoge for organizing this event, but, especially, Portugal for taking the initiative, not only for this event today, but, also, I think it's very good to follow up in the Security Council on the issue on the relationship between climate change and security and we very much welcome that Portugal is going to focus on the question of migration.

We think it's fully in line with all the efforts to shed more light on the multiple consequences climate change will have on all areas of our life and, increasingly, on international relations and peace and security in the world. And I'm grateful to note that the Secretary-General is very much committed to these efforts and that the number of events and discussions dealing with the link between climate change and security is on the rise. And, as Ambassador Cabral mentioned, Germany has tried to contribute to these efforts by organizing an open debate during our presidency in the Security Council in July this year, especially focusing on the security implications of climate change. It was the first time ever that the Council reached a consensus on a presidential statement recognizing the potential security implications of climate change. We have built on the momentum of this debate in organizing an international conference in Berlin on climate diplomacy in prospective from early warning to early action just two weeks ago.

In some regions of our planet, climate change-induced human migration is a reality already today. Climate change might not be the only factor in a crisis, but the terrible famine at the Horn of Africa is an example of that. Many factors are contributing to the current crisis, but, without any doubt, one of them are the droughts caused by climate change; so sea level rise, food insecurity and increasing natural disasters are forcing people to migrate. And we have to acknowledge that despite ongoing efforts to curb greenhouse gas emissions and to mitigate climate change, migration has already now become an adaptation strategy for people affected by these changes. Even if so far climate change induced migration is mainly limited to internal migration, this might change in the future when the effects will

become even more tangible. So it is urgent that the international community looks more closely into the adequacy and appropriateness of the legal and political instruments we have at hand. What are the obligations of a receiving state? What are the obligations of the state of origin? We will have to develop new rules and mechanisms in humanitarian law, in human rights law, in international environmental law and in development cooperation; so a complex task for all of us.

Let me mention in this context a very thought provoking conference organized by the Marshall Islands in May this year in cooperation with Columbia University. Germany is very supportive of the approach the UNHCR is taking. We need more research and better understanding of the migration processes. We have to be guided by the fundamental principles of human dignity, human rights and international cooperation. And we think that there is a need to develop a global guiding framework to apply to situations of external displacement other than those covered by the 1951 Refugee Convention.

I'm sure that this discussion today, which we are co-hosting together with IPI and Portugal, will contribute to the further exploration of the security threats that are posed by migration. Thank you very much.

**Hoge:** Ambassador, thank you. The aggravating effects of global climate change on existing threats to international peace and security are increasingly being taken up through multilateral institutions. This was most recently on display here with the open debate of the UN Security Council in July under the German presidency and the subsequent presidential statement. As we just heard from Ambassador Moraes Cabral, it will be a subject next month when Portugal is the president.

IPI is particularly delighted to be participating in a conversation on this aspect of the climate change debate because our work in this area has also sought to highlight the linkages between climate change, resource scarcity and security. We have held policy forums on the subject in collaboration with the governments of Denmark, of Pakistan, of Sweden and we are planning further meetings on the subject this year in cooperation with the government of Norway.

Just before this meeting began I was in conversation here – one of the panelists said – I mentioned something and she said, “tell that to the audience.” So this will take one more minute, but some of you may know that most of my life was spent working for The New York Times.

And the last year, which I worked for The Times, in 2007, I covered the United Nations, and I went to Africa with Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon. This was a trip, incidentally, in which he met with Muammar Gaddafi in Sirte, but it was a trip to Darfur and in connection with that trip, he added a side trip and it was – we were going to be in Chad anyway and he added a day trip to Lake Chad, which some of you may know – and I remember these statistics because they're good for a local boy like me– Lake Chad used to be the size of the entire state of New Jersey. Lake Chad then in 2007 had become the size of the island of Manhattan. Six countries depend upon Lake Chad for their resources, and there were conflicts in all six of them brought about by the scarcity of water, which was brought about, of course, by the diminution of that lake.

So in my own personal experience, the connection between climate change and security occurred even before I arrived here at IPI where

it has become a real focus of our study. So we're particularly delighted to be taking up that subject today.

Today our focus is on the projected effects of climate change on human migration, and we have three notable speakers, all of whom have spent major parts of their careers dealing with the issues of migration and refugees. You have their full printed biographies with you, but let me briefly tell you about them and their work in the order in which they will speak.

Susan Martin is the Donald G. Herzberg Associate Professor of International Migrations and serves as the Executive Director of the Institute for the Study of International Migration in the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University; a long-time expert on immigration and refugee policy. Dr. Martin came to Georgetown after having served as executive director of the US Commission on Immigration Reform.

Udo Janz is the Director of The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. His UNHCR postings have taken him to Indonesia, Thailand, Hong Kong, Cambodia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, and, prior to assuming his current position, he was Deputy Director of the Europe Bureau at UNHCR headquarters in Geneva.

And Michele Klein Solomon has been associated with the International Organization for Migration for a decade and now serves as the organization's Permanent Observer to the United Nations. Prior to that, she held a number of high-ranking legal posts in the US Department of State. So let me turn this over now to Dr. Susan Martin.

**Dr. Susan Martin:** Thank you, Warren. I'd like to thank IPI and the governments of Portugal and Germany for holding this meeting. The issues of the interconnection between environmental factors and migration has been on the – often on the international agenda since the early 1990's when there were discussions of the linkages as part of the lead up to the Rio conference on population and development, including some work that I did with IOM at the time, but it's been a very contentious area of public policy. Not least of which is because there has been a great deal of disagreement about the – what the actual causal or determinative linkages are between environmental change, on the one hand, and human migration on the other.

For many years experts in the environmental and migration communities talked at each other and across each other. We almost never talked with each other about this issue. People in the migration community, I can say, were often very concerned that those in the environmental community seemed to be raising the issue of migration as a scare tactic. If you don't do something about environmental problems or climate change we're going to have migration and that that's a bad thing. Those of us in the migration community, I think, tended to dismiss the line of arguments and were probably much too late in actually thinking about what the exact connections were. This has changed a lot in the last few years. There's been a lot more, not only attention paid to the issues and the interconnections, but a lot more civility in the discourse and a seeking of some common areas of agreement moving forward.

One of the things that you generally won't hear, though, a lot, particularly, from people in the migration field are numbers. We tend not to come up with estimates or projections as to how many migrants

there will be, either internal or international, as a result of climate change. We tend to try to be much more focused, not at the global level in deriving what range in some of the estimates to hundredths of millionths and billionths of people, but to try to understand more of this situation on the ground. What are the dynamics in particular locations?

This is largely because we understand that migration is driven by a variety of interlocking factors, that economics are important, social relationships, politics, security issues, both national security and human security. And the environment is an important component of the picture, but seldom the only reason that people move, though there may be people who are, in fact, driven from their homes largely because of environmental factors. But, I think, what we increasingly understand now is that environmental factors, including climate change, and, particularly, climate change may exacerbate the other factors influencing people to move. So it's influencing people's access to livelihoods. It's influencing the extent of political stability in various countries and regions. And it's that interplay that's important for us to understand.

As we go through this process, we usually think about four particular channels through which climate change appears to be having a major impact or potential – current and potential impact on human mobility. The first two channels are processes. They're more gradual. Rising sea levels, glacial melt, the process by which areas become uninhabitable because they're inundated with water of one sort or another. It's one factor. Second is increased drought and desertification. You heard about, a little bit, in the opening remarks, both of these processes. And with increasing areas being affected by drought means the more and more people, particularly those in agriculture, are finding it difficult to be able to maintain a livelihood that allows them to live with any type of certainty about what next year's income will be.

The other two pathways are more acute. They're events not so much, but slow onset processes. This is the increasing frequency and severity of acute natural hazards – things like cyclones and hurricanes that, you know, anyone who has been seeing the patterns over the last few years understand that those processes and the extent to which they can have immediate emergency consequences that force people to move away from their areas and get displaced for shorter or longer periods.

I use the term acute hazard rather than acute disaster because very often it's the governance – the preparations on the resources that people have that will determine whether the impacts are going to be very short term and easily – people can easily bounce back from them – or will be much longer term because the capabilities aren't in place for people to resume lives as they have known it.

And then the fourth type of event that is problematic for migration are situations where there is competition for scarce resources. That can lead to various forms of conflict. This area is actually quite contentious in terms of the literature on the extent to which scarce resources do lead to conflict, but examples of, at least, communal violence and communal tensions arriving are quite manifest and hold the potential for worsening.

Now, depending on these various pathways for climate change influencing migration, we can see great variations in the patterns of migration themselves. Some of the migration will be very gradual

over decades. They will tend to look very much like any form of economic or labor migration as people, because of environmental factors in combination with other concerns, find it more and more difficult to have livelihoods. And when they migrate they will look very much like internal labor migrants or international labor migrants because the push – immediate push – will often be that loss of livelihood that could have come from any number of different factors. Or it can be very rapid onset looking much more like our current refugee movements, acute emergency movements with massive displacement, as we're seeing out of Somalia, for example, today.

Some will be temporary and in the context of temporary movements very, very short term. People displaced for a few days and then able to return in a few months, but, in some cases, that migration will be permanent. The ability to go back to ones' homes will be almost nonexistent. Some will be internal. We expect that most migration will be within borders, as it currently is today from the variety of reasons people migrate, but, as we've heard, others will likely be across international borders. We expect, or much of the research indicates, that those who do migrate internationally are most likely to migrate into neighboring countries and very often those neighboring countries will be experiencing exactly the same kinds of problems only slightly less acute and will often be migration from one developing country into another, which also has few resources and capabilities for being able to address those movements.

It's very expensive to migrate long distances and, particularly, to migrate from poor countries to wealthier countries. And, actually, one of the big concerns amongst those of us who were examining these issues are the people who get trapped at home, who are unable to migrate out of harm's way. And their situation will, perhaps, be the greatest concern from both the humanitarian and a security point of view because there will be no alternatives for them and, often, they will be the most vulnerable amongst us.

There are also different policy responses that are needed at different phases of this process. At the pre-migration phase the focus of attention will need to be on mitigation, on adaptation, helping people to figure out how they can cope with situations that are unfolding, increasing disaster risk reduction strategies and programs to give people more capability for addressing these acute natural hazards, conflict resolution to try to address what might be potential conflict over scarce resources. But then some migration is likely to be inevitable and, therefore, the phase for that will be the process of moving to a new location. Some cases this will be very spontaneous; in other cases, particularly, the small island states there may need to be some planned relocation of populations because there won't be an interior to which people can move and won't necessarily be clear access to other countries without a formal process.

Following that, though, will likely be a process of return for many people, settlement in a new location for many others. And with that will come the challenges of integration or re-integration because that – migration doesn't end with people moving. It ends with how they're received in their new communities.

Now, the legal and policy frameworks for addressing all of these forms of movements and all of these phases are quite weak at present. They're the strongest for emergency movements, particularly related to conflict. That falls much more naturally within the mandate and authority of the UN high commissioner for refugees and the Refugee Convention as an instrument particularly if there is a

problem in terms of persecution of populations that are vulnerable and affected by climate change. They're quite a lot weaker for slow onset situations, especially those that involve movement across international borders. There are almost no existing legal frameworks that are adequate or appropriate for these forms of movement. They're evolving for internal displacement. There are guiding principles on internal displacement that include displacement from environmental factors, but these are, for the most part, based on international law, but not binding in and of themselves. In Africa there's some promise for strengthening the processes with the adoption of the convention on the right of internally displaced persons by the African Union and when it goes into force that will provide a stronger legal framework for addressing these movements.

Most of the policies at the national level pertains, at this point, to temporary protection mechanisms way that people can be allowed to remain, at least temporarily, in a new destination while conditions work themselves out. But I have looked carefully at, for example, the US program of temporary protection – protected status – for the victims in natural disasters and one of the flaws in it is that there is no mechanism to deal with cases where permanent relocation is going to be necessary. I favor the example is over in Montserrat when there was a volcano that created terrible devastation to the island. The US granted temporary protection, extended it five different times, until there was a definitive study saying that people could not go home. At that point temporary protection was lifted because it was no longer temporary, but there was no permanent alternative and it's a small number of people, but in the context of larger numbers, it's a major weakness in our frameworks.

Our organizational frameworks are, also, unsettled in terms of addressing these issues. Again, they're very clear for refugees and stateless persons. UN High Commissioner of Refugees has clear authority and mandate in that area evolving for internally displaced with, for example, at the international level, the cluster approach for dealing with humanitarian emergencies, but, still, quite unsettled in terms of responsibilities for those displaced by natural disasters as compared to protection for those displaced by conflict and still weaker for the international migration. The international organization for migration, perhaps, has the clearest role on these issues, but is not part of the United Nations and, largely, has a service role in relationship to governments – very important, but not at the stage or equivalent to UNHCR's role with regard to refugees.

So, quickly, given this state where should the debate be going in the future. And I really do welcome the fact that the Security Council is taking up these issues and moving them forward. The first is how migration fits into adaptation, disaster risk reduction and conflict resolution. Dealing with migration ahead of time is certainly better than dealing with it on an emergency basis. There are programs within the adaptation or disaster risk reduction frameworks that could be helping more people stay in situ, on site when they are affected by the processes of climate change. But, I think, it's very important that we begin to recognize that migration is itself an adaptation strategy and, actually, a very, very positive one for millions of people who can find better livelihoods, better security, better safety if they are able to move. And, again, as I said, it's the people who can't move who will often be the ones that are greatest risk and greatest concern.

We need much more investment in technical assistance for the countries where this process will unfold, whether it's in terms of internal migration or immediate cross border migration, particularly in

developing countries that will be faced with the bulk of the movements. And that's technical assistance in terms of thinking through their adaptation strategies and how migration fits in, but, also, for developing policy and organizational frameworks for addressing movements that occur.

I'm a scholar so it's not surprising that my recommendation is that we need more research, but, of course, we do need to understand better all of these complicated patterns of mobility. Not to take this issue as one of such global scope that it becomes impossible to really think about what are the hot spots? What are the specific places and regions and corridors for migration that will be most effective? Who are the likely communities of origin? What are the likely communities and countries of destination?

We need to move much more quickly towards developing normative and legal frameworks for addressing these movements. I, for one, do not believe that that means moving towards a new convention. I think that, at this point, that would be a counterproductive waste of time and energy. What we need to do is see what in existing human rights law, humanitarian law, refugee law by analogy applies, what can we draw from the guiding principles on internal displacement and we need to be identifying effective practices that do exist throughout the world and bringing those to the attention of governments and international organizations that will be tasked with dealing with these issues.

And, finally, I think, we need to be moving much further along than we are today in building the networks of intergovernmental cooperation and consultation with regard to addressing what is a transnational issue. It's transnational because of the environmental factors that don't know borders, but it's also transnational, of course, because the impact is on the movements of people, not only internally, but, also, potentially internationally, as well. Thank you.

**Hoge:** Thank you, Susan. That set the table very well. I also like the call for action at the very end. And now, we'll turn to Udo Janz.

**Mr. Udo Janz:** Thank you to the IPI and to the missions of Portugal and Germany for organizing this important policy forum and for inviting UNHCR to contribute to our deliberations. In fact, I think, Susan has actually, not only, laid out the topic with all its multifaceted angles. We could all go home now and – or engage in a direct debate with her. Thank you also for the various references you made to UNHCR and its mandate and the search to become a more predictable partner in the international response to the new phenomenon as we see it unfolding.

As you know, 2011 is an important year for the protection of refugees and stateless person as this marks our important anniversaries both the sixtieth anniversary of the Refugee Convention as well as the fiftieth anniversary of the Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons and, last but not least, this month also marks the 150$^{th}$ anniversary of the birth of Fridtjof Nansen, the League of Nations' first High Commissioner for Refugees.

Nansen was not only a committed humanitarian but, also, an extreme adventurer who ventured into lands of extreme climatic conditions. It is fitting that we should gather to discuss the linkages between climate change and migration in a year of such significance. This is because displacement is increasingly due not to conflict, but to natural disasters, climate change and environmental degradation, but

in an increasingly complex international environment it is becoming harder and harder to find solutions for the world's more than 43 million refugees internally displaced and stateless people. Natural disasters already take an annual toll on societies around the world destroying property, threatening and taking lives and disrupting national economies. Any additional disasters arising from climate change will only make matters worse.

The scientific consensus backed up by the research published to date shows that climate change is having and is progressively going to have severe negative impacts. Both slow and sudden onset disasters threaten human development in the region and risk forcibly displacing large numbers of people. At the same time it has become increasingly clear that natural disasters and climate change cannot be regarded or addressed in isolation from other global megatrends that are conditioning the future of our planet and its people, be it population growth, urbanization, water scarcity, food and energy insecurity and volatile commodity prices.

There's a growing evidence to suggest that natural disasters are growing in frequency and in intensity linked to the longer term process of climate change. With it the potential for increased resources, competition grows and, as a result, we are likely to go to see growing numbers of people being displaced from community, country or even continent. Those affected by displacement risk serious impoverishment, loss of land, loss of jobs, loss of housing, economic and social marginalization, health risks, food insecurity, loss of access to common property resources and community fragmentation.

And, yet, while growing numbers of people may be obliged to abandon their homes and move elsewhere, under current international law there is no special treatment accorded to those displaced when they relocate outside their national borders. Many of those displaced, as you know, will not qualify for refugee status under the terms of the 1951 Convention, but will rather be considered by receiving government as economic migrants.

Quite often what we see as a result of climate and use displacement and, certainly, that would be the case in Darfur, is the heightening of ethnic, racial and religious tensions and violent conflict as a result of those who have been displaced by environmental factors moving into areas inhabited by others whom they then begin to compete with for resources. Conflict, in turn, drives further displacement and where displacement, whether cross border or internal, is triggered by conflict, UNHCR's mandate is often triggered in tandem. There starts an important, though, subtle, and, perhaps, nuanced nexus between environmental push factors for displacement and UNHCR's mandate.

Hence, given UNHCR's core mandate responsibilities, our entry point, where we provide protection and solutions to people displaced externally, as the term used by Ambassador Berger. A term also used in the background document for the Nansen Conference on Climate Change and Displacement in the 21st Century held in Oslo earlier this year to refer to the phenomenon of cross border movements, it is UNHCR's entry point into the debate rather than the migration angle to the discussion. It is for this reason that UNHCR remains convinced of the need to develop a more coherent and a consistent approach to anticipate and address the needs for protection and solution for climate induced displacement.

The outcome of the Nansen conference will feed into several ongoing international policy processes including our own anniversaries and the upcoming ministerial level meeting convened by UNHCR in December in Geneva. In relation to climate change, UNHCR is an active member of the UN inter-agency standing committee where we contribute to the collective work alongside IOM, the IFRC, the Red Cross and the Norwegian Refugee Council to mention some and many others to develop a better understanding of the likely impacts of climate change on human mobility, the typologies of movements and the applicable legal frameworks.

This year, for example, IOM and UNHCR sponsored a number of expert discussions that respectively examined climate change, environmental degradation and migration and climate change and displacement. In addition, as part of the commemorative events this year UNHCR hosted an expert meeting in Bellagio in Italy in February of this year where we examined the complex inter-linkages between displacement and climate change. Much work has, therefore, been done to date in relation to looking at response and protection strategies and, more specifically, exploring how to fill so called gaps in the legal framework to protect people displaced by climate related events. But let's be sure about it, there is still much more work to be done.

I have been asked, specifically, to focus today on the effects of desertification and drought in Africa as well as the effects of sea level rises on the populations of small low-lying island states and will conclude with some recommendations for the future.

In Africa, drought and desertification are at the core of serious challenges and threats facing sustainable development. These problems have far reaching, adverse impacts on human health, food security, economic activity, physical infrastructure, natural resources and the environment and national and international peace and security.

It is common knowledge that land degradation and desertification constitute major forces – major causes of force human migration and climate-induced displacement, violent conflicts caused by increased competition over dwindling natural resources, food insecurity and starvation and destruction of critical habitats and the loss of biological diversity as well as socioeconomic instability and rising poverty. Africa is especially vulnerable to impacts of drought and desertification because of widespread poverty, large scale dependence on climate sensitive sectors, mainly rain-fed agriculture, poor infrastructure, heavy disease burdens on livestock, high dependence and unsustainable exploitation of natural resources and numerous conflicts. As a result of frequent droughts and desertification, Africa has continued to witness food insecurity, including devastating famines, water scarcity, poor health, economic hardship and social and political unrest.

Two-thirds of Africa is classified as desert or dry land. They are concentrated in the Sahara region of northern Africa and the Kalahari in the south. Desertification, especially around the Sahara, has been pointed out as one of the potent symbols in Africa of the global environmental crisis. It is predicted that climate change will increase the area susceptible to drought, land degradation and desertification in the region, as well as, exacerbate the effects. Under a range of climate scenarios it is projected that there will be an increase of five to eight percent of arid and semi-arid lands in Africa resulting in less

arable land, less water resources and, hence, less agricultural productivity.

Desertification is displacing large populations of people and forcing them to leave their homes and lands in search of better livelihoods. Desertification and drought related migration takes many forms; the majority occurring as internal migration. At greatest risk is the population at the lower end of the socioeconomic spectrum, both in the developed and developing regions. In developing regions the poorest inhabitants are often forced to live on marginal land outside urban areas or coastal zones, potentially prone to desertification. Migration is often a coping mechanism with little scope in finding permanent residence elsewhere. Availability of natural resources, for example, prompt pastoralists along the borders of Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda to migrate from areas of dwindling resources, thereby raising competition over finite resources with incidence of conflict increasing when these individuals move into areas of crop growing communities.

To understand the nexus between the effects of desertification and drought and displacement and analysis of the conflict in Darfur illustrates the clear linkage. In Darfur, as in other parts of Africa, long term decreased rainfall has left a crippling drought resulting in loss of agricultural production, loss of crop yields and loss of livestock. As a result, frequent migration of populations to areas less affected have ensued. Since the mid-1980s this region has been subject to violent conflicts between its inhabitants over access to land and water. Disputes generated by competition to access these resources quickly degenerated into violent conflict between herders and farmers as competition for meager resources causes tensions.

The gravity of severe drought and desertification over a prolonged period on population movements is, again, illustrated in the situation in Somalia, which has resulted in massive population displacement in the Horn of Africa. With drought spreading to almost all regions of Somalia, it has become a major cause of displacement. Its capital, Mogadishu, has already experienced an increased influx of drought-affected pastoralists despite the precarious security situation prevailing there. Whilst migration of people and livestock is not unusual during the dry season, this appears to be the first time that pastoralists and their livestock have migrated to the capital.

As livestock are dying in their thousands, with families losing everything, the drought has forced many pastoralists into camps for the displaced. This, alone, portrays the severity of the drought situation in the country. In the region, women and children, in particular, bear the greatest burden when land resources are degraded and when droughts set in. Children have been forced out of school as both human and livestock diseases spread and women have been forced to abandon the protection of their husbands, who often stay behind to tend whatever livestock remains, and place themselves, thereby, at great risk of sexual and gender-based violence as they make the unaccompanied trek to water, sometimes requiring them to walk for days on end.

To give you a picture of the displacement caused as a result of the drought in Somalia, between December last year and March this year, more than 52,000 people were displaced; many of them moving to urban areas in search of assistance. In total, since early this year, hundreds of thousands of Somalis have sought refuge in neighboring countries, mostly in Kenya, Ethiopia and Yemen. For example, Dadaab Camp in Kenya, now the world's largest refugee complex,

has this year, alone, received over 190,000 Somalis fleeing famine and insecurity.

Within Somalia since August 92,000 internal displacements have so far been recorded. While conflict has been a fact of life for Somalis for years, it is the drought that has taken them to the breaking point forcing many to walk for weeks on end to reach security, food and water. Stories of children dying along the way and mothers having to abandon them are common.

But the effects of drought are not unique to Somalia. Across the Horn of Africa an estimated 10 million people are facing a severe food crisis following a prolonged drought in the region with child malnutrition rates in some areas twice the emergency threshold amid high food prices that have left families desperate.

And beyond Africa, across the world, 150 million people live in cities with significant water shortages. As climate change exacerbates water shortages in those areas, the impetus for human migration and forced displacement is increased.

The effects from sea level rise on the population in the small low-lying island states in the Pacific present one of the most dramatic scenarios of the impact of climate change. The entire populations of low-lying states such as the Maldives, Tuvalu, Kiribati and the Marshall Islands may in the future be obliged to leave their countries as a result of climate change. This is not simply about islands suddenly disappearing. Well before that occurs, continued salination of otherwise arable land as a result of ocean tides rising is likely to force many people to move to places where they can grow food. Hence, it is likely that areas and countries will become uninhabitable long before they are submerged.

We're talking about twenty-two countries in the Pacific and territories with a combined population of approximately 9.2 million people. The plight of those people living in small and low-lying islands, whose livelihoods, culture and identity are threatened by rising sea levels, presents situations quite different from the situations of statelessness which have confronted us in the past. Whilst it has been noted that there is a general presumption of continuity of statehood and international legal personality under international law, and, hence, statehood is not lost automatically with a loss of habitable territory, nor is it necessarily affected by population movements. Nonetheless there are profound humanitarian and protection issues that will have to be addressed and we will all – we would all be advised to examine policy, legal, operational, humanitarian and resource responses in advance of this happening.

It is a particularly complex area, as Susan has already outlined, which is likely to require numerous strategies and responses. These may include adaptation measures such as planned relocation and/or migration, which may entail the mobilization of relevant regional and international organizations, arrangements and resources. The planned relocation, however, of whole populations or communities may, in some cases, be necessary. Any relocation plans need to ensure the enjoyment of the full range of relevant rights and a secure status for those relocated. In particular, individuals ought to have access to information about the reasons and procedures for their movement and, where applicable, on compensation and relocation. They have a right to participate in the planning and management of any planned movements and to enjoy their rights to life, dignity, liberty and security of person. Additionally, the needs and interests of host

communities need to be respected and carefully balanced in this process.

What can we do? At the Bellagio conference in February it was suggested that international organizations including, in particular, the UN can play critical roles in assisting affected states to develop efficient and effective assistance mechanisms. But states themselves, are also in a key position to become more proactive. I will outline some of the actions agreed in Bellagio to help prevent and manage future climate change induced displacement.

First, we must increase resilience and capacity for adaption of communities in areas prone to disasters and environmental change-related climate change and develop management measures to reduce vulnerability. There is growing certainty that developing nations and the most vulnerable communities and populations within them will be the worst affected. Development interventions to support resilience are, therefore, essential. Disaster risk reduction and adaptation measures can limit the scale and negative impact of climate change. Such measures should be guided by a comprehensive climate risk management approach. Without effective climate change mitigation measures, however, adaptation may no longer be feasible.

The example of Bangladesh is a model for us for implementation of adaptation measures to illustrate. Although cyclones and their associated storm surges have been wreaking havoc on Bangladesh for thousands of years, an ongoing program of cyclone shelter construction in Bangladesh has given hope to the region while saving lives with every storm.

Secondly, we need to look at the frameworks for managing climate induced migration. Here, Chaloka Beyani, the UN Special Rapporteur on internally displaced persons and his predecessor, Professor Walter Kälin, have on several previous occasions elaborated on the human rights dimension of climate displacement, particularly as they relate to IDPs. The UNHCR agrees that the guiding principles of internal displacement provide a sound, basic framework for protecting those displaced within the borders of the their own countries as a result of climate-related events. It is important, nevertheless, that states operationalize the guiding principles domestically through appropriate laws, policies and institutions.

Thirdly, regional agreements may also be necessary and mentioned here, too, Susan Martin already referred to, to the African Union which has gone a step further than the guiding principles and, instead, devised a binding international treaty for protection and assistance of internally displaced persons if and when it comes into force. The Kampala Convention is based on the guiding principles and specifically includes within its protection scope individuals displaced by natural disasters.

Fourthly, the so-called Nansen principles, formulated during the Nansen Conference on Climate Change and Displacement in Oslo in June this year, are designed to guide responses to climate related displacement. Building upon Nansen's legacy, the ten Nansen principles were recommended to guide responses to some of the urgent and complex challenges raised by displacement in the context of climate change and other environmental hazards. One of the most significant achievements of the conference was the recognition of the need for a more coherent and consistent approach to protest people

displaced externally owing to sudden onset disasters and for states working in conjunction with HCR and other relevant stakeholders to develop a guiding framework or instrument.

In addition, the chairperson's summary of the conference also rejected the terminology of climate or environmental refugees as being misleading and legally inaccurate. She suggested, instead, referring to environmentally displaced persons.

In conclusion, climate change is shifting the environmental baseline of various regions around the world, hence the need for adaptive mechanisms to cope with the dynamics of those shifting baselines. It will be fundamentally important in the coming period to ensure that the international protection regime is not only strengthened in areas where it is still, but, also, that it is made flexible enough to accommodate the new challenges of displacement. Solutions will need to be informed by both development and humanitarian policies and actors requiring joint and coordinated planning between them. The international community, too, needs to up its collective response to adapt to climate change and to better manage natural disasters. Thank you for your attention.

**Hoge:** Udo, thank you for that and we're going to move quickly on to Michele Klein Solomon.

**Michele Klein Solomon:** Thank you very much, Walter, and thank you to IPI for the opportunity to be here with you today. Susan and Udo have covered a lot of ground and I'm going to leave aside my prepared remarks because I know you're anxious to get to questions and response.

Let me just call attention to a few markers. A little bit about the role of IOM and a bit about some numbers that Susan was reticent to give and I normally am, too, but I do want to give you a sense of the magnitude that we're talking about here.

Markers – Susan said that this is not a new discussion. That's certainly true. In 1990 the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change said that one of the gravest effects of climate change, already in 1990, was likely to be the effects on the movement of people. So this is not a new concern, but it is certainly a greater concern today for all the reasons that Susan and Udo gave you. And one of the key messages that I want to leave you with is it's now time to really act on this issue. There's no more time to prepare. It's time to act on this issue.

Now, numbers a little bit. Susan is absolutely right that in the migration community, we are really reticent to offer numbers.Mostly, in the first instance, because we don't have good numbers. They're speculations. We do know, according to UN figures that there are 214 million international migrants in the world today. The number's probably higher than that because that does not capture all undocumented or irregular migrants. The projections for movement as a result of environmental degradation exacerbated by climate change vary widely, but the number that most people focus on, and Susan can certainly argue with this – she knows where it comes from – is 200 million people by 2050. So you look at the existing number of international migrants today of 214 million. Imagine another 200 million people moving as a result of environmental degradation over the course of the next thirty years. We're talking about significant magnitude, but the majority of those people, as Susan has stressed, are likely to move internally. And so it does not raise the same issues as international migration, overall.

The situations in which people move were very nicely topographied by Susan and I won't go into that again – the four types of movement that she talked about, both sudden onset and slower onset. And the majority, again, being internal. The situations, whether it be desertification or sea level rise as a result of climate change are also under study. What we need to look at, now, is being clear that those situations pose different challenges and, therefore, the responses will need to be different. I think it's very important that we not focus on a one-size-fits-all solution because the situation of the small island developing states is going to be very different than the situation of the countries in the Sahel. Whether the migration is internal or external, temporary or permanent, forced or not forced, and, I think, Susan, you did a very nice job of talking about is something forced when it takes place over a long period of time and the factors leading to the movement may include judgments based on livelihood, economic opportunities; it's very hard to segregate the environmental factor as a sole causal factor. And, certainly, even harder with respect to climate change is exacerbating environmental degradation.

So those definitional questions and trying to create a separate category of persons who are displaced as a result of climate change make it very difficult and, in fact, may be misleading because they – if you end up focusing on those definitional aspects, you're not focusing as much on the actual situations on the ground they're playing out and what the needs of the people are. So I'd really caution – be weary of getting into finely parsing the definitional aspects and, instead, focus on what the needs are – what the situations are.

And so let me now just finish with a bit about IOM's role in this regard. You know, International Organization for Migration is made up of 132 member states. That will be at least 145 by the end of this year. In the constitution of the organization, which is ratified by all the member states, there is an authorization mandate to work on displacement, migration, people who are moving and in need of migration assistance. So the possibility of working on behalf of persons displaced for environmental reasons is already in the constitution. And, in fact, we asked ourselves a few years ago, when we started to focus on this a little bit more, how many of IOM's existing programs are actually oriented to situations of environmental degradation exacerbated by climate change? And we did a review for our field offices and found that in the last ten years more than 500 projects were probably related to environmental factors; much more so than conflict-related factors. And we see that trend increasing.

What we do in IOM in this area is three pronged. One, is the research and, I think, that the most important thing to be doing now is really developing the evidence base. I've left in the back of the room—and I won't go into any detail—the most recent publications – a flyer with the most recent publications from IOM. Some of them are country specific studies. Some are more global including a volume that came out in 2009 called "Assessing the Evidence" that Susan and others contributed to in a very fundamental way that look at all the different situations and some of those global trends.

The second thing, and this echoes a message that both Susan and Udo delivered, is the need for linking up dialogues. And here it's both getting the climate change scientists together with the migration managers, but, also, getting the security related folks together with the political and development oriented people together. Susan is right. These communities have not historically spoken to one another and it's taken a long time to understand each other's language. I

mean we participated in some of the UNFCCC discussions and assist delegates who are interested in integrating migration and displacement related factors into the Kyoto Protocol discussions and it took several years to be able to find terminology that works so that we know what we're each talking about – adaptation – and seeing migration as an adaptation strategy and not simply a survival strategy; understanding that displacement and relocation are equally factors that are going to be involved in the calculus here.

So bringing people together and including – I mean that at the national level looking at how to integrate migration and climate change into national adaptation plans of action for – with respect to climate change; also, into poverty reduction strategy papers because, obviously, there's a very direct link between the movement of people related to climate change and achievement of development objectives for countries.

At the international level, what that means is within the IASC framework, the humanitarian response mechanisms pulling together the different agencies. And, of course, as Udo said, we work very closely in that context, as well with the rest of our IASC partners and looking at the practical responses that can be generated and continuing work in the Cancun Adaptation Framework context and beyond that. We really would like to thank both the governments of Germany and Portugal for introducing this discussion here in New York in the context of the Security Council and security-related concerns, including human security related concerns.

The last point that I'd like to make is to stress one of the points that Susan made, which is it's important to look at migration not only as a survival strategy, that what you turn to as a last resort, but, also, as an affirmative adaptation strategy. Sometimes the best thing that people can do is to plan ahead in and prepare for movement. And, ideally, of course, that's done in a legal way, through adequate legal channels that are worked out, whether on a bilateral basis, on a regional basis or on a more global basis. And let me tell you that's already happening in some cases.

I'll cite specifically the instance of in Colombia and Spain there's an example of a wonderful bilateral labor migration agreement that is specifically targeted to areas that are very weak in terms of environmental degradation and looking at possibilities for labor migration to areas of Spain to work primarily in agriculture, relieve pressure on fragile ecosystems in Colombia, allow people to go out and earn money that they send back to their home communities to help build the resilience of those communities. That's a small program, but it's a very interesting one to look at.

Similarly, and I'm sure some of you are aware of this, as well, with respect to some of the small island developing states, and, particularly, those that are most at risk possibilities for regional measures to relocate populations when it becomes necessary or to create preferential tracks for persons from the small island states into, for example, Australia or New Zealand. And those discussions are already underway. So, specifically, targeted, legal, planned, appropriate migration strategies that are in the interest both of the persons who are migrating as well as the societies which are affected. So let me stop there because I know you all have lots of questions and thank you very much for the opportunity to be with you today.

**Hoge:** Michele, thank you. All three of those presentations have answered a lot of questions, but, I know, that all three speakers are very eager to hear what your questions are and what your comments are. So if you would raise your hand, I will call upon you. And, excellent, in the second row here, if you would introduce yourself, please, and since we are webcasting, you have to hold that microphone very close to your mouth.

**Ambassador Daffa-Alla Elhag Ali Osman:** My name is Osman, I'm the ambassador of Sudan to the United Nations. I would like to thank the IPI for organizing this important workshop, equally the panelists for their useful information and for Portugal and Germany for organizing such discussions in the Security Council last July and the one which Portugal is intending to organize next month..

I am from a region which is affected very much by climate change and we have heard twice, maybe thrice, during this discussion or presentation that a region in my country, Darfur, is affected very much by climate change. As Dr. Susan talked about the three categories of climate change: floods, hurricanes and desiccation, we are affected very much by drought and desiccation in my country and in the region of the Horn of Africa.

The conflict in Darfur started when two waves of drought hit the region in early 1980. And that disrupted the economic activities of the people living in the region. They were mainly herders and farmers and when drought took place that impacted negatively on the economic activities in the region. I would like to share with you that we have a saying in Sudan in the rural areas which says that a herder can tolerate seeing one of his loved ones dying, but he cannot tolerate seeing one of his cattle die. So you can imagine, you know, the severity of the impact of climate change on herders who started to suffer from the scarcity of water. That was the root cause in Darfur, but, unfortunately, at a later stage, political opponents to the federal government exploited the situation and continued in the direction of military action which has affected very much the Darfur region. I just mentioned this to emphasize that drought, desiccation is not only a security threat, it is an economic threat, it's a social threat which affects the social fabric in the region where it hits.

The conflict in Darfur is not ethnical, it's not religious, it is because of drought and desiccation, as I said. In the Horn of Africa Sudan has been also affected by migration. Migration, it could be cross border and it could be internal when people are displaced within their own country, but we have received waves of refugees from Eritrea, from Somalia, from Ethiopia when, again, drought and desiccation hit that region and we still receive quite a bit of number of refugees in Sudan.

I would conclude by saying, here the challenge is, at the United Nations, is it an organ which will address this phenomenon or does it entail that a coordination and collaboration of a number of organs of the United Nations, since we all agree there are security aspects, there are economic aspects and social aspects. And I thank you for allowing me to participate in such an important workshop.

**Hoge:** Ambassador, thank you very much. Panelists, I'm going to collect a few more questions and then let you answer them all at once. I think I saw Ambassador Puri.

**Ambassador Manjeev Singh Puri:** Thank you very much and I really want to thank IPI and I want to thank the ambassadors of Portugal and Germany and, of course, all the panelists.

Professor Susan Martin you were particularly wonderful. I like the big sketch that you did and thank you very much for telling people that there's actually a great paucity of research on the matter. And, also, if you don't mind my pulling out or cherry picking something that you said. That, you know, interventionism, that's a waste of time at this point of time, thank you very much.

Let me just make a few big broad brush comments because, what I see here in this big discussion on climate change, migration, international peace and security is some kind of a – what should I say – broad brush attempt to somehow drag this whole thing into this fear, under the mandate of the Security Council.

See, climate change is one of the biggest issues confronting humankind today and we all need to address it with the maximum amount that we can possibly do. I come from a country in the region which is the most vulnerable. Believe me, not only with us, the small island states, which are referred to, etc.. These are not places where there's conflict which is happening or governance deficit, etc. Wed need to address climate change and what we need to do to cause huge amount of international collaboration. I think science has a massive amount to do. It can certainly help.

Let's remember, migration has been the oldest tool to address poverty and a better life for yourself. And I dare say much of migration over time has happened because of environmental reasons. I think we are seeing, of course, an exacerbation of that situation.

Let's also remember the poor are generally enfeebled. They are not the principle source of conflict fighting over scarce resources. They too enfeebled. Big conflicts arise because there are very big fish wanting to go over the resources which are available usually on the lands of the poor. Thank you Professor Susan for nodding when I said this.

I really think that our debateshere, need to focus on an issue which is where there's a big blank at the United Nations. And this area is that of migration. This is the big area. If climate change allows us a certain amount of entre into getting into this area, so be it. But the area of migration and the question of managed migrations, the question of legal frameworks for migration – let's remember that despite the population explosion that we've seen, the total land area of planet Earth is sufficient to take people. There are vast tracts of the planet which, if they started growing strawberries tomorrow, there could be lots of people from the places where earlier strawberries used to grow or wheat or corn or whatever used to grow can go across there. Tough call. Very tough call. In history, it's been a very tough call. But let us work towards what we can do in a collaborative sense and work towards collaboration. I don't think scare mongering is a particularly good idea or pushing it towards the direction of looking at conflicts, etc. Let's try to focus on collaboration. Thank you, very much, Warren.

**Hoge:** Thank you. Did I see another hand? Here in the second row.

**Maria Teresa Pessôa:** Thank you very much and thank you Portugal and Germany for organizing this very interesting debate. As the ambassador of Sudan said, this is primarily a question of sustainable development. And I will pick up on a point that Dr. Martin made about the severity of responses depending upon the availability of resources. And she also said that, at this point, although, it's necessary to look at the normative and

legal framework, the drawing of a convention would be, in her view, counterproductive. And I would like to, if possible, ask her to elaborate a bit on this point. Thank you.

**Hoge:** Could I just ask you to identify yourself for the sake of the audience?

**Pessôa:** Maria Teresa Pessôa, Minister Counselor for the Mission of Brazil to the UN.

**Hoge:** Thank you very much. Okay, we'll take two more here and then Tete Antonio here in the second row.

**Ambassador Antonio Pedro Monteiro Lima:** Thank you very much and thank you to Portugal and Germany for organizing this with IPI and thank you also to the panelists.

I am the ambassador of Cape Verde to the United Nations, a small island developing state. And when a small island developing state hears this kind of discussion, of course, it is very useful. And, of course, it is something we need to understand better what is going on in the world. But when you think about that, some of our countries – small island developing states – at this moment, some of the fathers or mothers, what they say for the future to their children. They don't say, 'we are going to try to put you in architecture in London' or 'make you a doctor in medicine in the United States.' They just say to them, 'your future is to be relocated in another country.' And this is the difference. Small island countries are not only people to be relocated. And for some of them in the Pacific, it is very original cultures of humanity. And it is not like a ship.. It is not. It is something, that sometimes when we study this, we think about migration like relocation and like giving more water or more needs for some countries, but in the case of Pacific islands they are going to lose everything they knew, everything they know. It is very difficult and I think that the real question is how to help these countries not to disappear.

Some time ago, I was talking to a scientist and I was asking him why you scientists don't say to the governments that 1.5 degrees Celsius is the limit not to go above for all the governments in the world because we, the small island developing states, we are going to disappear. We are going to disappear. So it is a question of urgency and it is a question, also, to take the correct and the decisive decisions in the negotiations. We cannot go further than 1.5 and we are discussing below two degrees Celsius and we know that, actually, it is about three degrees. And we are going to four degrees Celsius. That means that the islands are going to be completely off the map in the next century. This is the question.

And so sometimes, I ask myself about the seriousness of some discussions because when we see some countries saying that there is no need for second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. For us it is, like, you oblige us to go directly under the sea immediately. We don't need to wait for the the increase of the sea level rise. It is just to kill us.

And so I ask the panelists to tell me what is the solution? Is it only to ask Australia and New Zealand and other countries to relocate the people of the small island countries? They are not part of humanity already? So this is the question. Are they part of humanity? If they are part of humanity, we should take care of them immediately because they are going to drown. They are going to sink in the sea. And so this was my question, thank you, very much.

**Hoge:** Thank you that very challenging question. Tete Antonio, the last question and then I'll ask the panelists to respond to all the questions.

**Tete Antonio:** Yes, I think I will have some more comments than questions. Maybe at the end I will have a question. First, thanks to the panelists for making references to instruments developed by the African Union on this question of displacement and the requests by the African Union of an instrument on the displaced people. And thank you Warren Hoge for starting with Lake Chad.

Actually Lake Chad can be considered a laboratory of climate change for many reasons. With the situation of Lake Chad you have first, a shift of activity of people involved in Lake Chad from fisherman to agriculture. And the attraction of populations of, not necessarily from Chad, or even from the neighboring countries, to the favorable conditions of the desertification Lake Chad is bringing for agriculture. So you have also people not only affected by desertification somewhere else, but people attracted by the good conditions of agriculture in Lake Chad. So the shift of activity and displacement of population, let's say is very multi-facial. Thank you, also, for making reference to the situation in Somalia. I hope the experts as well as our friends from the Security Council will look at the shift in the mandate of the peacekeeping operations once involved in UNOSOM. In the case of Somalia you had UNOSOM which was not there for, let's say, distribution of humanitarian assistance but which had to shift its mandate from peacekeeping – specifically saying to not only to the distribution of humanitarian assistance, but, also, to the protection of humanitarian workers. So, I think those are some of the aspects our friends,experts, as well as most involved with Security Council may look at it.

One of the aspects I would like to find from the panelists – we know the consequences for Africa of drought, of desertification, of climate change. We know them very well as described by many of you. You have touched on the impact of climate change in Africa on the developed world only talking about migration of Africans to the developed world. Can you say something about the economic impact, as Africa is a continent endowed by raw materials and many, many, companies are involved in the exploitation of raw materials. Let me just give an example. Let's say in country A, you explored uranium. So the immediate social impact is that the worker of your company involved in the exploration of uranium in that country was feeding maybe, typically you have to feed more than ten or 15 people. So you have a direct impact even in the life of this worker. So it also has impact in the productivity itself. I can go further and further on the consequences that it may have in the – let's say – not only in Africa but, also, elsewhere as a consequence of climate change. Thank you.

**Hoge:** Tete, thank you. I'm going to ask you to stop there because there are at least two Security Council ambassadors in the room who have to be back at the council by 3:00. So Susan and Udo and Michele, in the same order you spoke originally, if you could take those questions and make some brief comments, I'd be grateful.

**Martin:** Thank you. These were extremely good comments and thank you very much for all of them and for the – I think that anyone listening to the perspectives that were offered can't help but walk away from this meeting understanding the complexities that, I think, all three of us were trying to capture. The most direction question to me was with regard to a convention and it's exactly that complexity which is so

difficult to capture in the form of a convention. I think that the concern about it being counterproductive is that it would lose the nuances of these different contexts, different forms of migration, different issues that need to be addressed and that we, in effect, as we heard from the ambassador from Cape Verde, we don't have the time in one respect to spend negotiating the terms of a convention that might never actually be ratified and come into force in the timeframe –we know from the experience with the Convention on the Rights of Migrant Workers that it still has not been – it's in force but it's still not been ratified by any major destination country of migrants.

In my view, to go through that same process in this context would either to be to simplify the issues down to being irrelevant or have a very nice piece of paper that never really is implemented. I think we are much better off working from the ground up on the situations that are unfolding already and will likely go ahead. And I think we need to work simultaneously continuing on mitigation. I think that our discussion of migration and adaptation is not a substitute for really still very, very serious attention to the issues that need to be addressed to mitigate the effects of climate change.

At the same time, to not take into account the needs of people who will be affected and are already being affected, I think, is to ignore the human aspects of these processes. So we have to simultaneously work on a lot of different fronts.

I think we need to have conflict resolution procedures in place that mean that when the tensions do arise over the competition over resources or the communal difficulties in addressing changing environmental circumstances, we need to be able to address those in a way that won't result in intensification of conflict on that. And we need to work, at the same time, on the legal frameworks of destination countries putting the things like the African Union convention into practice.

So there are just so many things to do that putting all of one's focus right now on a convention, I think, will take away from the practical issues that need to be addressed now, not at some time in the very distant future.

**Janz:** Thank you, Warren, just three brief points. One is an article that I read over the weekend in the *New York Times* on the seven billion question and the demographic change of the globe, which pointed to, perhaps, the fallacy of the Malthusian argument that we can't adapt and cope. We have over the years and we will in the future. So, I think, we don't find, necessarily, the explanation in the analysis of global demographic trends.

What we do see, however, and, I think, arguably, the new instrument – the question that you raised – I would share the pessimism or the futility, perhaps, even of such an exercise at this time and point, but, I believe, what is at the core of the High Commissioner's interest is to make any response to future climate-induced displacement more predictable so that we can find, together, with other development actors, humanitarian actors and governments an adequate response to the situation as it might evolve.

And, thirdly, that is not an abstract question for the future. It is already with us. Who is to say that large numbers of migrants crossing, for example, the Mediterranean, landing in Italy are ultimately driven by environmental reasons or by classic refugee protection reasons?

I believe there is a clear tendency that the drivers have to be seen in a cumulative way. Michele pointed out the difficulties of isolating clear environmental drivers in what makes people ultimately to take the decision. I have no doubt in my mind from what I see on the shores of Yemen, on the shores of Italy, you know, people coming across into the Dadaab Complex, the world's largest refugee camp, that environmental drivers play an increasingly important role. The scientists may be out there still debating that, but it will clearly be a phenomenon that we have to become accustom to live with.

Finally, my intention of raising the legal aspects of statelessness associated with the notion of disappearing island states is not one to cause alarm because I really believe the issue is also with us already. Many of those small island states have half of the population already working outside of the islands in the region and beyond. But it is the legal question that we will have to face and address whether or not statelessness is, in fact, linked to territorial existence or is it not? What are the issues that we need to grapple with in the future? Can somebody retain his or her nationality even though they are permanent residents in another country for a territory that no longer exists? I think these are the fundamental questions that we will have to address in the future because they haven't been addressed in the past. Thank you.

**Solomon:** Thank you very much. And thanks to all of you for your very insightful questions and comments. I have three points to make, also, in response.

First, on the evidence base – thank you ambassador, you're absolutely right. We need to do more and I meant to mention to you that there is more being done. Some of you may have seen this report which was released just at the end of last week. This was put out by the UK's chief scientific adviser. It's quite an interesting study and I commend to you, at a minimum, the executive summary, maybe not necessarily all 350 pages. But it's called "*Migration and Global Environmental Change*." It was released last week by Sir John Beddington, the chief UK scientific adviser. And it analyzes a lot of these questions.

Also, in the research area, and you'll see in the materials that are left in the back, IOM launched a climate change environmental migration alliance together withUN University and many of the academics in this area meant to expand that evidentiary base. And we would welcome partnering up with any of your governments and your institutions in doing so. There's a lot more to be done in this area.

Secondly, it's not just the research, obviously, as the ambassador from Cape Verde said, it's now. It's absolutely now. And it's particularly now for those governments that are facing this, whether internally or externally, and it's an existential question. What we need to do is not simply plan for relocation. I completely agree with you, but enhance the capacities or your governments in the first instance to make life possible – safe life possible at home. It's only migration when that's no longer possible or, in the context of an adaptation strategy, as I said, to try to relieve pressure on sensitive ecosystems – try to build resiliency with skills and resources that you can gather from abroad. Make it possible in the first instance for you to stay home and to continue life. And I do agree with you that that has to be a priority area of attention in the context of the post-Kyoto discussions.

But we, in the international community need to be prepared, even when we're talking about internal migration, to be able to respond to requests from governments to help with building your capacities. And that's not just relevant for the developing countries. Japan asked for assistance in the response to the terrible devastation that they faced this year. If there is a government that is well prepared it was the Japanese government, but we all saw how inadequate that was in the face of terrible disasters and where the international community has to be ready to offer assistance when requested. But, of course, those needs are more pressing when it's less developed countries with less resilience, as Susan said.

Let me come back, finally, to the provocative point, from my perspective, and welcomed-so, from permanent representative of India about the need to look at bringing migration into the United Nations. IOM, as you know, is the principle into governmental organization for migration. It's outside of the UN system for historical reasons that are no longer relevant. Whether IOM is brought into the UN or not I'm not going to opine on. That's a question for governments – the member states of IOM in the first instance, the member states of the UN to opine on and take up. But, even more importantly and more urgently, is the need to integrate migration-related considerations into the deliberations of the UN. So looking at, for example, the MDGs say nothing about migration, but it's very clear that, as you said, one of the most significant and age-old poverty-reduction strategies is migration. And if you look at remittances and the $350 billion that are going back to developing countries alone every year – that certainly reduces poverty at the individual household level, and sometimes at the community and country level. We can no longer afford to ignore that. Same in the sustainable development framework, in the post-Rio, Rio+20. Migration is absolutely, directly related. So it's time that we integrate migration and see migration as a natural phenomena. One that can potentially be positive, one that certainly has negative implications when it's forced, when it's not through regular channels, but when it's voluntary, safe, and legal, it can have tremendous benefits. And now, we need to do that. Thank you very much.

Hoge: This has been a very rich discussion, and I want to thank our excellent panel for prompting it, and all of you for participating in it. Thank you.