



# 10 Years After Genocide in Rwanda: Building Consensus for the Responsibility to Protect

An International Peace Academy (IPA)  
report on  
The Memorial Conference on the Rwandan  
Genocide

Jointly organized by the Governments of  
Rwanda and Canada

United Nations  
New York  
26 March 2004

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## Executive Summary

On the morning of 26 March 2004, members of the United Nations (UN) community shared a somber minute of silence to honor the over 800,000 victims of the 1994 Rwandan genocide. Thus began the *Memorial Conference on the Rwandan Genocide*, which was jointly organized by the governments of Rwanda and Canada to ensure that the lives lost in Rwanda are remembered and to examine the continuing implications of the Rwanda tragedy for the international community. The conference was organized on the eve of 7 April 2004, which was designated by the UN General Assembly as the International Day of Reflection on the Genocide in Rwanda. Participants noted the importance of drawing attention to a new normative framework—the principles of *Responsibility to Protect*—which is outlined in the final report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty and addresses the policy dilemma of how the international community should protect the lives of civilians from genocide, war crimes, or gross and systematic violations of humanitarian law.

## Introduction

The *Memorial Conference on the Rwandan Genocide* was jointly organized by the governments of Rwanda and Canada, and took place at the United Nations on 26 March 2004. The conference marked the ten-year anniversary of the April 1994 Rwandan genocide. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan opened the memorial conference. Charles Murigande, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Development Cooperation of Rwanda, and William Graham, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Canada, co-chaired the conference. David M. Malone, President of the International Peace Academy (IPA), welcomed conference participants and officiated a minute of silence. Dr. Ruth Iyob, Director of IPA's Africa Program, moderated the conference's deliberations, which included personal testimonies from survivors of the genocide. Approximately 300 participants attended the conference, including members of the Rwandan diaspora, nearly 70 permanent representatives to the UN,

and high-level representatives of human rights and humanitarian non-governmental organizations (NGOs). This report, which includes background research on the genocide and the *Responsibility to Protect*, captures some of the themes discussed during the conference.

## Background: Genocide in Rwanda

### *100 Days*

For a period of one hundred days between April and July 1994, over 800,000 men, women and children were killed in the Rwandan genocide. The highly organized and systematic extermination resulted in the decimation of nearly two-thirds of Rwanda's Tutsi population (thousands of Hutus who attempted to stop the genocide or protect Tutsis were also killed), and led to the rapid displacement of more than a million people in Rwanda and neighboring countries.<sup>1</sup> The ethnic groups of Rwanda—the Hutus, the Tutsis, and the Twa—share a language, culture and religion as the *Banyarwanda* people, but the country has a long history of intense political power struggles leading to violence. By the late 1980s the regime of Major-General Juvénal Habyarimana had institutionalized ethnic discrimination with quotas and the use of identity cards.<sup>2</sup> While the killings in 1994 were clearly intended to exterminate the Tutsi ethnic group, Rwanda had already endured seven large-scale massacres since 1959.<sup>3</sup> Indeed, Murigande, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Development Cooperation of Rwanda, noted at the memorial conference, Rwanda's cycles of killings were the result of decades of bad governance beginning with colonial rule and perpetuated by post-independence regimes.

The end of the Cold War ushered in a new era of political liberalization as Western governments pushed for multiparty democratic elections in many previous Cold

War client states. African civil society groups also began to push for an end to authoritarian systems of governance. Rwanda was not immune to these pressures, and domestic protests and calls for an end to single-party rule created a climate of uncertainty. Finally, on 1 October 1990, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) attacked Rwanda from Uganda. The RPF's aims included securing repatriation for all Rwandan refugees and ending ethnic discrimination in Rwanda.<sup>4</sup>

Over the next three years, talks were held in Arusha, Tanzania, and on 4 August 1993, the Habyarimana government and the RPF concluded their comprehensive peace agreement—the Arusha Peace Agreement (Arusha Accords). The agreement provided for a parliamentary system under a government of national unity based on the rule of law, pluralism, and adherence to international human rights standards.

### *UN Intervention*

The UN was expected to establish a peacekeeping force to monitor the political transition and keep the Arusha Accords on track.<sup>5</sup> Unfortunately, the establishment of the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) on 5 October 1993<sup>6</sup> followed on the UN's catastrophic mission to Somalia, which had ended with the killing of eighteen US soldiers on 3 October 1993. Escalation of tensions in Rwanda followed on the heels of this experience, and explains why the Security Council planned for a financially modest force of only 2,546 peacekeepers. General (Ret.) Roméo Dallaire, the UNAMIR Force Commander and a speaker at the memorial conference, had originally planned for a mission of 8,000 troops, but had scaled down planning to a minimum of 4,500. The UN Secretariat and then the Security Council further decreased this number and the peacekeeping force was limited to 2,548 military personnel.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>1</sup> For a background on the events leading to, and during Rwanda's 1994 genocide see African Rights, *Rwanda: Death, Despair and Defiance* (London: African Rights, 1995); Philip Gourevitch, *We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed with Our Families: Stories from Rwanda* (London: Picador, 1999); Gérard Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis 1959–1994: History of a Genocide* (London: Hurst and Company, 1995); Human Rights Watch, *Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999); and Linda Melvern, *Conspiracy to Murder: The Rwanda Genocide* (London and New York: Verso, 2004).

<sup>2</sup> Human Rights Watch, *Leave None to Tell the Story*, p.3 and p.17.

<sup>3</sup> See the United Nations, *The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993–1996* (New York: The United Nations Blue Book Series, Volume X, 1996), p.37.

<sup>4</sup> Linda Melvern, *Conspiracy to Murder*, p.13.

<sup>5</sup> See Ingvar Carlsson, Han Sung-Joo, and M. Kupolati, *Report of the Independent Inquiry into United Nations Actions during the 1994 Rwanda Genocide*, December 1999, and the United Nations, *The United Nations and Rwanda*, for analysis and examination of the challenges of the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR).

<sup>6</sup> UN Security Council. 3288th meeting, "Resolution 872 (1993) [On the Situation in Rwanda]" (S/RES/872). 5 October 1993.

<sup>7</sup> For an examination of the Security Council's dynamics in its response to Rwanda, see Howard Adelman and Astri Suhrke, "Rwanda," in David M. Malone, ed., *The UN Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century*, (Boulder, CO, and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004), and Linda Melvern, *Conspiracy to Murder*, p.67.

7 April 1994

Much has been made of 6 April 1994, the day two missiles shot down President Juvénal Habyarimana's plane, killing him and the new Burundian president, Cyprien Ntariyamana. This led the way for Hutu extremists (organizers of the movement known as Hutu Power and supporters of the militia known as *Interahamwe*) to capitalize on nearly three years of preparations for massive slaughter. These extremists were part of an intricate political and military network of powerful opponents to reconciliation with the RPF and political liberalization. Hutu Power had undertaken an enormous buildup and distribution of weapons. It has been reported that this massive buildup resulted in every third adult Hutu male's access to a machete.<sup>8</sup> By March 1994, Hutu Power's proliferation of hate media (print media such as *Kangura* and the radio stations Radio Rwanda and Radio Television des Mille Collines [RTLM]) had created a climate of fear and increased hostile relations between the ruling party, political opposition groups and moderate supporters of reconciliation. Finally, Hutu Power had systematically recruited young, unemployed men and established a secret communications network (Le Réseau Zéro or Network Zero) all with the aim of preventing the establishment of a viable national unity government and exterminating all Tutsis and moderate Hutus.

6 April 1994 marks the day that Rwanda slid from general anarchy and violence to full-scale genocide. But it was on the morning of 7 April 1994 that Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyamana, her husband, and ten Belgian UNAMIR peacekeepers were killed by Rwandan presidential guards under the control of Hutu Power. Thereafter, systematic killings commenced and did not end until July 1994.

## No Responsibility to Protect: Withdrawal in the Midst of Genocide

### *Surviving Genocide*

Despite a failure on the part of the international community to protect them, Ms. Speciose Kanyabugoyi and Mr. Eric Nzabihimana survived the genocide. They recounted their haunting experiences at the *Memorial Conference on the Rwandan Genocide*. Eric Nzabihimana

characterized the genocide as the final phase of Tutsi extermination that dated back to 1959. In April 1994, he learned that the killings had started through radio announcements of President Habyarimana's plane crash. Mr. Nzabihimana was one of 50,000 civilians that hid in the hills of Bisesero, in Kibuye. They were attacked by *Interahamwe* militia and police from 10 April 1994. By listening to international radio bulletins, Eric Nzabihimana knew that the French government had deployed a mission to provide assistance. Seeing some French tanks, he appealed to them for protection. He was greatly disappointed with their response. They advised him and others to run and hide, and promised to return, but never did. Ultimately, a cycle of raping and killing led to the slaughter of entire Tutsi communities in Bisesero. In total, over 200,000 people were killed in Kibuye.<sup>9</sup> During the memorial conference, Eric Nzabihimana reported that approximately 7,500 people were killed not far from a French camp before help was received. He appealed to the international community to encourage the French government to accept its responsibility.

Speciose Kanyabugoyi was living about 500 kilometers from a UNAMIR site. She sought shelter, along with hundreds of other Rwandans, in a nearby school on 10 April 1994. Hundreds of terrified civilians overflowed into the schoolyard. Ms. Kanyabugoyi, along with others, had calculated that UNAMIR would be able to provide



From L to R: Honorable Charles Murigande, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Development Cooperation of Rwanda; UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan; David M. Malone, President of IPA; Honorable William Graham, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Canada; and Dr. Ruth Iyob, Director of IPA's Africa Program

<sup>8</sup> Linda Melvern, *Conspiracy to Murder*, p. 56-59, and Human Rights Watch, *Leave None to Tell the Story*, p.5.

<sup>9</sup> African Rights, *Rwanda: Death, Despair, and Defiance*, p.687.

protection from roving bands of former government soldiers, the Forces Armées Rwandaises (ex-FAR) turned *genocidaires*. But on 11 April 2004, partly in response to the killing of its peacekeepers, Belgium began pulling out its troops. On 14 April 1994, Belgium announced its withdrawal from UNAMIR. Speciose Kanyabugoyi and nearly 4,000 other Rwandan civilians were attacked by the ex-FAR. They had witnessed the retreat of the Belgian peacekeepers. They did not understand that the Belgian troops were no longer under UN command and therefore no longer obligated to carry out the UNAMIR mission, and that even if they were, UNAMIR had no mandate to stop the genocide. Nor did the government of Belgium recognize a responsibility to protect Rwandan civilians from genocide. Ms. Kanyabugoyi survived the slaughter because she lay under piles of dead bodies of her friends and neighbors. She lost her husband and two children in the genocide.

#### *UNAMIR'S Limits and Constraints*

In his remarks at the memorial conference, General Roméo Dallaire, former UNAMIR Force Commander, noted that the “never again” concept, which emerged as an impetus to stop future genocides after the Jewish Holocaust during World War II, failed Rwanda. Before and throughout the genocide, Roméo Dallaire was aware that the use of hate radio in Rwanda was fueling violence, that weapons were being openly stock-piled and distributed, and that massacres of Tutsis were taking place with impunity. In fact, during the genocide, the former Force Commander requested authorization to jam radio transmissions from RTLM. UN headquarters denied his request.

Following 7 April 1994, ambassadors of non-permanent member states sitting on the Security Council, including Nigeria’s Professor Ibrahim Gambari, wanted to use UNAMIR to bring public order to Rwanda. But the Belgian government recommended full and total withdrawal of UNAMIR. The response to Dallaire, who had requested support to stop the genocide, was slow in coming and shackled to fears of the Security Council members that “genocide” would mean a scaled-up response.

Indeed, UNAMIR would have needed an immediate increase in human and financial resources in order to engage in more robust action. Protecting the Rwandan civilian population from genocide required, at the minimum, a show of defensive force to deter the

*Interahamwe* and the ex-FAR, and to give weight to diplomatic initiatives. At the maximum, UNAMIR would have had to evolve into a military intervention, undergirded by an effective coalition of Security Council members. Such an intervention would only succeed if Security Council members were politically willing to commit troops, logistical support, financial and other human resources. They would also have had to feel certain that they could secure public support for the mission in their respective capitals.

But first the members, and indeed the world, would have had to acknowledge that genocide was occurring in Rwanda. Indeed, throughout deliberations in the Security Council in April 1994, the United States and the United Kingdom rejected the use of the word “genocide” in public comments. Under the *1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide*, parties are collectively obligated to prevent and punish systematic murder of a national, ethnical, racial or religious group.<sup>10</sup> Participants at the memorial conference wondered if the Rwandan interim government could have influenced this reticence. At the time, Rwanda held a non-permanent seat on the Security Council. But despite the regime’s presence, members of the Council, including Nigeria and New Zealand, were frank in discussions of the situation in Rwanda. In actuality, the silence regarding the word “genocide” flowed from Washington and London, and has been consequently viewed as regrettable.

#### *Draw Down and Evacuation*

Professor Ibrahim Gambari, now a UN Under-Secretary-General and Special Advisor for Africa, outlined the decision facing the organization immediately after the genocide commenced. With the Belgian pullout from UNAMIR, and Bangladesh’s subsequent withdrawal from the UN mission on 19 April 1994, the Security Council asked UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali to formulate options for the way forward. Boutros-Ghali proposed three options: 1) immediate reinforcement of UNAMIR and an expansion of its mandate in order to restore law and order and halt the killings; 2) a reduction of UNAMIR from 2,558 to 270 observers; and 3) a complete withdrawal of UNAMIR. The Secretary-General did not support the third option. With its adoption of resolution 912 on 21 April 1994, the Council chose the second option.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>10</sup> See United Nations, *Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide*, 1948, Articles I- III.

<sup>11</sup> United Nations, *The United Nations and Rwanda*, p.43.

Gambari examined the institutional failure on the part of the UN Secretariat and the Security Council members to respond to the unfolding genocide. The Secretary-General should have emphasized which option of the three he preferred, at least attempting to persuade the Security Council not to abandon Rwanda. Furthermore, non-aligned movement members of the Council—Nigeria included—could have abstained from the resolution. But these countries held little leverage over the permanent members, many of whom were being lobbied by the Belgian government to end the UN mission in Rwanda. The Council was divided politically, with groups of states aligning themselves along lines of power and interests. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) had not been able to lobby Western countries and only two African countries (Ghana and Tunisia) were troop-contributing countries to UNAMIR. Simultaneously, the Council felt great pressure to make decisions by consensus. In the end, UNAMIR's draw down reflected a compromise between major powers in the Council which advocated total withdrawal and Argentina, the Czech Republic, Djibouti, Nigeria, Spain, and New Zealand, which aimed to maintain the UN mission in order to protect civilians from genocide in Rwanda.<sup>12</sup>

Meanwhile, 2,000 foreign nationals were being evacuated from Rwanda by France, the United Kingdom, the United States and Italy. Roméo Dallaire noted at the memorial conference, that as these evacuations were taking place, UNAMIR's capacity was being reduced. Only 450 African and Canadian troops, including a Ghanaian troop led by Lieutenant-General (Ret.) Henry Anyidoho, remained. They were able to save some 30,000. This alone reflects the fact that a robust military intervention could have ended the genocide and saved hundreds of thousands more.

## Never Again: Norms, Commitment and Institutions for the Prevention of Genocide

UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan reflected on the sorrowful lessons of a failed international response to genocide. The Secretary-General expressed deep regret for not doing enough to mobilize a more robust

intervention to stop the Rwandan genocide. Hindsight makes it possible to identify opportunities missed and to reflect on the unique challenges posed by humanitarian crises arising from internal conflicts. The legacy of Rwanda, according to the Secretary-General, raises important questions that affect all of humankind. The world's failure to come to the aid of Rwandans could be the impetus for forging a new consensus on the responsibility of the international community to protect people threatened by genocide and other grave violations of human rights.

### *The Responsibility to Protect*

The opening remarks by William Graham, the Foreign Affairs Minister of Canada, best conveyed the way forward for the international community. Graham underscored the importance of moving the international community beyond a state-centric model of security and toward a new sense of responsibility for the security of persons. Other speakers at the memorial conference echoed these views. Indeed, in his opening remarks, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan emphasized the need to confront and respond to urgent questions about the authority of the Security Council, the effectiveness of United Nations peacekeeping, the reach of international justice, the roots of violence, and the responsibility of the international community to protect people threatened by genocide and other grave violations of human rights. The debate elicited by these questions has resulted in some advances in conflict management.

The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) released a report entitled *The Responsibility to Protect* in December 2001. The report, the outcome of Kofi Annan's challenge to the international community to forge consensus around basic principles of intervention,<sup>13</sup> drew out some of the core principles and thresholds for future humanitarian interventions. Most importantly, states have the primary responsibility for protecting their own people. If states are either unwilling or unable to fulfill this obligation, then the international community must protect civilians from atrocities. Thus, the responsibility to protect is based on state sovereignty, but sovereignty implies responsibility and not just privilege.

<sup>12</sup> See Ibrahim Gambari, "Rwanda: An African Perspective," and Colin Keating, "Rwanda: An Insider's Account," in David M. Malone, ed., *The UN Security Council*, pp.500–520.

<sup>13</sup> See the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect*, Ottawa: The International Development Research Centre, December 2001, as well as the report by Simon Chesterman, *Discussions at the Release of the Responsibility to Protect*, New York: IPA, 15 February 2002.

Dr. Ramesh Thakur, Vice-Rector at United Nations University and a member of the panel that commissioned the ICISS report, presented some of the core conclusions it held for preventing future genocides. Dr. Thakur noted that ongoing conflicts around the world continue to pose the question of when external help should be rallied to save lives.

The ICISS report maintains that the UN's structural and institutional abilities are critical to the legitimate use of the responsibility to protect. According to the United Nations Charter and international law, only the UN, the world's leading multilateral organization, has the authority to override state sovereignty. Dr. Thakur noted that regional organizations could effectively supplement the UN in this area. But ultimately, if an institutionally weak UN cannot control when and how to intervene, then such authority is undermined—thus challenging the legitimacy of the responsibility to protect.

The ICISS panel has put forward a number of additional core principles of the responsibility to protect. First, the exercise of the responsibility should involve less intrusive and coercive measures. Only in the face of exceptional harm to human beings should military intervention be exercised. Secondly, interventions should be limited to four specific principles: 1) the just cause threshold; 2) precautionary principles; 3) right authority; and 4) operational principles. [See "Principles for Military Intervention," Box I.]

The responsibility to protect encompasses three broad elements: *the responsibility to prevent*; *the responsibility to react*; and *the responsibility to rebuild*. This trinity of obligations addresses many of the concerns of genocide survivors. Indeed, missed opportunities for preventing the genocide, halting the genocide, and rebuilding after the genocide fall within this framework.

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**The responsibility to prevent:** to address both the root causes and direct causes of internal conflict and other man-made crises putting populations at risk.

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The implications of the Rwanda tragedy continue to highlight the need for the UN, government officials, and the international media to pay more attention to early indicators of humanitarian crises. There had been several early warnings of genocide in Rwanda. Attention to the alarms raised by a number of human rights groups as

well as the work of the UN Commission on Human Rights' Special Rapporteur for Rwanda, Bacre Waly Ndiaye in 1993, would have saved hundreds of thousands of lives.

Perhaps in response to the important role played by special rapporteurs in calling attention to human rights abuses, the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan announced the establishment of a Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide. Such an institution might do more to examine questions of practical means for preventing as well as halting future genocides. As Charles Murigande, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Development Cooperation of Rwanda, noted, the conspiracy of silence surrounding the genocide in 1994 allowed the international community to ignore the many signs of genocide in Rwanda. Because the Genocide Convention does not address policy or broad issues of implementation, a special advisor might be able to contribute to the development of the norms, institutions and practical means to prevent genocide.

A more important area of prevention involves the root causes of internal conflict. Mr. Danilo Turk, Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs, noted a number of core areas, which have been addressed in the last ten years, including development-related structural prevention of armed conflict. Also, the good offices of the Secretary-General have become more central to prevention.

Despite this progress, a great deal more should be done. The ICISS panel has highlighted prevention as the single most important dimension of the responsibility to protect. Certainly, development issues affecting a population's economic and social well-being comprise the root causes fueling conflict.

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**The responsibility to react:** to respond to situations of compelling human need with appropriate measures, which may include coercive measures like sanctions and international prosecution, and in extreme cases, military intervention.

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The withdrawal of a robust UN presence, and the positions of the governments of Belgium, France, the United States and the United Kingdom, did not help to deter the actions of Rwanda's *genocidaires*. Participants felt that more apologies for failure to protect civilians during the genocide should be forthcoming.

Withdrawal of Belgian and then Bangladeshi troops from UNAMIR, as well as its eventual draw down in April 1994, suggested that the perpetrators of the genocide could proceed with killing civilians. In the face of such a morally shocking scenario, the Security Council could have chosen to scale up the operational capacity of UNAMIR to end the killings in Rwanda. Ironically, while genocide occurred in Rwanda, the UN enhanced its peace operation in the former Republic of Yugoslavia.

Future interventions would benefit from adherence to new normative frameworks. Robust yet well-defined multilateral interventions would carry more legitimacy and be more effective in the long run. The operational principles of the responsibility to protect help to define the nature and scope of military interventions for humanitarian crises in the future. [See “Principles of Military Intervention,” Box I.]

Responding to massive humanitarian and human rights abuses is the most challenging aspect of the responsibility to protect. The lack of consensus within the

Security Council in 1994 resulted partly from the difficulty in articulating a common viewpoint on the Council’s collective interests. Without new mechanisms to nurture more collective responsibility, a “coalition of willing” Council members is unlikely.

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**The responsibility to rebuild:** to provide, particularly after a military intervention, full assistance with recovery, reconstruction and reconciliation, addressing the causes of the harm the intervention was designed to halt or avert.

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Members of the Rwanda diaspora also felt that Canada and other governments should facilitate the work of the Rwandan government as it rebuilds and reconstructs its traumatized society. The UN has embarked on a number of important initiatives to help Rwanda rebuild and reconcile its society. Despite considerable debate, the UN’s International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)<sup>14</sup> in Arusha, Tanzania, could potentially contribute to

## Box I

### Principles for Military Intervention

#### Just Cause Threshold

Military intervention for human protection purposes is an exceptional and extraordinary measure. To be warranted, there must be serious and irreparable harm occurring to human beings, or imminently likely to occur, of the following kind:

A. Large scale loss of life, actual or apprehended, with genocidal intent or not, which is the product either of deliberate State action, or State neglect or inability to act, or a failed State situation; or

B. Large scale ‘ethnic cleansing’, actual or apprehended, whether carried out by killing, forced expulsion, acts of terror or rape.

#### Precautionary Principles

A. Right intention: The primary purpose of the intervention, whatever other motives intervening States may have, must be to halt or avert human suffering. Right intention is better assured with multilateral operations, clearly supported by regional opinion and the victims concerned.

B. Last resort: Military intervention can only be justified when every non-military option for the prevention or peaceful resolution of the crisis has been explored, with reasonable grounds for

believing lesser measures would not have succeeded.

C. Proportional means: The scale, duration and intensity of the planned military intervention should be the minimum necessary to secure the defined human protection objective.

D. Reasonable prospects: There must be a reasonable chance of success in halting or averting the suffering which has justified the intervention, with the consequences of action not likely to be worse than the consequences of inaction.

#### Right Authority

A. There is no better or more appropriate body than the United Nations Security Council to authorize military intervention for human protection purposes. The task is not to find alternatives to the Security Council as a source of authority, but to make the Security Council work better than it has.

B. Security Council authorization should in all cases be sought prior to any military intervention action being carried out. Those calling for an intervention should formally request such authorization, or have the Council raise the matter on its own initiative, or have the Secretary-General raise it under Article 99 of the UN Charter.

C. The Security Council should deal promptly with any request for authority to intervene where there are allegations of large scale loss of human life or ethnic cleansing. It should in this context seek adequate verification of facts or conditions on the ground that might support a military intervention. The Responsibility to Protect XIII

D. The Permanent Five members of the Security Council should agree not to apply their veto power, in matters where their vital State interests are not involved, to obstruct the passage of resolutions authorizing military intervention for human protection purposes for which there is otherwise majority support.

E. If the Security Council rejects a proposal or fails to deal with it in a reasonable time, alternative options are:

I. Consideration of the matter by the General Assembly in Emergency Special Session under the “Uniting for Peace” procedure; and

II. Action within area of jurisdiction by regional or sub-regional organizations under Chapter VIII of the Charter, subject to their seeking subsequent authorization from the Security Council.

F. The Security Council should take into account in all its deliberations that, if it fails to discharge its responsibility

to protect in conscience-shocking situations crying out for action, concerned States may not rule out other means to meet the gravity and urgency of that situation – and that the stature and credibility of the United Nations may suffer thereby.

#### Operational Principles

A. Clear objectives; clear and unambiguous mandate at all times; and resources to match.

B. Common military approach among involved partners; unity of command; clear and unequivocal communications and chain of command.

C. Acceptance of limitations, incrementalism and gradualism in the application of force, the objective being protection of a population, not defeat of a State.

D. Rules of engagement which fit the operational concept; are precise; reflect the principle of proportionality; and involve total adherence to international humanitarian law.

E. Acceptance that force protection cannot become the principal objective.

F. Maximum possible coordination with humanitarian organizations.

Reproduced from the report by Simon Chesterman, *Discussions at the Release of the Responsibility to Protect*, New York: IPA, 15 February 2002.

ending Rwanda's long history of impunity for crimes against humanity and prosecuting the engineers of genocide. At the memorial conference, the UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, noted that the ICTR's verdicts have included the first judgment that systematic rape constitutes genocide, and the first conviction of journalists for inciting genocide. Finally, the ICTR is the first court to hold a former head of state responsible for genocide.

The Tribunal has also instituted a groundbreaking Assistance to Victims and Witnesses Program, which provides psychological, legal and medical counseling, care and rehabilitation for victims, many of whom are women traumatized by rape and other forms of sexual violence.<sup>15</sup> Furthermore, the UN and its agencies are working to provide support for post-conflict reconstruction in Rwanda. Still, the Secretary-General noted, the UN could do more to help Rwandans, particularly its youth, to rebuild their society.

## Conclusions: Never Again...Again!

On 7 April 2004, the International Day of Reflection on the Rwandan Genocide, Secretary-General Kofi Annan launched his *Action Plan to Prevent Genocide* at the UN Commission for Human Rights in Geneva, Switzerland. An important element of the plan is the establishment of the post of Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, which was first announced at the memorial conference.<sup>16</sup>

In Kinyarwanda, the language of Rwanda, "to protect" literally means to defend. For Rwandans, the responsibility to protect is *inshingano yo k'urinda* (the responsibility to defend). Perhaps the most important legacy of Rwanda has been a new emphasis on protecting civilians during armed conflict. The work of the UN during the last ten years, including the work of the UN Security Council, has been greatly influenced by a growing

concern for civilians, who are the primary casualties in today's armed conflicts. During his remarks in Geneva on 7 April 2004, the Secretary-General noted that UN peace operations were now more consistently empowered to use force in defense of their mandates, and to protect civilians from violence. But in the face of another Rwanda, would the organization be able to respond effectively? Or are the institutional constraints and the lack of political commitment that allowed the international community in 1994 to remain silent in the midst of genocide still at play? Finally, narrow definitions of sovereignty in the twenty-first century will prove paralyzing in the face of new humanitarian crises where vulnerable populations face genocide or other systematic violations of humanitarian and human rights law.

Speakers as well as participants at the memorial conference seemed to be in search of a new paradigm for action in the face of future genocides. The challenge of Rwanda, as Graham concluded, remains that of translating its terrible lessons into diplomatic and political language for new multilateral policies and practices. Such policies should not only reaffirm the "never again" concept, they should also create and strengthen the UN's capacity and help to mobilize coalitions of states around new norms which respond to human suffering. Such a paradigm might be the *responsibility to protect*, which places ultimate responsibility on the state to protect its people. However, when a government is unable or unwilling to protect the humanitarian and human rights of its citizens in the face of massive atrocities, then the broader community of nations must intervene.

Participants hoped that the memory of the victims of Rwanda would be honored more than symbolically. As summed up by IPA's Dr. Ruth Iyob, only by accepting responsibility for the past can we attempt any resolve for the future. Indeed, as Murigande noted in his remarks, Rwandans hope that after the genocide in 1994, the world will never be the same again.

<sup>14</sup> The UN International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) established by UN Security Council Resolution 955 (1994) "for the sole purpose of prosecuting persons responsible for genocide and serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda and Rwandan citizens responsible for genocide and other violations committed in the territory of neighboring States between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994."

<sup>15</sup> Kingsley Moghalu, presentation at the International Peace Academy seminar on "Peace, Security and Governance in the Great Lakes Region," jointly organized by IPA and the Office of the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region, in partnership with the African Dialogue Centre, the Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation, the UN Sub-Regional Centre for Human Rights and Democracy in Central Africa, and the Centre for Conflict Resolution, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, 15 to 17 December 2003. A report on the seminar is expected to be published in May 2004.

<sup>16</sup> United Nations, "Secretary-General Observes International Day of Reflection on 1994 Rwanda Genocide: Launches Action Plan to Prevent Genocide Involving UN System in Speech to Commission on Human Rights," Geneva: United Nations, 7 April 2004 [<http://www.unog.ch/news2/documents/newsen/sg04003e.htm>].



## Annex I – Program

### Memorial Conference on the Rwandan Genocide

*Jointly Organized by the Governments of Rwanda and Canada*

United Nations  
New York  
26 March 2004

#### Welcome/Introduction

09:00 Welcome, David M. Malone, President, and Dr. Ruth Iyob, Director of the Africa Program, International Peace Academy (IPA)

#### Minute of Silence for the Victims of the Rwandan Genocide

Opening Statement, His Excellency Mr. Kofi Annan, Secretary-General of the United Nations

Introductory remarks, Honorable Charles Murigande, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Development Cooperation, Rwanda

Introductory remarks, Honorable William Graham, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Canada

#### In Memoriam: Bearing Witness

09:35 *Chair:* Honorable Charles Murigande, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Development Cooperation, Rwanda

Mrs. Speciose Kanyabugoyi, genocide survivor, Director General of Avega Agahozo, the Association of the Widows of the 1994 Genocide, Rwanda

Mr. Eric Nzabihimana, genocide survivor, Mayor, Commune District Itabire, Rwanda

General (Ret.) Roméo Dallaire, former Commander of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR)

#### Never Again: Toward a More Effective International Response to Genocide

11:15 *Chair:* Honorable William Graham, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Canada

Ibrahim Gambari, United Nations Special Adviser on Africa, “Looking Back and Looking Forward”

Dr. Ramesh Thakur, Vice-Rector, United Nations University, Tokyo, and former Member of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), “The Responsibility to Protect”

**Mr. Danilo Turk**, Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs, “The Implications of the Rwandan Genocide for the United Nations: Prevention, Protection, and the Rebuilding of Shattered Societies”

**Conclusion and Summation**

12: 55      **Honorable William Graham**, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Canada

**Honorable Charles Murigande**, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Development Cooperation, Rwanda

**Dr. Ruth Iyob**, Director of the Africa Program, International Peace Academy

## Annex II – Opening Remarks

H.E. Kofi Annan  
Secretary-General, United Nations

The genocide in Rwanda should never, ever have happened. But it did. The international community failed Rwanda, and that must leave us always with a sense of bitter regret and abiding sorrow.

If the international community had acted promptly and with determination, it could have stopped most of the killing. But the political will was not there, nor were the troops.

If the United Nations, government officials, the international media and other observers had paid more attention to the gathering signs of disaster, and taken timely action, it might have been averted. Warnings were missed. I recall a 1993 report by a United Nations special rapporteur that spoke specifically of an impending catastrophe.

The international community is guilty of sins of omission. I myself, as head of the UN's peacekeeping department at the time, pressed dozens of countries for troops. I believed at that time that I was doing my best. But I realized after the genocide that there was more that I could and should have done to sound the alarm and rally support. This painful memory, along with that of Bosnia and Herzegovina, has influenced much of my thinking, and many of my actions, as Secretary-General.

None of us must ever forget, or be allowed to forget, that genocide did take place in Rwanda, or that it was highly organized, or that it was carried out in broad daylight. No one who followed world affairs or watched the news on television, day after sickening day, could deny that they knew a genocide was happening, and that it was happening on an appalling scale.

Some brave individuals tried to stop the killing, above all General Roméo Dallaire of Canada, who is here with us today, the force commander of the small UN peacekeeping force that was on the ground at the time. They did all they could. They were entitled to more help.

Eight hundred thousand men, women and children were abandoned to the most brutal and callous of deaths, as neighbour killed neighbour. Sanctuaries such as churches

and hospitals were turned into slaughterhouses. An entire country was shattered. A terrible chain of events gradually engulfed the entire region in conflict.

Ten years later, we are trying to pick up the pieces.

In Rwanda itself, the United Nations is doing its utmost to help people recover and reconcile. We are present throughout the country – clearing mines, repatriating refugees, rehabilitating clinics and schools, building up the judicial system, and much else.

In Tanzania, a United Nations criminal tribunal continues to pursue the main perpetrators of the genocide. The tribunal has handed down pioneering verdicts: the first conviction for genocide by an international court; the first to hold a former head of government responsible for genocide; the first to determine that rape was used as an act of genocide; and the first to find journalists guilty of genocide – because they helped create the state of mind in which thousands of people could set aside the most fundamental moral instincts of all human society, and embark on the wholesale massacre of fellow human beings.

With these and other steps, the United Nations is doing what it can to help Rwanda find a path to lasting security and peace, with itself and its neighbors. We cannot undo the past. But we can help Rwandans, especially the young generation who are the future of the country, build a new society together.

The genocide in Rwanda raised questions that affect all humankind – fundamental questions about the authority of the Security Council, the effectiveness of United Nations peacekeeping, the reach of international justice, the roots of violence, and the responsibility of the international community to protect people threatened by genocide and other grave violations of human rights. There has been intense debate, and some genuine advances – practical and philosophical – on some of these questions over the past decade. But still one must ask, are we confident that, confronted by a new Rwanda today, we can respond effectively, in good time? We can by no means be certain we would.

I have suggested a number of measures that would better equip the United Nations and its Member States to meet genocide with resolve, including a special rapporteur or adviser on the subject. More can and must be done, and I am currently analyzing what further steps could be taken. The silence that has greeted genocide in the past must be replaced by a global clamor – a clamor and a willingness to call what is happening by its true name.

The General Assembly has designated 7 April as the International Day of Reflection on the Genocide in Rwanda. The Government of Rwanda, for its part, has asked that the world's observance of the Day include a minute of silence at noon local time in each time zone.

Such a minute of silence has the potential to unite the world, however fleetingly, around the idea of global solidarity. I have written to all the world's heads of State and government, asking them, and especially their public servants, to honor it. I have also instructed all UN offices, throughout the world, to take part. Here today, I

would like to urge all people, everywhere, no matter what their station in life, whether in crowded cities or remote rural areas, to set aside whatever they might be doing at noon on that day, and pause to remember the victims. Let us be united in a way we were not 10 years ago. And let us, by what we do in one single minute, send a message – a message of remorse for the past, resolve to prevent such a tragedy from ever happening again – and let's make it resound for years to come.

May the victims of the Rwandan genocide rest in peace. May our waking hours be lastingly altered by their sacrifice. And may we all reach beyond this tragedy, and work together to recognize our common humanity. If we can accept that everyone on this earth, regardless of color, creed, language or ethnicity is fully human – and, as such, fully worthy of our interest, sympathy and acceptance – we will have taken a giant step forward from dehumanization and toward a stronger sense of global kinship.

## Annex III – Introductory Remarks

**The Honorable Charles Murigande**  
Minister of Foreign Affairs and Development Cooperation, Rwanda

Minister Bill Graham,  
Secretary-General Kofi Annan,  
Excellencies,  
Ladies and Gentlemen,

Permit me to begin by expressing the gratitude of the government and people of Rwanda to the government of Canada for having organized this memorial conference with us. I would also like to welcome the Secretary-General, and thank him for joining us today.

I would also like to thank all of you for joining us at this conference, which is dedicated to the memory of the victims of the Rwandan genocide. It is our hope that this conference will enable us to honor their memory and also to reflect on how to prevent such a tragedy from re-occurring elsewhere.

I would also like to take this opportunity to thank the family of nations, through the representatives here in New York, for adopting the General Assembly resolution designating April 7, 2004, the “International Day of Reflection on the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda” and thereby agreeing to join us in remembering the victims of the Genocide and rededicating ourselves to ensuring that it never happens again.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

In the wake of genocide, Rwanda took the face of a desolate and wasted land. Indeed many of you will recall that some members of the international community expressed doubts whether Rwanda could continue to exist as a sovereign independent state.

Suggestions were made to us to the effect that we had no alternative but to partition the country into a land for Hutu and a land for Tutsi, or to be placed once again under UN trusteeship.

However, the people of Rwanda rejected those suggestions. The achievements of the last 10 years in terms of establishing peace, security and stability; reconciling and uniting the people of Rwanda; developing a culture of good governance and democracy; and economic

recovery and growth, have proved us to have been correct.

In fact, any keen observer with a good understanding of Rwandan history would know that the numerous cycles of “ethnic cleansing” that started in 1959 and continued unabated through the years until 1994, were neither the result of historical antinomy between Hutu and Tutsi, nor a genetic precondition that the Rwandans have to live with or guarded against by outside intervention. Rather, these killings were the product of decades of bad governance that started with colonial rule and was perpetuated by the post-independence regimes.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Rwanda has been a nation for five hundred years. The nation was a community of Rwandans, “Abanyarwanda,” as we call ourselves, sharing a common culture and a common language, living on the same hills and intermarrying. Rwanda had not always been a divided nation of Hutus, Tutsis and Twas, as many of you have been wrongly led to believe. The notion of ethnic difference, elevated to the status of racial difference by the colonialists, was an alien characterization, deliberately designed to divide in order to rule.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

As we reflect on the response of the international community to genocide, permit me to recall that in 1994 there was reluctance by the international community to call what was taking place in the country by its true name: GENOCIDE! Calling it genocide would have made it an obligation for the international community to intervene, which they were unwilling to do. And so people spoke of “mass killing,” “tribal violence” or “acts of genocide” to escape having to take any responsibility, while Rwandans died at a rate of well over 10,000 per day!

So we should ask ourselves as nation-states or representatives of nation-states at the United Nations, what are our obligations under the 1948 Genocide Convention? Why was there this complete failure to fulfill the obligations under the convention?

It was not for lack of warning. There had been many warnings. For example in a 1993 report by Mr. Adama Dieng, who was then the Special Rapporteur of the UN Commission on Human Rights on Summary and Extra-judicial Executions, supported earlier findings by many human rights NGOs, that genocide on a small scale had been committed in Rwanda and that there was a likelihood of a more large-scale killing.

Many western governments were also aware of these developments. In fact, as early as 1992, a French diplomat named Paul Dijoud warned a Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) delegation that visited Paris that they would never get to Kigali, and that if they did, they would find their Tutsi relatives dead!

Apart from that, there were reports both at the UN Secretariat and in the possession of leading members of the Security Council about the impending genocide as early as January 1994.

So the writing was on the wall. The warnings were clear, yet nobody acted or wanted to act.

The truth is that there was this conspiracy of silence. This conspiracy of silence had been present since the killings began in 1959. The silence was only broken by philosophers Jean-Paul Sartre and Bertrand Russell who characterized the killings of Tutsis in 1963-64 as “*the most barbaric crimes committed in the world since the holocaust of Jews.*” Apart from that there was complete silence throughout the 1960s, 1970s and 1990s, when cycles of genocide took place.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

We must learn from the tragic failures of Rwanda in 1994. It is absolutely critical that we learn from these failures so that they never happen again. Our NEVER AGAIN should be exactly that, NEVER AGAIN! No other nation or people should be allowed to suffer what we suffered in Rwanda. Let us commit ourselves to this, and be true to our commitments and obligations.

What is the obligation or responsibility of the international community in cases like what we faced in Rwanda in 1994? The obligation or responsibility is to provide protection; the responsibility to protect. Having watched our country suffer so grotesquely, one million people killed in one hundred days, we are very clear about this. The international community has a responsibility to protect, regardless of any questions of state sovereignty.

So we agree with the core principle of the report titled “The Responsibility to Protect” that:

“Where a population is suffering serious harm...and the State in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect.”

In Rwanda in 1994, not only was the government of the day “unable and unwilling” to protect the population, it was actually perpetrating genocide and mobilizing or coercing others to do the same. So the principle on non-intervention in the internal affairs of Rwanda by the international community should have yielded to the international responsibility to protect.

That international responsibility was sadly lacking. For example, an incident occurred in Kigali on April 11, 1994, when about 3,000 Rwandans in fear of losing their lives fled for protection to the headquarters of a UNAMIR battalion based at a secondary school called ETO Kicukiro in Kigali. These people were later abandoned by the peacekeepers, and were almost immediately nearly all massacred by the *genocidaires*. Among us today is one of the very few survivors who will give her testimony shortly. So, I would like to ask you to ponder the question, what was the responsibility of the international community to protect those 3,000 or so people at ETO Kicukiro?

Ladies and Gentlemen,

The Carlsson Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations during the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda dwelt quite extensively on the failures of the international community, so rather than discuss it in detail I will only highlight two aspects of it.

Firstly, the report recommends that the United Nations and the international community should apologize to the people of Rwanda for having failed them when they should have taken action either to prevent the genocide or to stop it once it had started. With a few exceptions, this apology has not been forthcoming.

Secondly, the report recommends that the international community should support efforts in Rwanda to rebuild the society after the genocide, paying particular attention to the need for reconstruction, reconciliation and respect for human rights, and bearing in mind the varied and serious needs of survivors, returning refugees and other groups affected by the genocide.

Although we have received support from various partners to whom we are very grateful, we had hoped for much greater support. Rwanda is a country that still has great needs, so we would appreciate greater support even now, ten years later.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

I would like to conclude by saying that Rwandans hope that after the genocide in 1994, the world will never be the same again. We should now be aware that inaction or hesitation by the international community when faced with situations like what we faced in Rwanda in 1994 can only lead to tragedy. The international community, all of us in our respective areas of responsibility, be it politicians, diplomats, international civil servants,

peacekeepers and so on, we must all recognize and face our responsibilities. My prayer is that if a similar situation were to unfold elsewhere in the world, we should be equal to the challenge, and therefore avert another horrific tragedy.

The United Nations, the organization to which we all belong, was established principally “To save succeeding generations from the scourge of war” and to “reaffirm faith in the fundamental human rights, dignity and worth of the human person.” Sadly, those two basic principles were betrayed. Let us dedicate ourselves to ensuring that this does not happen again.

Thank you.

## Annex IV – Introductory Remarks

The Honorable William Graham  
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Canada

This conference today has come to pass through the efforts of many parties. I would like to thank the Rwandan government for its partnership, and in particular Foreign Affairs Minister Charles Murigande and Ambassador to the UN Stanislas Kamanzi, whose moral and intellectual support has made this event possible. Also crucial has been the advice and help given by David Malone and the International Peace Academy. We know that because Mr. Malone is rapporteur, our discussions here will reach a much broader audience. And I certainly want to recognize the presence on our panel of General Roméo Dallaire, a distinguished Canadian, who is singularly qualified to help us consider many of the issues before us today.

I am particularly honoured to share the podium with Secretary-General Kofi Annan, whose dedication to the cause of peace stands as an example to us all. Two weeks ago Mr. Annan stood in the Canadian Parliament and at that time reminded us of the need to build a system of collective security that inspires enough confidence to ensure that no country feels obliged to resort to unilateralism. That is, in fact, one of the broader aims of our meeting here today.

This Memorial Conference is an occasion for us to reflect on the Rwandan genocide of 10 years ago, and on the world's collective failure to respond, as the Secretary-General and Minister Murigande pointed out. This reflection, if it is to be effective, must look not only backward, but also forward, if we are to ensure that the world's failure in Rwanda is not repeated. So many words have been written and spoken about that tragedy; but surely we must ask ourselves: "Are we better prepared with actions to prevent such a thing from happening again?" In fact, I fear we have not yet learned the practical lessons we should have.

As the American author Ralph Waldo Emerson wrote, "We learn geology the morning after the earthquake."

The horror of Rwanda taught us a stark fact about the geology of our new global environment, namely, that conflicts within states now have a uniquely devastating potential to kill and disrupt the lives of civilians. That

much we have learned from the earthquake that was Rwanda. But we have not yet learned how to build global structures capable of withstanding such forces next time. Or, to put it more starkly, we have learned what we need to do, but we lack the political will to achieve the necessary agreement on how to put in place the type of measures that will prevent a future Rwanda from happening.

The sad reality is that the international community is still struggling with what to do when the principle of sovereignty collides with fundamental humanitarian norms. Notwithstanding the importance of sovereignty as an international legal principle, there is no more urgent need than to protect civilians in the face of impending or unfolding genocide, war crimes or gross and systematic violations of humanitarian law.

The Secretary-General framed the problem before us most eloquently during his address to the Millennium Summit, where he said:

"[F]ew would disagree that both the defence of humanity and the defence of sovereignty are principles which must be supported. Alas, that does not tell us which should prevail when they are in conflict. Humanitarian intervention is a sensitive issue...fraught with political difficulty...but surely no legal principle—not even sovereignty—can ever shield crimes against humanity."

That call to action inspired Canada and others to establish the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, whose final report, *The Responsibility to Protect*, was presented here in February 2002. One of its authors, Ramesh Thakur, is here with us today and will join us on the second panel.

Central to the Commission's report is a new norm of "sovereignty as responsibility." This norm posits that when states are unable or unwilling to protect their populations from mass atrocities, or when a state is itself the perpetrator, the international community has a responsibility to act. The Commission rightly emphasizes the international community's duty to prevent humanitarian crises from occurring in the first place; but it also



recognizes that outside intervention may be warranted, in extreme cases, when diplomacy fails.

Canada agrees with this reasoning, since it is consistent with our concept that the well-being of the individual must come to be at the centre of our international affairs. We believe that the security of people is as important as the security of states, and therefore we reject the notion that state sovereignty confers absolute immunity. Indeed, we believe that the protections inherent in the concept of state sovereignty are seriously eroded when it becomes a shield for protecting the prerogative of governors rather than an instrument to protect the rights of the governed.

In our view, the principle of sovereignty as responsibility needs to become broadly accepted as a basic norm governing the actions of governments if the UN is to acquit itself fully of its responsibility for peace and security. We are aware that some states have legitimate concerns about the potential for intervention to be misused for political or economic ends. It is for this reason that prevention and diplomacy are intended to be the main ways in which the international community would fulfill the responsibility to protect; intervention can be justified only as a last resort. But it is indisputable, we believe, that this body does have a responsibility to react in the face of unfolding atrocities.

In order to carry out this responsibility effectively, of course, the UN has to live up to its potential as the vehicle of credible and effective multilateralism—not just to deal with intra-state conflicts, but also to deal with the many other new security threats facing individuals around the world, from the global spread of terror and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to pandemics such as HIV/AIDS.

The UN remains the world's most important institution, and the vessel of humanity's shared hopes. But as the world around us evolves, the international community must ask itself whether the UN today is equipped to live up to its mandate to "save succeeding generations from the scourge of war." And I think we have to admit that it is not. Our ability to deal collectively with contemporary security threats is often fatally constrained by rigid notions of sovereignty, and by the narrow interpretations of national interest that too often shape international debate.

The question remains whether individual member states, as custodians of the organization and guardians of the

Charter, have the political will to initiate renewal and modernization where it is required—to fulfill our responsibility for ensuring that the norms governing this institution are responsive to contemporary challenges. It is incumbent upon each state to consider whether it is willing to do the hard work, domestically and internationally, to build a multilateralism that delivers real solutions.

Let me assure you that within Canada, as we currently undertake an international policy review, we are putting at the very heart of our efforts the challenge of multilateral renewal, including the establishment of new rules and structures where they are needed, and the reorientation or elimination of those that may have outlived their usefulness.

We applaud the Secretary-General's commitment to reform, as most recently manifested in the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change. We know that this panel will not have an easy time drawing out the practical implications of security threats for the structure and functioning of the UN. But like you, Canadians are determined to see this organization make itself better able to address the urgent needs of people around the world.

We are also determined to see this organization become capable of drawing genuinely practical lessons from the Rwandan genocide. It is a sad certainty that we will be confronted with impending humanitarian tragedies in the years ahead. But let us not be resigned to that threat. For the sake of future generations, and as a duty to those who died in Rwanda, we must engage in full discussion of the circumstances that warrant military intervention on humanitarian grounds, and put in place the measures that will enable us, the community of nations, to live up to our responsibilities.

Some say this is a debate that the international community is not ready to have, that disagreements over Iraq have damaged the diplomatic environment so as to make it impossible to discuss intervention of any sort or for any reason. But I believe that this is a debate we cannot afford to postpone. In the absence of clarity and consensus on this issue, we risk the same paralysis as in the case of Rwanda, with the same unthinkable results. At stake is nothing less than the future credibility, relevance and effectiveness of the UN as an institution and agent of peace.

There can be no more fitting moment than now, a year after Iraq and 10 years after Rwanda, to open an honest

global debate about humanitarian intervention. I look forward to working with all of you to ensure that the UN has the legal, material and political tools it needs to protect the world's peoples when states fail in their responsibility to do so.

Ten years ago a terrible earthquake, one devised by human hatred, shook the global community. We cannot bring back the victims it claimed in Rwanda. We can, however, learn that tragedy's practical lessons on how to rebuild the structures of multilateralism in order to prevent such devastation in the future. Today I urge us all to dedicate ourselves anew to that task.

In Ottawa, the Secretary-General said, "It is hard to imagine the UN without Canada. It is hard to imagine Canada without the UN." The Canadian government and the Canadian people agree with these words. We will translate these sentiments into action, and work with you to make this place, so essential for world order and the security of the human being, a better, more efficient instrument for us all.

Thank you.





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