And Africa Will Shine Forth
A Statesman’s Memoir

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Preface

This work was written mainly after the period when I assumed the position of President of the United Nations General Assembly and before my appointment as the Chairperson of the Commission of the African Union.

The words and ideas it contains do not in any way commit these two prestigious institutions nor my country, Gabon. They are the result of personal reflections intended to add to the African debate.

Jean Ping
Introduction

Everyone knows that Africa, cradle of humanity, land of the Pharaohs and human civilization, and vast reservoir of human and natural resources, is not doing well. She crosses the deepest crisis that has shaken her since the end of colonial times. The specter of chaos lurks everywhere. She is now seen as the continent of “collapsing states” and “zombie nations”; the continent of extreme poverty, misery, and injustice; the continent of horrors, of the Rwandan genocide and of the worst atrocities committed in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Kenya, Darfur and elsewhere. This brutal reality has been, for quite some time now, analyzed by most observers and experts with certain fatalism, as testified by these book titles with pessimistic or even alarmist tones: “Black Africa Started on the Wrong Foot” (René Dumont), “Can Black Africa Take Off?” (Albert Meister); “And What If Africa Refused Development” (Axelle Kabou); “Africa Down” (Jacques Giri). By now, it is just a chorus of permanent lamentations about the “lost continent,” the “damned continent,” or the “cursed continent” whose past is not passing. And the rest of the world, which sees us as negligible, even contemptible (“all corrupt and all dictators,” they say), consider that henceforth, they no longer need us.¹

How could we have come to this? And yet, the African Continent, opened by gunfire five centuries ago to the influences of Western civilization and its fundamental values of humanism and progress, has always, more than any other part of the world, almost slavishly, done everything it was asked to do and yielded to the injunctions of all masters that succeeded each other at the head of the different world orders. “When the White people came to Africa,” as was said by Jomo Kenyatta, and quoted by European Commissioner Louis Michel, “we had the land and they had the Bible. They taught us to pray with our eyes closed. When we opened them, the White people had the land and we had the Bible.”² Not to “rehash the past” but to better understand where we come from and where we are going, we must remember that just 150 years ago, Africa was still under the yoke of slavery, deporta-
tion and the slave trade, and that fifty years ago, it was still the colonial regime of the “whip,” “ass-kicking,” and “hard labor.” So, to know where you are going and what you may become, you must necessarily know who you are, that is to say, where you come from and with what history. As the African proverb says, “When you do not know where you are going, look at where you came from.”

Therefore, the current world order in which Africa is naturally inserted cannot be easily analyzed and understood without a brief look back to the orders of the past. At the heart of the issues and problems raised by these orders stands the sovereign nation-state, which has stood for, since its Western origin in the seventeenth century, the right of an independent state, master of its territory and the only legitimate holder of the use of coercion, to freely determine its choices (including economic and political). It merges well with the concept of national independence.

But it so happens that African countries became legally responsible for their own fate less than half a century ago, by freeing themselves from the European and imperial order under which they had been closely confined for centuries. Accessing this long-desired national sovereignty, the new states have gradually tried, with varying degrees of willingness and happiness, to become emancipated from their “intimacy” with their former European tutelage powers. This period of “breaking off” and the quest for real autonomy, however, gave rise to very limited economic and political choices, corresponding to the bipolar East-West order that prevailed during the Cold War and the ideological game of the two superpowers: capitalism or socialism. African states had to “choose” their camp, align themselves and define, depending on this choice, the nature of their internal and external policy. Not rallying meant being the enemy, without nuances. We must remember that it was for the purpose of freeing themselves from these Manichean two-sided (West-East) shackles of the Western Janus that, in 1955, emerging from the long colonial night, the “Movement of Non-Aligned Countries” was created.

And then abruptly, in August 1991, this bipolar order, firmly established after the Second World War, suddenly collapsed with the implosion of the USSR, paving the way to “globalization” and the birth of a new order. This created, in its infancy, great hopes and even a
phase of euphoria. Very quickly, however, Africans became disappointed and lost their illusions. They had to face reality: the market forces that had taken over the planet created winners and losers, the very rich and the very poor, dominants and dominated; it was not, as has been alleged with an air of bravado, a positive sum game that would finally prove the unity of the human race and bring “perpetual peace”; rather, it became the nightmare that, for Africa, followed the dream. African countries have been confronted with a new series of major challenges arising from the advent of another unfair order.

At first, it was the rapid and radical challenge to their national sovereignty and their human dignity that had just been acquired. The brief historical digression of independence simply closed up. The “masters are back,” people whispered. And like the good old days, they said the law was for us, but did not apply it to themselves. They judged Africa only through their own lenses: gave orders and lessons, condemned and decreed fatal sanctions, convinced that they did so for the good of Humanity. Then came the unprecedented proliferation of barbaric wars, including ethnic conflicts, brought about or encouraged in particular by the methodical deconstruction of the states and the systematic destruction of any authority. We were expecting the rule of law and human rights and we harvested “the failed states”, coups, massacres, and genocides. This was finally the regression and massive impoverishment that result from the creation of extreme wealth and poverty by the exacerbation of the market forces, under the strong momentum of structural adjustment programs and the imperatives of the “Washington Consensus.”

That is how Africa regressed several decades and plunged into the ocean of poverty, disorder, and barbarism. Everything was reversed; now we walk backwards; the history of Africa stutters, it repeats itself. It is this phenomenon of reverse movement that the famous Italian writer Umberto Eco has called the “walk of the crayfish.” So today, the black continent, unloved, weakened, degraded, humiliated and marginalized, is reduced to wondering whether the new order that was put in place is also its own. Faced with such a configuration of the international system, will African states finally succeed, like other states, in reacting and preserving a little bit of their national independ-
ence, their human dignity, their cultural identity and national security and stability, while meeting the major imperatives of change, development, modernity, universality, and unity of the human race? This is the central question that pervades this book from beginning to end.

Enclosed in the folds of the new world order, subject to all sorts of threats, prisoners of ideological preconceptions, faced with the increase in all kinds of disorders, weakened by the refusal of any responsibility and privatization of everything (including “legitimate violence”), African states have had no other alternative at this stage than to hunker down again, once more. In fact, in the new international context marked by the turbulence of globalization, the absolute supremacy of the West, the collapse of the Soviet East and the arrival on the national and international scene of new non-state transnational, “sovereignty-free actors,” the choices available to Africans are again extremely limited.

a) Almost all African states have indeed tried, somehow, to “adapt” to international pressures and constraints while trying to preserve, as much as possible, its own specificities and vital national interests.

b) Others, however, very few indeed, have chosen, although under duress, like Robert Mugabe’s Zimbabwe, Assayas Afwerki’s Eritrea’ or Omar al-Bashir’s Sudan, another path, that of defending with all their might their sovereignty and their specificity, facing the music and resisting, at whatever cost, despite the pressure from the so-called “International Community.” They thus join the small, albeit growing, group of the “rejectionist front” (refusal to comply) or “axis of evil” (depending on your view), formed confusedly around Hugo Chavez’s Venezuela, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s Iran, Evo Morales’s Bolivia, Rafael Correa’s Ecuador, Belarus, North Korea, etc. This heteroclite and critical coalition seems to react by rejecting the new order and preaching some form of break with the West.

c) Other countries, such as Somalia, the only country in the world deprived of a state for two decades, have plunged into anarchy, sea piracy, terrorism, poverty and chaos, becoming known as “collapsed or failed states” or “chaotic non-governable entities.” In the words of Professor Jean Ziegler, “They are just a mark on a
physical map. As a national organized society, these countries have ceased to exist.”

In any case, this phase of turbulence, born during the 1990s, had the effect of forcing the African governments that wanted to modernize in the new millennium, to radically reorient national policy while also trying to preserve the most of their security, dignity, and integrity. The effect was mainly, on a collective level, to lead the continent to rethink its place in the international system, to regroup and even to initiate a process of political and economic integration. In an environment of unbridled globalization, exacerbated privatization, institutionalized interference and the generalized deconstruction of states, most African countries, individually and collectively, had to take on with courage and sometimes abnegation the implementation of this Fulani proverb: “If the earth turns, turn with it.”

However, we must not forget that every order passes, because international orders are products of history. Time gives birth to them, shapes them and finally destroys them. The scenario of a world that, for the first time in more than half a millennium, is not predominantly Western has already advanced. A CIA report even emphasizes that “Asia will be the emblematic continent of most of the heavy trends likely to shape in the world in the next fifteen years.” And where is Africa in all this, one might ask? Well, it “is not really part of the world map,” notes Zyad Limam, “at least in the world of the mighty.”

Decidedly, our dear continent that is going through a new dark moment in its history is considered negligible.

Yet despite this regional environment, destabilized by war and poverty as a result of the unprecedented socio-economic and geopolitical upheavals in the 1990s, many African countries are still islands of relative peace, stability, freedom, solidarity, and even progress. Africa still remains a catalogue of huge economic promises. The experience of these countries has indeed shown that, thanks to a determined political will, we could at least avoid the worst. We also quickly realized that union is strength and that if war, poverty, and chaos born from allegedly “happy” globalization were contagious, peace, security, order, tolerance, good governance, freedom, and progress could be as well. Therefore, these elements are key factors in the African policies fostered by the UN and the African Union (AU). Although it is now
convenient to speak of “world time,” made of constant shattering economic and social upheavals, it can be shown that there is also a “local time,” marked by an adaptation strategy facing the pressures of the global pace.

It is the pace of this local African time that I am trying to explain through an analysis of the major issues of concern to the world and the black continent, especially: peace and security, development and the fight against poverty, democracy, good governance, human rights, and the rule of law. This analysis will be constantly punctuated with anecdotal narratives and personal testimonies derived from my experience as Gabonese Member of Parliament, Minister of Foreign Affairs, President of the 59th session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, and Chairperson of the African Union Commission. Indeed, I thought it was appropriate to devote a small part of this work to the analysis, from the inside, of the issues of reforming the UN system and hence, the redefinition of a new global governance, which is fairer, more balanced, more caring and moral, and in which Africa would also finally find its reason and its place. For, however long the dark night, in which the African continent is plunged, the day will ultimately break, and believe me, that day will be bright.

There is no fatality to underdevelopment that would doom some to eternal poverty and others to perpetual enrichment. Barely fifty years ago, outside of Japan, all of Asia was still in a hopeless situation of underdevelopment comparable to ours. Famine then had a name, China, and poverty was called India. South Korea had a development level lower than that of Kenya, Côte d’Ivoire, or Ghana. Today, this “small” Asian country has climbed to the 13th rank of world economic powers, while China ranks second. Who would have believed it? Africa must, after the example of Asia, wake up, get up, and walk. It must take back the reins of its destiny and conquer the future so our sun can finally shine with a thousand lights. As very opportunely pointed out to me by a friend, we are now at the exact level that Southeast Asia was in the late 1950s, in other words, just about to surprise the rest of the world. It is this hope that cradles our hearts and drives our actions so that we can contribute, with the rest of the world, to the freedom and happiness of mankind. To achieve this, we must, in spite of our heavy current trends, remember these words uttered by André Malraux in
Brazzaville at the beginning of our independence: “Hope is one of the most inspiring words of History, because History is made, among other things, by looking forward to a promised land. But to achieve the fixed goals...there is only one remedy: the State.”¹²
PART ONE
Backward March:  
The Walk of the Crayfish

*The wind is blowing; we must look ahead and see how to live.*

Paul Valéry

Despite the circumstantial political positions and actions taken by African countries in certain periods of their post-colonial history, according to an international situation in perpetual motion, a critical path seems to inspire their respective policies: the search for a compromise among dialectically opposing major objectives common to all these countries, namely independence, freedom, peace, and security on the one hand, and growth and development on the other. It is this contradiction that gave rise to the major stages of the national policies of small countries, especially African countries, alternately dominated by one of these objectives, and based on needs and priorities chosen in the name of their vital interests.

By way of illustration, if we take a small country like Gabon, we can identify three large “ages” in terms of its domestic and foreign policy: the first one is after the proclamation of independence and the beginnings of an almost non-existent foreign policy under President Léon Mba, tirelessly concerned with a need for security (internally as well as at the Gabonese border). The idea was then to build a nation and to ensure a collective life, both against external aggression (he believed that the Communist threat was real in that period of the Cold War), and against the internal turbulence of attempted coups and risks of secession. The second is from the early 1970s, characterized by a new willingness to “break” ranks and open to the world, which was favored not only by the East-West détente and the policy of peaceful coexistence, but also by the Third-World claim of a “New
International Economic Order”; a stubborn quest for economic well-being, which came about with the accession to power of the new young president Albert Bernard Bongo (who later became known as Omar Bongo in 1973, and then Omar Bongo Ondimba in 2004). The third period was marked by a step backwards because of the difficulties faced by the African state due to the turmoil of globalization and the new world order following the Cold War.

We find a similar structure in the national policies of other African states, with specificities, of course. In fact, all of these countries have, during the period of the Cold War, faced similar problems and thus applied, almost identically, similar recipes in the elaboration of their national policies. Then, they gradually evolved towards the search for greater independence, especially in economic terms, to improve the well-being of their population, before experiencing a brutal coup as the ambivalent consequence, to say the least, of the fall of the Berlin Wall.
Chapter One

THE FIRST STEPS: POLITICAL LIBERATION AND “LIMITED SOVEREIGNTY”

It is not unusual that people want to remain master of their destiny.
Alain Plante

In 1960, when almost all African countries gained access to legal sovereignty, the international situation was dominated by the “clash of the century” between liberalism and communism, erecting two blocks, one against the other, in the name of two antagonistic ideologies. On one side, the communist camp dominated by the USSR; on the other, the capitalist camp where the United States played the leading role. The stake was the planet. The process of decolonization was inserted into this confrontation of two competing messianic systems disputing the world. At the time, it was evident that a direct war between these two thermonuclear champions was, if not impossible, at least not very likely; the battles would be fought in the “periphery”: in Asia, South America, and Africa, the war between the superpowers was fought locally through proxy forces.

It was in Asia first that the situation proved the most worrisome. During the 1960s, American interventions in Asia intended, in the name of a policy of “containment,” to curb the “Marxist subversion” and halt the expansion of the Soviet world. This was particularly the case in Vietnam, where a very long decolonization conflict turned into an East-West confrontation. In Latin America also, the US policy of
“big stick” diplomacy and intervention, direct or indirect, were intended to contain the agitation of revolutionary movements “taken over by the Communists,” as denounced in the official political discourse of the time.

Africa, one suspects, would not be left behind. Very soon, she too would become the ultimate battleground of East-West rivalries, as evidenced, for example, by the conflicts in central Africa, especially Angola, Congo-Brazzaville and Congo-Kinshasa (the future Zaire and current Democratic Republic of Congo [DRC]).

First case: Angola. Beginning in the 1960s, the USSR waged, under the banner of “proletarian internationalism” and the doctrine of “fraternal aid” enunciated in 1968, indirect military operations there. Initially, these were intended to support the struggle for national liberation that began in 1961 by the Movimento popular de libertação de Angola (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, [MPLA] which was created in 1956) with the support of the Portuguese Communist Party. Then, after the country became independent in 1975, the Soviets would defend the Angolan brotherly government of President Agostinho Neto with the help of Cuban troops against armed movements of rebellion by the Frente nacional de libertação de Angola (FNLA, National Liberation Front headed by Roberto Holden) and especially União nacional para a independência total de Angola (UNITA, created in 1966 by Jonas Savimbi), backed by the United States through Zaire and South Africa, respectively.

According to Henry Kissinger, who was an influential White House advisor at the time and a supporter of containment, “There, for the first time an African liberation movement prevailed first through massive (at least by African standards) military deliveries from the Soviet Union, including a significant Soviet airlift, and then by the intervention of Cuban combat forces equipped by the Soviet Union... If the Soviet Union and its auxiliaries were not stopped, they would emerge as the potentially decisive factor in the affairs of the continent.” Nothing could be clearer. In fact, starting in 1975 dozens of US aircraft, using Zaire, including the air base at Kamina in Katanga, poured huge quantities of weapons into Angola—guns, rocket launchers, mortars, anti-tank guns, and other weapons officially intended for use in the Zairian Armed Forces (FAZ), but
actually delivered to the FNLA. Important secret funds that allowed recruiting Belgian, British, and South African mercenaries were also given to the FNLA and UNITA through the CIA. From 1987, South Africa and UNITA began to exert unprecedented military pressure on the government troops backed by Cuba. The famous battle of Cuito Cuanavale was “one of the largest undertakings of its kind ever realized on the African continent, exceeded in size and intensity only by the campaigns of North Africa in World War II.”

We should also remember that in 1961 Prime Minister Patrice Emery Lumumba, hero of the independence of the former Belgian Congo (now DRC), was assassinated, accused of pro-Soviet sympathies. Belgium, explains Belgian journalist Colette Braeckman, “had eventually been persuaded that Lumumba had sympathies for the USSR and communist ideas, and succeeded in having its fears shared by the Americans.” This was later confirmed by Larry Devlin, former head of the CIA station in the Congo: He was thus eliminated at dawn on January 18, 1961 in Elisabethville in Katanga. His body, cut up with a saw by Gérard Soete (a Belgian) was dissolved in a bath of sulfuric acid, according to some sources. Even closer to home, in neighboring Cameroon, there was the pro-Marxist insurrection headed by the Union des Populations du Cameroun (Union of the Peoples of Cameroon [UPC]), whose leader, Ruben Um Nyobe, was killed in 1958 during “a violent repression conducted by French troops.”

It was also the case in Congo-Brazzaville—with which two neighboring countries, Zaire (now DRC) and Gabon, each share nearly 1,700 kilometers of common borders—when the situation created by the “revolution” of August 1963 provoked the deepest anxieties in the young authorities of the region. In three days, on August 13, 14, and 15, 1963, the “Three Glorious Days,” the pro-Marxist intelligentsia of the Congo, exploiting the discontent and divisions caused especially by the ethnic killings in Brazzaville in 1959 between Mbochi and Lari, induced the population to overthrow Abbé Fulbert Youlou and seize power with the assistance of the army. For many, the Communist threat was now at their doorstep. In Gabon, for example, wild rumors began to circulate about the imminent “red tide” coming from the Congo. Some already foresaw a “domino effect”
(the Communist contagion), others spoke of the sense of history and the inevitability of proletarian revolution, and others simply saw the hand of Moscow and Soviet subversion. In short, everyone felt concerned by these events.

The first President of Gabon, Léon Mba, deeply concerned about safeguarding the territorial integrity and physical survival of his country, positioned himself on a near-isolationist defensive and resolutely anti-Communist line. In Paris too, journalist Jean-Pierre Béjot notes, “It is the time of the struggle against the Communists. De Gaulle sees them everywhere; and those that De Gaulle does not see, Jacques Foccart shows him.” It is in this context and in this climate of psychosis that the following story took place in the Gabonese province of Haut-Ogooué:

Paul Yélé, the prefect of this region, was inspecting the area around the Letili River that serves at that place as border between the Congo and Gabon. He noticed on the other side, among the inhabitants of the Congolese bank, two very light-skinned persons. He immediately sent an alarmist message to Libreville indicating the presence of Chinese Communists at our borders. Irritated, President Léon Mba ordered the National Gendarmerie to immediately destroy the only bridge across the Letili near Boumango, on the old colonial administrative road that leads to Zanaga in the Congo. But after checking, it was found that it was simply two “Eurafrican” mestizos, members of the Congolese government, Hilaire Mounthault and Claude Da Costa, respectively Minister of Transport and Minister of Water and Forests. One must admit, to the justification of Prefect Paul Yélé that by his beard cut “à la Ho Chi Min,” his clear complexion and perhaps also by the shape of his face, Hilaire Mounthault could actually be mistaken for an Asian.

This story summarizes the general atmosphere rather well, bordering on psychosis, that reigned during this time of the Cold War, particularly with regard to security and the subversive threat with which President Léon Mba was obsessed.

It must be acknowledged that in such an environment, one had to choose a side. Even if one aspired to neutrality, the facts and the reality
obliged everyone to take a position. Because of course, each of the two
superpowers of the time preached for its own “parish” and expected
everyone else to make a clear choice: not joining meant being the
enemy without nuance. The Cold War, subversive and counter-subver-
sive activities, the conflicts by proxy and the need for peace and
security that were the result, then pushed African countries to resort
to alliances and collective security pacts. The intended objective: to
better defend and protect themselves against all these threats and
forms of aggression. The result was polarization and a growing milita-
rization of Africa and the Third World. On one side, anti-capitalists
whose emblematic figure was Sékou Touré, the president of Guinea
who had dared to say “no” to de Gaulle. On the other side, pro-capital-
ists, whose “leader” was Félix Houphouet Boigny, president of Côte
d’Ivoire. To maintain this bipolar structure, the two superpowers also
broadened their grip on the states already tied to them.

Some countries, such as Guinea, Mali, Madagascar, Congo
Brazzaville, were attracted to the USSR, country of the counter-model,
and were more or less aligned with the socialist camp, thus departing
from their former metropolis and the Western camp. By saying no to
the referendum on the future of the Franco-African Community
proposed by General de Gaulle, Guinea, for example, as early as 1958,
had drastically turned its back on France, by taking the “non-capitalist
road,” and choosing the socialist camp. By 1963, Congo Brazzaville
was also aligned with Moscow. Gabon made a different choice. By the
time Léon Mba took control of the country in such an unfavorable
regional and international context, Gabon relied on its ex-colonial
metropolis, to be protected, equipped, and seconded in its early
economic and political efforts, to ensure its physical survival after
obtaining its independence legally and peacefully, by mutual consent.
On this point, future President Léon Mba, then prime minister,
expressed himself in very clear terms: “Gabon is an independent State
within the Franco-African Community.... On September 28, 1958, the
people of Gabon, by near-unanimity, chose the Franco-African
Community. We have thus shown our firm will to continue our
journey with France.”20 The Gabon-France relationship thus entered a
period of intimacy and alliance. At the beginning of the 1960s, France
signed with Gabon and a number of other Francophone African
countries, a series of cooperation agreements including in matters of defense, foreign policy, and financial and economic matters.

For all these states, the most important and urgent task during this period of nation building and the initiation of foreign policy, was to ensure, above all, security both internationally and internally because the need for security prevailed over all others. In reality, most of these new states that then had neither the will nor the real capacity to lead an active foreign policy appeared on the international scene as mere satellites of their former protective powers. Their independence was, moreover, somewhat limited by the fact that their defense and their development depended almost exclusively on the military, economic, and financial protection that Paris, London, or Brussels wanted to grant them. For more than a decade, all these elements—the weight of the former metropolis, the obsession with external and internal threats—would be at the heart of the first post-independence steps of African countries whose foreign policy, embryonic for many of them, was a systematic copycat routine imposed in particular by their dependence on their former metropolis.

This means that this first age of the internal and external policy of most Francophone African countries was clearly dominated by their full membership in the “Franco-African Community.” France was then the guardian of the security and order of this “familiar” space regarded as its “backyard.” It was the beginning of what would later be called “France Afrique”; for many years, these new states relied on a de facto protectorate by the West or by the “Red East.” This resulted in the establishment of a sort of “limited sovereignty” within the “Brezhnev-like” meaning of the term (that of the “Brezhnev doctrine”).

This state of affairs changed only very slowly and it was only later, following the East-West détente that a new trend would emerge more clearly.
Chapter Two

MATURITY: ECONOMIC LIBERATION AND OPENING TO THE WORLD

It is the inalienable right of all people to control their own destiny.

Charter of the Organization of African Unity

The second major phase of the national policies of African countries was the opening to the world during the East-West détente of the 1970s and the parallel rise of third-world claims. Some major events marked this period, including for example: the “Soviet-Chinese schism” that peaked in 1969 following the Sino-Soviet border conflict; the nationalization on February 24, 1971 of the Algerian oil sector by President Houari Boumédiène; the official visit on February 21, 1972 to the People’s Republic of China by US President Richard Nixon; the “first global oil shock” following the Yom Kippur War that started on October 6, 1973; the fourth summit of the Non-Aligned Countries Movement held in Algiers from September 5 to 9, 1973 on the theme of “economic liberation”; adoption by the UN of the solemn declaration “concerning the introduction of a new international economic order” in May 1974; and the “Carnation Revolution,” which occurred in April 1974 in Portugal, followed by the independence of the Portuguese-speaking African colonies.

In this period, African countries became increasingly aware that true independence would require economic independence and development. They strove through the “new international economic
order” to gradually become, like the others, masters of their choice in economic and political matters. The difficulty of harmoniously managing a dialogue with the former colonial powers in all spheres of life also pushed African countries to grow more open towards “the other bloc,” even if it meant going beyond the contradictions born of the socioeconomic emergency of the time. Thus, many African countries could very well belong to the socialist camp and nonetheless practice a liberal economic policy to be able to meet the requirements of their national development. Henceforth, economic and social well-being would become the priority for African states, along with the pursuit of genuine “autonomy,” defined as the ability of a state and a society to exercise control over the allocation of resources and the choice of government.

In the case of Gabon, which we take here as an example among others, this second phase coincides with the ascension to power, on November 28, 1967, of the young President Bongo, who “trying to find his style,” wanted to give new impetus to the policy of his country and thus to better establish its authority. Favored by the détente in American-Soviet relations that began in the early 1970s, Gabon’s national policy would no longer be based solely on the clash of ideologies and would no longer be subjected to mere security requirements. From 1973, the fight against underdevelopment, the quest for economic independence, and the need to assert itself as a nation-state would gradually become the leading international concerns of the government, constituting a “critical juncture” for Gabon. The policy of “rupture,” or “renovation,” proclaimed by the new president could thus, in this precise context, gradually take off.

THE CHALLENGE OF THE BLOCS

In this general context, a new age dawned for the national policy of Gabon and other countries. This policy was marked by a greater assertion of sovereignty over natural resources, a policy of openness to the world, and a diplomacy of non-alignment characterized by better adherence to the great principles of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the Non-Aligned Movement. The year 1973 constituted a decisive step in this regard, and for the first time, President Bongo personally took part, in Algiers, in the fourth Non-Aligned Summit devoted precisely to issues of development and “economic liberation.”
It was upon his return from Algeria when he had extensive discussions with President Houari Boumédiène and Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdelaziz Bouteflika, both great “sovereignists” and ardent proponents of the “New International Economic Order” (NIEO) then on the agenda at the UN under the leadership of the Group of 77 that the announced turn clearly began. On October 19, 1973, Gabon was admitted into the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), becoming the 12th member. In December 1974, Omar Bongo again visited Algeria, this time to attend the historic first summit of OPEC. It was during this summit, marked by the claims of full sovereignty of the states over their natural resources—particularly oil, that the main measures were taken that led to a quadrupling of energy prices and the first worldwide “oil shock.” The price of a barrel of oil, which was only $1.80 at the end of 1970, actually rose to $3.70 during the summer of 1973, and the 1974 summit decided to set its price at $11.65 per barrel.

Gabonese foreign policy also became more assertive in an increasingly clear manner. The country began to challenge the orientation of the blocs. As then President Bongo said: “We simply refuse to let ourselves become satellites on the outskirts of one bloc or another, to dispose of our national independence to become the relays or the agents of international policy over which we have no control.” It was a revolution, that of the “flamboyant years.” There was indeed in this refusal an evident willingness to affirm the national identity of Gabon, giving the country the power to better determine its own destiny. Certainly, as argued by Alain Plantey, a former member of staff of General de Gaulle, “the independence of any State in today’s world is not total; it is neither a given nor immutable. But no responsible nation can entrust to others the care of its own interests: it would soon fall into subjugation. It is not unusual for a people to want to remain master of its destiny.” This was a new attitude somewhat inspired by De Gaulle that seemed to be adopted by the young Gabonese president.

OPENING TO THE EAST

The opening, corollary of the challenge of the blocs, consisted of establishing and fostering, based on national interests, the best possible relations with the largest number of countries in the fields of
commerce, economics, investments, and development aid. The idea was, in particular, to drain by this method more public aid and foreign investments likely to promote development.

Concerning Gabon, the establishment, in this new context, on October 15, 1973, of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and especially the break with Taiwan on April 20, 1974, as well as the simultaneous recognition of the People’s Republic of China, was considered a true turning point in Gabon’s foreign policy. This change was subsequently consolidated, not only by the installation of new embassies in Eastern countries, but especially by the historic first official visit made in October 1974 to Peking by a Gabonese Head of State. On that occasion, President Bongo was received by Mao Zedong in person; he also spoke with Prime Minister Zhou Enlai, who was already very sick and especially entered in direct contact with the future architect of modern China, at the time Vice Prime Minister Deng Xiaoping, whom he would affectionately call “my friend Deng.”

The opening towards the Communist Bloc would somewhat counterbalance the absolute prevalence of Western diplomatic influences. Indeed, in June 1975, at the opening of the 44th conference of OPEC in Libreville, President Bongo declared: “the will of certain countries to always confiscate just for themselves the fruits of the growth of Humanity must be energetically combated. We are against pillage and drainage of the wealth of Third-World countries by developed countries.” The step taken was surely considerable. Of course, the traditional friendships of Gabon (especially with France) were solidly preserved, but the circle of its new cooperative relations grew for the benefit of its economic and social well-being and the affirmation of its sovereignty.

COMMITMENT TO THE MIDDLE EAST

The détente with the Communist Bloc naturally opened the path to an identical evolution towards the Arab-Muslim world. In fact, after the example of a country like Gabon, many African states, which until 1973 did not have a Middle Eastern policy outside the privileged relations they had with Israel, turned their backs on the Hebrew state. They broke relations, as recommended by the OAU after the Yom Kippur War of October 1973, which had led to the first great world oil
crisis. Gabon progressively adopted a new political line, more nuanced and more pro-Arab as well as a more open attitude to Palestinian theses. It established diplomatic relations and soon exchanged ambassadors with several countries in the Middle East and North Africa. In 1974, Gabon became a member of the Organization of the Islamic Conference and a member of the Islamic Development Bank. And we have seen that in November 1973, it joined OPEC. It even received, in Libreville in June 1986, Yasser Arafat, president of the executive committee of the PLO, and Gabon authorized the opening in Libreville of a diplomatic mission of the “Palestinian State.”

Gabon, after the example of many other African countries, now had, as dictated at the time by its national interest, a Middle Eastern and Arab policy that was its own. Thus, the multi-shaped relations between Libreville and the Arab capitals intensified considerably as part of the “Arab-African dialogue” to the point of making Israel and its allies somewhat angry. However, the positive results from a political, economic, and financial viewpoint did not take long to be felt. In 1974, even Libya, whose economic development was still weak, gave a loan of ten million US dollars (almost seven billion CFA francs) to the Banque gabonaise de développement [Gabonese Bank of Development] (BGD), to build the Trans-Gabon Railway. Other Arab funds (Saudi, Kuwaiti, Islamic, etc.) followed and went to the sectors of education, health, and basic infrastructures.

THE PROMOTION OF SOUTH-SOUTH COOPERATION

From 1974, following one of the main recommendations of the fourth summit of the Non-Aligned Movement held in Algiers, during which the concept of South-South cooperation was adopted, Gabon also began establishing diplomatic relations at the level of resident ambassadors with several countries of Asia and Latin America. President Bongo went on an official visit to these countries to sign many cooperation agreements. Thus, in 1986, he was able to declare, not without reason: “A few years ago, certain journalists were used to considering Gabon as a hunting grounds of French interests. Now, the same journalists can speak of nothing else but my openness policy. In fact, what changed? I have always affirmed the deep care for the respect of our sovereignty and the desire to cooperate with all those who are not trying to interfere in our internal affairs. Certainly, for the
entire time we have consolidated our national union, our foreign relations were somewhat limited. But [today] we have diplomatic relations with Eastern countries, as well as with Western countries. We have ambassadors in countries whose political systems are different from our own.”

This was the beginning of a long and fruitful period of multi-shaped cooperation during which many agreements of economic, commercial, and cultural cooperation were signed with new states throughout the world. Multiple protocols of agreements for supplier credits and financial participation were thus signed in favor of development projects; Gabonese students obtained scholarships to continue their studies in the West as well as in the East, in the North as well as in the South. “All directions” economic diplomacy, whose beneficial effects can still be seen today, took off as early as 1973. To be convinced, suffice it to walk on the long and famous “Triumphal Boulevard” built in 1976 by the Yugoslavians. At the entrance of this boulevard, starting from the sea, to the left there is the majestic glass building of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, built by the Canadians. Two steps from there, still going up the boulevard, there is the French Cultural Center with modern architecture, then the two imposing palaces of the National Assembly and Senate, as well as the Information City built by China, all three next to the Town Hall, a magnificent work of Marshal Tito’s Yugoslavia. Next to the palace of the Senate, we can still admire the futuristic complex of the buildings of “December 2,” financed by the petrodollars of the (Gabonese) Provision for Diversified Investment (PID). Also on this great boulevard, are the offices of embassies (e.g., Russia, China, etc.) as well as the Central Bank, subsidiary of the Banque des États de l’Afrique centrale [Central Bank of African States] and other buildings hosting ministries.

As I noted elsewhere, until 1973, “the economy of Gabon was still a subsistence economy of a neocolonial type, exclusively based on the export of a few unprocessed raw materials.” But as of that date, with the first oil shock, the rise in the prices of the barrel of crude and the policy of openness to the world, Gabon became a giant site. For a decade, it was the time of great works: construction of the first railroad, “the most gigantic [project], without doubt, in the entire
history of black Francophone Africa,” the Trans-Gabon, whose first crossing was laid on December 30, 1973; takeoff towards Europe, in the 1970s, of the first long flight of the national company Air Gabon thanks to a brand-new Boeing 747; construction of the first infrastructures of basic roads, ports, and airports of the country; urban, administrative, health and educational equipment; electrification, bringing water, modern telecommunications network, etc. For the first time in its history, the country decidedly started on the road of true modernization, partly financed by foreign countries, as illustrated later by the weight and diversity of the origin of its foreign debt. What a beautiful adventure it was! What a beautiful time! That of two-figure growth rates, yes already at that time! That of the “bright years!”

OPENING WITHIN AFRICA

The foreign policy of a country like Gabon could obviously not be limited to relations with the Great Powers and the rich or emerging countries of the Third World. National interest demanded that Libreville stopped ignoring the rest of Africa and begin to base itself on a structured and active African policy. Such a policy would be based on well-known principles: avoidance of the use of force, pursuit of peaceful settlement of disputes, respect of the commitments assumed in treaties, respect of national sovereignty and the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, intangibility of the borders inherited from colonization, good neighborliness, pursuit of amicable cooperation, and African solidarity.

It was with its “nearby neighbors” (the bordering countries), then with the “nearby foreigners” (the countries of the sub-region) that Gabon started to entertain specific relations; first in the Equatorial Customs Union (UDE, introduced in 1959), then the Customs and Economic Union of Central Africa (UDEAC, created on December 8, 1964), which became the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC since March 16, 1994). Then the Economic Community of the States of Central Africa (ECCAC, created on October 18, 1983). In this way, harmonious relations with the rest of Africa were progressively introduced. These relations worked not only through the structures of the OAU, but also through multiple bilateral and multilateral cooperation agreements signed after 1973, and the
large mixed commissions created to follow up on them and the numerous embassies opened since then in Africa.

It is in this framework that a very large number of West African workers and African cooperators—professors, physicians, and engineers—were massively recruited to serve Gabon in several fields, especially in great construction, education, and health. It was also in this African framework that the exchanges of goods and services and the circulation of ideas and people were organized. This was a luminous period of Gabonese diplomacy supported by exceptional material and financial conditions (the great oil boom). It was then that the 14th Summit of the OAU was organized in Libreville, in August 1977.

OPENING TO THE ENTIRE WEST

The policy of openness was also introduced in favor of the Western camp, with the understanding that the period of détente was also marked by the emergence on the international stage of new economic powers such as the Asian “tigers.” Africa thus diversified its partners (Italy, Portugal, Japan, Canada, the United Kingdom, etc.). Naturally, the first Western power, the United States of America, present in Africa since independence, did not stay behind. But it must be recognized that at the time, Africa was not its “cup of tea.” The US, increasingly interested in oil, had not yet devised a true Africa policy.

In matters of multilateral cooperation, it is the European Union (at the time the European Economic Community) that came first with the significant contributions of the first European Development Fund (EDF) and the installation of the legal framework governing relations with Africa: the two Yaoundé conventions (1963 and 1968), the four Lomé Conventions (1975, 1979, 1984 and 1991) and subsequently, the Cotonou Convention adopted in 2000.

As for France, at this time, it still occupied an extremely privileged place; it was omnipresent in the economic African fabric with its numerous companies, its dominating weight in matters of culture and networks of exchanges, and its substantial interpersonal relations woven throughout history. In fact, most Francophone African countries were still solidly anchored in the Western camp and the great influence of the former metropolis was undeniable. Its complex
“networks” and its huge means of potential pressure on the Francophone African decision-making process were extremely important. However, France no longer had “exclusive hunting grounds” in Africa, as had been the case for a long time in the past.

In this regard, the senator representing French people abroad, Guy Penne, former advisor for African Affairs to François Mitterrand, told “French industrialists (…) that they must realize that globalization would finally do away with all hunting grounds.”

Nearing the end of the 20th Century, in 1996, American Secretary of State Warren Christopher declared in Johannesburg, “the time has passed where Africa could be cut up into spheres of influence and the foreign powers could consider whole groups of states as their private domain.” Likewise, according to Belgian journalist Colette Braeckman, “this is the end of the hunting grounds of the European powers, the end of the carefully delimited zones of influence of France, Great Britain. Now, Africa is also deregulated, globalized, open to all influences, to all economic ways—and first of all, to those of the strongest.” A world was dying, another was being born. Thus, for Africans, a new and difficult stage was beginning, that of the turbulences caused by globalization.
A new age for the national policies of African countries opened in 1990, with the end of the Cold War and the shift, in some fifteen years only, from a bipolar world to the global world in which we live today: the post-bipolar world, characterized by the end of the so-called Yalta East-West order (after the collapse of the Soviet Bloc) and especially by the advent of a new order dominated by the United States. At the time, when international relations started its great historical turnaround, each of the African countries had to take it into account and adjust accordingly in order to adapt to the circumstances.

At first, this new world order produced a great sense of euphoria; some proclaimed the end of ideologies and the end of history. Indeed, with the end of any order, people hope for a new order that will be better, not to say perfect. Thus, soon after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the international community began to dream of brighter tomorrows and the emergence of a new era of world peace, cooperation, and co-prosperity of nations. In November 1990, in a speech delivered at the Conference on Security and Trade in Europe (CSCE), Russian President Mikhail Gorbachev already announced the emergence of “a safer and more civilized world order, based not on the force of
weapons, but on a dialogue between equals, the balance of interests, harmony..., sovereignty, and integrity of man.” While earlier that same autumn, George H.W. Bush spoke before the UN General Assembly, saying, “We all know that there can be lasting peace and freedom in relationships between people only if states agree to follow common rules....The time has come for international law to reign....We are faced with a choice between the law of the jungle and the rule of law.”  

This legalistic and pacifist rhetoric could only seduce and reassure small countries. For the latter, and more particularly for the African continent, for ages subject to all forms of inequity, it was assuredly a great hope to hear the “masters of the world” themselves speak of the dawn of a world where equality, harmony, universal peace, and the law reign supreme; the advent of a “new international order, safer and more civilized,” which promised to men access to paradise on earth. One even began to believe that all states would finally be equal under the law, that no country would henceforth be above international laws, that the proxy conflicts of the bipolar era would finally disappear, and that Africa could finally focus on its development and its rebirth. Moreover, as if to give a reason for this optimistic thrust, the international environment was beginning to experience profound and dramatic changes: the most striking included the acceleration of multi-polarization, the globalization of international economy, and especially the globalization of democratic processes.

This period of euphoria was, however, only of short duration. Barely started, with the outline of a shift in direction, Africa had to admit the evidence; very quickly, it was disappointed and lost its illusions. Instead of a more equitable, freer, more prosperous, and more peaceful world announced with great fanfare, the African states, subject to strong external injunctions, had to immediately face a dangerous deterioration of their economic and social situation and an unprecedented proliferation of conflicts of every kind. At the same time, they were forced to apply, subject to fatal penalties, a number of significant economic and political reforms, in a very agitated international context. This was actually a dark era.

But while the weakened African continent plunged into chaos, the world saw an extraordinary strengthening of the leading role of the
major powers, headed by the United States of America.

THE MAP OF THE WORLD, PRESENT AND FUTURE

In the early 1990s, with the end of the Soviet Union, the United States began to think that they had definitely won the battle of history. The future indeed seemed to smile forever because they were now the masters of the planet. But the world that, since then, has gradually taken shape, does not seem exactly to corroborate the predictions already announced. In fact, the balance of powers is changing, new state and non-state players appear, and the international order continues to undergo significant changes. The world of 2020, and especially that of 2050, will differ in significant ways from the world of 2010. There are already profound changes in this world that is transforming before our eyes:

• First, there is Europe, economically gathered within the European Union, which is now a large industrial power in the making. It will likely be comparable to that of the United States or that of tomorrow’s China.

• Then, there is the rise of Asia, especially China and India, which have already acceded, along with Japan, to the rank of leading global players. For the first time in modern history, China, India, and Russia contributed more than half of the global economic growth in 2007.

• There is also the expected emergence of other powers that, together with Brazil, Russia, Korea, Canada, Australia, and Indonesia, form “pushy” powers. Brazil for example, “with 210 million inhabitants in 2025, could become the 4th economic power in the world, behind the United States, China, India...”

• Finally, there are vast regional economic groupings that are taking place before our eyes, formed in areas of co-prosperity such as the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR) or the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). And there is Africa with its African Union, its one billion inhabitants, and its plentiful natural resources, which little by little, is building its nest.
LEADERSHIP AND AMERICAN SUPREMACY: THE INDISPENSABLE NATION

The French language poorly renders the Anglo-American concept of “leadership.” Therefore, the terms leader and leadership, which belong to the same family, are often employed as such in political language without the need to put quotation marks. Purists translate them by the idea of direction. But whether it means to be at the “head of” or “lead,” the United States today represents the ultimate superpower of our world; they are at the head of the pack, especially in the West, the G8 and the G20, but also give the pack its direction. They exert a decisive influence and dominance in most areas (political, military, scientific, and cultural). And in so doing, they have become indispensable partners for both the major powers and for small countries, even though here and there, they face opposition for their unilateral view of international relations.

In his 1992 “State of the Union” speech, George H.W. Bush declared: “By the grace of God, America won the Cold War. A world once divided into two armed camps now recognizes one sole and preeminent power, the United States of America.” Winner of the ideological conflict that opposed it for nearly a half-century to its Soviet rival, American power, in fact, no longer has any reason to be modest in its triumph. The only world power, it now holds an unprecedented economic, technological, cultural, and military power, enabling it to exercise a decisive influence anywhere in the world. For the first time in the history of humanity, a state without rival dominates the whole planet, exerts “absolute leadership,” and is even poised to realize the millennium-old dream of a universal empire.

Faced with such a reality, very few countries, let alone in Africa, can avail themselves of not having the Americans as a “partner”: by choice or by the force of the circumstances, the United States has emerged since the end of the Cold War as the key negotiator. Madeleine Albright, Secretary of State of the Clinton administration, even inferred that the United States was now “the indispensable nation.”

With regard to Africa, more particularly, excluding the unfortunate episode of “Operation Restore Hope” in Somalia (1992-1994), it...
is easy to see how much the United States has invested in an African policy of a new type, at least unprecedented since the first term of Bill Clinton. Certainly, there was the case of Jimmy Carter, who, from April 1 to April 3, 1978, conducted a lightning visit to Nigeria and Liberia, evocative of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, who briefly stopped over in Monrovia, Liberia in 1943. But it is truly under the Clinton administration that the renewed US interest in Africa appears in force. First, President Bill Clinton made, from March 22 to April 2, 1998, a very much noticed historic tour. In the same vein, he organized for the first time, an Africa-US Ministerial Conference in Washington from March 15 to 18, 1999, in which he took part personally with the goal of defining the practical terms of cooperation with African states. Finally, in May 2000, the American Congress adopted, again under the leadership of President Clinton, a major law on trade and investment, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), which allows African states (admittedly selected according to a number of criteria ranging in particular from the respect of democratic principles to child protection, etc.) to export, at low rates, certain goods to the United States and especially to further open their economies to the free market.

This openly commercial US policy toward Africa—according to the famous slogan “Trade not Aid”—supported by the “Corporate Council on Africa,” was coupled with a series of related measures such as the “Millennium Challenge Account,” the “Safe Skies” initiative (for aviation security) or “Pepfar” (the fight against AIDS). It was also accompanied by a comprehensive military strategy, which was reinforced after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The ACRI (African Crisis Response Initiative) was launched under the second term of President Clinton, then replaced under the Bush administration by the ACOTA (African Contingency Operations Training Assistance), which established a partnership between the US and African militaries. At the same time when France, for example, closed some of its military bases in Africa, the United States opened and created a specific strategic command for Africa (AFRICOM).

The African trip of Bill Clinton has since been followed by other significant trips by American administrations: in May 2001, Secretary of State Colin Powell made a working visit to Mali, South Africa,

In addition, since the first term of George W. Bush, America has continued to strengthen its cooperation with the countries of the Gulf of Guinea, primarily, because they are oil and forest countries; and their geographical position represents, in the eyes of the Americans, a non-negligible strategic asset. Indeed, as part of their policy to diversify their oil supply sources, especially to escape from their excessive energy dependence on the Middle East, the United States is already sourcing 15 percent of their total oil imports in the Gulf of Guinea. They hope to increase this rate to 25 percent in the next ten years. Indeed, the African subsoil conceals 15 percent of world oil reserves.

This growing interest of the United States was, in these times of turbulence and Afro pessimism, overall favorably received by Africans. But some observers have seen it both as an illustration of the fading of Russia and the European powers—in particular former colonial powers like Great Britain and France—and especially the American willingness to strengthen its global leadership, including in areas previously neglected or left to their European allies.

Can one talk about the waning of Europe? It’s an exaggeration, but the fact remains that since the early 1990s, African states have seen their partnership with Europe gradually transform. So much so that henceforth, we speak of a decline of Europe in Africa, but the reality is much more threatening.

THE DECLINE OF THE EUROPEAN PROTECTING NATIONS

Although Europe no longer dominates the world, as was the case until the mid-twentieth century, it nevertheless remains the first partner of Africa and a vast industrial superpower in the making. On the economic side, for example, the European Union has a size substantially equivalent to that of the American economy. It has a population of around 400 million inhabitants, realizes approximately one-fifth of world trade, and provides over 50 percent of the world’s public support for development. The financial center of London is the most
powerful on the planet, and it is poised to win the long competitive battle with New York.

Until the early 1980s, most African countries had remained a kind of “backyard” of their former European colonial powers, which became their protectors. France, for example, was particularly successful, as we saw in the case of Gabon, in preserving a system of privileged relations with the “Franco-African family.” It in fact remained, despite the changes of time, the guardian of security and the purveyor of investment, economic, and technical assistance in the area of its former colonies, which was still regarded by some as French “territory.” But in the late 1980s, the landscape changed very quickly. The economic situation in Africa deteriorated severely (stagnant growth, colossal debt, massive unemployment, aid fatigue, etc.). Politically, the “democratic wind” of the fall of 1989 that came from Eastern Europe shook the African regimes. And in June 1991, the Franco-African summit in La Baule became a historic turning point by posing democratic advance as a sine qua non condition for development assistance.

As a whole, Europe, pervaded by a “general Afro-pessimism” and a feeling of “Africa fatigue,” perceived us as a real problem. She somewhat took her distance from us. To hide this distance from the “lost continent,” European leaders and their experts increasingly took refuge behind the “new tables of the law” of the “two twin sisters from Washington,” the IMF and the World Bank, i.e., behind the recommendations of neo-idealistic and ultraliberal inspiration conceived by American economist Milton Friedman through “The Chicago School” and propagated by the Reagan-Thatcher “couple.” This gave birth to what was then called the “Washington consensus,” which European experts in Brussels supported at the time (particularly certain French technocrats) in the name of “common values,” rebroadcasting them like a sounding board and imposing them in turn on Africa. Privatization, liberalization, deregulation, “less government,” “accountability,” regionalization, structural adjustments, macro-economic stability, sanctions, etc. then became the credo of the ACP-EU negotiations that gave birth in June 2000 to the “Cotonou Agreement.” This new partnership agreement systematized the political and economic “conditionalities” instituted for the first time.
by the EU in 1995 in Mauritius. “In France and in Europe,” Louis Dominici, former Ambassador of France to Gabon has written in this regard, “our technocrats set the tone. With the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, they wanted another Africa, another France, where the heart had less room. In 2000, they had virtually won the game: France faded and Africa sank into loneliness and crises.” On January 12, 1994, we remember, the CFA franc was devalued by 50 percent at the instigation of the IMF, thus ending the unconditional economic and preferred relations that existed between France and its former African colonies. This was already the beginning of a new and true break up.40

At the same time, Great Britain, former colonial power in eastern Africa and southern Africa, made arrangements with the United States, in the best tradition of the special ties that have bound them closely since 1956, to leave them free reign in Africa.41 The Clinton administration openly encouraged the political and military offensive in the region of the “Great Lakes” and in the upper valley of the Nile, which it already considered as the “new breed of African leaders.”

Other European countries, like Germany, which had been very present in Africa since the dawn of independence, were also pulling away from the continent for the benefit of Eastern Europe and Asia. Moreover, although in the Europe of the twenty-seven, the countries of the south-west (Italy, Spain, Portugal, Belgium, the United Kingdom, France, etc.) happily continued to regard Africa as their business, the countries of the north-east, i.e., the vast majority (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Romania, Ukraine, Slovenia, etc.), had little real African sensitivity. Accordingly, Europe seemed to hesitate and even give the impression of wanting to bury its ambitions as a great power and traditional protector of Africa. At most, Europe just wanted to reorganize economic competition. In this game, Washington may ultimately affirm its leadership. As for China, India, or Brazil, they are certainly emerging, but they remain regional rather than global powers. On the Board of Directors of the IMF, for example, Belgium continues to weigh more than India, and the Netherlands nearly two times more than Brazil, because of quotas established more than a half-century ago.
Thus, America could henceforth intervene in African affairs where, when, and as she wished. Of course, Europeans have not really forsaken the Africans; they are still among the leading contributors of development assistance and the first foreign investors in Africa. Certainly, the European Commission got in strongly under the great leadership of Louis Michel and Manuel Barroso. It reaffirmed it again in 2007 in Lisbon, especially by promising additional aid to “reinforce” Africa.\textsuperscript{42} Certainly, on the ground, France under Jacques Chirac and the Great Britain of Tony Blair and Gordon Brown continued to actively engage in support of economic development and peace. On the military side, the French system of Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capacity (RECAMP) and the European Union Force (EUFOR) show a real determination not to abandon Africa to its sad fate. But the world is changing and Europe is too. It is quite clear. And despite the speeches, Europe’s heart is no longer really in it; Europe seems generally occupied, from now on, with defining her identity, her borders, and her constitutional and economic future.\textsuperscript{43}

Like it or not, the conclusion is obvious: A page is being turned. Even France seems to have negotiated a new turn, perceived as an abandonment of its traditional African policy. As evidence, this confession of Jean-Pierre Barbier, Director of the Agence Française de Développement (AFD): “The disinvestment of French companies actually began and was accelerated by the events in the Côte d’Ivoire.” Today, “except for oil, Africa attracts less than 5 percent of direct foreign investment from France.” Thus, at a time when China, India and even Japan or Korea have substantially increased their investments in Africa, France and the rest of Europe have paradoxically divested heavily in favor of Asia. The trumpeted announcement is “the end of papa’s Africa.” Some see it as a sign that it is time to think of the conditions of an “Africa without France.”\textsuperscript{44} Others announce the “fall of the French Empire in Africa” (\textit{The Wall Street Journal}); while still others believe that “France is abandoning Africa” (\textit{Le Figaro}).\textsuperscript{45}

Yet it is obvious that for historical, geographical, and even strategic reasons, Africa has a certain vocation to cling to her immediate neighbor, the Europe from which she is separated by thirteen kilometers at the Strait of Gibraltar and the Mediterranean Sea (“mare nostrum”). This is the meaning to be given to the
Barcelona Process and the “Union for the Mediterranean.” It should be noted, however, that in the current context of globalization, the partnership with Europe, although it is a high priority, cannot remain exclusive for a long time, because it is contrary to the spirit and the letter of globalization, such as practiced and taught by the Europeans themselves. But the heart of the matter is that it takes two to tango. And from this viewpoint, some European countries such as France, for example, often give somewhat scrambled signals, to the point that one is not quite sure where one stands. “France,” wrote Ziad Liman in this respect in *Jeune Afrique*, “is gradually abandoning a market, opportunities and especially what makes her a somewhat global power still.” That is probably why other partners are now peeping into the political and economic space that France seems to neglect. Henceforth, the relations between Africa and Europe are no longer exclusive; they are in the process of becoming stale. The end of the 20th century and the beginning of this century are now marked by the arrival of new players and especially an Afro-Asian partnership on a whole new level. “In Beijing,” Zyad Liman continues, “our continent is seen through the prism of its immense possibilities. In Moscow, too, New Delhi, and Brasilia also...Africa is certainly the new frontier of globalization.”

**THE EMERGENCE OF ASIA**

What characterizes Asia today, the second world pole after the United States, is its amazing economic development marked by two-digit growth rates, the highest in the world. Asia is also a set of colossal states, many holding nuclear weapons: China, with 1.3 billion inhabitants, India, 1.1 billion, Pakistan, 160 million, and of course Japan, with 127 million. This broad zone of co-prosperity that has become indispensable also includes, besides the three economic giants (Japan, China, and India), extremely dynamic emerging countries such as Korea, the ASEAN states, Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan, and Indonesia.

Africa now maintains particularly dynamic relations with North Asia (China, Japan, and South Korea). The China-Africa cooperation, for example, is rampant in extremely varied fields (health, education, equipment, infrastructure, agriculture, industry, commerce, etc.). In Algeria, some twenty Japanese and Chinese groups of the BTP are associated with the construction of a west-east highway of nearly one
thousand kilometers, which by some reports represents the largest contract in the history of Algeria, worth 11 billion Euros. In Angola, China participates in the reconstruction of the legendary Benguela railway, linking the heart of Africa to the Atlantic coast. In Egypt, the Chinese group Citic has been awarded a contract of nearly one billion dollars to build an aluminum smelter. In South Africa, the “Industrial Land Commercial Bank of China” will disburse a staggering $5.6 billion to acquire 20 percent of the continent’s largest bank, the “Standard Bank.” One could multiply the examples everywhere.

Of course, this reinforced cooperation with Africa is also an integral part of the energy and global mining policy of Beijing, designed since the mid-1990s to sustain its very strong growth and ensure the supply of Chinese raw materials in the new millennium. In 2003, for example, China alone consumed 7 percent of the world’s crude oil. Although it is the fifth largest producer of black gold, “the Middle Kingdom” is also the number-two oil importer (behind the US). At the same time, China consumes 27 percent of the world’s steel, while being nevertheless the world’s largest steel producer, and 30 percent of the iron ore. According to an analysis by Harry G. Broadman, an economist at the World Bank, between 2000 and 2005, the exports of sub-Saharan Africa to China reached a staggering annual rate of 48 percent—this means two-and-a-half times faster than the region’s exports to the United States and four times faster than those to the European Union. The investments by China and India in this part of Africa are now counted in the billions of dollars. At the same time, Beijing has begun to remove its tariffs on hundreds of African products. Consequently, China, which is driving with its foot on the gas, has become the second-largest trading partner of Africa.

The same is true for Japan, which is now part of the major industrial and commercial donor powers. The number-three economy in the world, capable of exerting a significant influence on the conduct of affairs of the planet, Japan, a G8 and G20 member, aims to access permanent membership on the Security Council. Africa has excellent cooperative relations with Japan, especially in trade, where the sales of Japanese cars, for example, largely dominate the African markets. Japan is now Africa’s third major commercial supplier.
This is also the case of the new India, aspiring, like Japan, to a permanent position on the UN Security Council. India has already landed in Africa in sectors such as telecommunications, agriculture, computers, timber, minerals, and even oil. The state company Indian Oil, for example, has obtained an exploration permit in Gabon, while the private steel group Arcelor-Mittal has a foothold in Senegal.

However, Asia does not govern the planet, nor does Africa, far from it. But Africa increasingly exchanges goods, capital, and technology with Asia, and in doing so has managed to shake, with regard to competition, the most established powers (including the United States and the European Union already subject to bitter rivalry by China, India, Japan, Malaysia, South Korea, and Thailand). The Tokyo, Seoul, Shanghai axis is increasingly heavy on the trade with Africa. Moreover, Asia has created with Africa “strategic partnerships” of a new type such as the “China-African Economic Forums” for China, the “Tokyo International Conference on the Development of Africa” (TICAD) for Japan and the new “Korea-Africa Forum,” “India-Africa,” and “Turkey-Africa.”

With globalization, we witness the tilting of the world toward Asia-Pacific and the countries worth emulating because of their extraordinary success stories are almost all located in this part of the world: South Korea, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, etc. Each in its own way, and for various reasons, represents an alternative model for African states. In fact, “all Asian countries practice a state interventionism currently prohibited in Africa through structural adjustments.... They all refuse the dissolution of national states in liberal globalization and do not try, like international organizations do, to impose on Africa the overtaking and the dismemberment of nations.”

In summary, the interest of this Asian-African cooperation lies in the fact that it is seemingly done without dictates, without coarse interference, without impossible unprecedented conditionalities, and especially without systematic threats of sanctions: the carrot without the stick. Some are worried; others no longer hesitate to wave the old red rag of “yellow peril.” Yet their own countries have with Asia (and especially with China) particularly dynamic relations and without conditionalities often even qualified as “strategic.” These include the
United States and Europe. The US, for example, is increasingly turning to the Pacific, especially with the summits of the APEC (Asia-Pacific) countries to the detriment of the Atlantic and “old Europe.” On the American West Coast, for example, California and its cities of San Francisco and Los Angeles, turned to Asia, is now the cultural, technological and industrial center of America, relegating Washington and New York, respectively, on the East Coast, into the simple role of political capital and financial metropolis. “The Pacific,” finds Jacques Attali in this respect, “became the first sea of the world. In 1990, Trans-Pacific trade already exceeded Trans-Atlantic trade by half; half of world trade is done there now. Nine of the twelve major ports in the world are located on the Asian coast of the Pacific, and the majority of the air freight of the planet crosses this ocean.”

In Europe, countries like France, a nation that inspires all of Francophone Africa (fortunate and less fortunate), contains in its “Chinatowns,” hundreds of thousands of Asians (better treated than Africans) and trades more and more with China. Jacques Chirac, who during his presidency, traveled there several times to promote French interests, came back each time with lucrative deals for his country: sales of hundreds of Airbus aircraft and thousands of Alstom locomotives; construction in Wuhan of car assembly lines (Peugeot-Citroën); relocation of factories (Alcatel, Thomson-CSF), etc. Here, there is no “break-up” since Nicolas Sarkozy naturally followed the lead of his predecessor and also traveled the “Silk Road.” This is especially normal since the interest of France is at stake. This means that the economic competition and the inevitable relations of rivalry between the West and the East are in no way incompatible with realistic cooperation. One thing is certain, however, namely that in Africa, as noted by European Commissioner Louis Michel, “the Western, Asian and Arab powers compete fiercely.” And he specified in this regard: “I cannot stay a silent accomplice of all the European countries that seek to deepen their economic relations with China and at the same time, in their discourse, blame the African states that enter into such relations with China. I support globalization for all, not only for Europeans.”

THE DECLINE OF RUSSIA

In 1991, the USSR, a key player with the US in the East-West world order, imploded, and Moscow, the hub of the former Soviet Union, is
content to be henceforth the capital of a more limited entity from a geopolitical point of view: the Russian Federation. A civilian and military nuclear power, Russia is nevertheless still a great potential power pole. A permanent member of the UN Security Council, Russia was admitted in 1997 as a full partner in the G8. This copy of the Security Council is grouping the supreme leaders of the “masters of the world” countries. Admittedly, this state is still relatively weak in part because of the fragility of its economic fabric, the difficulties of the war in the Caucasus, and the presence of revengeful or warmongering neighbors at its borders, which probably explains the momentary loss of economic and political influence of this great country in Africa. But Russia, which holds all the potential necessary to enhance its international role, will ultimately, sooner or later, wake up, as demonstrated by the 2008 tensions in Georgia. Already in 2007, Russian President Vladimir Putin made a much-noticed first visit to South Africa and Morocco.

THE REVIVAL OF SOUTH-SOUTH COOPERATION

To continue to serenely ensure its development in a highly troubled international economic context, Africa understood that her salvation, in matters of foreign policy, could also reside in a new promotion of South-South cooperation, free of conditionalities, injunctions, threats, or sanctions. As well illustrated by Afro-Asian relations, such cooperation indeed takes place on the basis of equality, mutual benefit, and solidarity.

On the African continent, although it takes time for the full benefits of sub-regional integration to reveal its full benefits (for various reasons, of which the most obvious seem to be structural) South Africa, Egypt, and the countries of North Africa nevertheless maintain increasingly dynamic exchanges in the field of trade and investment with the rest of the continent. On the side of the Middle East countries, Africa has benefited from the generous support of the Arab Fund and funding from the Islamic Development Bank in various forms. But the objective should be to substantially increase investments from this region that is now a huge reservoir of influence, resources, and wealth.

Finally, in recent years, Africa and Brazil have decided to pursue a
policy of active cooperation, particularly under the leadership of Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. Brazil, a country of 180 million inhabitants, whose GDP is approximately $500 billion, now forms the BRIC group with Russia, China, and India, a group of emerging countries. According to Jacques Attali, by 2025, the country could become the fourth largest economic power in the world, behind the United States, China, and India. Brazil also aspires to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council. And as President Lula da Silva said in 2006, Brazilians “feel connected to the African continent by historical and cultural ties. As the country with the second largest black population in the world, we are committed to sharing Africa’s challenges and its destiny.”

In this day and age, such a declaration gladdens the hearts of abandoned Africans, who also have high expectations for the African-American summits of the South, the first of which was held in November 2006 in Abuja, Nigeria.

THE EMERGENCE OF NEW TYPES OF PLAYERS

Foreign policy has never been made in the closed circuit of a ministry of foreign affairs alone. However, everywhere, it was recognized that the state, through such a ministry, had a near-monopoly over diplomacy. Diplomacy was then defined as the conduct of relations between sovereign states via accredited representatives, who formed a body of professionals with a mission to conduct negotiations according to carefully developed procedures. But with the emergence of new types of actors who have imposed themselves, this public monopoly is now deeply undermined by the action, or the activism, of new “players.” As Kofi Annan writes: “Where once governance was limited to governments, today various non-state actors, including civil society, are part of various governance structures... Where once checks and balances in democratic societies were largely the domain of national parliaments, today civil society plays its part.” Indeed, to the traditional governmental international organizations (IOs) have been added the “non-sovereign” players, now called by the UN Secretary-General “great global partners” (NGOs, civil society, multinational firms, media, religious movements, etc.). These new non-state players unfortunately also include non-state armed groups (mercenaries, militias, private security companies, rebels, terrorists, pirates, soldiers, and organized criminals) who in turn intend to dismantle the African...
nation-state and privatize “legitimate violence” whose monopoly in the West always belongs to the state.

The African state, which is thus no longer alone in the world, is facing in this new world disorder strong and unbalanced competition from all these new players; thus, externally, it faces increasing competition, and it is contested, destabilized and even threatened, as we shall see, by these “non-sovereign” players, which are mostly of Western origin. “Of the 192 countries that exist worldwide,” says Hubert Védrine, “nearly 130 do not shelter NGOs; and those (NGOs) that have more resources and media relays, therefore the most powerful, are almost all Anglo-Saxon.”56 Internally, the state is also bypassed or avoided by the policies of decentralization and empowerment of the regions and local authorities, which began at the turn of the 1990s. The doctrine of “less government” intended to dismantle the “centralizing state” in favor of the market, civil society, and local intermediate powers, and also “resulted in the reduction of the areas of State action” and their descent to levels closer to the citizens.57 All this shows, as we shall see later, that power is no longer solely in the hands of the state and that even sovereignty, increasingly abused, seems now likely to become privatized. According to Samy Cohen, “the emergence of ‘new’ transnational players on the international scene has substantially transformed, in less than fifteen years, the global landscape, abolishing the monopoly held by the state players who are now forced to engage in a new type of competition. Thanks to economic globalization, the development of the media, communication technology, and transportation, their number and their role have grown considerably.”58

THE REVERSE OF THE MEDAL

What has not been said and written about globalization? For some, it is just a new incarnation of capitalism and a new stage of imperialism; for others, it is a natural and irreversible phenomenon, a huge wave with beneficial and unprecedented effects on a global scale. Although no one is really quite in agreement on the exact nature of globalization, almost everyone agrees, however, on the essential elements that make up this phenomenon that became the major feature of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. One can recognize a number of key features in this new world order.
First, there is the extraordinary explosion of science and technology, particularly in the field of information and communication. New information and communication technologies (ICT) enormously reduce the time and cost of transport and communication, and now pervade virtually all sectors of human activities and deeply change the economy, finance, work, education and even recreation. Then there is the increasing interdependence of the economies of all countries of the world, accompanied by the massive expansion of the markets and the increasing liberalization of trade, giving rise a sense of humanity’s global village, according to the famous expression of Canadian media specialist Marshall McLuhan. Each nation now lives under the eye of others.

For what interests us here, we will note that, contrary to prior periods, marked by the confrontation of ideologies and class struggle, the post-Cold War period has seen the triumph of a single economic model, itself based on a single thought and ideology, which proclaimed the end of history and imposed the supremacy of market principles and “economic efficiency” with the doctrine of “less government.” They stated that the progress of the market and democracy are indivisible and irreversible; this unique model is what one generally dubs “market democracy”: there is no development without free market, without freedom of trade, without privatization, without “less government,” without democratization, and without the protection of human rights. Only private investment and trade may, under the free market and a democratic political environment, promote development.

But the consequences resulting from this dazzling universal triumph of globalization and the neo-liberal agenda that now guided nearly the entire world were not the same for all, far from it. There were winners and there were losers. For some, it has brought prodigious profits, while for others, it has represented endless difficulties. Particularly concerning Africa, globalization as it is still unfolding at this time, has led to a series of paradoxes and ambivalences that affect precisely the independence, security, and development of the continent, which has experienced on these issues a true leap backward.
The other face of the new world order is above all a radical and systematic questioning of the principle of sovereignty and the independence of African countries, both in the field of international relations and their sovereign domestic prerogatives. We must also recall that the principle of sovereignty that appeared as early as the seventeenth century, at the same time as the modern state, namely the Western state, as it must be emphasized, merges with that of national independence. It has been setting out, for four centuries already, the exclusive right of a government to exercise state power in its territory and over a population without having to suffer the orders of a third party. But this principle, once untouchable, is increasingly bullied and very strongly challenged by globalization and the emergence of not only “non sovereign players” but also “new rights” in gestation. This is particularly the case of the “right of interference,” i.e., the right to interfere without permission in affairs that are under the exclusive jurisdiction of another state. Indeed, in the late 1990s, the indignation aroused by the atrocities, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, and crimes against humanity committed in former Yugoslavia and in Africa (e.g., the Rwanda genocide in particular) have encouraged greater acceptance of the principle of humanitarian intervention and what was called the “duty of interference.”

One must note in this regard that considerations of this kind led African countries to introduce, as of 2000, in the Constitutive Act of the African Union, the principle of the right of intervention in cases of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. We must also remember that it was under pressure from the African group that the UN succeeded in 2005 to codify, for the first time during the 59th session of its General Assembly, which I chaired, the new, extremely controversial concept of “responsibility to protect,” which seeks to legitimate, under certain conditions, the right of humanitarian intervention.

But in fact, most major powers (which behave as if they were above the laws, ethics, and sanctions), some of their NGOs (not all, thankfully), and even IOs, often use it as a pretext to claim the unilateral right to impose on others, by all means, their own ideas and values and a line of conduct and rules of the game that they
themselves have defined for others, but that does not apply to them. They no longer hesitate even to blackmail the small states and clearly show the quasi-messianic intent to model the whole world into the image of their own volition. “The contemporary globalization of the main dimensions of life,” writes Serge Latouche, “is not a natural process generated by a fusion of cultures and stories. It is still domination with its counterparties, subjugation, injustice, destruction.”

Therefore, globalization has been associated with the erosion of, or even the end of, state sovereignty. In the words of Jürgen Habermas: “Compared with the local roots of the nation-state, the term globalization in fact evokes the image of rising rivers that undermine border controls and risk leading to the collapse of the national edifice.” But although it is true that, in general, the role of the state in the international system is now regarded as “devalued under the triple effect of the arrival of new international players..., the phenomenon of globalization and the weakening of the nation-state model,” that of the African states is even more devalued. To say it with political scientist Samy Cohen, “There are ‘winning’ and ‘losing’ erosions depending on the type of State that undergoes them.... Sovereignty is distributed very unevenly. Between the ‘failed states,’ the ‘quasi-states’ and other ‘pseudo-states’ eaten up by civil wars, unable to maintain a minimum of social cohesion and prosperous democracies with relatively robust institutions of the Western world, the comparison is difficult. The concept of ‘global turbulence’ does not have the same meaning for the United States, a superpower, and Gambia, a micro-state. Globalization is perceived differently by each country. For some, it is an advantage; for others, it is a source of unsolvable problems, in the short and medium terms.”

It is in this context that Western countries are now working to strengthen the powers and prerogatives of the sovereign and strong “Weberian state” at home, whose legitimacy relies very often on the assertion of national identity—racial or religious. In Africa, however, the institutional disempowerment of authorities and the methodical unraveling of the state in favor of a model of state that can be privatized and reduced to its bare minimum, have caused the emergence of “ghost states,” “failed states,” “broken states” or “collapsed states.” These states “in collapse”—unable to offer a
common vision, a living minimum and a basic security scheme—were the ones that plunged into chaos and criminalization of society. Somalia has become an emblematic example.

Indeed, in Africa, violence occupied the space left vacant by the state that became a ghost; identity divisions are too often encouraged by the slogans of autonomy and the privatization of everything. These slogans no longer refer only to companies, but also to the legitimate functions of the sovereign democratic state. Indeed, the “functions that many people associate with the very essence of the state—both of its sovereignty and the social contract that underlies it—are externalized and subjected to market forces. These core functions include social security (including pensions), personal security (police), and national security (the army), and offer a striking picture of privatization gone mad.”

This is the current development of mercenaries (the “awful ones” and the “dogs of war” like Simon Mann in Malabo in 2004), the privatization of war (the “contractual” like “Executive Outcome” or “Blackwater” who have private armies of more than 5,000 men), and the multiplication of militias and private security companies. This is also true for warlords as was the case in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Somalia, Sudan, and even Angola where the “leaders” of crises in these countries (Fodeh Sankoh, Charles Taylor, Mohamed Farah Aidid, Jonas Savimbi, etc.) generally adorned themselves in identity-giving attire to justify their often criminal activities (trafficking in diamonds, coltan, timber, drugs, stolen cars, and weapons and engaging in maritime piracy, etc.). This is probably also true of some of the ethnic discourses developing today and causing Africa to now slip on the gentle slope of democratic intolerance, disorder, division, and violence. This is especially frightening because “anarchy,” as Tzvetan Todorov affirmed, “is worse than tyranny because it replaces the arbitrariness of one by the arbitrariness of all.”

Generally, in these countries, the concepts of responsibility, authority, and sovereignty no longer had any meaning, and the non-state players (terrorists, bandits, smugglers, mafias, pirates, and religious, regional or ethnic organizations, etc.) were able to acquire the broadest autonomy. The case of Somalia, with its clans and sub-clans, its regional organizations (in Puntland and Somaliland), and religious organizations (el-Shabaab, Hezbollah, etc.), is particularly
illustrative in this respect. Moreover, weakened by invasive and systematic outside interference, the ambient legal mimicry, the right-thinking and “politically correct,” the nation state is confronted in Africa more than anywhere else with the difficulties of governability that dramatically undermine its authority and dangerously turn its peoples into children. Bertrand Badié and Robert Jackson have shown how the import of the Western state model in non-Western societies had also promoted phenomena of sovereignty usurpation.

“Rampant recolonization” (according to Gilles Duruflé), “placement under international supervision” (Maurice Kamto), “global hegemony” (Zbigniew Brzezinski), “growing neocolonial domination” (Björn Beckman), “sovereignty usurpation,” etc., nobody will be surprised that a myriad of expressions have been used by some observers, economists, political scientists, or lawyers to describe what, in fact, presents itself as a jump backwards and influence of structure eroding, almost day by day, the powers of African states. In fact, safeguarding the autonomy of these states became increasingly random. With the slightest indiscretion reported, threats of multilateral and/or unilateral state and/or non-state sanctions were immediately applied or brandished. There were no brakes anywhere. One should, however, make it clear that punishment is a science and not a reflex.

We must recall here that the concept and practice of punishment in the relations between peoples are as old as time. The Greek historian Thucydides already spoke of the use of economics as a weapon during the Peloponnesian war (from 431 to 404 B.C.). But especially since the end of the First World War, the principle of punishment, directly derived from “Wilsonian diplomacy,” took its current modern form. Indeed, according to Woodrow Wilson—28th president of the United States (1913-1921), father of American moralizing idealism, Nobel Peace Prize winner (1919) and “creator” of the League of Nations (LON)—since a binding international order of states is created, the world is no longer like a jungle. It becomes a society in which the states, the same as the individuals in any society, are subjected to sanctions if they violate the norm and the law. Thus, any order also provides for the worst and in particular sanctions to punish the “criminals.” Punishing a nation, as we punish the guilty, an
individual, or a child, therefore becomes perfectly legitimate. The principle of “preventive war” stated by the Bush administration intended to punish “rogue states” involved, one says, this same logic. The goal here takes on an openly moral tinge: we must transform, thanks to punishment, the “deviant” attitude or behavior of the “sinner.” So stated, this seems obvious and accepted by all. But then, why are some countries consistently above the law and protected from sanctions? They decree laws for the others without applying them to themselves. Therefore, it should not be too surprising that it awakens old poorly healed wounds; some consider that this story sounds a little like the colonizers when they said, “We must lead and educate child-like people until the day they are able to support themselves.” It also reminds one of cases of “infidel people” who must be kept on a leash “for their own good.”

Let us not forget that today, for domination to be imposed and perpetuated, the force and the “sword” are no longer enough: one also needs a justifying ideology to legitimate dominance. And this ideology, based on the civilizing intent of the West (the Cross and the Bible), is always the same, namely that “this domination is for the good of the dominated.” We will return once again to the quote from Kenyatta: “When the White people came to Africa, we had the land and they had the Bible. They taught us to pray with our eyes closed. When we opened them, the White people had the land and we had the Bible.” According to Régis Debray, the world today is divided between “humiliating” and “humiliated,” but the difficulty “is that the humiliating do not see themselves as humiliating. They like to cross swords, rarely looking the humiliated in the eye.”

Brought back to the fashion of the day owing mainly to the success of multilateral and unilateral measures imposed against South Africa under the apartheid regime, sanctions, we must recognize very clearly, today represent “a vital tool that allows the Security Council to deal with threats to peace and international security,” as very appropriately mentioned by Kofi Annan when he was Secretary General of the United Nations. It is also true that there is no order without constraint, and that the planet, which entered a dangerous era, desperately needs some sort of global or regional police. This means that as a general rule, we cannot be against the principle of sanctions, which
the African Union also applies vis-à-vis its member states. But if an order is nothing but constraint (e.g., the USSR in its decline), it may collapse. Like with alcohol, it is the abuse that kills. In fact, some countries (along with some of their NGOs), which have established themselves as policemen of the world order, deliberately place themselves, as we have seen, above morality, laws, and sanctions. No real authority is in fact greater than theirs, especially when their interests are at stake. Thus, large countries like the United States, Russia, China, and India are challenging Justice and the International Criminal Court (ICC) with its seat in The Hague. The United States even went so far as to sign, with the ICC member countries, bilateral agreements of immunity and non-extradition to The Hague aimed at exempting American citizens from that international justice. But they do not hesitate, when it comes to others and their interests, to actively support the same ICC (as was the case in Sudan, for example). Why are we not also entitled to say, as they do, that our ties to drugs and criminals should be tried in Africa, rather than by our old colonial masters, who never cease to humble us?

Similarly, the sanctions are very often applied only selectively and unfairly; everyone knows for example that they are really effective only when they are directed against small states that are already on a leash. Indeed, they are increasingly used as economic weapons of bilateral diplomacy by large countries that handle various means of economic intervention (aid, customs privileges, sanctions, and embargoes) to achieve their own ends. For supporters of “realism” like Edward H. Carr and Henry Kissinger, the international field is basically anarchic. “The states,” they argue, “are not compelled by any law; the law is a fable that has no bearing out of the amphitheaters of the universities.” The few anecdotal examples below, which highlight the relationships between, on the one hand, some large countries, their powerful NGOs, and even IOs and, on the other hand, African countries, especially Gabon, clearly illustrate this state of affairs born of the new post-Westphalian system in which we now live.

We will take the first illustrative example from the bilateral relations between states: One morning of April 2003, I received in Libreville, at his request, the Ambassador of a great friendly power who visited me in my capacity as Foreign Minister of Gabon. After the
usual “courtesies,” we turned to the purposes of the visit, which had to do with the status of a new International Organization, the International Criminal Court. My interlocutor told me, with a straight face, that his country is urging mine to conclude, as soon as possible, an agreement concerning this organization. He also added, as a threat, that if Gabon did not comply before the end of June 2003, it would be deprived of the military credits granted by his country.

My surprise was especially great, faced with the brutal warning of the diplomat, since Gabon receives virtually no effective military aid (or any other type) from this great state. Moreover, this aid was limited in the past to the provision of three or four training grants for officers or petty officers of the Gabonese Armed Forces (GAF). I was all the more embarrassed because I resented this clumsy intimidation, I confess, as a kind of slap to the sovereignty of a friendly country that had done nothing wrong. In a dry tone, I asked my guest if he examined in advance the nature and size of the military loans he mentioned. Somewhat baffled by my question, he did not answer. He was content to repeat the instructions he had received from his government, which were probably the same, mechanically distilled to all its diplomatic representations in Africa and perhaps elsewhere, in almost all the countries of the Southern hemisphere.

I then pointed out to the Ambassador, a strong, charming man (and now a friend), that he did not need to make his request with such coarse threats, as I was already well prepared to transmit it to my government, partly because of fears and doubts rightly expressed by my colleague, the minister of justice, on this new international court. That’s what I did in the days that followed our conversation, without mentioning the content of the ridiculous threats made against Gabon. I just indicated that our very powerful friend would probably interpret a refusal as an unfriendly act. After the conclusion of the agreement, in the form of a simple exchange of letters, Gabon was then subjected to strong pressure in the opposite direction, coming both from several NGOs of the Northern Hemisphere and from the governments of other friendly European powers who had in this case a position diametrically opposed to that of the country of the Ambassador in question. All of them strongly encouraged us to review our position. Given the force of these pressures from countries that granted us real
substantial assistance, Gabon was compelled to write to the government of this great friendly country to obtain a revision of the agreement. Our sovereignty, I thought then, had taken another blow.

The second illustration concerns another International Organization, UNICEF, and the sadly famous case of the ship Etireno, which made great noise in the world. It is the story of a ship under a Nigerian flag that left from Cotonou (Benin) the morning of March 27, 2001, in full sight of everybody, going to Central Africa, with exactly 170 illegal immigrants on board from several West African countries (Benin, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Senegal, and Togo). When it arrived in Gabon during the night of Monday, April 2, 2001, the ship tried to illegally discharge its “undocumented” people on the beaches of Libreville with the connivance of human smugglers, who were themselves members of West African organized crime groups. Boarded immediately, the same night, by security forces, it was pushed with its “human cargo” outside the territorial waters of Gabon. This phenomenon, as everyone knows, is unfortunately very common; it can be seen most days either off the coast of the United States (Cuban or Haitian immigrants attempting to reach Florida) or in the Mediterranean Sea (African immigrants trying to reach Italy or Spain and then the rest of Europe by the Strait of Gibraltar, the Gulf of Sidra, Malta, or the Italian island of Lampedusa), or recently, the Canary Islands and African countries used as transit, such as Morocco, Senegal, and Mauritania. But in Gabon, Miss Denisa Ionete, UNICEF diplomat,71 stationed at Libreville and probably wanting to give sensational news, reported to the international press, in statements that could not have been more absurd, that this boat carried “250 child slaves destined for the Gabonese market.” Of course, this was not totally false.

Regarded as an oil-Eldorado, Gabon, like many other countries, indeed attracts many clandestine immigrants who quite often have left their homeland for dishonorable reasons: crime, debt, prostitution, fraud of all kinds. Unfortunately, there are often among them a number of “vulnerable” persons: physically handicapped beggars, women engaging in prostitution and children forced to work. The latter, with the complicity or the naiveté of their parents, are taken to Gabon and elsewhere by their own lawless countrymen, in order to
work (as sellers in markets or public places, beggars, or household maids) and to send money back home. This type of mafia practice is obviously odious, especially when it involves children who should be attending school with their families rather than be forced to work abroad. But the fault, if any, of Gabon in this case is its inability to effectively control its borders. But what country has succeeded in doing this? A reply is given to us by the French daily “Le Figaro,” which in its issue of December 27, 2006, states the following: “Polish workers reduced to slavery in Southern Italy; Moldovan, Belarusian, Ukrainian or Bulgarian young girls sold to networks of pimps across Europe; Albanian children locked in a cellar in Greece that they cannot leave except to go begging, young Romanians forced into prostitution in France; a network of trafficking in children’s organs uncovered in the Balkans. Not one month goes by without a new scandal exploding. Exceptionally, it makes the first page in the newspapers. Most often, the authorities smother it.” This is the sad reality of the world today, brought to light by the scandal (this time true) of the NGO “Zoe’s Ark,” a.k.a. “Children Rescue,” which was posing as a follower of Mother Teresa. Calls for help launched in the countries of origin of the trafficking and to rich nations are hardly ever heard; the answers, often brutal, that I sometimes received in my capacity as minister of foreign affairs were worthy of Pontius Pilate: Do not count on us, I was often told, it’s your problem.

In a world where the boundary between “internal” and “foreign” affairs has become porous, and where morals and the right of interference have burst into international relations, the Etireno case took a dramatic turn. The name of Gabon was dragged through the mud. The international press had a field day, while some non-African NGOs made it into a veritable casus belli. The country, facing in solitude an unequal struggle with variable geometry, was humiliated, condemned, classified in the last category (category 3 of the hierarchy of the shameful trafficking of human beings) and threatened with serious sanctions. This horrible campaign of vilification was especially devastating, in the case of the Etireno, as it was proved very quickly that they were not children but adults. Indeed they were sent back in accordance with national legislation and accepted international practice. But the damage was already done, and people continued to
ramble, to accuse and to exercise strong pressure and serious threats on Gabon, which was then considered, because of this false and sad affair as “a hub of child trafficking.” UNICEF, recognizing the seriousness of its false accusations, discreetly reassigned the accusing diplomat to Niger.

The third example, is a sordid story of ritual murder. During the first half of March 2005, the maimed and lifeless bodies of two teenagers were found on a beach in Libreville. The national and even the international press extensively discussed this heinous crime. Naturally, the police mobilized to find the criminals and bring them to justice. But as a result of a meeting of heads of international organization missions based in Libreville, the representative of the World Bank violently attacked the Gabonese authorities, accusing them of being lax and even of complicity, threatening them to go to the press. At the end of the meeting, however, her colleagues managed to calm her down and dissuade her from such an act, which they surely considered excessive. Instead, the resident coordinator for the United Nations in Libreville was mandated by all to address the issue with me in my capacity as minister of foreign affairs, which she did immediately. But to the general surprise, the headquarters of the World Bank in Washington was still advised not to provide us valuable assistance in this matter and to impose sanctions against Gabon. As for me, I asked to discuss it with the representatives of the missions and international organizations. Common sense dictated indeed to be able to share things and learn to exercise discretion in such a painful situation.

As we will see, diplomacy is a profession that creates risks when entrusted to the uninitiated. This profession, notes Ambassador Albert Chambon, “cannot be learned from books, like that of an engineer, architect, or even a doctor. It requires, above all, a thorough knowledge of men, men of all continents, and a special sensitivity to human relationships. Because this occupation is not acquired by book learning, everyone believes that he or she can improvise as a diplomat, while nobody would dream of becoming an improvised architect or doctor. In truth, no profession requires more experience than this one.” As shown, it is no longer enough to be a “brilliant economist” or a “brilliant financier” to validly represent organizations that venture increasingly into the political and moral field. These days, we must
better know the rules, usages, and limitations of diplomacy.

Nothing could be more normal than having all crimes and especially those against innocent children denounced, condemned, and very severely sanctioned. None, however, should serve as a supplementary means of two-sided pressure and sanctions against weak states, which in addition are often bankrupt. It is obvious to all, of course, that the heinous practice of ritual crimes in particular, related to the beliefs of another age should be regarded as part of a reprehensible obscurantism and perversity that shock the conscience and violate morality. But those who have the means should help to eradicate and not simply turn on the indignation machine, defame and punish the victim states of these barbaric practices that tarnish their image; because, let us repeat, to punish is a science and not a reflex.

The fourth illustration concerns the relationships with certain NGOs: In 1999, Gabon had decided to create thirteen nature protection parks, covering a total of 11 percent of its national territory and representing a huge capacity for catching the carbon dioxide (CO₂) emitted by the rest of world. Among these thirteen parks is that of “little Loango,” which in fact has existed for a very long time and where I myself grew up and spent a happy childhood in the midst of nature. This decision, quickly hailed by the international circles, made Gabon, according to the American magazine National Geographic, “after Costa Rica, the country that protects the largest area of its territory.” Shortly thereafter, I was happy to see the arrival in “little Loango,” of many foreign NGOs, specialized in environmental industry, eco-business, or the “business of climate change.”

Among them was a Dutch businessman interested in ecotourism; at the time, he acted under a “mask,” and I myself received him as a savior and helped him get settled, in my triple capacity as a native of the place, local parliamentarian, and minister of my country. Noting my enthusiasm for the preservation of the natural environment of my childhood, he even proposed to me to become a shareholder of his company. As for the foreign NGOs I also demonstrated zeal in signing with them, as Minister of Foreign Affairs, the “Headquarters Agreements” granting them benefits and privileges similar to those granted to foreign diplomats.
A few years later, in 2006, a Chinese oil company holding a prospecting permit started seismic search operations in the vicinity of the “little Loango” park (although not inside it) next to which a number of other (European) companies operated, producing oil (Shell, Perenco, and Total). Imagine our surprise to see some of these NGOs that we had welcomed as friends in our homes, and the Dutch tourist operator to whom we had granted so many material and financial advantages, start protesting, without even warning or at least telling us; they began to slyly edge on the international press, some international organizations like the World Bank, as well as friendly foreign governments like the Netherlands, France, and the Federal Republic of Germany, to compel the Gabonese authorities, through pressures and operations of media hype, to put an end to the Chinese oil prospecting. Of course, everyone can easily guess what was hiding in reality behind this attitude. It was however an easy claim to satisfy, which could find a good local solution if these NGOs and the businessman had chosen to resort to the national authorities (pro-Western, as it happens) that had generously offered them hospitality. But, accustomed to acts of force, and to bullying other people, they would rather practice what Bernard Kouchner, in his time, nicknamed the “law of media hype” and what others sometimes dubbed “ecologic-fundamentalism.” All this in order to pressure Gabon, to harass and intimidate this small, yet exemplary country, through measures as disproportionate as they were clumsy.

Naturally, as minister of foreign Affairs, I was struggling, too, with all these pressures. The indignation and slander machine that I mentioned earlier was again in motion, accusing, uttering cries of outrage, and covering any attempt at explanation with all the noise. But remember, however, these same NGOs, endowed by their country of origin with considerable financial resources and which take privileges and exorbitant fees from others, were never able to convince their own governments at home to seriously adhere to the Kyoto Protocol on the reduction of emissions of greenhouse gas. Yet it is these emissions, to which our continent contributes only a very small part (less than 4 percent), that are responsible for global warming, which threatens all of humankind so dangerously and especially Africa (through droughts, floods, weathering, food and health crises, etc.). In
fact, while Gabon, for its part, signs, ratifies, and implements the international conventions on biodiversity conservation and climate change; while it even goes well beyond what is asked of it, placing, as we have seen, 11 percent of its territory under absolute protection, the countries of origin of these NGOs, which are also the biggest polluters of the planet, refuse, as everyone knows, to do even the minimum, to avoid having to reduce their very high standard of living and to run the risk of “reduction.”

Those of the very big polluters, which accept the principle of reduction of their emissions of CO₂, however, give themselves half a century (until 2050) to achieve a reduction of 50 percent. They can thus continue to operate enthusiastically and quietly develop their super-polluting coal mines, increase their automobile and aeronautics production, or reduce the generation of food crops for the benefit of biofuels. So all that’s left to do is to turn, as usual, to the weakest and impose on them, if needed by threats, blackmail, and subversion, to immediately suspend their development, under penalty of deadly sanctions, to become simple captors of their dangerous carbon dioxide emissions. Isn’t it somewhat cynical?

“But should countries with one-fifth our gross domestic product—countries that contributed almost nothing in the past to the creation of this crisis—really carry the same load as the United States?” exclaims former American Vice President Al Gore, President of the Alliance for Climate Protection and Nobel Peace prize laureate. Take the case of Nicolas Sarkozy and Nicolas Hulot’s France; this friendly country that generally inspires our actions, would it be ready to give us an example, immediately abandoning, as called upon by the French “Greens,” the implementation of new vectors of massive pollution such as the construction of highways (which already cover 3 percent of its territory) or nuclear plants (which now provide 80 percent of its energy needs)? Would it think for a single second of reducing the growth of its automobile or aeronautics production? Is it willing to accept economic regression to save humanity? The answer is of course negative. And yet some of these same NGOs, marginalized in their own countries of origin but encouraged by them, descend on Africa, not as partners and educators, as could be expected, but as proconsuls, lesson givers, manipulators of conscience and opinions
and agitators of local NGOs paid and under their orders, “In truth,” people start whispering, “by blindly following some of these people, we will end up crawling on all fours.” We must recall once again that it is Gabon, the country blamed in this case by the NGOs, that absorbs, as admitted by President Nicolas Sarkozy, “each year four times more greenhouse gas than is produced all over France.” Such being the case, the real questions that arise are the following:

1. How can humanity survive if a Chinese, an Indian, or an African starts to consume as much as a Texan? Recall that the American state of Texas, which has 23 million inhabitants, alone releases as much as all 1 billion Africans put together; the United States, the European Union, and China account for more than half of the CO₂ emitted in the world. What to do in these circumstances to save humanity? Should we ask the Texan to reduce his overconsumption, his waste and emissions of CO₂, or the Chinese and the Indian not to imitate the “bad American example?” The sad answer is: because the Texan, the Chinese and the Indian refuse what is offered them, well, all that can be done is to turn against the weakest; so let’s prevent the Africans (the Gabonese in this case) from doing like everyone else and force them to stop their development. The cause is understood like this: as the train of progress and modernity drives at a very high speed without worrying about its disastrous consequences on us all, Gabon must remain on the platform for the happiness of those who are on the train.

2. Why should it always be the same ones who should pay the piper used by others? Human beings who, since the dawn of time, have lived in “little Loango” in harmony with nature, without roads, without cars, without airplanes, without electricity, without running water, in other words, without polluting the atmosphere and without overburdening the future of humanity, would they, too, not have the right to a little happiness, stability, progress and well being, especially since they are among the very first victims of global warming and rising waters and seas, for which they are not responsible?

3. Where are we at the international level, with the principle of “climate justice,” including the notions of “polluter pays,” financial
compensation to African countries, and “common but differentiated” responsibility? Is the North able to hear the anguish of this Africa that suffers and growls? Indeed, it is as if, in times of food crisis, those who have before them a plate already piled too high would ask their starving neighbors to eat less, under penalty of receiving a slap. Is it not a bit too easy!

And yet nobody should be against the idea of saving our common home, planet Earth so dangerously threatened. Moreover, the diagnosis of the ecological crisis is not really under debate any longer. The greenhouse effect is a reality. But uncertainty remains about possible remedies; and some advocated solutions (extremists and two-faced) raise problems. As noted by the very brave Claude Allègre of the French Academy of Sciences: “The tone of the speech that we hear these days is doom and gloom on the one hand, and on the other hand, the recommendation of return backward, stopping economic growth, non-development of the Third World, in short, stopping progress.” Still, according to the UN, “solutions to global warming cannot come at the expense of economic development.” Another question arises: Gabon, which has already given so much to humanity and is always willing to give more, should stay on the platform and remain forever a vast zoo simply intended to capture, without compensation, the CO₂ emitted by unrepentant polluter countries? Should it go back, all by itself, to the time of the oil lamp and sail boats?

Beyond this story, everyone knows, as written by Jacques Delors, that in the world “there are daily conflicts, open or implicit, discreet, away from wars....between industries and defenders of the natural environment or between large industrial groups and local civil societies. They can be managed, treated, monitored so that the future of a country or a society, the future of a piece of our planet is not sacrificed for the immediate benefit of one or the other actors.” What matters, in fact, is not so much to act as if it is nature that must dominate man or claim a land without people or even to seek to sacrifice some men on the altar of nature; what matters is rather to build a sustainable society, to ensure the sustainable future of the relationship between man and biosphere, to reconcile the imperatives of development and progress with those of nature conservation so as
to ensure a stable equilibrium between cities and countryside, between man (all men) and “our common home,” planet Earth, which is in such serious danger.

The fifth illustrative example relates to organizations with national and international jurisdiction. Indeed, during the year 2008 alone, within a few months, as though the judges had all agreed on it beforehand, there were many cases that gave rise in Africa to different emotions including frustration and humiliation.

The first two major cases concern the principle of “universal jurisdiction” that many, not only in Africa but around the world, consider abusive and inconsistent, coming from European courts (Spanish, Belgian, and French) apparently determined to attack especially civil and military personalities in Africa.

A Spanish judge, Fernando Andreu, decided one morning in February 2008 to prosecute some forty Rwandan personalities in office, including Staff General Karensi Karake, deputy commander of the joint UN/AU Armed Forces operating in Darfur (UNAMID). The latter was accused of having actively participated in the genocide, following the disappearance of President Juvénal Habyarimana in a plane crash that dates back to 1994. Following this serious accusation, Rwanda, which has four battalions in the UNAMID (2,500 soldiers), initially threatened to withdraw its contingent. But of the 26,000 men provided for this force, fewer than 10,000 were deployed in the field of operations at that time, including the 2,500 Rwandans. Such being the case, it seems to us that the decision dealt a fatal blow to UNAMID, which was already in bad shape since it did not have adequate logistical resources. Even the United States was worried and openly expressed its disapproval. In a second stage, Rwanda stressed the shortcomings of the proceedings and its tendentious character and decided, in turn, on behalf of the same principle of universal jurisdiction, to file suit with the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), against some thirty French military and political figures for “participation in the execution of the genocide of 1994.” Here is the reaction of an African living in France: “The attitude of human rights NGOs (FIDH, HRW, etc.), quick to demand the indictment of Africans, will be scrupulously observed by the whole continent. Will they demand that the 33 Frenchmen be tried before the international
justice [system] or will they close their eyes because they are white? Let’s see...”

The second major case relates to the sinking in 2002 in Senegal of the Senegalese ship “Le Joola,” which left more than 1,800 dead. Indeed, that Friday, September 12, 2008, a French judge, Jean-Wilfrid Noël, issued nine international arrest warrants against Senegalese civilian and military dignitaries including former Prime Minister Mame Madior Boye and the former head of the General Staff of the armies, General Babacar Gaye, who had become commander of the UN Mission in DRC (MONUC). Senegal, in turn, threatened to lodge a complaint against French personalities. According to Senegalese President Abdoulaye Wade, “we must put an end to the terrorism of European judges who annoy the leaders of our countries through unfair and whimsical procedures. We will follow up on this case!” And indeed the result is now known and unsurprisingly the case was dropped.

Then there was the decision made by Luis Moreno-Ocampo, chief prosecutor of the ICC to issue on Monday, July 14, 2008 an arrest warrant against the President of the Republic of Sudan, Omar Hassan Al-Bashir, on grounds that he would also be responsible (still in Darfur) for the “genocide.” Just a few weeks after the charges, judged abusive, of the Rwandan general, this new case on Darfur naturally raised doubts and mixed feelings. Could it be that nothing ever happens on other continents like Europe (the Caucasus and Georgia), the Indian peninsula (Pakistan or Sri Lanka), the Middle East (Gaza or Iraq) and Latin America (Guatemala or Colombia)? Russian President Medvedev, however, speaks of “planned genocide by Georgia against the South Ossetian people.” But here again, some would be tempted to paraphrase American President Franklin D. Roosevelt who, speaking about the well-known South American dictator Anastasio Somoza, was reported to have said: “He may be a son of a bitch, but he’s our son of a bitch.”

We should mention in passing that three other cases concerning only Africans are currently being examined at The Hague including Jean-Pierre Bemba, Senator and former Vice Chairman of the Democratic Republic of Congo, prosecuted for war crimes and crimes against humanity, arrested in Belgium on May 24, 2008 and detained
ever since at the ICC prison in The Hague where he is held along with, in particular, former Liberian Head of State Charles Taylor, or Thomas Lubango Dyllo, warlord also well-known in the Democratic Republic of Congo, transferred and judged at The Hague for forced enlistment of child soldiers.

Another important matter relates to French NGOs that decided in early 2008 to sue, before the French courts, heads of state of oil producing black African countries (Angola, Congo-Brazzaville, Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon). These NGOs accuse the heads of state of these countries of having bought residences in France using, according to them, funds generated by the oil resources of their own country. If these accusations are founded, and if they constitute a serious offense in France, why are these same NGOs pursuing only Africans, carefully avoiding blaming many other heads of state of oil countries possessing many homes and properties in France and elsewhere in Europe? Everybody knows for instance that most major European palaces (especially major hotels in Paris, London, Spain, Portugal, etc.) have been bought by petrol princes. Suffice it to read a few French newspapers to realize it: “A view of the Eiffel Tower is a ‘must’ for Middle Easterners... a Chinese family is negotiating the purchase of a vineyard for 12 million Euros in the Bordeaux region... Deauville is becoming popular with Russian customers.” Again “two weights, two measures”?

We should reject the trampling of Africa and not seek to defend the persons accused or even to express an opinion on the substantive issues raised by all these cases. For example, on the evidence and merits of the accusations, the UN International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur found in January 2005 that the crimes committed in Darfur were war crimes rather than crimes against humanity and not genocide. Another question is who must judge such cases or crimes? And before what courts (national, regional, international, mixed or foreign)? Still, one cannot help but wonder about some far simpler issues:

First: why are the noble principles of “universal jurisdiction” or the “fight against impunity” that we all cherish, triggered only against African personalities (in this case the Senegalese and Rwandan generals and the former Senegalese Prime Minister and the President
of Sudan)? Why do they not also apply the same principles to non-Africans, and especially heads of state of major world powers, against whom similar accusations have been made? Listen to the answer of Gideon Rachman in the Financial Times: “In Africa, we consider that the continent serves as a laboratory to the international judicial system. Four trials are under way at The Hague: all four involve Africans. Even if justice is deemed to be impartial, there will never be a trial against Russia for crimes committed in Chechnya. And, despite the apprehensions of American conservatives who have rejected the ICC for fear of being prosecuted, it is unlikely that US citizens would be bothered one day.” How do you want such behavior not to reopen old colonial poorly healed wounds?

Secondly, why precisely choose to launch all these legal proceedings when even the UN and the AU were trying to extinguish the fire caused in Darfur, throwing oil on the fire and forcing the UN and AU to evacuate the families and non-essential elements of UNAMID for fear of reprisals? Why will they not listen to the AU, which advocated not only justice but also peace and national reconciliation? “Of course,” says Gideon Rachman, “granting amnesties to despots and killers is a bad business. But—faced with a choice between peace and justice, and the rights of the living and the dead—priority should be given to peace and the living.”

Thirdly, a head of state in office, consequently enjoying universal principles of judicial immunity provided for in imperative international law (jus cogens) and recently reaffirmed by the International Court of Justice in the matter of Abdoulaye Yerodia N'Dombasi, must he be prosecuted by a foreign court, even the ICC? Everyone knows, as argued by the IFRI, that International Criminal Justice faces and will face for a long time an unspoken or unspeakable question: can it judge the winners? Until now, only men who lost power have been effectively judged, be it former Nazi leaders, Japanese military, Slobodan Milosevic, or Charles Taylor. Can it be otherwise? Will international justice eventually end up becoming a justice of the rich against the poor, a justice of the powerful against the weak? Will it constitute an instrument of domination over the South by the North? Assuredly, the “masters are back.” And international law, instead of serving to regulate and moralize, as it should, the relationships
between nations, first became a bludgeon in the hands of the strongest.

In any event, facing all these kinds of demands and threats of the “powerful” and those who shape public opinion, a single attitude is most often offered to the “small,” the “weak” and the “voiceless”: kowtow. In all these cases, it was necessary to comply to avoid in Gabon and Africa what could, therefore, appear as a real punishment: forfeiture of tariff profits under “AGOA,” blocking their files at the IMF, the suspension of some aid, international demonization and... sanctions. So that Gabon for example stands today in the somewhat uncomfortable or even humiliating position of having to constantly give guarantees and regularly provide the details and explanations on the measures taken to implement the requirements (sometimes whimsical, sometimes arrogant) of the “Great,” their media, their NGOs, and their multiple opinion relays. In the particular case of the fight against trafficking of children, for example: a new law was passed, a special unit was created in the police, dozens of parents and children in West Africa were arrested and deported, etc. Regarding the protection of the environment in “little Loango,” the Chinese petroleum search (but not the others) was simply suspended and nearly 200 Gabonese about whom no one cared, directly or indirectly became unemployed. The same year, the construction of a hydroelectric dam (by the Chinese) and a port dock (by Arabs) were stopped under the pressure of the same NGOs under orders that also blackmailed the state.91 But, should we not fear that one day, by way of being sacrificed and failing to be heard, the “voiceless” and the unemployed will be heard differently, by becoming for example troublemakers or even terrorists, like what is already observed in the Niger Delta in Nigeria? What will some manipulators and lesson-givers do then? I bet they will answer, as usual, that it is not their problem.

It should be noted, however, that business circles increasingly associate themselves with churches and enlightened minds to criticize certain policies of blind sanctions and their consequences on innocent people. Even President Clinton himself denounced, at the beginning of his second term, “the ‘madness’ of the immoderate use of economic punishment that mires the American state in inconsistent politics
rather than bending its targets." The judgment of the former French Prime Minister, Michel Rocard, is even more severe: “Everything happens in any case for the moment,” he writes, “as if the former slave traders and former colonists had now become in half a century rigorous lecturers in civic morality and politics with the right to grant or refuse assistance according to criteria they established themselves and that border on the arbitrary.”

This systematic questioning, open or subtle, brutal or “soft,” of the sovereignty and interests of small states has been brought to light by many analysts. Thus, Moreau Defarges writes in “The World Order”: “The master is the master, persuaded that this position is given to him by Providence, by History, by force of circumstances. For the servant or the slave, his inferiority and his misfortune are taken for granted.”

In one of his studies on North-South relations, political scientist Ariel Colonomos, specialist in the ethics of international relations, made this remark that should be mentioned here at length: “Even though the Westerners claim an ethic, those states whose universalistic pretension is based on economic and political superiority are confronted with a front of refusal by many of their interlocutors, who oppose to them their own cultural particularity and the specificity of their history.... Even if it were the most virtuous, universalism raises questions. In this context, an ethic of domination fully characterizes international relations. The power games on the international stage echo, in this sense, a fully Aristotelian vision where there cannot be equality among unequals.... The other is this barbarian whose fate is to be corrected or trained, educated in the best case scenario... In such a context, the foreign policy of the strong is inspired by his sense of superiority as well as by the need to see the weak obey his strategic, economic and cultural demands.... He thus reinforces conquering universalism.”

Further on, the same author writes: “In these circumstances, the primacy of the North over the South is reflected by unhindered dominance accompanied by paternalism.” While these may be exaggerated views, they all illustrate the same the problem that arises. Indeed, “The sovereignty that the countries of the Third World so desired, relates back to the power struggle, and there is no point in being sovereign if one remains weak, unless a norm imposed on the stronger sovereignties serves as protection.” Hence the need for
union designed, among other things, to better protect the collective African sovereignties so dangerously threatened. To paraphrase President Mitterrand’s statements about Europe: a strong Africa will protect us better.

THE HIRED ARSONISTS

The state of “perpetual war” in which many African countries plunged in the mid-1990s turned out to be equally paradoxical. To the general surprise, the political situation in those states, rather than improving as predicted by the general theory of “universal peace” and “perpetual peace,” instead worsened everywhere. As human society advance overall towards light and progress, Africa, destabilized and weakened, disoriented and gnawed by war, was abandoned and plunged into anarchy and darkness. According to the UN, “In 1996 alone, 14 of the 53 countries of Africa were afflicted by armed conflicts accounting for more than half of all war-related deaths worldwide and resulting in more than 8 million refugees, returnees, and displaced persons.” In July 2004, of the sixteen peacekeeping operations deployed worldwide by the UN with a total of 56,000 men (military and police), six took place in Africa. The threats on peace and security on our continent reached unprecedented proportions during the last decade of the twentieth century.

Since order is a mode of managing violence, one was entitled to expect, from this point of view, benefits from the new world order, especially that it should have put an end to aggressive nationalism, identity claims, genocide, and ethnic cleansing. This is not what happened. Quite the contrary, much more than in the past, we witnessed, on the side of the African states, a paradoxical mix of both an aspiration to pan-African/universalist values and an exacerbation of national particularities and ethnic or religious contradictions. Indeed, the dynamics of globalization largely contributes to the exacerbation of extreme violence insofar as it affects or destroys, as it does in Africa, the authority of the state and the capacity of governments to establish a minimum economic and social security necessary to respect the political order of a stable legal regime. “When the state is weak,” says Jacques Attali, “the chance to channel violence and control it disappears. Local conflicts are multiplying, identities are clenched, ambitions clash, and lives have no more value.” This is the
same as the finding made by Jean Ziegler when he wrote: “The privatization of the world weakens the normative capacity of the states. It puts parliaments and governments under guardianship. It renders otiose most elections and almost all the popular votes. It deprives public institutions of their regulatory power. It kills the law.”

Surely, globalization often contributes, through its excesses, systematic interferences and the resulting dictates, to delivering the fragile African countries to all predators and arsonists who actually are often paid by “offshore sponsors.”

Through all these means and in this manner, for the first time on the continent, not only in the Horn of Africa, but also in the Great Lakes region, following the pattern of the great European wars of the 19th and 20th centuries, there took place what some observers have called the “first African world war,” not only because of its intensity, the violence of the fighting, and the multiplicity of actors, but also its geopolitical repercussions. In fact, here, one of the hallmarks of the new nature of these wars of the so-called “third millennium” is that they quickly become complex, multidimensional, and especially contagious: conflicts now took on aspects and implications both internal (civil wars) and external (interstate wars). That is what one still sees today in Darfur, for example. “In recent years,” writes Kofi Annan, “the Security Council... has found that the breaches of the peace and acts of aggression most often begin within states, yet swiftly develop into threats to the peace of a whole region, if not the whole world.”

In Africa especially, the UN could clearly identify the contagious nature of those conflicts that, for nearly fifteen years, have destabilized the entire sub-region of the Great Lakes, including even a country like Gabon, although it has no borders with this sub-region. That is what we observe today in Sudan with the spreading of the conflict of Darfur to Chad and Central African Republic. And it is also perhaps what nearly happened in southern Africa, where several times, the use of force was contemplated against Zimbabwe in 2000.

It will be recalled for example in relation to the DRC that the rest of the defeated Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR) and the Hutu militias (called Interahamwe), ousted from Rwanda in 1994, have continued to carry out the war from their rear base in Kivu, east of the DRC (then...
The Zairian armed forces, the FAZ, both “out of phase,” complacent, and powerless against these battles, naturally favored the emergence of rebel groups supported from outside and determined to bring down, with the active support of extra-African powers, the autocratic regime of President Mobutu. Thirty-five years after the assassination of Congolese Prime Minister Patrice Emery Lumumba, it was decided to undo what had been done: Mobutu, although he was known to suffer from terminal cancer, had to be immediately flushed from power, people said, “or his body will be dragged through the streets of Kinshasa.” The person who had been for so long what the West wanted him to be was finally chased out of his country on May 17, 1997 as a result of a Western decision. The shocks of this conflict were felt as far as Gabon, more than 3,000 km as the crow flies from its epicenter, when, at the beginning of July 1997 in Léconi, a small community of fewer than 500 inhabitants located in southeast Gabon, a dozen fighters and civilians from Rwanda arrived on foot, in search of a country of refuge. Within a few days, their numbers grew, on July 24, to 1,328 refugees with an average daily frequency of arrival of about 40 people. These Rwandans, who included soldiers, probably ex-FAR or Interahamwe militiamen, some of whom, it was claimed, were regarded as “genocidal,” fled the combat zones and were chased all over the vast territory of the DRC by their opponents. They had thus traveled, most often on foot, nearly 4,000 km and crossed several countries before reaching the border of Gabon. The risks of contagion and spread of the conflict became clearer. Henceforth, Gabon was also in the eye of the hurricane and targeted by “the warlords” who, it seems, did not ask for much. Indeed, some of them, rumored by some to be encouraged from the outside, were just waiting for a pretext to take the war beyond the Congo and destabilize especially the generation of so-called “old leaders.”

From this point of view, the war had to act, according to its “offshore sponsors” and their “boxes of ideas” as the factor determining social, political, and economic reconfigurations of the continent, like a “big bang” giving birth to a new African order. In fact, according to a well-known Japanese formula, “Scrap and Build,” the idea was to destroy the existing order to build empires of a new type on its ruins. Spreading the “constructive chaos” or “creative destruc-
tion” in the region, flouting the sacrosanct principles of sovereignty, non-interference, inviolability of the borders and non-use of force, terrorizing other nations, pitting them, “all against all,” causing fragmentation and collapse of the states, leaders and systems in place, the war had to make a clean slate for the rise of a new geopolitical and geostrategic structure and transform the nature and the political regimes of these states into instantaneous and “allied” democracies. In the case of Central Africa, it took all the wisdom of Nelson Mandela, the strong reactions of Angola and Namibia and the know-how of some heads of state including Omar Bongo Ondimba to deter warmongers from also attacking small peaceful countries like Gabon, for example. It was indeed necessary to act and react quickly in order to avoid the uncontrolled variables.

In this context of great mistrust and great tension, the head of state of Gabon secretly sent me to Kinshasa in January 1998. I was carrying an important message of peace and cooperation for the destroyer of Mobutu, M’zee Laurent-Désiré Kabila, who at the time suspected Gabon of colluding with his predecessor and of sympathizing with the partisans who were against the new regime. This irrational attitude disconcerted us.

That January 30, 1998, a Friday morning, I therefore traveled very discreetly to Kinshasa, accompanied by Patrice Otha, deputy director of the presidential office. When we arrived and came in, Eddy Angulu Mambengi, minister of the environment, forest and tourism, who came to meet me at the N’djili airport and accompany me to the Intercontinental hotel, informed me that “M’zee” was in Katanga, 2,000 kilometers from the capital, but he was prepared to receive us. Touched by what I had just heard, I was seized by a mixture of joy and emotion. Joy because I realized that I was winning a bet with those who claimed in the Congolese capital that it was still too early, if not impossible, for Kabila to receive an emissary of Gabon; emotion for meeting the near-legendary “M’zee” Laurent-Désiré Kabila, “freedom fighter” who ousted “Mokonzi” Marshal-President Mobutu for some, comrade-in-arms of Lumumba, Mulélé, Gizenga, Sumialot... and Che Guevara for others.

We therefore left almost immediately after our arrival in Lubumbashi with my Congolese counterpart. We were staying at the
Kalawi hotel, in room no. 226. Advised that the president could receive us at any time, we did not take off our suits and waited patiently. At midnight, as nothing had happened, we each decided to go to bed. At six o’clock the next morning, I received a phone call saying that the president would receive us in an hour. We had just the time to put on our suits and ties again before leaving for the presidential residence.

The president received us on Saturday, January 31, at 7:00 AM, in the presence of the Ambassador Léonard She Okitundu, who was to become his minister of foreign affairs. I had the mission of explaining to him in person Gabon’s position; I also had to convince him of the good intentions and good faith of the Gabonese authorities towards his country and its new leaders. For over one hour, President Kabila listened to me, in a relaxed atmosphere and raised some questions that I answered with conviction.

I was aware that, in fact, certainties rather than doubts had to be established between governments: misinformation affects the quality of the judgment and, accordingly, that of decision and reaction. As Talleyrand is said to have observed, in politics, what is so becomes more important than what is true. In sum, the reception was positive, the exchanges reassuring and the misunderstandings dispelled. The process of information-communication-consultation launched by the Gabonese diplomacy allowed for reducing the share of ignorance and distrust and thus prevented and defused the crises. We left the Democratic Republic of Congo the same day, without fanfare, but with the feeling of having accomplished and succeeded in this delicate mission. Since then, the relations between the two countries have experienced a marked thaw followed by normalization, including with President Joseph Kabila, who took the reins of the country, after the terrible death of his father who was murdered on January 16, 2000. Although the “megaphone diplomacy” or the showoff diplomacy, often practiced with success in Africa, is becoming more popular, I am still convinced, as reportedly observed by the late UN Secretary-General U Thant that a perfect mission of goodwill is that which is not leaked out before its success and may never be revealed.

That is how, as a general rule, the light of peace did not enlighten the dark continent, which was ablaze as a whole and rather began to accumulate, in this area, virtually all of the sad records: 6 million
refugees; 17 million people displaced; 8 million dead from violence since 1990, including 5 million in the DRC, and a genocide in Rwanda that resulted in nearly 1 million dead, massacred in 100 days; and many countries fallen under the thumb of “warlords” with the corollaries of civil wars and their share of summary executions, rape, torture, mutilation, and the amputation of limbs. This is the sad record of the new African order, and it is the sad truth that those idealistic friends who, thinking perhaps to do well, wanted to remodel Africa after their own image, actually helped to open a Pandora’s box. They had quickly forgotten that:

1. Disorder is a luxury that the poor cannot always afford, especially when it tends to persist, as unfortunately shown by the current situation in Somalia, Sudan, DRC, and even in Zimbabwe, where people always seem ready to repeat the same sad Zairian experience. Indeed, we thought that it was necessary to drive out Mugabe at any price, as was the case with Mobutu, Mohamed Siad Barre, Saddam Hussein, and many others. This is duly noted. But the big question that burns our lips is, what would we do afterwards if, as usual, the whole sub-region were set ablaze, like in the Great Lakes, Iraq, or Somalia. Should we, in such circumstances, continue as if nothing had happened, the same policy (business as usual) for example against Omar Al-Bashir, albeit with the assistance of international justice, at the risk, once again, of adding fuel to the fire and then wash our hands afterwards when things go wrong and chaos breaks out? Why do we not learn the lessons of history? Yet everyone can easily see, fifty years after the elimination of Patrice Lumumba and over a decade after the fall of Mobutu and the assassination of Laurent Désiré Kabila, that Zaire/DRC has still not recovered, after 5 million deaths. The same thing could be said of Somalia. What a waste! Indeed, the West has hardly seen stability in Africa: between 1960 and 1990 the continent experienced seventy-nine coups.

2. Attempting to judge the whole world with Western principles alone is an error. The happiness of others cannot always be achieved without them or despite them. For although it is good to talk about the Other and about helping him, it is less good to systematically talk and act for him in his place and sometimes
even against his will, as was too often the case everywhere in Africa with the dramatic results we know. Remember also the criticisms formulated in this respect by Barack Obama himself: “For eight years,” he said of his predecessor, “we [Americans] have paid the price for a foreign policy that lectures without listening.”

3. In a continent that joyously accepts as universal the values of Western civilization, a continent that aspires to the “American Way of Life,” a continent deeply penetrated, to the most remote areas, by Western popular culture and consumption patterns, the systematic use of force is not the solution to its problems. The systematic use of force has become the problem. In fact, force is no longer necessary for the democratization of Africa and its Westernization. Just a little patience, know-how, and tolerance would be enough, because Western-style modernism has transformed Africa so much that it is difficult to imagine anything else.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT

Economics represent a major aspect of globalization that is distinct but inseparable from the political dimension. The post-1990 period has been characterized by the increasing economic and social marginalization of Africa. The recent fundamental evolution of the world economy, especially its globalization and ultra-liberalization, have radically transformed it, with equivocal consequences, to say the least: extraordinary enrichment of humanity on one side, mass poverty on the other, and the growing gap between the beneficiary or “winning” countries and the “losing” countries, especially in Africa, that are marginalized at the periphery. These radical transformations first affect the economic sector: the formerly undisputed primacy of the role of the state in development has been radically questioned. Before, the welfare state or the entrepreneur state used to build, as part of the “national economy,” roads, railways, ports, hospitals, and schools. It also managed mines, industries, and services and social benefits, and operated the posts, telecommunications, electricity, gas, water, etc. That’s what they still do today in Asia, particularly with regard to infrastructure, which probably explains the success of that continent. This is also what they are starting to do again in the West, facing the global crisis, with large-scale use of budgetary imbalances and massive
state intervention, which has been banned in Africa in the name of good governance.

In fact, with the advent of neo-liberalism, globalization, and the new world order, this entrepreneur state was henceforth perceived as a predator state, which constituted an obstacle to development. So it had to be destroyed. African countries, under heavy external injunctions, had to thus abandon the “national economy” model, the Welfare State and the Entrepreneur State, in favor of the market, which has often been both generator of extreme wealth and penury. This is the model, imposed on Africa, which was categorically rejected by Asia. While Westerners themselves, from France to the United States to Italy and Germany continued to practice an “economic nationalism of another age,” merrily subsidizing their agricultural sectors, and acted vigorously to defend their national companies against foreign takeovers, the Africans were, for their part, forced to “laissez-faire, laissez passer,” to exclude any interventionism and to give all power to the markets; in Africa, the economic aspect has totally imposed itself over the social and political aspects. But in spite of the rigorous application of this “economic catechism” and the implementation of advocated radical reforms, especially through endless structural adjustment plans accompanied by increasingly painful budgetary austerity, the results were contrary to the predictions, and the awakening was brutal: deindustrialization, disinvestment, corporate bankruptcies, massive unemployment, economic recession, riots of hunger and social crisis! In Africa, private initiative has still not truly substituted a state that has totally reneged; unlike the state, it builds no roads, no railways or industries or service companies. At most, it just redeems a portion of the privatized state enterprises judged highly profitable, the rest being purely and simply sacrificed through profit and loss. So most African countries, red lanterns of the world economy, paradoxically experience on the long term a downward trend of their growth and rampant marginalization of their disconnected economies, which became a vast minefield. The shock therapy imposed on Africa by the dogmas of the “great physicians of globalization,” less managers than ideologues, more preoccupied by worldwide rhetoric than concrete results, in the end killed the patient. On the economic level, Africa has simply collapsed.
Then, on the social level, while the world has known for the last two decades tremendous prosperity and a fabulous ability to produce wealth and well-being, Africa is unfortunately unable to capitalize on it. It remains today the poorest continent with a per capita income below 350 US dollars. In fact, according to a survey conducted in 2005 by Merrill Lynch/Capgemini, in ten years, the number of millionaires in dollars, which now stands at 8.7 million people, has more than doubled worldwide. They now control nearly a quarter of global wealth. American Bill Gates remains one of the richest men in the world with a fortune estimated to be equal to the cumulative GDP of all forty-nine poorest countries of the planet (mostly located in Africa). Inversely, according to the World Bank, the number of people living in absolute poverty, meaning less than one dollar per person per day, rose from 1.2 billion in 1987 to 1.5 billion in 1999 and will reach nearly 2 billion people by 2015 if the trend continues. In sub-Saharan Africa, more than 50 percent of the population lives in extreme poverty that continues to gain ground. It is a bleak picture! The African continent has become an area of deprivation, misery, and injustice. The state budget is no longer used to build schools and hospitals, or to buy medicines and textbooks, but just to pay the interest of the foreign debt. Tax policy is no longer an instrument of social cohesion and redistribution of wealth, but simply a machine to favor the enrichment of the richest. Although we see a decline in poverty in the world thanks to the drastic reduction of extreme poverty in Asia, in almost all African countries, mass poverty has instead become a tragic rampant reality, sometimes leading to food riots.

According to the UN, Africa is the continent that suffers most from poverty. In sub-Saharan Africa, average life expectancy has fallen from fifty years in 1990 to forty-six years today. In the developed world, less than 1 child in 100 dies before the age of five; but in most countries of sub-Saharan Africa, this number is 1 in 10, and in fourteen countries, it is 1 in 5. In sub-Saharan Africa, the number of people living on less than $1 a day has increased since 1990. Undernourishment has declined worldwide since 1990, but it has increased in Africa. These miserable conditions that resemble those that prevailed in the nineteenth century in England and other
European countries are most often associated with pandemics. Today, it is estimated that more than 20 million Africans have died of AIDS since the early 1980s and nearly 90 million individuals are infected with this plague of modern times, which accounts for 15 million orphans, 80 percent of whom live in sub-Saharan Africa.

As we can see, Africa could not accede to the “shared prosperity” that theoretically was to result from its placement under guardianship, its democratization, its Westernization, and its globalization. This is the paradox of tragic proportions that was so cleverly exploited by President Fidel Castro in a famous address to the heads of state of countries in the South: “Never before did mankind have such formidable scientific and technological potential, such extraordinary capacity to produce riches and well-being, but never before were disparity and inequity so profound.... Globalization is an objective reality underlining the fact that we are all passengers on the same vessel, that is, this planet where we all live. But passengers on this vessel are traveling in very different conditions.... This vessel is carrying too much injustice to remain afloat and it pursues such an irrational and senseless route that it cannot call on a safe port. This vessel seems destined to collide with an iceberg. If that happened, we would all sink with it.”

But despite all these setbacks, doubts and fears that globalization raises among African populations and ruling classes, it is necessary to go ahead, walk to the beat of the “global times,” move forward with our time and answer the requirements of our time. Good or not good, one said, globalization is here; it has become an inescapable reality and we must go with it, keeping in mind this old Fulani saying: “If the earth turns, turn with it.” Therefore, African states saw themselves in the imperious necessity to adapt to changing times by implementing large and painful reforms advocated in the hope that a new era of progress, prosperity, freedom, responsibility, dignity, and respect for each other was finally opening for them and their people, too.
PART TWO
The New Major Challenges

*Two things threaten the world: order and disorder.*

Paul Valéry

No matter how funny and cryptic the Fulani saying “If the earth turns, turn with it” may seem, it does respond to the dilemma that arose for the African states at the turn of the twentieth century: what to do, faced with the new order and globalization (if one can imagine for a moment that isolating oneself individually, as some have advocated, is not just a silly dream), resign or act, no matter what? Rather than simply suffer its perverse effects, African states have recognized the need to act and react, in particular, by adapting as much as possible to a phenomenon that, in fact, is currently taking over the entire world. In short, one must turn with the globalized world to avoid getting dizzy.

In this general context and in light of the major changes described previously, for two decades, most African countries had to take a road of deep and painful readjustment as a result of their national policies, with three main immediate objectives:

1. Strengthening actions aimed at preserving and rebuilding peace and collective security more threatened than ever, so that African people can also live free from fear;

2. Ensuring that the creation of modern states, in the context of globalization, supports Africans’ quest for economic and social well-being and their desire to live free from need;

Chapter Four

LIVING FREE FROM FEAR

The wind blowing across Africa is not an ordinary one; it is a hurricane.
Léopold S. Senghor

Peace and security are clearly the most valuable assets of nations and the indispensable ground from which development, democracy, and human rights must grow. Without peace and security, none of this is indeed possible. Conversely, war appears as the generalized destruction of life and property. It is an affront to human dignity and can hurt the physical integrity of civilians and soldiers alike. That is why, at the turn of the century, African foreign policy was stubbornly and primarily oriented towards prevention, mediation, the settlement of conflicts and post-conflict reconstruction, as a prerequisite for establishing the rule of law and the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Like all other people, Africans aspire to live “free from fear” and with respect for life, liberty, and human dignity.

The history of Africa over the last decade of the twentieth century was, as we have said, just a long litany of apocalyptic events punctuated by conflict and the generalized destruction of life and property. In such an environment of conflict, security again became a vital issue for African countries and a major goal of their diplomacy. The establishment of peace and the strengthening of security were major objectives of national policy. This became even more urgent as experience had shown, as in the above case of the Great Lakes region, that war was often contagious. Therefore, African leaders multiplied individual and
collective, direct and indirect initiatives in favor of peace and security.

It is surely useful at this stage to clarify that, faced with multiple conflicts in Africa, the possible choices were in reality almost always the same: to support one of the belligerents (as Angola did quite often in the past) or remain neutral—in general, the most frequent choice. But staying neutral in turn implies two other attitudes: keeping away entirely, certainly in order to avoid any the risk of slippage and interference, or participate, like the majority of African countries, in the settlement and management of the crises. This latter attitude of solidarity and “non-indifference” is consistent with a number of African values and traditions, especially those who advise not to remain inactive before the fire that threatens the neighbor’s house, to the extent that the flames may also spread to you. That said, peace in Africa is the concern of all Africans.

Emissaries, “peacemakers” of several African countries, began to roam all the various subregions for crisis prevention and management. Strengthening of the collective defense and building of a continental architecture for peace and collective security simultaneously accompanied these national and individual actions. This was particularly the case within the African Union and regional and subregional organizations. At the multilateral African level, the key agency of this new continental architecture for peace and security is the Peace and Security Council of the AU (PSC) launched on May 25, 2004. Designed after the UN Security Council, it has a Staff Committee (SC) in charge of advising and assisting in matters of defense and security. It also has an early warning system and a standby force (SF) constituted of five regional brigades.

**EXTINGUISHING THE FLAMES IN AFRICA**

Throughout the 1990s, the strategies of African countries were characterized by the redoubling of their commitments to conflict resolution. The cases of countries such as Senegal, Nigeria, Ghana, and Gabon are illustrative in this respect. Indeed, when the continent was terribly affected by the turbulence of the new world order, these countries remained among the very few nations that managed to preserve peace inside and outside their borders. In particular, being proud of never having experienced war, Gabon started, beginning in 1992-1993,
advocating and promoting, more than usual, dialogue, tolerance, and cooperation outside its own borders for the advent of a regional environment free from the horrors of war.

This small country has in fact participated in numerous solo and group operations for the maintenance, restoration, and consolidation of peace. This was particularly the case for more than ten years in Central African Republic (CAR) successively with the Inter-African Mission to Monitor the Implementation of the Bangui Agreements (MISAB), the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA), the multinational force in the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (FOMUC) and now with ongoing continuation by ECCAS. This was also the case in Burundi, and in Sudan with the participation of Gabonese officers in the military missions of the African Union in those countries.

Let’s take as an example the case of the “democratized and alternated” CAR of the early 1990s with its long and painful repeated crisis that shook it for more than a decade; the president of Gabon became personally involved as of the first three military mutinies that broke out in 1996 in Bangui. Solicited for this purpose, during the 19th Summit of Heads of State and Government of France and Africa held in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, in December 1996, President Bongo organized, in the capital of CAR, direct negotiations with both the rebels and political opposition leaders. More than eleven Central African opposition parties indeed agreed to talk with the presidential majority, under the direct mediation of Gabon. The result of this first phase led to the “Bangui Agreements,” signed on Saturday, January 25, 1997. An inter-African force, MISAB, composed of African volunteer countries (including, Gabon, Senegal, Togo, Burkina Faso, Mali, Côte d’Ivoire, and Chad), was set up and placed under the command of Gabon, with the purpose, as its title indicates, to assure the implementation of the Agreements and restore peace in the country. An “International Committee of the Bangui Agreements” was created to direct the actions of MISAB. Chaired by Malian General Amadou Toumani Touré (since 2002 president of Mali for the second time), the Committee directly received the political guidance necessary for those Agreements from the president of Gabon, as president of the International Mediation Committee.
Only two years later, on March 27, 1998, the UN Security Council finally decided to set up a UN peacekeeping operation to take over from MISAB. Also placed under the command of Gabon, the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA) managed to stabilize the security situation and laid the groundwork for normalizing the political situation and beginning the implementation of economic reforms in the country. This is how the legislative elections of 1998 and the presidential elections of 1999 could be organized and take place without major problems. It was a great success! But we have seen that MINUCA came very late and in addition ended its mandate too early, on February 15, 2000; the Security Council then decided to prematurely withdraw its troops and establish a very modest little “United Nations Peace-Building Office in the Central African Republic” (BONUCA). Still in place in Bangui, but without much money, BONUCA should move towards genuine peace-building operations.

So, it is primarily thanks to the determination of Africans themselves that a wave of international solidarity subsequently appeared to help the CAR find solutions to the situation with which it was confronted. Without a real internal political will of national reconciliation, like the good example set by Angola, without good governance, and without external material and financial support in order to consolidate and rebuild peace, the results of post-conflict operations still seem extremely fragile, precarious and likely to take a step backwards, as largely illustrated by the multiple coups perpetrated in Bangui since 2001. In May 28, 2001, for example, the fourth coup of its kind organized by supporters of former President André Kollingba, left several people dead and caused an exodus of tens of thousands of people. It also caused successive dismissals: Minister of Defense Jean Jacques Démafouth, holder, however, in the shadow of President Patassé, of the dark side of power was suspected of plotting a parallel conspiracy against the regime and thrown in jail. The chief of staff, General François Bozizé, was also accused of preparing another coup and then sacked as well.

After a clumsy attempt to arrest him, Bozizé and his armed supporters fled, at the beginning of November 2001, to neighboring Chad, causing great tension with this country. Thus began, between
2001 and 2003, a series of incidents and armed attacks in Bangui and in the southern part of the country between the pro-government troops of Abdoulaye Miskine, a terribly feared warlord, who was supported by Congolese combatants from the Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC) from the neighboring Democratic Republic of Congo, on the one hand, and on the other hand, supporters of François Bozizé assisted by “Chadian elements.” We learned that these were the famous “liberators” who were going to participate on March 15, 2003, in the capture of Bangui and continue thereafter to sow disorder and desolation in the north of the country. The clouds were accumulating dangerously on the RCA, as were warning signs of an internationalization of the conflict.

As early as August 6, 2002, the first military clashes with the Chadian army took place in the extreme north near the town of Mbo. The sounds of boots were also heard in the south, on the Congolese bank of the border river Oubangui. Gabon’s assistance was again solicited, in an informal mini-summit held in Brazzaville on Thursday, August 15, on the sidelines of the inauguration ceremony of President Sassou Nguesso, a ceremony in which Ange Félix Patassé and Idriss Déby, respective presidents of the Central African Republic and Chad, took part.

In the middle of the night of that Thursday, August 15, all heads of state present at the ceremony met, right after the gala dinner, to have another look at CAR, which was still recovering. They asked Omar Bongo Ondimba, in his capacity as chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on the dispute between Chad and CAR, to send on the ground a “commission for the verification and evaluation of the situation,” because it seemed that the worst was yet to come.

I was responsible for leading this delegation composed of thirteen political figures, diplomatic and military representatives of Cameroon, Congo, Gabon, Mali, the African Union, and BONUCA. The delegation left Libreville in mid-morning on Thursday, August 22, 2002 for Franceville first, in order to obtain the guidance of President Bongo. We were essentially told that we needed to objectively evaluate the incidents on both sides and propose measures that could reduce the tension that persisted between the two countries. The delegation then flew to Bangui, where it was received in late afternoon by
President Patassé surrounded by some members of his government and his party, the MLPC and the president of Parliament. The next day, the delegation went in succession to Kabo and Mbo in northern CAR, then Sido and Sarh in southern Chad to spend the night. The second morning, the delegation reached Chad’s capital N’Djamena, where it met with President Deby before returning to Libreville for its briefing and to work out its final report.

But in the meantime, a rather serious incident had occurred. On Friday, August 23, in mid-afternoon, near the border, along National Road No. 1, which leads to Chad, between Kabo and Sido. Indeed, the impressive convoy that was escorting us on this laterite road was suddenly stopped seven kilometers from our entry point to Chad by the sight of a Toyota 4x4 pickup that blocked the road. I heard a voice behind me, that of Gabonese General Barthélemy Ratanga, whisper: “Careful, Sir, there is danger.” Since I did not see what he meant, he pointed out to me several combatants armed with bazookas (RPG7 rocket launchers) who were deployed in battle positions on each side of the road, along the edge of a forest. We could barely see their heads that were above the high grass, and surmounted by the bazookas worn across their chests.

For a long moment, I was stunned, full of emotions. I finally got out of car, half-surprised, half-angry and muttering: “This is not possible! They cannot do this to us!” In fact, we faced a serious dilemma: either turn back, as the soldiers themselves recommended to me, compromising our mission, or try to negotiate, running great risks. One moment, I felt helpless and I confess to have been driven by a sense of anxiety about the heavy choice that I had to make. Then, staring at all these armed men, my memory suddenly carried me back a few years. I had indeed already been confronted with similar situations in which Providence had always provided happy endings.

Let us briefly go back to the past to give a few details that will allow understanding what then motivated my decision later in the Chad/Central African Republic “wasp’s nest.” One night at the beginning of August 1997, during the second Congolese Civil War, two rockets were fired at our aircraft, a Presidential Grumman Gulfstream IV, taking off from the Maya-Maya airport in Brazzaville with all lights off, carrying the Gabonese delegation led by the Vice-President of the
Republic, Didjob Divungi Di Ndinge. Aviation General Cyriaque Badinga, who commanded the crew of the aircraft, did not reveal the incident to us until after we left Congolese air space. Indeed, given the fact that the Angolans threatened with military intervention if an agreement on the cessation of hostilities was not signed before August 31, mediator Omar Bongo urged President Pascal Lissouba and his hawkish advisors to accept the plan that would save both the peace and his regime. But they were dragging their feet and delaying the talks to gain time in anticipation of a quick military victory that would have enabled them to impose their views without making concessions. Then the Gabonese President sent this delegation to Brazzaville, which included a number of ministers in charge of negotiating with the belligerents a cease-fire and cessation of hostilities agreement. The delegation was received, one after the other, in their respective control area, by President Lissouba at his palace on the “Plateau” in “Downtown,” by Bernard Kolelas, mayor of Brazzaville, at his neighborhood villa “Bacongo” in the south of the capital and by the once-and-future President Denis Sassou Nguesso at his residence of “M’pila” in “Talangai” north of Brazzaville. Then we had to leave the city imperatively before nightfall; but we were invited to dinner and, therefore, delayed by Pascal Lissouba. So who gave the order to shoot? One still wonders today!

I also remembered that day in November 1999, during which our helicopter, a presidential “Puma,” was hit as a result of fire from light weapons coming from the rebelling Congolese town of Mbinda located near our border. And yet, the helicopter was carrying the Gabonese Prime Minister at the time, Jean François Ntoutoume Emame, accompanied by several of his ministers, including Minister of Defense Ali Bongo, who had all come to see the situation created by the massive influx in Gabon of Congolese refugees fleeing the combat zones during the outbreak of the third civil war in Congo.

We nevertheless landed smoothly in Lekoko, a Gabonese border village, located a few miles from Franceville, capital of Haut-Ogooué, but we still had to negotiate with excited, armed Congolese rebels when we had to take off again before nightfall. Upon our return to Franceville, I had a deep sigh of relief: Praise God! We were all safe.

And then, coming out of these painful memories and returning to
the current situation, I decided, against the opinion of the majority, to try my luck going to negotiate with the fighters, encouraged by the presence of a white flag in front of the Toyota. But the civilian and military personalities of Central Africa who accompanied us categorically refused to follow us and, in a panic, decided to return without further delay to Kabo, thus abandoning us to our fate without protection and without means of transportation. However, we went on foot, with General Lamine Cissé, UN representative, by my side, and the other members of the delegation behind us, to meet these fighters.

A man armed with a bazooka came towards me. He was about thirty. Thin, slender, and turbaned, he looked rather like a Chadian. To the general surprise, he presented me with a military salute, introducing himself and his troops as “advanced elements of General Bozizé.” Indeed, all these men were led by Corporal Chief Francis Bozizé, son of the general, who had a satellite telephone deployed on the roof of the Toyota. He gave me his telephone and told me: “General Bozizé wants to speak to you.”

I took the telephone:

- “Hello, my general,” I said.
- “Is this Minister of State Jean Ping?” he asked me.
- “That’s correct, my general. But why do your men block our way?”

- “That is not at all the intention of my men, Mr. Minister,” he said very kindly, “but we learned that you would use a helicopter to go from CAR to Chad.”

And then, the general added immediately: “Never mind, I will have you escorted to the border.”

Finally, we felt reassured. He actually ordered his men, at the end of our conversation, to escort us to Sido, which we reached, famished, at about 6:00 in the evening, right before nightfall. We had more fear than harm. The heavens once again had helped us.

Immediately, we went to inspect the traces of the incidents of August 6, 2002 (bullet holes, remnants of rockets) and visit the refugee populations in Sido. The night advanced, and we had to go back to the
city of Sahr. However, and in the absence of something better, we were invited at about 8:00 in the evening to share the meal of the troop, mainly consisting of mutton and millet, a kind of delicious dough, similar to foutou and foufou, which I was eating for the first time with great appetite. It was a real treat. Although already very tired, we still had to head to Sahr, where we arrived around 11:30 at night. At dawn, under a drizzling rain, a Soviet MI-17 military helicopter took us to N’Djamena. Sprawled on the mattress that served as a seat, leaning against the additional fuel tank, I could nevertheless admire the majestic meandering of the river Chari, which we descended until the Chadian capital.

After this extremely eventful trip, the verification mission was able to establish that the incidents of August 6, 2002, at the Chad-Central African border had been between Abdoulaye Miskine and his men and elements of the Chadian Armed Forces (the FAT) based in Sido, which, according to Chadian authorities, had exercised their right to follow in Central African territory before returning on orders from N’Djamena.

However, the events of August 10, which resulted in the temporary occupation of the Central African town of Kabo, were to blame, according to some, on Bozizé’s men, and according to others, on “Central African and Chadian elements.” The “Commission for Verification and Evaluation” consequently proposed to remove Abdoulaye Miskine and François Bozizé, to secure the border between the two countries by developing cooperation on the ground of their armed forces under the observation of the CEMAC troops. The Commission also decided to define or update the most sensitive borders to the north and northeast (Sudan-Chad-CAR border) and resume cooperation by the reactivation and operation of all existing joint committees.

These proposals, which also gained a “national dialogue” dimension towards reconciliation, were accepted and refocused by the heads of state of CEMAC during the summit held in Libreville on October 2, 2002. But their partial application and the usual procrastination of all parties re-plunged the CAR into an internal and external confrontation logic. The standoff between Patassé and Bozizé intensified, and the differences between Bangui and N’Djamena became
deeper. On March 15, 2003, after resisting a dozen coup attempts, the wind changed: Ange Félix Patassé was finally chased from power by...General Bozizé.

That day, while the Central African President left Niamey, the capital of Niger, where he had just taken part in a summit of the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (COMESSA or CEN-SAD in Arabic) to return to his country, General Bozizé launched, from Boali and Damara, the final assault against Bangui. Already, at the beginning of March, an explosive offensive was conducted against the town of Bossampélé, which was on the road to Bangui, and reputed to be impregnable, as it was defended by a strong battalion of 700 well-armed Congolese troops led by Jean Pierre Mbemba, an ally of Patassé.

The battle for Bangui had begun. General Bozizé’s men seemed to trample everything in their path. At the beginning of March, Bossampélé had fallen; on March 13 and 14, Bossangoua, Kabandara, Sibut and Bossambélé were in the hands of the “liberators.” On March 15, at 3:00 pm, Bangui was taken. The airport was occupied after a few skirmishes with the peacekeeping force of CEMAC, in whose ranks there were three killed and eight wounded. When, at 4:45 pm, the airplane of President Patassé appeared, it was too late. It was purely and simply prevented from landed and diverted to the N’simalen airport in Yaoundé, in neighboring Cameroon.

The day after the coup, and while the situation was still confused in Bangui, where the security of the CEMAC troops was threatened, Rodolphe Adada, at the time Congolese Minister of Foreign Affairs, and myself, accompanied by national and international journalists, disembarked in the CAR capital the morning of March 17, 2003, after painstakingly negotiating and obtaining special permission to land, since the international airport of Bangui-M’poko had been closed.

We were welcomed when we got off the plane by the commander of the CEMAC force, Gabonese Rear Admiral Ignace Martin Mavoungou and a few CAR protocol officials. We took place on board an official car escorted by two armored tanks of CEMAC to travel between the M’poko airport and downtown. In addition to the corpses littering the ground, we could also see the scars of looting in the commercial and residential neighborhoods as well as the traces of
the fighting that was still taking place between the “liberators” and the looters.

Minister Rodolphe Adada and I, first official foreign personalities to set foot on Central African soil after the coup of March 15, 2003, stayed at Hotel Safari, the only hotel still in service in the capital, which had been devastated by almost a decade of mutinies and rebellions. After visiting the Congolese and Gabonese officers of CEMAC, then all the troops whom we congratulated and encouraged on behalf of our presidents, we went to Camp Beal, the headquarters of the new authorities of the country.

We were received by General Bozizé, to whom we transmitted a special message from President Denis Sassou Nguesso, Acting President of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), and President Omar Bongo Ondimba, President of the Ad-Hoc Committee on the Central African Crisis. The message concerned in particular the safety of the CEMAC troops, who had lost three soldiers, as well as the need to reestablish peace and security and restore the constitutional order and democratic process.

Gradually, peace took hold, both externally (with all its neighbors) and internally (with the opposition and the exiled); gradually, hope was also revived—certainly still extremely fragile—for a better life for Central Africans who did not deserve to experience such an ordeal! But it was not yet a victory, because it was necessary to consolidate peace to engage in the “structural prevention” that is necessary to prevent the resurgence of a crisis and hasten the return to a true, lasting peace. For this purpose, the international community surely, although somewhat tired of the repetitive nature of this crisis, must instead double its efforts to help restart the economy and the Central African political class to reconcile and implement a lawful state and good governance. Indeed, indifference would have been the worst response.

Another example of a crisis, which was very different from the one experienced by the CAR, would be the coup in Sao Tomé and Principe. This was a coup, surely unique in the world, where a military junta, after successfully taking over power by the force of bayonets, agreed to return it, just days later, thanks to the negotiation carried out by
Africans themselves. On Wednesday, July 16, 2003, at 3:00 am, sixteen soldiers, piled aboard a taxi-bus, took control of Sao Tomé and Principe without shedding blood. They were led by the head of the military training center, Major Fernando Pereira dubbed “Cobo” of the Santomean regular army, associated with Arlesio Costa, former mercenary of the 32nd South African “Buffalo” Battalion who, during the Apartheid era, operated especially in Angola along with Unita. The democratically elected President, Fradique Bandeira Melo de Menezes, was then visiting Abuja, capital of Nigeria. All sovereignty agencies of the country were disbanded, the members of government present in the capital were arrested and imprisoned at the Quartel Das Forças Armadas, the HQ of the army. As for the Prime Minister, Ms. Maria Das Neves de Sousa, she was admitted to the “Ayres Menezes” hospital, having suffered much more fear than harm.

The reactions of condemnation soon rang out everywhere. Nigeria, whose oil interests in the archipelago are well known, considered the coup a provocation. It very seriously considered a military intervention to reinstall the deposed president by force. Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo nevertheless decided to consult on this point his counterpart De Menezes: he asked how many men there were in the Santomean armed forces, the answer was: “300”. He then proposed an airborne landing of Nigerian troops to quell the rebellion.

Quite wisely, President De Menezes himself, as well as other heads of state of the sub-region, advised against the premature use of force in order to give diplomacy and negotiation a chance. Consequently, faced with the Nigerian threat that looked like the entrance of a bull in a china shop, ECCAS offered its mediation. An international delegation of nine countries, including Gabon, was dispatched on the spot, from Libreville, on Friday, July 18. This delegation was formed of representatives of countries of ECCAS, CPLP, the AU and Nigeria, including myself.

Our mandate was to negotiate the return of constitutional order with the Military Commission headed by Major Pereira himself, naturally assisted by Arlesio Costa, the “brain” of the coup. First, we laid as a prerequisite, for the opening of the negotiations, the release of all personalities arrested. After some hesitation, this requirement
was accepted in mid-afternoon on Sunday, July 20. Consequently, we went to the “Quartel Das Forças Armadas” to attend the actual release of the prisoners, which took place around 7:00 pm. But much to our surprise, when we arrived on the scene, we saw that the jailers and their prisoners were watching the same TV and playing cards, in a quite peaceful mood.

The formal negotiations began the next morning, Monday, July 21, in the premises of UNDP, not far from the Miramar Hotel where we were staying. The night of Tuesday, July 22, an agreement was reached, and the coup leaders finally accepted the restoration of constitutional order and agreed to return the democratically-elected president to power.

The latter, who has been in Libreville for two days, returned to his country in the afternoon of Wednesday, July 23, accompanied by President Obasanjo on board a Nigerian airplane. The meeting organized late that afternoon, on July 23 at the Presidential Palace, between the Nigerian head of state and the coup organizers, in the presence of President De Menezes himself and our team of negotiators, looked like a staging. First, Obasanjo lectured the mutineers and asked them to promise never to do it again. “Cobo,” the leader of the coup organizers, got up, made a short confession and effectively promised, indeed, to never do it again.

At that moment, what could one think but it’s all “just theater.” In the end, life is not always as far from theater or cinema as one may believe. At the 3rd Summit of the AU in Addis Ababa (July 6-8, 2004), President Obasanjo brought some levity in the proceedings by this joke, which was at least amusing: “When I went to escort President De Menezes home, passing through Libreville to get the blessing of Dean El Hadj Omar Bongo Ondimba, I told President de Menezes that, on arrival at the Sao Tomé airport, he had to get out of the plane first...because you never know!”

The rebels were granted amnesty and the establishment of a National Forum for reflection. Finally, everything returned to normal. “La commedia è finita” concluded the newspaper “J.A./L’intelligent” in its issue of August 2004.

These two very different examples of crises, that of the CAR and
that of Sao Tomé and Principe, sufficiently illustrate the important role the African countries play to put an end to the internal conflicts and strife that bloodied their continent.

**PREVENTIVE PEACE**

The objective increasingly established by African diplomacy is no longer, as was demonstrated, for example, in the CAR or Sao Tomé and Principe or as we see today in Somalia and Sudan, the mere resolution of armed conflicts when crises have already exploded, but also and especially to defuse them before they degenerate in order to act in time to prevent, stifle, or limit a conflict. According to the definition given by former UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, preventive diplomacy aims to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into open conflicts, and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur. Consequently, the idea is a) to prevent political conflicts from becoming violent; b) to prevent conflicts that are already violent from aggravating or escalating; and c) to prevent conflicts already discussed by negotiation from bursting again. This policy of prevention involves conciliation efforts, good offices, and unfortunately, also interference. It is in this view that a multitude of initiatives were undertaken from 1992 in order to prevent, stifle, or limit crises, as was the case especially in the Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Madagascar, Togo, Zimbabwe, and elsewhere.

It is interesting to observe in this regard that in an extremely complex case such as that of Côte d’Ivoire crisis, preventive diplomatic initiatives actually started as of 1994, right after the death, on December 7, 1993, of President Félix Houphouët-Boigny. According to the “new” article 11 of the constitution of Côte d’Ivoire, amended on November 6, 1990, Henri Konan Bédié, president of the National Assembly, automatically succeeded him at the head of state until the 1995 expiration of his “presidential mandate in progress.”

However, the last and brilliant prime minister of Houphouët, Alassane Dramane Ouattara, known by the acronym “ADO,” also had claims on the estate and was determined to go to the presidential elections of 1995 against the new president. A deadly rivalry ensued between the two men, already divided by an incipient opposition.
Almost all precursor signs of the severe rampant crisis that was going to finally explode ten years later could already be seen. Although there were still “weak signs,” should we have left Côte d’Ivoire to extricate itself alone? Or should we, on the contrary, have tried to do something to avoid the crisis? Omar Bongo, who knew the two adversaries perfectly well, chose the latter course and began, with other heads of state, the delicate mission of defusing tensions; it was Act I. Obviously, at that stage, it was “early preventive diplomacy” and secret. The Gabonese president succeeded, in the end, in dissuading ADO from becoming a candidate. People could breathe again.

Not for a long time, alas, because after this first election was won on October 22, 1995 by Henri Konan Bédié, the rivalry between the two antagonists continued to worsen, exacerbated by both internal and external stakeholders. It became open and exacerbated with the topic of “Ivoirité” and the contestation, for reasons that he was of “dubious nationality,” of the candidacy of ADO in the presidential election scheduled for October 2000. Omar Bongo Ondimba, Abdou Diouf of Senegal, and Gnassingbé Eyadema of Togo collectively offered their good offices; certainly, the political dispute became public, but it was still possible to stifle it by preventing it from becoming violent. This was Act II. The Gabonese president received Konan Bédié in Franceville from August 25 to 27, 1999; he also contacted Ouattara and called the two men to enter into dialogue and find a modus vivendi. But nothing helped. On the contrary, a press campaign hostile to services started in Abidjan. Preventive diplomatic action was thus rejected in the name of national sovereignty. Both sides seemed rather determined to do battle. “We will see who is a man!” “Dead kid is not afraid of the knife!” said the supporters of each party.

It was at this juncture that, on December 24, 1999 that the “Christmas coup” took place, by which, a third personality by the name of General Robert Gueï, deposed President Bédié and seized power by “dribbling,” as he liked to say, both opponents. Upon his accession, to the command of the state, on February 8, 2000, the General-President went to Libreville, saying that he was going to “request the wise counsel of a big brother.” The Gabonese head of state willingly agreed to continue giving his contribution to the search for a
solution to the new crisis in which violence had appeared; this was Act III, this time intended to prevent the latent conflict from further increasing. This was already “late preventive diplomacy.” Under the circumstances, he also accepted a proposal made by the OAU to participate, with nine other African Heads of State, including Presidents Mbeki (South Africa), Wade (Senegal) Bouteflika (Algeria), Obasanjo (Nigeria) and Konaré (Mali), in the “Committee of Ten,” which had been tasked by the OAU to go without delay to Abidjan with the mission of finding a political compromise likely to ensure a peaceful transition to ensure the unity and stability of Côte d’Ivoire.

President Bongo, who could not go, asked me to represent him in this Committee, which met initially in Lomé on August 9, 2000. On the morning of August 10, the Ten decided to go to Abidjan to meet with Robert Gueï and all the heads of Ivorian political parties. But soon thereafter, we had a closed-door meeting with General-President Gueï in a large suite at the Hôtel Ivoire. In substance, we made him the following proposal: “Mr. President, we have to restore constitutional order quickly. After a short period of transition that you will manage as an arbitrator, you will step aside in the presidential elections of October 2000, following the example of what was done in Mali by General Amani Toumani Touré (ATT).” Robert Gueï, who obviously was not of this opinion, avoided giving a clear answer. However, as everybody knows, he did become a candidate.

The rest is history. He lost the elections and the presidency under pitiful circumstances. Indeed, the junta was chased away by a popular uprising against the electoral coup of General Gueï, who had refused to acknowledge his defeat. Laurent Gbagbo, the fourth personality in this saga, proclaimed victory on October 22, 2000, and on October 26, took office as President of Côte d’Ivoire. But the crisis was not resolved by this. The new President went several times to Libreville to speak about the situation of his country, while the debate on the explosive concept of “Ivoirité,” and the exacerbation of intercommunity tensions continued.

On Thursday, September 19, 2002, Côte d’Ivoire woke up to the sound of the cannons of mutinous soldiers. Heavy fighting engaged for several days, leaving hundreds of victims, including Minister of the Interior Emile Boga Doudou and the former President Robert Gueï,
both killed the same day. Côte d’Ivoire, this jewel of West Africa, this haven of peace, prosperity, and stability, had just entered a dangerous spiral that could lead it not only to civil war, but also, people said, to a conflict with its northern neighbors. Who would have believed it? Omar Bongo, who was then on official visit in Brazil, was solicited again. He proposed to immediately hold a summit dedicated to this new crisis. This was Act IV. At this stage, before the Civil War, the idea was no longer to avoid it or even to manage it. It was this task that was taken on starting in 2002 by ECOWAS, the soldiers of its Mission in Côte d’Ivoire, MICECI (baptized ECOFORCE), as well as the French military in the Licorne operation who interposed themselves between the belligerents, cutting, by the same opportunity, the country in two.

It was in this context of de facto partition of the country and acute crisis that President Bongo Ondimba was invited to Paris to participate, on January 25 and 26, 2003, along with Jacques Chirac, Laurent Gbagbo, Thabo Mbeki, Kofi Annan, and many other personalities, at the Kléber conference dedicated to the implementation of the Linas-Marcoussis agreements. These agreements, signed on January 24, 2003 by the main Ivorian political parties and the rebel movements led by Guillaume Kigbafo Soro, Secretary-General of the Popular Movement of Côte d’Ivoire (MPCI), which would later become “the New Forces,” provided for the review of the texts that raised problems, especially those concerning “Ivoirité” (article 35 of the constitution). They kept President Gbagbo in power—but stripped some of his prerogatives as head of the executive—as well as the establishment of a National Union government open to all signatory parties.

Violently rejected by some, ardently defended by others, these agreements, which were at the time only starting to be implemented very partially, paradoxically exacerbated the antagonisms and plunged Côte d’Ivoire into a long political night of which nobody could foresee what the dawn would be. Again, it was necessary to do something for this beautiful country that was clearly moving toward the abyss. This will be Act V.

On Friday, November 21, 2003, President Laurent Gbagbo accepted to meet in Libreville, under the aegis of Omar Bongo Ondimba, French Minister of Foreign Affairs Dominique de Villepin, with whom he would resume the dialogue. At the time, he gave his
agreement to return to a logic of peace and the “serious” application of the provisions of the Linas-Marcoussis agreements. A week later, it was Guillaume Soro’s turn to travel to Libreville to meet with the President of Gabon. In turn, he accepted that the ministers of the “New Forces” would resume their place in the national reconciliation government instituted in March 2003. Between Act I and Act V, which in fact would be followed by several others, ten years had already passed. What a waste!

On February 27, 2004, the UN Security Council, which had previously ruled out the hypothesis of a UN peacekeeping force, finally decided, ten years after the beginning of the crisis, to deploy a peacekeeping force of 6,240 blue berets, UNOCI, in the Côte d’Ivoire. Were they now going to move towards resolution of the crisis? Nothing was less sure, as the continuation of the events was going to prove. Considering the attempts of the Ivorian government to militarily take back the entire national territory, the intervention of the African mediation of Thabo Mbeki, the set-up, under the joint aegis of the UN and AU, of an International Working Group (GTI), and the appointment of a new prime minister (Charles Konan Banny), “enjoying full powers,” nobody could predict at this stage whether Côte d’Ivoire was finally going to definitively come out of this dirty situation of “neither war nor peace.”

And yet, everybody, or almost everybody, got involved to try to save this flagship country of West Africa, which was in fact the “showcase of francophone Africa.” But nothing helped. Perhaps it is also necessary to recognize that there were probably too many mediators and too many hands in the pot. Furthermore, the Ivorian and non-Ivorian parties, “men of the crisis,” and their “offshore sponsors” were radicalizing, on the contrary, their respective positions, each preserving a military option with the same refrain: “We’ll see who’s a man!” Or: “When dialogue fails, then there is confrontation.” Despite the decision of “seeking peace,” they continued plunging almost surreptitiously from rampant prevention of the conflict… to the somewhat chaotic management of the “non-war.”

What to do, people then wondered, since all attempts to prevent and get out of the crises had failed? According to some, an interna-
tional intervention was necessary perhaps using armed force under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. But this was easier said than done, because in practice, the member states of the UN Security Council tended to react either too late (as was the case in Rwanda) or too little (as in CAR), or in a disorderly manner (as in Somalia), or in a disproportionate manner (in Iraq), or even by procrastination and non-action (as during the war in Congo Brazzaville). This is why some agreed to think that “Rwanda, Bosnia, and Somalia have demonstrated the inefficiency, lack of preparation and weaknesses of global and regional institutions, and their relative inability to deal with the conflicts that are likely to be commonplace in the future.”

It is at this juncture that, as a new “coup de théâtre,” President Laurent Gbagbo, being an adept tactician, and one of his most passionate protagonists, former rebel Guillaume Kigbafori Soro, the fifth personality, engaged in a direct dialogue in Ouagadougou under the auspices of the Burkinabe President, Blaise Compaoré. Against all odds, they succeeded in concluding, without external interference, an agreement described as historic after which Soro was appointed Prime Minister on March 26, 2007. Who would have thought it! Another African solution to an African problem? Was it finally the long-awaited exit from the crisis and the much hoped-for peace? It was an opportunity that should not be missed. One could finally believe that the time for peace, reconciliation, and reconstruction had come. Unfortunately, further developments would prove the opposite!
Chapter Five

LIVING FREE FROM NEED

Our policy is directed not against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos.

US Secretary of State George C. Marshall

Among the four universal freedoms proclaimed by US President Franklin Delano Roosevelt in his January 1941 State of the Union Address is the freedom from want. Similarly, one of the fundamental purposes undertaken by the United Nations at its creation in 1945 is “the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples.” The founding fathers of the United Nations had, therefore, already well understood that peace and security were inseparable from economic and social development. It was in that same spirit that on June 5, 1947 the United States announced the details of a massive economic aid plan that from 1948 to 1951 collected an unprecedented amount of assistance for war-ravaged Europe in order to wage what US Secretary of State George C. Marshall called the fight against “hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos.” It was this massive aid that helped lay the foundations of peace, prosperity, and democracy in Western Europe after World War II. It is regrettable that its initiators, like those who primarily benefited from this assistance, have somewhat forgotten this magnificent history lesson.

Indeed, it must be admitted that a world that offers no prospect of progress and development cannot be a world of peace or at peace. Apparently, African countries have understood this well. This is why the creation of modern states or groups of modern states and their
quest for economic and social well-being in order to enable their people to live “free from need” has, since the early 1990s, become an essential objective of African policies, encouraged by the UN, and stimulated by the fight against the growing economic marginalization of Africa. Indeed, in this era of globalization, never has the prosperity of each nation depended so much on that of others and, as a result, no country can stand alone.

The policies of most African countries were, therefore, organized either individually or collectively around an essential objective: to lift Africa from daily poverty, especially through globalization. According to the classic economic theory that has dominated the planet, globalization should increase the performance of the global economy and benefit all thanks to the development of international trade and the optimal allocation of the world’s wealth, provided, however, we are told, that we introduce good governance. But, what is good governance anyway?

GOOD GOVERNANCE

Emerging in the 1980s, and even more so in the 1990s as a key expression with the value of necessary dogma, good governance is the official doctrine of donors intended to inspire action by African governments. It is based on a series of economic, political, and even ideological directives and on a series of neo-liberal rules, values, and standards regarded as universal. These principles include the primacy of law and democracy; transparency and accountability (the so-called “reporting obligation”); efficiency and effectiveness; cohesion in the formulation of policies; and ethics and good conduct—a series of recipes made mandatory in order to achieve success in the name of development.\textsuperscript{115}

It was the implementation of this good governance that many believed would lead to the dismantling of the African state. Indeed, it was this state, strong, authoritarian, a guarantor of peace and security, and an engine and privileged agent of development, that was now perceived as a predator state and as a hindrance to progress. Consequently, it was necessary to dismantle it in order to give way to a minimum, and democratic state and to private interests. To this end, economic and political reforms were immediately imposed and carried out in order to wrest power from African states, thus entrusting these responsibilities to private entities, the global markets, non-governmental organi-
zations, and civil society.

GOOD ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE

As a major requirement of the international community, good economic governance is based on the dominant model of globalization or what was coined at the time as the “Washington Consensus.” These policy prescriptions had to do with economic opening with respect to trade and investment against a background of financial and budgetary orthodoxy. It was articulated in 1989 by John Williamson, then Chief Economist and Vice President of the World Bank, around ten ultra-liberal prescriptions—the “new tables of the law.” It aimed to ensure, especially through so-called structural adjustment policies, a healthy financial and monetary management. According to the “twin sisters of Washington”—the IMF and the World Bank—which are charged with the liberalization and opening, with forceps, of developing economies, the destiny of Africa was now written in stone. It was necessary to institutionalize the stabilization and management of large macro-economic variables as dogma of economic practices based on neo-liberalism, the cult of the market, and the primacy of the economic over the political. This reform package was carried out under the supervision of the IMF, the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the World Bank. Consequently, it was necessary to respect these dogmas and to religiously apply these directives. In these frank remarks one may find, perhaps, a trace of resignation. This is not the case. The idea is simply to look at the world realistically and without blinders. However, this should not lead to resignation or solely to nostalgic lament, but, rather, to action.

Two examples, one concerning Gabon and the other Malawi, illustrate quite well this idea that lucidity does not necessarily lead to resignation or to passivity, despite the pressures that a small country can undergo.

On March 14, 2004, the Gabonese government held lengthy discussions on the choices to be made, based on its national and African interests, concerning the votes it would cast the next day in the Commission on Human Rights—the much politicized and decried United Nations body based in Geneva of which Gabon was a member. Each year, an “anti-Castro” resolution was submitted for vote by the
Commission. In 2003, during the 59th Session of the Commission, Gabon was not heavily solicited for its vote on this resolution; in 2004, however, the highest authorities of the country were inundated with an extraordinary political campaign organized at all levels. On the night of March 14 and throughout the day on March 15, the day before the vote, I received, between 8:00pm and 8:00am, multiple telephone calls from officials from Africa, the US, and the Caribbean, strongly requesting our support; some countries supported Cuba, and others condemned it. I had never before been confronted with such a situation. The President of the Republic of Gabon himself was awakened by phone calls the night prior to the vote only to be solicited by several heads of state.

Some government officials put in the balance their firm and decisive support of IMF funding to Gabon, as Gabon had been in delicate negotiations with the IMF for nearly two years without reaching a conclusion. Still others recalled that in the context of South-South bilateral cooperation, Gabon had made a request to Cuba for some fifty Cuban physicians and that Cuba had helped Gabon and Africa more than certain superpowers. After a particularly eventful night, on D-Day, Gabon ultimately abstained during the vote on Resolution 2004/11 on the Situation of Human Rights in Cuba. The resolution was adopted with twenty-two votes in favor, twenty-one against, and ten abstentions. In the end, Gabon obtained the indispensable financial support of the IMF. On May 28, 2004, the Minister of Economy and Finance of Gabon signed, an agreement in Washington, D.C. that sanctioned the granting of stand-by credit. In turn, Cuba, recognizing that Gabon was in an extremely uncomfortable position, allowed the negotiations to proceed favorably concerning the request for physicians who, in fact, arrived in Libreville at the end of December 2004.

The second example concerns a Malawian, Tito Jestala, as reported in *Africa Renewal*, a publication of the United Nations Department of Public Information (DPI):

“Tito Jestala, who farms a tiny plot of land in Chiseka, Malawi, thinks he has the answer. In 2005, more than 30 of his neighbors died of malnutrition, in one of the periodic droughts that have swept Southern Africa. Even in a good year, he told the UK
newspaper *The Independent*, he could coax barely 250 kilograms of maize from his exhausted land. But over the last two years, his harvest has tripled, producing plenty of food for his family and leaving more than enough to sell at the local market. The difference, Mr. Jestala says, is fertilizer. For years this basic input was simply beyond his means and those of millions of other African farmers. But in 2005, the government of President Bingu wa Mutharika began subsidizing fertilizers and high-yielding seed for Malawi’s smallholders. The action cut fertilizer prices by 80 percent and slashed the cost of hybrid maize seeds from 600 kwacha per bag to 30. The impact was dramatic. The following year Malawi’s maize harvest more than doubled, to 2.7 mn tonnes. It rose again in 2007 to 3.4 mn tonnes—enough to feed the nation and sell 400,000 tonnes to the UN’s World Food Programme (WFP) and hundreds of thousands of tonnes more to neighbouring countries, generating $120 mn in sales. This formerly aid-dependent country even donated 10,000 tonnes of maize to the WFP’s nutrition programme for people living with HIV/AIDS…. The subsidy programme is already being seen as a model by a growing number of African governments…. But the programme has encountered difficulties in gaining acceptance from donors. In 1999, the government had introduced a more modest programme of free ‘starter packs’ of fertilizer and seeds for family farmers in an effort to boost production. The results were impressive, but the subsidies ran afoul of the pro-market policies of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF)…. Under considerable pressure from these financing institutions, the programme was phased out…. Most Malawian farmers, however, were too poor to pay commercial rates for fertilizer and seeds. As a result, maize yields plunged. When drought struck in 2001 neither farmers nor the government had adequate grain stores to see them through, and more than a thousand people are estimated to have died. Then after the failed 2005 harvest left 5 million of Malawi’s 13 million people on the brink of starvation, the newly elected government of President Mutharika defied the donors and launched the subsidy scheme with its own funds. That move proved decisive, Kanayo Nwanze, vice-president of the UN’s International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), told
Africa Renewal. ‘It was a very bold decision to provide subsidies for seeds and fertilizers over the objections of the development partners’ he said, noting that during a meeting with senior Malawian officials a furious representative of a donor country had stormed out of the room. ‘But the government stood its ground….’ With success literally growing all around them, ‘the next year, the donors supported it,’ Mr. Nwanze noted. It also made good economic sense, he continued, since the savings from the reduced imports and increased export sales generated three to four times more revenue than the subsidies cost….A growing number of countries, including Zambia, Ghana, Senegal and Kenya, have announced plans for similar subsidies and more governments are expected to follow suit.”

The pursuit of good economic governance, despite the external, multifaceted, and sometimes clumsy restrictions that accompany it, thus explains why macroeconomic stability became an obligation and the keynote of economic programs in Africa. The tragedy of Africa’s growth, we are consistently told, is partly due to the fact that African governments have not succeeded in establishing a stable macroeconomic environment. In other words, African governments have not kept their rates of inflation low, controlled their budget deficits, protected the stability of their exchange rates, managed their foreign debt, or kept their real interest rates stable and positive.

This budgetary discipline, aimed at reducing public spending, especially the elimination of subsidies and the monetary discipline to reduce inflation, became, as of 1994, following the sudden devaluation of the CFA franc—the common currency of fourteen countries in West and Central Africa—the new credo or urbi et orbi of African economic policies. The same was true about privatization: to be “economically correct,” African states had to disengage by a forced march from production and commerce activities, with the corollary of the total suppression of economic subsidies, to enable the extension of the role of markets and trade liberalization. For example, it was in this context that a framework law, No. 1/96 on privatization, was adopted in Gabon in 1996. As a result of this legislation, a concrete program for the privatization or liquidation of companies in the public sector was implemented at a fast pace. A very long list of companies to be
privatized was thus drawn up by the IMF in one of its famous “letters of intent” concerning all activities and all sectors (water, electricity, post and telecommunications, transportation, agro-food businesses, industry, mining and hydrocarbons, trade, banking, and other services). It is important to clarify that all public companies have indeed privatized and are now in the hands of large foreign private groups. The total influence of an external structure had been achieved from an economic viewpoint, as had been the case in 1960 before the advent of independence. This is the story of the beggar who sits on a pile of gold and asks for alms from the passersby.

At the same time, the safety and promotion of investments were reinforced. Indeed, in the general context advocated by the G20 and the G8 countries, the safety of investments is a major asset for countries that wish to attract investors. The economic, political, legal, and tax environment must be “correct” or, in other words, propitious for the development of the market and free enterprise. It was in order to improve this environment in the spirit of globalization, that under pressure from the World Bank, an investment charter was adopted by the Gabonese Parliament in 1998 (law no. 015/98) in order to set up the advocated regulation instruments and the recommended facilitation procedures. The World Bank’s new, idealized Partnership for Development was thus set out in order to attract foreign private investors. It was not enough, however, to want to become like Singapore. The famous foreign private investments (FPI) were still lacking in Africa. According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the huge global flows of private capital had carefully avoided Africa thus far, as the continent received less foreign direct investment than the Republic of Singapore in total. In contrast, the forced elimination of state subsidies and the sudden stoppage of public investments caused the collapse of Gabon’s fledgling national economy, particularly in the transportation (sea, air, river, roads, etc.) and food production sectors.117 They were also responsible for the severe food crisis that emerged in 2008 as well as the riots occasioned by hunger which followed.
PART THREE
The Revival of Pan-Africanism and Multilateralism

*I love those who yearn for the impossible.*

Johann Wolfgang von Goethe

In general, small countries, much more than large ones, give special importance to the observance of national laws and international standards. The force of the law, because it protects, is, indeed, an essential component of the foreign policy of most small countries. This is why African states, as they measure the strategic place of international legal protection in their national policies, should scrupulously observe international legal principles, especially those prescribed by the United Nations Charter and the Constitutive Act of the African Union.

In addition, due to the increasing effects of globalization and the resulting profound changes under way, the emergence of new transnational players, and the jurisdictions of the most diverse doctrines in international law, it is no longer just individual states that must face the outside enemy, but, rather, humankind that must confront emerging threats of common concern. This is why the current world order is increasingly based on a fundamental moral and ethical dimension.

The current impulse in international codification and legal standardization shows that with globalization and the end of ideologies, multilateralism actually becomes the most realistic approach to meeting the challenges of the day. In the world today, no country, large or small, can ignore the international system and its constant evolution. No nation, no matter how powerful, can singlehandedly protect itself against such global threats as terrorism, transnational crime, or environmental degradation.
Chapter Six

SHARED MANAGEMENT OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS

I always thought that small steps together are preferable to a great solitary leap.

Aimé Césaire

One of the major characteristics of globalization is its apparently paradoxical combination of centripetal and centrifugal forces. On the one hand are the dominant trends of globalization that tend towards greater centralization and homogenization and on the other hand are the forces of multipolarization marked by the emergence of a world exploded into major centers (the United States [US], the European Union [EU], the Commonwealth of Independent States [CIS], and Japan) and secondary-centers (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN], MERCOSUR, the North American Free Trade Agreement [NAFTA], and the Caribbean Community and Common Market [CARICOM], etc...]. But while these geopolitical organizations and trading blocs are being formed throughout the world, Africa, crossed by centrifugal currents and won over by the logic of war, balkanization, fission, and micro-nationalism, has remained outside of these larger movements of the day. Thus, Eritrea was detached from Ethiopia in 1993 and South Sudan from Sudan in 2011.

More and more voices have risen up in the African political and intellectual elite to revive the ideal of the Pan-Africanist movement that was born at the beginning of the twentieth century. Among the
illustrious pioneers of the Afro-American Diaspora are Edward Blyden, Henry Sylvester William, George Padmore, Marcus Garvey, and W.E.B. Du Bois. On the African continent, the greatest and most famous defender of Pan-Africanism was certainly Dr. O. Kwame Nkrumah, the first president of Ghana. More than fifty years ago, he, along with Ahmed Sékou Touré (the first president of Guinea), Gamal Abdel Nasser (the second president of Egypt), and Nnamdi Azikiwé (the first president of Nigeria), supported the total political and economic integration of all of the states on the African continent. For this purpose, Dr. Nkrumah advocated for the creation of a federal state on a continental scale with a single central government, a common nationality, and a single monetary zone to be named the United States of Africa. With the arrival of globalization, Pan-Africanism once again became extremely current. Indeed, the new impulse of regionalism throughout the world also had an impact on Africa. It became necessary to revise the Charter of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) to bring it up to date with the most recent political and economic developments and to prepare Africa for a globalized world. Without integration and the joint development of Africa’s vast potential, there would be no salvation for Africa’s countries, which aspire to live free from need.

POLITICAL INTEGRATION

It is in this general context that, aware of the delays already incurred and convinced of the need to act collectively, the African heads of state decided, under the leadership of Libya’s President Muammar al-Gaddafi, to reinforce and accelerate the political and economic integration of their countries. Instead of the OAU, which had been created in 1963, these heads of state envisioned a simple, inter-governmental cooperation organization—a new framework for continental integration—named the African Union (AU). On the occasion of the OAU’s Fourth Extraordinary Summit, held in Sirte, Libya on September 8-9, 1999, a decision to create this new organization was adopted.

According to the scenario worked out by Libya, the summit host country, the birth of the African Union and the United States of Africa would take place in Sirte, the birthplace of Colonel Gaddafi, on September 9, at 9:00 am, the anniversary week of his taking power.
As Colonel Gaddafi had not previously submitted his “project of establishment of the United States of Africa” for examination by African experts and ministers, the AU’s birth was unable to take place that day. The heads of state of Nigeria, South Africa, and many other countries vigorously opposed it, in the name of compliance with procedural rules and national and international legalities. According to these officials, “democratic countries could not, in such a case, commit without a previous examination of the related texts and without informing their public opinions and their parliaments.” However, in the spirit of compromise, and, especially, to pay tribute to the efforts put forth by the leader of Libya, it was decided, at the suggestion of President Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal, to announce that day, in a solemn proclamation called the Sirte Declaration, the principle of this founding that would transform the OAU into the AU.

The Constitutive Act of the African Union, prepared on the basis of modern European experience, was finally approved one year later on July 12, 2000, at the 36th OAU Summit held in Lomé, Togo. It entered into force on May 26, 2001, at the 37th and last summit of the OAU held in Lusaka, Zambia. After a one-year transitional period, the AU officially replaced the OAU at its much-celebrated inaugural summit held on July 10, 2002, in Durban, South Africa. Many of the Africans gathered that day, in the country of Nelson Mandela, felt, as I did, that they were present at a great moment in contemporary history.

We must, nevertheless, recognize that this process, intended to facilitate the total realization of the political and economic integration of the continent, as envisioned by Dr. Nkumah and Colonel Gaddafi, as well as the establishment of the “United States of Africa,” with a government of the AU comprised of ministers with certain supranational competencies, had barely begun. While the AU Commission (its Secretariat), the Pan-African Parliament (its legislative body), the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the African Court of Justice and Human Rights (its judiciary), the Economic, Social and Cultural Council, and other organs such as the Peace and Security Council are still in place today, the road ahead remains extremely long. This is particularly the case concerning the continental executive entity referred to as the “government” of the
The following observations were made by the President of South Africa concerning the project of the “government of the United States of Africa,” which was subject to approval by the heads of state at the 7th Ordinary AU Summit held in 2006 in Banjul, Gambia: “We are offered a 107-page document that we did not have the time to read or study, which gripes about the national sovereignty and transfers it to an institution whose prerogatives are still unclear. I cannot give the agreement of my government without referring it to Parliament and the institutions of my country.” This very strong reaction from Thabo Mbeki was symptomatic of the deep differences of opinion that still needed to be overcome, especially by those countries who wanted to block everything that seemed to indicate a “supranational drift.” Indeed, two camps representing two major schools of thought had emerged. On the one hand was the school of so-called “realistic” inspiration of the “sovereignty advocates,” “gradualists,” or “minimalists.” Their leader was President Thabo Mbeki, actively supported by Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni, Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, and numerous other heads of state of southern and eastern Africa. On the other hand, was the school of so-called “idealistic” or “radical” inspiration of the “maximalists,” “unionists,” or, even, “federalists,” whose standard-bearer was Col. Gaddafi, strongly backed by Senegalese President Abdoulaye Wade. For the former, namely the “gradualists,” the idea has been to work stage by stage, in accordance with the plan provided by the Abuja Treaty, towards a community of states based on regional blocs or Regional Economic Communities (RECs) that, preferably, would be strengthened beforehand, the so-called “Buildings Blocks.” For the latter, the “immediatists,” the idea, on the contrary, was to go very fast in order to make up for lost time. They advocated for the immediate constitution of a continental government as a significant step towards the creation of the United States of Africa.

In principle, no African country is opposed to the logic of integration. Quite to the contrary, since the ultimate objective is the establishment of the United States of Africa. Meanwhile, it is essential to reinforce those continental institutions that will allow Africans to succeed collectively at what none of these states could capably do
alone. In the future, global governance will be increasingly linked to regional integration entities in a logic of subsidiarity. Thus, most Africans acknowledged that the salvation for the continent was, in fact, to be united in an African bloc as opposed to remaining small, independent countries. When we start looking more closely, we realize that the differences of view remain deep and, even, radical. Many consider, for example, that this process requires more time and should not, in particular, encroach on national sovereignty issues. For example, President Museveni maintained that it should be just a union of independent and sovereign states. These disagreements mainly concern the timeframe, in other words, when will it be concretized? It also concerns the roadmap for realization of the integration, in other words, how can it be shaped? And, finally, it concerns the shape that this union might take, in other words, what will it be? What model of union will be chosen: a federation, a confederation, etc.? What will be the speed of integration? What will be the shared values? What will be the common languages? What will be the degree of transfer of sovereignty? What will the relationship among the government of the Union, the national governments, the Commission, and the RECs look like? What form will the executive, the legislative, judicial branches, etc., take? These were the big questions that fueled the ongoing debates.

All of these questions were marked by the serious and persistent differences of view among the member states. These uncertainties only exacerbated the passionate statements made by government officials and caused some heated debates during many of the AU summits and meetings of the councils of ministers dedicated to the examination of this important issue. However, these same passions were raised fifty years ago. In fact, quite often, the ambience of these debates strangely reminded me of the deliberations at the time of the creation of the Organization of African Unity in 1963. Sometimes, I even had the impression of having gone back to the very beginning with the confrontation between the same two schools of thought: on the one hand, that of the maximalists/federalists/immediatists/unionists/idealists as compared to the revolutionaries of the Casablanca Group at the time of the creation of the OAU and, on the other hand, that of the minimalists/sovereignists/gradualists/realists as juxtaposed to the
moderates of the Monrovia Group of the 1960s. For example, when hearing my Senegalese colleague and friend, Cheikh Tidiane Gadio, a former Foreign Minister of Senegal, mention during our long debates, in flights of lyricism, the names of W.E.B. Du Bois, Marcus Garvey, Cheikh Anta Diop, Léopold Sédar Senghor, and Kwame Nkrumah himself, I could not help but think of what would have actually happened if the “Afro-Federalist” theories of the illustrious Ghanaian statesman and supporter of Pan-Africanism had prevailed forty-four years ago over the sovereignist approaches of Négus Hailé Sélassié, Emperor of Ethiopia. Would Africa have succeeded in accomplishing integration as Brazil, the United States, and India were able to achieve? Or would Africa have disintegrated and imploded like the Soviet Union, the Balkans, or the Federation of Mali?

The crossfire from the “sovereignists/gradualists,” was especially intense from the foreign ministers of Swaziland, Uganda, South Africa, Botswana, and many others who held diametrically-opposed positions to those of Senegal and Libya. These officials would take it upon themselves—in the corridors or closed deliberation rooms—to make us forget our hopes, brushing them away as daydreams and utopias. The length and persistence of these impassioned debates would sometimes make me plunge into my own daydreams. Sometimes I thought of Gandhi and Nehru and their successful creation of the Indian Union. At other times, I recalled President Josip Broz Tito and the tragic end of “his Yugoslavia.” My thoughts also went to two French philosophers, Henri Bergson who said “…most great reforms appeared at first sight to be impracticable, as in fact they were”123 and Edgar Morin who considered that one should not give up on utopias because the fight to fundamentally transform our societies cannot be abandoned. I must confess that I was especially aware of the unprecedented chance that was offered to me: to take an active part in such an important debate related to the future of our continent and the countries and peoples that comprise it. As a citizen of a small country, Gabon, which had struggled fiercely in the 1950s for its independence and against the unionist conceptions of the defendants of the Federation of French Equatorial Africa (I am thinking, in particular, of Jean Barthélemy Boganda, the leading nationalist politician of what is now the Central African Republic), I understood, better than anyone,
the fears and doubts of the “gradualists.” I also, however, held the firm belief that faced with globalization, the salvation of Africa lie greatly in its unity and integration. “This is probably true,” some told me, “but it is not a reason to confuse speed and precipitation.” “So be it,” answered others, “but it does not mean that we have to wait for the day of the last judgment. Otherwise, Pan-Africanism will remain a simple, unrealized dream.” In this regard, the Libyan leader no longer hesitated to denounce those he called “traitors” and “hesitant,” and his statements, while said in passing, did not facilitate the search for consensus. What a dilemma! In spite of my own fears and doubts, I was still convinced that the future belonged to integration. This would take as much time as it would take. I believed that in order to live and prosper, Africa was condemned to unite one way or another, under penalty of being purely and simply eaten up by the big wolves with long teeth who hardly hide behind the bushes of globalization and the end of national sovereignty. “Indeed, who would have believed half a century ago that the European continent, torn up by two world wars, in mourning for millions of dead, marked by ferocious hatred and implacable feuds, would succeed in such a short period of time to overcome the old divisions and realize its old dream of unity?”

ECONOMIC INTEGRATION: THE TIME OF GEO-ECONOMICS

In any event, we must recognize that in the era of globalization, where primacy is given to the economic aspect (over the political aspect) and to external legitimacy (over internal legitimacy), the political integration of the continent should be based on its economic integration, the essential development tool of African countries. Africa, people constantly recall in this regard, can only integrate into the world economy if it succeeds in its own economic integration. It was, thus, strongly affirmed that it would be necessary to succeed in African integration or, ultimately, disappear. As of 2001, it was this stubborn quest for unity and integration that was also the basis of the organization of NEPAD’s continental socio-economic program and, especially, of the renewed interest in the Abuja Treaty which came into force in 1994.
TOWARDS AN AFRICAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY (AEC)

The Abuja Treaty, signed in 1991, advanced the commitments stated in the Lagos Action Plan and the Final Act of Lagos of 1980. It defined, despite pressure from the Bretton Woods Institutions with their structural adjustment programs, a concrete formula of economic cooperation and regional integration and a roadmap that would lead to the creation of a continental common market by 2025. For this purpose, it established, at the African sub-regional level, the objectives and modalities of economic regional blocs or integration circles referred to as Regional Economic Commissions (RECs). The RECs, regarded as the pillars of economic integration, would progress over a period of thirty-four years—which may now be increased to a maximum of forty years—and in six stages, towards the creation of an African Common Market (fifth stage) and, ultimately, the implementation of the African Economic Community (AEC), whose potential is considerable (sixth stage). Over time, you will need to judge the progress for yourself.

The African Economic Community represents 22 percent of the world’s still uncultivated, exposed land (30.3 million km2 or ten times the size of Europe, ten times the size of India, four times the size of the United States, and three times the size of China). By 2020, its market will cover 1.4 billion consumers, as much as China today, and by 2050, it will include 2 billion consumers. Let me also add that the AEC contains one of the largest reservoirs of raw materials on the planet: 90 percent of the world’s reserves of platinum, cobalt, and chromium; 76 percent of phosphate; 73 percent of diamonds; 60 percent of manganese; 40 percent of gold; 30 percent of bauxite and uranium; and 15 percent of iron and oil. In addition, there are abundant agricultural raw materials (cotton, cocoa, and coffee) and wood (forests). It should also be noted that the continent has one third of the world’s hydroelectric capital as well as many other important economic, social, and cultural capabilities. These rich resources show that our continent offers, in the current context of globalization, a real economic opportunity and that it is not, as claimed by Afro-pessimists, a problem.

At the same time, I must admit that Africa is, unfortunately, also
the most fragmented continent with 165 borders that cut it into 54 countries whose combined GDP is barely equal to that of Belgium or the revenue of the US oil company Exxon-Mobil. Thus, the two largest African countries, the Sudan and Algeria, with a land area of 2.505 and 2.382 million km², respectively (ten times larger than the United Kingdom), have populations of only 36 million and 34 million, respectively, with population densities of around 15 inhabitants per km² (versus 584 inhabitants per km² in Japan, 393 in the Netherlands, 244 in the United Kingdom, and 3,200 in the Gaza). Furthermore, many other African countries have populations of less than half a million consumers with densities of less than 5 inhabitants per km². Therefore, the creation of the RECs was indispensable to achieving a critical mass and to offsetting the narrowness of our domestic markets, which has always been a handicap to the development of Africa.

“One way or another,” writes author Désiré Mandilou, “Africa must consolidate its internal African growth....In a globalized economy, countries in sub-Saharan Africa can only attain the critical mass needed by coalescing and encouraging population growth.”125 For example, a REC, such as ECOWAS, has a total population of 390 million inhabitants and a land area of 5 million km² as compared to the European Union, with 400 million inhabitants and a land area of 4 million km². The road that leads towards economic integration, however, is still replete with pitfalls and, sometimes, looks like the slow, at times, backwards walk of the crayfish. In Africa, there is, for example, a proliferation of sub-regional organizations with states sometimes maintaining double or triple memberships in the various RECs.126 There is also a lack of macro-economic coordination and harmonization, and the principle of variable geometry (the level of integration) within some RECs, such as the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA), which has yet to launch its operations, or the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), which has been inactive since 1992, remains problematic.

THE DREAM OF SHARED PROSPERITY: NEPAD

In international economic relations, a central question that arose at the time when the world was experiencing tremendous prosperity, was how Africans, left behind and marginalized, would be able to take
advantage, both individually and collectively, of this immense global wealth. According to the global financial community, the answer to this nagging question was simple: by globalization, that is to say, by greater integration into the world economy.

In this context, on July 3, 2001, in Lusaka, the African heads of state worked out and adopted an operational response to this problem. The answer, now known as the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), was regarded as the economic counterpart of the African Union. It was, in fact, the merger, under the earlier name of the New African Initiative (NAI), of two projects that were both distinct and complementary. The first initiative, the Millennium Partnership for the African Recovery Program or Millennium African Renaissance Program (MAP) was conceived of by South African President Thabo Mbeki; the second proposal, the OMEGA Plan, was put forward by Senegalese President Abdoulaye Wade.

The first project, that of Thabo Mbeki, expressed serious concerns about the proliferation of wars and bad governance in Africa and was rather political, intangible, and superstructural. His idea was to meet the demands of globalization. It is true that his plan roughly corresponded to what donors would later call the exemplary conditions of good governance (good political, economic, and corporate governance); that is to say, peace and security; democracy; human rights and justice; macro-economic balance and stability; transparency; anti-corruption measures; protection of investments, etc. The second project, that of Abdoulaye Wade, a former professor of economics, was particularly concerned about the increasing economic marginalization of Africa and was rather economical, tangible, and infrastructural. His plan focused more on the economic development of the continent (infrastructure, education, health, new technology, agriculture, access to global markets, etc.).

Submitted simultaneously, and without prior consultation with or examination by the heads of state and government at the summit in Lusaka, the two projects, which in fact complemented one other well, were naturally sent back to OAU experts for analysis and synthesis. During this synthesis, ultimately referred to as NEPAD, Africans, in an effort to promote synergies with international partners, agreed on an approach, at the strong urging of Thabo Mbeki and seconded by
Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo, to better understand, internalize, and implement, for the renaissance of their continent, the model conditions required by the international community of donors.

To engender this corrective step, in March 2002 the South African and Nigerian Presidents urgently proposed the immediate establishment of a particularly daring mechanism, the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). The APRM was intended to assess, based on a code of good conduct, whether countries had made significant progress in the areas of good governance as advocated by the Bretton Woods Institutions. The idea was, through self-assessment, applying pressure on governments, and mutually-reinforced monitoring, a seal of good governance would be granted to the “good student.”128 While these prerequisites were necessary for our countries, they were not sufficient by themselves because in order to develop and succeed, real support would be needed. The mobilization of the G8 and the G20 and the international financial community in terms of technology transfer, reduction of debt, access to global markets, and a massive mobilization of foreign investments (FDI) and public development aid (PDA) would be crucial. This support, if agreed to by the G8, could lead to a true, new “Marshall Plan” for Africa that could be carried out under the new Partnership for Development.

Unfortunately, the transition from rhetoric to declarations of intent to political programs of concrete action is rather rare among donor nations. Some Africans expressed some serious doubts about the reality of the political will and commitments of the G8 partners, which, they said, promised a lot but did very little. “NEPAD,” Jeune Afrique declared in its July 9, 2006 issue, “has never been anything more than a fool’s deal, a chimera and a prayer wheel...” For Muammar Gaddafi, it is simply “a white elephant.” “Since 1986,” recalled Paul Badji, Permanent Representative of Senegal to the United Nations, “Africa has been bound to the international community by three successive contracts: first, the United Nations Programme of Action for African Economic Recovery and Development; secondly, the United Nations New Agenda for the Development of Africa in the 1990s; and, third and finally, NEPAD. The characteristics of each of these programs and the historical circumstances in which they were launched are far from identical, but they are similar to the extent that
the lack of resources that caused the first two to fail continues to characterize the first stage of the implementation of NEPAD.”

For their part, Africans, who have aligned themselves with the maxim “there is no need to hope to start acting,” busied themselves in an effort to demonstrate their political will through concrete sharing and the effective achievement of the goals of NEPAD. Of course, the general situation remained worrisome, but the most serious obstacles were behind us especially if we consider the fact that the proposals to integrate NEPAD into the African Union were shaping well. It should be recalled that the wars that set ablaze more than half of the eleven countries of central Africa had been virtually extinguished, thanks mainly to the efforts of Africans themselves. The very long conflict in Angola, considered “the worst war in Africa,” began in 1961 and finally ended in 2000 after four decades of fratricidal conflict. Today, Angola, with growth rates in the double digits, a 20 percent jump in 2007, has entered a crucial phase of intense activity to bring about economic and social reconstruction. Similarly, “the first African world war,” which began in 1998 in the DRC and involved a dozen neighboring African countries in the largest ground of military operations the continent had ever known, had also virtually ceased. The bloodshed in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Burundi had ended. In 1996 alone, the United Nations reported that the fourteen African countries experiencing armed conflict accounted for more than half of all war-related deaths worldwide. Today, the fighting continues in Darfur and Somalia. The African Union and the RECs, although they do not have adequate resources, endeavor to extinguish these ongoing fires.

We should also remember that the democratic process, hurt by armed violence, has been gradually reintroduced throughout Africa. For example, the DRC, a former Belgian colony which became independent in 1960, held its first democratic elections in more than 40 years in 2006; President Joseph Kabila was declared the winner on November 27, 2006. Credible elections, like those that took place in Ghana, are now held across the continent. Even the post-electoral violence recorded in Kenya, Zimbabwe, and elsewhere in Africa attests, albeit negatively, to the reality and fierceness of democratic competition. Surely, in Africa, elections are no longer a foregone conclusion.

We must, therefore, believe that “another world is possible” for
Africa. South African President Thabo Mbeki was certainly right in expressing the hope of millions of Africans when, before the French National Assembly, he quoted Robespierre and declared that our continent should “witness the dawn of the bright day of universal happiness.”

The people of Africa dream of a humanized globalization that will benefit the poorest of countries so that all citizens of the planet will finally be liberated from fear and hunger. They dream of a globalization of solidarity that will increase equal opportunities for all within and between nations and that will establish, for this purpose, fair and binding codes of conduct and just rules of the game for more brotherly relations without sacrificing the major goals of economic development at the global level and the maintenance of free and open societies.

Such a dream, on a par with the great American dream is, admittedly, accessible. Its success is a matter of worldview and a question of political will and of international mobilization. Former French President Jacques Chirac and former British Prime Ministers Tony Blair and Gordon Brown have repeatedly called for the implementation of “a new Marshall Plan” to fight poverty in Africa and, in particular, for the cancellation of Africa’s unsustainable and unpayable debt and for the mobilization of new international instruments for development and finance. At this great moment in the history of their continent, and at the height of their expectations and ambitions, Africans hope to work together with all outside partners to build their future.

IDEOLOGICAL INTEGRATION:
THE UNIVERSALIZATION OF WESTERN VALUES

The world, at least its vast majority, now considers and accepts, as natural or universal the values of Western and Judeo-Greek origin as carried out through globalization: the primary and sacred right to individual happiness; market economy; good governance; and, moreover, democratic governance. This sharing of the same values and schools of thought requires all countries to respect common rules. Like other countries, African states have also developed a set of political, economic, and cultural and ideological reforms necessary for their adherence to globalization. This progress inexorably forges ahead, sometimes ignoring both the sovereignty of nations and the
diversity of political and cultural regimes. “Governments,” notes Jean Paul Fitoussi, “are subjected to external pressure from their peers and may not, under penalty of serious risk, ignore the dominant model of the moment. Whatever their initial beliefs, they must play the game.”

This mandatory game comes with compulsory rules and is, often, accompanied by threats of sanctions if one does not comply. These rules are mainly based on the prerequisites of democracy, human rights, openness, and good governance. Any state that deviates from these rules is, in principle, immediately isolated and marginalized and risks the cessation of foreign investments.

GOOD POLITICAL GOVERNANCE

If the quest for economic well-being depends, above all, on good economic governance as discussed earlier, it also applies to good political governance in accordance with the famous words expressed by French Finance Minister Baron Louis in the 19th Century: “Give me a good policy and I will give you good finances.” But in the new emerging world order, good policy means, of course, market democracy. “Ideas are one of our most important exports,” the distinguished US political scientist Francis Fukuyama said on this issue, “and two fundamentally American ideas have dominated global thinking since the early 1980s, when Ronald Reagan was elected president. The first was a certain vision of capitalism—one that argued low taxes, light regulation and a pared-back government would be the engine for economic growth…not just in the United States, but around the world. The second big idea was America as a promoter of liberal democracy around the world, which was seen as the best path to a more prosperous and open international order.”

In this general context, reforms, not only economic, but also political, were required and implemented, especially through structural adjustment policies. These reforms, in the context of the doctrine of less government, were aimed at setting up good political governance based on universalized democratic standards. The authoritarian and centralized African state of yesteryear was consequently shifted to the neo-classic state of utopia—a “minimalist state,” “soft state,” or “world-state” as termed by French journalist and essayist Thierry Wolton. The African state was, therefore, regularly called to task for its underdevelopment, which was regarded as the real obstacle to peace, progress, and
democracy in Africa. This democracy, long perceived as incompatible with development, and even harmful and dangerous, became the prerequisite or *sine qua non* condition for good political governance.

We must, again, recall that the current world order proclaims that political liberalism and economic liberalism are two sides of the same coin. It also asserts that the progress of the market and democracy is indivisible, irreversible, and quick. And, finally, it declares that the ideas and values—of Judeo-Greek origin and of Western inspiration—as conveyed by globalization, are now universal and, even, immutable (individualism, secularization, fair markets, nationalism, human rights, democracy, etc.). Today, the situation appears quite clear. The current world order, which holds individual freedoms and human rights as absolute, has conveyed these principles to the rest of the world. The market and democracy, the ultimate expression of the triumph of the primacy of the individual over society and institutions, have, in turn, flourished worldwide. Thus, French economist Jacques Attali noted, “from century to century, Humankind imposes the primacy of individual liberty over any other value.” The proof of the current ambition for development, which has become universal, is the aspiration towards the Western consumption model, the power of Western technology, and the status related to the Western lifestyle and, even more so, the “American way of life.” Like the newly rich, the elites of non-Western societies and, especially the African intelligentsia, dream of being able to enjoy the values and property of the consumer society created by the Western world. In this respect, they very often appear, at least in speech and posture, more Catholic than the Pope. This is surely what led Cameroonian Eugène Nyambal, despite the fact that he was a senior adviser to the IMF Administrator for Africa, to write: “Given...the natural inclination of the elites to fight by proxy on behalf of foreign interests, we should beware that the African Union be exploited to reinforce the foreign grip on the countries with the complicity of Africans.”

In fact, if one takes a quick look at the policies, strategies, action plans, programs, and current projects in Africa (the AU, NEPAD, the APRM, as well as other charters, reports, decisions, and recommendations), one sometimes finds that there is a certain trend towards a systematic mimicry that often transforms Africa into a simple
voicebox for the dominant, appealing model. It can be argued, however, that this fascination, mainly with the United States and its universalization of values, is the “ironic consequence of sixty years of American action” to open and Americanize the world. In this context, says political theorist Benjamin Barber, “democracy becomes less a government system than an attractive logo, intended to transform friends and adversaries into consumers of the product America.”

Nevertheless, given that all contemporary societies of freedom and progress have been founded on the values of civilization as forged by the West—originating in the Judeo-Greek ideal and the 18th century European Enlightenment—and given that it is also true that economic and social well-being, development, and modernization necessarily require the adoption of these ideas and values, why should we not adhere to them as well? Let us recall that it was this type of reasoning that led to the modernization of Japan, and we all know what a resounding success that has been. In fact, Japan opened gunfire on US Admiral Perry in 1853, having understood that it could not escape being put under protection by the Westerners unless it imitated them. Emperor Mitsuhiro, who in 1868 acceded to the throne of the Land of the Rising Sun under the name of Meiji Tenno, then gave his country a Parliament (in the British fashion), a civil code (inspired by the Napoleonic Code), an army (after the Prussian model), and a Western technology, industry, etc. It is recognized that it was this “methodical imitation” that saved Japan. On this subject, French economist Serge Latouche asserts that “The undeniable success of Japan, yesterday, and the more problematic one of certain newly industrialized countries today, appear to testify to either a successful Westernization or the rescue of the cultural identity and ultimately, both.”

Finally, like Japan, the present and future of Africa will necessarily be hybrid even though “the imitation of the models of organization tested in the West has become a yardstick of the value of African public institutions, a stamp of quality that each importing country is proudly putting forward to signify its entrance into modernity.” Can we say that systematic mimicry is almost as dangerous as the irreducible narcissism? This is why attempts at world cultural leveling and system-
atic standardization of cultural identities actually constitute a risk of impoverishment of humankind. Quite the contrary, as recommended by UNESCO, the idea is to preserve the diversity of cultural expressions in order to ultimately reconcile cultural identity and universality.\textsuperscript{144} We must, rightly argued Aimé Césaire, “dive into our roots to achieve universality.”

In any case, we can fortunately and concretely see that in the new democratic state in Africa, particular emphasis is being placed on the model of Western democracy with a separation of powers (executive, legislative, and judicial) and legitimization through popular sovereignty as expressed in the form of periodic, fair, free, transparent, and competitive elections. These are, indeed, the two key elements on which every modern parliamentary democracy in the Western style is based. As so aptly theorized by Montesquieu in the 18th century, parliament makes the laws, the executive branch manages the state, and the judiciary branch interprets the laws compiled by the legislature and exercises judicial control on the acts of the executive. The rest, one might say, is often simple mimicry to the extent that democracy has always been somewhat different from one Western country to another.\textsuperscript{145} President Franklin D. Roosevelt himself said that “Democracy...is a quest, a never-ending seeking for better things, and in the seeking for these things...there are many roads to follow.”\textsuperscript{146}

Today, the difficulty for Africa resides in the fact that these days one must always go further and faster, instantly and totally becoming assimilated into a single, dominant model. “Where once representative democracy was at the core of democratic forms of governance,” UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan said in 2006, “today participatory democracy is becoming increasingly important.”\textsuperscript{147} It is under this once revolutionary drive by the African elites, attracted by the dominant model that should be mimicked to signify entry into modernity, that particular emphasis is placed on new fashionable concepts that are often still in gestation. These new concepts reflect a standard (less state) and target a goal (the dismantling of the centralized nation-state). This happens, for example, with:

- Organization of the “counter powers,” a characteristic principle of the American system of checks and balances, owing mainly to the constitutional freedom of the right to form associations. This
right enables NGOs, the media, businesses, and civil society in general to serve as counter powers to the government to increase the number of actors with a voice and to increase accountability. This is the new spirit of democracy with the fashionable notion of participation, consultation, and citizen debate and with the concepts of participatory democracy, deliberative democracy, social democracy, local democracy, or democracy of opinion.

But one might ask, what participation and what opinion are we talking about with regard to a collapsing Africa? First of all, in Africa, the so-called international community and the so-called international public opinion is primarily the opinion shaped by the West as conveyed by its NGOs and its mass media which impart a higher authority. As for the values and views of the real Africa, of the deep Africa, in reality, they do not count at all. Regarding the “counter powers,” be they large globalized foreign companies that are much more powerful than our states or certain outside NGOs assisted by a few local representatives who are paid by them and working on their behalf, they have become, in Africa, the principal vector of external influence, true indoctrinated powers that try to impose on states that are already bankrupt, their own single point of view or, even, to speak on behalf of these states. They no longer hesitate to intimidate or blackmail them. Furthermore, they are not answerable to anyone, neither to the public nor to the companies. This is why some of these NGOs often remind one of the evangelical character of their activism, the civilizing and messianic ambition of the colonizer, and the religious movements of the nineteenth century.

• The constitutional limitation of mandates and the requirement of democratic alternation: a two-term presidential limitation, as in the United States. Russia and China also have a strict limit of two presidential terms firmly in place. This means that Africa would no longer be able to remain outside of this advancement.

However, this should not prevent us from noting in passing that there is no similar provision in the constitutions of the nations of the “old Europe,” although it was the cradle of modern democracy. In fact, history sometimes overcomes the clichés and mocks us. For example, in Argentina, Cristina Fernández Kirchner
was triumphantly elected president to succeed her husband, whom the Constitution prohibited from having a third term. In Russia, to overcome the same obstacle, its very popular president, Vladimir Putin, remained in office as prime minister of his protégé, President Dmitry Medvedev, with the intention to become again president of Russia thereafter.

- As the respect for human rights is a major ideological concern of our time, it was necessary and quite proper to include it in African constitutions and in the African Union’s Constitutive Act. The rights of individuals should be placed at the center of a community’s primary concerns and essential duties. Even though many may consider it outdated, the substantive debate between individualism and communitarianism continues: Do people exist, first of all, as products of society or as free individuals? Certainly, the Japanese, who imitated the Westerners so well, continue privileging the logic of the group and respect for seniority. Certainly, as well, the notion of *raison d’état*, so much disparaged, so much denounced, is still valid in the greatest Western democracies. Africa in general has resolutely chosen to promote the rights of the person, and it should be congratulated.

- The decentralization that forced African countries, at the turn of the 1990s, in the general context of the “less state” doctrine, was intended to dismantle the strong state of old and the centralizing totalitarianism that characterized it.

It is helpful to consider, for illustrative purposes, the example of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG). Formulated by experts at the African Union, and signed by its member states, it clearly states that it aims to “promote adherence, by each State Party, to the universal values and principles of democracy and respect for human rights” and that “States Parties shall promote good governance by ensuring transparency and accountable administration” in order to “create conducive conditions for civil society organizations to exist and operate within the law.” Is this not a beautiful illustration of strong or advanced democracy? Thus, Africa is moving towards a change of mentality, and that is good. So much so, that people have come to immediately demand from her what no one, at that
time, demanded from Europe or America, and that no one demands today of the East or the Far East. Consequently, there is no way for her to be inspired like Japan from the essence of the strength of the great Western civilization, but simply to mimic and copy a single model, the dominant model at this time. As we can see, Africa has actually become a true field of experimentation of all methods. But the real question that is now raised to her is to know whether all these methods may be easily assimilated by the reality of African societies. This is the problem of the aptitude of the imitator to appropriate and internalize the imported model given as an example. In the meantime, we no longer show imagination, but we simply recite textbooks. Recognizing it out of intellectual honesty does not at all mean that we reject these methods. Quite the contrary, especially since it is necessary to go ahead with the time, “the world time.” And right now, when there is no time to wait, it is an illusion to hope to be heard in isolation and survive by adopting the suicidal strategy of the lonely knight. Consequently, one should hop on the bandwagon and advance towards modernity, but with eyes wide open, grouped in closed ranks within an African Union that is sufficiently strong to protect us and prevent us from collapsing like Somalia, Haiti, or Iraq.
Chapter Seven

SHARED MANAGEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Servi ordinem et ordo servabit te

(Preserve order and order will preserve you)

The international legal system today consists of juxtaposed entities with no central executive, legislative, or judicial authority. There is no world constitution or world government and no true police authority to enforce international law. However, the United Nations Charter is an essential international legal document that opened the door for agreement among member states to unite to maintain international peace and security and to promote the economic and social development of all people. The Security Council is empowered, with legally binding powers and “shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression.” Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (Article 42), the Security Council can decide on the use of armed force as may be necessary to “maintain or restore international peace and security.” It also allows the General Assembly, a sort of world parliament, not only to vote on resolutions and decisions, but to discuss, at least theoretically, “the powers and functions of any organs provided for in the present Charter” (Article 10). The logic of collective security thus increasingly calls for a limited transfer of the authority to determine the legitimate use of force from individual states to the member-state bodies of the UN.

The international political order does not have binding world
jurisdiction. The UN Charter calls upon parties to a dispute “to seek a solution” by peaceful means and “to bring any dispute or any situation…to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly” (Article 35). However, I believe there has been an evolution in the application of the rules of international law, the basis of international order, to all states, erga omnes, without exception. This has sometimes been the case concerning fundamental human rights, humanitarian law, or the protection of common assets. On the other hand, new values and concepts increasingly appear, such as the right of interference, the rights of the child, gender equality, universal competence, human safety, and the responsibility to protect. Likewise, new institutions have been established or are about to be created, such as the International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda or the former Yugoslavia or a world environment organization, whose creation has been called for. Jacques Attali, in his Brief History of the Future, imagines the creation of new supranational institutions. According to him, they will evolve towards a world government with a planetary Constitution that will include a Security Council comprised of the G-8 countries and a few rising nations, a General Assembly to be supported by a second body elected by universal suffrage, and a third body made up of companies to constitute a world parliament. Thus, humanity increasingly perceives itself as a totality or a “planetary village.” This being the case, the question is no longer that of an individual country that must face a foreign enemy, but that of all humanity that must survive in the face of common global challenges.

AFRICA FACED WITH GLOBAL CHALLENGES

Africa, it is often said, is not doing well. Major threats and risks, sometimes of a new and unprecedented magnitude, have emerged on the continent with increasing frequency. This list of threats and challenges is long and varied: social scourges such as epidemics (for example, SARS, Ebola, and malaria), pandemics (HIV/AIDS), and epizootic diseases (the avian influenza H5N1); armed conflicts and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; transnational financial crime and world debt; the explosion of poverty and corruption; international terrorism, genetically modified organisms (GMOs); global ecological debacles; and reoccurring climatic catastrophes. As one can see, this list is quite impressive. A number of major countries,
including the United States and United Kingdom, have set up new departments or entities within their governments to contend with these emerging threats. The world, indeed, is coming to a major crossroads, where vital choices are warranted, particularly in the areas of environmental protection or the fight against global terrorism; choices that will require much more debate worldwide.

These phenomena do not have the same impact on all countries throughout the world. More than ever, African policies have had to incorporate the promotion of multilateralism in their objectives as well as the necessary shared management of African and international affairs. Global threats and challenges can only be resolved collectively and globally with the support of all countries and all of the key players in the search for solutions. To this end, African countries have strongly mobilized in the fights against the degradation of the environment and international terrorism, to name just two of the many ongoing threats.

PRESERVING AFRICAN LUNGS AND SAVING AN ENDANGERED PLANET EARTH

The serious dangers resulting from the pollution created by human activity worldwide and the growing universal awareness of this problem constitute an important but relatively recent phenomenon. As of the 19th century, experts and officials have expressed fears about the serious effects of pollution. For generations, this major global issue was not fully understood. Today, the world is mobilizing, already having witnessed the 1984 catastrophe in Bhopal, India caused by a toxic gas leak at the Union Carbide plant which killed 3,000 people overnight and injured more than 10,000 and the explosion of a reactor at the Chernobyl nuclear plant in the Ukraine in 1986, which is predicted to be the cause of tens of thousands of cancer deaths due to the fallout. Disasters related to technical progress and industrialization are, unfortunately, not imaginary. The intensification of the greenhouse effect due to the hyperactivity of mankind and the global warming that has followed are causing consequences that are so severe from a meteorological, health, and economic viewpoint that humanity is now faced with a formidable challenge: how to continue to exist when nature and the climate are turning against humankind.
The increase in sea levels, acid rain, floods, melting glaciers, droughts, fires, and killer heat or cold waves are very serious global threats that urgently need global answers. Faced with these threats, the world is slowly waking up and is becoming increasingly aware of the need for unity concerning its fate. Since the Earth Summit held in Rio in 1992, more voices have been raised regarding the protection and management of the environment and its resources in order to limit the damage that mankind has inflicted on the planet and which, in the long term, will prove dangerous to the world’s survival.

Thus, environmental assets such as the air, water, and biodiversity are considered global public goods (GPG) from which everyone benefits and which, therefore, require cooperation on a global scale and should not be subject to the laws of the market or hindered by national sovereignty concerns. The already very long list of GPGs or CHM (the Common Heritage of Mankind) is far from being closed. It concerns not only environmental goods, but also health, educational, and, even, political goods (peace and security). These have become public goods, some tangible (depollution of water and air), some intangible (human rights), and some natural (climate). The list also includes internationalized spaces such as outer space or Antarctica. In addition, it includes some cultural, natural, or mixed goods that, while remaining under the sovereignty of states, “are of outstanding interest and therefore need to be preserved as part of the world heritage of mankind as a whole.”

In Africa, issues related to the environment and biodiversity have for many years received the special attention of the African States. I must stress that the vast tropical forest of the Congo Basin, the second largest in the world after the Amazon, is one of the “lungs” of the world. This forest, in fact, covers more than 22 million acres and represents 85 percent of the total area of Gabon. It is estimated that Gabon single-handedly possesses 6,000 species of plants and, besides elephants and buffalos, nineteen species of primates (including the famous gorilla), twenty species of carnivores, and more than 600 species of birds; its rivers, lagoons, and ocean waters teem with fish of all kinds. Any observer can see that this ecosystem gives “the impression of an omnipotent nature barely bearing the mark of some human scratches.”
However, to ensure a sustainable and responsible management of its vast heritage of landscape and its precious inter-generational public goods, the Gabonese government, conscious of its global responsibilities, voluntarily adopted, in August 2002, a series of new additional measures for the establishment of thirteen national parks representing a zone of absolute protection areas, covering 11 percent of its national territory. If we believe the media, “percentage wise this puts Gabon neck and neck with Costa Rica…and Gabon is five times larger than Costa Rica.”

By fully participating in the process of implementation of international agreements on sustainable development, this decision, qualified as historic by the international community, can also allow Gabon to contribute to the strengthening of multilateralism.

However, one cannot help but also give special attention to the legitimate issues raised concerning global public goods. Are we not risking, some wonder, of transforming the GPG into yet another legal machine that will pit the developing countries of the South against the more powerful of the North? The wealthier countries generate the most pollutants, but refuse to reduce their emissions of greenhouse gas which are responsible for the world’s terrible global warming. This is, indeed, a blatant case of double standards. Let us remember, for example, the importance of Gabon’s “little Loango” National Park as recounted above as well as the formidable outside pressures exercised on a small country like Gabon to develop and, at the same time, preserve its natural heritage, which gives so much to mankind. What is covered and hidden under the umbrella concept of “future generation?” How can Africa “represent humankind” in general and its own “future generations” in particular? Is it necessary to sacrifice one generation for future generations? How can Africa concretely reconcile the collective interests of all mankind (external constraints) with the national interests of African countries (internal constraints), especially in matters concerning their legitimate aspiration for growth and development, their struggle against poverty and disease, and the need for access to energy and drinking water? Should we not reward those governments that preserve tropical rainforests and, thus, serve the planet? How, indeed, can Africa transform itself without means and without international financial compensation given, for example,
that millennial traditions—such as the practice of farming on burned lands and the use of firewood as a source of energy—often threaten Africa’s forests? Such questions make more sense, especially when considered in light of the following humorous story:

In accordance with the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) and the Convention on Biological Diversity adopted at the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 and its principles of implementation known as Agenda 21, African governments in general, and the Gabonese government in particular, have made the decision to ban the killing of elephants and to create areas of absolute protection of flora and fauna. Among these protected areas is, as noted above, the “little Loango” National Park, located in the department of Etimboué (not far from Port-Gentil), where I have been, for more than 10 years, one of three deputies. Thus, for several years, thanks to these measures to safeguard fauna and flora, there has been an unprecedented proliferation of the number of elephants cohabiting with the people of my constituency.

The daily concern for the local people is that these elephants can, in a day, devour at “breakfast” the equivalent of six months of a family’s hard work. And, even worse, they sometimes physically attack people, often causing unfortunate deaths. Consequently, the people (the voters) did not understand why the state, which I represented, can protect animals that destroy months of toil and attack them. Thus, in 2001, when running for a second term as deputy, I was told the following remark which, as funny as it sounded, was no less legitimate or justified: “Mr. Minister-Deputy, your government protects your friends the elephants to our detriment. This being so, go ahead then, ask these beasts to vote for you! They are with us all around the village and hear you when you speak loudly. You can even go to see them this evening to ask for the housing and meal we usually offer you...” In spite of any arguments I could have given on the benefits of ecotourism, particularly in terms of potential employment, income distribution, or the supply of currency, it was hard to convince my electors who, in reality, needed protection. Let us remember, in this regard, the outcry caused in France by the reintroduction of one small
wolf into Mercantour National Park and the two unfortunate bears to the Pyrenees mountains.

WORLD SECURITY AND THE FIGHT AGAINST GLOBAL TERRORISM

At the beginning of the 21st century, a new form of terrorism emerged: hyper-terrorism, also called international terrorism or global terrorism due to its increasingly global and nebulous character. On September 11, 2001, hundreds of millions of viewers around the world followed live and were shocked by the unfolding tragedy of the most dramatic attacks in recent history. On that day, four US airliners were diverted simultaneously by nineteen hijackers, suicide bombers turned into flying bombs to crash into emblematic buildings in the United States. The record was appalling: almost 3,000 civilians were killed in the attacks on the twin towers of the World Trade Center, icons of capitalism and symbols of New York, the economic and financial capital of the world, and the Pentagon, headquarters of the largest military force in the world, located near the capital of the United States.

Americans no longer felt safe on their own soil. Since Pearl Harbor, there had been no direct challenge launched against the United States by an opponent. Provoked at home and heartbroken, the US response was swift. The very next day, on September 12, 2001, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1368 condemning the attacks as a threat to international peace and security and recognizing the “inherent right of individual or collective self-defence in accordance with the [UN] Charter.” Speaking from the Oval Office on September 13, 2001, President George W. Bush promised the people of the United States that America would “lead the world to victory” in the war against terrorism in what he termed was the “first war of the twenty-first century.” On September 28, 2001, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1373, which denied safe havens to those who finance, plan, support, or commit acts of terrorism and established a new committee that gave the international community a new counterterrorism framework. On October 7, the first missiles fell on Afghanistan and the Taliban regime, in power in Kabul since 1996, was defeated.
Although September 11, 2001, is a milestone in the history of terrorism, hyper-terrorism, as a globalized movement, has older roots. Some experts believe that the invasion of Afghanistan by Soviet troops in 1979 marked “the starting point of a campaign for a new jihad, anchored in a dimension of internationalism.” During the 1980s, thousands of volunteers from the Arab Maghreb Union and the Middle East (between 10,000 and 150,000 individuals according to sources), called mujahideen, supported the Afghan resistance. In the late 1980s, and with the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, the whole internationalist Islamist movement was reorganized under the leadership of Osama bin Laden who then created al-Qaida. Originally directed against part of the Arab regimes, which al-Qaida considered the “nearby enemy,” accused, in particular, of not applying *shariah* (Islamic law). The ideology of al-Qaida turned against the United States and its allies (the “distant enemy”) throughout the 1990s. Thus, as of 1993, Americans became the main target of this terrorist network: al-Qaida’s first attempted attack against the World Trade Center and its support of the Islamist factions in Somalia’s civil war that led to the failure of the US-led multinational force, known as Restore Hope, mandated to deliver humanitarian aid in the southern half of Somalia.

The rest is history: the car bomb attacks in Riyadh in 1995 and against the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1996, the repeated suicide operations against American military bases in the Arabian Peninsula, and the attack against a US Navy ship in 2000 in the Yemeni port of Aden. Although all these terrorist attacks, including that of September 11, 2001, and those perpetrated in Tunisia, Indonesia, Turkey, Morocco, Algeria, Egypt, Mauritania, Nigeria, Spain, and the United Kingdom have more or less different motivations, they all lay claim to bin Laden and his ideology. Thus, the globally franchised networks of al-Qaida, which “sometimes have a very distant relationship with the central core, now juggle with the close enemy, represented by Muslim regimes whose legitimacy on political and religious issues is questioned, and the other distant enemy, symbolized by the American power and its allies.”

The split and de-territorialized structure and autonomy of al-Qaida’s operational capabilities make the fight against hyper-
terrorism difficult. Comprised of a multitude of diffuse al-Qaida networks, a kind of “international terrorism,” al-Qaida has enormous financial resources placed around the world and a formidable group of very well-trained suicide bombers. The events of recent years have shown that no region, no country, no individual is protected from the dangers of terrorism. How can we efficiently cope with such global security threats? For its part, the African Union, as elaborated in July 1999 in Algiers, adopted a Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism thus marking at the regional level its solidarity and readiness to make its full contribution to the collective efforts of the United Nations to combat international terrorism. In this context, an AU Center for Counterterrorism was established in Algiers. To date, many African countries have signed thirteen international agreements on terrorism as developed under the aegis of the United Nations. They are also ready to take part in the concluding discussions concerning the long-expected Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism.

The specter of terrorism will continue to haunt Africa and the international community, perhaps a little more each day. The news on March 11, 2004, of the attacks in Madrid and those of July 7, 2005, in London, also attributed to the al-Qaida network, or those perpetrated by “Islamists” in April 2005 in Cairo against Western tourists, demonstrated, once again, that the fight against terrorism, even when coordinated on an international level, cannot be limited exclusively to conventional military responses, but must be approached from all angles. If victory requires repression and global war, it will also surely require the resolution of the imbalances in economic development and of the ongoing conflicts in the world, especially in the Middle East, which for sixty-four years has punctuated the work of the United Nations. “By endlessly deferring the settlement of the conflict in the Middle East, this confrontation has become the epicenter of international instability, the first source of incomprehension between the different worlds, an easy alibi for all forms of terrorism.” More than ever, the United Nations appears to be the only legitimate organization that can mobilize and engage collective action to face the many challenges that now confront mankind.
A NEW GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: THE REFORM OF THE UNITED NATIONS

Our future is played out, in large part, in the halls of the United Nations, the essential meeting place for all mankind. The United Nations was created in the aftermath of World War II to “maintain international peace and security…and to achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural or humanitarian character.” Like many international organizations, the UN is an instrument in the service of peace and security, development, human rights, and humanitarian affairs through international cooperation. It is an essential, unique, and irreplaceable organization for multilateral cooperation with a universal membership with a shared commitment to international affairs. This is the place par excellence for international legitimacy and a vital center of multilateral action and indispensable global governance intended to avoid, whenever possible, relations with nations governed only by the laws of the jungle and dominated by the strongest.

However, despite the erosion of time and profound changes in the world throughout the past half-century, the UN has undergone little appreciable change since its inception. In October 1944, when, as a first step, United States experts met at Dumbarton Oaks with their British, Russian, and Chinese counterparts to draft the plan for a “United Nations Organization,” Africa was totally absent. Let us also remember that on April 25, 1945, when fifty countries met in San Francisco for the United Nations Conference on International Organization, only four African countries were present: the South African Union, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Liberia. It should also be recalled that on June 26, 1945, at the signing of the United Nations Charter at the inception of the United Nations, the Organization had fifty-one member states, including eleven seats in the Security Council, of which only five, the major victors of the Second World War (the US, the USSR, the United Kingdom, France, and China), were granted veto power. Today, the UN brings together 193 member states (an almost four-fold increase since its creation) with 54 African member states (slightly less than a third of the membership).

Since 1945, the world has undergone numerous and deep ideological, political, economic, social, cultural, legal, and technological...
transformations: the vast decolonization movement of the 1960s; the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990; globalization; the growing phenomenon of underdevelopment; the emergence of new transnational players; the emergence of new threats to international peace and security, etc. Finally, we should also note that the old “enemy nations” defeated in 1945 (Germany, Italy, and Japan) have become countries that are “friends and allies,” prosperous and powerful, and have found their place in the comity of nations. For all these reasons, a broad consensus has gradually emerged over the past fifteen years, calling for a thorough reform of the UN and, as a result, global governance in order to better adapt to the challenges of the 21st century and to respond more effectively to the needs of the contemporary world.

Within this overall context, on June 10, 2004, I was elected as president of the 59th Session of the UN General Assembly. This election was a significant challenge for me. Indeed, before taking office, I had little awareness of the magnitude of the task that awaited me. I relied a bit on some of the veterans of the UN, such as the Ambassador of France to the United Nations, Alain Dejammet, who wrote that the president of the General Assembly “does not do much,” although he is “generally a known personality from his country of origin.” I certainly knew that in addition to the ordinary questions that should be addressed at any session of the General Assembly, this year, there would be a review, at the global summit level, of a number of important issues of the past decade. But, I was far from imagining that the issue of UN reform, to mark the revival of the Organization, would occupy such an important place in my work schedule. In fact, during the general debate, which traditionally takes place during the second fortnight of September, thus shortly after I officially took office, the statements of heads of state and delegations almost all highlighted the question of reform of the United Nations and, in particular, that of the Security Council. Almost all of the speeches were focused in one direction: that the UN could not indefinitely postpone a decision on its reform. On the eve of its 60th birthday, and despite the fact that many observers could not stop talking about reform, either to praise or to complain about it, a “reform always heralded but never realized,” the UN seemed determined, more so than ever, to negotiate a real turning point in its history.
It should be emphasized that this reform, the deepest in the history of the United Nations, was aimed primarily at four ambitious goals: the establishment of a collective security system for the new century; the fight against poverty and underdevelopment; the establishment of the rule of law and the strengthening of the protection of human rights; and the adaptation of UN agencies and departments and global governance to the realities of our time. But only the question of Security Council reform, to which I will turn shortly, truly kept the attention of member states and, thus, polarized the General Assembly debates. These institutional reform proposals concerned all major UN bodies, with two exceptions: the International Court of Justice, which would undergo no change for now, and the Trusteeship Council, whose mandate had become obsolete, and which could be eliminated. The Secretary-General called for the creation of a new body, the Human Rights Council.

I would like to return to one specific UN reform issue which, since at least 1993, has continuously polarized UN debates, namely, the question of the membership of the Security Council. Indeed, the Security Council, limited to fifteen members, with an action-oriented agenda, and much followed by the media, has “primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security,” as stated in Article 24 of the UN Charter. For many non-insiders, the activities of the United Nations boil down to those of its Security Council. In addition, the Security Council may take enforcement action in accordance with Article 42 of Chapter VII of the UN Charter. It is the only UN body that can undertake measures that may impact the whole world and, certainly, involve all of the 193 member states of the Organization. It should, therefore, within its powers, take into account new threats and redefine the scope and meaning of collective security. Its composition, as a result, should be sufficiently representative of the contemporary world in whose name it is supposed to decide and act; its legal role would, consequently, be better legitimized, its credibility would be strengthened, and its authority would be better respected.

Through more than twenty years of formal discussions, a painstaking consensus has gradually built in favor of increasing the number of Security Council members to better reflect global economic and political realities so that the Council could act
effectively on behalf of the international community in all its diversity. In December 1963, the Security Council was expanded with four new non-permanent seats, thus bringing the number of Council members from eleven to fifteen, and, notably, providing greater representation of the developing world. Since 1960, almost all of the African countries that had gained independence had, in fact, joined the Organization. It was, therefore, now necessary, in the same spirit, to give more seats on the Security Council to other countries, so that the Council could be more representative of the member states and of the world today.

Similarly, the role and contribution of Security Council members was increasingly emphasized when considering any expansion in size; not just that of the five permanent members, but of those who possess economic and political weight and/or based on their financial, military, or other contributions to international peace and security. In this respect, in 1997, Africa pronounced itself as prepared to assume these responsibilities with the adoption of the Harare Declaration at the 33rd Session of the Conference of heads of state and Government of OAU held in Harare, Zimbabwe. In spite of this momentum, very serious controversies and deep divisions remained among member states concerning the future composition of Security Council. They focused, in particular, on the following:

1) Size: not over twenty-five members in order to achieve consensus.

2) The permanent members: would two categories be necessary—permanent and non-permanent, which would later become formula A, or an expansion concerning only the non-permanent members which would become formula B?

3) The criteria of choice: differences also persisted concerning the criteria of selection of prospective new permanent members. By way of background, it was, especially, the diversity of ambitions and rivalries among candidates and the fight to occupy or prevent occupancy of the new permanent seats, which actually posed the most problems. It made the debates difficult and passionate and raised a dangerous threat of derailing the whole process of reform.

In Africa, for example, for the two permanent seats with veto rights claimed, in the Harare Declaration of 1997, several
candidates suddenly announced themselves on the spot in New York during the September 2004 General Assembly debate. The African common position was restated in February 2005 in Swaziland through the so-called Ezulwini Consensus and was reasserted in July 2005 at the AU Summit in Sirte, Libya. The reality of the African position was much more complex. Africa, like all other continents, was also divided and conquered by the plurality of ambitions, some of which were visible, declared, and flaunted, while others seemed implicit and hidden.

4) The right to veto: This right was very harshly criticized and was subject to numerous proposals. According to some members, new permanent members should be given the same veto power as held by the current permanent members, a position supported, in particular, by the Group of 4 (Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan) and stubbornly reaffirmed by the African Union on the basis of the Ezulwini-Sirte Consensus. According to other members, this right should not be granted to new permanent members because it would further complicate the functioning of the Council. “It is already complicated enough as it is with five,” some members whispered in the corridors of the UN.

According to others still, the veto should be eliminated or its use regulated. “If there were no more permanent membership or veto power,” said then French Foreign Minister Hubert Védrine, “the main current permanent members would leave the UN. What was said in Yalta between Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin remains valid. The UN is for once a helpless forum.” In reality, the dilemma was whether the P-5 members were really willing to share with others the privileges and power conferred by the right of veto or, conversely, did they rather prefer to keep their grandfathered rights as stated in the UN Charter? The French newspaper Le Monde asked a number of provocative questions that many players in the reform process should also consider. The following query was probably the least diplomatic: “Can we grant India, Brazil or South Africa the responsibility to decide war and peace, on par with the United States or China?” For such a reform to succeed, it would be necessary for all UN member states, large and small, rich and poor, to agree to act collectively towards the same objective. But what does spring into action mean for an interna-
national organization that had 191 members at the time? How could it ensure that the interests, mostly divergent, of all parties and, therefore, of the whole, could converge in order to achieve collective, immediate, and most effective action? How could this agenda for UN reform move forward and, therefore, the transformation of global governance be accomplished? By what principles and methods would this be carried out? Would it take a major world crisis or disaster and untold suffering for the community of nations to finally decide to undertake reforms? I was well aware that the core of the problem resided in the fact that in order to achieve effective and palpable reform, ideas must match reality; in other words, the reforms must have their own inherent feasibility. Meanwhile, the centers of major decisions relating to global governance, moved increasingly towards the G8 and G20, which are themselves undergoing major change.

An appreciable number of countries, however, agreed on maintaining the status quo. They considered, for instance, for various reasons of national interest, that the proposed reform of the Security Council, as contained in formula A, could also mean, ipso facto, a challenge to the balance of power among certain regional powers. The hypothesis that a country could become a Security Council member permanently and definitively, with or without veto power, to the detriment of another similar power, would only generate claims, frustrations, and fears on the part of those who, wrongly or rightly, knew in advance that they would be “unfairly” excluded. Consider, for example, what it would mean for Pakistan if its neighbor and rival, India, would join the Security Council with veto power. Consider how Italy might feel, as a member of the G8, the only major nation of the former coalition of the Axis powers not included as an original permanent Security Council member, excluded from the Group of 4, if it was omitted from Council membership. Consider China’s viewpoint if Korea was not offered membership, but Japan, China’s opponent for nearly a century, was. Think of Egypt, the Arab-Muslim-African giant, which would not understand being overlooked in favor of South Africa, Nigeria, or Senegal. Many members felt that any change in the UN Charter would open Pandora’s box.

Those member states that wanted reform most ardently were not only among the group of countries that had lost the war in 1945, they
were also those countries that had become emergent powers such as Brazil, India, South Africa, Nigeria, Canada, Egypt, as well as many others.

In any case, in 2005, the member states knew that Security Council reform would inevitably be subject to harsh discussions, given the balance of power at hand, and also considering the many other substantive issues that had aroused some of the boldest of proposals at that time (for example, the definition of terrorism, the concepts of the responsibility to protect or of human security, the creation of a new principal organ in charge of human rights, and the notion of anticipatory self-defense.) “The responsibility to protect,” for example, was a very new and long-discussed concept that especially seeks to legitimize the right of humanitarian intervention and move, in the international order, from the primacy of the states to that of individuals. That responsibility (of the states) to protect people who are on their territory, enunciated that when a state is unable or not prepared to exercise this responsibility, or is itself responsible for massive violations of human rights, the international community has the responsibility of responding to protect the people who are victims.

According to Kofi Annan, the Security Council should have on this subject “in cases of genocide, ethnic cleansing and other such crimes against humanity...if national authorities are unwilling or unable to protect their citizens, then the responsibility shifts to the international community to use diplomatic, humanitarian and other methods to help protect civilian populations, and that if such methods appear insufficient the Security Council may out of necessity decide to take action under the Charter, including enforcement action, if so required.” Although one can only agree with the noble humanitarian motivations of such a principle, its application, we must admit, still raises fears and doubts from many countries to the extent that it establishes the principle of “transnationality,” which could lead to improper interpretations and political exploitation. It is the same for the controversial notion of “anticipatory self-defense,” which refers to the doctrine of preventive attack or “preventive war” promoted by the Bush administration from 2002 and that some consider “contrary to international law.”

In short, as pointed out at the time by a French newspaper quoting
a UN source about the examination of the proposals of the Secretary General: “There is work to do and there will be a fight. But it is a good basis to move forward.” It was, indeed, the tumult preceding the great battle that began the moment I submitted my draft document for the September Summit meeting to the member states. But while the examination of the draft document and its large groups of issues took place in a relatively calm atmosphere, despite the salient points of divergence, the debate on the reform of the Security Council would suddenly resurface in late June. It was at this stage that John Bolton, the new US Ambassador to the United Nations, who could be difficult and prickly, made his arrival on August 25, announcing his plans to reform the UN. In a letter sent to the other 190 member states, he immediately reported his willingness to renegotiate the entire draft document and proposed no less than 750 amendments! The confusion was, again, total. The US ambassador, whom I received on two occasions during that same month, politely told me that President Bush would not endorse a document with which he did not agree.

The position of Ambassador Bolton raised the pessimism of many observers, diplomats, and correspondents who feared that less than three weeks before the world’s largest summit ever organized, where more than 180 heads of state were scheduled to participate, the whole process would fail. The newspaper Le Monde published an article entitled “The United Nations Prepares Without Illusion the Greatest Summit Peak of its History.” The Washington Post was even tougher vis-à-vis the US Government, noting that “less than a month before world leaders arrive in New York for a world summit on poverty and UN reform, the Bush administration has thrown the proceedings in turmoil with a call for drastic renegotiation of a draft agreement to be signed by presidents and prime ministers attending the event.”

Finally, after one last meeting with Ambassador Bolton, who showed great understanding at the time, in the early hours of September 13, 2005, the day before the opening of the World Summit, we succeeded, when no one believed any longer in the draft, and agreed on a fairly politically and diplomatically balanced document that included conditions for ambitious UN reform.

But, after several months of extreme tension, blocking attempts, and difficult negotiations, the very long and arduous process of UN
reform, always heralded, but never realized, had finally started inearnest. What a joyous time it was for me! The decisions to create acommission responsible for the consolidation of peace and post-conflictsituations (the Peacebuilding Commission [PBC]) and for theestablishment of a new Human Rights Council responsible for theprotection of human rights were, indeed, made; the new highlycontroversial concept, the responsibility to protect, the responsibilityof each individual state to protect its populations from genocide, warcrimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity was alsoadopted; there were additional important measures approved tomake the UN Secretariat more efficient, more effective, moretransparent, and credible; and significant advances were made in thefields of development and collective security.

I left New York with the happy feeling that I had given the best ofmyself, having completed my mission as president of the difficult andcrucial 59th Session of the UN General Assembly and, thus, havinghonored Africa. But I was particularly relieved since the recent weekshad been particularly difficult with the death of my older brother andhead of the family, Pierre-Louis Agonjo Okawe, whose funeral couldnot be held in my absence. Thus, while leading the last and difficultnegotiation, I also had to take care, from New York, of the preparationof the funeral of my brother, which finally took place on September19, 2005. Beyond being a memorable success for Gabon, and anextraordinary human adventure that I was proud to have played a partin, it was also a remarkable symbolic victory for the small memberstates of the United Nations.
Conclusion

TOGETHER, LET US BUILD A BETTER FUTURE FOR AFRICA

The future does not belong to anyone. There are no precursors, there are only latecomers.

Jean Cocteau

In the end, how can we judge a policy be it economic, social, or financial other than by its results? In politics, we should not judge success solely on intentions. Thus, one increasingly wonders about the real impact of globalization in Africa as policies have been established and, hopefully, implemented, to that end.

First, from an economic and social viewpoint, the results have been disastrous. As noted earlier, Africa could not accede to the shared prosperity that would, theoretically, result from financial assistance and globalization. Instead, it has totally collapsed. Africa’s per capita income dropped by 25 percent between 1986 and 2006; its share in world markets has been reduced by half in just a few decades, while its debt has multiplied twenty-fold. If nothing is done for this continent, the prospects for the future are even more gloomy, and the various scenarios for the probable future indicate a growing deterioration of the situation. UNDP’s 2003 Human Development Report revealed an appalling and almost incredible forecast, if current trends continue: extreme poverty will be a way of life, particularly in Africa south of the Sahara, until the end of the 23rd century! Unfortunately, to lift Africa up from its share of daily disasters, the international community
continues to extol the merits of globalization and “miracle remedies” that, so far, have failed miserably in Africa; in fact, the solutions have contributed to worsening the crisis. Yet, Africans, with few exceptions, have reacted positively to the multiple external prescriptions that other countries have offered with the stunning poor results known to all.

Yet, the ideological exaltation of human rights has turned into a true nightmare for Africa. Now, over the globalized African borders and within them, more gunshots than goods and services are exchanged. People kill one another with machetes in full view of televisions around the world. Unfortunately, this situation has grown far worse than ever before, in this much-denounced era of individual groups and sub-factions within groups. This new policy has been adopted across the continent resulting in generalized regression as, for example, we have witnessed with the ongoing conflict in Somalia, the genocide in Rwanda, and the killing of millions of innocent men, women, and children in Africa.

And yet, for more than twenty years, African governments have consistently complied with the changes demanded of them. They have disengaged from their sovereign responsibilities at a brisk pace, leading to more separation between states as opposed to uniting them. Africa has relentlessly pursued decentralization, liberalization, the opening and privatization of its economies and public services, and has further tightened its financial belt in order to promote democracy, fundamental freedoms, and to combat the octopus of corruption. All of this has occurred without any real benefit to the continent. To the contrary, Africa has seen a continuous deterioration of its economic situation, the persistent worsening of unemployment and poverty, and a dramatic chaos in political life. Should we consider this bleak future as fatal and resign ourselves to it? Should we continue to suffer the current logic and its inevitable certainties and remain indifferent to the denials of the facts?

In the end, how can we not share the bitter statement of disappointment of François Traoré, the President of the Union of Burkinabe Producers, when he declared, “The Europeans should let us analyze what is good for us. For forty years, they have taught us democracy and development. Given the result, they should stop
repeating the same lessons”? How can we not heed the warning of American economist Jeffrey Sachs, one of the great gurus of neoliberalism, when he said that “The entire discourse of the Fund, on the necessary belt-tightening and budgetary balance makes no sense if it leads to the starving of the people”? How can we not be shaken by the scathing condemnation of Jacques Chirac when he declared that “Liberalism is doomed to the same failure as communism and it will lead to the same excesses. Both are the perversions of human thought”? In any event, one needs not be a genius to see that Africa is living more than ever on a volcano; yet, we continue to lull ourselves with illusions and empty phrases. Is it not time to stop this race towards the abyss, to react and change the current conformist practices, more ideological than managerial, in order to shorten the excessively long suffering of Africa? Is it not also the time to give meaning to our actions, to shape a real future, and a long-term vision for the continent? In fact, it is right now that “What the world will be in 2050 is decided, and what it will be in 2100 is prepared.”

A LONG-TERM VISION

In fact, the disappointments of reality force us not to leave open the legitimate questions of whether it is enough to defer to the rhetoric of the “Washington consensus” and whether Africa should continue to religiously apply, as it has done so far, the measurements and standards that advocate conventional thinking in order to transform the Comoros into Singapore, Ghana into South Korea, or Gabon into Switzerland. The answer, make no mistake, is an emphatic negative. Because, as Jacques Chirac declared, globalization, “at the rate things are going today...far from bridging this gap, is widening it even further.” It enriches the winners, that is to say, the strongest, and impoverishes the losers, that is to say, the weakest, mainly Africans, by excluding and marginalizing them. Cameroonian Eugène Nyambal, a young World Bank official in the early 1990s, wrote “I witnessed, powerless, the dismantling of the social systems in Africa... I came to the conclusion that the policies of the ‘Washington Consensus’ are an intellectual fraud because no developed country implemented such policies in order to modernize.” Consequently, if we are aware of the coexistence, in the context of globalization, of many possible “futures,” it is urgent to abandon blind obedience and unguided sailing, not only
for the benefit of the ambitious project of a new African leadership in which the political, social, economic, educational, cultural, and ecological aspects would merge and complete each other, but also for the reform of global governance, which is increasingly being taken up by the G8 and G20.

In this matter, Africans themselves are deeply engaged based on their individual strengths and collective thoughts, proposals, and actions in order to master their own common destiny and to design a desired future and the means for achieving it. As stated by former French Prime Minister Michel Rocard, “development with an external engine does not exist.” Africa, therefore, must begin to redefine itself towards an ideal and towards a long-term vision for its societies. We must build a new shared model of development for Africa, a model that naturally integrates the differentiated unity of humankind and that sufficiently takes into account the realities of today and the challenges of globalization.

But, in the end, one might ask what is it that Africa and Africans are seeking? Do they have a desired future? Do they have a collective vision for the future of their countries? Well, yes, they do. In short, Africans are just trying to make their continent, and the countries that comprise it, a continent like all others in the world; in other words, a continent living free from fear and free from need. Free from fear, whether fear of war, fear of violence, fear of insecurity, fear of injustice, fear of persecution, or fear of disease, means that Africans, like all other peoples in the world, also aspire to live in peace with respect for life, freedom, and human dignity. No one, indeed, in any culture, wants to be deprived of liberty or be injured or murdered. Free from need meaning the need to have enough to eat, enough to drink, and to properly feed one’s family, the need to educate and care for one’s children, the need to work, the need for clothing and to have shelter, the need to have access to drinking water and electricity, or the need for recreation. In short, it means lifting Africa out of poverty, squalor, marginalization, and underdevelopment.

To achieve this, Africans increasingly realize the need to unite and to gather their forces in order to move forward together now and in the future. Indeed, when Africa speaks with one voice, it is inevitably heard and often listened to, especially when it is about its own affairs.
On the other hand, isolated, the voice of any African country may be inaudible or quite simply "fuzzy" in the context of the new world order as it takes shape before our eyes and at our doors.

It is worthy of mention that Africa’s ongoing regional and continental integration processes continue to gain momentum. Integration is expected to create benefits such as larger markets through free movement of people, goods, services, and capital; greater scope for trade and increased investment; development of regional capital markets; and greater cooperation in addressing peace and security issues, among others. Progress in the integration agenda is therefore important for business, through the facilitation of trade and investment. As Aimé Césaire so aptly said, “I always thought that small steps taken together are preferable to one great solitary leap.” It is in this context and in this spirit, that one could substantially deepen the thinking started at the continental, regional, and national levels within the African Union and its NEPAD agency.

Although NEPAD is a framework of rich dialogue and achievement in the field of development for the continent, it still lacks an endogenous and innovative overall vision for Africa. This vision should be less susceptible to the ideologies of the “big bang” or of “market democracy”; it should not require Africa to religiously meet the prerequisites of donors or to recite the rosary of needs in order to garner the financial assistance it needs for the development of the continent; this vision should reject the trampling of Africa; it should be a bit more pragmatic, self-centered, and more inspired by the success stories and models of emerging countries in Asia and South America that aim for social cohesion and social inclusion. It should be oriented towards increasing Africa’s productive capacities, in particular, in the agricultural, industrial, infrastructure, energy, and services sectors. It should promote the full integration of Africa; and it should support the sovereignty of African states and the return of their full responsibility for the respect, dignity, and honor of their people.

At the national level, for example, Gabon 2025, developed by Gabonese academics with the assistance of UNDP experts from 1994 to 1996, is a forward-looking study aimed at defining, for the next generation, a desirable and feasible image for Gabon. This realistic project, however, should be revisited and enriched in light of more
recent operational and broader frameworks such as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) of the 2000 Millennium Declaration, AU and NEPAD reinforced and RECs revitalized. One could, as an example, turn this small African country, Gabon, in the general context of an overall vision for Africa, into a veritable model of peace and security, a model of freedom, justice, and tolerance (strengthened by Gabon’s recent decision to abolish the death penalty), and a model of progress, good governance, and solidarity that could achieve the fulfillment of the MDGs by 2015. One could use this model to attain the same success in almost all other African countries.

A TOOL AND TARGET GOALS

To implement this shared new vision, this new model for building the future that Africans want with all their hearts, a tool, the modern state, is needed. Let me quote, once again, André Malraux who, on this topic, had the perfect, inspirational words: “... hope is one of the most inspiring words of history, because history is made, among other things, of a series of promised lands. But for the promises to be kept... there is only one way: the State...” It may be this same observation that led Senegalese President Abdoulaye Wade, then Vice Chairman of Liberal International, to challenge his liberal colleagues around the world when they assembled for an annual Convention in Paris, in these terms: “You Europeans, in your countries, all infrastructures have been created, you have a certain standard of living, therefore the state can play a minimal role. By contrast, in our African countries where everything is to be done, as if they were coming out of war or a major disaster, the state must still play an important role.... Because without the state, who will build bridges, schools, hospitals, roads and dams? Certainly not the market...!”

Hence, the continent needs to be emancipated from ready-made plans and structures that inhibit innovative thought and action in Africa. Africa must restore meaning to the political reality that the state is vital, by renewing and reinventing it, particularly in its roles as guarantor of peace, security, and stability; as a promoter and regulator of growth and development; and as a protector of the environment, of fundamental freedoms, and of basic human rights (including, importantly, the rights of women and children). Only the modern state, a major tool for government action, can implement, individually
and, especially, collectively, this new vision of integral development and societal transformation with precise targeted objectives and strategies and the means to achieve them, as well as specific programs of action and projects in the key social, economic, political, and international sectors. But, let me be candid. It is not about attaching ourselves to an obsolete model of state sovereignty and narrow nationalism, or a closed and administered economy, or even a guardian state that provides for an increasingly costly public welfare. On the contrary, increased state responsibility, action, and initiative is not incompatible with the freedoms of enterprise and market, democracy, gender equality, human dignity, good governance, and a reopening to the world and all of the modernizations it offers. The following examples illustrate just a few of the possible target goals:

1) The economic sector. It is clearly recognized that for a market to thrive, it needs a conducive, organized, structured, regulated, and accountable environment. The framework to accomplish this is, of course, the modern state. Market forces and the modern state should, indeed, be organized to complement and reinforce one another. Markets are a human endeavor and a social creation and, therefore, are not always perfect, particularly in light of the sometimes tumultuous character of globalization. They need support and regulation to function properly; they need a strong and responsible state. This is what other countries from the South, such as Malaysia or Singapore, have understood and realized successfully. And, this is what Africa has refused. It is obvious, for example, that the state can no longer do everything and that it should, therefore, withdraw from economic areas where the private sector is present or willing to be present. But we should not forget that the market cannot fully and spontaneously replace all of the roles performed by the public sector. It would, consequently, be wrong to make the state the key to everything in these very agitated times. This means, a fortiori, that one cannot demand that the governments of the more vulnerable, smaller African countries withdraw immediately from all sectors, particularly in those areas where there is no private initiative in the public service or rural agricultural sectors. In these sectors, the state or groups of states (the RECs or the AU and its NEPAD) must step in to fill these gaps or overcome, if only for a short time, the deficiencies of private initiatives
in order to stimulate or strengthen such private initiatives. Public investment and private investment must, in these circumstances, support each other in order to achieve common objectives.

In rural Africa, one cannot imagine leaving access to drinking water, healthcare, electricity, or transport solely in the hands of the private sector which, moreover, for lack of profitability, is not interested in taking on these tasks. Who, for example, will build rural roads to transport agricultural products to urban markets? Who will initiate and encourage the necessary scientific and technological research in Africa? Who, in Africa today, will protect the environment, build bridges, ports, dams, schools, and hospitals if not the state? Who will encourage agricultural production and productivity in order to move towards food security? Who will fight against food crisis and hunger riots? So many issues are neglected in current thinking and planning. UNCTAD has shown that public drive (for example, for the financing of infrastructure) was indispensable to the arrival of private investments and entrepreneurs.  

Privatization is just a tool and a means. It is a good tool, certainly, but one that should remain in the service of humanity. It cannot constitute the key to all problems and it is not an end in itself. For example, the United Kingdom and its illustrious Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher discovered, with astonishment, severe inefficiencies in the failed rush to privatize the British Railways. Moreover, Britain has had to nationalize banks in financial trouble such as the ironically named Northern Rock Bank. It was the same in the United States with the government’s massive bailout of failed investment banks (e.g., Bear Stearns), mortgage credit institutions in bankruptcy (i.e., Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac), and insolvent insurance companies (e.g., American International Group). One US Senator, Jim Bunning, Republican from Kentucky said “When I picked up my newspaper yesterday, I thought I woke up in France. But no, it turned out it was socialism here in the United States.” Would Karl Marx not turn over in his grave? In France, large service companies such as Société Nationale de Chemin de Fer (SNCF), the Régie Autonome des Transports Parisiens (RATP) and Electricité de France (EDF) remain in the hands of the government. In South America, and also in Africa, people have begun to seriously consider a renationalization of some of
the large companies that were privatized in a hurry less than 15 years ago. It should be recalled, once again, that the history of humankind tells us that authoritarian states created the market economy. Contemporary history is dotted with great economic successes through state action (i.e., in China, India, Malaysia, and Tunisia). What these countries have in common is that their state structures were strong, to say the least. Emperor Meiji Tenno was a divine right emperor, a “half-god,” some would say an enlightened despot. Japan’s entrance into modernity and industrialization was methodically driven by the state. The same is true regarding the more contemporary cases of South Korea, Taiwan, and Malaysia, which initiated their growth and development under authoritarian or military regimes (South Korea and Taiwan).

Singapore, in particular, experienced breathtaking economic success under the long-time authoritarian reign of Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew (1965-1990) and that of his son who succeeded him. In less than a generation, the small country of Singapore has passed from the Third World to the First World. And, what about China, which has achieved the success that we are all well aware of by marrying socialism and the market; or India, whose market economy and democracy coexist with a strong and omnipresent state. We should also think of South America, Brazil, and elsewhere in the West as well as the famous Swedish model, which in an otherwise failing Europe, has experienced a prosperous economy with generous social programs.

It is, paradoxically, these countries, located mostly in Asia and South America, that have reaped the greatest benefits from globalization, open markets, and the acceleration of trade. Should this not give us pause? While many experts have expressed their doubts and fears concerning globalization, this was not the position of Dominique Strauss-Kahn the former French Minister of Economy and Finance who later became the Managing Director of the IMF (2007-2011). As far as he was concerned, the development model imposed on the South by the North, with its “full opening to international trade and a modest state, with a limited tax and social system...is wrong,” and inconsistent with that used by “China, India, Korea and the Asian tigers.” This is the exact same claim made by Jeffrey Sachs who...
considers the policy advocated by the World Bank in Africa to be a disaster. “A practical development strategy recognizes that public sector investment is a necessary complement to private investment. The World Bank has instead wrongly seen such investments as an obstacle to private investment.” What is needed, instead, added Strauss-Kahn, “is to promote asymmetric trade rules for the South.... International trade law should not be the same for all, it must correct these imbalances.” Because we know what provides freedom to the fox in the henhouse.

2) The social sector. In this case, the goal targets the struggle against social exclusion (a source of violence) and social scourges (a source of death). Obviously, the idea is not a return to the era of the welfare state or provident state where we expect everything from the government or state. They no longer have, alas, the means. They must, however, fight against social exclusion, poverty, and unemployment as a central goal of their macroeconomic policies. They also must, in fact, reconcile the imperatives of freedom, stability, efficiency, and economic effectiveness with those of fairness, solidarity, and social cohesion. This is the aim, for example, of the MDGs. It is also what the Brazilian and Swedish governments are trying to achieve today and with some success. Brazil, for example, combines high economic growth with an ambitious social agenda intended to reduce poverty and income inequality. These objectives were understood by the former leaders of the Bretton Woods Institutions, Robert Zoellick of the World Bank and Dominique Strauss-Kahn of the IMF, given the extent of the damage caused by the Washington Consensus and by the global crisis. These institutions have started to develop new economic and social programs aimed at fighting poverty, hunger, and disease. They now want to help Africa in a different, more constructive way.

The famous British economist John Maynard Keynes pointed out as early as 1936 that the outstanding faults of the free market economy are its failure to provide for full employment and its arbitrary and inequitable distribution of wealth and income. This same observation also led US President Franklin Delano Roosevelt to put into place an effective program of public investment and capital works to combine social ethics and economics. President Roosevelt, one of the most popular presidents in the history of the United States, with his New
Deal policy, did not, however, need to resort to totalitarian measures or to the suppression of freedoms to face the challenges of unemployment, economic recession, financial crisis, poverty, and the bankruptcy of thousands of companies. Developing countries as well as many industrialized nations are now confronted with a serious problem: economic growth, when it exists, often creates great wealth, but few jobs. “From 1995 to 2005,” notes the International Labour Organization, “the number of unemployed people rose from 157.3 million to 191.8 million, an increase of 21.9 percent.” A complete break with the old model of the welfare state is, perhaps, not necessary, as demonstrated by the Brazilian and Swedish experiences.

3) The political field. One illustrative example is the promotion of democracy and good governance. One of the central questions to be considered is whether democracy is incompatible with a strong state? This important issue deserves some clarification. First, let us recall Jacques Attali’s “lesson for the future: the authoritarian State creates the market that in turn creates democracy.” Let me add that any order that by law and democracy is organized around norms and rules of the game should be respected. This notion, therefore, necessarily brings together the issues of power and legitimate violence. What should we do, what can we do, if decisions are not complied with? The answer, starting with the major Western democracies, is that every state has the duty and responsibility of maintaining public order and of protecting its citizens and ensuring the rights of its minorities based on justice and the rule of law. Accordingly, the state must, in promoting the democratic process and good governance, succeed in transcending the old demons of divided identities and sources of violence (race, ethnicity, religions, tribal); it has the responsibility of stopping, particularly through education and the law, all forms of intolerance.

Democracy is a process that takes time, learning, and collective adherence. This progression, which may take place with the incentive of foreign assistance, can only be done step by step, stumbling, retracing one’s steps, and then starting afresh to move forward. Therefore, we can deplore that Africa has so often turned away from the era of instantaneous democratization which, as a result, contributed to the withering away of the state. Africa is considered by
many to be a continent that has failed or collapsed. The political debate in Africa, instead of being held around a table, took the form of a battle with machetes and Kalashnikovs. “It is easy,” French President François Mitterrand said in prophetic terms in the mid-1970s, “to govern a fantasy world populated by certainties. But when the real world arises, boom!” Boom, indeed, in Africa, where a great leap backward occurred as a consequence of locking the African continent into a straitjacket of prepackaged ideas and institutions that came from the outside.

Make no mistake, I am not suggesting that democracy and the economic liberalism that accompany them are not suitable for Africa; in fact, Africa has made changes and progressed. On the contrary, democracy and good governance, let me be clear, are not only inevitable, but are also indispensable for our continent. “No one,” it should be repeated, “in any culture, no one wants to be deprived of liberty or injured or murdered!” Democratic processes must, thanks to education and training, take root in the African culture and its traditions. Market democracy, which has become an imperative in the modern world, should be introduced in Africa, in a peaceful and consensual manner. We should discuss together, what we plan to undertake together.

An unfortunate example is Iraq which many believed could be democratized relying solely on the military power of the United States. As Serge Latouche very opportunely recalls, “In a world that now universally accepts the values of civilization and progress, colonization no longer appears necessary to Western domination.” One must therefore beware of assuming that the North knows everything better than everybody and that it must therefore discuss, decide, and act for the South, in its place. Just as one cannot imagine a democracy without democrats, it cannot be achieved without a minimum of adherence and democratic culture that cannot be bought, decreed, or proclaimed, but rather can be awakened and acquired. “All in all,” wrote Michel Rocard, “democracy cannot be limited to compliance with formal rules. It is primarily the product of a culture. Strong with our one hundred fifty or two hundred years of practice...we teach...with unbelievable amnesia...these countless nations that have never experienced democracy or that, if they have met it, it was less
than ten or twenty years ago."

The instant democratization of the world, also called “Nescafé democracy” or “turnkey democracy,” in other words, this “great illusion to want to export from scratch ‘democratic political systems’ in defiance of the political, social and cultural conditions of countries [whether they are] able to import them or not,” has shown its limits. Thus, “in 2003, the Americans believed that the fall of Saddam Hussein would give birth to democracy like Jimmy Carter expected in 1979 from the fall of the Shah of Iran.” In Haiti, the long and brutal dictatorship of Jean-Claude Duvalier, followed by that of the military, were successively ousted. The first democratically-elected President of Haiti, Jean Bertrand Aristide, was triumphantly installed in power in 1990 in Port-au-Prince, with the help of the West. But a few years later, Aristide, a theologian of liberation was, in turn, ousted, then reinstalled by the international community, and later chased away again by the same international community without the explicit willingness of the Haitian people and without reducing poverty, economic stagnation, corruption, and violence. This is one more example of the introduction of democratic disorders, fractures, and violence and the contradiction to the theory of instant democracy.

Democracy proclaims a sovereign people, yet, one must be able to speak freely and without undue pressure. While no one disputes the good grounds of democratic values any longer, which imply the will of the people to decide their own political system, many, however, are increasingly wondering whether there are no better policies and mechanisms to promote them. Consequently, some even go so far as to claim that the legitimacy and representative character of African elites today seem to come less from the population than from international organizations. Thus, we sometimes hear of the “democracies of the IMF.” A CIA report emphasized that “backsliding by many countries that were considered part of the ‘third wave’ of democratization is a distinct possibility.” But, I must admit that criticizing deceptive illusions does not mean giving up the goal.

The adverse consequences of a forced march towards democracy are often compared to the story of a man who, while awaiting the birth of a butterfly, found the process so long and so painful that he decided to speed it up and give a helping hand by opening the cocoon. The
butterfly was born, but was unable to fly. “Poor butterfly, who cannot fly!” exclaimed the man. Then, with the best of intentions, he wondered, “What can I do for the butterfly?” The man was incapable of understanding that what he had just done, and what he regarded as assistance, was the source of the inability of the butterfly to fly. In short, what he believed to be a “painful process” was in fact the sine qua non condition for the butterfly to fly. In sum, instead of helping, the man with good intentions disabled the butterfly. “But, hey, what can you do,” remarked a friend one day, “the Great and Powerful of this world, who unfortunately confuse democratic values and mechanisms intended to promote them, never listen to anyone; they only trust their computers and their sanctions!”

4) The considerations of morality and ethics (the fight against corruption and the exploitation of children and women, the violation of human rights, gender equality, etc.). Who bears the primary responsibility for fighting against the terrible scourge of corruption and for guaranteeing citizens the exercise of their fundamental rights, if not the state? Certainly, civil society and the media should exercise their due diligence as watchdogs and denounce violations if necessary. Only the state and its judicial system can lead a comprehensive and sustainable effort toward the emergence of a true culture of human rights in Africa as the guarantor of a peaceful political life. As correctly noted in the report of the Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, the United Nations Charter “seeks to protect all States, not because they are intrinsically good but because they are necessary to achieve the dignity, justice, worth and safety of their citizens. These are the values that should be at the heart of any collective security system for the twenty-first century, but too often States have failed to respect and promote them.”

It is, therefore, not only the state that must be challenged, but its actions. As a tool, the state can implement “good” and “evil.” The same knife that can help prepare food, can also commit murder. In any case, the result is not the “fault of the knife.” In the words of French Renaissance writer François Rabelais, “Science without conscience is the ruin of the soul.” The state, it has been said, cannot lack conscience without bringing ruin to an entire nation. Issues of ethics, moral values, the respect for fundamental human rights, the protection of
the vulnerable, the rights of women, the responsibility to protect, and human security all call for state action and have become, in recent years, particularly under the influence of the core values of powerful Western civilizations, major unavoidable concerns of the entire international community. In this context, it would be tragic and suicidal for those African countries that have chosen democracy, good governance, and justice to fall into the centralizing totalitarianism of yesteryear with its large-scale corruption and repressive practices from another time. It is my sincere belief that many African countries can and must, without major risks, lead by example and, thus, become an African model of good governance. They should take inspiration from and adhere to external positive experiences without trying to copy them blindly. The credibility and responsibility of the modern African state is at stake.

5) Strengthening international cooperation. The current global context marked by the development of the legal framework of international society seems to be appropriate. The role of the state is increasingly recognized, not only as an irreplaceable instrument of national government, but also as a leading player on the regional and international scene. Thus, after having proclaimed in the 1990s with great media fanfare, the thesis of liberal democracy as an unsurpassable horizon of history, Francis Fukuyama now recognizes with the icy lucidity that characterizes those who have lost their illusions, not only that the democratic experience cannot be decreed and requires time, but also that it is necessary to strengthen the state. Thus, he now sees in the weakness of the southern states not only one of the main reasons for underdevelopment, but also the major cause of chronic instability in the international system in recent years. “Since the end of the Cold War,” he wrote, “weak or failing States have arguably become the single most important problem for international order.” This famous American political scientist, therefore, came to the conclusion that would not be denied even by the fiercest supporters of state management of the past. “The main problem of world politics is not how to trim the State, but rather how to improve it.... A critical issue facing poor countries that blocks their possibilities for economic development is their inadequate level of institutional development. They have no need for an extensive State, but a strong and effective
State.” Similarly, the report of the Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change asserts that “If there is to be a new security consensus, it must start with the understanding that the front-line actors in dealing with all the threats we face, new and old, continue to be individual sovereign states, whose role and responsibilities, and right to be respected, are fully recognized in the Charter of the United Nations.”

Recognizing the irreplaceable role of the state and groups of states in promoting peace and security, freedom, tolerance, gender equality, justice, good governance, sustainable development, solidarity, and regional and international cooperation makes us ask the basic question that is addressed to all free societies that are open and concerned about the establishment of a new international order that is safer, freer, and more fair: how does the international community set up better regional and global governance and multilateral cooperation that truly meet the goals and principles of the UN Charter and of the African Union’s Constitutive Act, particularly with regard to peace and collective security, development, and the protection of fundamental human rights? In a world that is now open and largely dominated by an endless and increasing flow of exchanges of all kinds, by what might be termed a “globalization of everything,” states can no longer ignore the benefits of this vital multilateral cooperation that must be more balanced, safer, more humane, more caring, and more moral.

In this era of interdependence, building a true public space (and I would add regionally and globally) in which all of the key players around the world can be heard is essential.207 “At the international level, all States—strong and weak, big and small—need a framework of fair rules, which each can be confident that others will obey,” UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan aptly said. “Fortunately, such a framework exists. From trade to terrorism, from the law of the sea to weapons of mass destruction, states have created an impressive body of norms and laws. And yet this framework is riddled with gaps and weaknesses. Too often it is applied selectively, and enforced arbitrarily. It lacks the teeth that turn a body of laws into an effective legal system.”208

But what precisely do some countries fear? It is the anachronistic return to the imperium of yesteryear with on the one hand, the very
restricted circle of a few privileged nations, the great powers, always winning and arrogant, always above morals and laws, unilaterally imposing their will on the rest of the world and especially Africa without even worrying the slightest bit about its interests or its problems, or its specificity, or the aspirations of its people; and on the other hand, the “damned of the earth,” always losers, always humiliated and always sentenced to bow. It is especially this apparently deliberate willingness to close the open parenthesis at the end of the long colonial night, taking away again “from the small, poor and despised” the little freedom, responsibility, consideration, and dignity left to them at that time. How can one be surprised then that some people talk about the return to the Colonial Pact? In fact, for fifteen years already, the “masters,” people say, have made a comeback. African peoples and states have experienced too many injustices and humiliations, received too many orders, and endured too much damage and pain without any real benefit, or, if you prefer that other image already cited “too much stick, not enough carrot.” But “a game can last only if all partners are confident that they will win. If some are convinced that they will always lose, or always win and the game becomes a war; in particular, those who feel doomed to be beaten are tempted either to cheat or kick the table. The order through democracy supposes players that are all assured that at one point or another, they will get something out of it.”\textsuperscript{209} We must accordingly consider that, in such circumstances, the defense of national and continental interest requires that we know how to show sensitivity to external constraints without systematically ignoring the interior constraints; in other words, one must know, like a reed under the pressure of the wind and hurricane “to bend but not break,” as was unfortunately too often the case, like in Somalia.

According to political scientist Samy Cohen, “the ‘corpse’ of the state is still moving.”\textsuperscript{210} The idea of an absence of choice, that states can only submit to the pressures exerted on them, is highly debatable. According to Cohen, “Most of the time, there are different options from which to choose. The state must decide on its strategy and the use of its resources. The path is not mapped out in advance. Faced with pressure, it can implement different strategies: mobilize support, seek the best possible compromise, or, even, ignore the pressure if
possible. Only the state can reconcile external constraints and internal pressures; it should be the mediator between international negotiation and domestic politics.”

It is, sometimes, vital to give primacy to internal constraints over external constraints, and to oppose, if need be, resistance to certain external demands (which do not always shine by their common sense) to enable at least a minimum of efficiency, consistency, security, and dignity, even in a situation where there is an imbalance of power. Obviously, the state is no longer operating alone in the world; certainly, the state should not disappear, rather, far from it. While it no longer has its hands totally free, Africa can and must remain responsible and must try to rise above the major challenges of the day for the benefit of the African people who have the need to see “the dawn of the bright day of universal happiness.”

For this, Africa must first rely on its own strengths, individual and collective, including effectively restoring the meaning and value of the modern state and sub-regional and regional African integration. Only an active, structured, and effective state can regulate the market and promote growth and sustainable development, especially through investment, trade, and regional and international cooperation. Similarly, state and interstate institutions are central to preserving peace and security and are essential in the ardent fight against global threats and the social and environmental scourges that threaten humankind. They are the key to effectively combating the dreaded scourge of corruption, to facilitating and internalizing the democratic process in Africa, and to further enhancing the human element as the pivotal factor for development. To achieve this, Africa must go further than what it has already done in the re-founding of the state, African integration, and shared global governance. For the moment, “reforms have led to inconclusive results.”

There is still much to be done; but, it should begin with our own collective and courageous efforts to lay the foundations for a modern and strong democratic state in the context of an African Union and strengthened Regional Economic Communities. Beyond state sovereignty, the image and, especially, the credibility of the continent, its nations, and its peoples are at stake; the world is watching.

A continent, it should be remembered, is a huge land mass with great potential. Africa is a continent whose area is greater than that of
Europe, the United States, China, India, Mexico and Argentina put together. It is a continent that has a large domestic market that will have 1.4 billion consumers by 2020 and more than 2 billion by 2050; it has one of the largest reservoirs of wealth and raw materials on the planet. It is a continent in which some RECs, such as SADC and ECOWAS, are already large, fairly well structured, and integrated entities. Africa must not continue to be perceived as a problem, but rather as an opportunity. As King Gezo of Abomey (Benin today) once said, “If all the sons of the kingdom came, with their hands united, to fill the holes in the broken jar, the kingdom would be saved.” Assuredly, Africa would be saved, and it would finally emerge from the long dark night in which it had been plunged and held by history for centuries.
Afterword

PEACE, SECURITY, AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA: A CONVERSATION WITH JEAN PING

Interview with H.E. Mr. Jean Ping, Chairperson of the African Union Commission, held at the Hotel Intercontinental, New York on September 26, 2010, by Dr. Adam Lupel and Ambassador Adonia Ayebare of the International Peace Institute.

Adam Lupel: The original French manuscript for this book was completed after your time as President of the United Nations General Assembly but before you were appointed as Chairperson of the African Union Commission. How has your experience at the AU affected your outlook since you first wrote the book? What has changed?

Jean Ping: Yes, there are many, many changes already within the house. First of all, if you read the book you’d see that NEPAD was outside. There was no question of integrating NEPAD into the African Union. In the book, it is considered as the sort of economic body. While the AU was political, NEPAD was economic. In

1 Also present at the interview was Ambassador Tête António of the African Union Permanent Observer Mission to the United Nations. We thank him for his support.
fact, they were in some competition. Today, NEPAD is fully integrated into the African Union. It is no longer a separate body. It is now a sort of implementing agency for the projects of the African Union. So you see there are big changes.

The real initiative for NEPAD was taken by Thabo Mbeki. He is the real father of NEPAD. And Mbeki thought of it as a renaissance for Africa. But it was more a political view of the renaissance of Africa. He decided to make it fully African and added three other founding fathers. He added President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, he added President Bouteflika of Algeria, he added President Obasanjo of Nigeria. Then when he introduced the idea in Lusaka, President Wade of Senegal came with another project, which was called OMEGA, without any consultation. The heads of state were confronted with these two projects and requested that they be merged into one project. In fact, they matched together perfectly, because Wade’s project highlighted the development dimension, the infrastructure aspect and the rest, while the Mbeki project was more political. Let me say, something like ideological. So the matching of this project was very easy. They were complementary to each other, and Wade was added to the founding fathers of NEPAD; so you have five founding fathers.

But we still have a part of the project which is the Peer Review Mechanism that is still a little bit outside today and will be also fully integrated into the AU. Peer review was a very important mechanism of the Africans themselves to monitor themselves. Well, it is a voluntary mechanism, in order for Africa to be fully integrated into globalization, to hold these values of democracy, good governance, and all of this. And to be in conformity with globalization, in conformity with the Washington Consensus, which is of course dead today.
Lupel: Clearly, a big change then would be the status of the Washington Consensus, which by all accounts has indeed lost authority as an economic model.

Ping: Absolutely. A big part of this book was a reaction against the Washington Consensus. I said it in a very diplomatic way, but we thought the Washington Consensus was wrong. And now it is over.

Lupel: Does that make you more optimistic for the future?

Ping: I have never been pessimistic. I am sure that we will overcome. I am not going to demonstrate it, but I’m sure that we will overcome. You see, what seems to me very clear is that the Washington Consensus came at the time of the Reagan/Thatcher philosophy of less state. The state is not the solution, they said, the state is the problem. Okay. Now I think that in the United States it was correct at that time. With the Chicago school and Milton Friedman, it was correct. But, when they brought it to Africa (first of all, Asia had rejected it outright) we were obliged to accept it. And it was a total failure. I think, in part, the wars in Africa were one consequence of this policy, because they decided that we were to dismantle the state in two ways or three ways.

First, is to say that the state should disengage from all its activities. It should have nothing to do with the economy. Leave it to the market. Secondly, you should give freedom to everybody. And, commit to decentralization. You know, Africa had a bad system of everything being absolutely centralized with a “one man show” on the top and then going down from there. It was not good. But when they decided to change, they reversed it totally, totally! Decentralization meant that the power was no longer in the center. It should be in various regions, etc., politically speaking. And, economically speaking, it meant taking government out of the economy. And
then they said NGOs have to be there. So the power is no more with the states. The NGOs, which are more and more playing a crucial role there, were not local NGOs. They came from mainly Anglo-Saxon countries, and from Europe, and they imposed their injunctions upon us. So the state was destroyed in a continent where we did not yet have a nation. We had tribes… with problems. So what happened? The ethnic conflicts and, you know, the tribal wars started everywhere.

We had wars in the past before 1990. But these wars were mainly ideological: West against East. And border disputes. But with this destruction of the state, all the countries were confronted with the problem of the rise of ethnic identities and tribal contradictions. Which means that after 1990, many parts of Africa were in conflict. We had genocide in Rwanda. This was a real genocide: the first genocide on the continent. Almost one million people killed in three months. In three months! Then we had war everywhere. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, we had ten countries fighting each other there. We had the problem of atrocities and massacres in Liberia and in Sierra Leone. It was terrible!

Lupel: This issue of the state is very important in the book. You discuss its importance throughout.

Ping: For me, this is the central theme.

Lupel: Looking forward, what kind of state do you think is best suited to bring about the progress that is required, and how can African leaders bring it about?

Ping: I think that the state should be strong but democratic with respect for the rule of law. You see, take a country like the United States or France. Can you think that the state is not strong? You go to illegally demonstrate in the street they will catch you immediately. If I go and just steal a car or break into a house,
I’m in jail forever. You understand. But in Africa if you go to make a demonstration in the street, they say that’s freedom. If you burn a house or a car, this is freedom. So while in developed countries they have been strengthening the state, under the guise of the threat of terrorism, riots, fighting against immigration, and drugs, thus, making the state more powerful than ever, on our continent they destroy the state. I’m not thinking that a state should be a dictatorship. No, no, not at all. I’m saying that a state should respect the rule of law. Somebody said that democracy is a dictatorship of the law, the rule of law. Everybody is subject to the law. Nobody should be above the law. You understand what I mean? So who is going to ensure that? Who is going to ensure the rule of law? Who is going to fight against corruption? Who is going to promote gender issues? Who is going to promote democracy? It is the state. But, it should be the state, a strong state, to fight against tribalism, to fight against corruption, etc. A strong state that respects the rule of law: democracy. This is what I think, because it’s exactly what has happened in Europe.

Lupel: Perhaps that’s a good segue to start talking about the relation among African governments, African institutions, and the international community, both in the sense of specific problems, such as conflict, but also more generally. In addition to the state, the other big theme in this book is your support for greater regional integration, continental integration, and cooperation with the international community. Strong states and regional integration: do those two ideas ever come into tension in your mind?

Ping: You see, Africa now has one billion inhabitants. A continent which, geographically, is ten times Europe’s size, ten times India’s size, four times the size of the US, four times the size of China. This is the continent
of Africa, full of raw materials, very rich, full of green energy, solar, wind, and water. Everything is there. Africa has the second largest tropical forest in the world, the world’s second lung, so to say, the second largest in the world after the Amazon rainforest.

So you can see that Africa could be considered the future of humanity. I’m exaggerating a little bit. But, at the same time, this rich continent of fifty-four countries is divided by 165 borders. Some of them have less than half a million inhabitants. A country like São Tomé has only 150 thousand inhabitants. You see the problem. How can this state develop sustainably and be viable? This is the case for the majority of our countries. You have some like Nigeria, Egypt, and Ethiopia, which are well populated. Egypt and Ethiopia have about 85 million inhabitants, each — Nigeria has a population of over 150 million. DRC is also around 70 million. But the rest have populations below 50 million and the majority of them less than 20 million. I give you the case of my country, Gabon, which is geographically bigger than the UK but with only one and a half million people.

The only way to succeed economically and survive in a competitive globalized world is to have integration. Let me talk about economic integration first. To have a bigger market, economic integration would be a necessity. And we will need to trade among ourselves. But there is no infrastructure, there is nothing. That is why in Africa, inter-Africa trade represents less than 10 percent. Africa does not trade with Africa. We trade with, well...Europe before trading with the rest of the world. Okay. We have no chance to have a big market without integration. Even South Africa has less than 50 million inhabitants. You see? So they are developing their hinterland with SADC, which is today 170 million inhabitants. SADC affords South Africa a better perspective, economically speaking.
Well, politically speaking, none of us, none of our individual voices could be heard outside. None of them, because they are too small.

Let’s talk about world governance today. How is world governance? The world governance seems to be now, economically speaking, G20. Politically speaking, G8 plus the Security Council, to simplify it. You have the Security Council with the P5 members who have the right of veto, and the G8 which is a club leading the world. Economically speaking, you have the G20, and you have the IMF and the World Bank; and then you have WTO on trade. This is the design of what is going to be the world governance. Where is Africa with one billion inhabitants in all these bodies and institutions? Where are we? Nowhere. You go to the Security Council, where we have three members, without any right of veto, three out of fifteen every time. So we are a very small minority for one billion inhabitants. But if you go to Europe, Europe has today a population of about 400 million, roughly. Geographically, the size is 1/10th of our size. But Europe has in the Security Council two permanent members with the right of veto: UK and France. And they have in addition to that some others who are not permanent. And Germany is claiming one more permanent seat with the right of veto. So you see how a continent like ours is totally marginalized.

You go to the G20, we are not there. Only South Africa is there, but South Africa is there as an emerging country, not as an African country. We are petitioning to be members. We have been invited to attend meetings but at the invitation of the host country. If a country decided not to invite us, there would be no problem. So we have been invited since London in 2009. Gordon Brown really listened to us. Bush refused to invite us just before. So Africa is only tolerated. It’s like a favor. Obama accepted us in
Pittsburgh, and Canada also accepted us. We are going to attend the G20 in Seoul. And we’ll attend the G20 in Paris. I think that we’ll be invited to attend subsequent G20 meetings. But we have not yet been admitted as full members.

Lupel: The African Union?

Ping: Yes, the African Union, as a statutory member. Europe is there. The European Union is there as a full member in addition to so many European countries like France, UK, Germany and Spain. They are all at the G20. We have one billion inhabitants. When you go to a theater, you have the normal seat and if the place is full they give you a smaller temporary folding seat. That is our situation. We are not permanent members. But we are invited.

It is the same with the G8. The G8 has decided to give us some three hours during their meetings. Let’s say, less than half a day. Our first invitation was in Okinawa. Since then, they have been always inviting us. After they have met they call us to discuss with us for half a day. It is not bad for us. It is better than nothing. But we are not members there. None of the Africans—South Africa included—is a member. So what is the future of world governance? It can’t stay like that. They have to make some adjustments.

The legitimacy of these bodies is in question. If they are not representing the world, how can you speak and decide on behalf of the whole world? Then there is a problem of legitimacy. Now all this is under discussion, which means that we Africans cannot remain sitting and waiting in this temporary folding seat or as you like a side seat. We have to stake a claim.

Lupel: One more follow up question on this, and then I think we’d like to move on and ask a few questions about Africa’s relationship with the United Nations.
Ping: Well! The United Nations, we think, should also work with regional organizations. Otherwise it won’t survive. It means that the world body should not work with the European Union only. It should work mainly with us on African affairs. It should work with Latin America and Asia and be seen to be conducting global governance with regional organizations. The UN should do this now, as soon as possible.

Lupel: We have been talking mostly about economics, development and such. In the book you draw a parallel between Africa now and Asia in the 1950s to suggest that Africa could be just about on the cusp of a moment of great development. What do you think needs to happen in order to inject that kind of growth in Africa?

Ping: For me it didn’t happen, mainly because of the Washington Consensus. Globalization provides the opportunity to improve the world economy—not make the richest more rich and the poorest more poor, or the poorer, poorest. It’s to improve the whole world economy to fight against poverty. If you follow statistics globally, you will see that poverty has been alleviated or reduced in the world. But it is only in China and India that poverty has been alleviated or reduced, while in Africa it is worsening. So if you look at global statistics, you’ll be satisfied but if you go into details, you will see that discrepancies are there.

How is globalization supposed to bring about a better economy? It’s through investment trade and official development assistance (ODA). These are the three main elements that are supposed to bring about a better world everywhere. But if you examine it, you will see that the share of Africa has reduced compared to let’s say thirty years ago. Our percentage of trade has decreased to something like 2 or 3 percent of the trade of the world. It is the same with direct investment. If you subtract investment in South Africa, the
rest of direct investment going to the rest of Africa is equivalent to the direct investment in the city-state of Singapore. What is the problem? Why doesn’t direct investment go to Africa? Why does it go to Asia? Why is trade not working with Africa? Trade is working with the rest of the world. Why is ODA decreasing in spite of all the promises that have been given? ODA is decreasing. The promised 0.7 percent has never been reached, except by maybe less than ten countries today. So you see, in spite of all the promises, in spite of all the speeches here and there, ODA is declining. The 0.7 percent ODA has never been reached, and Africa as a continent, is badly facing problems.

So what do we do? I think one idea is to have a huge market. I said in the beginning that Africa has one billion inhabitants, but they are divided into so many small states, by barriers and by obstacles. So we have to integrate. We in the African Union, for instance, we say that we have five sub-regions, five geographical sub-regions…North Africa, (UMA), Southern (SADC), West Africa (ECOWAS), Central Africa (ECCAS), and for East Africa, let me simplify with COMESA. For, that sub-region count several organizations that are now trying to merge and are moving fast to have a common market. By a way of illustration, the arrangement implementing a single Free Trade Area to which three regional blocks, namely COMESA, SADC and EAC came as from October 2008 is part of this objective. This agreement was breaking ground to achieve the full economic integration of the continent. The concerned regions will constitute an economic space including twenty-six countries, that is to say half of the member states of the AU and a few more than 58 percent in terms of contribution to GDP and 57 percent of the AU’s total population. West Africa is doing the same thing. ECOWAS encompasses almost 400 million inhabi-
tants. It is similar to Europe. The size of ECOWAS, in terms of population and its market is almost the same as Europe. This will attract more investment and more trade while suppressing the internal economics and political obstacles, the custom barriers, etc. This is the way to attract investment and to improve trade. You know, Europeans sometimes are telling us “don’t trade with China. It’s dangerous.” And yet they trade with China. They invest heavily in China instead of investing in Africa. Let’s say we want to increase our direct investment. But where will the money come from? The money is in Asia today and in the Middle East, the Gulf. They have huge extra savings. So we have to ask them, (India, China, and Korea)to invest in the continent. But at the same time the Europeans mainly say, “oh be careful, don’t accept this investment because…”—Why do they accept it then and tell us not to accept it? We really need to improve our economy through investment, through trade, and through ODA. And we are calling on Europe to invest in Africa. We are saying to the US, why don’t you invest in Africa? The US is investing only in the oil sector. There are huge possibilities for investment in the continent. Why don’t they come?

Lupel: In Africa, as everywhere, issues of economic development are intimately connected to issues of security as well.

Ping: Yes, if you’re finished with the economy, we can move to politics and security. Is that correct?

Lupel: Yes. It’s all related, of course. And you’ve also raised the issue of international cooperation.

Adonia Ayebare: Presently, there is a perceived friction between Africans and the UN, especially, in the wake of recent events in DRC, Chad, Sudan, etc. How do you see the relationship between the UN and African governments and regional institutions developing in the
near future? What do you think are the reasons for the tension? Do you see the situation improving? And how will this affect the effectiveness of the AU and the UN in Africa?

Ping:

Well this is a very good question, a delicate one, but a very good question. The United Nations was created in 1945 after the Second World War, which was a war among nations with a certain number of rules. So it was created to avoid such conflicts, to avoid them and to prevent them. But the conflict in Africa is of a different nature. It’s not a conflict among nations. It’s mainly a conflict inside of nations, combined with conflicts among nations. If you go to Sudan, it’s an internal conflict inside of Sudan, combined with an interstate conflict in the sub-region. A majority of African conflicts now have an intrastate dimension. Has the UN adapted itself to such a situation? That’s one question. I’m not replying but you see that countries are disappointed. They were expecting something else and more. They were expecting forces that would enforce peace. So they are not only disappointed but there is also a lot of misunderstanding. Let me go into details. When Chad asked the UN to move out, their argument was this: We are in conflict with Sudan. There are Sudanese here crossing the border to go and fight against the government of Sudan. There are Chadians on the other side crossing the border to come and fight against the Government of Chad. You are on the border. You see them passing, and you just watch, saying that this is not in your mandate. Your mandate has been created to protect civilians; to protect refugees and not to engage in combat. So what are you doing there? Herein lies the problem of misunderstanding. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, it was the same thing. I went to talk to these people and their argument was that the UN, for
instance, has sent troops to some places where there is no war. They are deployed for example in Maniema where there is no fighting. But where you have conflict, say in the eastern part, they just watch all that happening, including the problem of the negative forces which are there.

The problem of the Interahamwe? The problem of the Mai Mai. The UN is not contributing to resolving these problems. So the question is what are you doing there? They did it also in Somalia, with the strategy of zero death. The UN goes to Somalia, one helicopter is shot down, and it says, let’s quit. So there is probably a problem. I don’t have the solution to that problem. But I think there is a problem.

Ayebare: Then there is another layer of relationship. What is the state of relationship between the UN and the AU? Because, you’re both addressing peace and security issues on the continent. What is the state of coordination? Are you happy with the relationship? There is the ten-year capacity building program. What is the state of the relationship between the two organizations?

Ping: Well, first of all we think and we do believe that the primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security in the world belongs to the UN. Everybody expects the UN to solve problems and to maintain peace and security. We are 54 members out of 193. We pay our contributions; we do everything, so we need also to have the UN to come and protect us and to maintain peace and security on the continent. So this is admitted. But we see that the Security Council doesn’t want the UN to go to Somalia. There is no peace to keep there. Which means that the African Union must first bring peace and then they will come. Simply. We would think that it is their responsibility to do that. That’s the first thing. Many conflicts in Africa have been considered
by the Security Council as low intensity wars. When we face this type of issue, we are obliged to go ourselves. On a regional basis, like the war in Congo-Brazzaville in the mid-1990s, nobody accepted to go there. We solved it ourselves with countries of the region. We sent ourselves there without asking for authorization. And the problem was solved. Maybe not solved properly, but we brought back peace. So it is simple. One, we think that it’s the UN, but if the UN is not there, we have to take responsibility.

Lupel: You think that the UN should indeed have the first responsibility, but if they’re not responding, then—

Ping: It’s not that they should, they have the primary responsibility to keep peace in the world. And we are members of the UN. But if for one reason or another, good or bad, they don’t come, we have to take responsibility. This has happened in Somalia, where for twenty years it has been the only country in the world without a state. All the terrorists are there. You know? All the bad things happened there. The trafficking, the terrorism, the piracy, everything is there. So we can’t allow this to continue. We have to take responsibility. That’s what we are doing.

Ayebare: It makes sense. But like they say, the devil is in the details. Coordination on the ground between the AU and the UN has proven difficult, especially when the African Union has gone in like in Darfur and has stabilized a situation, or in Burundi. The UN comes in and there are problems with coordination. So the question is how do you see the future of coordination between the organizations? When the UN comes in later, after the AU has stabilized the situation?

Ping: I think that’s the main problem. Security Council decision making is very slow. I’ve mentioned that in the case of Côte d’Ivoire, you will see there that the prevention started in 1994 or ’95, because you saw that
the elements of the conflict were there. We tried to solve it with preventive diplomacy. No way. And finally, the conflict became violent. And the UN came ten years later with a decision by the Security Council. The fight was already there. The country was already divided into two. For me it was a little bit late. And in general, it is late. There is no way of taking quick decisions. It’s not the Secretariat. It is the problem of decision making. In the case of Sudan, you have noticed that the Secretary General at that time, Kofi Annan, alerted world opinion quickly. Okay. And then the fight started. We went there without any preparation; we went in to try to stop that with UNAMIS. And then the UN came. Of course, we accepted that very easily. The first hybrid operation in the world was set up; the first one of its kind and the biggest operation of the UN ever, with the ceiling of 26,000 elements. If the ceiling is reached, it will be the biggest one in the history of the UN, and also the first UN hybrid force led by the UN and the African Union, a regional organization. Okay. 95 percent of the troops there are Africans. There are no Europeans fighting there. We have received some Asian troops, but the majority of them are Africans. We work with the UN, but there is a tendency to think that the African Union does not exist, that it is only UN. When they appoint people, when they decide, when they report, we are not consulted, so we are obliged to draw their attention constantly to the fact that we are there too... If you wanted to be alone, you could have told us. But you have two organizations, which mean that there is a necessity of coordination. Generally, they want to work alone except when they have problems. Then they call us.

Ayebare: Yes, there has been a lot of debate here in New York about coordination between the UN and regional organizations. There are a lot of studies that have
been conducted, and I’m glad you are talking about the practicality of it. And this relates to the question of AU capacity. How close is the AU to having the five regional brigades of the African Stand-by Force on the ground working so that Africa can have its own peacekeeping capacity?

Ping: Has the UN anything similar? No. So—

Ayebare: But how close is it?

Ping: I think that we have the best architecture for peace and security in the world. We now have the Peace and Security Council, which was created in the image of the UN Security Council, with fifteen members. We have a system of early warning which does not exist in the UN. We have one monitoring the situation everywhere, mainly when we have elections. We know that now we have conflicts resulting from elections, so all the elections are under control one year before to monitor if there is a risk of conflict or not, etc. This is an example. Apart from this early warning system, we have also the Panel of the Wise, which is not yet fully operational.

Ayebare: IPI is working with the Panel.

Ping: Yes, exactly. You are doing a lot. They are studying now, and with your help, which is very good. With your help, we can make it more and more efficient. And I should give thanks to you for your cooperation. Then we have this brigade. Five brigades to be pre-positioned as a stand-by force, which is something that does not exist in the UN. This stand-by force, which is practically ready, it would be easy to mobilize it. And it’s going to be operational soon. We’ll convene a meeting soon to have an evaluation of this. But it’s moving in a good direction. We will have the problem of means—always this is the problem we have—financial means, which we don’t have. And we are asking the UN and European Union to assist. We
thought that this could have come from the UN. You know? The Prodi report reflected on this, to have something like a stand-by force with predictable money available to use. The European Union has that. Currently, they have provided us with a peace facility with money that we use to pay the salary of our troops in Somalia. So, we are creating the necessary infrastructure, on a regional basis to act alone or with the UN. But the problem is -the means and ability to take quick decisions. The more you wait, the more the situation becomes worse.

Lupel: So how do you see the trend in Africa then? Do you see it shifting away from the UN?

Ping: No, no. The coordination is getting better. Yes, it is much, much better. We should admit that UNAMID is the first operation of its type, and the rules and regulation of DPKO are complex. We should understand and we do understand that. What we are telling them, and not only DPKO, but the P5, is that if you listen to us, you will not make so many mistakes, because we know the field better than you.

Ayebare: Yes, I think that’s a major, major shift, if the two organizations can work together in real life. They can solve even the debates of the Security Council reform, because people are working together. If you allow me, the issue of peace building: It seems the international system and the African Union also might fall in the same trap of concentrating on boots on the ground in peacekeeping to the detriment of peacebuilding and development. When you look at the architecture of the African Union, it’s good. It integrates security with development. But most of the resources now, of course for the obvious reason that there are still conflicts, are spent on security. But do you see? When should we start moving away from that and spending more money on development? And does the AU have a program for peacebuilding? When you look at the
commission, peacebuilding is not focused on now. What’s the plan of the commission to start looking beyond conflicts to look at the strategy of integrating peacebuilding into the architecture?

Ping: There is a strategy for peacebuilding itself, and there is a strategy for development as a whole. The UN is not really dealing with development. They leave it to the World Bank, the IMF, and in a certain way to UNDP and the specialized agencies, the FAO and the rest. But for us, it is all inclusive. Two out of our four strategic pillars cover peace and security and development. We are talking about railways, roads, universities, etc., and we are moving fast toward implementation, action, not only reflection and talks. We are working closely with the African Development Bank and also with some other partners like the European Union, China, India, Korea, Turkey, US, all our partners. We not only have bilateral links for development, but also multilateral action for development. If you want to build a road from Djibouti to Dakar, you have to deal with the multilateral aspect—there is a multilateral dimension, not only bilateral dimensions. So we are moving forward. I believe the Pan African University will start this year.

We think and believe that there is no peace without development and there is no development without peace. These two elements are linked. And we should develop Africa if we want peace and vice-versa. So in the field of peace building, as well as development, we are doing what we need to do. Now, in the field of let me say micro peacebuilding, we have some problems. You recall that the decision to have the peacebuilding commission in 2005 was due to the fact that the Security Council, after having established peace in a conflict area, leaves too early. And we move back to war again. It’s costly. So we said that instead of dealing only with peace and leaving hastily, once you have
succeeded in bringing peace and thereby risking the start of war again, you should have a policy of peacebuilding. And we thought that peacebuilding would really address development. Even at that time, we thought that peacebuilding should go to ECOSOC, because ECOSOC would deal with the World Bank, with the IMF, etc—This was to make ECOSOC stronger, like an economic Security Council. You have Security Council there dealing with political issues and a strong ECOSOC dealing with economic issues. But it was rejected, because the P5 want to maintain their veto and their power. So it shifted to—

Ayebare: This was when debating the peacebuilding commission?

Ping: So it went there. The decision that was made was very difficult. The decision was taken and we left the details to Jan Eliasson and the 60th session of the General Assembly. But as you can see, they are not doing what we expected them to do.

Ayebare: Yes. I think there is always a disconnect. Here in New York what we think is a big deal is not necessarily a big deal in the field. Peacebuilding is everywhere here. It’s big here but relatively absent in the field. The countries they picked are African countries; they always say that, Burundi, Sierra Leone.

Ping: You see, you take the case of Central African Republic, which is not a resource poor country, they have diamonds, they have everything, but the economy was disorganized. It used to be dominated by the informal sector. So, the government was not able to get money from taxation. They were not able to pay the salary of the staff. And when they went to see the IMF and the World Bank, they said they will help them if they paid their debt. But they knew perfectly that they couldn’t pay their debt. They had no money
even to pay their salaries. So you see it was a vicious circle. And they say well, these are our rules. That’s when we say, it can’t work like that. We have to change it. And you see today, the World Bank and the IMF have changed. Not enough, but they have changed a little bit. We have talked to them. And they are changing, but it’s not enough.

Ayebare: Yes, the debate on what defines peacebuilding continues.

Ping: Yes, exactly.

Lupel: There is a lack of agreement on how to define peacebuilding in operational terms. In relation to peacekeeping, you said that you thought that much of the problem related to misunderstandings and the sense that not enough has been done. Some feel that the UN and others have spent too many resources on the military side of peacekeeping at the expense of peacebuilding and development. Would you agree? Has too much money been spent on peacekeeping?

Ping: Yes, of course.

Ayebare: You see that as a problem?

Ping: Of course. It’s clear now that if you want to make peace sustainable, you have to put a big push behind peacebuilding, and then you won’t have to come back to peacekeeping. Otherwise, the Central African Republic and the rest have been there now for ten years, turning like that without really moving.

Ayebare: I remember when working on Burundi and the Peacebuilding Commission, and people would say they were there for three years. But the minister of finance said we don’t know about the Peacebuilding Commission. We know UNDP.

Ping: Yes, exactly.

Lupel: We’ve talked broadly about security and develop-
ment, the state and regional integration, among other things. You expressed optimism when we began that Africa would overcome the obstacles before it. Looking forward and to wrap up in some way, what do you see are the greatest challenges for the continent in the coming years?

Ping: Yes, the big challenges for the continent today are still peace and security, in a broad sense of the term. If you take the Sahara and the Sahel, you see that from Mauritania to Somalia, this part of the Sahara desert has become a big boulevard of all threats, all the threats. Al Qaeda is there, Traffickers are there, Salafists are there. Drugs, for instance, are coming from Colombia and Venezuela, crossing the ocean to arrive in West Africa. But the final market is Europe. Production is Latin America. We are just a transit zone, but this transit is very costly, very costly for us in terms of security, of peace, of life. Even the President of Guinea-Bissau was killed because of that. Now you see also heroin starting to come from Afghanistan, through Somalia, through the desert, and this has been a place where heroin and cocaine mix and go to Europe. And these people, the traffickers, are working to destabilize the countries there—the problem with the Tuaregs, for example, and the security there. They are taking hostages to get money. So it has become a big threat for the stability of this part of the world. And Sudan is in this area. Somalia is in this area. So you can see that security remains a principal concern, in spite of the fact that we have succeeded in stopping war almost everywhere—a process which began in 1990 with all these changes, the end of the Soviet Union, the fall of the Berlin Wall, globalization, etc.—we have settled or almost settled the majority of conflicts. Just to remind you that one of the most difficult conflicts was Angola, with forty years of fighting in this country.
The war has now been stopped forever. The country is dealing with its own peacebuilding, its own integration. In the African Union, we are now requesting Angola to help the others, for instance, Guinea-Bissau. Angola’s problem has been solved by the Africans; let me say by the Angolans themselves, without outside help. Remember the big occasion, UNAVEM, nothing, they quit. Okay. It has been solved. In DRC, that of which was called the First African World War, because ten countries were fighting there. This big conflict has also been solved. Don’t forget that. Five million people passed away in DRC. Genocide was committed in Rwanda. I’m talking about the Great Lakes. We still have some important problems in the eastern part, but we’ll solve them. We’ll solve them, which means that we have come a long way. We still have problems of peace and security, as I told you, with all the threats of war in Sudan, which could be a very big problem, because Sudan is a microcosm of the African continent. You have a Christian and Muslim population. You have Arabs and non-Arabs. You have so many people there coming from everywhere. It was the road to go to Mecca. And the people of Nigeria for example, crossed Sudan to go there and many of them have settled there. They are there in Darfur. You have southern Sudan. So this is a micro-Africa, which means that the problems there, if they are solved properly, will help the rest of the continent. If they are not solved properly, it might be a threat to the rest of the continent. Why talk about Somalia? We have radicals there like the Al Shabab. They not only want to establish an Islamic government there and to kill Sharif, who’s now the president, but they want to export this to the whole continent. How can one accept this? It was considered like a very low intensity war, and then you add piracy and it is now considered a threat to international peace. You see, we have all
these challenges which are still there. But we will solve them with the help of the rest of the world. We’ll solve them. Now the problem of development, which we are talking about, peacebuilding, we will not have a peace, a sustainable peace if we don’t have development; if we continue to have poverty; if we continue to have injustice; if we continue to have all these threats we are facing. Some of them are not African threats. They are global threats. As I told you, the drugs are not from Africa. It’s global. Terrorism is not only in Africa. It’s a global issue. So we should work with the rest of humanity, the rest of the world, provided that they listen to us, that they don’t consider us as children but as responsible for our own lives, for our own destiny and ready to work with the rest of the world. That’s what we have been doing. And sometimes the rest of the world is saying that Africa wants African solutions to African problems. It doesn’t mean that we refuse help from others, no, no, no, not at all. We need everyone. We need to work with the UN, we need to work with Europe, we need to work with America, we need to work to solve our problems. Provided that you don’t think that the solution to African problems should come from Georgia. This is not Georgia. This is not Europe. This is Africa.

Lupel: Thank you. This has been very helpful.

Ayebare: Thank you.
Endnotes

1. Thus, according to some French persons, “It is true, we do not need Africa economically…France is in Africa with more friendly ambitions.” Interview of then French Interior Minister Nicolas Sarkozy in *Jeune Afrique*, Nov. 5-11, 2006.


3. By the *Treaty of Westphalia* in 1648, the European great powers put an end to the Thirty Years’ War and affirmed the principle of sovereignty and the rights of nation-states.

4. Despite their asserted antinomy, liberalism and Marxism were both born from the Enlightenment. Similarly, at origin, Afro-Asian trends and non-alignement were complementary, despite some ambiguities revealed at Bandung.


6. These sovereignty-free, or non-state, actors include NGOs, multinationals, the media, terrorists, organized criminals, mafias, traffickers, etc.

7. Assayas Afewerki: “I will not make up to please the US Administration.”


13. History has held that the Brazilian President Jámo Quadras was forced by the United States to resign while his successor was overthrown with the support of the same country. Just as the Head of State of Chile,
Salvador Allende, was also overthrown with the support of the Americans in 1973.


20. Speech to the nation by Prime Minister Léon Mba after the enactment of the first Gabonese constitution, February 20, 1959.


25. The Philippines, North Korea, and Argentina in 1974; Brazil, Venezuela, and Mexico in 1975.


27. For UDEAC/CEMAC, the countries were Gabon and three of its “nearby neighbors” plus the Central African Republic (CAR) and Chad; for CEEAC, the six member states of UDEAC/CEMAC plus São Tomé and Principe, Angola, as well as the three countries (DRC, Rwanda, and Burundi) of the Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries (ECGLC).

29. “Address by US Secretary of State Warren Christopher at the South African Institute of International Affairs,” University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, October 12, 1996.


31. Speech by President François Mitterand at the 45th UN General Assembly, September 27, 1990, UN Doc. A/45/PV.4, p. 36.

32. Brazil is already, with Russia, India, and China, in the “BRIC” group of emerging economies.


34. The history of the G8, which is now comprised of the eight largest industrial powers of the world (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States), began in 1975, at the initiative of French President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, who convened at Rambouillet the six most industrialized countries of the time (France, Germany, Japan, the UK, and the US); then in 1976, the G6 became the G7 with the addition of Canada; the G7 then became the G8 in 1997 when Russia formally joined the group.

35. In the 1980s, some analysts also remarked that “…the government of the United States was slow to focus on the African continent. It waited for independence to wake up, if we want to simplify it.” Denis Martin, “Les Etats-Unis Ont-ils une Politique Africaine?” *Politique Africaine* vol. 12 (December 1983): p. 4.


37. In addition to its large base of 2,000 troops in Djibouti, the US had planned to deploy a dozen troops in the region of the Sahel (Senegal, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Chad, Ghana, Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria).


39. In the language of international economic and financial institutions, the term conditionality, as stated by former World Bank Adviser and Chief Economist for South Asia John Williamson, is generally first
defined as “all special conditions to whose respect the Fund conditions the use of its resources in given circumstances.” John Williamson, ed., *IMF Conditionality* (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1983).

40. I placed the first great rupture at the end of the 1950s with the decision made by French President General Charles de Gaulle to grant independence to the colonized people of black Africa.

41. In 1956, despite the opposition of US President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Anthony Eden, then British Prime Minister, triggered the Suez War, which he lost to Gamal Abdel Nasser’s Egypt.

42. See Michel in “Afrique-Europe,” op. cit.

43. See Dominique Moïsi, “Reinventing the West,” *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 82, no. 6 (November-December 2003): pp. 67-73.


47. The Tokyo International Conference on African Development was launched in 1993 by the Government of Japan as a venue to promote trade development between Africa and Asia as well as with other partners.


49. The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the premier Asia-Pacific economic forum, is comprised of twenty-one Pacific Rim members. It has 2.5 billion inhabitants or 40 percent of the world’s population and represents 54 percent of the GDP of the planet and 44 percent of world trade.


51. The West trades, relocates industries, and invests heavily in China, but not in Africa (in 2010 China ranked second in FDI at $US 101 billion). The Chinese, who draw huge profits from these exchanges, in turn
reinvest in Africa a part of these profits and acquire technology thanks to transfer contracts signed with Western industrialists (UNCTAD Global Investments Trends Monitor, No. 5, January 17, 2011, available at www.unctad.org/en/docs/webdiaeia20111_en.pdf).


54. Speech by H.E. Mr. Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, President of the Federative Republic of Brazil at the 61st session of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/61/PV.10, September 19, 2006, p. 7.


57. See, for example, Aimé Félix Avenot, La Décentralisation Territoriale au Gabon (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2008).

58. Ibid., p. 9.

59. Take the case of the French NGO, L’Arche de Zoé or “Zoe’s Ark,” which was officially operating as a humanitarian charity in Chad. According to Chadian President Idriss Deby Itno, the NGO was involved in an illegal money-for-adoption scheme preying on child refugees from war-torn Darfur. It was later found that the children were almost all to be Chadian and to have at least one living parent.


64. Benjamin R. Barber, Comment le Capitalisme Nous Infantilise (Paris: Fayard, 2007), p. 204.

65. The privatization of customs, for example, control of the declared
values of imports, gate fees, and other tax collections, is increasingly implemented in favor of foreign private companies (SGS, INSKAPE, Crown Agency, for example); that of private security companies, in particular, the now famous “Executive Outcome” and “Sandline” related to South Africa and the United Kingdom.


67. The term “influence of structure” is obviously used here in its economic sense, which, in this case, implies an inevitable influence on politics.

68. Todorov specifies in The New World Disorder that external military intervention is justified “in the extreme case of genocide, not because of an imaginary right of interference that one would assign oneself, but as a duty of Humanity.” Todorov, The New World Disorder, op. cit.


70. The fears and doubts of my colleague Pascal Missongo, Gabonese Minister of Justice at the time, proved to be founded.

71. It should be noted that UNICEF, a specialized agency of the United Nations system, is not at issue here, but rather the behavior of some of its often poorly trained and misinformed staff.


73. The competent national authorities had also decided to discontinue the Chinese seismic search pending a new environmental-impact study entrusted to a Dutch company. But the result was also unemployment for nearly two hundred Gabonese (by the companies Sinopec and Penrenco).


75. In Poland, for example, 90 percent of electricity comes from coal-fired power plants. See, for example, Transition to a Low-Emissions Economy in Poland (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, February 2011), p. 27.


77. African countries are both victims of greenhouse gases emitted by the big polluters and obligated to absorb the gas through the channel of
their forests.


81. Universal jurisdiction is the principle that every state has the power to punish certain crimes regardless of where they took place or the person who committed them. But the current extension of its application and legal basis are the subject of polemics.


85. It should be made clear that the prosecution and arrest of Slobodan Milosevic (who was no longer in power) and Radovan Karadzic do not fall under the jurisdiction of the ICC, but rather that of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) (comparable to the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, whose seat is at Arusha in Tanzania).

86. This now famous quote is attributed to US President Franklin D. Roosevelt. See, for example, William Pfaff, *The New Yorker*, 27 May 1985.


88. As evidence, we are not defending either former President Charles Taylor, already in prison, or the former Head of State Hissène Habré,
whose trial we support.

89. In the Darfur crisis, Sudan offered to try its own criminals in national courts, while the United States and some African countries proposed to have them tried in ad hoc regional African courts (such as the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda) or, as is the case for Europe, with the ICTY.

90. The International Court of Justice received an application from the DRC in October 2000 concerning the violation of the extraterritorial jurisdiction and the infringement of the diplomatic immunities of its Minister of Foreign Affairs, Yerodia Ndombasi, against whom an international arrest warrant had been issued by Belgium in April of that year.

91. In Port-Gentil, Gabon, for example, a Lebanese company and its Moroccan competitor accused one another of financing and corrupting the Gabonese NGO “Healthy Environment Growth.”


95. Ibid., pp. 119-124.

96. Ibid., pp. 123-124.


101. See Ping, Mondialisation, Paix, Démocratie et Développement en Afrique, op. cit.

102. Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization,
op. cit., p. 2, para. 9.


104. Sometimes the inciting role played by Mwalimu Julius Nyeréré is mentioned.

105. The Americans, for example, duped by the collapse of the USSR, had indeed restored their confidence in their messianic mission to democratize the world by the use of force. It was this mission, along with some success in Africa, which led to the extended conflict in Iraq.

106. Thus, according to economist Béatrice Hibou, “one of the principles that structure the discourse of the World Bank can be summarized by the desire to circumscribe politics while reinforcing the choice of liberal norms....” See her article, “Banque Mondiale: Les Méfaits du Catéchisme Économique—L’Exemple de L’Afrique Subsaharienne,” in *African Politics*, no. 71 (October 1998) pp. 58-59.


108. Speech by then Cuban President Fidel Castro at the Summit of the Group of 77 and China in Havana, April 12, 2000.

109. CEMAC troops who afterward became the Central African Multinational Force (FOMUC) financed by the European Union, returned, as in the beginning of the crisis, to fill the void left by the departure of the MINURCAT blue berets.


111. There were other acts for Côte d’Ivoire, such as the Accra III or the Summits of the Peace and Security Council, an organ of the African Union.


114. Franklin Delano Roosevelt, State of the Union Address, January 6, 1941.

115. The World Bank has identified six components of good governance:
voice and accountability; political stability and violence; government effectiveness; regulatory burden; rule of law; and control of corruption.


117. At that time, Air Afrique, Air Gabon, Cameroon Airlines, and Zambian Airways were dissolved.


121. Today, we speak of the “authority” of the Union.

122. The Abuja Treaty and the Lagos Plan of Action provide for the gradual establishment of an African Economic Community (AEC), based on the regional economic communities (RECs), over a transition period of thirty-four years divided into six stages. But, according to general opinion, the RECs have not worked as expected and considerable delays have occurred.


126. There are three RECs, for example, found in East Africa [(the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the East African Community (EAC), and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA))].

127. Thabo Mbeki subsequently shared his project with three other African Presidents: Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria, Abdelaziz Bouteflika of Algeria, and Hosni Mubarak of Egypt.

128. A high-level panel of eminent personalities was established to proceed, upon request, with the assessments of the countries.

129. Speech by Ambassador Paul Badji of Senegal at a 2004 UN General Assembly meeting devoted to the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), UN Doc. A/59, P.34, October 18, 2004, p. 22.

130. The crisis in the country’s east, in the North Kivu province, remains volatile.


133. For example, the International Financing Facilities (IFF) for consolidating contributions for airline tickets, etc.

134. According to Jacques Attali, in the Judeo-Greek ideal, liberty is a final goal; adherence to a moral code is a condition of survival; wealth is a gift from the heavens; and poverty is a threat.

135. For example, in Asian and African traditional societies, primacy is given to the society and not to the individual, as is the case in the West.


144. It is the purpose of the *Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions*, which entered into force on March 18, 2007.

145. The British parliamentary democracy is very different from the French presidential democracy and from the Swiss direct democracy.

146. Speech by US President Franklin Delano Roosevelt to the Commonwealth Club, San Francisco, California, September 23, 1932.


148. In Europe, the heads of state or government are eligible for reelection several times, although it is rare for them to remain in power for more than fifteen years. However, France just modified its constitution for this purpose.


152. David Quammen, *National Geographic*, vol. 24, no. 3 (September
202

153. CITES, which entered into force on July 1, 1975, prohibits international trade in species of flora and fauna threatened with extinction, including elephants for their coveted ivory tusks.

154. See Article 51 of the UN Charter.


156. Ibid., p. 11.


158. The United Nations system is, indeed, a vast network which includes fifteen specialized agencies [i.e., UNESCO, the World Health Organization (WHO), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), World Trade Organization (WTO)], the so-called Bretton Woods institutions [i.e., the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)], and thirteen programs and funds [i.e., the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and the World Food Programme (WFP)].

159. In the 1960s and 1970s, British decolonization resulted in forty-seven independences; French, twenty-three; Portuguese, six; Belgian, three; Dutch, two; and Spanish, one. See the UN’s website on decolonization concerning trust and non-self-governing territories, available at: www.un.org/en/decolonization/nonselfgov.shtml#p.

160. As quoted by Jean-Pierre Béjot, La Dépêche Diplomatique, “Jean Ping préside l’Assemblée générale de l’ONU: l’Afrique francophone à l’honneur. Et à la tâche?” September 30, 2004. Béjot added to this observation that “the President of the General Assembly [of the UN] is under the spotlight for a whole year and, through him, it is his country that is honored.”

161. Including the United Nations International Conference on Population and Development (Cairo, 1994), the World Conference on Women (Beijing, 1995), the World Food Summit (Rome, 1996), the
Millennium Summit (New York, 2000), the World Summit for Sustainable Development (Rio, 1992 and Johannesburg, 2002), and the International Conference on Financing for Development (Monterrey, 2002).

162. Some analysts do not hesitate to call reform of the UN “impossible” and “unthinkable” for the time being given, especially, the unresolved issue of representation in the Security Council and elsewhere in United Nations system.

163. The General Assembly adopted Resolution 48/26 in 1993 calling for the establishment of a working group to “consider all aspects of the question of the increase in the membership of the Security Council.” In 1997, Razali Ismail, then President of the General Assembly, put forth a proposal for the expansion of the Security Council known as the “Razali plan.” Unfortunately, it was not put to a vote.

164. In the Harare Declaration, Africa claimed at least two permanent seats with veto power (for the continent, rather than the states) and five additional non-permanent seats. The permanent seats would be occupied by the principle of rotation, while the veto right would be progressively curtailed until its abolition.

165. The Ezulwini Consensus is named after the city in Swaziland where the ministerial committee of fifteen met. The Committee was constituted in January 2005 in Abuja at the 60th AU Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers and met in Ezulwini on March 7 and 8, 2005.

166. Védrine et al, Continuer L’Histoire, op. cit., p. 73.

167. Articles 108 and 109 (paragraph 2) of the UN Charter require for the entry into force of any amendment to the Charter, a vote of two-thirds of the member states, including the five permanent members of the Security Council.


170. Most Southern countries, ardent defenders of Kofi Annan over the attacks by the US Congress, somewhat distanced themselves from him on some of these points as of the publication of his report in March 2005, due to his proposals, which they considered too favorable to the
positions of major Western powers, including the United States. However, almost all African states continued to support him, and were thus remarkable craftsmen of the success of the reforms and of the summit.


174. This controversial, but important concept is subject to the potential risks it entails, to prevent the repetition of crises similar to those the world has seen in the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and elsewhere that made people say, “never again.”


180. Similar prospective studies have been conducted with the assistance of UNDP for other African countries such as the Côte d’Ivoire. (Botswana would also have made an excellent case study.)

181. According to international law, the state includes three components: a territory with delineated borders and, in principle, recognized by other states; a population; and, finally, public powers in charge of administering the first two elements.

182. Malraux, speech in Brazzaville, op. cit.

183. The defense of sovereignty should not be understood here as a hierarchical doctrine legitimizing the absolutist practice of power.


186. See, for example, Matthew Karnitschnig, Deborah Solomon, Liam Pleven, and Jon E. Hilsenrath, “US to Take Over AIG in $85 Billion Bailout; Central Banks Inject Cash As Credit Dries Up,” The Wall Street Journal, September 18, 2008.


188. The electricity cuts, for example, the famous load-shedding following hasty privatization in the 1990s, have led countries such as Togo to renationalize their energy production. Other African countries, on the contrary, that had not previously known such load-shedding until quite recently, are now incurring it after the privatization of their energy production.


191. Béjot, La Dépêche Diplomatique, op. cit.


196. Ibid., p. 63.


199. See, for example, the viewpoint of historian Justin Vaïsse, “Condoleezza et la Démocratie, Cinq Pistes de Réflexion.” *Le Monde*, February 10, 2005.


205. Ibid., pp. 181-182.


211. Ibid, p. 29.

212. This is the conclusion reached by a number of researchers from various countries. See, for example, *L’Afrique Politique: Réforme des Etats Africains* (Paris: Karthala, 2001, for the Centre d’Etude d’Afrique Noire).

213. As for all those players whose impact can no longer be ignored, the state should perhaps encourage those who are most useful: Southern NGOs, which must now coexist beside some powerful Northern NGOs and public and private media in Africa, should also serve as relay for the transmission of our interests.