Reimagining Peacemaking: Women’s Roles in Peace Processes

MARIE O’REILLY, ANDREA Ó SÚILLEABHÁIN, AND THANIA PAFFENHOLZ

INTERNATIONAL PEACE INSTITUTE
ABOUT THE AUTHORS

MARIE O’REILLY is Editor and Research Fellow at the International Peace Institute.
Email: oreilly@ipinst.org

ANDREA Ó SÚILLEABHÁIN is Senior Policy Analyst at the International Peace Institute.
Email: osuilleabhain@ipinst.org

THANIA PAFFENHOLZ is Senior Researcher at the Graduate Institute Geneva’s Centre on Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding.
Email: thania.paffenholz@graduateinstitute.ch

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Executive Summary

Peace processes increasingly go beyond outlining cease-fires and dividing territory to incorporate elements that lay the foundations for peace and shape the structures of society. Yet by and large the participants who decide the former continue to decide the latter; the inclusion of others—those who did not take up arms, those who were working for peace, or significant portions of the population whose priorities for a peaceful society may differ—has not kept pace.

This report focuses on one such group: women. Between 1992 and 2011, just 2 percent of chief mediators and 9 percent of negotiators in peace processes were women.1

Why do so few women participate in high-level peacemaking? The peacemaking landscape presents a number of barriers to women’s participation today. First, women's participation relates to a broader dilemma about the ends and means of peacemaking: if the goal of a peace process is only to end violence, then women—who are rarely the belligerents—are unlikely to be considered legitimate participants. If the goal is to build peace, however, it makes sense to gain more diverse inputs from the rest of society—women and others who will be affected by these decisions. Second, women’s different security needs and priorities for peace challenge the dominant understanding of peace and security in the international system, which remains largely focused on state security rather than human security. Third, multilateral organizations like the UN that have made commitments to women’s participation in peacemaking often have less power to influence the structure of a peace process in today’s changing mediation landscape. Perhaps most importantly, a deeper resistance to change and a reluctance to share power is also at play—particularly on the part of the conflict parties themselves.

When women do participate, what effect does it have? Until now, there has been little research into the impact of women’s participation in peace processes. New evidence from the Geneva Graduate Institute’s Broadening Participation Project shows that when women’s groups were able to effectively influence the process, a peace agreement was almost always reached and the agreement was more likely to be implemented. The project examined the roles of women’s groups (and other groups) in forty peace and transition processes.2 New statistical research involving a larger dataset also shows that women’s participation increases the probability that the peace agreement will last longer.

Mediation teams and policymakers frequently voice concerns about how to facilitate women’s participation in practice. Women’s inclusion has been advanced in many creative ways in a variety of contexts. The following seven models for increasing inclusivity can be adapted to different settings:

1. Direct participation at the negotiation table
2. Observer status
3. Consultations
4. Inclusive commissions
5. Problem-solving workshops
6. Public decision making
7. Mass action

A combination of inclusion models throughout the process makes its success more likely. This is demonstrated clearly in a case study on two distinct peace processes in the Philippines. Although the average rate of women’s participation in peace processes around the world remains low, the Philippines is an outlier in this respect. In two recent peace processes there, women participated in record numbers. However, by comparing the two processes, it becomes clear that quality participation is more important than quantity, and, as with every peace process, reaching an agreement is only the first step on a long and arduous road toward rebuilding trust.

Across contexts, and regardless of the models and mechanisms being used, those seeking to strengthen a peace or transition process by advancing women’s meaningful participation can

leverage four key strategies:
1. Build coalitions based on normative and strategic arguments.
2. Establish a credible selection process.
3. Create the conditions to make women’s voices heard.

Given the evidence of women’s impact and the changing mediation landscape, a broader reimagining of peace processes is needed, so that those shaping and participating in them can work with the multiplicity of actors involved to both end violence more effectively and build a more durable peace.

Introduction

From the dinner table to the boardroom table, women’s participation in decision-making processes is increasing in societies around the globe. Yet twenty years after the historic United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing, in which 189 countries called for “full and equal participation of women in political, civil, economic, social and cultural life,” women’s participation at another table—the peace table—lags behind. Between 1992 and 2011, just 2 percent of chief mediators and 9 percent of negotiators in formal peace processes were women. Only 7 percent of agreements signed between 1990 and 2010 referenced gender equality or women’s rights.

In addition to preventing and ending armed conflict, peace and political transition processes provide key opportunities for major reforms that transform institutions, structures, and relationships in societies affected by conflict or crises. The agreements they produce are often followed by constitution-making processes, and they lay out elements of postconflict planning, map power structures in society, and implicitly determine priorities for donor funding, all of which can in turn influence the recurrence of conflict and the durability of the peace.

Advocates for women’s participation in peace and constitution making have long taken a rights-based approach to the issue: as half of a society’s population, women have a right to be represented in these decision-making processes that will affect their lives. The UN Security Council has also recognized the importance of increasing women’s participation in resolving conflicts and building peace, particularly at decision-making levels, since its landmark Resolution 1325. Yet progress remains slow, and off-the-record discussions with peacemakers, decision makers, and those who support and shape these processes show that many remain resistant to including women due to a lack of evidence about the value that women’s participation can bring and fear that it may derail the process. In addition, many peacemakers who are committed to inclusive peace processes question how to design them and increase participation in practice.

In this report we examine the challenges and opportunities presented by women’s participation in peace and transition processes, and offer recommendations for reimagining the traditional approach to peacemaking with a view to building a more durable peace. We consider women’s roles as individuals and in groups, but we are particularly interested in the impact of organized constituencies of women who are more likely to represent a gendered perspective on a conflict and its resolution. When assessing impact, our primary focus is on the impact of women’s participation on peace; as a secondary focus, we consider the effect of women’s participation on gender-specific outcomes of negotiations.

The report is structured in five sections. We first explore the barriers to women’s participation and

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6 Bell and O’Rourke, “Peace Agreements or ‘Pieces of Paper’?”
7 See, for example, UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (October 31, 2000), UN Doc. S/RES/1325, operative paras. 2 and 8(b). For a full list of Security Council resolutions on women and peace and security, see Annex III.
how they relate to trends and challenges in the broader field of peacemaking. Second, we present new evidence about the impact of women’s participation on the likelihood of achieving an agreement and on the durability of the peace that follows. In the third section, we examine models for inclusion that have been used in a variety of settings. In the fourth, we bring to life ways to achieve meaningful participation in practice, through a case study of the country with the highest rates of women’s participation: the Philippines. Based on the findings of the previous sections, in the fifth we present practical strategies that peacemakers, decision makers, and engaged citizens can use to create more inclusive peace and transition processes in any context. We offer broader recommendations in the conclusion.

Our findings and recommendations are based on research carried out at the International Peace Institute in New York from 2013 to 2015 and the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva from 2011 to 2015. Throughout, we highlight the diverse perspectives of peacemakers, policymakers, and experts who kindly shared their insights with us.

I. Dilemmas in Peacemaking and Barriers for Women

Mediating peace is no easy task, but peace and political transition processes remain critical vehicles for the peaceful resolution of conflict. Data suggests that mediation lessens the chances that conflict will recur when compared to military victories or agreements reached directly between the conflict parties. Yet, empirical findings from a set of international crises from 1918 to 2001 demonstrate that while mediation has a strong impact in the short term—in achieving a cessation of hostilities—this frequently comes at the expense of long-term peace.

As such, there is clearly a need to strengthen these approaches and strategies for peace. This is all the more true in light of the changing security landscape. In the twentieth century, peace negotiations were primarily carried out between governments and, after the Cold War ended, between governments and well-defined rebel groups. The twenty-first century is witnessing a rise in violent extremism and hybrid forms of conflict, with multiple and less clearly defined actors and territories, all of which are posing new challenges to traditional approaches to mediation and negotiation. And as civil wars rather than interstate wars dominate the conflict landscape today, 90 percent of these wars occur in countries already affected by conflict—raising further questions for the short- and long-term priorities of peace processes.

Against this backdrop, this section explores four questions concerning the lag in women’s participation: How does women’s participation relate to larger dilemmas surrounding the ends and means of peace processes as they are currently structured? Is the premise of women’s participation at odds with the dominant conceptions of peace and security? What opportunities and challenges does today’s changing mediation landscape present? Is there a deeper resistance to women’s participation at play?

ENDS AND MEANS OF PEACEMAKING

Peace agreements increasingly go beyond outlining cease-fires and dividing territory to incorporate elements that lay the foundations for peace and shape the structures of society—from constitution drafting to reforming institutions and creating frameworks for transition processes. Yet by and large the participants who decide the former continue to decide the latter; the inclusion of others—those who did not take up arms, those who were working for peace, or significant portions of the population whose priorities for a peaceful

13 For a critical analysis of this trend, see, for example, Hallie Ludsin, “Peacemaking and Constitution Drafting: A Dysfunctional Marriage,” University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law 33, No. 1 (2011): 239–311.
Traditionally, peace processes have focused on bringing the belligerents, who are rarely women, to the negotiating table. These conflict parties, who in turn become the negotiating delegations, do not want to dilute their power (see box below). Indeed, off-the-record discussions with mediators and mediation support teams indicate that many still find it very difficult to create the space for new constituencies at the negotiating table, even as international frameworks laying the basis for women’s participation in peacemaking have advanced.14 Some fear that they will be wasting political capital with the negotiating parties if they insist on a more inclusive process and that the “risks and challenges of overloading the [peace] table” could derail the entire process. Others emphasize that mediators are not, at the end of the day, measured against how inclusive they have been but how well they managed to reach an agreement.17 These arguments are shared by those who highlight that evidence in favor of inclusive and sustainable settlements is lacking and that questions remain about the links between citizen engagement, the durability of peace, and the functioning of the state over time.18

While some may simply be unaware of the evidence surrounding women’s contributions to the effectiveness of such processes (and new evidence is outlined in this report), women’s inclusion is one element of a larger dilemma surrounding the legitimacy and end goals of peace processes as they are currently structured.

Power and expertise: Challenges to women’s participation

Women mediators, negotiators, and peacebuilders are well aware of the power dynamic that makes it difficult for their voices to be heard—or taken seriously—in peace processes. “It’s a power game. And in most of these games, women are not there,” said then UN mediator-in-residence Margaret Vogt in an interview with IPI. “So, when it comes to discussing peace [at] the table, the participants—the negotiators—see it as an opportunity to renegotiate power, and they want to restrict the domain as much as possible.”19

Women’s groups seeking inclusion at the peace table are often met with extensive questions about their credibility, their constituencies, and their qualifications. “I thought my experience of what was happening on the ground would be useful,” said one female civil society leader, “but they seemed to want people with PhDs in negotiation.”20 In some cases, a higher bar is set for women’s participation than for other groups. They are expected to be both prominent leaders with technical experience and activists with large grassroots constituencies.21 The qualifications for armed actors are more limited, as their participation tends to be based on direct involvement in violence.

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14 See, for example, Christine Bell, Colm Campbell, and Fionnuala Ñ Ó aoláin, “Justice Discourses in Transition,” Social and Legal Studies 13 (2004): 305.
15 This finding emerged from analysis of the cases in the Broadening Participation Project.
16 For a list of the UN Security Council resolutions on women and peace and security, see Annex III.
17 Participants’ remarks at off-the-record roundtable event on mediation held at IPI, New York, October 29, 2014.
18 These findings stem from individual interviews and off-the-record roundtable discussions with mediators, mediation support actors, peacebuilding practitioners, and experts held at the International Peace Institute in New York in 2014, as well as the Graduate Institute’s participation in the Oslo Forum and the Zanzibar Mediators’ retreat hosted by the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD Centre) in 2011 and the high-level UN mediation course in Istanbul in 2013. Similar findings are reported elsewhere. See, for example, Alice Nderitu, and Jacqueline O’Neill, “Getting to the Point of Inclusion: Seven Myths Standing in the Way of Women Waging Peace,” Institute for Inclusive Security, June 2013.
20 Participant’s remarks at off-the-record roundtable on women, peace, and security with peacebuilders, civil society leaders, and experts at IPI, New York, October 29, 2014.
Women’s participation creates a quandary about the end goals of peacemaking: is a peace process primarily a forum for ending the violence, or should its focus be on building sustainable peace? Those who prioritize stabilization often think that the violent parties—whether state or nonstate actors—are the only legitimate participants, making women’s participation less likely. “In life, as in mediation, we often have our most important conversations in a small room,” said one mediator. Given the need for prioritization that this implies, “stabilization wins the day,” said another.²²

On the other hand, if the goal of a peace process is to build peace, then it makes sense that individuals and groups who seek peace and who represent the diversity of the citizenry participate. In addition, exclusivity creates a dangerous precedent: “If people have guns, then we talk to them. If they don’t wear that badge, then we won’t,” said one practitioner.²³

Belligerents and mediators perceive a trade-off between the goals of ending violence and building peace, and pursue mediation in a way that emphasizes favorable short-term results even if it ultimately increases the probability that crisis will recur in the long term.²⁴ Yet if the ideal is both a cessation of hostilities and a durable peace, this suggests a need to get beyond this “trade-off” framing and identify missing elements that make both short- and long-term success likely. The new evidence outlined in this report suggests that when women participate meaningfully across a range of models, they increase the chances of both significantly.

WOMEN’S PRIORITIES FOR PEACE

Like men, women identify with a number of different markers of identity, whether relating to gender, ethnicity, or class, for example. They also reflect a multitude of interests in society and take on a variety of roles throughout the spectrum of conflict: they are victims, perpetrators, peacemakers, and political advocates. Yet, despite the heterogeneity of women’s experiences and their diverse roles in war and peace, it is widely accepted that women experience conflict differently from men.²⁵ Men make up the majority of combatants during conflict and are more likely than women to die from war’s direct effects. Women are more likely to die from war’s indirect effects after conflict ends—from causes relating to the breakdown in social order, human rights abuses, economic devastation, and the spread of infectious diseases.²⁶ Research also shows that in addition to the scourge of conflict-related sexual violence that predominantly affects women, domestic violence against women increases when conflict breaks out and is more prevalent than conflict-related sexual violence.²⁷ Similarly, levels of rape and domestic violence remain extremely high in postconflict settings, as demobilized fighters primed to use force confront transformed gender roles at home or the frustrations of unemployment.²⁸

These examples help to explain why women’s understandings of security are often at odds with the dominant concepts of security that were historically (though not exclusively) formulated by men and continue to underpin predominantly male-led peacemaking efforts. The latter conceptualizations fail to take these multidimensional threats to women’s physical security into account. And for the most part, governments, multilateral organizations, and other organizations involved in high-level peacemaking and peacebuilding continue to treat “conflict” and “postconflict” settings separately, based largely on the end of formal combat and the decline in the battle-related mortality rate. Women, on the other hand, face a continuum of violence and insecurity that does not

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²² Participants’ remarks at off-the-record roundtable event on mediation held at IPI, New York, October 29, 2014.
²³ Ibid.
²⁴ Beardsley, The Mediation Dilemma; participants’ remarks at off-the-record roundtable event on mediation held at IPI, New York, October 29, 2014.
²⁵ For example, since the year 2000 the UN Security Council—traditionally focused on “hard” security interstate wars—has recognized the gendered effects of war in a series of seven resolutions on the issue of women and peace and security, starting with Resolution 1325. See Annex III.
fit into these categories. Violence against women in the home (experienced by one in three women around the world) is now understood as an indicator of broader violence in society.29 So gender equality, power dynamics, and security can no longer be considered as separate spheres.

Just as women tend to experience conflict differently from men, their priorities for peace frequently differ at the negotiating table. Although women who are affiliated with the conflict parties often opt to toe the party line, research shows that when women have had the opportunity to influence peace processes in other ways (and in some cases even as negotiators for the belligerents), they have frequently broadened the set of issues at the negotiating table to address development and human rights as well as security.30 In other words, they address issues relating to the causes and effects of conflict and frequently marry the three pillars of the United Nations (human rights, security, and development) in their approach. This can also be understood as bringing the concepts of “human security” and “positive” peace, which denotes the absence of structural violence and a reinforcement of those factors that sustain peace. As noted above, these concepts are not always compatible (and are often in conflict) with the dominant conception of peace in the international system and in the traditional approach to peace processes, which typically treats peace as the absence of armed conflict (“negative” peace) and prioritizes state security.

In fact, quantitative analysis shows that women’s security and positive peace are intertwined: there is now compelling evidence that women’s physical security and gender equality in society correlate with broader peace and stability in states.31 While the causal direction remains unclear, quantitative analysis shows that women are more likely to face rape, domestic violence, and other physical threats in states with high rates of conflict, crime, and instability, and in those that have poor relations with their neighbors or with the international community.32 Similarly, states are less likely to be peaceful if their family laws favor men or gender discrimination is prevalent in practice, despite equality under the law.33

**A CHANGING MEDIATION LANDSCAPE**

There is growing recognition in policymaking that inclusive societies, which provide equal opportunity for all, are more likely to be peaceful and stable. Inclusion and inclusive development are increasingly seen as core elements of conflict prevention, and there are calls to integrate them more fully into the work of the UN Security Council as well as other parts of the UN system and regional organizations.34 As such, the inclusion of women in peace and transition processes complements a number of recent trends in the broader field of peacemaking, even as it confronts deeply-rooted power structures and time-worn conceptualizations of peace and security.

Indeed, more and more policymakers, diplomats, mediators, and mediation support actors are committed to increasing women’s participation in peacemaking and understand the value that their diverse perspectives can contribute to the peacemaking process. However, they still question how this can be done. Many argue that the time pressures associated with ending the violence—including short timelines created by powerful higher authorities such as the UN Security Council—do not allow for such a comprehensive approach that could broaden the set of actors who participate and target long-term peace as well as crisis management.35

To some extent, they are caught between a rock and a hard place as UN Security Council resol-

32 Hudson et al, Sex and World Peace.
33 Ibid.
34 For example, the UN Security Council held an open debate on inclusive development for international peace and security in January 19, 2015, under the presidency of Chile.
35 Participants’ remarks at off-the-record roundtable event on mediation held at IPI, New York, October 29, 2014.
tions calling for an increase in women’s roles in peacemaking, which are binding on member states, have also helped to heighten expectations that mediators will implement these objectives in their work. These resolutions give women in conflict-affected countries tools for justifying their participation, but mediation teams often feel overwhelmed by these demands. They worry that these groups “overestimate the role of international mediators and their capacity to influence the parties,” when in the end, “the mediator is not a god” and faces a plethora competing demands.  

Other changes in the mediation landscape also stand in their way. With the recent rise in terrorism, increasingly militarized responses to violent extremism, and the closing space for mediation in many parts of the world, the mediator often lacks the power to suggest the terms of a peace process.  

And though multilateral mediators in particular have a rich normative framework to draw from in support of women’s participation in peacemaking, they are not necessarily the ones leading mediation processes today (see the box on the Malian peace process on page 9). The increased number of actors involved in mediation and a proportionally reduced role for the UN has been documented in the scholarly literature on mediation. With some exceptions, it appears that most independent international mediators—private organizations and prestigious individuals—have not demonstrated significant interest in women’s participation or gender-sensitive processes. Practitioners also report that the proliferation of mediation organizations undermines unity of purpose among those seeking to support peace, which can in turn make it difficult to prioritize broader participation.

OVERCOMING A DEEPER RESISTANCE

While acknowledging the constraints posed by the mediation landscape today, some peacemakers and experts question whether the prevailing exclusivity is more influenced by a lack of political will than issues of ways and means. Independent practitioners note that “The UN and other powerbrokers succumb to requests not to have women in the room” and “When the local government says ‘We don’t want women,’ the international community compromises and says ‘OK.’”

Connecting local and high-level peacemaking

Women’s participation at decision-making levels in national, regional, and international mechanisms for preventing and resolving conflict lag behind. But at the grassroots level, examples abound of women’s leadership in community-based peacebuilding. And even when women are excluded from official peace processes, they have succeeded in linking grassroots peacemaking to national political processes in some cases.

According to Ugandan peacebuilder Ruth Ojiambo Ochieng, “When women were excluded from the Juba peace talks between the Ugandan government and the Lord’s Resistance Army in 2006, they came together and asked, ‘Does it have to be only one peace table?’” Ochieng and other leaders organized women’s peace tables at the village and district level, and ensured that these consultations fed into the Juba process and the national recovery and development plan that followed. In creating their own peace tables, women developed a grassroots network that they continued to utilize to monitor progress on government commitments. Several women who led the peace tables became politically active, and went on to win elections as local councilors and members of Parliament.

36 Ruth Ojiambo Ochieng’s remarks at IPI roundtable event on women, peace, and security, October 29, 2014. Quoted with permission.
38 Participants’ remarks at off-the-record roundtable event on mediation held at IPI, New York, October 29, 2014.
41 Notable exceptions include the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD Centre) and the Conflict Management Initiative (CMI).
42 Participants’ remarks at off-the-record roundtable event on mediation held at IPI, New York, October 29, 2014.
44 Participant’s remarks at off-the-record roundtable on women, peace, and security at IPI, New York, October 29, 2014.
From a different perspective, women’s participation is also tied to a broader trend of increasing demands for democracy, accountability, and meaningful representation in societies around the world, as evidenced by waves of protest and unrest from Tahrir Square to Wall Street and from Ouagadougou to Hong Kong. Similarly, in the field of peace research, citizen participation and local buy-in are increasingly acknowledged as fundamental elements of effective peacebuilding, not least in terms of the legitimacy of a process and its sticking power after a settlement has been reached and international mediators have moved on. However, just as many elites are pushing back against the popular striving to renew the social contract within states, in the particular example of peace processes—which themselves present a prime opportunity for redefining the social contract and transforming structures of conflict in society—many belligerents and those who wield power resist the participation of women.

Indeed, in addition to the conceptual and practical dilemmas outlined above, it is clear that a deeper resistance to women’s participation is at play. When broader participation does take place in a peace or transition process, it is the main conflict parties, followed by the mediators, who most frequently initiate the inclusion of civil society groups or political parties into negotiations. In forty cases studied, conflict parties mostly opted for including more groups to increase their legitimacy or achieve support from major constituencies, including hardliners. Mediators pushed for inclusion to gain momentum for negotiations or to add new perspectives or test new ideas. However, when it comes to the participation of women’s groups in particular, the picture looks quite different. Women’s groups were only included when local and international organizations (as opposed to mediation teams or negotiating parties) lobbied strongly for their participation. Beyond any technical support or conceptual shift, this indicates a need for domestic and international advocacy and pressure to influence the political will for women’s participation.

One recent precedent shows that this kind of resistance can be overcome—those considered legitimate participants can change. During the Cold War, governments had strongly resisted negotiating with nonstate armed groups, who were rarely considered legitimate interlocutors at the peace table. However, as the number of civil wars increased in the 1990s and research advanced regarding the effects of their inclusion, attitudes shifted. While the participation of particular violent groups may still be called into question, the participation of nonstate armed actors per se is the new normal. Many now argue that the participation of unarmed nonstate actors, particularly women’s groups and other civil society organizations already working for peace in their countries, should be the next paradigm shift. This makes sense given the need for buy-in from societal constituencies beyond the conflict parties (who themselves may have little legitimacy among the citizens) and the fact that women who participate as representatives of the armed conflict parties are often constrained by their party line, as noted above. In addition, many women who are excluded from high-level processes are experienced peacemakers at the local level, though their qualifications are often overlooked or questioned (see the box on page 7, “Connecting local and high-level peacemaking”).

Overall, these barriers show that more awareness is needed about both the “why” and “how” of women’s participation. The next section explores the “why”—the impact of women’s participation. Following sections then turn to the “how”—namely, models and strategies for creating inclusive peace and transition processes.


47 Ibid.

II. Women’s Impact on Peace Processes

Many of those leading, shaping, and supporting peace and transition processes still do not view women as valuable partners in reaching their goals. A central challenge is the lack of evidence-based knowledge on the ingredients for a successful peace or transition process in general and the impact of women’s participation on the outcome in particular. As a consequence, negotiations and peace processes are all too often designed on the basis of untested hypotheses or normative biases, instead of solid evidence-based findings.

Research from a variety of fields shows that on average women are more likely to be perceived by fellow citizens as members of society that can be trusted; they are more likely to serve as caregivers

Resistance to change in the Malian peace process

In the current peace process in Mali, there are eleven co-mediators, including the UN, the African Union, and the European Union—multilateral organizations that have made formal commitments to increasing women’s participation in peacemaking. The inclusion of community representatives and women in the peace process was initially one of top priorities for the UN and the EU. However, the lead-mediator, Algeria, and many other co-mediators could not be convinced of the importance of women’s participation. There were “not many takers” on the international mediation team for bringing women into the peace process as the lead mediator was “keeping the traditional approach with the traditional parties.” The diplomats involved in the international mediation team were “all men above fifty-five [years of age],” according to a mediation support actor involved in the peace process. The Algerians and others were reportedly reluctant to include community representatives and women for cultural reasons and because they thought it would delay the negotiations.

An additional source of resistance emerged from the negotiating parties themselves who thought the participation of community and civil society representatives—including women—should be part of the reconciliation phase that would follow the direct negotiations between the parties after an agreement was reached. Among the 100 delegates from the three delegations—representing the government of Mali, the armed groups closely aligned with the government, and the opposition armed groups—there are reportedly five women at most. However, “the co-mediators are not much better”: only the UN and EU are reported to have women in their teams for the duration of the process, serving as experts and advisers; Mauritanian and Burkinabé female officials have participated at certain times during the process. “There is only so much you can push for as a mediation team,” the mediation support actor said, “it’s first and foremost the parties who decide.” On the other hand, “the way the lead mediator presents women has an impact,” said another participant in the process, “and the UN is increasingly not the lead mediator.”

On May 15, 2015, a signing ceremony was organized in Bamako, but only the government of Mali, armed groups closely aligned with the government, and the international mediators signed the agreement. Opposition armed groups, who had initialed the agreement in Algiers on May 14, 2015, were absent and continue to ask that some of their concerns be addressed before signing. As of June 2015, the Malian peace process is inconclusive and in a precarious state, as violence has broken out again.

49 Participant’s remarks at off-the-record roundtable event on mediation held at IPI, New York, October 29, 2014.
50 IPI interview with mediation support actor involved in the peace process, who spoke on the condition of anonymity, May 27, 2014. The figures and quotes that follow are also from this source, unless otherwise indicated.
51 Estimate from mediation support actor cited above. Given the secrecy surrounding these talks and the changing composition of delegations, the precise number at any given time is difficult to verify.
52 Participant’s remarks at off-the-record roundtable event on mediation held at IPI, New York, October 29, 2014.
and place more emphasis on social and civic responsibilities compared to men.\textsuperscript{55} While these kinds of characteristics stem from socially constructed gender roles and are not essential to all women’s identities, such attributes and perceptions make women logical contenders for leadership roles in peacemaking, with complementary skills and approaches to their male counterparts. Moreover, as outlined above, women have different perspectives to bring to bear on what peace and security mean and how they can be realized.

But what happens in practice when women do participate? Until now, research on this subject has been limited, in part due to a lack of gender-disaggregated data.\textsuperscript{56} This section presents new qualitative and quantitative findings from a broad sample of cases assessing the impact of women’s participation in peace negotiations and their implementation. It first presents the results of a qualitative analysis of forty in-depth country case studies, examining the influence women’s groups had on the quality and sustainability of peace agreements and the circumstances under which women can successfully influence processes. It then shares quantitative results on the impact of women’s participation on the durability of peace agreements from a statistical analysis of 182 agreements.

**REACHING AND IMPLEMENTING AGREEMENTS**

What does the latest qualitative research show about the impact of women’s participation on the likelihood of reaching a peace agreement and its implementation?

The “Broadening Participation Project,” a multi-year research project conducted at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva led by Thania Paffenhholz has sought to better understand how inclusion works in reality and what the impact of inclusion is on the quality and sustainability of political agreements.\textsuperscript{57} Quality is understood as how well the causes and effects of conflicts are addressed in the agreement. Sustainability is understood as how well the provisions addressing these quality factors are implemented, and to what extent violence is reduced. The research applied a comparative case study approach investigating forty in-depth qualitative case studies of peace negotiations and political transitions and their implementation (see Annex I).\textsuperscript{58}

The overall project considered the participation of a variety of distinct groups across negotiations, such as armed groups, political parties, and religious groups. Organized constituencies of women were also assessed as a distinct group along these lines.\textsuperscript{59} This section examines the impact that these organized women’s groups, networks, or coalitions (rather than individual female mediators or negotiators) had when they participated in a peace or transition process. It is also important to examine women’s groups as distinct from individual female negotiators, mediators, witnesses, or signatories since there is some evidence to suggest that women’s groups are more likely to raise concerns that are distinct from the belligerents’ priorities or specifically relevant to women.\textsuperscript{60}

The participation of women’s groups came in a variety of forms in the forty cases studied, encompassing both official and non-official roles both at the negotiating table and more distant from it, such as consultations and post-agreement commissions (seven models of inclusion that emerged are explained in the next section of this report). In twenty-eight of the cases, women’s

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\textsuperscript{56} Of course, there are exceptions, such as qualitative research by Sanam Naraghi Anderlini, *Women Building Peace.*


\textsuperscript{58} Paffenhholz, “Main Results.”

\textsuperscript{59} This does not include, for example, women participating in negotiations as delegates for the main conflict parties.

\textsuperscript{60} UN Women, “Women’s Participation in Peace Negotiations,” p. 4.
groups were included in one or more of these fora during the process.

Exerting Influence for Impact

The participation of women’s groups is only correlated with positive negotiation outcomes if women’s groups had a strong influence on the process. The level of influence was measured by both the extent to which included actors brought specific topics that addressed the causes of conflict to the negotiation agenda and/or whether these were integrated into the agreement. Influence also included the extent to which actors pushed for starting negotiations or reaching an agreement. The level of influence was then correlated with agreements signed and implemented. The latter considered the extent of implementation of core agreement provisions.

When women’s groups were able to strongly influence negotiations or push for a peace deal an agreement was almost always reached (only one case presented an exception). Even where women’s groups only had moderate influence, an agreement was reached in the majority of cases. When women’s groups were not involved at all, or had a low influence on the process, the chance of reaching an agreement was considerably lower.

Of course, women’s involvement is not the only factor influencing the likelihood of reaching an agreement, and agreements were also reached in a few cases without women’s participation. Nevertheless, the results demonstrate that women’s inclusion does not hinder reaching agreements, as is sometimes argued. On the contrary, women’s inclusion is associated with an increased likelihood of an agreement being reached.

Moreover, there was not a single case where organized women’s groups had a negative impact on a peace process. This does not hold true for other groups, which have at times rallied against peace processes—in Sri Lanka, for example, Buddhist monks and civil society organizations conducted demonstrations against the peace process. On the contrary, women’s groups frequently mobilized en masse to help seal a peace deal, from Liberia to Northern Ireland.

When women’s groups were able to exercise strong influence, the chances of agreements being implemented—in short, that the resulting peace would be sustained—were also much higher. When an agreement was reached, all of the cases with strong women’s influence saw either partial or full implementation of this agreement. In general, the stronger the influence was, the higher the likelihood of implementing an agreement.61

Advancing Peace as well as Gender-Sensitive Provisions

When women’s groups had a strong influence (as defined above) in the negotiation process, they were able to bring a greater number of issues to the table and raise specific and concrete concerns.

Perhaps the most significant achievement of women’s groups was to push for the commencement or finalization of negotiations when momentum was stalled. When women had strong influence, they were at the forefront of pushing conflict parties—both those inside and outside the formal negotiations—to reach an agreement. Liberia is a renowned example, where women mobilized to demand the signing of a peace agreement. In other cases, women advocated for measures that would help prevent relapse into violence, such as addressing the root causes of the conflict as seen in Kenya and Burundi, and that would contribute to transforming power relations in society, as seen in Egypt and Yemen.

Women also advocated for context-specific women’s rights and gender equality provisions in peace agreements. For example, in Burundi, women succeeded in inserting into the peace agreement provisions on freedom of marriage and the right to choose one’s partner. In Guatemala, women’s groups in the Civil Society Assembly worked hand in hand with the women’s representative at the table to introduce commitments to new legislation that would classify sexual harassment as a criminal offence and establish an office for indigenous women’s rights.

The results outlined here demonstrate that the inclusion of women is not simply a normative issue. When women participate and are able to exercise influence, there are positive effects for the likelihood of reaching a peace agreement, the text

61 An agreement is defined as being fully implemented when at least 80 percent of its relevant provisions were implemented; an agreement is defined as partially implemented when at least some of the key provisions have been implemented.
of the agreement that is produced, and the implementation that follows. This participation can take a variety of forms—seven types of participation identified across the case studies are outlined in section III below, “Models of Inclusion.”

**DURATION OF PEACE**

The findings outlined above show that the participation of influential women’s groups correlates with agreement implementation when using a comparative case study approach. But do *individual* women also contribute to the success of a peace agreement, as mediators or negotiators, for example? And what do statistical analyses of larger sample sets reveal? Quantitative studies have examined the effect of civil society’s participation on peace negotiations—scholar Desirée Nilsson demonstrated that peace agreements are 64 percent less likely to fail when civil society representatives participate.  

But similar quantitative studies on women’s participation in particular have been lacking until now. New statistical analysis by researcher Laurel Stone suggests that women’s participation has a positive impact on the durability of peace agreements. By measuring the presence of women as negotiators, mediators, witnesses, and signatories to 182 signed peace agreements between 1989 and 2011, and the length of time that a peace agreement lasted, Stone concluded that women’s participation had a statistically significant, positive impact on the duration of peace when controlling for other variables (see Annex II). When women are included in a peace process, the peace agreement that results is 20 percent more likely to last at least two years. Women’s participation has an even greater impact in the longer term: an agreement is 35 percent more likely to last for fifteen years if women participate in its creation (figure 1). Stone’s statistical analysis of women’s rights language in peace agreements actually demonstrated a negative correlation with the duration of peace agreements. This suggests that

*Figure 1. Women’s participation and peace agreement duration*

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63 This section shares the unpublished work of Laurel Stone, research associate for policy studies at University of Notre Dame’s Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies. Details of Stone’s statistical analysis and methodology can be found in Annex II.

64 Given the lack of nuanced data available about the exact nature of women’s participation across this relatively large sample of peace processes, this analysis has limitations: it does not incorporate levels of influence, adjust for the number of women participating in a process, or distinguish between the relative merit of one form of participation over another. See Annex II for more details.
while “mainstreaming” gender-sensitive language may be valuable for advancing gender equality and reducing structural violence in society (and further research is needed in this regard), the inclusion of gender provisions alone will not contribute to sustaining the peace agreement. This finding makes clear that gender provisions in a peace agreement should not be conflated with women’s participation in a peace process.

Peace processes tend to be poorly documented, not least due to their secretive and politically sensitive nature, and this presents limitations for any statistical analysis in this field. This is particularly true in the case of women’s participation, about which there is little information concerning the points in the process at which women have engaged, and the terms of their engagement. In addition, more information is needed to examine the conditions in which women’s participation is made possible and to understand the causal direction behind the correlation. For example, democracy also demonstrated a positive impact on peace duration in this study. Since democracy and gender equality are often linked, the nature of the causal effect of each on peace duration remains to be established (for more information, see Annex II). The following section explores the concrete ways that women can be involved in peace and transition processes, and how they can gain influence in a variety of roles—from direct participation at the table to mass action for peace.

III. Models of Inclusion

Peace processes and transition processes are complex, context-specific, and often unpredictable affairs. Similarly, women’s participation can take on many different forms and can go far beyond direct representation at the negotiating table. This section explores how mediation teams, delegates, women’s groups, and all those seeking to support peace can achieve broader participation in practice. It outlines seven models of inclusion that can be drawn from and adapted to the specific context as appropriate. It offers a particular focus on direct representation at the negotiation table, which is often the most controversial form of participation, and focuses primarily on the participation of women’s groups that do not represent the conflict parties rather than individual female delegates or mediators.

The varied forms of participation outlined here are not mutually exclusive; on the contrary, they occur and can be established in parallel or at different stages of the process, depending on the context. These models can be used and adapted to increase the participation of women, but they also apply to the inclusion of other marginalized groups whose participation could increase the chances of resolving conflict and creating a lasting peace. In addition to the broad goal of increasing the chances of agreement and improving the durability of peace, the selection of a particular model at a particular time in a process may also depend on a range of short-term objectives—for example, if there is an acute need to increase the public’s perception of the legitimacy of the process or to garner experts’ inputs on specific issues.

**DIRECT PARTICIPATION AT THE NEGOTIATION TABLE**

Women’s participation at the negotiating table, whether in official peace talks or in national dialogues (which focus on peacemaking, constitution making, or wider institutional reform) can contribute to a more democratic decision-making

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65 The insertion of gender-sensitive language could also be associated with other negative correlates for agreement duration, which may have more explanatory power. For example, it could be that international actors are more likely to insert this language after a protracted negotiation process in which some belligerents remain committed to war but there is international pressure to conclude an agreement.

66 This section draws largely from Paffenholz, “Civil Society and Peace Negotiations”; “Results on Women and Gender”; and “Broadening Participation in Peace Processes: Dilemmas and Options for Mediators,” Mediation Practice Series, Geneva: HD Centre, June 2014. It also draws from case study research and interviews conducted by the International Peace Institute between 2013 and 2015.

67 Paffenholz, “Civil Society and Peace Negotiations.”
process by increasing the legitimacy and representativeness of the negotiations. In this model, women can participate as mediators and as part of negotiating delegations, whether the delegation represents women’s groups, a conflict party, or some other constituency. This option constitutes the most direct form of participation and provides the opportunity for women to directly influence the talks—which in turn shape the structure of other fora in the peace process, the roadmap for a postconflict society, and women’s participation in public life thereafter. For example, in Guatemala’s 1996 peace accord, which ended more than three decades of conflict between the government and insurgents, Luz Méndez was the sole woman in the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity’s delegation. Méndez helped to ensure that many of the provisions recommended by women’s groups in a parallel Civil Society Assembly (see page 16), including gender-specific provisions, were endorsed—leading to a final accord that pioneered women’s protection and participation in the political process.

However, a seat at the table does not necessarily mean that individual women will voice concerns and perspectives distinct from those of men. Notwithstanding Luz Méndez’s role in Guatemala, this is often true when women participate in delegations associated with the conflict parties or other groups, rather than delegations representing women’s groups. In Indonesia’s Aceh conflict, for example, Shadia Marhaban—the sole woman representing the Free Aceh Movement in the 2005 peace talks—later cast doubt on her influence as a woman (Marhaban’s story is shared on page 30). When women are in such a significant minority in a peace process, it can be difficult to articulate a different set of views from the dominant narrative or to make their voices heard.

Nonviolent women’s groups may be more likely to push for peace at the negotiating table, and direct representation can grant them a status on a par with the conflict parties and avoid the dangerous precedent associated with only allowing those who take up arms to occupy central positions in the process. As Graça Machel, co-mediator in Kenya in 2008, put it “When you give prominence to the warring parties at the expense of consulting and involving the majority of people, you are giving them rights to decide on behalf of the others, in essence rewarding them for having taken up arms.”

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**Women at the table in Northern Ireland**

In 1996, the launch of all-party talks in Northern Ireland brought the potential for broader participation, through an election process to become a party to the dialogue forum and gain seats at the peace table. In order to be present alongside the mainstream parties and political representatives, Catholic and Protestant women’s groups came together to gather the 10,000 signatures required to establish a political party, the cross-community Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition (NIWC). With a platform of bringing women’s concerns to the negotiating table and ensuring an inclusive peace accord, NIWC was one of ten parties popularly elected to participate in the negotiations. NIWC secured enough support across communities to earn two of the twenty seats at the negotiating table.

Women used this access to the talks to directly influence the content of the 1998 Good Friday Agreement. They brought a greater focus on social issues to the agenda and ultimately secured the inclusion of language on victims’ rights and reconciliation in the agreement, including a commitment of support to young victims of violence. Another clause also called for women’s full and equal political participation. The NIWC also proposed a civic forum, to link the peace process to a public consultation after the negotiations.

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68 Note: women’s participation as mediators was not included in the Broadening Participation Project, from which these models emerged, as the project assessed the participation of women’s groups (and other groups).

69 See, for example, Christine Bell, Women and Peace Processes, Negotiations, and Agreements: Operational Opportunities and Challenges, Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre (NOREF), March 2013.


71 Paffenholz, “Results on Women and Gender”; UN Women, “Women’s Participation in Peace Negotiations.”


Nonetheless, direct representation does not always translate into decision-making power. Often a small group of male leaders makes all the decisions, even if the number of delegations has been enlarged to include women’s groups. For example, between 2001 and 2003, the Inter-Congolese Dialogue brought together the government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the country’s armed groups, the unarmed opposition, and civil society—including women’s groups—to ensure a broad societal mandate for the negotiations. But the different groups did not have an equal say in the negotiations. In contrast, the National Dialogue Conference in Yemen in 2013 was designed to give decision-making power to all delegations, and resulted in hundreds of binding decisions with a high degree of consensus (see the box “A national dialogue designed for inclusion in Yemen”).

**OBSERVER STATUS**

Broadening participation in peace negotiations through observer status can allow women to influence the negotiating parties through a more informal mechanism. It also creates a mechanism for selected groups to communicate information about the process to a wider audience.

Observer status can be particularly effective if the included group enjoys a high moral standing in the country and can act as guarantor for the agreement. However, due to the lack of formal power devolved to observers, a sympathetic mediator is often essential to ensuring the success of this model. Otherwise, it is easy for observers to be sidelined.

During the 2003 Accra peace talks on Liberia, the Liberian Bar Association, the Inter-Religious Council for Liberia, and the Mano River Women’s Peace Network played active roles as observers, coordinating effectively with outside groups to hold the negotiating parties accountable and maintain the momentum for a peace agreement. The regional Mano River Women’s Peace Network had become well known for its roles in publicly

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74 Paffenholz, “Results on Women and Gender.”
75 Paffenholz, “Civil Society and Peace Negotiations.”
lobbying for peace and helping to open political dialogue between governments. On the other hand, the Women’s International Peace Network refused an offer of observer status because its members judged they could more effectively advocate for peace from outside the negotiations—which they did with mass demonstrations in support of the negotiations.\footnote{Paffenholz, "Broadening Participation in Peace Processes."}

**CONSULTATIONS**

Consultations are another channel for women to influence negotiations without participating directly in the talks and to generate a broader sense of ownership over the peace process among a greater proportion of the society. Consultations are the most common form of broader inclusion across peace processes.\footnote{Paffenholz, "Main Results."} In some cases, consultations can be officially endorsed and part of the negotiation architecture.

An official consultative forum can serve as a formal advisory body to the negotiation process, with a direct communication channel between the consultative forum and the official talks.\footnote{International Civil Society Action Network (ICAN), Institute for Inclusive Security, and Nonviolent Peace Force, "Building More Inclusive Political Transitions: A Review of the Syrian Case," 2013, pp. 5–6.} It can be elite based or incorporate a broader spectrum of constituencies. During the UN-led mediation in the peace process in Afghanistan in 2001 and in Guatemala from 1994 to 1996 (see box below) women played important roles within the Official Consultative Forums.\footnote{Paffenholz, "Civil Society and Peace Negotiations."} These were set up to facilitate broader participation and gather the opinion of societal and other political actors to enrich the negotiation agenda and at the same time give legitimacy to the talks. Consultations can also be less official, as happened when women set up their own consultative body during the African Union–led

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**Parallel consultative forum in Guatemala**

The Assembly of Civil Society in Guatemala formed in 1994 to gather interested groups into one platform to give nonbinding recommendations to the negotiating parties—the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Union and the government. The assembly brought together representatives from eleven interest groups, including human rights organizations, trade unions, indigenous groups, religious communities, and the women’s movement. This was made possible in part because the country’s vibrant civil society was effectively organized and had exerted considerable pressure for peace over the years.

Women had a significant influence on the nature of this assembly and the agenda that it would pursue. The women’s sector represented thirty-two women’s groups, and these women created alliances with women representing other groups in the assembly, bridging divides and unifying the diverse group. They also pushed for greater diversity in the assembly’s make-up, advocating for the inclusion of other marginalized groups like displaced populations.\footnote{Thornton and Whitman, “Gender and Peacebuilding.”} This forum in turn exercised significant influence on the peace negotiators and the agreement they produced. The assembly produced recommendation papers on all the relevant issues under discussion at the negotiation table. Most of its recommendations were taken, directly or indirectly, into account by the negotiating parties. This included language on gender equality, women’s rights, and women’s political participation, as well as women’s roles in implementing the peace agreement.

Nonetheless, the Guatemalan peace process also revealed its limitations in the implementation stage. Two years after the Civil Society Assembly endorsed the peace accords, a referendum to amend the constitution to include the most far-reaching reforms failed. This has been attributed to a variety of reasons, including the fact that there was no institutional mechanism for civil society’s participation after the accords had been signed and organized civil society did not communicate effectively with society at large.\footnote{Alvarez and Palencia Prado, "Guatemala’s Peace Process," Accord, 2002.}
mediation in Kenya in 2008 following election violence.  

Public consultations—broad-based gatherings of representatives of the population writ large and usually held all over the country—can also take place during negotiations, but more often happen as part of the implementation of a peace agreement or as part of a constitution-making process. Public consultations were used effectively in Afghanistan, Kenya, and Northern Ireland during the constitution-making processes to allow for people’s opinions to inform the draft constitution.

INCLUSIVE COMMISSIONS

Commissions are mostly set up after peace agreements to implement major provisions of the agreements, such as constitutional commissions, transitional justice commissions (like truth and reconciliation commissions), and cease-fire-monitoring commissions. In a few cases commissions are also established to prepare for or conduct the peace process, such as the High Commissioner for the Peace Process in Colombia. Alternatively, they are set up as permanent bodies to deal with a crucial outcome of the peace process, such as the Inter-Ethnic Commission in Kyrgyzstan, which had a mandate to prevent and reduce ethnic tensions and injustices. All of these commissions are official bodies that relate to implementing the peace agreement. The inclusivity of these commissions is a crucial precondition for their success. The research found that the more specifically an inclusive composition of these commissions is written into the agreement, the more effective they have been in practice. Gender-sensitive selection criteria have helped a valuable mix of women with a variety of expertise to join the commissions (see the adjacent box on Kenya).

HIGH-LEVEL PROBLEM-SOLVING WORKSHOPS

These workshops bring together representatives close to the leaders of the conflict parties (“track 1.5”) and offer them a space for discussion without the pressure to reach agreement. The workshops are unofficial and generally not publicized. They can be one-off events or last as long as several years. When belligerents refuse to meet publicly, these workshops may be the only common meeting space. Participants can pick up where the official negotiators leave off—exploring alternatives, producing position papers, and even drafting agreements that can function as starting points for official negotiations. It is important that mediators be aware of such initiatives, and make effective use of the results of the debates at these workshops.

Often women’s representation in these workshops is low as a key criterion for invitation is the closeness to decision makers.

POST-AGREEMENT COMMISSIONS

The mediation process following the election-related violence in Kenya in 2007 and 2008 created several important commissions charged with implementing key components of the power-sharing agreement. For example, the National Integration and Cohesion Commission contributed to the prevention of violence by mediating peace deals among local communities that had been opponents during the post-election violence. The Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission convened hearings across the country, including special hearings for women to voice their experiences and concerns, which were documented in its final report.

The selection criteria and procedures for all commissions were stated in a parliamentary act that followed the peace agreement. All commissions had gender, ethnic, religious, and geographic quotas in addition to the specific qualifications required. Posts for commissioners were publically advertised. All of this supported the recruitment of a number of highly qualified female human rights lawyers and other female civil society activists across the commissions.
Nonetheless, problem-solving workshops exclusively for women can also be effective. During the beginning of the Inter-Congo POLITICAL Negotiations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), one such workshop prepared sixty-four participating women for the direct participation in the Inter-Congo Dialogue. The workshop was organized and facilitated by the UN Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) and local NGOs such as Femmes Africa Solidarité and Women as Partners for Peace in Africa. Sessions were held on gender dimensions of reforms and effective participation in negotiations. The participants agreed on a declaration and plan of action for all women and were able to overcome their differences based on party and ethnic allegiances.

PUBLIC DECISION MAKING

Public decision making, usually in the form of referenda, is a powerful tool to get public buy-in for an elite pact while also allowing for the participation of women, who usually represent more than half of the electorate. In this model, peace agreements or new constitutions can be submitted to ratification by the electorate, and the results are usually binding. Peace agreements are frequently negotiated by the moderates within the parties; thus, a public endorsement of the deal helps to protect the agreement from hardliner constituencies. It can also provide some democratic legitimacy to the process, particularly if it means that the process earns public support, thus bolstering the sustainability of the agreement. The decision to put a peace deal to public vote needs to be carefully considered, however, as a vote against the agreement blocks its implementation and usually puts the process on hold.

For example, the decision to put the “Annan plan” to a referendum in Cyprus was judged as necessary to ensure a mandate for the agreement. However, Greek Cypriots rejected the plan, putting the process on hold. A core reason for the rejection has been the lack of buy-in from the main political party in the country. In contrast, in Northern Ireland, the referendum over the Good Friday Agreement in 1998 was heavily supported by a communications and advocacy strategy, and resulted in the endorsement of the agreement. Women’s groups were essential in launching a YES campaign in support of the referendum.

MASS ACTION

Mass action can create a general pro- or anti-peace agreement atmosphere. These campaigns can also give the negotiating parties insight into the perceived legitimacy of their position (whether in favor of or against the process). It is not easy for mediators to influence mass mobilization but it is crucial for all track-one actors to monitor developments in this area to see how the public is reacting to the process and how viable their proposals for peace would be over the long term.

Women are particularly well placed to exert influence on a peace process through mass action. Though women are usually in a minority among governments and armed groups that typically get a seat at the peace table, as well as among other high-level power holders that may influence the negotiations in other ways, women are often particularly active members of civil society and grassroots movements advocating for peace. In addition, in conflict zones women often have more freedom of movement than men as they are not typically perceived as belligerents.

Indeed, there are numerous examples of women catalyzing mass action for peace and influencing formal peace processes in this way. In Liberia, the Women in Peacebuilding Network (WIPNET) engaged in a series of mass actions, successfully demanding that the parties sign the peace agreement. They performed a sex strike (ordinary women across society joined the strike, including sex workers), blocked the doors of the negotiations, and held countrywide sit-ins and demonstrations. In Sri Lanka, a businesswoman called Neela Marikkar brought business leaders together in a group called Sri Lanka First and in 2001 organized a demonstration with partner organizations that was attended by an estimated 1 million Sri Lankans across the country. This mass action played a significant role in pressuring political leaders to begin negotiations with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam.

88 Ibid.
89 Ibid.
90 Ibid.
have also mobilized effectively for a more inclusive high-level process. In Somaliland, women’s groups continually organized demonstrations at the negotiation venues as a means to demand inclusion. These actions helped them to become official observers in the eventual Baroma conference in 1993.

IV. Realizing Inclusion in Practice: The Philippines

Although the average rate of women’s participation in peace processes around the world remains low, one country is an outlier in this respect: the Philippines. As the country has faced several decades-long internal armed conflicts, women have increasingly been at the forefront of formal peacemaking. In March 2014, the government of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front signed a major peace agreement; women made up 50 percent of the government’s negotiating team and 25 percent of the signatories. In February 2011, the government and the National Democratic Front signed the Oslo Joint Statement; women were 35 percent of the delegates to the negotiations and 33 percent of the signatories. The Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process that oversaw both processes—the office actually presides over five distinct peace tables—was led by a woman.

Given the limited participation of women in formal peace processes globally, why and how was this level of participation achieved in the Philippines? What lessons do negotiations in the Philippines offer for advancing women’s participation? This section will address these questions while comparing the quality of women’s participation in two negotiation processes—the talks between the government and the National Democratic Front, and the talks between the government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front.

These processes were not studied in the Broadening Participation Project (the results of which were shared in section II of this report), because the agreements were signed recently and the impact of women’s participation is still playing out in current developments. Nonetheless, the high level of women’s engagement in the formal negotiations in the Philippines offers a unique opportunity to examine how women’s participation can come about in a particular context, while offering insights for other settings. In addition, several of the inclusion models outlined previously in section III can be examined in practice in these two processes. As explored below, the combination of participatory models applied in the process with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, across all levels of society, strengthened the influence of women at the highest levels of the peace talks.

WOMEN’S ROLES IN A CLAN-BASED SOCIETY

The Philippines has a complex history of subnational conflict, with many active armed groups including Muslim separatists and communist-affiliated groups. Decades of conflict have fueled a culture of violence in certain areas. For instance, in the Muslim region of Mindanao, in addition to the armed movement for self-determination, clan-based conflict has threatened internal security and divided communities. The Philippines, the clan system is a cornerstone of the social order, and members of powerful families—male and female—dominate the political sphere.

In this context, women have leveraged family ties to gain leadership positions. Women make up 25

95 Secretary Teresita Quintos-Deles took office as the presidential adviser on the peace process on July 1, 2010, after first serving in the role from 2003 to 2005. Another female leader, Annabelle Abaya, was presidential adviser from November 2009 to June 2010.
97 By one estimate, there have been 1,266 clan disputes between the 1930s and 2005, which have killed more than 5,500 people and displaced thousands more. See Maribel Buenoabra, “Gender and Conflict in Mindanao,” In Asia, October 19, 2011, available at http://asiafoundation.org/in-asia/2011/10/19/gender-and-conflict-in-mindanao/.
percent of the national government and hold influential positions in the executive and legislative branches. The prominence of women in public life has been underscored by key legal developments in the Philippines: in 1981, it was the first Southeast Asian nation to ratify the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW); in 2009, it adopted an extensive anti-discrimination law, called the Magna Carta of Women; and in 2010, it adopted a national action plan for UN Security Council Resolution 1325.

However, despite women’s active roles in many aspects of Philippine life, particular regions—including Mindanao—remain heavily patriarchal. In northern provinces, the proportion of women engaging in the labor force is as high as 77 percent; in southern provinces, that number is as low as 17 percent. In Mindanao, despite their exclusion from formal economic and political roles, generations of women have served as mediators in clan conflicts. Because women are rarely targeted in clan disputes or revenge killings, women are accepted as mediators between rival clans. As their physical security is less threatened than men during clan conflict, women have greater mobility, and they are called on for a variety of intermediary roles, from collecting retribution payments to hosting reconciliation feasts. In addition to mediating clan conflicts, women in Mindanao have negotiated informally with warring factions and the Armed Forces of the Philippines, toward a reduction of violence in their communities. In the past, this traditional role for women as peacemakers was often overlooked by high-level mediation actors, though women’s civil society groups have called attention to these activities throughout the larger armed conflicts.

LANDMARK PARTICIPATION, LIMITED IMPACT IN OSLO

The conflict between the Philippine government and the National Democratic Front (NDF) aims to resolve the longest-running communist insurgency in Asia, with more than forty-five years of violent activity. Following years of stalled negotiations, the parties agreed to the 2011 Oslo Joint Statement. The negotiations in Oslo are an unconventional example of women’s direct participation at the negotiation table: the talks had the highest percentage of female delegates across thirty-one major peace processes between 1992 and 2011, according to a study by UN Women.

But despite this direct participation of women delegates, no further talks have occurred since the Oslo Joint Statement was signed. The process remains stalled in part due to disagreements over the interpretation and implementation of security and immunity guarantees. In short, although both parties released political prisoners, there is an ongoing dispute regarding the release of additional NDF political consultants, with the NDF alleging continued illegal detention of their members. Meanwhile, the government asserts that it has continually signaled its readiness to return to the negotiating table.

Given the evidence of women’s impact outlined above, what prevented this landmark participation from moving the process forward? While the NDF claimed to adhere to gender principles in its appointments, critics assert that women were not meaningful participants in the peace process. Instead, the women participating in the NDF negotiating panel were the wives of the organization’s leaders, which compromised their inputs. As noted above, women nominated to a process to

104 Ibid, p. 22.
105 Ibid.
represent a particular conflict party may be unlikely to express the kinds of distinct and diverse perspectives on the process and the priorities for peace that women coming from other backgrounds have so often offered. In addition, the party’s panel was composed of established leaders who were known to the government, but who no longer had legitimacy or power among the majority of NDF members. As a result, the process in Oslo lacked buy-in from key constituencies and spoilers, and had limited influence over the NDF’s operations on the ground.¹¹⁰ Women’s work to bring both sides together could not overcome this larger disconnect between the Oslo process and the ongoing political and insurgency campaigns back in the Philippines.

On the government side, several women with experience in peace and development work served on the negotiating panel, including Jurgette Honculada, who was appointed in late 2010. She participated in the 2011 Oslo negotiations, as well as informal rounds of talks before and after the Oslo Joint Statement. According to Honculada, gender was not part of the formal agenda in Oslo, and the NDF panel was not always receptive to attempts to insert inclusive language.¹¹¹ Though the talks remain on hold, the government maintains a negotiating panel of five members that includes two women, Honculada and Maria Lourdes Tison, who both have strong affiliations with peace advocacy groups and civil society organizations.¹¹² These women representatives have engaged in high-level problem solving workshops with members of the NDF, aiming to restart the formal negotiations. Honculada asserts that the government team will look for opportunities to incorporate gender concerns when the process resumes.¹¹³

Unlike the peace process between the government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front described below, women’s engagement in the NDF process beyond the peace table in Oslo was limited. The process lacked additional mechanisms for inclusion, whereas the process with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front involved observer seats for women in civil society, a national dialogue, and a transition commission. Without these accompanying platforms and without a selection process for female negotiators on the NDF panel, the influence of women in the NDF process was weak, despite their record-breaking representation in the talks. The process demonstrates the fallacy of assumptions that a greater number of women present will in itself produce a more durable or a better quality agreement; merely involving more female participants at the peace table is no substitute for women’s influential participation. It also demonstrates that women’s participation alone cannot overcome larger legitimacy issues, if those at the peace table are not accepted as representatives by their own constituencies.

**SIGNIFICANT INFLUENCE ON THE BANGSAMORO AGREEMENT**

The peace process between the Philippine government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) began in 1997, after twenty years of negotiations with MILF’s precursor, the Moro National Liberation Front. The armed movement for independence for Mindanao was launched by the Moro National Liberation Front in the 1960s; members who opposed dialogue with the government separated and formed the MILF in the 1980s, to pursue a more militant approach.¹¹⁴ By the late 1990s, the MILF was ready to negotiate with the government, though peace talks stalled repeatedly due to policy disputes and changes in the government’s administration.¹¹⁵ The March 2014 Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro encompasses previous accords in the process, most importantly the 2012 Framework Agreement for the Bangsamoro. It establishes a roadmap for political and structural reforms in Mindanao, including the abolition of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao and the creation of a new autonomous political entity called the Bangsamoro.¹¹⁶

Though there were no formal mechanisms to

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110 Interview with Irene Santiago by Marie O’Reilly and Andrea Ó Súilleabáin, New York, September 25, 2014.
115 Malaysia has served as facilitator of the process since 2001, and it is head of the International Monitoring Team that was deployed in 2005.
116 International Civil Society Action Network (ICAN), “Women and Civil Society at the Table.”
guarantee women’s inclusion in the process, their direct participation at the peace table—and their involvement through inclusive platforms—has steadily increased over time. Since 2004, every negotiating panel appointed by the government has included at least one woman. By the 2014 signing of the Comprehensive Agreement, there were more female delegates on the government and MILF negotiation teams than ever before. Other government bodies supporting the process, such as the secretariat, legal panel, and technical working groups, were also headed by and composed mostly of women.

In 2001, for the first time, the government’s negotiating panel appointed two women to its five-member team, Irene Santiago and Emily Marohombsar. In September 2010, Miriam Coronel-Ferrr was appointed to the panel, and in December 2012, she became the first female to chair the government panel. In 2012, a female Muslim civil society leader, Yasmin Busran-Lao, served as undersecretary of the panel. These women were selected because of their past work for peace in Mindanao, their expertise on negotiation and technical issues, and their representation of significant constituencies through their work in civil society organizations. Despite their qualifications, after earning a seat in the negotiations, they faced barriers to achieving influence and acceptance as credible negotiators by their male counterparts (see the box “Irene Santiago: Taking women seriously at the negotiating table”).

On the other side of the table, the MILF panels were consistently composed of all men, until September 2010 when two women were appointed as technical advisers. In 2013, Raissa Jajurie served as a key negotiator and consultant on behalf of the panel, after serving as a legal adviser—she was the only lawyer in both the panel and board of consultants—and after demonstrating her expertise on key constitutional issues. Due to the MILF’s

Irene Santiago: Taking women seriously at the negotiating table

Irene Santiago served as one of the first female negotiators for the Philippine government in its negotiations with the MILF, from 2001 to 2004. Santiago believes there are three main barriers that prevent women’s inclusion in peace processes. First, there is a conceptual barrier; when peace negotiations are intended to end war, only war actors are admitted. “But if we change the concept of peace talks, to focus on ending war and building peace, then women have a chance at inclusion,” said Santiago. Second, there is a technical barrier for women, due to their limited experience in the public sphere in some contexts. But this can be overcome with capacity-building that recognizes women’s experience in informal peacemaking, and training on substantive issues and negotiation skills. Third, there is a political barrier to acknowledging the importance of women in decision making. According to Santiago, this is the most difficult barrier to overcome. “Most people are still seeing the inclusion of women as a quota to be met rather than a valuable tool that affects the outcome,” she said.

When they gain a place at the peace table, women need to demonstrate technical expertise to be regarded as credible negotiators. Santiago decided to gain expertise in a specific area, beyond gender issues, to demonstrate her value to the other negotiators. She became an expert on cease-fires, and went on to lead the cease-fire committee. This earned Santiago recognition as a valuable negotiator, which allowed her to raise gender issues at strategic points in the talks without being marginalized as a “soft” gender expert.

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119 Busran-Lao served as presidential adviser on Muslim concerns.
120 Interview with Irene Santiago by Marie O’Reilly and Andrea Ó Súilleabháin, New York, September 25, 2014.
122 Interview with Irene Santiago by Marie O’Reilly and Andrea Ó Súilleabháin, New York, September 25, 2014.
123 Ibid.
124 Ibid.
long-term exclusion of women from their negotiating team, those on the government side questioned whether they would resist the appointment of Miriam Coronel-Ferrer as lead government negotiator. However, the MILF panel maintained that it would not object to a woman leading the government’s panel, though the MILF chair remarked, “It would have been easier between gentlemen—no inhibitions.” Nonetheless, MILF’s approach to women participants had changed over time, if more slowly than on the government side. “MILF said in public...in 2006...that women have no role in public decision making. They would never say that now,” according to Irene Santiago.**

Female Leaders’ Push for Inclusion and Gender Provisions

Throughout the various iterations of the peace process between the Philippine government and the MILF, women in leadership roles pushed for broader inclusion. Teresita Quintos-Deles, the adviser on the peace process to the Philippine president, has championed the inclusion of women in the negotiating teams, in civil society roles, and in national consultation processes. Quintos-Deles was the first woman appointed as the presidential adviser from 2003 to 2005, and was reappointed to the post in 2010. She has been at the forefront of multiple civil society peace initiatives, including co-founding a citizens’ peace coalition in 1986 and co-founding PILIPINA, the first women’s organization in the Philippines to promote indigenous feminism.**

Annabelle Abaya, another female leader of conflict resolution initiatives, was presidential adviser from November 2009 to June 2010. During her short tenure, Abaya reached out to civil society organizations to broaden the support for peacemaking across the country. She also successfully pursued the signing of an executive order on the national action plan for Resolution 1325, to institutionalize the participation of women in peacemaking and politics.**

On both sides of the table, the women appointed to the negotiating panels had both technical qualifications and extensive experience as civil society advocates who led mass action groups and campaigns. Before joining the government panel, Irene Santiago founded the Mindanao Commission on Women in 2001; it was one of the first NGOs to carry out interfaith peace activities, working with Christian, Muslim, and indigenous women leaders.**

On the MILF side, Raissa Jajurie was an experienced human rights lawyer and an established advocate among Muslim women before her appointment. In 2007, she co-founded Nisa Ul-Haq Fi Bangsamoro, or Women for Justice in the Bangsamoro, a network that uses an Islamic framework for women’s empowerment trainings and advocacy.

Drawing on their leadership experience in civil society and mass mobilization, the women in the process pushed for additional roles for women throughout the talks, both at the table and in broader inclusive platforms. Female negotiators, including Santiago and Coronel-Ferrer, have stressed the difference women made in the negotiations. When women played lead roles in discussing substantive and procedural issues, there were new dynamics in the talks. “First, it created a harder push to bring women in on the other [MILF] side of the table. Second, it had to do with the substantive agenda that went into the text.”**

Women on both sides came together to ensure economic, social, and political guarantees for women entered the agreement. Following the 2012 Framework Agreement, Santiago led consultations with Bangsamoro women, to obtain their understanding of “meaningful political participation,” and their priorities for the 2014 Comprehensive Agreement.**

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127 Interview with Irene Santiago by Marie O’Reilly and Andrea Ó Súilleabháin, New York, September 25, 2014.
129 Ibid. Abaya previously served as a negotiator on the government panel in the NDF process.
130 Interview with Irene Santiago by Marie O’Reilly and Andrea Ó Súilleabháin, New York, September 25, 2014.
includes several clauses that promote gender equality and women’s participation in public life (see the box “Gains for women in the Bangsamoro peace agreement”).

Women negotiators united across the table, both to promote gender issues and to push the overall process forward. They emphasized the importance of this united approach when presenting to the media throughout the talks. They worked to demonstrate progress and build support for the peace process, and to persuade the public that continuing the negotiations was a smarter, better approach than returning to violence.\(^\text{134}\) They leveraged their leadership roles in civil society peace initiatives, both to broaden participation in the peace talks and to build momentum for its outcomes. They also drew on these networks to support their roles as negotiators. The audacity required to sit in negotiations dominated by men “comes from knowing you have women beside you and women behind you,” said Santiago.\(^\text{135}\)

Public Consultations, an Inclusive Commission, and Mass Action

Both the government’s negotiating team and the MILF recognized the fragile environment in Mindanao, where decades of conflict resulted in a proliferation of small arms and multiple violent factions. The two panels were keenly aware that the process needed to maintain credibility with the general population in order to sustain its effective-

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\(^{134}\) N-Peace Network, “Interview with Miriam Coronel-Ferrer.”


ness and limit the appeal of more extreme groups among disaffected parts of the population. As a result, the process included broad public consultations and a transition commission. At the same time, women’s civil society groups supported the process through mass action to counter violence threatened by spoiler groups. For instance, following the 2012 Framework Agreement, three weeks of violence broke out between the Moro National Liberation Front and the military; women led a peaceful protest pressuring the government and the MILF to end the violence and maintain the progress of the peace talks.\(^{141}\)

Under the leadership of the presidential adviser, the government launched a national consultation process called Dialogue Mindanao in 2010. This national dialogue set out to facilitate public understanding of the issues being discussed in the negotiations, feed public opinions back to the negotiation panels, and promote public participation in the peace process.\(^{142}\) Over five months, the dialogue convened in thirteen regions across the Philippines, with 300 civil society participants in each session. The Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process selected the participants to represent a cross-section of academia, local government, religious groups, women, youth, indigenous groups, and others.\(^{143}\) The final report, which included an additional perception survey, was distributed to all negotiating parties and served as a basis for discussions at the negotiating table. The dialogue was credited with quieting some of the divisive voices at the negotiating table, and moving the parties toward the 2012 Framework Agreement.\(^{144}\)

In 2012, the government launched the Transition Commission to feed into the negotiating panels as they drafted annexes that would form the basis of the Bangsamoro Basic Law. The fifteen-member commission was formed by government and MILF appointees; three of the government’s seven appointees were women, while Raissa Jajurie was the MILF’s sole female appointee. The commission’s mandate called for “authentic democratic collaboration in the crafting of a proposed law by the affected people themselves.”\(^{146}\) The commission held consultations across Mindanao and in neighboring provinces. It held thematic consultations on women’s issues, and was perceived as reaching the grassroots level with greater efficacy than previous consultations.\(^{147}\)

The consultations were perhaps most important in the communities that will border the new Bangsamoro entity. As Coronel-Ferrer explained, “There are certain provisions that have created fears in neighboring communities... We went back to those communities to find out where the fears are coming from, and to try to address the fears. We have made ourselves very accessible to everyone: mass media, civil society, peoples’ organizations, academia, business, legislators.”\(^{147}\)

Women leaders in the process pushed for this level of public engagement and transparency, because they linked inclusion with sustainable outcomes. According to Quintos-Deles, the resolution of conflict should engage as many ordinary people as possible.\(^{148}\) As a result, the 2014 Comprehensive Agreement was viewed as more inclusive than preceding agreements, and reflected the needs and concerns of many groups previously excluded from the process. In late 2014, Quintos-Deles announced that her office will fund the construction of six women peace and training centers in the Bangsamoro, to facilitate women’s inclusion throughout the implementation of the agreement.\(^{149}\)

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147 N-Peace Network, “Interview with Miriam Coronel-Ferrer.”


LESSONS

While peace processes between the Philippine government and both the National Democratic Front and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front represent high points of women’s participation, women attained lasting influence only in the MILF process. The two contrasting negotiation processes, each of which spanned several decades, demonstrate the importance of using a combination of inclusion models throughout a peace process. In the MILF process, direct participation at the negotiation table was combined with official consultations, a transition commission, and mass action.

The limited outcomes of the process between the government and the National Democratic Front demonstrate that the presence of women negotiators does not guarantee inclusive or sustainable outcomes. When women sit at the peace table on behalf of a conflict party, they may not represent the needs and priorities of other women in the society nor will they necessarily have a positive influence on the implementation of an agreement. However, when the selection of female delegates in the Philippine context was based on qualifications such as their past work for peace or their leadership of organized constituencies of women, they appeared more likely to bring women’s priorities into the negotiations and to push for a sustainable agreement.

The MILF process also serves as a reminder that women’s meaningful participation cannot guarantee that agreements will hold. In January 2015, forty-four police commandos, seventeen rebels, and four civilians were killed in a clash in Mindanao, in a flawed counterterror operation that has cast doubt over the MILF peace process.150 As a result, lawmakers have suspended their work toward adopting the Bangsamoro Basic Law. As of spring 2015, the government and MILF peace panels were convening regular private and public sessions to bring the process back on track, along with the presidential adviser. Though the immediate future remains uncertain, the panels are utilizing their established links to women’s groups and pro-peace civil society groups to rebuild public support for the Bangsamoro agreement. As with every peace process, reaching an agreement is only the first step on a long and arduous road toward rebuilding trust. Based on their experiences in helping to bring about the Comprehensive Agreement, women will likely have more contributions to make in this journey toward peace.

V. Strategies for Meaningful Participation

The models and cases described in the previous sections show that inclusion takes many forms, both at and beyond the negotiating table. When designing a peace or transition process, planning for inclusion should not be construed as a selection between different models but rather a series of decisions about what combination and sequence has the best chance of success. However, in order to make inclusion meaningful in any of these models—that is, to ensure that included actors are able to exercise influence—those structuring and seeking to influence or strengthen a peace or transition process need to take a number of factors into account relating to process design and the broader context, which can affect whether meaningful inclusion is achieved. This section explores the various factors that need to be considered while presenting four key strategies for meaningful participation.

1. Build coalitions using normative and strategic arguments

Across the forty cases examined in the Broadening Participation project, women’s inclusion was mostly initiated and achieved via concerted pressure and lobbying by women’s organizations within the country, which was sometimes supported by external actors. The goal of women’s inclusion tended to be realized more easily in contexts where there were strong women’s coalitions relating to peace and human rights. In the Northern Ireland peace process, for example, women united across sectarian divides to form the Women’s Coalition and earned a seat at the negotiating table. In Somalia’s 2002 Peace and Reconciliation Conference, women organized themselves as the “Sixth Clan” so that they could participate in the formal peace negotiations. Beyond the peace table, too, coalition building

among women’s groups was essential to maximizing women’s influence in a variety of cases, from Liberia to Yemen.151

Campaigns for women’s inclusion typically invoked normative arguments in the cases analyzed. This was not the case for other included actors, such as political parties or broader civil society groups. The decision to include these other actors was most often driven by strategic and political motivations and initiated by the main conflict parties themselves—as a means to increase their legitimacy, secure public buy-in, or achieve support from other

The Great Lakes Women’s Platform

In February 2013, eleven countries in the Great Lakes region of Africa signed a peace accord to address decades of violence in eastern areas of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Region was negotiated and adopted without any women participating in the negotiations. The technical committees formed to oversee the implementation and monitoring of the agreement also did not include any women.

In March 2013, Mary Robinson was appointed UN special envoy for the Great Lakes region, to mediate the implementation process and work with the already-established implementation committees. Recognizing the absence of women in the formal process, Robinson convened consultations with women leaders and civil society groups across the region, seeking to link their community-level efforts in building peace to the regional and national implementation committees. In January 2014, Robinson launched the Great Lakes Women’s Platform for the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework, to ensure that women in the DRC and region were engaged in the implementation of the agreement.

The Women’s Platform will provide grants to women’s organizations already working to implement peace in the region, convene these grantees for capacity building and collective action, and communicate the successes of women’s groups and community-based solutions.152 This initiative demonstrates increased recognition of the need to connect women’s efforts to build peace on the ground with high-level peace processes that can otherwise prove very remote, elite-based, and male dominated. In July 2014, Said Djinnit was took over as UN special envoy for the Great Lakes region.153 In his first briefing to the Security Council in this role, Djinnit indicated that he would continue to support the Great Lakes Women’s Platform, and linked its success to sustainable implementation of the agreement.154

By January 2015, thirty-six women’s groups received grants through the platform, with additional grantees to be selected throughout 2015. The first meeting of grantees was convened in May 2015 in the DRC.155 The platform has the potential to serve as an innovative model to address factors that are key to women’s participation—funding, coalition building, transfer mechanisms, and support structures. Given the high-level leadership from the UN special envoy and the platform’s regional approach, it also has a better chance of overcoming some of the hurdles associated with power politics and the regional geopolitical context. However, even as the platform gets off the ground, questions about its efficacy have been raised, due in part to stalled funding for grantees and the departure of Robinson from the Great Lakes envoy post. To achieve its ends, the platform will need dedicated personal leadership from the current UN envoy, more concerted follow through from donors, and the persistence of the civil society organizations driving it forward from the ground up.

151 Paffenholz, “Results on Women and Gender.”
155 Interview with Harriette Williams Bright, advocacy director of Femmes Africa Solidarité, New York, April 14, 2015.
constituencies. In these cases, mediators also pushed for inclusion in order to bring different perspectives to the talks, provide impetus to move negotiations forward, or because they were inspired by past positive experiences of inclusion in other contexts. In other words, although the involvement of women’s groups correlates with successful negotiation and implementation outcomes, their inclusion is rarely viewed as a strategic priority by the conflict parties or mediators. If it were, other groups’ experiences suggest that women’s participation could become more likely.

Indeed, when mediators were already open to including women, this also appeared to make their participation more likely, as happened with the mediators Graça Machel and Kofi Annan in Kenya, for example, or Nelson Mandela in Burundi. Those structuring a peace or transition process frequently express the concern that “It was difficult to engage with women… because they were not one group,” but a strong women’s movement is not a prerequisite for women’s participation. Mediators and outside actors can use their role strategically and find alternative ways to foster coalition building among women’s groups and support their participation or support the inclusion of a variety of women groups. In the Great Lakes region of Africa, the UN’s special envoy has supported women’s groups seeking to participate in the implementation phase after they were excluded from the peace process (see the box “The Great Lakes Women’s Platform” on page 27). International actors calling for women’s participation can also lead by example by having gender-balanced teams of their own.

2. Establish a credible selection process
For those designing, structuring, and participating in peace and transition processes, deciding which groups to work with is often a significant challenge. “There are risks [in] overloading the negotiating table… there’s already such a proliferation of actors,” said one mediation support actor. “We face the question of the genuineness of the civil society actors that we’re dealing with,” said another.

Those structuring a peace process face practical dilemmas regarding who should be eligible to participate and how they should be selected. Selection processes can be complex and time-consuming, causing some mediators to forego civil society selection altogether and proceed with only the conflict parties.

Participation in a peace process can be determined by the main negotiating parties, by the mediator, or by other, more formal selection processes. Procedures for selection have included invitation processes, as in Colombia and Yemen; nominations, as in Afghanistan; elections, as in South Africa, Guatemala, and Northern Ireland; open-access participation, as seen for most public consultations or, as in Kenya, public advertisement of positions within key implementation commissions. Selection criteria can include closeness to decision makers, reputation and credibility, professional background, geographic location, ethnicity, gender, and other—often political—factors.

The most successful selection processes, in terms of inclusive outcomes, are transparent processes carried out by constituents in conjunction with quotas. In Guatemala, different sectors of civil society elected their own sector-specific representatives, from trade unions, minority groups, women’s groups, and others. By maintaining gender as one of a number of criteria for group-specific participation, mediators have been able to enhance women’s participation at different stages in the process in Colombia and Yemen (see the box “Quotas for inclusion in Yemen and Colombia”). Gender quotas have also helped to ensure inclusion of more women in the DRC, Kenya, Papua New Guinea, Somalia, and South Africa.

On the other hand, experience suggests that selection criteria and processes that are overly driven by the belligerent groups are unlikely to be effective—the groups selected are likely merely to echo the positions of the conflict parties themselves.

156 Participant’s remarks at off-the-record roundtable event on mediation held at IPI, New York, October 29, 2014.
157 Ibid.
158 Paffenholz, “Main Results.”
160 Paffenholz, “Civil Society and Peace Negotiations.”
Quotas for inclusion in Yemen

Quotas can be a valuable tool to ensure women’s participation in negotiations and in key implementation mechanisms, such as monitoring bodies or post-agreement commissions. In some cases, high-level mediators tasked with structuring peace processes have initiated quotas; in other cases, quotas are adopted after lobbying for broader participation. In the 2013 National Dialogue in Yemen, the 30 percent quota for women resulted from mass mobilization and the mediator’s persistence. The UN special adviser on Yemen at the time, Jamal Benomar, repeatedly raised the possibility of a quota to the all-male committee tasked with setting the terms for the National Dialogue Conference. In doing so, he stressed that the quota was not being imposed by his team or the UN, but requested by the Yemeni women and civil society who had driven the revolution. Benomar linked inclusivity to a positive outcome and argued that for stability to endure, underlying dynamics must be addressed through a consultative process that would generate a deeper understanding of the conflict drivers.\(^{161}\)

3. Create the conditions to make women’s voices heard

Across the negotiation and dialogue formats, decision-making procedures are important: they may sideline female participants or marginalize their contributions, thus cancelling out the benefits of inclusion. Indeed, in almost all national dialogue processes, despite widespread consultation with groups and direct representation of women at the table, ultimate decision-making power has rested with a small group of already-powerful, mostly male actors.\(^{162}\) In the 2001 Somali peace process, women were allocated a quota in all six “reconciliation” committees, but any decision by the committees required the authorization of a leadership committee of male clan elders, effectively muting women’s influence.

Research on gender dynamics in group decision making offers valuable insights in this regard that could be adapted to the peace and transition processes. For example, empirical studies of women’s political participation and influence in other deliberative bodies shows that when women are present only in small numbers, they are less likely to be able to influence deliberation processes that are based on majority rule. However, when deliberative fora use a consensus model for making decisions, this can reduce women’s deficit of authority and establish group behavior that allows them to exert influence.\(^{163}\)

When women do not participate directly in negotiations but in consultative fora or other arenas, mechanisms for ensuring that their inputs find their way to the negotiation table and into peace agreements are essential. The “transfer” mechanisms\(^ {164}\) and strategies that have proven most successful combine the insider tactics of submitting position papers directly to negotiators and meeting with mediators, negotiators, or technical advisers with outsider tactics like issuing public reports, lobbying international actors, and conducting media outreach.\(^ {165}\)

Support structures and capacity-building programs for women also play a significant role in increasing their influence and effectiveness before, during, and after a peace process. In cases where women were offered expert support in drafting contributions to the peace agreement, in conflict resolution, or in awareness-raising campaigns, for example, they were more apt to make effective, quality contributions, as seen in the InterCongolese Dialogue or in a number of Somalia’s national dialogues.\(^ {166}\) There are often questions about whose role it is to provide this kind of support and training:\(^ {167}\) in the past, both those running the peace process and outsider organiza-

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161 Interview with Jamal Benomar conducted by Marie O’Reilly and Andrea Ó Súilleabháin, New York, May 8, 2014.
162 Paffenholz, “Results on Women and Gender.”
165 Paffenholz, “Main Results.”
166 Paffenholz, “Results on Women and Gender.”
167 Participant’s remark at off-the-record roundtable event on mediation held at IPI, New York, October 29, 2014.
tions have played this role.

Similarly, many women face logistical barriers to participating. They may need to organize childcare; they may not have access to funds to travel; they may need additional security provisions to ensure that their safety won’t be jeopardized as a result of their participation, even on their return home. Meeting these needs goes hand in hand with women’s ability to participate meaningfully.

4. Keep power politics—and the public—in mind

Inclusive peace processes tend to challenge established power structures; resistance is to be expected, particularly among elite actors. When the main negotiating parties are not committed to the process, including women at the table has little chance of success, especially when these women are not given decision-making power. When resistance is very strong during negotiations, it can be more effective for women’s groups to remain outside of official talks, as more leverage and pressure can be built from the outside via the media or mass action. If groups are to be included in the official negotiation format, they need concomitant decision-making power. If they are attached to the official formats in consultations, for example, an official mechanism to transfer the results of the consultations to the negotiating table should be established.168 In many peace processes, regional actors have had greater political influence than international actors.169 In some cases, whether or not a process moves forward has depended on the position of a strong state player in the region. In other cases, the process is brokered by a regional

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**Negotiating for an armed Group in Aceh, “I was the Muddy Dove”**

Shadia Marhaban was the only woman delegate to peace talks that ended a thirty-year civil conflict between the Indonesian government and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) in Helsinki in 2005. Marhaban was an active member of GAM, serving as a translator and journalist for the movement. Indonesian women peace advocates challenged Marhaban’s role in the talks, asserting that her affiliation with GAM precluded her from representing women’s gender-specific interests in the peace process at large. To them, “I was the muddy dove,” Marhaban said in an interview.170 But Marhaban maintains that it is important to include women members of armed groups in peace talks, because of their ability to influence the group’s broader membership to support the agreement. She argues, “Women from armed groups can influence the constituency more than women from outside civil society groups,” though they may be viewed as unlikely peacemakers.171

As a negotiator, Marhaban established herself not as an advocate for women’s issues, but as a substantive peace and security expert.172 According to Marhaban, “My seat at the table was not an act of inclusion. It had nothing to do with me being a woman.”173 Marhaban’s technical knowledge gained her respect and authority among the delegation, but she later realized that the needs of GAM’s female members were overlooked in the peace process. Despite their active roles and significant numbers—more than 2,000 women were members of GAM—women were left out of the reintegration and reparations programs after the peace agreement. As a result, Marhaban has questioned her influence as the sole woman in the negotiations, where it was difficult to raise priorities beyond the delegation’s core platform. Today, Marhaban advocates for women’s increased participation in peace processes across delegations. She co-founded the Aceh Women’s League in 2006, and has carried out political awareness and empowerment trainings for 1,400 former female combatants.174

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168 Paffenholz, “Main Results.”
169 Paffenholz, Civil Society and Peacebuilding.
170 Interview with Shadia Marhaban by Marie O’Reilly and Andrea Ó Súilleabháin, New York, December 4, 2014.
171 Ibid.
173 Interview with Shadia Marhaban by Marie O’Reilly and Andrea Ó Súilleabháin, New York, December 4, 2014.
174 Ibid.
organization, with greater leverage on national decision-makers than the UN. This geopolitical context has a significant influence on the success of peace processes and creates barriers and opportunities for inclusive process design. The recent escalation of conflict in Yemen is a sad example of how the lack of buy-in by leading national elites and regional actors can undermine an otherwise relatively inclusive process.

Gender roles in societies also play a role in facilitating or hindering women’s participation as well as the level of influence that women are able to exert. In cases where women had a recognized mediation role at the local level, they asserted influence more easily and were invited to participate. This is evident in the case of the Philippines, for example. In other cases, local customs excluding women from public life have made it more difficult to leverage women’s inclusion, as seen in Afghanistan or Yemen, where women’s inclusion needed support from the international community and the mediators.

Finally, it should not be taken for granted that including women or civil society groups is the same as getting buy-in from the public at large. Broader participation can make the process more legitimate in the eyes of the public, but it alone cannot guarantee public commitment to the outcome of the process. Indeed, some of the processes studied, such as Guatemala, achieved meaningful inclusion in the deliberative stage but faltered in the implementation stage due in part to a failure to bring the broader public along. Regular communication with the public and the mobilization of broader constituencies in support of the agreement reached should be considered part and parcel of the responsibilities of all those who participate. Public buy-in need not be a pre-existing condition; it can also be created. In Northern Ireland, in the run up to the referendum on the Good Friday Agreement, a massive civil society campaign succeeded in its push for an outcome in support of the peace agreement.

Conclusion

Despite perceptions among some practitioners that the participation of women in peace processes poses too many risks and does not align with the bottom line of reaching an agreement, new evidence shows that the opposite is true. The qualitative and quantitative research presented here indicates that women’s participation—especially when women were able to influence the process—increases the likelihood that an agreement will be reached in the short term while also making it more likely that the peace that results will be more sustainable. It also showed that women’s participation should not be conflated with the inclusion of gender-sensitive language in a peace agreement. The inclusion of women is no guarantee that gender issues will be addressed, and women can bring far more than gender-related issues to a peace process. Nonetheless, influential women’s groups have tended to push for both peace and gender-sensitive provisions.

Although it may be difficult to achieve broad participation in practice, the models and short case studies presented here demonstrate that women’s inclusion has been advanced in many creative ways in a variety of contexts. The report presented seven models that can be drawn from and adapted to different contexts, and it showed that some combination of models is more likely to result in an inclusive and successful process. The case study of the Philippines demonstrated that high levels of women’s participation can be realized in practice, but the quantity of women is less important than the quality of their participation. To achieve meaningful participation, regardless of the particular model and mechanisms selected for a process, those structuring and seeking to influence or strengthen a peace or transition process can leverage four key strategies: build coalitions based on normative and strategic arguments; establish a credible selection process; create the conditions to make women’s voices heard; and keep power politics—and the public—in mind.

175 Paffenholz, “Results on Women and Gender.”
176 Ibid.
Given the evidence, a broader reimagining of peace processes is needed, so that those shaping them and participating in them can work with the multiplicity of actors involved to both end violence more effectively and build a more durable peace. Indeed, despite many practitioners’ claims to the contrary, this re-conceptualization is already taking place, frequently led by women and men pushing for a more participatory, legitimate, and effective peacemaking in their own countries. These community-driven initiatives often include processes to integrate governance and infrastructures for peace. And citizens and peacemakers alike are working to create a more popular connection to these otherwise remote negotiation processes, to build on the short-term goal of ending violence, and to create a vision of society that is transformative in the long run.

To this end, there is a need to get beyond the narrow focus on the traditional peace table to consider how successful multi-track participatory peace and transition processes can be achieved. It is time to ask how peace processes can best empower women and those who contribute to peace rather than limit themselves to addressing the interests of those who have taken up arms. The proliferation of mediation actors—from international governmental organizations and states to regional organizations, former heads of state, and nongovernmental organizations—could actually present an opportunity in this regard, as different actors could take on complementary roles in different tracks.177 A greater focus on preventing conflict before it breaks out and on implementing peace agreements after they have been reached will also be needed—and on engaging women throughout these phases.

Indeed, women have many different roles to play in reimagined peace processes. As the field of mediation opens up to new actors and women gain increasing authority in other spheres of life, female experts and leaders have more opportunities to contribute as mediators.178 They can facilitate the inclusion of women in various parts of a peace process while bringing different perspectives into the substance of the talks and using complementary communications and negotiation skills. The idea of having “co-mediators”—one male and one female—deserves further exploration. This worked well with Kofi Annan and Graça Machel in Kenya, for example, leading to much greater involvement of women and civil society in the process and serving as a gender-balanced example for the negotiating parties. Co-mediation also allows for a combination of “insider” and “outsider” mediators, who can leverage invaluable local knowledge and an increased sense of ownership and buy-in from the local population alongside external sources of legitimacy, accountability, or expertise.

Beyond women’s participation as individuals, the evidence shows that women’s groups have made significant contributions to the success of peace and transition processes by pushing for agreements, institutionalizing them thereafter, and advancing the gender agenda in their countries—which matters for peaceful societies writ large. Their most important role in helping to reimagine peace processes more broadly, however, may be in building movements that tackle the most intractable barrier to change in this area: political will. Beyond the conceptual shifts in understanding peace and the technical work needed to support women’s participation in practice, there remains a deeper, ideological resistance to women’s full participation that requires coalition building across societies. Women are at the center of conceiving creative ways to push for the participatory processes that bring all citizens closer to the goal of peace.


178 For more on women’s roles in mediation in particular, and the status of their participation in this area, see Marie O’Reilly and Andrea Ó Súilleabháin, “Women in Conflict Mediation: Why It Matters,” New York: International Peace Institute, October 2013.
Annex I

Broadening Participation Project Case Studies

by Thania Paffenholz

3. Benin (Political Transition 1990-2011)
7. Darfur (Peace Negotiations 2009-2013)
9. Egypt (Political Transition 2011-2013)
15. Israel-Palestine (Geneva Initiative 2003-2013)
18. Kyrgyzstan (Political Reforms 2013 – present)
29. Solomon Islands (Townsville Peace Agreement and Constitution Making 2000-2014)
32. Somalia (Djibouti Process 1999-2001)
34. South Africa (Political Transition 1990 – 1997)
37. Togo (Political Transition 1990-2006)
38. Turkey (Armenia Protocols 2008-2011)
39. Turkish-Kurdish (Peace Process 2009-2014)
40. Yemen (National Dialogue 2011-2014)
AnneX II

Quantitative Analysis of Women’s Participation in Peace Processes

by Laurel Stone

Until now, there have been few if any statistical analyses of the effect of women’s participation in peace processes on the durability of peace. In the absence of a comprehensive dataset detailing women’s participation in negotiations, I created a new dataset that measures whether or not one or more women participated in peace talks occurring between 1989 and 2011, using data from Uppsala University’s Peace Agreement Dataset, UN Women’s reports on women in peace processes, and multiple case studies.1

To measure duration of peace, the number of days between the date of a signed peace agreement and the date the peace agreement ended—indicated by the withdrawal of one or more parties from the agreement—was recorded.2 This duration of peace variable was also recorded at the two, five, ten, and fifteen year marks.

Women’s participation carried a significant and positive impact on peace, according to logistic regression analysis. Testing the predicted probability of the likelihood of peace duration revealed more nuanced conclusions about women’s impact over time.3 In the short term, peace processes that included women as witnesses, signatories, mediators, and/or negotiators demonstrated a 20 percent increase in the probability of a peace agreement lasting at least two years. This percentage continues to increase over time, with a 35 percent increase in the probability of a peace agreement lasting fifteen years.

Why would a female participant increase the probability of peace duration? Several theories and case studies have offered explanations, many of them included in this report. The statistical analysis reveals that the presence of women was not the only significant predictor. Democracy also demonstrated a positive impact, with an average of 23 percent probability of a peace agreement lasting fifteen years. Democracy and women’s participation are often linked, so this could partially explain the result. It also suggests that societal equality and good governance together encourage a lasting peace.4 Therefore, causality could move in either direction: democracy could aid gender equality in a conflict-affected country or the presence of a woman could facilitate the inclusion of democratic principles in the agreement.

The numbers support the idea that women are important agents for peace, but how policies are shaped for empowering women in peace processes must be carefully considered. For example, Security Council Resolution 1325 facilitated a “mainstreaming” of gender language, which resulted in more peace agreements with clauses relating to women’s rights after its adoption in 2000. However, simply adding gender-sensitive language to a peace agreement is not equivalent to empowering women to participate in the peace process. In addition to analyzing women’s participation, women’s rights language in the text of the peace agreement was also statistically analyzed, and the results actually revealed a negative impact on the duration of peace. This finding does not mean that adding women’s rights language to the text of an agreement causes failure, but it does indicate that merely adding gender-sensitive language as a “catch-all” for negotiated agreements will not increase the prospects for durable peace. Conflict parties and global policymakers cannot expect the addition of language from Resolution 1325 by itself to be a pathway to women’s equality and successful peacemaking.

Given the limited information about every woman who participated in each process, this quantitative analysis does not capture the number of women involved in each case nor what the extent of their involvement was beyond the classification of roles outlined above. Improved systematic documentation of the role of women in peace processes would facilitate future quantitative analyses in this regard. In addition, understanding how women impact peace processes requires more than statistics alone. Qualitative analyses of how women were included and why their presence made a difference are needed to enrich any data-driven approach. Nonetheless, the numbers support the idea that women are important agents for peace.

2 If the peace agreement did not end, the date given by Uppsala’s dataset as the final date coded (December 31, 2011) was used to calculate duration.
3 Predicted probability testing singles out one variable and increases its presence to its maximum level, to determine its impact. In this study, calculating the maximum level of women’s participation can help forecast the probable impact women’s inclusion will have on the durability of peace.
5 While causality could move in either direction, it cannot be assumed that either women’s participation or democracy are the sole causal explanations for peace duration since there is always room for more variables to also carry significance. Statistical analysis included robustness checks for potential collinearity between the two variables, and neither variance inflation factor tests nor interaction tests revealed high collinearity between women’s participation and democracy.
Annex III

UN Security Council Resolutions on Women and Peace and Security

The UN Security Council has adopted seven resolutions focusing on women and peace and security since the year 2000. Three resolutions have addressed the broad women and peace and security agenda—across participation, protection, and prevention—and its implementation. Four have focused explicitly on conflict-related sexual violence. The most recent resolution is the first since 1325 to focus in particular on women’s contributions to peacemaking.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Resolution</th>
<th>Focus</th>
<th>Year</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1325</td>
<td>Acknowledges a link between women’s experiences of conflict and the maintenance of international peace and security; urges women’s leadership and equal participation in conflict resolution and peacebuilding; requires gender mainstreaming for peace operations.</td>
<td>2000</td>
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<tr>
<td>1820</td>
<td>First resolution to recognize conflict-related sexual violence as a tactic of war; requires a response through peacekeeping, justice, services, and peace negotiations; emphasizes the need to increase women’s roles in decision making on conflict prevention and resolution.</td>
<td>2008</td>
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<tr>
<td>1888</td>
<td>Strengthens tools to implement 1820, calling on the secretary-general to appoint a special representative on sexual violence in conflict; expresses concern regarding the lack of female mediators.</td>
<td>2009</td>
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<tr>
<td>1889</td>
<td>Calls for further strengthening of women’s participation in peace processes and the postconflict period, as well as the development of indicators, monitoring, and reporting to measure progress on Resolution 1325.</td>
<td>2009</td>
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<td>1960</td>
<td>Provides an accountability system for sexual violence in conflict, including by listing perpetrators; calls on the secretary-general to establish monitoring, analysis, and reporting arrangements for sexual violence; encourages efforts to increase the participation of women in formal peace processes.</td>
<td>2010</td>
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<td>2106</td>
<td>Provides operational guidance on addressing sexual violence and calls for the further deployment of women protection advisers; calls on all actors to combat impunity for crimes of sexual violence in conflict.</td>
<td>2013</td>
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<tr>
<td>2122</td>
<td>Calls on all parties to peace talks to facilitate equal and full participation of women in decision making; aims to increase women’s participation in peacemaking by increasing resources and improving information on women in conflict zones; acknowledges the critical contributions of women’s civil society organizations to conflict prevention, resolution, and peacebuilding.</td>
<td>2013</td>
</tr>
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