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Understanding Compliance

with Security Council Demands:

Coding Methodology and Notes

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# Introduction

The Security Council Compliance project is a multi-year research project undertaken by the International Peace Institute (IPI). The project aims to improve our understanding of the role of the UN Security Council in the area of work where it has been most active since the end of the Cold War: resolving civil wars. The project involves a quantitative and qualitative review of compliance with all Security Council Resolutions passed between 1989 and 2003 in the context of civil wars. It combines a statistical analysis of compliance with more than 1,500 specific demands by the Security Council with detailed case studies. We hope to provide evidence-based answers to the question about the extent to which civil war parties comply with the broad range of demands issued by the Security Council, and whether the variance in the level of compliance can be explained by conflict settings, conflict management strategies and political dynamics in the Council.

The qualitative strand of this research project will primarily consist of case studies written by noted academics with a strong expertise on the United Nations’ conflict management efforts in specific civil wars. These case studies will focus on a sample of civil wars in which the Security Council undertook peacemaking, peacekeeping, or peace building initiatives. Each of these case studies will provide a narrative explaining the pattern and dynamics of compliance and non-compliance. They will provide historical detail and further depth to the analysis of the hypothesized relationship between compliance, the conflict setting, and the Security Council’s commitment and conflict management strategy.

The quantitative research is conducted using various regression analyses. It draws on the IPI Security Council Compliance Database, which is comprised of all operative clauses in Security Council Resolutions that specified a demand related to civil wars. It lists the demands, their addressees and values for more than 50 variables relating to:

* Characteristics of the civil war addressed by the demand;
* United Nations activities in response to the civil war;
* Circumstances of the drafting and adoption of the Resolution issuing the demand;
* Substance of the Resolution and of the demand;
* Characteristics of the demand addressees; and
* Follow-up, monitoring and enforcement mechanisms.

The temporal scope of the database, and of the quantitative study, covers the first fifteen years after the Cold War (1989-2003). During this period, the Security Council adopted 367 Resolutions that contained 1,531 specific demands to warring factions in 25 civil wars. This project uses the following definition of the term civil war: A civil war consists in one or several simultaneous incompatibilities that concern government and/or territory in a state, and that are causally linked to the use of armed force, resulting in at least 500 battle-related deaths during a given year during the conflict, and that involve two or more parties, of which the primary warring parties are the government of the state where armed force is used, and one or several non-state opposition organizations. This definition is inspired by the terminology used by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program’s.[[1]](#footnote-1)

The core of our analysis is the concept of compliance. In short, compliance can be defined as the state of conformity between an actor’s conduct and the conduct demanded by the Security Council within the timeframe when compliance was expected to occur. Related to compliance is the depth of the demand. Whether a demand requires a significant and risky deviation from the addressees’ previous behavior will play an important role in the demand addressee’s calculus of the expected utility of compliance and non-compliance. It can be expected to have a significant impact on the likelihood of compliance.

This is the first study that systematically examines compliance with UN Security Council Resolutions dealing with armed conflict. In addition to involving significant methodological innovations, this research project addresses a topic that touches on numerous political sensitivities. For those reasons we have adopted a research methodology that is transparent, robust and comprehensible. By relying on experts to code compliance, having them document the sources that form the basis of their assessment, and employing a detailed common methodology for all expert coders, we aim to maximize the utility of our data and the reliability of our analysis.

# Summary of Methodology

The IPI Security Council Compliance Database lists all addressees of all demands in Security Council Resolutions adopted in the context of civil wars between 1989 and 2003. However, you will only be asked to evaluate compliance with those demands that address civil war parties.

We compiled this list of all demands to civil war parties on the basis of the following definition of the term civil war party: Civil war parties are the government of the state on whose territory force is used, non-state opposition organizations or other states who use armed force to promote their position in the incompatibilities in which the civil war consists. Non-state organizations are non-governmental groups of people, who have announced a name for their group, use armed force and have at least very rudimentary forms of organization. Incompatibilities are the stated (in writing or verbally) generally incompatible positions of the civil war parties on the political system, the replacement of the central government or the change of its composition, or the status of a specified territory.

This research project analyzes compliance with Security Council demands issued during ongoing civil wars or addressing the post-conflict phase of peace processes after internal conflict. You is asked to code compliance with demands addressing the following: a) states or non-state opposition groups that were a warring faction at any point during the civil war, i.e. those who used force to promote their positions in the incompatibilities in which the civil war consisted; and b) very occasionally, political parties resulting from a transformation of civil war parties.

Many operative paragraphs in Resolutions name specific addressees of demands. Others refer to the characteristics of the addressees to identify them (e.g., “all warring factions”, “all signatories of the peace agreement”). IPI will provide you with a tentative list of civil war parties addressed by all demands you are asked to code.

Over time, state and non-state actors may become, or cease to be, civil war parties. The government of the state on whose territory force is used is considered a civil war party during the entire conflict, and demands to it always constitute demands to a civil war party.

Changes in the leadership of a government or rebel group engaged in a civil war do not affect its status as addressee of a Security Council demand. If a rebel group changes its name, or if it merges with another group within the timeframe during which compliance is assessed, the group resulting from these changes will remain an addressee of any demands that were previously issued to the group.

## A. Demands sorted by operative paragraph

**1.** In recent years, Security Council Resolutions have become very detailed, complex and increasingly lengthy documents. This study does not assess overall compliance with an entire Resolution, but with each of its operative paragraphs that contains an exhortation. Those unfamiliar with the Security Council’s drafting techniques should note that operative paragraphs (OP) are the numbered paragraphs of Resolutions that start with an operative verb in present tense (e.g., “calls on”, “reminds […] of”). In order to maximize the precision of the study, all operative clauses of Security Council Resolutions formulating a demand to one or several states or non-state actors is analyzed separately. Therefore, the study does not assess overall compliance with a Resolution, but with each of the demands made in its operative paragraphs. This study defines the term “demand” as a paragraph of a Resolution that contains an exhortation to one or several identified or identifiable addressees.

**2.** Demands in preambular paragraphs, which constitute the first part of a Resolution and start with a verb in gerund (e.g., “considering”), are not taken into account. Preambles do not impose demands per se, but they may be informative to a contextual reading of a demand. Likewise factual or interpretative statements in Security Council Resolutions (e.g. “the Security Council appreciates/ condemns/ recognizes the importance of”) do not qualify as demands.

**3.** Some operative paragraphs contain two or more substantively distinct sub-demands. Separate sub-demands in a single demand request different courses of action, and they are separated from each other by the words “and” or “as well as”. If a demand requests a course of action, and specifies that this course of action “include” another more specific behavior, the more specific exhortation does not constitute a separate sub-demand. The Security Council’s choice to group sub-demands together in one operative paragraph is presumed to be meaningful. A disaggregation of operative paragraphs or paragraphs risks breaking links between different prescriptive aspects of the Resolution that the Council has chosen to link in specific ways. Therefore, compliance with each sub-demand contained in a single operative paragraph or paragraph is not assessed separately.

* E.g. an operative paragraph of a Resolution that "requests the parties to cease all hostilities, to conduct negotiations and to report to the SC on the progress in the peaceful resolution of the conflict" constitutes only one demand.

3.1. One exception to this rule applies when the sub-demands contained in a single operative paragraph or paragraphs are listed as separate subparagraphs. In this case, they are entered into the database as separate demands.

* E.g. an operative paragraph of a Resolution “requests the parties to:

1. Cease all hostilities,
2. Refrain from assisting and encouraging the entry into Palestine of armed bands and fighting personnel,
3. Refrain from importing or acquiring or assisting or encouraging the importation or acquisition of weapons and war materials”

This operative paragraph is counted as three different demands, all of them having the same operative paragraph number.

3.2. The second exception to this rule applies to operative paragraphs or paragraphs that contain two or more different sub-demands directed at different addressees. In this case, the sub-demands are counted as two or more different demands.

* E.g. an operative paragraph of a Resolution “requests the United Kingdom to take all steps to end the violence in Palestine, and urges all states to support the United Kingdom in doing so.”

This operative paragraph is counted as two different demands, both of them having the same operative paragraph number.

**4.** If the same prescription of behavior is made repeatedly in separate Resolutions, every such statement of the prescription is viewed as a separate demand.

4.1. *Explicit references* to demands made in previous Resolutions qualify as demands when they include an exhortation. This exhortation may repeat the demand issued in the prior Resolution, or it may call on the parties to comply with a prior demand without describing the requested conduct. As opposed to explicit references, *general references* to previous Resolutions do not qualify as demands. General references merely confirm or recall prior Resolutions s, or demands contained therein, without issuing an exhortation.

* E.g. the clause “reaffirming its call for strict respect of the territorial integrity of…” is an explicit reference repeating the description of the requested conduct. It constitutes a demand.
* E.g. the clause “calls on the parties to implement without further delay Resolutions 802 and 808” is an explicit reference omitting the description of the requested conduct. It also qualifies as a demand.
* E.g. the clause “reaffirms all the provisions of its Resolutions 802 and 808” does not contain any exhortation. It constitutes a general reference, and it does not qualify as a demand.

**5.** The line between a demand and a factual statement or interpretative statement and a condemnation by the Council is sometimes hard to draw. This study only records demands issued by the Council, and ignores factual or interpretative statements as well as condemnations.

5.1. A demand always comprises a direct or indirect exhortation and an identified or identifiable addressee.

* E.g. op. para. 7 of SC Res. 668 (1990): “urges all parties to the conflict to exercise maximum self-restraint”

Indirect exhortations specify the *responsibility* of an actor to pursue or refrain from a course of action, or the *need* for the actor to pursue or refrain from a course of action.

* E.g. op. para. 15 of SC Res. 1494 (2003): “recalls that the Abkhaz side bears a particular responsibility to protect the returnees and to facilitate the return of the remaining displaced population”
* E.g. op. para. 5 of SC Res. 840 (1993): “emphasizes the *necessity* to complete this work [drawing up a new constitution] and to establish a new government for all Cambodia as soon as possible”

5.2. Factual and interpretative statements contain an account of the Council’s view on a factual, legal or political question. Clauses that attribute a particular value to a certain course of action, e.g. by qualifying them as *important*, are factual and interpretative statements.

* E.g. op. para. 5 of SC Res. 1457 (2003): “Stresses that the completion of the withdrawal of all foreign troops […] as well as the early establishment of an all-inclusive transitional government in the country […] are important steps towards ending the plundering of the natural resources of the Democratic Republic of the Congo”
* E.g. op. para. 7 of SC Res. 1494 (2003): “Underlines further that the process of negotiation leading to a lasting political settlement acceptable to both sides will require concessions from both sides”
* E.g. op. para. 2 of SC Res. 860 (1993): “stresses the importance of completing this [drawing up and approving a constitution] in accordance with the Paris Agreements”

## B. Each addressee’s data recorded separately

**6.** As each addressee’s compliance with the Security Council’s demands is assessed separately, the main unit of observation of the dataset is the demand per addressee. If a demand addresses two or more state or non-state actors, the behavior of each addressee constitutes a relevant observation, so the data point for each addressee is entered into the database in a separate line.

6.1. The only exception to this rule applies to universal demands, i.e. demands addressing “all states” or “the international community” or those using a similar formulation. Universal demands constitute only one observation although they may have as many as 192 addressees.

**7.** This research project analyzes the performance of states and non-state actors who become addressees of Security Council demands. Demands of the Council that address its own subsidiary organs, organs of the United Nations or departments, funds and agencies in the United Nations system are excluded from the scope of the study.

* E.g. demands to the UN Secretary-General, the UN Committee of Good Offices in Indonesia (a terminated subsidiary organ of the Security Council), OCHA, UNDP, the World Bank, IMF, IAEA or its Director General will not be recorded.

7.1. If a demand addresses the highest representatives of a state (such as its president); the state itself is the addressee of the demand.

## C. Thematic scope of study

**8.** Only demands made in the context of civil wars are included in the scope of the study. Lists of the intrastate armed conflicts that fall in the scope of this study can be found in the “Resolutions per conflict Uppsala extended” Excel tab and in the “Agenda and Timeline” document. The final list is still being finally being determined.

8.1. Demands made in the context of interstate armed conflicts, and those addressing a situation that does not amount to an armed conflict, are excluded from the study.

8.2. Demands in thematic resolutions that lack any geographical focus are excluded from the scope of the study.

## D. Demands to multiple addressee

**9.** When a demand has multiple addressees (e.g., “all conflict parties”) you should evaluate compliance by all of them with a single level of compliance score, which they will all share. What is being evaluated is compliance with the demand, not compliance by each addressee with the demand. Of course, different addressees may comply to different extents, or with different degrees of rapidity, to a demand addressed to them. Below, in Part II Section J, we set out how you should formulate one single common score for compliance with that demand where multiple addressees are addressed.

## E. Demands repeating demands issued in prior Resolution

**10.** If the same exhortation is issued repeatedly by the Security Council in separate Resolutions, every such statement of the demand is viewed as a separate demand. In other words, each demand, regardless of whether it repeats demands in other Resolutions, is viewed as a discreet demand. The IPI Security Council Compliance Database includes two dummy variables that capture full and partial repetitions of prior demands.

• E.g., OP 13 of SC Res. 1001 (1995), OP 13 of SC Res. 1014 (1995) and OP 14 of SC Res. 1020 (1995) all “demand that all factions in Liberia strictly respect the status of ECOMOG and UNOMIL personnel, as well as organizations and agencies delivering humanitarian assistance throughout Liberia, and that these factions facilitate such deliveries and that they strictly abide by applicable rules of international humanitarian law”. Each repetition of this demand is viewed as a separate demand. Also note that each constitutes a single demand, although it contains numerous sub-demands (see Section D above).

## F. Demands addressing multiple civil wars

**11.** During the first fifteen years after the Cold War, the Security Council almost always adopted separate Resolutions on each of the civil wars on its active agenda. In three exceptional cases, the Security Council issued a small number of demands pertaining to two or more conflicts at once: in Central America, in the former Yugoslavia, and with regard to the International Criminal Tribunals in Rwanda and Yugoslavia. These demands are multi-counted, once for each civil war they addressed, and compliance in each of these civil wars is evaluated separately.

• E.g., OP 3 of UNSC Res. 637 (1989) calls on the governments which signed the Guatemala City agreement on “Procedures for the establishment of a firm and lasting peace in Central America” of 7 August 1987 (S/19085) to “continue their efforts to achieve a firm and lasting peace in Central America through the implementation of the commitments in the Guatemala agreement as well as in the Joint Declaration of 14 February 1989.” This demand pertains to the resolution of the civil wars in El Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua. Compliance with this demand is assessed separately in the context of each of these three civil wars.

The list of demands provided to you by IPI will specify to which civil war(s) each demand refers.

# Compliance Coding Methodology

## A. Definition of compliance

The term compliance refers to all conduct (acts and omissions) by actors that conform to the requirements of behavioral prescriptions addressed to them. Conversely, noncompliance (or violation) is conduct that fails to conform to such requirements.[[2]](#footnote-2)

The concept of compliance only deals with the degree of conformity between a norm and the norm addressee’s conduct. It is agnostic as to the reasons why this conformity does or does not occur.[[3]](#footnote-3)

The concept of compliance is distinct from the concepts of impact and effectiveness. The assessment of the effectiveness of a Security Council Resolution is not merely a function of compliance, but it also depends on a normative assessment of the appropriateness of the response by the Security Council to the civil war situation it aimed to address. Measuring the impact of a Security Council Resolution would also involve answering the question as to whether, and to what extent, the Resolution caused civil war parties to engage in the conduct they undertook. Both questions go beyond the narrowly defined research question of this quantitative analysis.

## B. The scale for level of compliance

Compliance with most types of norms cannot be conceptualized in binary terms. It is hardly ever a black-or-white issue: compliance may change over time, some demand addressees may comply while others do not, and any demand addressee may comply with parts of complex demand while ignoring others. We use a four-point scale for the assessment of the level of compliance by civil war parties with demands issued to them by the Security Council. This coding scale does not allow the use of half-scores or fractional scores. A single compliance score captures compliance by all addressees with a single demand.

Each point on the level of compliance scale is assessed by reference to either the incidents covered by the demand, or, where the demand involved multiple sub-demands, by reference to the aspects of the demand. By incident we mean events triggered by the demand addressees that fall within the substantive scope of the demand and that occurred within the time frame for assessing compliance. By aspect we mean sub-demands entailed within one demand.

1. No or marginal compliance:
   * No compliance with the demand in all or almost all incidents covered by the demand; or
   * Compliance with no or almost no aspects of the demand of any significance to the achievement of the overall objectives of the demand.
2. Medium low compliance:
   * Compliance in a minority of incidents covered by the demand; or
   * Compliance only with those aspects of the demand that were of a relatively low significance to the achievement of the objectives of the demand.
3. Medium high compliance:
   * Compliance with a majority of incidents covered by the demand; or
   * Compliance with those aspects of the demand that were of relatively high significance to the achievement of the objectives of the demand.
4. Full or almost full compliance:
   * Compliance with all or almost all incidents covered by the demand; or
   * Compliance with all or almost all aspects of the demand significant for the achievement of the objectives of the demand

## C. Interpreting Security Council demands

Whether the conduct performed by the addressees of a Security Council demand is in compliance with the demand or not depends on the interpretation of the demand. This interpretation can be based on the rules for the interpretation of international treaties, which can be applied, by analogy, to Security Council Resolutions.[[4]](#footnote-4)

The starting point for the interpretation of demands in Security Council Resolutions should be the natural and ordinary meaning of the terms used by the Security Council.

If the wording of a demand is obscure or ambiguous, it is be interpreted in the light of its object and purpose, which can be derived from the Resolution as a whole, including its preamble. When determining compliance, the following questions presented a point of departure:

* What was the objective of the Security Council in issuing the demand at the time of the adoption of the demand?
* What outcome did the Security Council seek to attain by issuing the demand?
* What outcome did it expect to occur in case of full compliance by all parties?

In exceptional cases, if the meaning of the demand could not be derived from the Resolution issuing the demand, the meaning of the demand was derived from any available records analogous to travaux préparatoires of the Resolution, or from the Security Council’s practice after the adoption of the Resolution. The travaux préparatoires include the records of the meeting at which the Resolution was adopted, and at which the proponents of the Resolution explained their intentions. The record for all Security Council meetings is available on the United Nations website. The Security Council’s practice after the adoption of the Resolution includes Resolutions, Presidential Statements, and other Security Council documents which are available on its website. Extreme care was taken when referring to the Security Council’s practice after the adoption of the Resolution as an auxiliary means for the interpretation of an earlier demand, since the subsequent acts of the Security Council may reflect changes in its intentions and objectives that occurred after it adopted this demand. Primary determination was made through examining the Security Council’s intention at the time when it issued the demand. While Reports from the Secretary-General to the Security Council preceding the adoption of the Resolution do not constitute travaux préparatoires they helped to clarify the rationale for Security Council demands that were adopted in response to such reports.

When interpreting a Security Council demand, their hortatory or mandatory nature (i.e., “invites” or “demands”) was not taken into account. Instead, determination was based only on the conformity between the requested conduct and the conduct performed by the demand addressees. The independent variables capture the differences between hortatory and mandatory demands. For example, a demand may “encourage all civil war parties to implement the peace agreement without further delays”, or it may “decide that the parties shall implement the peace agreement without further delays”. This difference in the normative strength of the demand does not have any impact on the assessment of compliance by the civil war parties.

## D. Demands for results and demands for continuous behavior

In general, we distinguish two kinds of Security Council demands. Some demands ask for a result, while others only specify the behavior the demand addressee is supposed to adopt. This distinction has important implications for the assessment of compliance.

Often, a demand can be formulated as a demand for a result or as a demand for certain behavior, with vastly divergent outcomes. For instance, a Resolution can “demand that the decisions taken in the framework of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue are implemented”, thus clearly requesting a result. The only way for the civil war parties to comply with the demand is to implement the decisions taken in the framework of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue. However, the Security Council could also formulate the demand as a demand for certain behavior, requesting that the civil war parties “work toward the implementation of the decisions taken in the framework of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue.” In this case, the demand addressees can satisfy the demand by merely making serious and honest efforts to implement the decisions, irrespective of whether they are actually implemented or not.

## E. Criteria for assessing compliance

In assessing the level of compliance with a specific demand considered the following criteria: completeness, timeliness, continuity and universality of compliance.

*Completeness of compliance*: The completeness of compliance refers to the extent to which the conduct of the civil war parties conforms to the requirements of the Security Council demand addressed to them. For example, the Security Council issues a demand to a foreign state intervening in the civil war to immediately withdraw its troops from all occupied territory. The state withdraws from two thirds of the occupied territory, including all major occupied cities. Pending an assessment of the timeliness and continuity of this conduct we conclude that the completeness of compliance was medium high (3).

*Timeliness of compliance*: The timeliness of compliance refers to the question whether compliance occurred at the time when a demand addressee was expected to undertake certain conduct, or whether it was delayed. Delays in compliance have a negative impact on the level of compliance score. Please refer to Section F below for further details.

*Continuity of compliance*: This criterion refers to the question whether the demand addressee discontinued compliance at any point during the period when compliance is recorded. Please refer to Section G below for further details.

*Universality of compliance*: This criterion was considered only when a single demand addresses multiple civil war parties. It refers to the question whether all – or only some – demand addressees complied with the demand. Please refer to Section J below for more detailed rules on how to account for differences in the level of compliance displayed by multiple civil war parties addressed by a single demand.

## F. Timeliness of compliance

Security Council Resolutions issuing demands often do not specify when the Security Council expects the demand addressee to undertake the requested conduct. Occasionally, specific deadlines are set, in particular with regard to demands for a cease-fire (e.g., “cease fire tomorrow at 12:00 CET”). In other cases, the Security Council demands that a civil war party “immediately” adopts a course of conduct. When the Security Council attaches a deadline to its demand, or when it demands that a conduct be undertaken immediately, it signals a particularly strong concern for timely compliance with the demand. In these cases, a particular weight to delays in the demand addressee’s compliance is attached.

When the Security Council does not specify when the demand addressee has to undertake the requested conduct we can assume that the Council wants the action or omission to occur “without undue delay, that is to say, as soon as reasonably practicable, in the light of individual circumstances”.[[5]](#footnote-5) The earliest possible moment for compliance can only be determined by reference to the characteristics of the demand, the circumstances of the situation and those of the demand addressee. Undoubtedly, the demand “to publicly dissociate yourselves from militant rhetoric” can be fulfilled faster than the demand “to revitalize the peace process”. The evaluation of the demand addressee(s)’ compliance is made on the basis of the assessment when a duly diligent addressee could have been expected to display the requested conduct – as soon as reasonably practicable.

It is impossible to indicate in general terms which lapse of time constitutes a slight or big delay. If a Resolution demands “the immediate cessation of hostilities” the continuation of hostilities for a few more days could already constitute a major delay. In contrast, compliance with a demand calling for the organization of a referendum may not occur within several months without being considered belated.

The degree to which belated compliance impacts on the level of compliance score depends on how much time elapsed before compliance occurred and on the extent to which incomplete compliance made it impossible to reach the outcome sought by the Security Council. The extent to which the delay rendered it impossible for the Security Council to reach the outcome sought by the demand is analyzed.

For example, the rationale of a given demand for an immediate cease-fire is, first, to stop ongoing fighting and, second, to prevent future outbreaks of belligerent violence. After the demand was issued, the addressees continued large-scale military operations and fighting for six weeks. Subsequently they ceased fire and did not resume fighting. Even though the period of non-compliance was very short as compared to the years of subsequent compliance the initial non-compliance made it impossible to reach the first outcome sought by the Security Council, an immediate end to hostilities. On the other hand, the addressee’s conduct did not impair the second part of the objective of the Security Council, which is to prevent future outbreaks of belligerent violence. Depending on the assessment of the relative importance of both sub-demands, which may vary from case to case, the level of compliance should be assessed with a relatively low score (2).

In the same vein, phased compliance (i.e., partial compliance at first, then full compliance) impacts on the assessment of the level of compliance. The compliance score depends on the extent to which phased compliance made it impossible to reach the outcome sought by the Security Council by issuing the demand.

For instance, a Security Council Resolution demands a rebel group to withdraw its forces from two cities. The demand neither specifies a timeline nor extreme urgency (e.g., by demanding an ‘immediate withdrawal’). Within days, the militia withdraws from the bigger and strategically more important town. It then takes six weeks to withdraw from the second town. Depending on the circumstances of the case, the rebel group could have been expected to complete the entire withdrawal within one or two weeks. Please note that, all else being equal, the military withdrawal from an area can be expected to take longer than the cessation of ongoing fighting, given the logistic challenges even a duly diligent demand addressee will have to confront. The rebel group’s withdrawal from the second town occurred after an undue delay. Given the withdrawal from the bigger and strategically more important town occurred in a timely manner, the level of compliance should be assessed with a relatively high score (3).

## G. Continuity of compliance

If a demand addressee generally complies with a demand, but seriously disrespects it for a limited period of time, such temporary non-compliance can greatly impair the general outcome sought by the Security Council in issuing the demand. Therefore, qualified temporary non-compliance has a negative impact on the level of compliance score. Temporary partial non-compliance impacts less on the level of compliance score than temporary non-compliance.

For example, a demand calls on civil war parties to cease fire. All warring factions complied with the demand within few days, i.e. without undue delay. After five months, one of them launched a large one-month military operation in contravention of the cease-fire demand. The cease-fire is restored a month later. The rationale of the cease-fire demand was to end fighting and to maintain an absence of belligerent violence thereafter. The one-month military intervention did not frustrate the former objective of the Security Council’s. However, it seriously impaired the second one. In the absence of indications of the contrary, we can also assume that by issuing a cease-fire demand at a given point in time, the Security Council aimed to terminate hostilities along the frontlines where they existed when the demand was issued. If the one-month military operation led to significant territorial gains and losses this objective of the Security Council was also frustrated. Thus, the level of compliance with this demand should be assessed at a relatively low score (1-2).

## H. Time frames for assessing compliance

Two separate assessments of the level of compliance were conducted: ‘short-term compliance’ and ‘medium-term compliance’. The two variables differ in their cut-off points after which the addressee(s)’ behavior will not have an impact on the assessment of compliance any more.

In assessing ‘short-term compliance’ only the conduct of the demand addressee(s) that occurred within six months after the date of adoption of the Resolution issuing the demand is taken into account.

In assessing ‘medium-term compliance’ only the conduct displayed by the demand addressee(s) within two years after the date of adoption of the Resolution in which the demand figured is considered.

Demands by the Security Council cannot be considered obsolete after a certain period of time. However, the passage of time is the enemy of inference. It creates the equivalent of noise, i.e. a growing number of motives for civil war parties to undertake a conduct demanded by the Security Council irrespective of the Council’s demand.[[6]](#footnote-6) Hypothesized correlations between compliance, the civil war setting, the Security Council’s commitment and its conflict resolution strategy would become spurious if extremely belated compliance or non-compliance were taken into account.

Compliance during the six-months and two-year periods is not an average measure. Rather the level of compliance is discounted when compliance occurs after an undue delay, i.e. not as soon as reasonably practicable. Please refer to Section F above on how to account for belated compliance. The cut-off points merely signify that any conduct by the addressee(s) that occurs thereafter are not taken into account in assessing compliance all parties comply with a demand to cease fire three weeks after the adoption of the Resolution issuing the demand. Thereafter, full compliance is maintained until new fighting breaks out after seven years. A three week delay in ceasing hostilities constitutes an undue delay since duly diligent addressees of a cease-fire demand can be reasonably expected to cease fire within several days under most circumstances. Given the civil war parties did not comply with the demand as soon as reasonably practicable the level of their short-term and medium-term compliance should be assessed at a medium high level (3) despite the fact that they were in compliance with the demand during most of the timeframe for evaluating compliance. The fact that the parties resumed fighting after seven years should not be taken into account in assessing short-term or medium-term compliance, since this very late non-compliance occurred after the cut-off point for assessing compliance.

For example, a demand “asks all warring factions to cooperate fully with a UN peace operation”. All parties fully cooperate with the UN peace operation during the first sixteen months after the adoption of the demand, and fail to do so thereafter when they engage in a new three-year-long round of fighting. In assessing short-term compliance, late non-compliance that occurred after the six-month cut-off point is not taken into account. Thus, short-term compliance is assessed at a high score (4). However, non-compliance occurred within the two-year timeframe for evaluating medium-term compliance. Since full compliance lasted sixteen months before it turned into non-compliance for the next eight months, medium-term compliance should be assessed at a medium high score (3).

## I. Compliance by civil war parties

When evaluating compliance with the Security Council’s demands, the conduct of civil war parties only is taken into account, and not by any other actors who may also be addressed by the demand.

For example, OP 8 of SC Res. 1376 (2001) “demands that the illegal exploitation of the natural resources of the Democratic Republic of the Congo cease.” This demand addresses a wide range of private and public actors in the DRC and beyond. In assessing compliance with the demand, only the conduct of civil war parties is taken into account.

## J. Assessing compliance with demands to multiple civil war parties

When a demand has multiple addressees (e.g., “all conflict parties”), compliance by all of them is evaluated with a single level of compliance score, which they will all share. When a demand is addressed to two or more civil war parties, equal weight should be attached to each party’s conduct in the determination of the compliance score.

For example, OP 4 of SC Res. 797 (1992) calls upon the Government of Mozambique and RENAMO to cooperate fully with the United Nations and to respect the cease-fire and the peace agreement. When assessing compliance with this demand, equal weight should be attached to the conduct of both parties.

However, there is an important exception to the rule spelled out in the preceding paragraph. If one or several addressees of a demand qualify as primary addressees, greater weight is attached to their conduct than to the conduct of other parties. We also distinguish between more than two layers of demand addressees (i.e., primary, secondary, and tertiary addressees). Three factors helped us determine whether any demand addressees as primary addressees.

First, when a demand is issued to multiple civil war parties in a multi-party civil war, attaining the overall objectives the demand seeks to promote may sometimes depend on the behavior of some major civil war parties more than on the behavior of some minor factions. In that case, it would be problematic to attach equal weight to each party’s conduct. In assessing compliance with such demands, we took into account that some conflict parties have a higher capability to impact the achievement of the objectives pursued in a demand. Please note that you should consider the parties’ capabilities to influence the outcome sought by the Security Council, rather than their actual use of these capabilities. Otherwise, there is a risk attaching greater weight to the conduct of spoilers who actually used their capacity to disrupt peace processes while discounting compliance by those civil war parties who did not do so. In case of doubt, equal weight is attached to each addressee’s conduct.

For example, almost a dozen civil war parties were involved in a given civil war at the same point. Some of them were highly localized both in terms of their means, constituency and objectives, and they had very minor capabilities to influence the war outcome and to spoil the peace process. When a demand “calls on all warring factions to cease fire” the compliance/ non-compliance of these local civil war parties is less significant than the behavior of the main. In assessing compliance, all major factions should attach equal weight to the conduct but less weight should be attached to the conduct of the local minor factions.

Second, some demands that are addressed to multiple addressees request a course of conduct only some of them can adopt. In that case, we focus entirely on the conduct of those civil war parties when determining compliance. Some other demands request a course of conduct some addressees are more able to adopt than others. We should attach heavier weight to the conduct of the former addressees, as appropriate, given the precise conduct requested by the Security Council.

For example, OP 4 of SC Res. 1417 (2002) “demands the demilitarization of Kisangani”. Historical evidence reveals that Kisangani was occupied by RCD-Goma at the time when the demand was issued. In assessing compliance with this demand you should focus entirely on the conduct by RCD-Goma even though this civil war party was not identified as the demand addressee.

Third, sometimes the Security Council addresses a demand to several civil war parties, but also singles out one of them as a primary addressee. In that case, we should attach roughly twice as much weight to the conduct of the civil war party singled out by the Security Council.

For example, a demand “calls on all civil war parties, especially the rebel group XY, to stop delaying the implementation the peace agreement.” If there are three parties with equal capabilities, the conduct of rebel group XY weighs twice as heavy as the conduct of each of the other parties. If the Security Council had not singled out rebel group XY as primary addressee of the demand, equal weight would have been attached to the conduct of each civil war party.

In order to arrive at a compliance score, compliance with each of these sub-demands is examined separately, if sufficient information is available. This analysis is synthesized into a single compliance score other than in the two exception cases listed above.

## K. Assessing compliance with demands containing multiple sub-demands

Compliance with sub-demands contained in a single operative paragraph is assessed with a single score. When we assessed a single compliance score for the demand we took into consideration that not all sub-demands have the same relative importance. We then evaluated the relative importance of sub-demands by considering the objective of the Security Council in adopting this demand. In case of doubt as to which sub-demand had a higher relative importance, similar weight was attached to each.

For example, OP 3 of SC Res. 766 (1992): “cease all hostilities forthwith, cooperate fully with [UNTAC] in the marking of all minefields […]” Reading this demand in the context of the entire Resolution shows that the demand is preceded by expressions of concern about continuing violations of the cease-fire, both in OP 3 and in OP 1. This indicates that the Security Council attached greater importance to the cessation of hostilities than on cooperation with UNTAC on marking the mine-fields. In assessing the compliance score, greater weight should be attached to the conflict parties’ response to the former sub-demand.

## L. Belated compliance with demands repeating demands issued in an earlier Resolution

If a demand is made repeatedly in separate Resolutions, every such statement of the demand is viewed as a separate demand. If the addressee(s) of such demands only complied after the demand was issued several times, their delay in compliance has a different effect on the level of compliance score for each of the demands. In assessing the level of compliance score for each of these demands we take into consideration how much time elapsed between the adoption of each Resolution reiterating the demand and the time when compliance occurred.

For example, two Security Council Resolutions demand a rebel group to withdraw its troops from a valley. The second Resolution is issued two months after the first one. Within ten to twelve days after the adoption of the second Resolution the faction withdraws from the valley. In assessing compliance with the earlier demand we do not take into account the fact that it was later repeated in a second Resolution. In light of the lapse of time between the adoption of the earlier Resolution and the withdrawal of the troops, the level of compliance with the earlier demand should be assessed at a medium high score (3). Given the civil war party fully complied with the second demand without undue delay, compliance with the second demand

## M. Documentation of compliance assessment

Any assessment of compliance is based on personal judgment. We seek to make assessments of compliance transparent and comprehensible for the audience for our research project. “The point is to compile objective evidence of subjective socially-based interpretations of behavior”.[[7]](#footnote-7) The best way to do so is to base all assessments on primary and secondary sources, and to document what these documents tell us about compliance. Therefore we have documented the sources that formed the basis of our coding decisions on the compliance variables. The documentation compiled by coders of compliance can be found online at the IPI website.

# Depth of Demand Coding Methodology

Security Council demands to civil war parties deal with a broad variety of issues. Some request a civil war party to disarm, others ask for the suppression of racist propaganda on the radio, yet others require the warring factions to guarantee the security of a UN peace operation, or they merely impose a reporting obligation. The greatly varying degree of a demand’s intrusiveness explains why the costs associated with compliance with some demands create high incentives for non-compliance while compliance with others does not raise any significant costs (making compliance more attractive and more likely). In previous qualitative research the depth of a demand was conceptualized as “the extent to which a demand requires the addressee to depart from what he would have done in the absence of the demand”.[[8]](#footnote-8)

To understand compliance with Security Council Resolutions, we need to control for the variance in the depth of demands. We define the depth of a Security Council demand to a civil war party as the potential hazard for the addressee that is associated with engaging in the demanded conduct. Specifically, the hazard associated with performing the requested conduct consists either in a risk to the demand addressee’s survival or in a negative impact on its ability to attain victory in the civil war or win power in its aftermath. This hazard becomes more acute if other civil war parties do not comply with any Security Council demands addressed to them or their commitments in the peace process. In other words, the depth of a demand is the potential harm incurred by the demand addressee assuming other civil war parties do not comply with their obligations.

The depth of demand variable only captures the potential hazard for the addressee that is associated with engaging in the demanded conduct. In assessing compliance we did not weigh this hazard against potential benefits the addressee could gain from compliance. Evaluating both the potential hazard and gains from compliance and the likelihood that they will materialize would replicate the compliance decision-making calculus of civil war parties and would therefore be endogenous to the level of compliance.

We use a three-point scale to assess the depth of demand. This scale does not allow the use of half-scores or fractional scores.

1. Low depth of demand: Compliance with this demand (in isolation from other demands) does not put the survival of the demand addressee as an organized group, or even the life of its senior members, at a significant risk. Nor does it significantly impact the addressee’s chances to attain victory in the civil war or to win power in its aftermath. This is true even if other civil war parties fail to comply with any demands of the Security Council addressed to them and renege on their commitments in the peace process.
2. Medium depth of demand: Compliance with this demand (in isolation from other demands) makes it significantly more difficult for the demand addressee to attain victory in the civil war or to win power in its aftermath, particularly if other civil war parties fail to comply with demands of the Security Council addressed to them and renege on their commitments in the peace process. At the same time, compliance with the demand does not put the survival of the demand addressee as an organized group, or even the life of its senior members, at a significant risk, even if other civil war parties fail to comply with any demands of the Security Council addressed to them and renege on their commitments in the peace process.
3. High depth of demand: Compliance with this demand (in isolation from other demands) puts the survival of the demand addressee as an organized group, or even the life of its senior members, at a significant risk, particularly if other civil war parties fail to comply with any demands of the Security Council addressed to them and renege on their commitments in the peace process.

For example, compliance with a demand to receive a certain document clearly does not pose a hazard to the survival of civil war parties nor does it impact on their chances to attain victory in the civil war. Thus, the depth of such demands should be qualified as low (1).

In another example, compliance with a demand to UNITA to assign a liaison officer to the Headquarters of the UNAVEM III peacekeeping mission does not impose any significant risk on a UNITA, nor does it impact on its chances to attain victory in the civil war. Thus, the depth of such demands should be qualified as low (1).

Take a case where compliance with demands to cooperate with a UN peace operation deployed to the civil war theatre makes it more difficult to pursue a military strategy in the conflict and attain military victory. A UN peace operation conducts inquiries into claims of infractions put forth by other conflict parties and monitors the warring factions’ conduct.[[9]](#footnote-9) However, compliance with such a demand does not pose a threat to the survival of the demand addressees. Even spoilers typically could undergo a transformation, comply with these demands and join the peace process. The depth of such demands should normally be qualified as medium (2).

As a final example, by fully complying with the demand to undergo disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) a rebel group foregoes its ability to defend itself against the government if it reneges on its commitments in the peace process and resorts to renewed warfare.[[10]](#footnote-10) Thus, the depth of such demands should be qualified as high (3).

When assessing the depth of a demand we only accounted for the potential hazard associated with engaging in the conduct requested in that specific demand, in isolation from the other demands to the same addressee.

For example, a demand asks a rebel group to withdraw its forces from the area surrounding the capital. A separate demand asks the same group to participate in the DDR process thereafter. When assessing the depth of the former demand we did not take into account the potential hazard for the rebel group that is associated with participating in the DDR process once it has repositioned its forces as requested. Withdrawing the forces from the area surrounding the capital typically makes it significantly more difficult for a rebel group to attain a military victory in the civil war. Assuming the rebel group retains the ability to defend itself against attacks by the government or other rebel groups after redeploying to different parts of the country the withdrawal does not put the survival of the rebel group at a significant risk. Thus, the depth of the demand to withdraw from the area surrounding the capital should be qualified as medium (2).

Our assessment of the depth of a demand was based on our analysis of the situation in the earliest possible moment when compliance was supposed to occur, i.e. when it became reasonably practicable. Thus we did not take into account later developments that might have impacted on the hazards associated with very belated compliance, even if compliance actually occurred after a long delay. Please refer to Part II Section F for details on the timeliness of compliance.

For instance, a demand asks the government to immediately disband all pro-government militias. The demand is issued at a time when security sector reform has not yet led to the establishment of a national army that could protect the government against attacks from rebel groups. Some sixteen months later the new national army gains the capability to fulfill this task. Given the Security Council expected the government to immediately disband its proxy militias, we based our assessment of the depth of the demand on an analysis of the situation right after the demand was issued. At that point, dissolving the pro-government militias would pose a threat to the survival of the government in case of rebel attacks. Thus, the depth of the demand should be qualified as high (3) despite the fact that very belated compliance (after eighteen months) would be associated with a smaller hazard to the government.

Civil war parties operate in ‘the fog of war’. Lack of information may lead them to take bad decisions on cooperation or non-cooperation with their enemies and the Security Council. However, it would be very difficult, and sometimes almost impossible, to quantify the actual perceptions of the depth of demand by civil war parties at a given point in time. This is particularly true when members of the civil war party’s leadership fundamentally differ in their assessments, when they frequently revise them or remain very uncertain about them. For instance, some leaders of a rebel group may believe that the government’s commitment to the peace process is genuine while others remain deeply suspicious. In each case, it would be very difficult to base the assessment of the depth of demand on the addressee’s subjective perception. Thus, the demand addressee should not base our assessment of the depth of demand on the perception or misperception of the hazard of compliance. Even when a demand addressee was confident about cooperation by its opponent we based our assessment on the potential hazard associated with engaging in the demanded conduct if other civil war parties fail to comply with demands of the Security Council addressed to them and renege on their commitments in the peace process.

Like compliance, the depth of a demand is assessed with a single score shared by all addressees of a demand. Of course, compliance with a specific demand can impose more significant hazards on some civil war parties than on others. For instance, compliance with a demand to all civil war parties to cooperate in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of all non-state armed groups imposes a great hazard on rebel groups, but not necessarily on the government. When a demand has multiple addressees and the depth of demand varies for each of them, we assessed the depth of the demand at the highest level observed for any of the addressee. This is due to the fact that non-compliance by one civil war party often triggers non-compliance by all. Just one side in the conflict cannot implement many demands, such as requests to cease fighting or conduct negotiations. Even when it is possible for one civil war party to comply in the absence of compliance by others non-compliance by one side often leads to a reciprocal response by the other side. Thus, the ‘highest hurdle’ for compliance needs to be taken for compliance to become likely. By assessing the depth of the demand at the highest level for any of them we account for this dilemma of compliance.

The depth of the demand is assessed separately for each demand. While we assessed the level of compliance with a demand in the short term and in the medium term separately, we only made one assessment of the depth of the demand.

# 1. Identification Filters

## 1.1 Demand number (TAG)

The number of the demand is composed of the following four numbers listed sequentially:

1. The number of the Resolution, and
2. A two-digit number representing the operative paragraph or paragraph stipulating the demand (e.g. “01”, “12”), and
3. A two-digit number distinguishing two or more separate demands expressed in a single operative paragraph or paragraph

After the number of the Resolution, a coma is inserted so that each element of the number can be easily identified.

* E.g. op. para. 4 of SC Resolution 648 (1990) of 1/31/1990: “648.0401”;
* E.g. para. 2 of SC Resolution 1419 (2002) of 6/26/2002: “1419.0201”;
* E.g. demand 11, para. 12 of SC Resolution 1075 (1996) of 10/11/1996: “1075.1211”.

## 1.2 Resolution number (NUM)

This variable indicates the official number of the Resolution containing the demand. The official Resolution number is a consecutive number.

## 

## 1.3 Operative paragraph or paragraph number (NUM)

This variable records the number of the operative paragraph or paragraph containing the demand. The Security Council usually numbers the *operative paragraphs* of its Resolutions. If the operative paragraphs of the Resolution are designated as (a), (b), (c), etc., the coder assigned consecutive numbers to the paragraphs, starting with the first operative paragraph. When an operative paragraph of a Resolution contains subparagraphs that are designated as (a), (b), (c), etc., only the number of the operative paragraph itself was recorded.

## 1.4 Date of adoption (DATE)

The date is indicated in the format M/D/YEAR.

## 1.5 Substance of demand (STRING)

The substance of the demand summarizes the demand. The original wording of the demand should be maintained as much as possible, but excessively long demands may be shortened or simplified. All essential elements of the demand should be maintained in the title, while detailed specifications can be omitted if they do not have an added value for the understanding of the meaning of the demand.

## 1.6 Resolution and demand filters

Due to the hierarchical nature of the dataset, there is data that is aggregated at the level of civil war-year, Resolution and demand. These variables (in addition to variables 2.1 above and 1.7 below) are used to filter results at the various levels of analyses.

## 1.6.1 Strict new Resolution (DUMMY)

This variable filters at the Resolution level and omits double counted Resolutions do to overlapping agenda items.

Values:

1. No
2. Yes

## 1.6.2 New Resolution (DUMMY)

This variable filters at the Resolution level and includes double counted Resolutions do to overlapping agenda items.

Values:

1. No
2. Yes

## 1.6.3 New demand (DUMMY)

This variable filters at the demand level.

Values:

1. No
2. Yes

## 1.7 Addressee filters

Because the variable includes all demands contained in operative paragraphs of Resolutions regardless of an addresses participation in the situation, the data includes a wealth of information on a wide variety of parties. This includes the international and donor communities, NGO’s, humanitarian actors, etc. Since the scope of this project’s analysis remains limited to compliance by actors that are or have been engaged in the conflict, the following variables are used to filter addressee level data.

## 1.7.1 Civil war participant (DUMMY)

This variable indicates whether the addressee is an active participant in conflict at the time of the adoption of the Resolution.

Values:

1. No
2. Yes

## 1.7.2 Civil war party (DUMMY)

This variable indicates whether the addressee was an active participant in conflict at any time prior to the adoption of the Resolution.

Values:

1. No
2. Yes

## 1.7.3 Civil war actors (DUMMY)

This variable indicates whether the addressee was an active participant in conflict at any time prior to the adoption of the Resolution. It additionally includes all entities, such as political parties, that have transitioned out of conflict.

Values:

1. No
2. Yes

## 1.8 Coder filters

Variables used to indicate the name of the individual responsible for coding independent and dependent variables. Abbreviations and coders are as follows:

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **ABBREVIATION** | **NAME** |
| AH | Ann Hopper |
| BH | Brent Hierman |
| CJ | Chelsea Johnson |
| CK | Chen Kertcher |
| CM | Cynthia Michota |
| CS | Cyrus Samii |
| CW | Carla Winston |
| DF | Dan Fahey |
| DS | David Siroky |
| DV | Daniel Millan Valencia |
| EW | Emily West |
| FC | Fernando Chinchilla |
| JC | James Cockayne |
| JG | Justin Gilstrap |
| JW | Jeni Whalen |
| KT | Kimairis L. Toogood |
| LS | Lee Seymour |
| LSc | Lindsey Scorgie |
| MM | Madalena Moita |
| MMK | Megan MacKenzie |
| MP | Mateja Peter |
| NL | Natacha Lemasle |
| PG | Patricia Gossman |
| PR | Philippe Rieder |
| RG | Renee Gendron |
| RoG | Roberto Genoves |
| SMMB | Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé |
| TC | Teresa Cravo |
| WC | Will Clegg |
| ChM | Christoph Mikulaschek |

## 1.8.1 Coder of independent variables (STRING)

## 1.8.2 Coder 1 of dependent variables (STRING)

## 1.8.3 Coder 2 of dependent variables (STRING)

# 2. Independent Variables: Situation-specific

These variables describe the situation addressed by the adoption of the Resolution by the Security Council. For the purpose of this research project, the term situation refers to a dispute, conflict or conflict episode on the agenda of the Security Council, which persists without major interruption, which focuses on the same territory, and which involves essentially the same actors. In most cases, the title of the situation will correspond to the heading of the Security Council agenda item, under which the respective Resolution was adopted. Sometimes, the titles of agenda items do not describe the dispute or conflict appropriately (e.g. “letter of the Government of …” instead of “situation in …”).[[11]](#footnote-11) In such cases, a more descriptive wording is used in this study.

## 2.1.1 Agenda item (STRING)

This variable designates the agenda item under which the Security Council adopted the Resolution stipulating the demand. In most cases, the title of the situation will correspond to the heading of the Security Council agenda item, under which the respective Resolution was adopted. Sometimes, the title of an agenda item does not describe the dispute or conflict appropriately (e.g. “letter of the Government of …” instead of “situation in …”).[[12]](#footnote-12) In such cases, a more descriptive wording is used in this study.

## 2.1.2 Civil War name (STRING)

Alternately, we code the variable as the title of the civil war event. We title the civil war by the primary state actor at the time of the conflict. For instance, the various civil wars in the former Yugoslavia are coded “SR Yugoslavia” prior to May 5th, 1992 and “Croatia” or “Bosnia Herzegovina” after. The conflict in Kosovo is coded as “FR Yugoslavia” as Kosovo didn’t declare independence until 2008.

## 2.2 Year of adoption of the resolution (YEAR)

Calendar year that the Resolution was adopted by the Security Council.

## 2.3 Type of situation (CAT)

This variable describes the situation in which the Resolution containing the demand was adopted. The type of the situation can be derived from the characteristic of the challenge this situation confronts the Security Council with. The single most important objective of the Council in addressing the situation provides guidance on the proper determination of the type of the situation.

The type of situation can change over time in a given case. For instance, the situation might fall under the category “cessation of hostilities” while fighting is ongoing. Once a cease-fire is reached, the focus might shift to the “resolution of an interstate/intrastate conflict.” Multiple scores should be avoided by identifying the single most important challenge posed by the situation at the moment of the adoption of the Resolution.

Values:

1. Cessation of hostilities

* E.g. situation in Indonesia in November 1947

1. Resolution of an intra-state conflict

* E.g. situation in Georgia in January 2003

1. Protection of specific groups

* E.g. apartheid regime in South Africa in February 1986

## 2.4 Region of the situation the demand deals with (CAT)

The regional categorization used in this study follows the list compiled by the Cartographic Department of the Dag Hammarskjöld Library (Department of Public Information) at United Nations Headquarters. The list is available at <http://www.un.org/depts/dhl/maplib/worldregions.htm>. It offers a geographical taxonomy, and is not affected by a state’s membership of a political bloc in the UN system.

Values:

1. Eastern Africa
2. Middle Africa
3. Northern Africa
4. Southern Africa
5. Western Africa
6. Eastern Asia
7. South-central Asia
8. South-eastern Asia
9. Western Asia
10. Eastern Europe
11. Northern Europe
12. Southern Europe
13. Western Europe
14. Caribbean
15. Central America
16. South America
17. Northern America
18. Australia and New Zealand
19. Melanesia
20. Micronesia
21. Polynesia
22. Cross-regional (several regions on two or more continents, but not all regions)
23. Worldwide (all regions)

For the purpose of this dataset, the codes (22) and (23) have been added to the list compiled by the Cartographic Department of the Dag Hammarskjöld Library.

If a demand addresses a situation that extends over two or more regions on a single continent, multiple codes are used. If the demand addresses a situation extending to two more regions on different continents, the code (22) is used. If the situation addressed by the demand extends to all regions, the code (23) is used.

## 2.5.1 Start of the armed conflict (DATE)

This variable indicates the date of the start of the armed conflict. The first use of armed force marks the start of the armed conflict. The data for this variable is taken from the Uppsala Conflict Database (<http://www.pcr.uu.se/database/basicSearch.php>). The format mm/dd/yyyy is used.

## 2.5.2 End of the armed conflict (DATE)

This variable indicates the date of the termination of the armed conflict. Peace agreements, victories, ceasefire agreements, or the persistent low activity of military confrontation (below 25 battle deaths per year) are the prevalent causes of the termination of an armed conflict. The data for this variable is taken from the Uppsala Conflict Database (<http://www.pcr.uu.se/database/basicSearch.php>). The date is indicated in the format mm/dd/yyyy. The date 1/1/2007 is used if the armed conflict is still ongoing as of 1/1/2007.

## 2.5.3 Duration of the armed conflict (NUM)

The duration of the armed conflict in days at the moment of the adoption of the Resolution including the demand. This variable is calculated by subtracting the start date from the date of the Resolution. If the Resolution was adopted before the start of the armed conflict, this number is negative.

## 2.5.4 Continuation of the armed conflict (NUM)

The duration for which the armed conflict continued after the date of the adoption of the Resolution stipulating the demand until the termination of the armed conflict. This variable is calculated by subtracting the date of the Resolution from the end date. If the Resolution was adopted after the termination of the armed conflict, this number is negative. If the armed conflict is still ongoing as of 1/1/2007, the duration of the time span between the adoption of the Resolution and February 2007 is manually entered into this column.

## 2.5.4 Post-conflict (DUMMY)

This Variable will indicate whether the Resolution was adopted during conflict or after the end of hostilities.

Values:

1. Adopted during conflict.
2. Adopted after hostilities have ceased.

## 2.6 Intensity of armed conflict (ORD)

This variable indicates the intensity of the armed conflict at the time of the adoption of the Resolution containing the demand. It determines the level of battle-related deaths during the twelve months period prior to the adoption of the Resolution stipulating the demand. The data on this variable contained in the Uppsala Conflict Database (<http://www.pcr.uu.se/database/basicSearch.php>) should be considered a guideline for the coding of this variable.

Values:

1. Below minor (less than 25 battle-related deaths a year)
2. Minor (at least 25 but less than 1000 battle-related deaths a year)
3. Major war (at least 1000 battle-related deaths in a year)

## 2.7 Number of warring parties (NUM)

According to the Uppsala Conflict Database a warring party is an actor who uses armed force to promote its position in the incompatibility (see the Uppsala database’s [codebook](http://www.pcr.uu.se/database/definitions_all.htm) for further details). Only non-state actors that were engaged in the armed conflict against the government, qualify as warring parties in the intrastate armed conflict, excluding armed groups that only fought each other. The data on this variable contained in the Uppsala Conflict Database (<http://www.pcr.uu.se/database/basicSearch.php>) should be considered a guideline for the coding of this variable.

Only warring parties that have been active during the twelve months period prior to the adoption of the Resolution have been taken into account. The Uppsala Conflict Database defines active parties as parties that caused at least 25 battle-related deaths during the respective year.

## 2.8 Foreign involvement in armed conflict (DUMMY)

The Uppsala Conflict Database defines an intrastate armed conflict with outside intervention as a conflict within a country between a government and a non-governmental party, where the government, the opposition or both sides receive troop support from other governments that actively participate in the conflict (<http://www.pcr.uu.se/database/definitions_all.htm>).

Values:

1. No foreign involvement at the time of the issuing of the demand
2. Foreign involvement at the time of the issuing of the demand

The “interstate/ intrastate dimension” variable of the Uppsala Conflict Database specifies whether the conflict was “intrastate” or “intrastate with foreign involvement”. This variable should not be confused with Uppsala’s “third party involvement variable”.

## 2.9 Number of battle-related deaths (NUM)

This variable indicates the combined total number of battle-related deaths during five calendar years preceding the adoption of the Resolution stipulating the demand. The data for this variable is taken from the “bdeadbes” estimate in the [Battle death Dataset](../External%20Data%20Sets/PRIO-CSCW/Battle_Deaths_2.0_UppsalaPrio.zip) of the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo. This dataset mainly builds on the data included in the Uppsala Conflict Database, but it also draws on other sources to close the gaps in the Uppsala Conflict Database’s data on battle-related deaths.

## 2.10 Political instability

This variable indicates a significant political shift in any of the three years preceding the adoption of the resolution. Data are derived from the [PolityIV Dataset](../External%20Data%20Sets/Polity%20IV) of the Center for Systemic Peace and George Mason University.

We record political instability when the civil war country experienced a significant change in authority, an interregnum period, or the creation of a new state entity prior to the adoption of the Resolution. A significant change in authority occurs when there is a greater than 2 point change in the ‘polity’ score for the civil war country. An interregnum period is defined as complete collapse of central authority. Bosnia Herzegovina, Croatia, and Yemen are the only civil war countries that experienced the formation of new state entities during the period of observation of our study. Periods of interruption and transitional government, as defined by the Polity IV Dataset, are treated as periods of political instability.

In two separate columns, we code political instability during a one-year period and a three-year period prior to the adoption of the Resolution.

## 2.10.1 Political instability one-year (DUMMY)

Values:

1. No political instability
2. Political instability

## 2.10.2 Political instability three-year (DUMMY)

Values:

1. No political instability
2. Political instability

## 2.10.3 Political shocks (ORD)

This variable indicates a significant political “shock” in the year preceding the adoption of the resolution. Data are derived from the [PolityIV Dataset](../External%20Data%20Sets/Polity%20IV) of the Center for Systemic Peace and George Mason University. We differentiate between negative and positive shocks, as well as the rough degree of the shock. We operationalize this by using a five-point scale of regime transition in the year preceding the adoption of a resolution. We code the initial move into an interregnum period as a major adverse regime transition. Due to the ambiguous nature of foreign occupation and transitional periods, we code them as “0” or non-shocks. Since this variable only measures the initial shock to government institutions, continuing interregnum, transitional, and foreign occupation periods as “0”.

Values:

1. Major Positive Regime Change – Six-point or greater increase in POLITY score.
2. Minor Regime Change – Three to five-point increase in POLITY score.
3. Little or No Change in POLITY score.

-1. Negative Regime Change – Three to five-point decrease in POLITY score.

-2. Major Adverse Regime Transition – Six-point or greater decrease in POLITY score or the onset or continuation of an interregnal period.

#### 

## 2.10.4 MAGFAIL (ORD)

The magnitude of a state failure, which is only available in cases of adverse regime change. Examples of a failure include shutdowns of routine government services, failure of security forces and administrators to carry out any government directives, and anarchic conditions in large parts of the country, with rival militias, warlords, or local or regional authorities attempting to establish autonomous zones of government. Scores can change from year to year during a political crisis.

Values:

1. No adverse regime change.
2. Adverse regime change (defined above) with no significant weakening of state institutions or persistent collapse of public order.
3. Failure of state authority in a limited part of the country, e.g., secession or rebel control of, or anarchic conditions in, one or several regions that do not include the core area of the country or its capital.
4. Failure of state authority in a substantial part of the country, or in the capital and its environs.
5. Complete collapse or near-total failure of state authority

## 2.10.5 MAGFAIL lagged (ORD)

The MAGFAIL variable lagged one year

## 2.10.6 MAGFIGHT (ORD)

A scaled measure of the number of non-governmental contestants that is only available in cases of revolutionary and ethnic wars. This is based on source estimates of the number of “armed supporters”, “guerillas”, etc. of rebel and revolutionary movements. This can include number of rioters or armed demonstrators. In cases of multiple armed rebel groups, this number is taken to be the total across rebel movements. In years in which data is not available, values are interpolated where possible. If a range of estimates exists, the mid-point is used. If the range declines in the course of a year, the highpoint for the year is used. If the opposition movement relies mainly on terror tactics, the number reflects estimates of active members in that group.

Values:

1. No war
2. Less than 100 combatants or activists’
3. 100 to 1000 combatants or activists
4. 1000 to 5,000 combatants or activists
5. 5,000 to 15,000 combatants or activists
6. More than 15,000 combatants or activists

## 2.10.7 MAGFIGHT lagged (ORD)

The MAGFIGHT variable lagged one year

## 2.10.8 MAGAREA (ORD)

The proportion of a given country affected by a conflict is also only available in cases of revolutionary and ethnic wars. A province, region, or city is considered *directly affected* if fighting/terrorist attacks/revolutionary protest occurs there at any time during the year. It is *indirectly affected* if the area has significant spillover effects from nearby fighting. Indirect affects include refugee flows, curtailment of public services, loss of civil liberties or the imposition of martial law. If the conflict expands and contracts during a year, the variable is coded according to the conflict high point.

Values

1. No war
2. Less than one-tenth of the country and no significant cities are directly or indirectly affected
3. One-tenth of the country (one province or state) and/or one or several provincial cities are directly or indirectly affected
4. More than one-tenth and up to one quarter of the country (several provinces or states) and/or the capital city are directly or indirectly affected
5. From one-quarter to one-half the country and/or most major urban areas are directly or indirectly affected
6. More than one-half the country is directly or indirectly affected

## 2.10.9 MAGAREA lagged (ORD)

The MAGAREA variable lagged one year

## 2.11 Natural resource availability

In order to account for the effects of natural resources on the ability of conflict parties to continue hostilities regardless of external direct funding, we use two measures: non-renewable natural resource and lootable natural resource availability.

NOTE: The codes for the two variables only differ for the cases of Cote d’Ivoire, which has lootable but not non-renewable natural resources (especially Cocoa), and for Iraq and Azerbaijan, which dispose of non-renewable natural resources which are not lootable (oil).

## 2.11.1 Non-renewable natural resource availability (DUMMY)

This variable indicates that the availability of non-renewable natural resources in the civil war country. We limit this variable’s scope to include only natural resources produced within the conflict country. As such we exclude smuggled and contraband materials. However, we take into account timber production due to both the extended time horizon involved in timber renewal and the unsustainable overexploitation of timber in civil war economies that assimilates timber to a non-renewable natural resource for the purpose of our study.

Values:

1. No significant quantity of natural resources available
2. Significant quantity of natural resources available

## 2.11.2 Lootable natural resource availability (DUMMY)

Alternately, we use a dichotomous variable indicating lootable natural resource availability. We base our definition of lootable natural resources on that of Michael Ross: “ The ease with which individuals or small teams of unskilled workers can extract and transport a resource.”[[13]](#footnote-13) For example, natural resources such as alluvial diamonds, illicit drugs, and other agricultural products are lootable, while those such as oil and deep shaft minerals are relatively unlootable due to the complex and fixed nature of extraction techniques.

Values:

1. No significant quantity of lootable natural resources available
2. Significant quantity of lootable natural resources available

## 2.12.1 Proximate civil war (DUMMY)

This variable indicates whether another civil war was ongoing in a state bordering the theatre of the civil war addressed by the Security Council Resolution containing the demand at hand.

Values:

1. No proximate civil war
2. Proximate civil war

## 2.12.2 Number of proximate civil wars (NUM)

Number of proximate civil wars ongoing at the time of the adoption of the Resolution.

## 2.13 Depth of demand

Drawing from Downs, Rocke and Barsoom, this variable can be defined as the “extent to which a demand requires the addressee to depart from what he would have done in the absence of the demand”.[[14]](#footnote-14) The depth of demand variable measures to what extent the demand requests the addressee to depart from a counterfactual estimate of the behavior the addressee would have set in the absence of the demand.

The depth of demand is assessed for each demand separately. The experts measuring compliance made the evaluation.

Values:

1. Low depth of demand: Compliance with this demand (in isolation from other demands) does not put the survival of the demand addressee as an organized group, or even the life of its senior members, at a significant risk. Nor does it significantly impact the addressee’s chances to attain victory in the civil war or to win power in its aftermath. This is true even if other civil war parties fail to comply with any demands of the Security Council addressed to them and renege on their commitments in the peace process.
2. Medium depth of demand: Compliance with this demand (in isolation from other demands) makes it significantly more difficult for the demand addressee to attain victory in the civil war or to win power in its aftermath, particularly if other civil war parties fail to comply with demands of the Security Council addressed to them and renege on their commitments in the peace process. At the same time, compliance with the demand does not put the survival of the demand addressee as an organized group, or even the life of its senior members, at a significant risk, even if other civil war parties fail to comply with any demands of the Security Council addressed to them and renege on their commitments in the peace process.
3. High depth of demand: Compliance with this demand (in isolation from other demands) puts the survival of the demand addressee as an organized group, or even the life of its senior members, at a significant risk, particularly if other civil war parties fail to comply with any demands of the Security Council addressed to them and renege on their commitments in the peace process.

## 2.13.1 Final Depth of demand

Two independent expert coders made compliance and depth of demand codes. IPI then reconciled these codes through examination of source materials supplied by expert coders.

## 2.13.2 Coder 1 Depth of demand

## 2.13.3 Coder 2 Depth of demand

# 3. Independent Variables: United Nations-specific

These variables describe the actions of the Security Council and United Nations at the time of the adoption of the Resolution.

## 3.1 Diplomatic or expert-level subsidiary organ of the Security Council

These variables indicates whether and which kind of subsidiary organ of the Security Council was either in charge of working on the situation at the time of the adoption of the demand, or was created by the Resolution containing the demand. The subsidiary organ is taken into account even if its work is not directly linked to the demand.

The link “Subsidiary organs” on the webpage of the Security Council (<http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/>) contains valuable information on subsidiary organs. Chapter V of the Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council also contains a detailed description of the Council’s subsidiary organs. The repertoire is available on the Council’s webpage for the period until 1995. Chapter VI of the Annual Report of the Security Council to the General Assembly, which is available on the Council’s webpage for the years after 2000, also covers the work of the Council’s subsidiary organs.

## 3.1.1 Sanctions committee (DUMMY)

E.g. Committee established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1267 (1999)

Values:

1. No
2. Yes

## 3.1.2 Adjudicative commission (DUMMY)

E.g. United Nations Compensation Commission (established in 1991 to process claims and pay compensation for losses resulting from Iraq's invasion and occupation of Kuwait)

Values:

1. No
2. Yes

## 3.1.3 Investigative commission or panel of experts (DUMMY)

E.g. Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth in the Democratic Republic of the Congo *or* the International Independent Investigation Commission investigating the assassination of Rafik Hariri and others.

Values:

1. No
2. Yes

## 3.1.4 Criminal tribunal mandated by the Security Council (DUMMY)

E.g. ICTY, ICTR, Special Court for Sierra Leone

Values:

1. No
2. Yes

## 3.1.5 Other commission (DUMMY)

e.g. ad hoc commission on Somalia established by Res. 794 (1992)

Values:

1. No
2. Yes

## 3.1.6 Established subsidiary organ of the Security Council (CAT)

The variable also indicates, in a separate column, whether the subsidiary organ was established by the Resolution, which contains the demand or whether it already existed before its adoption.

Values:

1. N/a (no subsidiary organ)
2. Pre-existing: The subsidiary organ had already been established before the adoption of the Resolution issuing the demand. Changes in the mandate of a pre-existing subsidiary organ by the Resolution issuing the demand do not impact on the qualification of the subsidiary organ as pre-existing.
3. Pre-existing and new: A subsidiary organ had already been established before the adoption of the Resolution issuing the demand, and a new additional one was created by this Resolution.
4. New: The Resolution issuing the demand established the subsidiary organ.

## 3.2 Security Council mission (CAT)

This variable indicates whether the Security Council conducted a mission to the region of the conflict addressed by the Resolution during the six months prior and after the adoption of the Resolution. The webpage of the Security Council (<http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/>) contains valuable information on its missions.

Values:

1. No
2. Mission prior to the adoption of the Resolution
3. Mission posterior to the adoption of the Resolution
4. Mission prior and posterior to the adoption of the Resolution

## 3.3 UN field presence

This variable indicates whether the Security Council has established UN institutions in the state under consideration at the time when the demand was adopted. The SC, GA or the Secretary-General may have set them up. Country offices of the UNDP or other UN agencies, funds and programs are not taken into account.

## 3.3.1 Traditional peace keeping operation (DUMMY)

Traditional peace-keeping operation: their mandate is limited to monitor

ing a truce, troop withdrawal or buffer zone between hostile parties.[[15]](#footnote-15)

Values:

1. No
2. Yes

## 3.3.2 Multidimensional peace keeping operation (DUMMY)

Multidimensional peace operation: their mandate involves peace building tasks that may include monitoring the cantonment and demobilization of military forces as well as the resettlement of refugees, supervising civilian transitional authorities, and the implementation of human rights, national democratic elections, and economic rehabilitation.[[16]](#footnote-16)

* E.g. United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)

Values:

1. No
2. Yes

## 3.3.3 Civilian peace-building mission (DUMMY)

Civilian peace-building mission such as United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL)

Values:

1. No
2. Yes

## 3.3.4 Transitional administration (DUMMY)

Transitional administration such as United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET)

Values:

1. No
2. Yes

## 3.3.5 Civilian police mission (DUMMY)

Civilian police mission such as United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH)

Values:

1. No
2. Yes

## 3.3.6 Civilian observers (DUMMY)

Civilian observers such as Observer Mission for the Verification of the Elections in Nicaragua (ONUVEN)

Values:

1. No
2. Yes

## 3.3.7 Commission (DUMMY)

Commission such as United Nations Palestine Commission as originally devised in UNGA Res. 181

Values:

1. No
2. Yes

## 3.3.8 Consular commission (DUMMY)

Consular Commission such as the Consular Commission in Batavia

Values:

1. No
2. Yes

## 3.3.9 SRSG, PRSG or personal Envoy of the SG (DUMMY)

SRSG, PRSG, Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General or United Nations Mediator reporting to the Secretary-General with a mandate related to the situation under consideration by the Security Council.

* E.g. United Nations Mediator in Cyprus, appointed in pursuance with RES 186 (1964)

Values:

1. No
2. Yes

## 3.3.10 UN mediation of assessment mission (DUMMY)

UN mediation or assessment mission such as special mission dispatched by the Secretary-General pursuant to op. para. 4 (a) of Res. 48/208 of the General Assembly to mediate among the parties

Values:

1. No
2. Yes

## 3.3.11 Investigative commission or panel of experts (DUMMY)

Investigative Commission or Panel of Experts

* E.g. Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
* E.g. International Independent Investigation Commission investigating the assassination of Rafik Hariri and others

Values:

1. No
2. Yes

## 3.3.12 International Criminal Court of hybrid court (DUMMY)

International Criminal Court or hybrid court in the state under consideration by the Security Council such as Special Court for Sierra Leone

Values:

1. No
2. Yes

## 3.3.13 Established UN field presence (CAT)

The variable also indicates, in a separate column, whether the field presence was established by the Resolution that contains the demand or whether it already existed before its adoption.

Values:

1. N/a (no UN field presence)
2. Pre-existing: The United Nations field presence had already been established before the adoption of the Resolution issuing the demand. Changes in the mandate of a pre-existing United Nations field presence by the Resolution issuing the demand do not impact on the qualification of the United Nations field presence as pre-existing.
3. Pre-existing and new: The United Nations field presence had already been established before the adoption of the Resolution issuing the demand, and a new United Nations field presence was created by this Resolution.
4. New: The Resolution issuing the demand established the United Nations field presence.

## 3.4.1 Peace operation (CAT)

This variable indicates whether a peace operation existed in the location that is addressed by the Resolution containing the demand at the time of the adoption of this Resolution, and whether it was under the command of the United Nations.

Value

1. No peace operation
2. Peace operation under United Nations command

* E.g. United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)

1. Peace operation not under United Nations command

* E.g. African Union Mission in the Sudan (AMIS)

1. Two or more simultaneous third-party military interventions, at least one under UN command

* E.g. Kosovo Force (KFOR) and United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)
* E.g. Operation Turquoise and the United Nations Assistance Mission to Rwanda (UNAMIR)

1. Two or more third-party military interventions, neither under UN command

* E.g. International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan)

1. Two or more third-party military interventions, one under UN command and one not under UN command

## 3.4.2 Established peace operation (CAT)

This variable also indicates, in a separate column, whether a peace operation existed in the location that is addressed by the Resolution containing the demand or whether it was mandated by the Resolution itself.

Values:

1. N/a (no peace operation)
2. Pre-existing: The peace operation had already been established before the adoption of the Resolution issuing the demand. Changes in the mandate of a pre-existing United Nations field presence by the Resolution issuing the demand do not impact on the qualification of the peace operation as pre-existing. The fact that a pre-existing non-UN peace operation was only authorized in the Resolution issuing the demand does not impact on the qualification of the peace operation as pre-existing.
3. New: The Resolution issuing the demand established or authorized the peace operation.
4. New peace operation in addition to, or in lieu of, an existing peace operation: A peace operation had already been established before the adoption of the Resolution issuing the demand, and this peace operation was replaced, or supported by a new peace operation created or authorized by this Resolution.

## 3.4.3 Number of armed UN peace keeping troops (NUM)

The total number of *armed troops* of a *United Nations peace operation* deployed to the state undergoing a civil war at the time or prior to the adoption of the Security Council Resolution stipulating the demand is recorded.

The mid-year data from the “[Numbers of Uniformed Personnel in Peace Operations at Mid-Year, 1948-2006](../External%20Data%20Sets/Stimson%20Center%20Peace%20Operations%20Database%20(midyear%20size)/Copy%20of%20peace_ops_size_1948-2006_web_data.xls)” compiled by the Henry L. Stimson Center is used as a guideline for the coding of the total number of armed troops of the United Nations peace operation. If the Resolution issuing the demand was adopted after July 1 in a given year, the mid-year number of armed troops for the respective year is recorded in the dataset. If the Resolution was adopted prior to July 1 of this year, the mid-year number for the previous year is used.

## 3.4.4 Number of unarmed UN peace keepers (NUM)

The total number of personnel of an *unarmed United Nations peace operation* (with military observers and/or civilian police) deployed to the state undergoing a civil war at the time or prior to the adoption of the Security Council Resolution stipulating the demand is recorded.

The mid-year data from the “[Numbers of Uniformed Personnel in Peace Operations at Mid-Year, 1948-2006](../External%20Data%20Sets/Stimson%20Center%20Peace%20Operations%20Database%20(midyear%20size)/Copy%20of%20peace_ops_size_1948-2006_web_data.xls)” compiled by the Henry L. Stimson Center is used as a guideline for the coding of the total number of personnel of an unarmed United Nations peace operation. If the Resolution issuing the demand was adopted after July 1 in a given year, the mid-year number of unarmed peace operation personnel for the respective year is recorded in the dataset. If the Resolution was adopted prior to July 1 of this year, the mid-year number for the previous year is used.

## 3.4.5 Number of UN-authorized non-UN peace keepers (NUM)

The total number of personnel of a *non-UN peace operation authorized by the United Nations* deployed to the state undergoing a civil war at the time or prior to the adoption of the Security Council Resolution stipulating the demand is recorded.

The mid-year data from the “[Numbers of Uniformed Personnel in Peace Operations at Mid-Year, 1948-2006](../External%20Data%20Sets/Stimson%20Center%20Peace%20Operations%20Database%20(midyear%20size)/Copy%20of%20peace_ops_size_1948-2006_web_data.xls)” compiled by the Henry L. Stimson Center is used as a guideline for the coding of the total number of personnel of a non-UN peace operation authorized by the United Nations. If the Resolution issuing the demand was adopted after July 1 in a given year, the mid-year size of a non-UN peace operation authorized by the United Nations for the respective year is recorded in the dataset. If the Resolution was adopted prior to July 1 of this year, the mid-year number for the previous year is used.

## 3.4.6 Number of unauthorized non-UN peace keepers (NUM)

The size of other *non-UN peace operations not authorized by the United Nations* deployed to the state undergoing a civil war at the time or prior to the adoption of the Security Council Resolution stipulating the demand is recorded.

The mid-year data from the “[Numbers of Uniformed Personnel in Peace Operations at Mid-Year, 1948-2006](../External%20Data%20Sets/Stimson%20Center%20Peace%20Operations%20Database%20(midyear%20size)/Copy%20of%20peace_ops_size_1948-2006_web_data.xls)” compiled by the Henry L. Stimson Center is used as a guideline for the coding of the size of other non-UN peace operations not authorized by the United Nations. If the Resolution issuing the demand was adopted after July 1 in a given year, the mid-year size of a non-UN peace operation not authorized by the UN for the respective year is recorded in the dataset. If the Resolution was adopted prior to July 1 of this year, the mid-year number for the previous year is used.

## 3.5.1 Seizure of the Security Council of the situation (STRING)

This variable indicates the *state or UN organ seizing the Security Council of the situation* corresponding to the agenda item under which the Resolution containing the demand was adopted. A standardized three-letter code is used to identify the country or UN organ (see the “[list of abbreviations of state names](list%20of%20abbreviations%20of%20state%20names.xls)” and the “[list of abbreviation of non-state actor names](list%20of%20abbreviations%20of%20non-state%20actor%20names.xls)”).

## 3.5.2 Relationship of the seizing entity to the situation (CAT)

This variableindicates, in a separate column, the *relationship of the seizing entity to the situation*.

Values:

1. Participant in the dispute or conflict
2. State bordering a state on whose territory is occurring the situation under the consideration of the Security Council
3. State from the region of the state whose situation is under the consideration of the Security Council; refer to the list of regions referred to in the description of [Variable 1.4](#VAR_1_4)
4. Group of states of which at least half are located in the region of the state whose situation is under the consideration of the Security Council; refer to the list of regions referred to in the description of [Variable 1.4](#VAR_1_4)
5. Regional organization from the region of the state whose situation is under the consideration of the Security Council, i.e. at least one of the members of this regional organizations has to be located in the respective region; refer to the list of regions referred to in the description of [Variable 1.4](#VAR_1_4)

* E.g. AU, ECOWAS, EU

1. State not from the region of the state whose situation is under the consideration of the SC
2. Group of states of which more than half are located outside the region of the state whose situation is under the consideration of the Security Council; refer to the list of regions referred to in the description of [Variable 1.4](#VAR_1_4)
3. UN organ

* E.g. UN Secretary-General

Note: These categories are mutually exclusive. If a state from the region of the state whose situation is under the consideration of the Security Council also borders the state in which the situation under consideration of the Council occurred, it falls under the second category. If a neighboring state participates in the conflict, it falls under the first category.

## 3.5.3 Date of the first seizure of the Security Council (DATE)

The date of the seizure of the Security Council of this situation is indicated in the format mm/dd/yyyy.

## 3.5.4 Period of the first seizure of the Security Council (NUM)

The amount of time in days for which the Security Council had been seized of the situation before the Resolution containing the demand was adopted is calculated automatically by subtracting the date of first seizure from the date of the Resolution.

## 3.6 Degree of P5 consensus on the agenda item under consideration

This variable indicates whether any P5 abstained from a vote or vetoed against a draft resolution dealing with the same agenda item during the years prior to the adoption of the Resolution containing the demand. Information on vetoes and abstentions can be found in the “[Table of vetoed draft resolutions in the United Nations Security Council 1946-2002](../Literature/FCO%20(UK)%20Table%20of%20Vetoed%20Draft%20Resolutions%202003.pdf)” edited by the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, which is saved in the “Literature” folder. For a list of vetoes cast in 2003, see the list “[Subjects of UN Security Council Vetoes](http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/membship/veto/vetosubj.htm)” compiled by the Global Policy Forum. Data on abstentions can be found through the UNBISNET Voting Records search mode (<http://unbisnet.un.org/>).

## 3.6.1 Degree of P5 consensus two year (CAT)

This indicates whether abstentions by P5 occurred over the *two year period* prior to the adoption of the Resolution issuing the demand.

Value:

1. No abstentions by P5
2. Abstention/abstentions by one P5
3. Abstention/abstentions by several P5
4. Veto/vetoes by one P5
5. Veto/vetoes by several P5
6. Abstention/abstentions and veto/vetoes by one P5
7. Abstention/abstentions and veto/vetoes by several P5

## 3.6.2 Degree of P5 consensus four year (CAT)

This indicates whether abstentions by P5 occurred over the *four year period* prior to the adoption of the Resolution issuing the demand.

Value:

1. No abstentions by P5
2. Abstention/abstentions by one P5
3. Abstention/abstentions by several P5
4. Veto/vetoes by one P5
5. Veto/vetoes by several P5
6. Abstention/abstentions and veto/vetoes by one P5
7. Abstention/abstentions and veto/vetoes by several P5

## 3.7 Number of prior Security Council Resolutions on the same situation (NUM)

As outlined above, the term situation refers to a dispute or conflict on the agenda of the Security Council, which persists without major interruption, which focuses on the same territory, and which involves essentially the same actors.

All Resolutions that are adopted under the *same agenda item* as the Resolution issuing the demand at hand are considered Resolutions on the same situation. Moreover, a Resolution adopted under the *agenda item of a regional conflict complex* that includes the conflict addressed by the Resolution issuing the demand is considered a prior Resolution on the same situation unless it deals exclusively with another conflict within this regional conflict complex.

Resolutions adopted under the agenda item Central America that deals with El Salvador, either specifically or by addressing the regional conflict complex as a whole, is counted as Resolutions on the situation in El Salvador.

## 3.8.1 Number of prior Resolutions containing the same full demand (NUM)

The first column indicates the number of demands that repeat prior demands. Minor changes in the wording of the demand are ignored, if the substance of the demand corresponds with the prior demand.

* E.g. Security Council Resolution 41 (1948) requests the parties to the conflict in Indonesia “to keep the Council directly informed about the progress of the political settlement in Indonesia.” In Resolution 27 (1947), the Security Council had asked the parties to the conflict “to keep the Security Council informed about the progress of the settlement” while Resolution 32 (1947) contained the same demand by merely calling upon both parties “to adhere strictly to [Resolution 27 (1947].” Both Resolution 32 (1947) and Resolution 41 (1948) constitute reiterations of the demand issued in Resolution 27 (1947).

If a demand contains several separate sub-demands some – but not all – of which have already figured in prior Resolutions, the demand is not considered a repetition of the prior demand. It is considered to be a new demand, because it enlarges the content of the behavioral change sought by the Council.

If the earlier demand contains some sub-demands which *are* repeated in the later demand, and also some sub-demands which *are not* repeated in the later demand, but no new sub-demands, the later demand is considered a repetition of the prior one, because the substance of the second demand is a subset of the substance of the earlier demand.

* E.g. op. para. 5 of Resolution 766 “demanded that all parties respect the peaceful nature of [UNTAC’s] mission and take all necessary measures to ensure the safety and security of all United Nations personnel.” Later, op. para. 17 of Resolution 792 (1992) “demands that all parties take all action necessary to safeguard the lives and the security of UNTAC personnel.” The demand in Resolution 792 (1992) repeats the demand in Resolution 766 (1992).
* Had the two demands been issued in reverse chronological order, op. para. 5 of Resolution 766 (1992) would not qualify as a repetition of op. para. 17 of Resolution 792 (1992), as 766 would in that case expand the scope of the behavioral change sought by the Council, and therefore, under the earlier rule, not constitute a repetition of the earlier demand, but a new demand.

Separate sub-demands in a single demand call for different courses of action, and they are separated from each other by the words “and” or “as well as”. If a demand requests a course of action, and specifies that this course of action “includes” another more specific behavior, the more specific exhortation does not constitute a separate sub-demand. For a demand to constitute a repetition of an earlier one, the emphasis on certain elements of the demand included in the later demand does not need to figure in the earlier demand.

* E.g. op. para.17 of Resolution 792 (1992) demands that all parties take all action necessary to safeguard the lives and the security of UNTAC personnel, including by issuing instructions to this effect to their commanders, while op. para. 5 of Resolution 766 (1992) merely contains the demand to ensure the safety and security of all United Nations personnel. The emphasis on instructions to the commanders in the later demand does not limit the general scope of the demand that is identical with the substance of the earlier demand. The fact that op. para.17 of Resolution 792 (1992) specifies that the obligation to issue certain orders to commanders is *included* in the obligation to safeguard the personnel of UNTAC proves that this specific obligation is an element of the general demand, and not a separate sub-demand, and that it was already contained within the earlier demand.

If a demand addresses two or more addressees, and the later demand directs an identical exhortation only to one or some of them, the latter demand constitutes a repetition of the former one. If the scope of addressees of the second demand includes actors who were not addressed by the first one, the two demands cannot be considered the same.

If a demand contains two or more sub-demands all of which are contained in different demands of a prior Resolution, the respective demand is considered a repetition of the demands contained in the prior Resolution. Differences in the arrangement of identical demands in different Resolutions do not qualify the fact that a single prior Resolution contained all sub-demands in the later demand.

## 3.8.2 Number of prior Resolutions containing the same partial demand (DUMMY)

The occurrence of *partial* repetitions of demands is coded in a separate column. A partial repetition occurs when the demand, or any of its sub-demands, was already issued in one or several prior Resolutions addressing one, several or all of the addressees of the new demand.

Values:

1. The demand, or none of its sub-demands, already figured in earlier Resolutions, or
2. The demand, or any of its sub-demands, already figured in one or several earlier Resolutions.

## 3.9 Prior consent of parties to substance of the demand (DUMMY)

This variable analyzes whether the demand reiterates a commitment made by any party to the conflict prior to the adoption of the Resolution containing the demand. Such prior commitments may be found in peace agreements. This variable indicates whether the substance of the demand already figured in a peace agreement that predated the Resolution in which it was issued.

For the eight types of peace agreements, refer to the definitions available under the link “peace agreements” on the UN Peacemaker website (<http://peacemaker.unlb.org/>). Information on peace agreements can also be found in the Uppsala Conflict Data Program Peace Agreement Dataset (<http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP/our_data1.htm>).

Peace agreements made in the context of the same civil war is taken into account even if they were not concluded among all parties to the armed conflict, or if they were signed by groups different from those participating in the armed conflict at the time of the adoption of the Resolution issuing the demand. When an agreement concluded prior to the outbreak of a civil war dealt with the incompatibility underlying the civil war, and its conclusion occurred in temporal proximity to the start of the civil war, it is taken into account.

The determination whether a demand in a Resolution reiterates a commitment made in a prior peace agreement is made on the basis of the methodology laid out in the description of variable 3.8.1.

Values:

1. No
2. Yes

## 3.10 Secretary-General issued a report prior to the adoption of the Resolution (DUMMY)

All reports of the Secretary-General to the Security Council since 1994 are listed on the webpage of the Security Council, and their full text can be retrieved from there (<http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/>). Information on reports of the Secretary-General to the Security Council can be found in the Official Records of the Security Council, which can be accessed for each resolution adopted prior to 1992 on the Council’s webpage by looking up the text of the resolution. Mostly, recent pertinent reports of the Secretary-General are mentioned in the preamble of the resolution itself.

Values:

1. No
2. Yes

# 4. Independent Variables: Adoption Circumstances-specific

## 4.1.1 Resolution introduced by (STRING)

This variable indicates which state(s) introduced the Resolution. See the “[list of abbreviations of state names](list%20of%20abbreviations%20of%20state%20names.xls)” for the standardized three-letter code used to identify these states.

If the draft was not formally introduced by a single state, but “prepared in the course of the Council’s prior consultations”, the code “1” is used in both columns.

The Security Council’s meeting records display which Council member introduced a resolution, as the President of the Council always starts the meeting by introducing all documents on the meeting’s agenda. The Council’s meeting records are available on the webpage of the Dag Hammarskjöld Library for all meetings held since 1994. For prior resolutions, the meeting records have to be retrieved from the Official Records, which are only available in hard copy at Columbia University’s Law School Library and other libraries.

## 4.1.2 Relationship of the introducing entity to the situation (CAT)

This variableindicates, in a separate column, the *relationship of the introducing entity to the situation*.

Values:

1. Participant in the dispute or conflict
2. State bordering a state on whose territory is occurring the situation under the consideration of the Security Council
3. State from the region of the state whose situation is under the consideration of the Security Council.
4. Group of states of which at least half are located in the region of the state whose situation is under the consideration of the Security Council.
5. Regional organization from the region of the state whose situation is under the consideration of the Security Council, i.e. at least one of the members of this regional organization has to be located in the respective region.

* E.g. AU, ECOWAS, EU

1. State not from the region of the state whose situation is under the consideration of the SC
2. Group of states of which half or more are located outside the region of the state whose situation is under the consideration of the Security Council.
3. UN organ

* E.g. UN Secretary-General

Note: These categories are mutually exclusive. If a state from the region of the state whose situation is under the consideration of the Security Council also borders the state in which the situation under consideration of the Council occurred, it falls under the second category. If a neighboring state participates in the conflict, it falls under the first category.

## 4.2 Voting record

This variable indicates, which Security Council member states cast positive or negative votes, abstained or were absent. Moreover, it indicates the number of positive votes, negative votes and abstentions in three separate columns.

The voting record for Security Council votes of recent decades is available through the link “New Browse list search” on the UNBISNET website (<http://www.un.org/Depts/dhl/unbisnet/index.html#voterecords>) by inserting the UN document number of the resolution in the following format: S/RES/number (year). The Official Records of the Security Council also display the voting record in the entry for the respective resolution. The respective part of the Official Records can be accessed through the webpage of the Security Council (<http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions.html>) for all resolutions adopted until 1992.

## 4.2.1 Voting record – China abstention (DUMMY)

Values:

1. No
2. Yes

## 4.2.2 Voting record – France abstention (DUMMY)

Values:

1. No
2. Yes

## 4.2.3 Voting record – Russia abstention (DUMMY)

Values:

1. No
2. Yes

## 4.2.4 Voting record – UK abstention (DUMMY)

Values:

1. No
2. Yes

## 4.2.5 Voting record – US abstention (DUMMY)

Values:

1. No
2. Yes

## 4.2.6 Voting record – number of E10 negative votes (NUM)

## 4.2.7 Voting record – number of absent votes (NUM)

## 4.2.8 Voting record – number of yes votes (NUM)

## 4.2.9 Voting record – number of abstention votes (NUM)

## 4.2.10 Voting record – number of no votes (NUM)

# 5. Independent Variables: Demand Content-specific

## 5.1 Mandatory and hortatory demand (STRING)

In its Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa), the International Court of Justice made the following observations on the question how to distinguish between hortatory and mandatory demands: “The language of a resolution of the Security Council should be carefully analyzed before a conclusion can be made as to its binding effect. In view of the nature of the powers of Article 25 [on the mandatory character of Security Council decisions], the question is to be determined in each case, having regard to the terms of the resolution to be interpreted, the discussions leading to it, the Charter provisions invoked and, in general, all circumstances that might assist in determining the legal consequences of the resolution of the Security Council.”[[17]](#footnote-17)

In the aforementioned Namibia Advisory Opinion and in the Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory the International Court of Justice held that the legal basis invoked, Chapter VI, VII, VII or XII of the Charter, is only one of several cumulative criteria for the determination of the mandatory or hortatory character of a demand.[[18]](#footnote-18) In the Namibia Advisory Opinion, for instance, the Court concluded that four demands issued under Chapter VI constituted mandatory demands.[[19]](#footnote-19) The court’s affirmation that demands issued under Chapter VI of the Charter can be legally binding is the subject of a controversy. For instance, the United Kingdom holds the view that the Council can only adopt binding decisions when it acts under Chapter VII of the Charter.[[20]](#footnote-20)

It is undisputed that decisions taken under Chapter VII can contain non-binding demands.[[21]](#footnote-21)

Consequently, mandatory and hortatory demands can be distinguished on the basis of an assessment of the intention of the Security Council to issue a given demand as a decision or recommendation.[[22]](#footnote-22) The assessment of the Council’s intentions is guided by the criteria identified by the International Court of Justice in the Namibia advisory opinion.

While the intention of the Council has to be assessed in each case, the following list of terminology used by the Council provides some preliminary guidance in distinguishing mandatory and hortatory demands:

*Terms used in hortatory demands:*

* Invites
* Encourages
* Recommends[[23]](#footnote-23)
* Appeals to
* Reaffirms … appeal to
* Should[[24]](#footnote-24)
* Considering that … should
* Declares that … should

*Terms that may be used in both hortatory and mandatory demands:*

* Urges[[25]](#footnote-25)
* Strongly urges
* Recalling … asking for
* Stressing the need
* Reaffirming the necessity
* Requests
* Are requested to
* Recalling that … were requested
* Declares that … must
* Calls upon[[26]](#footnote-26)
* Calls on[[27]](#footnote-27)
* Calling upon[[28]](#footnote-28)
* Resolves to call on[[29]](#footnote-29)
* Reminds that … has called upon[[30]](#footnote-30)

*Terms used only in mandatory demands:*

* Decides that … shall[[31]](#footnote-31)

## 5.2 Thematic type of requested conduct

These variables describe the conduct prescribed by the *demand*. Multiple types are possible only if a demand contains two or more sub-demands that request different thematic kinds of conduct.

The determination of the thematic type of the requested conduct is particularly difficult when the Security Council calls for a conduct that is also requested under a peace agreement.

Determining the thematic type of the requested conduct, special attention should be paid to the order in which the Security Council used in the operative paragraph or paragraph.

## 5.2.1 Military conduct (DUMMY)

Military conduct, including orchestrated political violence.

Values:

1. No
2. Yes

## 5.2.2 Police (DUMMY)

Police and law enforcement.

Values:

1. No
2. Yes

## 5.2.3 Humanitarian assistance (DUMMY)

Provide humanitarian assistance to victims of mass violence and detained combatants, including allow humanitarian access to them.

Values:

1. No
2. Yes

## 5.2.4 Protection of civilians (DUMMY)

Protection of civilians or protection of specific groups (beyond humanitarian access).

Values:

1. No
2. Yes

## 5.2.5 Freedom of Movement (DUMMY)

Freedom of movement of local populations.

Values:

1. No
2. Yes

## 5.2.6 Implementation of peace agreements (DUMMY)

Implement peace agreement: for the eight types of peace agreements, refer to the definitions available under the link “peace agreements” on the UN Peacemaker website (<http://peacemaker.unlb.org/>).

Values:

1. No
2. Yes

## 5.2.7 Internal political reconfiguration (DUMMY)

Internal political/organizational reconfiguration of local or national government structures.

Values:

1. No
2. Yes

## 5.2.8 Dialogue (DUMMY)

Engage in dialogue/reconcile with internal political actor, including release of political prisoners.

Values:

1. No
2. Yes

## 5.2.9 Elections (DUMMY)

Conduct related to elections or referenda, including election campaigns.

Values:

1. No
2. Yes

## 5.2.10 Economic and social policy (DUMMY)

Economic and social policy, including preservation of natural resources.

Values:

1. No
2. Yes

## 5.2.11 Media operations (DUMMY)

Media operations (stop propaganda or refrain from it, inform population of certain development, make public declaration).

Values:

1. No
2. Yes

## 5.2.12 Transitional justice (DUMMY)

Transitional justice, including truth and reconciliation commissions.

Values:

1. No
2. Yes

## 5.2.13 Engage in dialogue (DUMMY)

Engage in dialogue/reconcile with other state.

Values:

1. No
2. Yes

## 5.2.14 Provide assistance (DUMMY)

Provide political, financial, military or political assistance to resolution of conflict.

Values:

1. No
2. Yes

## 5.2.15 Respect sanctions (DUMMY)

Requests States to respect sanctions.

Values:

1. No
2. Yes

## 5.2.16 Monitor (DUMMY)

Monitor behavior of other actors.

Values:

1. No
2. Yes

## 5.2.17 Provide security to UN mission (DUMMY)

Provision of security and freedom of movement for UN mission or peacekeeping force.

Values:

1. No
2. Yes

## 5.2.18 Cooperate with external UN actor (DUMMY)

Cooperation with external UN actor (e.g., peace operation, International Atomic Energy Agency, or UN Security Council, or one of its subsidiary organs).

Values:

1. No
2. Yes

## 5.2.19 Report to UNSC (DUMMY)

Report to the Security Council or advise the Security Council.

Values:

1. No
2. Yes

## 5.2.20 Report to the SG (DUMMY)

Report to the Secretary-General.

Values:

1. No
2. Yes

## 5.3 Broad thematic type of requested conduct

These variables describe the conduct prescribed by the *demand* in broader terms than those of variable 5.2. Multiple types are possible only if a demand contains two or more sub-demands that request different thematic kinds of conduct.

The determination of the thematic type of the requested conduct is particularly difficult when the Security Council calls for a conduct that is also requested under a peace agreement.

Determining the thematic type of the requested conduct, special attention should be paid to the order in which the Security Council used in the operative paragraph or paragraph.

## 5.3.1 Military and Law enforcement (DUMMY)

Include the following categories:

5.2.1 Military conduct, including orchestrated political violence

5.2.2 Police and other law-enforcement conduct

Values:

1. No
2. Yes

## 5.3.2 Humanitarian actions (DUMMY)

Include the following categories:

5.2.3 Humanitarian access and assistance, including provision of security to humanitarian personnel

5.2.4 Protection of civilians or protection of specific groups (beyond humanitarian access)

5.2.5 Freedom of movement of local populations

Values:

1. No
2. Yes

## 5.3.3 Governance and internal political relations (DUMMY)

Include the following categories:

5.2.6 Implementation of peace agreements

5.2.7 Internal political/organizational reconfiguration of local or national government structures

5.2.8 Dialogue/reconciliation with internal political actor, including release of political prisoners

5.2.9 Conduct related to elections or referenda, including election campaigns

5.2.10 Economic and social policy, including preservation of natural resources

5.2.11 Media relations and operations, public declarations

5.2.12 Transitional justice, including truth and reconciliation commissions

Values:

1. No
2. Yes

## 5.3.4 External relations (DUMMY)

Include the following categories:

5.2.13 Dialogue/reconciliation with another state

5.2.14 Provision of political, financial, or military assistance to resolution of conflict

5.2.15 Respect for sanctions

5.2.16 Monitoring of behavior of other actors

Values:

1. No
2. Yes

## 5.3.5 Cooperation with the United Nations (DUMMY)

Include the following categories:

5.2.17 Provision of security and freedom of movement for UN mission or peacekeeping force

5.2.18 Cooperation with UN actor (e.g., peace operation, International Atomic Energy Agency, or UN Security Council, or one of its subsidiary organs)

5.2.19 Report to the Security Council or advise the Security Council

5.2.20 Report to the Secretary-General

Values:

1. No
2. Yes

## 5.4 Functional type of requested conduct (CAT)

Values:

1. Singular act
2. Continuous conduct
3. Omission
4. Singular act(s) or omission(s) *plus* continuous conduct

The demand to cease a certain action is considered a demand for a single act, not for an omission.

The demand to provide assistance to certain actors is considered a demand for continuous conduct unless the assistance unequivocally consists in a single act.

## 5.5 Characterization of the situation by the Council in relation to international peace and security (CAT)

Any characterization located in the entire Resolution is taken into account.

Values:

1. Council omits a characterization of the situation
2. Situation constitutes (present) threat to international peace and security
3. Situation constitutes (present) threat to international peace
4. Situation constitutes (present) threat to security
5. Situation constitutes a (present) threat to international peace and security in the region
6. Situation constitutes (present) threat to regional security
7. Situation constitutes breach of the peace
8. Situation results from act of aggression
9. Continuation of situation constitutes threat to international peace and to security
10. Continuation of situation constitutes threat to international peace
11. Continuation of situation constitutes threat to security
12. Continuation of situation constitutes threat to international peace and security in the region
13. Continuation of situation constitutes threat to regional security
14. Continuation of situation could constitute threat to international peace and to security
15. Continuation of situation could constitute threat to international peace
16. Continuation of situation could constitute threat to security
17. Continuation of situation could constitute threat to international peace and security in the region
18. Continuation of situation could constitute threat to regional security
19. Situation constitutes threat to peace and security in the region
20. Situation constitutes threat to peace in the region
21. Situation constitutes threat to security in the region
22. Continuation of situation constitutes threat to peace and security in the region
23. Continuation of situation constitutes threat to peace in the region
24. Continuation of situation constitutes threat to security in the region
25. Continuation of situation could constitute threat to peace and security in the region
26. Continuation of situation could constitute threat to peace in the region
27. Continuation of situation could constitute threat to security in the region

## 5.6 References in the Resolution to the Charter or other treaties

This variable indicates whether the Resolution issuing the demand includes a reference to Chapter VI, VII, or VIII of the Charter, to any specific Charter article or to any other treaty. Any reference located in the Resolution is taken into account.

## 5.6.1 Operative Chapter VI (DUMMY)

Operative reference to Chapter VI.

Values:

1. No
2. Yes

## 5.6.2 Operative Chapter VII (DUMMY)

Operative reference to Chapter VII.

Values:

1. No
2. Yes

## 5.6.3 Operative Chapter VIII (DUMMY)

Operative reference to Chapter VIII.

Values:

1. No
2. Yes

## 5.6.4 Preambular Chapter VII (DUMMY)

Preambular reference to Chapter VII.

Values:

1. No
2. Yes

## 5.6.5 Preambular Chapter VIII (DUMMY)

Preambular reference to Chapter VIII.

Values:

1. No
2. Yes

## 5.6.6 References in the Resolution to the Charter articles (STRING)

This variable indicates references to specific Charter articles. It contains the number of the respective article(s). Multiple scores are possible. If no reference was made to any Charter article, the code “0” is used.

## 5.6.7 References in the Resolution to other treaties (DUMMY)

This variable records references to other treaties and agreements in the Resolution issuing the demand.

Values:

1. No
2. Yes

## 5.7.1 Positive incentives conditional upon compliance with the demand (CAT)

Only positive incentives that are explicitly referred to in the Resolution is taken into account.

Values:

1. None
2. Positive financial incentives
3. Technical development incentives
4. Removal of sanctions
5. Recognition of territorial claim or other status recognition
6. Both positive financial incentives *and* technical development incentives
7. Both positive financial incentives *and* removal of sanctions
8. Both removal of sanctions *and* recognition of territorial claim or other status recognition

## 5.7.2 Threats conditional upon compliance with the demand (CAT)

Only threats that are explicitly referred to in the Resolution is taken into account. If the Security Council threatens to impose future sanctions, it does not voice a threat of the *loss of benefits*. Threats about the imposition of sanctions are recorded by variable 5.8.1.

Values:

1. None
2. Threat of loss of financial benefits
3. Threat related to peace operation
4. Threat of loss of other benefits
5. Threat of the loss of financial benefits *and* threat related to peace operation *and* threat of the loss of other benefits
6. Threat related to peace operation *and* threat of the loss of other benefits

#### 

## 5.7.3 Threat of the use of force in the case of non-compliance (CAT)

Only threats that are explicitly referred to in the Resolution is taken into account.

Values:

1. No threat
2. Specific threat
   * E.g. declaration that "the situation in Palestine is reconsidered with view to action under Chapter VII if resolution rejected"
3. Abstract threat
   * E.g. Res. 1441 (2002) recalling its repeated threat that Iraq will it “will face serious consequences as a result of its continued violations of its obligations”
   * E.g. threat to "consider what further measures are required to maintain or restore the peace" in case of non-compliance

## 5.8 UN Sanctions (CAT)

This variable indicates whether sanctions were imposed *against the addressee* or whether the Security Council threatened to impose sanctions upon it in case of non-compliance with the demand, in a different demand.

## 5.8.1 None (DUMMY)

No sanctions

Values:

1. No
2. Yes

## 5.8.2 Imposed (DUMMY)

The Resolution containing the demand imposes sanctions

Values:

1. No
2. Yes

## 5.8.3 Previous (DUMMY)

UN sanctions were imposed previously and were in force at the time of the adoption of the Resolution containing the demand

Values:

1. No
2. Yes

## 5.8.4 Threat (DUMMY)

The Resolution at hand contains a threat of future sanctions in case of non-compliance with the demand

Values:

1. No
2. Yes

## 5.8.5 Threat in other section (DUMMY)

The Resolution at hand contains a threat of future sanctions in case of non-compliance with other demands contained in the Resolution

* E.g. PRST S/26633 of 25 October 1993

Values:

1. No
2. Yes

## 5.9 UN Sanctions type

Furthermore, the variable indicates, in a separate column, which kind of sanctions were taken or announced in case of non-compliance.

## 5.9.1 General trade (DUMMY)

General trade sanctions.

Values:

1. No
2. Yes

## 5.9.2 Arms embargo (DUMMY)

Embargo on import or transfer of arms and related materiel

Values:

1. No
2. Yes

## 5.9.3 Oil embargo (DUMMY)

Trade sanctions on petroleum and/or on petroleum products

Values:

1. No
2. Yes

## 5.9.4 Natural resource embargo (DUMMY)

Embargo on export of non-petroleum natural resources (including diamonds, timber, etc.)

Values:

1. No
2. Yes

## 5.9.5 Financial sanctions (DUMMY)

Financial sanctions on organs of the state targeted by the sanctions, or on persons or entities exercising governmental authority on behalf of the addressee

Values:

1. No
2. Yes

## 5.9.6 Travel restrictions (DUMMY)

Travel restrictions for organs of the state targeted by the sanctions, or on persons or entities exercising governmental authority on behalf of the addressee

Values:

1. No
2. Yes

## 5.9.7 Targeted sanctions (DUMMY)

Targeted sanctions on trade in specific commodities not covered by the above (e.g. North Korean luxury import sanctions)

Values:

1. No
2. Yes

## 5.9.8 Diplomatic boycott (DUMMY)

Diplomatic boycott against organs of the state or of the organization targeted by the sanctions

Values:

1. No
2. Yes

## 5.10 Mechanism for monitoring compliance with the demand

This variable indicates which institution was mandated to monitor compliance *with this specific demand*. The mandate to monitor can either be included in the Resolution or a previous Resolution, in the terms of engagement of a peacekeeping force or in another official United Nations document.

## 5.10.1 Council (DUMMY)

Council (not the SC) such as the United Nations Council for Namibia

Values:

1. No
2. Yes

## 5.10.2 Commission (DUMMY)

Commission such as the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine

Values:

1. No
2. Yes

## 5.10.3 Consular commission (DUMMY)

Consular Commission such as the Consular Commission for monitoring the situation in Indonesia

Values:

1. No
2. Yes

## 5.10.4 Sub-commission (DUMMY)

Sub-commission only if the Commission itself is not involved in the monitoring other than through the establishment of the Sub-commission. If both a Commission and its subsidiary Sub-commission monitor compliance, the former is listed as the monitoring mechanism.

Values:

1. No
2. Yes

## 5.10.5 Committee (DUMMY)

Committee (including Sanctions Committee) such as the Security Council Committee established pursuant to Resolution 985 (1995) (concerning the situation in Liberia).

Values:

1. No
2. Yes

## 5.10.6 Subcommittee (DUMMY)

Sub-committee only if the Committee itself is not involved in the monitoring other than through the establishment of the Sub-committee. If both a Committee and its subsidiary Subcommittee monitor compliance, the former is taken into account; e.g. Subcommittee established by SC RES 19 of 2/27/1947 (in the Corfu Channel dispute).

Values:

1. No
2. Yes

## 5.10.7 Panel of expert (DUMMY)

Panel of experts such as the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

Values:

1. No
2. Yes

## 5.10.8 UN field personnel (DUMMY)

UN field personnel (PKO, SRSG, Special Envoy of the Secretary-General) such as UN Interim Force in Lebanon

Values:

1. No
2. Yes

## 5.10.9 Security Council (DUMMY)

Monitoring of compliance by the Security Council itself (only if specifically announced by the Council)

* E.g. Res. 1037 (1996): “Decides that, no later than 14 days after the date on which demilitarization is scheduled to be completed […], [the Security Council] will review whether the parties have shown a willingness to implement the Basic Agreement”

Values:

1. No
2. Yes

## 5.10.10 President of the Security Council (DUMMY)

President of the Security Council

Values:

1. No
2. Yes

## 5.10.11 Secretary General (DUMMY)

Secretary-General (other than by issuing a report). If the Resolution requests the Secretary to issue a report, this request will only be recorded by Variable 3.12. An example for a Resolution requesting the Secretary-General to monitor compliance other than by issuing a report is Res. 226 (1966), which asks the Secretary-General to “follow closely the implementation of the present resolution.”

Values:

1. No
2. Yes

## 5.10.12 Other UN body (DUMMY)

Other UN body

Values:

1. No
2. Yes

## 5.10.1 3 Other international organization (DUMMY)

Other international organization

Values:

1. No
2. Yes

## 5.10.1 4 Specific state (DUMMY)

Specific state(s) such as the enforcement of naval blockade against Haiti imposed by Res. 875 (1993) by U.S., Canadian, Argentinian, French, Dutch and UK ships in 1993

Values:

1. No
2. Yes

## 5.10.15 Fact-finding mission (DUMMY)

Fact-finding mission established by the Security Council

Values:

1. No
2. Yes

## 5.10.16 Establishment of a mechanism for monitoring compliance (CAT)

The variable also indicates whether the monitoring mechanism was established by the Resolution, which contains the demand or whether it already existed before its adoption.

Values:

1. N/a (no monitoring mechanism)
2. Pre-existing: The subsidiary organ had already been established before the adoption of the Resolution issuing the demand. Changes in the mandate of a pre-existing subsidiary organ by the Resolution issuing the demand do not impact on the qualification of the subsidiary organ as pre-existing.
3. Pre-existing and new: A subsidiary organ had already been established before the adoption of the Resolution issuing the demand, and a new additional one was created by this Resolution.
4. New: The Resolution issuing the demand established the subsidiary organ.

## 5.10.17 Mechanism for monitoring compliance (DUMMY)

This dummy variable indicates whether or not a compliance monitoring mechanism exists on the ground at the time of the resolution.

Values:

1. No
2. Yes

## 5.11 Request for a report by the Secretary-General in the Resolution (DUMMY)

Any request for an SG’s report located in the Resolution is taken into account.

Value:

1. No
2. Yes

## 5.12 Request for another report by the Resolution

Any request located in the Resolution is taken into account. The report has to be addressed either to the Security-Council, or to the Secretary-General, provided a separate demand requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council.

## 5.12.1 Request by one UN organ, agency or fund

Value:

1. No
2. Yes

## 5.12.2 Request by one or more member states

Value:

1. No
2. Yes

## 5.12.3 Request by all member states

Value:

1. No
2. Yes

## 5.12.4 Request by a regional organization

Value:

1. No
2. Yes

## 5.12.5 Request by a multilateral peace force

Value:

1. No
2. Yes

1

## 5.13 Sunset clause (CAT)

A sunset clause provides for the automatic expiry of a regulation established by the Resolution at a specified later point in time. Any sunset clause located in the Resolution is taken into account.

* E.g. the extension of the mandate of a UN peace operation for six months

The variable does not only describe the type of the sunset clause, but it also indicates, in a separate column, its duration in months.

Value:

1. None
2. Sunset clause related to UN peace operation
3. Sunset clause related to sanctions
4. Other type of sunset clause
5. Sunset clause related to UN peace operations as well as an other type of sunset clause

## 

# 6. Independent Variables: Addressee Characteristics

## 6.1 Addressee name (STRING)

In general, this study is only interested in assessing the level and the correlates of compliance with Security Council demands by relevant actors. Often, the Security Council uses an extremely inclusive language in its demands. For instance, a demand may address “all political parties” in a conflict country. However, only those that gained seats in the national parliament, and relevant others, such as opposition parties with a significant number of supporters that boycotted the elections, are coded as addressees of the elections. Other parties are omitted from the study because their compliance or non-compliance with the Security Council’s demands did not have a significant impact on the course of the conflict.

A standardized three-letter code is used to identify the country or non-state actor (see Annex 1 & 2 for the lists of abbreviations of state and non-state actor names).

## 6.2.1 Geographic location of addressee (CAT)

The variable specifies in which of the 21 world regions identified by the Cartographic Department of the Dag Hammarskjöld Library (Department of Public Information) the addressee is located.

If a demand addresses an international organization whose members are located in two or more regions on the same continent, multiple codes is used. If the demand addresses an international organization extending to regions on two or more continents, the code (22) is used. The OSCE, for example, is coded “22”.

Values:

1. Eastern Africa
2. Middle Africa
3. Northern Africa
4. Southern Africa
5. Western Africa
6. Eastern Asia
7. South-central Asia
8. South-eastern Asia
9. Western Asia
10. Eastern Europe
11. Northern Europe
12. Southern Europe
13. Western Europe
14. Caribbean
15. Central America
16. South America
17. Northern America
18. Australia and New Zealand
19. Melanesia
20. Micronesia
21. Polynesia
22. Cross-regional (several regions on two or more continents, but not all regions)
23. Worldwide (all regions)
24. All Europe
25. All Europe and North America
26. All Africa
27. CIS
28. All Americas
29. MENA

## 6.2.2 Geographic political group of addressee (CAT)

If the addressee is a state, this variable specifies the regional political grouping within the UN system in which the addressee was located at the time of the adoption of the Resolution.

Values:

1. Not a member of any regional group at the time of the adoption of the Resolution

* E.g. Israel did not form part of a regional group until it joined WEOG in 2000

1. African Group
2. Asian Group
3. Eastern European Group
4. Latin American and Caribbean Group (GRULAC)
5. Western European and Others Group (WEOG)
6. N/a

* E.g. all states, international organizations, non-governmental actors etc.

## 6.3 Status of addressee (CAT)

Resolutions addressing “all states” fall in the category “1”.

Values:

1. State
2. Non-state actor
3. International organization
4. The international community
5. Individual
6. Ethnic, religious, political or other communities, and other groups of individuals
7. Multilateral peace force
8. Universal
9. Political party
10. Private sector

## 6.4 Participation in the armed conflict (DUMMY)

This variable indicates whether the addressee directly participated in the armed conflict by taking part in the hostilities with regular or irregular armed forces at the time of the adoption of the Security Council Resolution issuing the demand. This variable and the respective data are taken from the Uppsala Conflict Database (<http://www.pcr.uu.se/database/basicSearch.php>).

Values:

1. No
2. Yes

## 6.5 Victorious side in the armed conflict (CAT)

This variable measures whether a winner emerged in the armed conflict in the context of which the demand was issued. This variable and the respective data are taken from the Uppsala Conflict Database (<http://www.pcr.uu.se/database/basicSearch.php>).

Values:

1. The addressee achieved a victory in the armed conflict prior to the issuing of the demand
2. The addressee achieved a victory in the armed conflict after the demand was issued
3. The addressee was defeated in the armed conflict after the demand was issued
4. No victory in the armed conflict
5. N/a (the addressee did not participate in the armed conflict)
6. The addressee was defeated in the armed conflict before the demand was issued

## 6.6 Prior consent of the addressee to the substance of the demand (CAT)

This variable analyzes whether the addressee explicitly endorsed the substantive content of the demand prior to its adoption in the Resolution. Such prior commitments may be found in peace agreements. Variable 3.9 indicates whether the substance of the demand already figured in a peace agreement that predated the Resolution in which it was issued. This variable measures whether the addressee was a party to an agreement that already contained the substance of the demand.

For the eight types of peace agreements, refer to the definitions available under the link “peace agreements” on the UN Peacemaker website (<http://peacemaker.unlb.org/>). Information on peace agreements can also be found in the Uppsala Conflict Data Program’s Peace Agreement Dataset (<http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP/our_data1.htm>).

Refer to the Uppsala Conflict Database’s list of definitions (<http://www.pcr.uu.se/database/definitions_all.htm>) for the definition of the term secondary party to the conflict. The question on which side a party was engaged in the conflict is to be determined by reference to the party’s position in the conflict at the time of the adoption of the Resolution issuing the demand. The information needed for making this determination is taken from the Uppsala Conflict Database (<http://www.pcr.uu.se/database/basicSearch.php>).

If the addressee was not among the initial signatories of the peace agreement, but explicitly and publicly accepted its provisions prior to the adoption of the Resolution issuing the demand, it is considered a party to the peace agreement.

Values:

1. No
2. Yes
3. No, but another party to the conflict (primary or secondary, warring or non-warring) intervening on the side of the addressee consented to the substance of the demand prior to the issuing of the Resolution
4. No, but an opposing primary party to the armed conflict, or a secondary party to the conflict (warring or non-warring) intervening on its side, consented to the substance of the demand prior to the issuing of the Resolution

## 6.7 Energy consumption (NUM)

This variable measures the energy consumption in the state of the addressee. The consumption is measured in thousands of coal-ton equivalents. This variable is taken from the Correlates of War project’s [National Material Capabilities Dataset](../External%20Data%20Sets/Correlates%20of%20War/National%20Capabilities%20Data%20set.zip). If the addressee is neither a state nor non-state actor with a home state (e.g. if the demand addresses an international organization), or if the demand addresses all states, the cell in the database should be left empty. Data for this variable is only available until 2001.

## 6.8 Iron and steel consumption (NUM)

This variable measures the iron and steel consumption in the state of the addressee. The production is measured in thousands of tons. This variable is taken from the Correlates of War project’s [National Material Capabilities Dataset](../External%20Data%20Sets/Correlates%20of%20War/National%20Capabilities%20Data%20set.zip). If the addressee is neither a state nor non-state actor with a home state (e.g. if the demand addresses an international organization), or if the demand addresses all states, the cell in the database should be left empty. Data for this variable is only available until 2001.

## 6.9 Total population (NUM)

This variable measures the total population of the state of the addressee. This variable is taken from the Correlates of War project’s [National Material Capabilities Dataset](../External%20Data%20Sets/Correlates%20of%20War/National%20Capabilities%20Data%20set.zip). If the addressee is neither a state nor non-state actor with a home state (e.g. if the demand addresses an international organization), or if the demand addresses all states, the cell in the database should be left empty. Data for this variable is only available until 2001.

## 6.10 Urban population (NUM)

This variable measures the number of people living in cities with a population greater than 100,000 in the state of the addressee. It is taken from the Correlates of War project’s [National Material Capabilities Dataset](../External%20Data%20Sets/Correlates%20of%20War/National%20Capabilities%20Data%20set.zip). If the addressee is neither a state nor non-state actor with a home state (e.g. if the demand addresses an international organization), or if the demand addresses all states, the cell in the database should be left empty. Data for this variable is only available until 2001.

The degree of urbanization serves as an indicator of the economic development status of the country.[[32]](#footnote-32) It shows the productivity of the country’s economy in two ways: a high percentage of urban population shows that food production per farmer has risen to a point where the majority of the population can engage in nonfarm activities. Moreover, economic activity in nonfarm economic activities is generally higher in urban settings than in rural areas.[[33]](#footnote-33)

## 6.11 Degree of effective governmental control (CAT)

This variable, and the coding, corresponds to the [Polity IV project](../External%20Data%20Sets/Polity%20IV/p4xls03%20Annual%20Time%20Series%20Dataset.zip)’s “fragment” variable. It “codes the operational existence of a separate polity, or polities, comprising substantial territory and population within the recognized borders of the state and over which the coded polity exercises no effective authority (effective authority may be participatory or coercive)” in the state of the addressee.[[34]](#footnote-34) Data for this variable is only available for the years 2000-2003. If the addressee is neither a state nor non-state actor with a home state (e.g. if the demand addresses an international organization), if the demand addresses all states, or if the data is unavailable, the code “4” is used.

Value:

1. No overt fragmentation
2. Slight fragmentation: less than 10% of territory not under effective control of government
3. Moderate fragmentation: 10-25% of territory not under effective control of government
4. Serious fragmentation: over 25% of territory not under effective control of government
5. N/a, or no data available

# 7. Independent Variables: State Addressee Characteristics

These variables only describe state addressees of Security Council demands. No data for these variables was gathered for non-state actors or international organizations.

## 7.1 Character of government score (NUM)

This score corresponds to the [Polity IV Project](../External%20Data%20Sets/Polity%20IV/p4xls03%20Annual%20Time%20Series%20Dataset.zip)’s “Polity2” score. It is a composite variable calculated through an assessment of the competitiveness of political participation, the regulation of participation, the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment and constraints on the chief executive.[[35]](#footnote-35) The character of government is indicated on a 21-point scale from institutionalized autocracy (-10) to institutionalized democracy (10).

When a polity is temporarily dissolved by “foreign interruption”, no Polity2 score is available from the Polity IV dataset.[[36]](#footnote-36) In these cases, which are coded with the score “-66” for the “Polity” variable, no value is recorded for the “character of government score” variable.

## 7.2 Durability of regime score (NUM)

This variable is also taken from the dataset of the [Polity IV Project](../External%20Data%20Sets/Polity%20IV/p4xls03%20Annual%20Time%20Series%20Dataset.zip). It corresponds to Polity IV’s “durable” score and it indicates “the number of years since the most recent regime change (defined by a three-point change in the polity score over a period of three years or less) or the end of transition period defined by the lack of stable political institutions”.[[37]](#footnote-37)

## 7.3 Executive constraints (CAT)

This variable corresponds to the “xconst” variable of the [Polity IV Project](../External%20Data%20Sets/Polity%20IV/p4xls03%20Annual%20Time%20Series%20Dataset.zip). It “refers to the extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision-making powers of chief executives, whether individuals or collectivities” by accountability groups like parliaments or an independent judiciary.[[38]](#footnote-38)

Values:

1. Unlimited authority
2. Intermediate category
3. Slight to moderate limitation on executive authority
4. Intermediate category
5. Substantial limitations on executive authority
6. Executive parity or subordination

## 7.4 Executive recruitment (NUM)

This composite variable, and the coding, correspond to the “exrec” variable in the [Polity IV Project](../External%20Data%20Sets/Polity%20IV/p4xls03%20Annual%20Time%20Series%20Dataset.zip) dataset. It is calculated by assessing the regulation of chief executive recruitment along a scale from unregulated to regulated, the competitiveness of chief executive recruitment along a scale from selection to election and the openness of chief executive recruitment along a scale from closed to open.[[39]](#footnote-39)

## 7.5 Political competition (NUM)

This variable is also taken from the [Polity IV Project](../External%20Data%20Sets/Polity%20IV/p4xls03%20Annual%20Time%20Series%20Dataset.zip) (“polcomp”). It combines information on the competitiveness of political participation and on the regulation of political participation in a state.[[40]](#footnote-40)

## 7.6 Military expenditure (NUM)

This variable is taken from the Correlates of War project’s [National Material Capabilities Dataset](../External%20Data%20Sets/Correlates%20of%20War/National%20Capabilities%20Data%20set.zip). Data for this variable is only available until 2001.

## 7.7 Military personnel (NUM)

The manpower is measured in thousands of troops. This variable is taken from the Correlates of War project’s [National Material Capabilities Dataset](../External%20Data%20Sets/Correlates%20of%20War/National%20Capabilities%20Data%20set.zip). Data for this variable is only available until 2001.

## 7.8 Composite index of national capability score (NUM)

This composite variable combines information on the military expenditures, the military personnel, the energy consumption, the iron & steel consumption, the total population and the urban population. It is taken from the Correlates of War project’s [National Material Capabilities Dataset](../External%20Data%20Sets/Correlates%20of%20War/National%20Capabilities%20Data%20set.zip). Data for this variable is only available until 2001.

# 8. Dependent Variables: Compliance

Compliance with most types of norms cannot be conceptualized in binary terms. It is hardly ever a black-or-white issue: compliance may change over time, some demand addressees may comply while others do not, and any demand addressee may comply with parts of complex demand while ignoring others. We use a four-point scale for the assessment of the level of compliance by civil war parties with demands issued to them by the Security Council. This coding scale does not allow the use of half-scores or fractional scores. A single compliance score captures compliance by all addressees with a single demand.

Each point on the level of compliance scale is assessed by reference to either the incidents covered by the demand, or, where the demand involved multiple sub-demands, by reference to the aspects of the demand. By incident we mean events triggered by the demand addressees that fall within the substantive scope of the demand and that occurred within the time frame for assessing compliance. By aspect we mean sub-demands entailed within one demand.

Values:

1. No or marginal compliance:
   * No compliance with the demand in all or almost all incidents covered by the demand; or
   * Compliance with no or almost no aspects of the demand of any significance to the achievement of the overall objectives of the demand.
2. Medium low compliance:
   * Compliance in a minority of incidents covered by the demand; or
   * Compliance only with those aspects of the demand that were of a relatively low significance to the achievement of the objectives of the demand.
3. Medium high compliance:
   * Compliance with a majority of incidents covered by the demand; or
   * Compliance with those aspects of the demand that were of relatively high significance to the achievement of the objectives of the demand.
4. Full or almost full compliance:
   * Compliance with all or almost all incidents covered by the demand; or
   * Compliance with all or almost all aspects of the demand significant for the achievement of the objectives of the demand

## 8.1 Final compliance score

Two independent expert coders made compliance and depth of demand codes. IPI then reconciled these codes through examination of source materials supplied by expert coders.

## 8.1.1 Short-term compliance

Compliance 6 months after the adoption of the Resolution.

## 8.1.2 Medium-term compliance

Compliance 12 months after the adoption of the Resolution.

## 8.2.1 Coder 1 Short-term compliance

Compliance 6 months after the adoption of the Resolution.

## 8.2.2 Coder 1 Medium-term compliance

Compliance 12 months after the adoption of the Resolution.

## 8.3.1 Coder 2 Short-term compliance

Compliance 6 months after the adoption of the Resolution.

## 8.3.2 Coder 2 Medium-term compliance

Compliance 12 months after the adoption of the Resolution.

# Annex 1: List of State Abbreviations

* AAB - Antigua & Barbuda
* AFG - Afghanistan
* ALB - Albania
* ALG - Algeria
* ALL - all UN member states
* AND - Andorra
* ANG - Angola
* ARG - Argentina
* ARM - Armenia
* AUL - Australia
* AUS - Austria
* AZE - Azerbaijan
* BAH - Bahrain
* BAR - Barbados
* BEL - Belgium
* BEN - Benin
* BFO - Burkina Faso
* BHM - Bahamas
* BHU - Bhutan
* BLR - Belarus
* BLZ - Belize
* BNG - Bangladesh
* BOL - Bolivia
* BOS - Bosnia and Herzegovina
* BOT - Botswana
* BRA - Brazil
* BRU - Brunei
* BUI - Burundi
* BUL - Bulgaria
* CAM - Cambodia
* CAN - Canada
* CAO - Cameroon
* CAP - Cape Verde
* CDI - Ivory Coast
* CEN - Central African Republic
* CHA - Chad
* CHL - Chile
* CHN - China
* COL - Colombia
* COM - Comoros
* CON - Congo
* COS - Costa Rica
* CRO - Croatia
* CUB - Cuba
* CYP - Cyprus
* CZE - Czechoslovakia
* CZR - Czech Republic
* DEN - Denmark
* DJI - Djibouti
* DMA - Dominica
* DOM - Dominican Republic
* DRC - Democratic Republic of the Congo
* DRV - Vietnam
* ECU - Ecuador
* EGY - Egypt
* EQG - Equatorial Guinea
* ERI - Eritrea
* EST - Estonia
* ETH - Ethiopia
* ETM - East Timor
* FIJ - Fiji
* FIN - Finland
* FRN - France
* FSM - Federated States of Micronesia
* GAB - Gabon
* GAM - Gambia
* GDR - German Democratic Republic
* GFR - German Federal Republic
* GHA - Ghana
* GMY - Germany
* GNB - Guinea-Bissau
* GRC - Greece
* GRG - Georgia
* GRN - Grenada
* GUA - Guatemala
* GUI - Guinea
* GURN - Government of Unity and National Reconciliation
* GUY - Guyana
* HAI - Haiti
* HON - Honduras
* HUN - Hungary
* ICE - Iceland
* IND - India
* INS - Indonesia
* IRE - Ireland
* IRN - Iran
* IRQ - Iraq
* ISR - Israel
* ITA - Italy
* JAM - Jamaica
* JOR - Jordan
* JPN - Japan
* KEN - Kenya
* KIR - Kiribati
* KOR - Korea
* KUW - Kuwait
* KYR - Kyrgyzstan
* KZK - Kazakhstan
* LAO - Laos
* LAT - Latvia
* LBR - Liberia
* LEB - Lebanon
* LES - Lesotho
* LIB - Libya
* LIE - Liechtenstein
* LIT - Lithuania
* LUX - Luxemburg
* MAA - Mauritania
* MAC - Macedonia
* MAD - Maldives
* MAG - Madagascar
* MAL - Malaysia
* MAS - Mauritius
* MAW - Malawi
* MEX - Mexico
* MLD - Moldova
* MLI - Mali
* MLT - Malta
* MNC - Monaco
* MON - Mongolia
* MOR - Morocco
* MSI - Marshall Islands
* MYA - Myanmar
* MZM - Mozambique
* NAM - Namibia
* NAU - Nauru
* NEP - Nepal
* NEW - New Zealand
* NIC - Nicaragua
* NIG - Nigeria
* NIR - Niger
* NOR - Norway
* NTH - Netherlands
* OMA - Oman
* PAK - Pakistan
* PAL - Palau
* PAN - Panama
* PAR - Paraguay
* PAR - Paraguay
* PER - Peru
* PHI - Philippines
* PNG -Papua New Guinea
* POL - Poland
* POR - Portugal
* PRK - North Korea
* QAT - Qatar
* ROK - South Korea
* ROM - Romania
* RUS - Russia
* RVN - Republic of Vietnam
* RWA - Rwanda
* SAF - South Africa
* SAL - El Salvador
* SAU - Saudi Arabia
* SEN - Senegal
* SEY - Seychelles
* SIE - Sierra Leone
* SIN - Singapore
* SKN - St. Kitts and Nevis
* SLO - Slovakia
* SLU - St. Lucia
* SLV - Slovenia
* SNM - San Marino
* SOL - Solomon Islands
* SOM - Somalia
* SPN - Spain
* SRI - Sri Lanka
* STP - Sao Tome and Principe
* SUD - Sudan
* SUR - Suriname
* SVG - St. Vincent and the Grenadines
* SWA - Swaziland
* SWD - Sweden
* SWZ - Switzerland
* SYR - Syria
* TAJ - Tajikistan
* TAW - Taiwan
* TAZ - Tanzania
* THI - Thailand
* TKM - Turkmenistan
* TOG - Togo
* TON - Tonga
* TRI - Trinidad and Tobago
* TUN - Tunisia
* TUR - Turkey
* TUV - Tuvalu
* UAE - United Arab Emirates
* UGA - Uganda
* UKG - United Kingdom
* UKR - Ukraine
* URU - Uruguay
* USA - United States of America
* UZB - Uzbekistan
* VAN - Vanuatu
* VEN - Venezuela
* WSM – Samoa
* YAR - Yemen Arab Republic
* YEM - Yemen
* YPR - Yemen People's Republic
* YUG - Yugoslavia
* ZAM - Zambia
* ZIM - Zimbabwe

# Annex 2: List of Non-state Actor Abbreviations

* AAK - Alliance for the Future of Kosovo
* ABASA - Burundian-African Alliance for Salvation
* ABK - Abkhazia (Georgia)
* ACBiH - All concerned in Bosnia and Herzegovina
* ACCDI - All states concerned in Cote d'Ivoire
* ACFY - All concerned in the former Yugoslavia
* ACYC - All concerned in the Yugoslavia conflict
* ADB - Asian Development Bank
* ADC - Ahmad Diamond Corporation
* AD-Coligacao - Front for Democracy in Angola
* ADD - Action for Democracy and Development Party (Cambodia)
* ADF - Allied Democratic Forces
* ADFL - Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo
* AF - Atlantic Front, or Yatama (Nicaragua)
* AFRC - Armed Forces Revolutionary Council
* AHDA - All Humanitarian and Developmental Actors
* AHMADAA - Ali Ahmad Ahmad
* AHMADAS - Ali Said Ahmad
* AHMADH - Hassan Ahmad
* AHMADI - Imad Ahmad
* AHMADMA - Moussa Ahmad Ahmad
* AHMADN - Nazem Ahmad AHMADSA - Said Ali Ahmad
* AIA - All International Agencies
* AIFI - All international financial institutions
* AIO - All International Organizations
* AKHIMANZA - Steven K. Akhimanza
* AKIL - A. Knight International Ltd.
* ALATAS - H.E. Ali Alatas, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Indonesia and co-President of the Paris Conference on Cambodia
* ALCP - All-Liberian Coalition Party
* ALiR - Rwandan Liberation Army
* ALL 827 - "All state who have not yet complied with the provisions of resolution 827"
* ALLAFG - All Afghans
* ALLCAM - All Cambodians
* ALLCON - All Congolese
* ALLI - All individuals
* ALLLIB - All Liberians
* ALLY - Leader of Guyana Democratic Party (GDP), Asgar ALLY
* AL-SHANFARI - Thamer Said Ahmed Al-Shanfari
* AMC - Amalgamated Metal Coporation Plc
* AMF - America Mineral Fields
* AML - Anglovaal Mining Ltd.
* AMMM - A & M Minerals and Metals Ltd.
* ANADDE - National Alliance for Law and Economic Development
* ANGLO - Anglo American Plc
* AP - Patriotic Alliance
* APC - Alliance for Parliamentary Cohesion (Haiti)
* APCON - Armee Populaire Congolaise
* APLC - All People's Congress (APC) (Sierra Leone)
* APD - Alliance for Peace and Democracy
* ARCTIC - Arctic Investment
* ARO - All Regional Organizations
* AS - African States
* ASA - Asa Diam
* ASAI - Asa International
* ASES - All sectors of society in El Salvador
* ASHANTI - Ashanti Goldfields
* ASL - Alex Stewart (Assayers) Ltd.
* ATC - African Trading Corporation Sarl
* AU - African Union
* AVIENT - Avient Air
* AV-INTWARI - Alliance of the Valiants
* BACCHUS - Leader of National Democratic Front (NDF), Joseph BACCHUS
* BAF - Burundian Armed Forces
* BAG - Bayer A.G.
* BANYA - Banyamulenge
* BARCLAYS - Barclays Bank
* BAS - Business Air Service
* BAT - Bukavu Aviation Transport
* BBL - BHP Billiton
* BC - Banro Corporation
* BDA - Bilateral Donors to Afghanistan
* BELGO - Belgolaise
* BERISHA - Sali Berisha, leader of the Democratic Party and current Albanian President
* BICC - Bonn International Center for Conversion
* BIHACKA - Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia, aka Bihacka Krajina
* BIKUMU - Felicien Ruchacha Bikumu
* BILDT - Carl Bildt--Co-Chairman of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY)
* BLDP - Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party (Cambodia) -- known as the KPNLF prior to May 1992
* BOLEY - Dr. G. E. Saigbe Boley Sr.
* BOUT - Victor Anatoljevitch Bout
* BOWEN - Ltg. J. Hezekiah Bowen
* BREDENKAMP - John Arnold Bredenkamp
* BURUNDI - Mr. Burundi
* BVBA - Diagem BVBA
* CABOT - Cabot Corporation
* CAF - Congolese Armed Forces
* CAMCA - Cambodia's constituent assembly (of 1993)
* CANDRC - Candidates in DRC 2006 elections
* CARICOM - The Caribbean Community
* CARSON - Carson Products
* CB - Constitutional Bloc (Haiti)
* CC - Mercantille CC
* CCAFH - Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Haiti (General Raoul Cedras)
* CCP - Cambodian People's Party (name changed from KPRP in 1991)
* CDF - Civil Defence Forces
* CFDC - Congress for Democratic Change (Liberia)
* CFID - Cambodia Free Independent Democracy Party
* CHDC - Congo Holding Development Company
* CHEAPOO - Chea Cheapoo
* CHP - Chief of Haitian Police
* CIS - Commonwealth of Independent States
* CMAC - Cambodian Mine Action Centre
* CNDA - National Democratic Convention of Angola
* CNDD - National Council for the Defence of Democracy
* CNR - Commission on National Reconciliation (Tajikistan)
* COG - Cogecom
* COMIEX - Comiex-Congo
* COSLEG - COSLEG Holding
* COTOL - Coalition for the Transformation of Liberia
* CPH - Chemie Pharmacie Holland
* CPKF/CPFOR - Collective Peacekeeping Forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States
* CPLP - Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries
* CPPLP - Capital Product Partners L.P.
* CPP - Cambodia People's Party
* CRC-NPFL - Central Revolutionary Council of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia
* CROATI - Croat Irregulars (Bosnia)
* CROATI-C - Croat Irregulars (Croatia)
* CRP - Cambodge-Renaissance Party (Cambodia)
* CS - Civil Society
* CSNV - Civil Society
* CUPP - Citizen's United for Peace and Progress (Sierra Leone)
* DA - Democratic Alternative (Macedonia)
* DA - Donor Agencies
* DAS - Das Air
* DAURAMANZI - Charles Dauramanzi
* DB - De Beers
* DC - Donor Community
* DCS -
* DEVHAI - development actors in Haiti
* DF - Dara Forest
* DHC - Diamond High Council
* DLK - Democratic League of Kosovo
* DON - Donors
* DOS SANTOS - José Eduardo dos Santos leader of the MPLA
* DPA - Democratic Party of Albanians (Macedonia)
* DROY - Democratic Republic of Yemen ("state" declared by secessionist political party in May 1994; existed until 7 July 1994)
* DUMAS - Roland Dumas, Minister for Foreign Affairs of France and co-President of the Paris Conference on Cambodia
* EC - European Commission
* ECHO - Echogem
* ECMM - European Comunity Monitoring Mission
* ECOMOG - ECOWAS Monitoring Group
* ECOWAS - Economic Community of West African States
* EGI - Egimex
* EGMF - Enterprise General Malta Forrest
* EMET - Euromet
* ENGOLA - Sam Engola
* ERP - Equal Rights Party
* EU - European Union
* EWRI - Eagle Wings Resources International
* EXA - EXACO
* EXFAR - Ex Rwandan Armed Forces
* EX-RWA - Ex Rwandan Government
* EXSUP - External supporters of the ethnic Albanian minority in Macedonia
* FAPC - Forces Armees du Peuple Congolais
* FAZ - Forces Armees Zairoises
* FDA - Angolan Democratic Forum
* FDD - Forces for the Defence of Democracy
* FDLR - Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (DRC)
* FDN - Fuerzas Democraticas Nicaraguenses (Nicaraguan Democratic Forces)
* FDP - Free Democratic Party
* FDRP - Free Development Republican Party (Cambodia)
* FI - Financial Institutions
* FINCON - Finconcord SA
* FINMIN - Finmining
* FLC - Front de Liberation du Congo
* FLRN - National Revolutionary Front for the Liberation of Haiti
* FMLN - Frente Farabundo Marti para la Liberacion Nacional
* FN - Forces Nouvelles
* FNCD - National Front for Change and Democracy (Haiti) - Alliance of parties supportive of Aristide
* FNI - Nationalist and Integrationist Front
* FNL - National Liberation Forces
* FNLA - National Liberation Front of Angola
* FOC - Flashes of Color
* FONUS - Forces novatrices pour l’union et la solidarité (FONUS) (DRC)
* FORREST - George A. Forrest
* FORTIS - Fortis bank
* FPI - Ivoirian Popular Front (Front Populaire Ivoirien) (Côte d'Ivoire)
* FQM - First Quantum Minerals
* FRAPH - Revolutionary Front for the Advancement and Progress of Haiti
* FREDERIC - Kabasele Tshineu Frederic
* FRELIMO - Frente de Libertacao de Mozambique
* FRODEBU - Front for Democracy in Burundi
* FROLINA - Front for National Liberation
* FRP - Free Republican Party (Cambodia)
* FRPI - Front de Resistance Patriotique en Ituri
* FUMO-PCD - Mozambique United Front-Democratic Convergence Party
* FUNA - Former Ugandan National Army
* FUNCINPEC - United National Front for an Independent,Neutral,Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia
* FV - Forces Vives
* GANGDEEN - Leader of National Republican Party (NRP), Robert GANGADEEN
* GATETE - Edward Gatete
* GFIA - George Forrest International Afrique
* GGF - Group George Forrest
* GLGT - Great Lakes General Trade
* GLM - Great Lakes Metals
* GREEN - Leader of For a Good and Green Guyana (GGG), Hamilton GREEN
* GURN - Government of Unity and National Reconciliation
* HADJI - Omari Hadji
* HARADINAJ - Ramush Haradinaj, president of the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK)
* HAXHIREXHA - Kastriot Haxhirexha, leader of the Albanian Democratic Party (Macedonia)
* HCS - H.C. Starck GmbH & Co KG
* HEMA - Hema Militias
* HEMA-UPDF - Hema-Ugandan Peoples' Defence Force
* HMC - Harambee Mining Coporation
* HML -
* HNA - Haitian National Assembly
* HO - Humanitarian Organizations
* HORN - Heckie Horn
* HOYTE - Leader of People's National Congress (PNC), Hugh Desmond HOYTE
* HRW - Human Rights Watch
* HVO - Croatian Defense Council (Bosnia) (aka Hrvatsko Vijece Obrane)
* HWIA - Islamic Unity Party of Afghanistan (aka Hizb-i Wahdat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan, led by Mohaqiq/Khalili)
* IA - International Alert
* IAL - Ibryv and Associates LLC
* IAS - Industry Associations
* IC - The International Community
* ICAO - International Civil Aviation Organization
* ICC - the International Criminal Court
* ICFY - International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia
* ICORC - International Conference for the Reconstruction of Cambodia
* ICRC - International Committee of the Red Cross
* ICTFY - International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
* ID - International Donors
* IDC - International Donor Community
* IDMA - International Diamond Manufacturers Association
* IE - "all other individuals and entities contacted by the Panel of Experts"
* IEMF - International Emergency Multinational Force
* IFI - International Financial Institutions
* IFO - International Francophone Organization
* IFOR - Multinational Implementation Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina
* IGAD - Intergovernmental Authority on Development
* IHO - International Humanitarian Organizations
* II - International Institutions
* IIDF - International institutions in the fields of development and finance
* IIO - "all interested international organizations" (Afghanistan)
* IMF - International Monetary Fund
* IMRO-DPMNU - Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization - Democratic Party of Macedonian National Uunity
* INKINZO - The Shield
* INTER - Interahamwe
* INTERPOL - International Criminal Police Organization
* IO - International Organizations
* IPIS - International Peace Information System
* IPRC - International Panorama Resources Corp
* IRG - International Reference Group on Disarmament and Security in the Horn of Africa
* IRMT - Islamic Revival Movement of Tajikistan
* IS - "all interested states" (Afghanistan)
* ISAF - International Security Assistance Force (Afghanistan)
* ISCOR - ArcelorMittal
* IWG - International Working Group (Cote d'Ivoire)
* JEM - Sudanese Justice and Equality Movement
* JEQUE - Carlos Jeque
* JIA - Islamic Party of Afghanistan (aka Jamiat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan, led by Rabbani/Massoud)
* JIB - Jewel Impex Bvba
* JMIA - National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan (aka Junbish-i Milli-yi Islami-yi Afghanistan, led by Dostum)
* JNA - Yugoslav People's Army
* JOHN - Leader of People's Democratic Movement (PDM), Llewellyn JOHN
* JOHNSON - Major-General Roosevelt Johnson
* JPKF - South Ossetia Joint Force
* JOU - Journalists
* KABANDA - Emmanuel Kabanda
* KABAREBE - James Kabarebe
* KABASELE - Frederic Kabasele
* KALUME - Denis Kalume Numbi
* KAM - Kamajors
* KARIM - Peter Karim
* KATUMBA - Augustin Katumba Mwanke
* KAZADI - Didier Kazadi
* KAZINI - James Kazini
* KDU - Key Defectors from UNITA
* KEC - Kemet Electronics Coporation
* KFLD - Khmer Farmer Liberal Democracy
* KFOR - Kosovo Force (NATO)
* KGN - Komal Gems NV
* KHA - KHA International AG
* KHANAFER - Nahim Khanafer
* KIBASSA - Kibassa Maliba
* KIM - Kimberley Process
* KINROSS - Kinross Gold Corporation
* KITEMBO - Gertrude Kitembo
* KLA - Kosovo Liberation Army
* KMC - Kababankola Mining Company
* KN - K & N
* KNCP - Khmer National Congress Party (Cambodia)
* KNP - Khmer Neutral Party (Cambodia)
* KOALI - Kosovar Albanians
* KONAKOM - National Committee of the Congress of Democratic Movements (Haiti)
* KONARE - Alpha Ournar Konare (Chairperson African Union Commission)
* KONGOLO - Mwenze Kongolo
* KOSC - Kosovo Albanian community
* KPNLF - Khmer People's National Liberation Front (Cambodia) -- known as the BLDP after May 1992
* KPRP - Khmer People's Revolutionary Party (name changed to CPP after 1991)
* KROMAH - Ltg. Alhaji G. V. Kromah
* KT - Katangan Tigers
* LAP - Liberian Action Party
* LAPMB - Liberation Army of Presevo, Medvedja, and Bujanovac
* LAS - League of Arab States
* LDF - Lola Defence Force
* LDEP - Liberia Destiny Party (LDP)
* LDP - Liberal Democratic Party (Cambodia)
* LeadGLP - Leader of Guyana Labor Party (GLP)
* LEadPPP - Leader of People's Progressive Party (PPP),
* LeadFRAPH - Leader of the Front for the Advancement and Progress of Haiti
* LERP - Liberia Equal Rights Party
* LG - Lundin Group
* LIEC - Liberian Independent Elections Commission
* LIMA - Lima Militias
* LiP - Liberty Party (LP) (Liberia)
* LNC - Liberian National Conference
* LNU - Liberia National Union
* LP - Labor Party (Liberia)
* LP-A - Liberal Party (Albania)
* LPC - Liberian Peace Council
* LPP - Liberian People's Party
* LRA - Lord's Resistance Army
* LRP - Liberal Reconciliation Party
* LUP - Liberia Unification Party
* LURD - Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy
* MACHEL - Mario Machel
* MAI - Mai Mai
* MALtd - Mineral Afrika Limited
* MARINUS - Anthony Marinus
* MARWOPNET - Mano River Union Women's Peace Network
* MASINGIRO - Masingiro GmbH
* MASSAQUOI - Francois Massaquoi
* MAWAPANGA - Mwana Nanga Mawapanga
* MAYOMBO - Nobel Mayombo
* MBC - Minerals Business Company
* MBEKI - Thabo Mbeki
* MDA - Multilateral Donors to Afghanistan
* MDN - National Development Mobilization Party (Haiti)
* MEKDECI - Leader of Guyanese Organization for Liberty and Democracy Party (GOLD), Anthony MEKDECI
* MFA - Movement of the Forces of the Future (Mouvement des Forces de l'Avenir) (Côte d'Ivoire)
* MFDC - Movement of Democratic Forces in the Casamance
* MIDH - Movement to Establish Haitian Democracy (Haiti)
* MILJUN - Military Junta (Sierra Leone)
* MJP - Movement for Justice and Peace (Mouvement pour la Justice et la Paix) (Côte d'Ivoire)
* MLC - Movement for the Liberation of the Congo
* MNANGAGWA - Emmerson Mnangagwa Dambudzo
* MNFH - Non-UN Multinational Force for Haiti
* MNLC - Mouvement National Pour la Liberation du Congo
* MNP-28 - Patriotic Nationalist Movement (Haiti)
* MODEL - Movement for Democracy in Liberia
* MODELH - Democratic Movement for Haitian Liberation
* MOLINAKA - Molinaka and Naktaorsou Khmere for Freedom (Cambodia)
* MONAMO-PMSD - Mozambique National Democratic Movement-Social Democratic Party
* MOP - Movement to Organize the Country (Haiti)
* MOYO - Sibusio Moyo
* MOYOM - Mike Moyo
* MPCI - Patriotic Movement of Côte d'Ivoire (Mouvement Patriotique de Côte d'Ivoire)
* MPIGO - Ivoirian Popular Movement of the Great West (Mouvement Populaire Ivoirien du Grand Ouest) (Côte d'Ivoire)
* MPLA - Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
* MPT - Movement for Peace in Tajikistan
* MRI - Melkior Resources Inc
* MRN - National Reconstruction Movement (Haiti)
* MSC - Malaysian Smelting Corporation
* MUAMBA - Richard Muamba Nozi
* MUNYUZA - Dan Munyuza
* NAC - Nac Kazatomprom
* NADIR - Leader of The United Force (TUF), Manzoor NADIR
* NAMI - Nami Gems
* NANO - Fatos Nano, leader of the Socialist Party (Albania)
* NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organization
* NCF - Northern and Central Fronts (Nicaragua)
* NDCP - Neutral Democratic Party of Cambodia
* NDM - New Deal Movement
* NDP - National Democratic Party of Liberia (NDPL)
* NDPC - Neutral Democratic Party of Cambodia
* NDP-M - People's Democratic Party (Macedonia)
* NF - New Forces (Cote d'Ivoire)
* NGE - Non-Governmental Enterprises
* NGO - Non-Governmental Organizations
* NGUESSO - "President Denis Sassou Nguesso-of the
* Republic of the Congo (“the Mediator”), in his capacity as Chairperson of the
* African Union (Cote d'Ivoire)"
* NK - "Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh"
* NKP - Nationalist Khmer Party (Cambodia)
* NLA - National Liberation Army (Macedonia)
* NNFMS - Ningxia Non-Ferrous Metals Smelter
* NPFL - National Patriotic Front of Liberia
* NPP - National Patriotic Party
* NR - Nicaraguan resistance [Nicaraguan Democratic Force (Fuerza Democrática Nicaragüense, or FDN) operating from Honduras; and the Revolutionary Democratic Alliance (Alianza Revolucionaria Democratica, or ARDE) operating from Costa Rica.]
* NRF - National Redemption Front (Sudan)
* NRP - National Reform Party
* NUP - National Unity Party (Sierra Leone)
* Calls upon all parties in Sierra Leone to demonstrate their full - Jack Nziza
* commitment to the democratic process and to ensure that the 2007 presidential and - Okapi Air
* parliamentary elections are peaceful, transparent, free and fair - Organization of African Unity
* OAS - Organization of American States
* OCG - Oregon Certification Group
* OECD - Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
* OGI - OM Group Inc
* OIC - Organization of the Islamic Conference
* OKOTO - Jean-Charles Okoto Lolakombe
* OL - Operation Licorne (Cote d'Ivoire)
* OMI - Orion Mining Inc
* ONR - Oryx Natural Resources
* OSCE - Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (formerly Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe -- CSCE)
* OSCEMC - OSCE's Mission in Croatia
* OSLEG - Operation Sovereign Legitimacy
* OSWI - "other states with influence in the country" (Afghanistan)
* OTAFIRE - Otafire Kahinda
* OTHERCDI - other organizations and interested parties (Cote d'Ivoire)
* OTHERDRC - other organizations and interested parties (DRC)
* OTHERSUD - other interested parties (Sudan)
* PACODE - Democratic Congress Party
* PADEMO - Mozambique Democratic Party
* PAFEMO - Mozambique Federal Party
* PAI - Independent Angolan Party
* PAIN - National Agricultural and Industrial Party (Haiti)
* PAJOCA - Party of the Alliance of Youth, Workers and Farmers of Angola
* PALIPEHUTU - Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People
* PALIPEHUTU-FNL - merged
* PALMO - Liberal and Democratic Party of Mozambique
* PANADE - National Democratic Party
* PANPRA - Haitian National Revolutionary Progressive Party
* PARADIS - Haitian Party of God
* PARENA - Party for National Recovery
* PCC - Private Commercial Companies
* PCN - National Convention Party
* PD - Parti democraté (Cambodia)
* PDA - Angolan Democratic Party
* PDCH - Haitian Christian Democratic Party
* PDCI-RDA - Democratic Party of Côte d'Ivoire--African Democratic Rally (Parti Democratique de la Côte d'Ivoire--Rassemblement Democratique d'Afrique)
* PDK - Party of Democratic Kampuchea (Cambodia), also known as the Khmer Rouge
* PDK-K - Democratic Party of Kosovo
* PDLA - Angolan Democratic Liberal Party
* PDP - Party for Democratic Prosperity (Macedonia)
* PDP-ANA - The Democratic Party for Progress - Angolan National Alliance
* PDPL - People's Democratic Party of Liberia
* PDPSL - People's Democratic Party (PDP) (Sierra Leone)
* PIMO - Independent Party of Mozambique
* PIS - Police and Intelligence Sources
* PISKUNOV - Anatol Piskunov
* PISKUNOVA - Valentina Piskunova
* PIT - Independent Workers' Party
* PIT-CI - Ivoirian Labor Party (Parti Ivoirien des Travailleurs) (Côte d'Ivoire)
* PL - Liberal Party
* PLD - Liberal Democratic Party (Angola)
* PLH - Political Leaders of Haiti (People's Progressive Party (PPP), People's National Congress (PNC), Hugh Desmond HOYTE; For a Good and Green Guyana (GGG), Hamilton GREEN; Alliance for Guyana (AFG), Rupert ROOPNARINE; Democratic Labor Movement (DLM), Paul TENNASSEE; People's Democratic Movement (PDM), Llewellyn JOHN; National Democratic Front (NDF), Joseph BACCHUS; The United Force (TUF), Manzoor NADIR; National Republican Party (NRP), Robert GANGADEEN; Guyana Labor Party (GLP); Guyana Democratic Party (GDP), Asgar ALLY; Guyanese Organization for Liberty and Democracy Party (GOLD), Anthony MEKDECI
* PLP - Peace and Liberation Party (Sierra Leone)
* PMH - Prime Minister of Haiti
* PMDC - People's Movement for Democratic Change (Sierra Leone)
* PNC - People's National Convention (Sierra Leone)
* PNDA - Angolan National Democratic Party
* POH - President of Haiti (Jean-Bertrand Aristide)
* POMAC - Pacific Ores Metals and Chemicals Ltd
* PONG - A.H. Pong & Sons
* PP - People's Party
* PPH - Political Parties in Haiti [National Front for Change and Democracy(FNCD), including National Cooperative Action Movement(MKN); National Congress of Democratic Movements(CONACOM); Movement for the Installation of Democracyin Haiti (MIDH); National Progressive Revolutionary Party(PANPRA); National Patriotic Movement of November 28(MNP-28); National Agricultural and Industrial Party(PAIN); Movement for National Reconstruction (MRN); Haitian Christian Democratic Party (PDCH);Assembly of Progressive National Democrats (RDNP);National Party of Labor (PNT); Mobilization forNational Development (MDN); Democratic Movementfor the Liberation of Haiti (MODELH); HaitianSocial Christian Party (PSCH); Movement for theOrganization of the Country (MOP);Democratic Unity Confederation (KID); National LavalasPolitical Organization (OPL)]
* PPP - Progressive Peoples Party (Liberia)
* PPPM - Mozambique People's Progress Party
* PRA - People's Redemption Army
* PRD - Democratic Renewal Party
* PRDA - Party of Reunification of the Angolan People
* PRDH - Haitian Democrat Revolutionary Party
* PRODEM - Progressive Democratic Party (Liberia)
* PRP - Party for the Reconciliation of the People
* PRS - Party of Social Renovation
* PSCH - Haitian Social Christian Party
* PSD - Party for Social Democracy
* PSDA - Angolan Social Democratic Party
* PSDofA - Social Democratic Party of Angola
* PT - Labor Party
* PUCH - Haitian Communist Party
* PUSIC - Party for Unity and Safeguarding of the Integrity of Congo
* RADDES - Rally for Democracy, and Economic and Social Development
* RAP - Reform Alliance Party (Liberia)
* RAREMET - Raremet Ltd
* RCD - Congolese Rally for Democracy
* RCD-A - RCD - Authentique
* RCD-G - RCD-Goma
* RCD-K - RCD-Kisangani
* RCD-ML - RCD-Liberation Movement
* RCD-N - RCD-National
* RCD-NL - RCD-NL
* RCD-O - RCD-Original
* RCP - Repbulican Coalition Party (Cambodia)
* RDF - Rwanda Defence Forces
* RDI - Representitives of the diamond industry
* RDNP - The Progressive National Democrats (Haiti)
* RDR - Rally of the Republicans (Rassemblement des Republicains) (Côte d'Ivoire)
* REDEK - Repbulic Democracy Khmer Party (Cambodia)
* RENAMO - Resistencia Nacional de Mozambique
* RM - Rwanda Metals
* RO - Regional Organizations
* ROC - Republic of Croatia (pre-independence)
* ROOPNARINE - Leader of Alliance for Guyana (AFG), Rupert ROOPNARINE
* RPB - Rally for the People of Burundi
* RPF - Rwandan Patriotic Front
* RSK - Republika Srpska Krajina, or Serbian Republic of Krajina (until August 1995)
* RSN - Reassemblement pour la solidarité nationale (Cambodia)
* RUF - Revolutionary United Front
* RULP - Reformed United Liberia Party (RULP)
* RUPRAH - Sanjivan Ruprah
* RwaAP - Rwanda Allied Partners
* RWIGEMA - Alfred Rwigema
* SADC - Southern African Development Community
* SAIO - "all specialized agencies and international organizations" (Afghanistan)
* SALEH - Salim Saleh
* SAMO - Somali Africans Muki Organization
* SANTOS - Jose Eduardo Dos Santos (leader of Angola's MPLA )
* SANU - Somali Alliance for National Unity
* SARA - Saracen
* SAS - Small Arms Survey
* SASE - Serb Authorities in Sector East (following August 1995 Operation Storm)
* SAVIMBI - Jonas Savimbi (leader of Angola's UNITA)
* SCB - Standard Chartered Bank
* SDA - Somali Democratic Alliance
* SDM - Somali Democratic Movement
* SDSM - Alliance of Democratic Forces in Macedonia
* SDV - SDV Transintra
* SERBI - Serb Irregulars (Bosnia)
* SERBI-C - Serb Irregulars (Croatia)
* SF - Southern Front (Nicaragua)
* SFOR - Multinational Stabilization Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina
* SG - Socialist Group (Haiti)
* SGD - Sierra Gem Diamonds
* SHEFER - Niko Shefer
* SIMBA - Manase Simba
* SIPRI - Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
* SLA - Sierra Leone Army
* SLC - SLC Germany GmbH
* SLM/A - Sudanese Liberation Movement/Army
* SLM/A-al Nur - Sudanese Liberation Movement/Army-al Nur faction
* SLPP - Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP)
* SMC - Speciality Metals Company SA
* SMIERCIAK - Ronald S. Smierciak
* SNA - Somali National Alliance
* SNatM - Somali National Movement
* SNC - Supreme National Council (Cambodia)
* SNDU - Somali National Democratic Union
* SNF - Somali National Front
* SNT - Somali National Front
* SNU - Somali National Union
* SOC - State of Cambodia (new name of the People's Republic of Kampuchea, adopted 1989)
* SOD - States and Other Donors
* SOGEM - SOGEM ltd.
* SOLib - Social Liberal Party
* SOML - Somaliland
* SP - Stockholm Process
* SPLA - Sudan People's Liberation Army
* SPM - Somali Patriotic Movement
* SPMJ - Self-Proclaimed Military Junta (Guinea-Bissau)
* SRGO - "all Somali and regional parties as well as government officials and other actors"
* SRIC - Security Research and Information Centre
* SRPSKA - Serbian Republic of Bosnia Herzegovina --aka Republika Srpska (Bosnia)
* SRRC - Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council
* SSDF - Somali Salvation Democratic Front
* SSNM - Southern Somali National Movement
* STOL - Thorvald Stoltenberg-- Co-Chairman of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY)
* SUL - Saracen Uganda Ltd
* SWAN - Swanepoel
* TAD - Triple A Diamonds
* TAYLOR - Charles Ghankay Taylor
* TENNASSEE - Leader of Democratic Labor Movement (DLM), Paul TENNASSEE
* TG - Tandan Group
* THACI - Hashim Thaci, leader of Democratic Party of Kosovo
* TIG - Trinity Investment Group
* TII - Trinitech International Inc
* TIL - Thorntree Industries (Pvt) Ltd
* TL - Tremalt Ltd
* TLB - Taliban
* TMC - Tenke Mining Coporation
* TRADEMET - Trademet SA
* Tristar - Tristar
* TSTL - Track Star Trading 151 (Pty) Ltd.
* TWP - True Whig Party
* UD - Democratic Union
* UDA - United Democratic Alliance (Liberia)
* UDCY - Citizens' Democratic Union (Côte d'Ivoire)
* UDPCI - Union for Democracy and Peace in Côte d'Ivoire (Union pour la Democratie et la Paix en Côte d'Ivoire)
* UIC - Union of Islamic Courts (Somalia)
* UIFSA - United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan (Northern Alliance)
* ULIMO - United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy
* ULIMO-J - United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy - Krahn
* ULIMO-K - United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy - Mandingo
* ULINA - Union of National Liberation
* UMICORE - Umicore grp.
* UNAMO - Mozambique National Union
* UNB - UN bodies
* UNGA - United Nations General Assembly
* UNHCHR - United Nations High Commissioner on Human Rights
* UNI - Universal
* UNITA - National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
* UNMO - UN military observer
* UNMOP - United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka (Croatia)
* UNPAs - United Nations Protected Areas
* UNPP - United National People's Party (Sierra Leone)
* UNRFII - Uganda National Rescue Front
* UNSC - United Nations Security Council
* UNSG - United Nations Secretary General
* UNV - United Nations Volunteers
* UO - Unarmed Opposition
* UOM - University of Maryland
* UP - Unity Party
* UPC - Union of Congolese Patriots
* UPDF - Ugandan Peoples' Defence Force
* UPP - United People's Party (Liberia)
* UPRONA - National Union for Progress
* URNG - Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity
* URNL - Union des Republicains Nationalistes Pour la Liberation
* USCF - United Somali Congress Faction
* USF - United Somali Front
* USP - United Somali Party
* UTO - United Tajik Opposition (Tajikistan)
* VESELJI - Abdulhadi Veselji, leader of the Albanian Party for Democratic Prosperity (PDP), Kosovo
* VG - Victoria Group
* VS - Vishay Sprague
* WB - World Bank
* WCO - World Customs Organization
* WFDB - World Federation of Diamond Bourses
* WNBF - West Nile Bank Front
* WOEWIYU - Jucontee Thomas Woewiyu
* WTO - World Trade Organization
* XHAFERI - Arben Xhaferi, leader of the Democratic Party of Albanians (Macedonia)
* YPP - Young People's Party (Sierra Leone)
* YUMBA - Yumba Monga
* ZINCORE - ZINCORE Metals Ltd.
* ZVINAVASHE - Vitalis Zvinavashe Gava Musungwa

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