

In Pursuit of Peace and Security:

The Role of Special Representatives of the UN Secretary-General and Their Relationship with the UN Security Council

December 2012

On November 19th, 2012 the International Peace Institute (IPI), together with the Research Project on SRSGs at the Department of Political Science, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena (Germany) convened a roundtable workshop to discuss the role of the Special Representatives of the UN Secretary-General (SRSG) and their relationship with the UN Security Council. The meeting, held under the Chatham House Rule of non-attribution, brought together former and active SRSGs, members of staff of the UN Secretariat, UN experts, and representatives of member states and academia. This meeting note summarizes the ideas that arose during these discussions. It was written by Dorothea Prell, M.A., member of the Jena Research Project. The note reflects the rapporteurs' interpretation of the meeting and not necessarily the views of all other participants. The team of the Research Project would like to thank its donor the German Foundation for Peace Research and the core donors of the International Peace Institute for making this workshop possible.

Executive Summary

The purpose of the roundtable workshop was to identify specific resources, opportunities and constraints of SRSG leadership vis-à-vis the UN Security Council. Given this, the workshop makes an important contribution to the ongoing research on this topic. The broader aim of the workshop was to elaborate more specific and appropriate tools for understanding, analyzing, and applying relational leadership exercised by SRSGs in their interaction with the Security Council. Bringing together past and current practitioners was essential for this purpose: Reconstructing experiences and reporting from the field as well as headquarters perspective was an important way to generate knowledge and material for further research and enhance practice. To this end, academic expertise and practical experience was needed to be integrated to take stock of past and current practices. While every mandate and conflict situation is unique, the work of SRSGs merits more attention in order to identify a set of recommendations for more an effective exercise of leadership in varying contexts.

Panel I – SRSGs as Agents of the UN’s work for peace and security

The first panel was opened by the senior Director of Research at the International Peace Institute (IPI) with some introductory remarks outlining the agenda of the workshop. This first panel discussed the legal status, origin, and development of SRSGs as agents of the UN’s work in peace and security. Trend data from the Jena database on SRSGs was presented and provided backdrop for discussion and an introduction to the resources, opportunities, and constraints to SRSG leadership.

The opening presentation by Prof. Dr. Manuel Fröhlich, Director of the Jena Research Project, gave a comprehensive overview of the evolution, development, profile, and relevance of SRSGs. Following the Jena SRSG trend database 1946-2011, which is still work in progress and the basis for qualitative studies, Manuel Fröhlich presented a series of findings and insights:

- The database provides data of 558 High-level Appointments (HLAs) consisting of 380 personalities from 102 different countries.
- The number of SRSGs has increased regarding to a global breakdown of active HLAs per year. In particular, the increase of SRSGs in Africa and the increased number of transregional SRSGs working on thematic issues from headquarters (e.g. SRSG for Children in armed conflict) is remarkable.
- A problem poses the deduction of main tasks and responsibilities in the areas of peacemaking, peacebuilding and peacekeeping and the distinction between the titles Special Representative, Special Envoy and Special Adviser.
- A look at the number of HLAs issued by a respective Secretary-General indicates that the strong increase of HLAs started during the tenure of Boutros Boutros-Ghali. Kofi Annan and Ban Ki-moon show by chance the same quota of new appointments during their first tenure.
- SRSGs come from all over the world. The United States of America are on top of the SRSG-contributing countries whereas Africa is the region with the most SRSGs being deployed.
- Regarding the distinction between male and female SRSGs, there is a discernible increase of female SRSGs under Ban Ki-moon. The average age of SRSGs at the time of their appointment is between 55 and 59.
- The highest number of appointments per personality was observed for Lakhdar Brahimi, Álvaro de Soto, Ian Martin and Ralph Bunche.
- Comparing biographical backgrounds of sample SRSGs in 2006 and 2011 (both samples without transregional SRSGs) shows that nearly half of the SRSGs in 2011 had served as Deputy SRSG before. This supports the argument that SRSGs come from a distinct group of people with certain qualifications e.g. like experiences in mediation or careers in academia or in NGOs.

- There are two important points to conclude the relevance of and research on SRSGs.
 - First, there is evidence of a strong correlation with the decline in intra-state conflicts and the increase in SRSg activity.
 - Second, against the backdrop of the study by Doyle and Sambanis (2007) which asserts that structural factors account for 75% of the prediction of success or failure of peacebuilding, the remaining 25% indicate that there is leeway for personality and differences in leadership style.
- Taking into account that personality matters, research not only focusses on individual SRSg leadership but also on deputies and the Mission Leadership Team as a whole.

The second panelist discussed tensions and conflicting expectations regarding the job of a SRSg. He emphasized four areas of conflicting expectations:

- The first area refers to the political role of SRSGs, particularly with regard to conflict and post-conflict situations, where SRSGs are in the center of conflicting political interests on national, regional and international level. SRSGs often find themselves in situations where they are caught between two chairs, between upholding the values of the UN Charter and national interests of member states.
- The second area deals with tensions within the SRSg's political role. On the one hand the SRSg acts as mediator and on the other hand he or she is a public promoter of UN values. Especially in cases where human rights play a decisive role the SRSg faces a dilemma situation. To illustrate this dilemma the panelist gave examples of the SRSg in Côte d'Ivoire at the time of the elections and the Joint Special Envoy in Sudan and his interaction with indicted Sudanese officials.
- The third point reflects the tensions caused by the SRSg's role as international diplomat on the one hand and as manager of a huge budget on the other hand. SRSGs with diplomatic background are often not used to manage these dimensions of resources and assets.
- The fourth area deals with the authority and visibility of the SRSg and the expectations linked to the apparent wealth of assets the mission includes.

Two final points were highlighted: First, with reference to the job profile of SRSGs it was stressed that although holding a great number of power and influence, SRSGs are subject to a lot of visible and invisible constraints. Second, since SRSGs have to possess a lot of qualities, which are difficult to find in a single person, SRSg efforts increasingly become team affairs and the considerations are moving towards building strong senior management teams.

The discussant reflected on the contributions from Prof. Fröhlich and the second panelist from the perspective of an experienced practitioner and identified problems and considerations for research and practice. With regard to the project database he expounded

the problem of summarizing different actors under one acronym “SRSG” which are special or personal representatives, advisers and envoys. Moreover, he recommended to separate these diverse sorts of actors and to look at them and their area of activity more individually in the next steps of research.

Referring to further research work the discussant highlighted the threefold requirements of SRSGs: the political, managerial and communicative requirements, but with special accentuation on the importance of the managerial requirements. Communicative requirements refer to public communication as well as to the engagement with civil society and regional actors. Furthermore he emphasized the importance of team leadership in a peace mission, beside the different responsibilities of the SRSGs.

For practice he pointed out the following issues: First, although there is a tendency to emphasize the political responsibility, for future appointment decisions he underlined the importance of managerial skills and responsibility of a SRSG. Moreover, for the appointment of a candidate, he should be familiar with upholding the values of the UN Charter. Second, with a focus on preventive diplomacy, he questioned the potential need for more Special Envoys mediating under the radar (“chaps kicking around”) in place of high-profile and high-maintenance international diplomats. A third point he put to discussion referred to the role of thematic mandates. The discussant addressed the duplication of mandates (especially human rights mandates) in the field and the need for more effectively bringing together mandates (e.g. Special Rapporteurs and Experts of the Human Rights Council and mandates of organizations like UNICEF and UNHCR).

The ensuing discussion centered around two topics. First of all, participants discussed difficulties for the quantitative analysis and evaluation of SRSGs resulting from established as well as changing routines of high-level appointments in the UN Secretariat and in the office of the Secretary-General. Participants indicated that in the past most Special Envoys were senior officials of the Secretariat, operating very low-key and within the framework of quiet diplomacy. Often not publicly known, it will hardly be possible to count these Envoys and integrate them into the database. It will be similarly challenging to determine the beginning of an appointment, especially for someone who was already working in the Secretariat or when there is no particular announcement. With regard to the Jena database participants also discussed the problem, which derives from the lack of clarity of SRSG nomenclature. This is an obvious issue, since there is no reliable set of rules for the titles or rather for the recruiting and appointment process of Special Representatives, Advisers or Envoys. Given this, participants agreed to shift the emphasis more on to what they are actually doing and to distinguish between SRSGs who lead a mission in the field, who have country-specific or conflict-specific mandates and SRSGs with a thematic mandate. Moreover, it would be interesting to analyze cases where a combination of these actors is present, for example in Cyprus.

The second issue of the discussion centered on the political and legal basis and key requirements and experiences making an individual suitable to act as a SRSG. A participant compared the political and legal basis for the work with a SRSG sitting on a stool with three legs. That would be the juridical legitimacy through the appointment of the Secretary-General, the blessing with concurrence of the Security Council and the consent of the conflict parties. Participants discussed the importance of various skills and requirements such as knowledge of the norms and values of the UN, a capacity for relational leadership, knowledge of the UN System including certain knowledge of procedures, managerial skills and the ability to be independent. Closely linked to these requirements, experiences and skills was the question of recruitment, training and preparation for SRSGs due to the fact that a lot of SRSGs have a particular diplomatic background and little managerial and leadership skills.

Panel II – SRSGs and their Principals

This panel addressed the relationship and interaction of SRSGs with the members of the Security Council, troop-contributing countries, and other key stakeholders from member states. Findings from the IPI database on UN Security Council's Resolutions in Civil War illustrated trends and data of Security Council's demands to parties involved in civil wars and the scope of mandates SRSGs have to implement.

The first panelist presented data from the IPI project on compliance of civil war parties with demands in Security Council Resolutions in the context of civil wars from 1998 to 2006. His presentation „The Role of the Security Council in Civil Wars“ examined the role of the UN Security Council as Principal and focused on two main questions: First, to what extent do civil war parties comply with the demands issued by the Security Council? And second, what explains a variation of the level of compliance with demands?

The Council's Engagement on the topic of civil wars has grown dramatically from one single resolution addressing civil wars in 1989 to 49 resolutions in 1993. In the year 2007 75% of all Security Council resolutions dealt with civil war situations. With regard to Security Council demands, the number markedly increased from 6 demands in 1989 to 285 demands in 1993. Between 1989 and 2006 the Security Council issued over 3,000 all in all.

Answering the first question, the main findings are the following: First, the Council's authority does not seem to have eroded over time. Compliances remain relatively stable with minor fluctuations over the years. Second, the council increasingly began to address issue areas not directly linked to armed conflicts e.g. internal political relations and affections of foreign relations. The demands were categorized into five thematic types, namely military demands, humanitarian demands, governance, external relations, and

cooperation with the United Nations. Surprisingly, humanitarian demands have lower compliance rates than expected and they are even lower than military demands.

What is causing this variation of compliance? As the panelist argued, the strongest and most consistent positive factor associated with compliance was the linkage to monetary mechanisms. For the question traditional vs. multidimensional peacekeeping the project achieved mixed results. Multidimensional peacekeeping had a robust positive correlation with compliance, but the strength depended on what else was included in the model. As traditional peacekeeping operations tend to be deployed in a more difficult conflict setting there was a negative correlation for traditional peacekeeping with compliance. Surprisingly, sanctions were negatively correlated with compliance and threats and positive incentives tended to have a negligible relationship in the aggregate. Another finding along the way was the observation of growing complexity of Security Council resolutions in view of the demands. For SRSGs there is a big role in peace operations to play in view of interpreting what has to be implemented.

The second panelist spoke about findings from several end-of-mission-reports written by SRSGs and their relationship to various principals. As he illustrated, SRSGs have many principals, since they do not fall strictly within the UN Charter (Article 99). They have to deal with a number of other actors in the UN system and beyond: namely the UN Security Council, Security Council members, especially permanent members, countries themselves, neighboring states, and police contributing countries etc. He highlighted the fact that there must be a sense of purpose to an SRSG's mission. The appointment should not be the default position for the principals insofar as the appointment becomes a substitute for policy, which can be an opportunity to buy time while policy is negotiated amongst principals.

The amount of leeway of an SRSG may vary due to the mandate of the Security Council. With regard to SRSGs, their personality and authority the presenter stated that they are more than just mere administrators. It is important that the mandate must not constrain success where it is possible. Success is often constrained because of tensions within the mission resulting from an increasing divide between financial, troop and police contributions. A further aspect raised by the panelist refers to the reporting to and briefing of the Security Council by the SRSG. SRSGs should have the capacity to not only analyze the situation on the ground but also to adjust in accordance with their principal's policy directives. These are very important sources of information from the ground. The information should be strategic to assist the principals in UN headquarters. In addition, the issue was raised whether withdrawal strategies of other partners are influencing the way the SRSG is reporting back on in regard to developments on the ground and the policy options available.

Referring to UN norms and values mentioned before, the panelist agreed that SRSGs have the opportunity to bring the UN Charter to life, all situations specific or thematic tasks should be in harmony with this purpose to keep the legitimacy. Furthermore, he raised the

question of the relationship between SRSs and national Envoys that are at times appointed and may have an influence on the work of the SRS on the ground. In his closing remarks he stated that SRSs can make a difference and are a useful tool for the UN and the international community. Future avenues for research should focus on a more systematic consideration of end-of-mission reports (by the Security Council) and on the debriefing exercise by previous SRSs so that future office-holders can learn and benefit from these experiences.

The first discussant highlighted in his contribution the plurality of principals. Beside the Security Council, the Secretary-General, the troop and police contributing countries, the government, intergovernmental bodies, as well as the Secretariat are relevant and important principals to the SRS. In his considerations he focused on the relationship between the SRS and the Security Council, which is mediated through a mandate. SRS leadership can be exercised through influencing the mandate “upstream” and “downstream”. The mandate has three parts: the political, the technical and the reporting part. With some luck there is the possibility and some leeway to informally discuss the conception of the mandate with Security Council members in order to influence the wording of these parts, as the discussant stated. As an example, he spoke about his experiences as SRS where he had a special meeting with the members of the Security Council in order to understand the meaning of the wording of the mandate and to manage visions and expectations of various members of the Security Council. As the discussant stressed, it is very important to understand the mandate and if possible to influence it “upstream”, if one considers the mandate as bottom and not necessarily as a ceiling.

A second possibility for a SRS to influence the mandate “downstream” is reporting. On the one hand there is the opportunity to prepare the Secretary-General’s report where particularly the observation section is of importance. Another possibility are private or rather informal consultations with the Security Council and with individual council members. The SRSs can convey that the next resolution should not exacerbate past problems.

Moreover, the discussant emphasized that troop and police contributing countries as well as the government of the host country should be involved in the conception and discussion of the respective mandate as they are primarily concerned. Consensual legitimacy, which is a very important basis for the work of the SRS, arises through a good and productive relationship with the host country. He concluded that the main principal of the SRS is the UN Security Council.

The second discussant evaluated the relationship between the SRS and his principals slightly different as his previous speaker. He recognized that the SRS has to deal with many different stakeholders, but as first and foremost the Secretary General remains the principle stakeholder to the SRS. Thus, the relationship between Secretary-General and SRS should be as symbiotic as possible. With regard to the legal basis he underlined the importance of

Article 100 of the UN Charter. As the discussant indicated, the relationship between Secretary-General and the SRSG has evolved over the years. Before the end of the 1980s it was easier to maintain a symbiotic relationship with the Secretary-General but with relative little interaction. Meanwhile, in the early 1990s, the relationship changed under Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali. Boutros-Ghali followed a different type of relationship, since he did not like the Security Council being involved. With the proliferation of Envoys and SRSGs the symbiotic relationship became difficult to handle. Boutros-Ghali's successor Kofi Annan liberalized the interaction between SRSGs and Security Council.

The discussant emphasized the sharp distinction between the interaction of SRSGs or Envoys of the Secretary-General with the Security Council according to their nature of mission. First, in peacemaking missions the task is eminently diplomatic in nature and meetings must be kept confidential. The mandates of the Envoy should be as comprehensive and controlling as possible, because he will need all available tools and all leverage he could get. As the Secretary-General and his envoys are normative mediators, the SRSG must be able to maintain stability during a crisis. The decisions he makes will influence the post-conflict process, as the discussant stressed.

Second, a distinction needs to be made in regard to missions of traditional and multidimensional peacekeeping. A cease-fire or peace agreement leaves many open questions of authority. In this situation it is necessary for every actor to know his/her duties and responsibilities. It can create difficulties if one concentrates all in the hands of the SRSG. This is because there are areas where it is probably better for the SRSG not to be involved directly, for example election monitoring and human rights monitoring.

Finally, he addressed the relationship between the Security Council and the Secretary-General: mastering the Security Council is a test of the Secretary-General as good officer. His ability to keep the Security Council informed of the status of negotiations is an art because he or his SRSG must provide enough information to continue the support of the Security Council but not enough so that they might feel inspired to interfere.

Recurring themes of the ensuing discussion touched upon the question of who is the main principal, the issue of reporting, and the importance of mandate and associated venues of influence.

The question of who is the main principal and who are the most important stakeholders of the SRSG was discussed in detail. One expert categorized the already mentioned change of the relationship between the Secretary-General and the SRSG over the past decades as a change from "old school" in times where the Security Council was blocked to present-day "new school". Another participant raised the question whether today there is a reverse development towards a multilateralization or rather fragmentation of the Good Offices, which is associated with a quantitative increase, but a shrinking qualitative involvement of

the Secretary-General due to the increasing tendency of the Security Council to control the interaction with SRSs and good officers. This trend towards a micro management on part of the Security Council was confirmed by another participant who mentioned that members of the Security Council must ensure a clear unity of command and that they should refrain from so called “christmas tree” resolutions which are too complex and complicate the task of a mission on the ground. The participant recommended a trend back to the original concept of the Security Council as the authoritative body under the charter, which entrusts a mandate to the Secretary-General or to a commander of a coalition of the willing with a clear idea of who is in charge. One should not try to multilateralize the decision-making as it seems to be the case today. Other participants pointed out that the question of the main principle is a question of to whom a SRS is ultimately responsible and referred to the people of the host-countries, who so far received too little attention. Most participants agreed that the main principal is the Secretary-General and emphasized that much of his responsibility is exercised by the political departments DPA and DPKO. The nature of the relationship between the SRS and these political departments is also of importance and deserves a closer study with a view to future research. One participant emphasized that the SRS is neither responsible to the Security Council nor to the P5 or P3.

Participants also discussed the issue of reporting. It was pointed out that reporting could be used effectively by the SRS to make statements that resonate back in the country. This opportunity to keep the international community informed and to report simultaneously in a fair way regarding the countries’ context, creates credibility of the SRS. One participant stated that an important result/take-away of the workshop was the role and importance of end-of-mission reports and argued for doing this in a debriefing format together with the successor of the respective SRS. Another participant drew the attention to the complexity of reporting in the UN. Although, the immediate principal is the Secretary-General, in reality, however, there is a diffuse line of authority and reporting to the Secretary-General implies reporting through the complex UN bureaucracy. Security Council Missions, as one participant discussed, represent a further possibility for Security Council members to gain information and to see what was happening on the ground. The participant suggested that the questions of the strategic use of Security Council Missions deserve a closer look.

Another topic of the discussion was the importance of mandates and associated venues of influence. One participant with field experience stated that with much in-depth knowledge and demand for results in the field, SRSs can influence the contours of future mandates. Furthermore, the participant referred to an actual peace mission and talked about a situation on the ground, in which changes occurred and where it was necessary to clarify the mandate with the Security Council. Later the SRS was asked to draft paragraphs of the resolution which were adopted word-for-word by the Security Council. This influence on future resolutions, as the participant highlighted, helped to improve the relationship with the local government since decision makers became aware of the importance to act in accordance with the UN. It was noted by another participant that there has to be continuing

exchange of ideas and expectations between SRSGs and Security Council members all year round, not just at the moment of mandate setting. One expert with field experience said that mandate setting is one of the key moments of a mission and that there is sometimes the opportunity to significantly influence the mandate. In this process it is an advantage to engage with national stakeholders and local people before. This could lead to a better understanding of their wishes and needs because there is a responsibility to the people. A last question was raised regarding the extent to which the informal interactions and consultations of SRSGs with the Security Council are scripted and whether a free exchange of information is possible at all.

Being a Thematic SRSG

A thematic SRSG was invited to speak about the particular role of thematic SRSGs. Against the backdrop of her considerable field experience and her experience at UN headquarters she reflected on characteristics and challenges of being a thematic SRSG as well as on the added value of thematic mandates.

The SRSG emphasized that thematic mandates are very difficult to mainstream across countries, regions, departments and missions with a huge number of actors from different governments, UN departments, UN agencies and UN legislative bodies being involved. Building a good and trustful relationship and having a strong exchange with the SRSG in the field is very important to ensure that the thematic SRSG will not undermine his work on the ground. At the same time the thematic SRSG has to deliver beyond advocacy and to live up to the high expectations of his constituency, the NGOs, to take a position and sometimes a public role for the thematic issue. The context of work of a thematic SRSG is very complex because of the three legislative bodies – the Human Rights Council, the Security Council and the General Assembly – and also other partners that are part of the monitoring and reporting system. A crucial example of this complex working context is the implementation of an action plan negotiated with and signed by a government. Since it is not the thematic SRSG who implements that plan but rather agencies as UNICEF, the ILO, OHCR or – if there is one – the mission. Therefore, a good relationship between them and the SRSG in the field is important as well as to maintain an atmosphere where they will not work against each other. To a great degree this depends on personality, expertise and experience of the SRSG.

She continued to discuss the question of what is the added value of thematic mandates in terms of peace and security. The added value of thematic mandates is linking the needs of missions in the field with the Security Council and adding all available tools and leverage of the Security Council. In terms of peace and security, the consequences of particular circumstances require people to be involved at a country-specific level. The best way to interest the Council is to focus on country-specific situations and on specific perpetrators to

use the particular methods, e.g. Security Council sanctions and the ICC. Thematic mandates require special personalities because they need to be accepted from the field. Thematic mandates can be influenced by the personality of the SRSR and his background, experience and his knowledge of the UN system. These personalities have to build relationships, manage coordination and share information with the resident coordinator to create space that will allow everyone to achieve and deliver what they need to. Moreover, there is a need to have a good line of communication at the working and leadership level. It is necessary to have someone in the field who has a clear understanding of the mandate and who has access and can communicate freely to the SRSR in order prevent downstream problems with coordination. Finally, the SRSR emphasized that thematic SRSRs are not in competition with a SRSR or those working in the field. The thematic SRSR is a support on the ground in order to advocate on a political level and to address very specific issues of a conflict.

In the following discussion, special attention was drawn to the effect of a proliferation of overlapping mandates in relation to human rights and peace and security. One participant said that in situations where different people are involved, in the end nobody has the exclusive responsibility “to pull the system together”. To avoid this problem, one needs a very well-drafted mandate, strong relationships, the capacity of the thematic SRSR and the right people in the right place who will not fight each other and thereby undermine the system. Thus, thematic missions need strong leadership to use the capacity from different actors, to advance the activity and to ensure that the complex directives are met.

Other participants discussed the importance of the tool “Group of Friends”. They agreed with the SRSR that the tool is very useful in supporting the work of a thematic SRSR. Another participant raised the question of the role of sequencing in the development of the office and the desired end-state of a thematic mandate. The SRSR described the importance of sequencing for her office. Being appointed as the third office-holder she could build up on the work of two predecessors. The first SRSR in office set up the agenda, the second succeeded and put the whole system of that mandate in place. As the third SRSR in line she now has to ensure the implementation of action plans. The end-state and success is to maintain the SRSR’s credibility, to ensure the relevance of the mandate and to add value to all those who are working on other capacities.

Finally, one participant emphasized how important it is for thematic SRSRs to have experienced field-level responsibilities. He continued that SRSRs should not be allowed to neglect charter norms of human rights. They need to ensure strategic orchestration towards field-based activity. The thematic SRSR finally stated that thematic missions are important because they force everyone to stick to principles to guide missions toward a vision that is not always there. SRSR leadership is sometimes needed to help a government to deal with spoilers within it.

Panel III – SRSRs and their Principles

This panel discussed the relevance of the interplay between UN principles, challenges on the ground, and personal convictions and strategic choices of SRSOs in carrying out their mandate. An academic comparison of different SRSOs, their respective conceptions of peace, and the implications for their work was the start of the debate.

The first panelist presented first findings from her study on “SRSO’s different conception of peace”. According to her assumption SRSOs are expected to have different conceptions of peace due to their different nationalities, backgrounds and experiences. Since they have a strong influence on the Security Council’s decision-making it is important to decipher their conception of peace. The study analyses six SRSOs and their conception of peace in order to answer two main questions: The first question is whether it is possible to uncover different conceptions of peace among SRSOs. The second question asks how much of these personal conceptions differ from that of the Security Council on Security Council’s mandates. The conception of peace has two dimensions. The first dimension is a set of causal beliefs for which the SRSO understands conflict. The second dimension is a set of principle beliefs and norms on which the SRSO relies to act upon the conflicts. Methodologically she used track lexical markers. These are words, which are a revealing causal and principle beliefs that can be found in the observation section of the SRSO’s report to the Security Council. She counted how many times these lexical markers occurred in the reports, how they were associated and how they appeared jointly with other lexical markers. The lexical markers belong to various semantic fields focused on security stability, rule of law, socio-economic development and reconstruction, preventive diplomacy, peacemaking/conflict-resolution, peacekeeping and peacebuilding, durability of peace and local ownership. Lexical markers were analyzed for three cases, which means three SRSOs and two conflicts for each SRSO, namely Lakhdar Brahimi in Haiti and Afghanistan, Jean Arnault in Afghanistan and Georgia and François Lonseny Fall in Somalia and in the Central African Republic. As an example she compared Brahimi and Arnault who both served in Afghanistan. While the lexical markers of Security Council mandates remained almost the same across the two cases, the SRSO’s use of lexical markers differed. This observation can be explained by the varying interest of SRSOs in different themes. For example Brahimi paid much more attention to security issues than Jean Arnault whose attention is focused on social fabric and sub-national units. She concluded that different SRSOs have varying conceptions of peace. This means that SRSOs pay special attention to different themes and have different interests. These differences can be measured by means of word clouds.

The second presenter discussed in his contribution the sort of situation and scenario where SRSOs are present. He focused on questions such as what the nature of expectations of an individual is and the kind of role and what kind of individuals suits a particular kind of role. To give an overview he talked about three aspects related to SRSOs who have served in the field. The first aspect dealt with the nature of the states where SRSOs are operating. Most of

these states suffer from civil wars and are states in formation, for example East Timor and South Sudan. The SRSBs must balance their international and national responsibilities, as they sometimes become the de facto state administrator of a collapsed state. With view to values in that particular kind of situation the question of the goal to set up a democracy was put to discussion as nowhere in the Charter it is written that the UN is comprised of democratic states.

Secondly, the presenter illustrated the aspect of geopolitics. He stressed that broader regions play a strong role, as security- and other challenges come from beyond the border of that state. As examples he referred to Afghanistan and Rwanda. Any solution of a particular conflict has to include security elements from beyond the border of a given state. The panelist pointed out the role of hegemon and explained that almost every region in the world has a hegemon and that they become a spoiler in the conflict. Therefore, the hegemon needs to be managed and addressed in most conflicts. He continued to elaborate on the role of regional organizations. The support of regional organizations in conflicts will always be a question of their own capacity and willingness to step up.

The third aspect of the talk referred to the operationalization of the mandate. Following his explanations, missions need flexibility to change plans rapidly and to reflect fast moving political dynamics. The respective mandate of a mission should be extremely narrow to be achievable, because the broader the mandate, the greater the chance of failure. And finally, the mission should be deployed with robust planning and should engage in dialogue with domestic political actors.

Concluding his presentation he put up a few questions regarding the profile of SRSBs for discussion, such as: What kind of SRSBs is needed? Should SRSBs be from the P5, established powers, large donors, regional hegemon, or emerging powers? What kind of backgrounds, talents, and expertise should they have?

The first discussant of the last panel shared his experiences from the field and from UN headquarters. At first, the discussant described the difficulty from a headquarters' perspective to find the right SRSB as one of the most difficult tasks. This is because one cannot compare SRSBs in peacekeeping operations with national diplomatic service. Finding the right person and profile is also a question of timing and depends on specific moments during the mission. Different phases of a mission – for example the start-up, the time when the mission is steady, or when it comes to downsizing or transitioning – require different tasks (e.g. stabilizing the countries or monitoring elections) and therefore different profiles of SRSBs. Drawing on his own experiences he illustrated these different kinds of phases and tasks in a mission. At the beginning of his deployment main issues were criminal violence and security issues which changed later, after a natural catastrophe, to mainly humanitarian aid, reconstruction, support and coordination with the international community. Later, after the humanitarian situation was stable the main task turned toward supporting the electoral process.

The discussant continued to highlight a few points which are important for the SRSB and his mission. The people who are supporting SRSBs are essential to the mission's success. These

are not only diplomats and military actors, but also people from the UN and from the private sector who are interested in keeping the UN as a stability factor in the country. To be successful, the SRSR must be political-savvy, media-savvy and needs an excellent leadership team including the DSRSRs, the chief of staff etc. who have great knowledge of the UN system. Another important issue is the leverage of a SRSR. Only the SRSR knows how much pressure or leverage he or she can use in different circumstances. Political instinct and diplomatic skills are essential for the success of the SRSR. A crucial task beyond that is to identify the hegemon in a particular conflict and to understand the agendas of member states since the SRSR's mandate may be politically correct, but not necessarily what member states truly want to happen on the ground. From headquarter's perspective he explained the difficulties of the selection process. Difficulty arises when the person with the best profile for a specific moment, for a specific mission is identified, but the Secretary-General refuses to appoint that person since his/her nationality is already overrepresented in the UN system. Beside the question of nationality, it is very important to check the background of the SRSR in the recruitment process. The SRSR needs to be a team builder, he needs to have leadership skills and he must be able to mobilize partners and resources. His last points referred to the importance of induction before being deployed as SRSR to the mission and to the importance of a good relationship not only with headquarters but also with many other different actors, namely the Security Council, the General Assembly, the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C34), the 5th Committee, and the troop and police contributing countries.

The ensuing discussion mainly reflected on the SRSR selection process, the SRSRs and their principles, the influence of regional hegemons, emerging powers and regional organizations and finally on the question of neutrality and impartiality.

Questions were raised regarding the transparency and the dynamics behind the selection process. Participants discussed the need of transparency during the selection process including the engagement of member states in that question vice versa the Secretary-General's prerogative to search for the right person. Participants finally agreed on the latter approach. One expert on that question described the process and important criteria for the selection of SRSRs. The search process starts with questions like: What do you want the individual to do? What is the mandate of the mission? How is the situation on the ground? Who are the regional players and sub-regional players? Who are the main actors? Is there a group of friends? Which are the member states that are going to be pressurizing for their candidate? This participant continued to emphasize the importance of terms of references, which articulate the needs and standards of selection and are used as a standard tool to reach out for the best SRSRs. He highlighted as well the great importance of leadership teams. It is crucial to add to the importance of the good offices role or political function of the SRSR a DSRR who adds for example managerial skills to the mix. He also drew attention to the need for better training and mentioned the senior mission leadership course. Participants also discussed the problem that a lot of heads of government from Africa and the Latin America Group often ask for mission leaders from their region. Although the

question of language, meaning that the SRSG should be able to master the local language, cannot be underestimated; SRSGs should be selected as far from the conflict as possible. Regarding the topic of principles and SRSGs one participant put the question of how SRSGs balance their own principles with those of the UN up for discussion. Other participants highlighted that sometimes it has been extremely helpful for SRSGs to receive some guidance or policy decision on principles from above when they had to deal with member states, heads of states or host countries. The discussion drew also attention to the dilemma of SRSGs who want a “good relationship” with the host country and who may run into the problem of not reporting the truth for example on human rights violations in order to maintain this good relationship. Moreover, participants discussed the question relating to the difference between “regional hegemons” and “emerging powers”. Emerging powers may often be regional hegemons, but not all regional hegemons are emerging powers. India was cited as an example that was a regional hegemon in the seventies. Today it is considered as emerging power because it has the ability to try to influence events but it does not reach this impact beyond its region. The discussion finally returned to the issue of values and principles and reflected on the issue of neutrality and impartiality. One participant stressed that the UN has nothing to do with neutrality because it is a very value-based organization. Another participant referred to Dag Hammarskjöld who said it was important to differentiate neutrality versus impartiality. This understanding is necessary for all civil servants. There is no need to be neutral on morality, but in fulfilling duties, servants must be impartial.