International Peace Academy

Makerere University, Uganda

Africa Peace Forum, Kenya

Building Peace in Eastern Africa

Rapporteurs: Dr. Dorina A. Bekoe and Dr. Paul Omach

DECEMBER 2002 ■ ENTEBBE, UGANDA

Acknowledgements

About IPA's Africa Program

The seminar on building peace in Eastern Africa, organized jointly by the International Peace Academy (IPA), the Faculty of Social Sciences at Makerere University (Uganda), and the Africa Peace Forum (Kenya), took place in Entebbe, Uganda, from 16 to 18 December 2002. The meeting involved about fifty diplomats, soldiers, academics, and civil society actors, drawn largely from Eastern Africa, and was the third in a series of three policy seminars to address ways in which Africa's sub-regional organizations can increase their capacity to manage local conflicts. The seminar was also part of the IPA Africa Program's current three-year project (2000-2003) on developing regional and sub-regional security mechanisms in Africa. This work followed seven years of collaboration between IPA and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) between 1992 and 1998. In a bid to enhance African efforts at developing regional and sub-regional security mechanisms, IPA is working with partner institutions in Africa to:

- Assess major challenges faced by sub-regional organizations in Africa in their efforts to prevent and manage conflicts, operationalize their security mechanisms, and complement the African Union's (AU) conflict management efforts;
- Provide a forum for civil society actors to contribute to efforts at developing security mechanisms in their sub-regions;
- Provide training for the staff and accredited officials of sub-regional secretariats;
- Raise awareness of, and increase international support for, sub-regional security mechanisms in Africa;
- Enhance networking and sharing of information among a variety of African actors;
- Publish and disseminate policy-relevant research that will be useful to decision-makers, academics, and the NGO community.

About Makerere University

Uganda's Makerere University, first established in 1922 as a technical school, is currently one of the largest universities in the region with 25,000 undergraduate and graduate students. The faculty of social science, among the largest in the university with approximately 5,200 students and staff, offers fifteen undergraduate and graduate programs. The faculty is active in conflict resolution research through its international relations program.

About the Africa Peace Forum

The Nairobi-based Africa Peace Forum (APFO) strives to promote peace and human security in Eastern Africa through research and analyses on early warning and conflict management strategies and the development of community-based peace initiatives. APFO works closely with governments, inter-governmental and non-governmental entities, and research institutions in Africa and abroad.

About the Rapporteurs

Dr. Dorina A. Bekoe is an associate in the Africa Program at IPA and Dr. Paul Omach is a lecturer at Makerere University in Kampala, Uganda.

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Executive Summary

In collaboration with the Faculty of Social Sciences of Makerere University (Uganda) and the Africa Peace Forum (Kenya), the International Peace Academy (IPA) hosted a seminar in Entebbe, Uganda, from 16 to 18 December 2002, to assess the challenges and opportunities for building peace in Eastern Africa. The seminar brought together about fifty diplomats, soldiers, civil society representatives, and academics, mostly from Eastern Africa. Among these were Nuwe Amanya-Mushega, Secretary-General of the East African Community (EAC) and Legwaila Joseph Legwaila, the Special Representative of the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General for Ethiopia/Eritrea, who delivered the keynote address. The Entebbe seminar was the third in a series of three meetings organized by IPA in Africa under its *Project on Developing Regional and Sub-Regional Security Mechanisms in Africa* (2000-2003). IPA's Africa program aims to identify and analyze the issues impeding the successful resolution of conflicts in Africa and works to strengthen sub-regional organizations.

Eastern Africa – Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda – faces unique challenges and opportunities. Unlike West and Southern Africa, Eastern Africa lacks a potential regional hegemon – like Nigeria and South Africa – and has little regional peacekeeping experience. However, this sub-region also occupies a new strategic position in America's new "war on terrorism." Eastern Africa has benefited from the renewed involvement of the UN and other external actors and enjoys a rich tradition of pan-Africanism. Against this background, participants in Entebbe discussed prospects for strengthening conflict management efforts in Eastern Africa through regional economic and political integration, improved management of ethnic identity issues, and the development of civil society participation in conflict management efforts. Significant obstacles to peace were identified in areas such as security sector reform, the massive number of small arms in circulation throughout the region, and uncoordinated regional policies on refugees in an area that has spawned Africa's largest refugee population.

KEY ISSUES AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

Participants at the Entebbe seminar provided recommendations that addressed Eastern Africa's inadequate response to regional conflicts, the region's mixed record of democratization, and the renewed interest of the US and other external actors in the region. Specifically, participants urged the strengthening of Eastern Africa's organizations to manage conflict; advocated for improved governance in the sub-region; strongly supported efforts to reform security sectors and manage problems related to nationalities, ethnic identity, and refugees; called for civil society actors to be included in conflict management efforts; and emphasized improving relationships with external actors.

- The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the East African Community should develop greater institutional and operational capabilities for conflict management. Presently, IGAD and the EAC play relatively minor roles in managing Eastern Africa's conflicts, in contrast to the more active roles played by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). In more concrete terms, all IGAD members were asked to support and participate more actively in its Conflict Early Warning System (CEWARN). Currently, only two members – out of the required four needed to bring it into force – have ratified IGAD's early warning protocol. Moreover, conflict resolution is not an explicit part of the EAC mandate, though its *raison d'être* of regional integration requires a secure sub-region.

  IGAD and the EAC are poorly staffed, lack peacekeeping experience, and do not have permanent mediation bodies, rendering any interventions *ad hoc.* However, even as some participants called for IGAD to establish its capacity for peacekeeping, as the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) has done in West Africa, others cautioned against the establishment of such a force. They voiced concerns about the lack of a potential regional hegemon comparable to Nigeria in West Africa and

South Africa in Southern Africa, to lead such an intervention force. Eastern Africa was also seen as too divided for such a force to be created by regional leaders. Several participants, however, noted that ECOWAS and SADC, like IGAD, continue to suffer from financial, logistical, and capacity constraints.

- IGAD and the EAC cannot work in isolation, but need to forge partnerships with civil society actors in Eastern Africa, other sub-regional and regional organizations, and external actors. Indeed, it was noted that state actors in Eastern Africa – in their roles as agents of both war and peace – have compromised their ability to intervene effectively in conflicts within the sub-region. Some participants advocated the organization of regular meetings between Africa's sub-regional and regional organizations in order to learn from each other's experiences. One recommendation called for the designing of a training program for IGAD and the EAC in cooperation with the African Union (AU), ECOWAS, SADC, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). Several participants also called for a stronger relationship with the United Nations. Such a partnership would allow the UN to obtain accurate and timely data on the security situation in Eastern Africa.

- Managing and resolving conflicts requires an understanding of their root causes. Several participants therefore urged policymakers to produce summaries of lessons learned from current peace processes in Eastern Africa and to undertake a "conflict audit" to document the primary and secondary factors that impede the resolution of conflicts. From this information, data could be shared with sub-regional organizations, the AU, the UN, and policy institutes, with a view to developing a peace studies curriculum. Training programs can be conducted to hone the skills of policymakers and field practitioners to improve the methods through which Eastern Africa addresses conflicts. This would help develop an understanding of the detrimental effects of

governance, crime, injustice, and policing policies on the stability of states in this region.

- Improved governance could promote the management of civil conflicts and instability in Eastern Africa. In particular, better governance will help to increase the legitimacy of regional states in undertaking neighborhood interventions. To this end, participants called for the adoption of common regional principles on the rule of law, human rights, strong democratic and oversight institutions, free and fair elections, and the creation of programs that aim to eliminate economic disparities between ethnic (or identity) groups. Improved governance must also involve control of the small arms and light weapons (SALWs) trade and better management of refugee flows and refugee camps.

- Poor governance, weak institutions, inadequately trained security forces, and porous borders, all facilitate the illicit trade of small arms and light weapons. While the Nairobi Declaration of March 2000 and the Bamako Declaration of December 2000 provide potential mechanisms to curb the illicit trade of small arms and light weapons, many of their legislative and operational components have not been implemented. In addition, civil society groups have been largely left out of the process. Participants urged that regional states address the illicit trade of small arms and light weapons by involving civil society organizations more significantly in these efforts; by seriously undertaking security sector reform; by coordinating joint-border patrols; and by implementing poverty reduction programs.

- In part, small arms and light weapons proliferate because several governments in Eastern Africa have politicized their security forces. Frequently, security forces have been used by autocratic regimes to retain political power, protect particular ethnic groups, or quell opposition. Even in supposedly democratizing states, security forces have been used to monitor the actions of opposition groups. As a result, human rights are often abused and some groups remain marginalized and unprotected.

Moreover, as police forces have become weak, many states in the region have seen a rise in mob justice and vigilantism. Participants urged the reform of the security sector as a critical component in reducing conflict. Reforming the security sector entails deep political restructuring, including democratization; adopting principles of good governance; training police and armed forces in human rights; and ensuring proportional representation of all ethnic groups in security forces.

- The conflicts in Eastern Africa have generated more than 750,000 refugees. Besides the heavy costs on the host countries, large numbers of refugees can pose security threats, as refugee camps serve as recruiting grounds for insurgencies and also provide a conduit for the flow of illicit small arms and light weapons. As a result, refugee camps contribute to the spreading of civil wars across borders. Presently, no coordinated regional policy on refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) exists to counter these effects. Participants urged Eastern African states to work more closely with each other to address not only the management of refugee camps in the host nation, but also the needs of the refugee-exporting country to stem the flow of refugees. Equally important, states must begin to develop programs that provide economic opportunities for refugees in order to remove the incentives to join insurgencies.

- Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan, and Somalia all struggle with demands from ethnic and regional groups to achieve greater autonomy, and even secession. According to one participant, Ethiopia's early experiment with fostering strong nationalism and building a strong central government resulted in the repression and marginalization of certain ethnic groups and formed the basis for the eventual secession of Eritrea. The governments of both Ethiopia and Eritrea have been accused of human rights abuses, as they have suppressed dissent to state policies. Participants urged governments to find a balance between allowing the political accommodation of different groups and strengthening central governments to deliver social services and provide security to their citizens.

- Historically, civil society organizations have not played significant roles in conflict management in Eastern Africa. In part, this has been due to the distrust with which governments viewed civil society organizations – considering them anti-government actors beholden to the agendas of external funders. While the relationship between government and civil society is changing, as evidenced by the prominent roles played by civil society organizations in the Somali and Sudanese peace processes, participants urged greater inclusion of civil society organizations, and women in particular, in efforts by sub-regional organizations, governments, and the AU to manage and resolve conflicts. To this end, civil society organizations must coordinate their activities internally and also with sub-regional organizations. Moreover, governments must reduce their control over the actions of civil society organizations. Still, participants cautioned against the indiscriminate involvement of civil society organizations in peacemaking efforts without understanding how they might most effectively participate in conflict resolution.

- Through the provision of financial and military resources, the UN can mitigate some of the regional impediments – such as inadequate resources for mediation and intervention – to effective conflict management. Presently, the UN's main involvement in Eastern Africa, the UN Mission in Ethiopia/Eritrea (UNMEE), is charged with maintaining a cease-fire, keeping Ethiopian and Eritrean forces separated in the Temporary Security Zone, and implementing the Boundary Commission's April 2002 decision on the demarcation of the common border between both countries. While the mandate of UNMEE requires that its mission ends following the demarcation of the border, Legwaila Joseph Legwaila, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General, recommended that UNMEE remain until the completion of the territorial transfer.

- The US "war on terrorism" has brought renewed external attention to the Horn of Africa. Washington has established a military base in Djibouti, it is

negotiating with Eritrea to establish another base, and has provided Kenya with additional funds to improve security. Tanzania has adopted anti-terrorism legislation that some local civil society actors fear could be used to erode civil liberties and to clamp down on domestic dissent. Many participants voiced concerns that, as a result of the US "war on terrorism," anti-terrorism legislation may fan the flames of ethnic and religious animosity in Eastern Africa and impinge on the sovereignty of states, as governments respond to American demands for greater security measures. Eastern African governments must establish a balance between preventing the erosion of their sovereignty and protecting the interests of their citizens, while cooperating with the US to eliminate terrorism.

- In addition to the US, the European Union (EU) and Japan need to play a stronger role in Eastern Africa. The EU has supported conflict management efforts in Ethiopia/Eritrea and Sudan, but overall, its policies were criticized as short-term, ineffective, and uncoordinated. Japan has directed most of its economic assistance to Kenya, but has not played a high-profile role in conflict management efforts in Eastern Africa.

1. Introduction

In collaboration with the Faculty of Social Sciences of Makerere University (Uganda) and the Africa Peace Forum (Kenya), the International Peace Academy (IPA) hosted a seminar in Entebbe, Uganda, from 16 to 18 December 2002, to assess the challenges and opportunities for building peace in Eastern Africa. The seminar brought together about fifty diplomats, soldiers, civil society representatives, and academics, mostly from Eastern Africa. Among these were Nuwe Amanya-Mushega, Secretary-General of the East African Community (EAC) and Legwaila Joseph Legwaila, the Special Representative of the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General for Ethiopia/Eritrea, who delivered the keynote address.

The meeting in Entebbe was the last of three policy seminars organized by IPA under its *Project on Developing Regional and Sub-Regional Security Mechanisms in Africa* (2000-2003), which assessed the major conflict management challenges faced by sub-regional organizations in Africa and sought to strengthen the capacity of these organizations and civil society actors to manage their own conflicts, in cooperation with external actors. The first seminar in the series was held in Gaborone, Botswana, in December 2000 and addressed security issues in Southern Africa.[1] The second seminar took place in Abuja, Nigeria, in September 2001 and discussed the means for successful resolution of conflicts in West Africa.[2] Smaller task force meetings followed each of these seminars. In March and August of 2002, task force meetings were held in Johannesburg, South Africa, and Dakar, Senegal, which discussed ways of strengthening the capacity of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), respectively, to manage regional conflicts.[3] Similar seminars

and task force meetings are planned for the Great Lakes region in 2003 and 2004 during the next phase of the Africa program (July 2003 – June 2006).

Participants at the Entebbe seminar in December 2002 considered several inter-related domestic and sub-regional security issues that have impeded the resolution of conflicts in Eastern Africa, which differs from other African sub-regions in important respects. First, the absence of a potential sub-regional hegemon, the sub-region's weak conflict management mechanisms, and the subsequent lack of peacekeeping experience, seem to place Eastern Africa at a disadvantage compared to West and, to a lesser extent, Southern Africa. Second, the new strategic position that Eastern Africa occupies with respect to America's "war on terrorism" and the renewed involvement of the UN and other external actors like the European Union (EU) and Japan, present new dangers and opportunities for Eastern Africa. Several participants called for regional economic and political integration in Eastern Africa as a way of preventing and managing regional conflicts.

Ambassador David Malone, President, International Peace Academy, left, and **H.E. Nuwe Amanya-Mushega**, Secretary-General, East African Community

[1] International Peace Academy, the African Renaissance Institute, the Southern African Regional Institute for Policy Studies, and the Department of International Relations, University of the Witwatersrand, *Southern Africa's Evolving Security Architecture: Problems and Prospects*, December 2000, Gaborone, Botswana.

[2] International Peace Academy and the Economic Community of West African States, *Toward a Pax West Africana: Building Peace in a Troubled Sub-region*, September 2001, Abuja, Nigeria.

[3] International Peace Academy and Centre for Africa's International Relations, University of the Witwatersrand, *Peacemaking in Southern Africa: The Role and Potential of the Southern African Development Community (SADC)*, March 2002, Johannesburg, South Africa; and International Peace Academy and the Economic Community of West African States, *Operationalizing the ECOWAS Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping, and Security*, August 2002, Dakar, Senegal.

They stressed the need for more effective conflict management institutions in the sub-region and called for the inclusion of civil society in conflict management efforts. Participants also urged security sector reform to strengthen the region's military and security forces, and to make them more accountable to civilian leadership.

This report is divided into five additional sections. The next section provides an overview of the major conflicts in the region and the inter-linkages between them. The third section evaluates the conflict management capacity of Eastern Africa's organizations. The fourth section highlights the security challenges in the region. The fifth section evaluates the role of external actors – the UN, the US, the EU, and Japan – in Eastern Africa's security complex. Section six summarizes the policy recommendations for improving conflict management efforts in Eastern Africa.

2. Overview of Conflicts in Eastern Africa

Eastern Africa is made up of two sub-regions: the Horn of Africa, comprising Djibouti, Somalia, Sudan, Ethiopia, and Eritrea; and East Africa, comprising Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda. The region is closely linked to the states of the Great Lakes region – Burundi, Rwanda, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) – which is currently a major theater of civil war and political instability. The absence of formal conflict management mechanisms highlights three difficulties that Eastern Africa faces in resolving the sub-region's conflicts. The first difficulty centers on whether it is logistically feasible for IGAD and the EAC to intervene militarily in regional conflicts – especially since no peacekeeping force like the ECOWAS cease-fire monitoring group (ECOMOG) exists in Eastern Africa. A second, but indirect, concern arises from the lack of a potential regional hegemon in Eastern Africa. In West and Southern Africa, Nigeria and South Africa, have taken the lead in interventions in Liberia and Lesotho.[4] But, despite these interventions, ECOWAS and SADC suffer from the same financial, logistical, and capacity constraints as IGAD and the EAC, while the leadership role of Nigeria and South Africa has been challenged by other states. In Eastern Africa, no state has, however, staked a claim to playing such a leadership role. Finally, member states in Eastern Africa would find it difficult to legitimize interventions in each other's conflicts. Many participants noted that it would be difficult for countries like Uganda, Sudan, or Somalia to devise strategies to end regional conflicts in which these countries are themselves involved. Some of these countries are also facing insurgencies themselves. Similarly, several participants noted that countries like Kenya or Uganda could not credibly provide advice on democratic governance, given the relatively weak state of democracy in their own countries.

For forty years, Eastern Africa has been wracked by conflicts.[5] This section briefly summarizes the major conflicts afflicting Eastern Africa. Presently, conflicts are raging in Somalia, Sudan, and Uganda. Following a two-year border war, between 1998 and 2000, the governments of Ethiopia and Eritrea, in partnership with the UN Mission in Ethiopia/Eritrea (UNMEE), are in the early stages of implementing the border demarcation decision by the Boundary Commission of April 2002.

Somalia

Civil war erupted in Somalia in 1991, with the demise of the regime of the US-backed autocrat, Siad Barre. The US led a UN peacekeeping force to Somalia in December 1992. However, the death of eighteen American soldiers in October 1993 led to its departure and the eventual withdrawal of the UN in 1995. Since then, Somalia has operated without a central government and has been divided along regional and clan lines. Somaliland, in the northwest, has seceded from Somalia (although the international community does not recognize its sovereignty), while Puntland, in the northeast, has declared regional autonomy.

Presently, IGAD leads efforts to restore peace to Somalia. The organization convened a technical committee in February 2002, comprising Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya, to organize a National Reconciliation Conference in September 2002. Intended to bring together representatives of the Transitional Government of Somalia, established during the Arta Peace Process in Djibouti during 2002, the conference of September 2002 did not take place as planned, due to disagreements among the factions about the legitimacy of the Transitional Government.

In July 2003, a constitution that proposed a federal system for Somalia was rejected by the president of the Transitional Government, Salat Hassan, due to fears that

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[4] Adekeye Adebajo and Christopher Landsberg, "South Africa and Nigeria as Regional Hegemons," in Mwesiga Baregu and Christopher Landsberg (eds.), *From Cape to Congo: Southern Africa's Evolving Security Challenges* (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), pp. 171-203.

[5] Legwaila Joseph Legwaila, "The Role of the United Nations in the Horn of Africa," paper presented at the International Peace Academy/Makerere University/Africa Peace Forum seminar in Entebbe, Uganda, 16-18 December 2002.

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it was creating an "anti-Islamic environment." With the end of the mandate of the Transitional Government scheduled for August 2003, Hassan refused to give up power, increasing fears of renewed conflict in Somalia.[6] Meanwhile, Somaliland continues its efforts to establish itself as an independent entity, making attempts at keeping Somalia a unified state more difficult. After holding local elections in December 2002, Somaliland held presidential elections in April 2003.

Sudan

Soon after independence in 1956, civil war erupted in Sudan between the largely Christian and animist South and the largely Muslim North. IGAD's involvement in Sudan began in 1993 with the establishment of the Standing Committee of Foreign Ministers comprising Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda, charged with reaching a negotiated settlement to the civil war. Disputes over the separation of state and religion have hindered the progress of the Standing Committee.[7] Other regional efforts, namely the 1997 *Declaration of Principles* and the establishment, in 1999, of the Nairobi secretariat to manage the peace process, also did not yield results. The latest peacemaking effort – the *Machakos Protocol* – agreed in July 2002 between the government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM)/Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) promises southern Sudan the right to self-determination; participation in the national government; and respect for the region's traditions, religion, and customs. As a concession, the South will cease efforts for independence. Instead, a referendum on independence will be held after a six-year transition period.[8] Additionally, the US has begun efforts to end the civil war, creating the $20 million Sudan Peace Fund.[9]

In the first half of 2003, the parties to the *Machakos Protocol* returned to the negotiating table. Critical issues that still need to be resolved include: the separation of religion and state; a possible referendum in southern Sudan; the religious character of Khartoum, the capital; the selection of the president and vice-president during the interim period; proportional representation; and the establishment of an electoral process. In addition, the parties in Sudan must agree on the degree of autonomy to be granted to the territories of the Southern Blue Nile, the Nuba Mountains, and the Abeyi: all non-Muslim areas in northern Sudan.[10]

Left to right: **Ambassador Bethuel Kiplagat**, Director, Africa Peace Forum; **Dr. Edward Kirumira**, Dean, Faculty of Social Sciences, Makerere University; and **Professor Ali A. Mazrui**, Binghamton University

Uganda

During the tenure of Yoweri Museveni that began in 1986, Uganda's government has battled two opposition

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[6] "Somali leader wins poll," *BBC News*, 19 April 2003 (available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/2960935.stm 17 August 2003); "Somali tension as mandate ends," *BBC News*, 12 August 2003 (available from: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/3143733.stm 12 August 2003); and "Somalia: Faction Leader Leaves Talks," *IRIN*, 6 August 2003 (available from: http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=35813&SelectRegion=Horn_of_Africa 17 August 2003).

[7] "The Sudan Peace Process," *Intergovernmental Authority on Development*, paragraph 7 (available from http://www.igad.org/sectors/ph/sup.html 9 September 2002).

[8] *Machakos Protocol*, 20 July 2002 (available from http://www.usip.org/library/pa/sudan/sudan_machakos_07202002.html 9 September 2002).

[9] For more on the Sudan Peace Fund, see United States Agency for International Development (available from: http://www.usaid.gov/about/sudan/peace.html 29 May 2003).

[10] *International Crisis Group*, "Sudan Endgame," Africa Report No. 65, 7 July 2003 (Electronic Version).

forces: the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA)[11] and the Uganda People's Democratic Movement/Army (UPDM/A). While the Ugandan government signed a peace agreement with the UPDM/A in 1988, reaching an accord with the LRA has proved more difficult. Although conciliation efforts took place in 1993 and 1997, neither succeeded in resolving the conflict.[12] Tens of thousands of Ugandans have perished and approximately 350,000 have been displaced by the war.[13] The assistance by Sudan's government to the LRA has helped to prolong the conflict. In December 1999, in an effort to end this alliance, Uganda and Sudan signed the Nairobi Agreement under which Sudan promised to cease assistance to the LRA.[14] However, the Nairobi Agreement failed to resolve the conflict.[15] In March 2002, the Ugandan government launched "Operation Iron Fist." Under this initiative, the Ugandan government received the permission of the government of Sudan to combat the LRA on Sudanese territory bordering Uganda. So far, this strategy has failed to defeat the rebels.[16]

Ethiopia and Eritrea

Ethiopia and Eritrea fought a costly border war between 1998 and 2000, following Eritrea's secession from Ethiopia in 1993, which resulted in an estimated 100,000 deaths.[17] After initial peacemaking efforts by the US, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) – led by Algerian president Abdelaziz Bouteflika, the OAU chairman – spearheaded conflict resolution efforts. Algeria's efforts, in partnership with the US and the EU, culminated in a cease-fire in June 2000 and a comprehensive peace agreement in December 2000. The UN Mission in Ethiopia/Eritrea was established in 2001 to implement the Algiers peace agreement as well as the demarcation of the border between Ethiopia and Eritrea, which was determined by the Boundary Commission in April 2002.[18] There are approximately 4,000 UN peacekeepers in Ethiopia and Eritrea.[19] While the implementation of the peace agreement has continued, recent clashes have occurred between farmers on both sides over grazing lands.[20] There have also been continued tensions between Addis Ababa and Asmara over the delimitation and demarcation of the common border.

As this brief summary of the major conflicts in the region indicates, Eastern Africa's conflicts are not purely internal affairs, but sometimes involve other states in the sub-region and external actors. Such external involvement in the region's internal affairs has sometimes made these conflicts more intractable, poisoned inter-state relations, and complicated peacemaking efforts.

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[11] Although currently known as the Lord's Resistance Army, the group evolved from the merger of several other insurgencies. It began with Joseph Kony's break from the UPDM/A in 1986. Kony then assumed the leadership of the Holy Spirit Movement, and in 1988 incorporated members of the UPDM/A who did not agree with the 1988 peace agreement. See Balam Nyeko and Okello Lucima, "Profiles of the Parties to the Conflict," in Okello Lucima (ed.), *Protracted Conflict, Elusive Peace: Initiatives to End the Violence in Northern Uganda* (London: Conciliation Resources, 2002), p. 17.

[12] On the 1993 peace process, see Billie O'Kadameri, "LRA/Government negotiations 1993-1994," in Lucima (ed.), *Protracted Conflict, Elusive Peace*, pp. 34-41. On the 1997 peace process, see James Alfred Obita, "First International Peace Efforts 1996-1998," in Ibid., pp. 42-45.

[13] Caroline Lamwaka, "The Peace Process in Northern Uganda 1986-1990," in Ibid., pp. 30–33.

[14] Patrick Oguru Otto, "Implementing the 1999 Nairobi Agreement," in Ibid., pp. 52-57.

[15] Ibid., pp. 52-57.

[16] Human Rights Watch, *Abducted and Abused: Renewed Conflict in Northern Uganda*, vol. 15, no. 12 (A), July 2003, pp. 6-7 (Electronic Version).

[17] Human Rights Watch, *The Horn of Africa War: Mass Expulsions and the Nationality Issue (June 1998-April 2002)*, vol. 13, no. 3(A), January 30, 2003, p. 4 (Electronic Version).

[18] UN Security Council, *Progress Report of the Secretary-General on Ethiopia and Eritrea*, (S/2002/977), 30 August 2002, paragraphs 9-10.

[19] "UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea Fact Sheet," (available from http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/unmee/unmee.pdf 7 August, 2003).

[20] UN Security Council, *Progress Report of the Secretary-General* (S/2002/977), Annex II, paragraph 2.

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3. Eastern Africa's Sub-regional Organizations

The need for institutionalizing conflict management efforts in Eastern Africa through IGAD and the EAC is urgent. There has been an increased reliance on sub-regional organizations for conflict management in Africa over the last decade, as evidenced by the participation of ECOWAS and SADC in regional peacekeeping efforts in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Lesotho. The OAU (now the AU) also led mediation efforts in Rwanda, the DRC, and Ethiopia/Eritrea. In contrast, conflict management efforts in Eastern Africa have often occurred bilaterally or through external actors, rather than through IGAD and the EAC. IGAD has played a role in peace processes in Sudan and Somalia, but these have yet to bear fruit. Deep political divisions remain within the members of IGAD which have frustrated the management of regional conflicts. This section reviews the conflict management capacity of IGAD and the EAC.

The Intergovernmental Authority on Development

The Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD), established in 1986, comprised Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, and Uganda,[21] and was mandated to deal with ecological and humanitarian problems on the Horn of Africa. The reality of conflicts and insecurity as an obstacle to development in the sub-region, and the perceived need for regional approaches to conflict management, led to a formal restructuring of the organization. In March 1996, the organization was renamed the Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD).

The objectives of the new organization were broadened to include the promotion of peace and stability and the creation of mechanisms for the prevention, management and resolution of inter and intra-state conflicts within the sub-region. A Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) has since been established in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Inaugurated in June 2002, CEWARN seeks, with inadequate staff and resources, to obtain, analyze, and distribute information on potentially violent conflicts; develop scenarios to respond to potential conflicts; and conduct research on ongoing crises.[22] In this initial phase, CEWARN will focus on events that could potentially lead to cross-border pastoral conflicts – such as cattle rustling – and increase insecurity in the region. In Eastern Africa, pastoral conflicts are most prevalent in the border areas of Kenya, Ethiopia, Sudan, and Uganda (Karamoja cluster) and the Kenya, Ethiopia, and Somalia border areas (Somali cluster). Operationally, CEWARN has proposed the establishment of national (versus sub-regional) Conflict Early Warning and Early Response Mechanisms (CEWERUs) – entities composed of various institutions at the national level (including civil society) to initiate an early response to conflicts and to facilitate the sharing of information.[23] Mindful of the importance of information to these efforts, participants raised concerns about CEWARN's ability to collect data, given the reluctance of governments to provide intelligence information that may prove sensitive to their security. CEWARN relies on publicly available information, as opposed to intelligence information,[24] to detect impending conflicts.

The establishment of CEWARN is a potentially important step in developing a security mechanism in Eastern Africa, but its weak institutionalization and

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[21] During the seventh summit of heads of state and governments in Addis Ababa in 1993, Eritrea was admitted as a member.

[22] Intergovernmental Authority on Development, *Draft Supplementary Protocol on Decision-Making for CEWARN*, Article 14, as reproduced in Appendix F, in Cirû Mwaûra and Susanne Schmeidl, (eds.), *Early Warning and Conflict Management in the Horn of Africa* (Lawrenceville, NJ and Asmara, Eritrea: The Red Sea Press, Inc., 2001), pp. 277-287. See also presentation by Charles Njorge Mwaura, "IGAD's Role in Conflict Management in the Horn of Africa," paper presented at the International Peace Academy/Makerere University/Africa Peace Forum seminar in Entebbe, Uganda, 16-18 December 2002.

[23] Charles Njorge Mwaura, "IGAD's Role in Conflict Management."

[24] The differentiation between intelligence and publicly available information is also made in Susanne Schmeidl, "Conflict Early Warning and Prevention: Toward a Coherent Terminology," in Mwaûra and Schmeidl (eds.), *Early Warning and Conflict Management in the Horn of Africa*, pp. 73-76.

lack of resources and staff remain a major obstacle. Indeed, while all IGAD member states have signed the CEWARN protocol, only Eritrea and Kenya have ratified it so far. (Four states must ratify CEWARN before it can come into force). Many participants, however, felt that, notwithstanding the creation of CEWARN, the impact of Eastern Africa's sub-regional organizations on local conflict management efforts remains minimal. In order to bolster conflict prevention efforts in this region, participants stressed the importance of providing good governance and strengthening democratization efforts, as well as involving local civil society actors more actively in peacebuilding processes.

The East African Community

The East African Community – consisting of Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda – was originally established in 1967 to promote regional economic integration, but it collapsed in 1977 due to political and ideological differences among its member states and squabbles over the sharing of the economic benefits of integration. Specifically, Tanzania and Uganda perceived Kenya as benefiting disproportionately from the economic union. Political differences between Tanzanian president, Julius Nyerere, and Uganda's leader, Idi Amin, also weakened the EAC. In 1993, the three countries established a Permanent Tripartite Commission for Co-operation. This commission culminated in the framework agreement to re-establish the East African Community, and was signed by the leaders of the three countries in December 1999. The primary focus of the EAC is regional economic integration, with the ultimate goal of establishing a political federation between Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda.[25]

While conflict management is not one of the EAC's explicit goals, the organization has recognized the critical importance of security in fulfilling its mandate of economic development and integration. At the core of the revised EAC treaty is the notion that economic development and regional integration can help prevent conflicts and enhance security.[26] Notably, in 1998, the EAC drafted a *Memorandum of Understanding on Common Defense and Security*, a prelude to the 2000 *Memorandum of Understanding on Interstate Security*. Given the Kenya-Uganda border clashes among the Pokot, Sebei, Turkana, and Karamajong communities, the 2000 *Memorandum of Understanding* provides specifically for the establishment of border committees to stabilize these areas.

Moreover, to improve the EAC's effectiveness and to close the credibility gap the sub-region faces, Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda have committed their governments to adhere to certain codes of conduct related to the rule of law, human rights, creating strong democratic and oversight institutions, and establishing independent electoral systems.[27] Eastern Africa needs to develop common norms and values for promoting good governance. However, the failure of the region's leaders to adhere consistently to these principles, combined with a lack of resources and adequate personnel, have so far limited the EAC's role in this area.

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[25] On the background to the EAC, see Ali A. Mazrui and Alamin M. Mazrui, "The Tensions of East African Integration: Failed Pan Africanism, Emerging Pax Africana?" paper presented at the International Peace Academy/Makerere University/Africa Peace Forum seminar in Entebbe, Uganda, 16-18 December 2002.

[26] Peter Anyang' Nyong'o, "Governance and Democratization in Eastern Africa: Overcoming Conflicts and Initiating Political Integration," paper presented at the International Peace Academy/Makerere University/Africa Peace Forum seminar in Entebbe, Uganda, 16-18 December 2002.

[27] Ibid.

4. Eastern Africa's Security Challenges

Several structural and political factors have created instability in Eastern Africa and present challenges for the development of a security mechanism. Most critically, according to several participants, Eastern Africa must adopt principles of democracy and good governance to overcome the failure of economic integration and political cooperation. The region's actors must design policies to manage ethnic tensions and nationality issues more effectively; they must urgently undertake security sector reform; they should work toward economic and political cooperation; they should involve civil society actors in conflict management efforts; they must manage the large inflows of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) more effectively; and they should take effective measures to stem the flow of illicit small arms and light weapons (SALWs).

Democracy and Good Governance

One of the greatest security challenges in Eastern Africa is the promotion of democracy and good governance. Stronger democracy and good governance in Eastern Africa could open political space and help to alleviate many of the tensions caused by ethnic and regional marginalization. Security sectors must also undergo successful reform as governments become more democratic and adopt principles of good governance. Currently, security sectors in many Eastern African countries have been politicized by autocratic governments who have used their securocrats to retain power. Good governance would further efforts to integrate the sub-region's economies and facilitate cooperation: critical components in building a more secure region.

Nationalism and Ethnic Identities

In the course of state-building in multi-ethnic societies, governments often wrestle with striking the correct balance between ethnic autonomy and a strong central authority. In the first case, allowing ethnic groups a degree of autonomy in policymaking – either through powersharing or federalism – may raise fears of excessive nationalism, leading to violent conflicts. On the other hand, strong centralized governments run the risk of suppressing the democracy and development aspirations of certain ethnic groups. In particular, for countries suffering from civil war, understanding how to balance the desire for increased ethnic or regional autonomy with a strong central government constitutes a critical element for successful peacebuilding. Many of the states in Eastern Africa – particularly, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia, and Sudan – illustrate these tensions.

Governments in Ethiopia have historically instituted policies aimed at both strengthening the central government – in an attempt to promote loyalty to the state – and strengthening the autonomy of ethnic groups – as a means of providing political accommodation. While each approach has produced some positive results, each also has its own difficulties. Ethiopia, more than other states in the region, reinforces the point that policymakers must appreciate the nuances of political accommodation and powersharing.

Both Emperor Haile Selassie (1941-1974) and Mengistu Haile Mariam (1974-1991) enacted policies that cultivated strong nationalism, and favored the Amhara ethnic group at the expense of other ethnic groups. Haile Selassie sought to create a sense of nationalism through a common education, the development of a national army, and the adoption of Amharic as the official language and the Coptic Orthodox Church as the national church. Continuing to strengthen the central state, Mengistu governed by weakening the Church and breaking the ties that peasants held to the land and to their ethnic groups. However, the increasingly oppressive government only ignited the flames of ethnic identities. Indeed, many Ethiopians blame the secession of Eritrea in 1993 on the autocratic actions of the Mengistu regime.[28]

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[28] Dominque Jacquin-Berdal and Aida Mengistu, "Nationalism and Identity in the Horn of Africa," paper presented at the International Peace Academy/Makerere University/Africa Peace Forum seminar in Entebbe, Uganda, 16-18 December 2002.

The Mengistu government was overthrown in 1991 by the Tigrayan People's Liberation Front (TPLF), which chose to implement an ethnically-based federation. Striving to ameliorate relations among ethnic groups and avoid future bids for independence, president Meles Zenawi opted to create a federalist state that recognized Ethiopia's different ethnicities. Ethiopia's government has gone as far as allowing, at least in principle, any group the right to self-determination, including secession.[29] However, a federalist state, while an improvement over the suppression of national identities by past rulers, must be adopted with caution. In particular, one participant argued that over-emphasizing ethnicity will only result in the disintegration of the state and could erode a sense of nationhood. Alternatively, others have argued that ethnicity could be promoted while simultaneously emphasizing issues or interests that cross ethnic lines, thus avoiding the ossification of group identities. According to one participant, these competing views are manifested in Zenawi's recent policies aimed at strengthening the central state and muzzling criticism of the government. Several participants noted that Eritrea has a more autocratic regime than Ethiopia's. Eritrea's history has created a deep sense of nationalism among its people. Italian colonialism, Eritrea's autonomous status in Ethiopia during the 1950s, and the liberation war against Ethiopia, all contributed to the creation of an Eritrean national identity. Nonetheless, it is ironic, according to one observer, that despite having seceded from Ethiopia in reaction to Addis Ababa's oppressive policies, Eritrea has taken several steps to strengthen the nation's sense of unity through suppressing its nine ethnic groups and emphasizing the development of nationalism and a strong central state. Like past Ethiopian regimes, Eritrea's government has also been accused of widespread human rights violations against political opponents and the press.[30]

Turning to Sudan, in the near future, the country will have to craft policies to accommodate its different ethnic groups. Whereas Sudan had previously defined its South as consisting of Nuba, there are now categories of up to 99 sub-groups of Nuba. These

changes will likely have serious implications for any decision on the future of southern Sudan. If it becomes an independent state, southern Sudan is likely to face a similar dichotomy between nationalism and ethnic identity that confronts Eritrea. If southern Sudan chooses to remain within Sudan, the country will also have to resolve this dilemma.

In Somalia, a sense of nationhood among the country's various clans has led to the disintegration of the central government, with the state having collapsed ten years ago. Two regions in Somalia – Somaliland and Puntland – have carved out their own autonomous territories, while the rest of Somalia remains in the hands of rival warlords. The current state of Somalia challenges the notion that the ultimate goal of peacemakers should be the reconstitution of Somalia as a single unit. Instead, several participants at the seminar urged the international community to recognize Somaliland and Puntland as independent states. Others argued for a united Somalia.

Dr. Paul Omach, Makerere University, and **Dr. Josephine Odera**, Africa Peace Forum

Security Sector Reform

Security forces – namely military, police, paramilitary, militia, and intelligence organizations – have often played negative roles in Eastern Africa. Most

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[29] Ibid.

[30] Ibid.

damagingly, security forces have become politicized. In many Eastern African countries, security forces have protected a favored group of citizens, thus exacerbating political and social cleavages. Autocratic governments have used security forces to retain political power, often subverting the will of their citizens. Politicized security forces have also resulted in unauthorized external interventions – such as Uganda's intervention into the DRC without approval from its parliament. Additionally, several participants noted that poor economic and political discipline within security forces has resulted in a failure to establish credible police forces. In most instances, police forces are under-funded, poorly trained, poorly paid, and corrupt. This has undermined the capacity of regional police forces to maintain civic peace and provide security to their citizens. The result is the rise in mob justice, vigilantes, and local militias which have undermined rather than increased security. Security sector reform has thus emerged as an issue that is crucial to democratization and good governance efforts in Eastern Africa. Security sector reform will be undertaken most effectively through adoption of policies that promote democratic principles, balanced recruiting, and the creation of strong civil-military ties.[31]

Security forces under autocratic governments are in the greatest need of security sector reform. In the absence of democratic institutions through which citizens can resolve grievances, undemocratic regimes, which often suffer from charges of illegitimacy, rely heavily on security forces to maintain order, remain in power, and quell opposition. Controlling security forces and using them in ways that harm opposition groups rather than protect citizens becomes the main means of retaining power. As such, many autocratic governments, concerned with their own political survival, cannot establish strong civil-military relations, and in the worst cases, fail to protect their citizens from internal threats. Moreover, the composition of security forces can also exacerbate existing ethnic cleavages, with ruling ethnic groups often disproportionately represented in the security forces. Thus, in addition to political marginalization through an ethnically unbalanced security apparatus, some governments have excluded certain groups from protection. Therefore, an equally important tool for reforming security forces in Eastern Africa is the development of fair and ethnically-balanced recruiting processes. In addition, security sector reform should include educational sessions on human rights and democratic principles.[32]

While democratic governments are best positioned to reform security sectors, adopting democratic principles alone will not suffice. Democratic institutions provide channels through which groups may voice grievances, promote ethnically-diverse recruiting processes, and prevent the marginalization of particular groups from political participation and protection. However, even as democratization takes root, security forces can still threaten the consolidation of democracy.[33] Such forces have been accused of complicity in violence, intimidation, and harassment of political opposition groups in Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda. Thus, in addition to adopting strong democratic principles, regional governments must also develop a common definition and vision of a reformed, modern, and professional army. Currently, clearly-defined concepts of security sector reform do not exist. Other important changes should occur involving the organizational, legislative, and financial aspects of the security sector. In particular, clear guidelines must be established between the management and control functions of security sectors and oversight agencies, such as parliaments as well as civil society actors and the media.

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[31] Paul Omach, "Security Sector Reform in Eastern Africa," paper presented at the International Peace Academy/Makerere University/Africa Peace Forum seminar, Entebbe, Uganda, 16-18 December 2002.

[32] Ibid.

[33] Robin Luckham, "The Military, Militarisation and Democratisation: A survey of Literature and Issues," in Eboe Hutchful and Abdoulaye Bathily (eds.), *The Military and Militarism in Africa* (Dakar: Codesria, 1998), p. 1.

Pax Africana: Sub-regional Economic Integration and Political Cooperation

While regional economic integration has been greatly retarded by conflicts, it is also widely seen as a potential conflict prevention strategy. Economic integration and political cooperation could result in a *Pax Africana* that provides the means through which African states can resolve African problems.[34]

Pax Africana, which has appeared in various forms throughout Eastern Africa's history, refers to the notion that African states should resolve their own conflicts. Central to *Pax Africana* is the acknowledgement of the regional nature of conflicts. As such, governments must show a willingness to intervene in neighboring states in situations in which stability and democratic governance may be threatened. According to Ali Mazrui and Aliman Mazrui, Eastern Africa experienced *Pax Africana vanguard* when, for example, Rwandan Tutsi rebels trained in Uganda, overthrew the genocidal Rwandan Hutu regime in 1994. At its most developed stage, *Pax Africana* could involve the creation of a trusteeship through which regional states would administer badly-governed neighboring countries.[35] Trusteeship is not a new idea. Tanganyika, for example, held Zanzibar "in trusteeship;" Tanzania held Uganda "in trusteeship" after the fall of Idi Amin; while Ethiopia also held Eritrea "in trusteeship." It was suggested that Somalia might be better off under an African trusteeship, the high cost notwithstanding, rather than remain on its current destructive course. Several participants disagreed with the idea of such a trusteeship which was regarded as eroding the sovereignty of Somalia and handing the country over to unelected foreign officials. Others also argued that such African-led trusteeship could absolve the UN of its proper responsibilities in Africa.

The Role of Civil Society in Conflict Management

In the post-Cold War era, civil society organizations have come to be regarded as important actors in peacebuilding processes.[36] In the past, many governments perceived civil society as anti-government actors who were pursuing the agendas of their external funders, and sought to regulate their activities. Increasingly, however, sub-regional organizations which previously never involved civil society in their programs, now increasingly do so. Both IGAD and the EAC have acknowledged the role of civil society in advancing the objectives of their organizations. CEWARN, for example, was designed, with active support from NGOs, to involve civil society participation in IGAD's early warning system.[37] But the institutional mechanisms for the participation of civil society actors in these processes are unclear and there is often a lack of communication and dissemination of information between civil society organizations and governments.

Civil society actors in Eastern Africa have played prominent roles in peacebuilding and mediation in the last decade. For instance, in Sudan's peace process, civil society actors played an important role in advocacy, participation, and dissemination of information. In Somalia, civil society groups advanced the Arta peace process of August 2000, and helped erode the support base of the country's warlords. NGOs have also formed "peace committees" composed of traditional authorities, elders, women, youth, and religious leaders, as well as state officials. The Wajir Peace Committee and Garissa Pastoral Peace and Development Initiative in Kenya, as well as groups representing the Nuer ethnic group in Sudan are examples of this trend. In addition, faith-based groups like the New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC), the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative (ARLPI) in

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34 Mazrui and Mazrui, "The Tensions of East African Integration."

35 Ibid.

36 For a background on civil society organizations, see, International Peace Academy, *The Infrastructure of Peace in Africa: Assessing the Peacebuilding Capacity of African Institutions*, September 2002; and Josephine Odera, "The Role of Civil Society in Managing Conflicts in Eastern Africa," paper presented at the International Peace Academy/Makerere University/Africa Peace Forum seminar in Entebbe, Uganda, 16-18 December 2002.

37 Charles Njorge Mwaura, "IGAD's Role in Conflict Management."

Uganda, and the National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK) have also been instrumental in conflict management efforts and in offering development assistance to local communities. These organizations have played constructive roles in post-conflict peacebuilding efforts, especially in situations in which there has been no state presence. Civil society organizations have also served as key partners for regional initiatives. For example, the process towards the adoption of the 2000 Nairobi Declaration on the proliferation of SALWs greatly involved civil society actors.[38]

Despite their significant contributions to peacebuilding efforts in Eastern Africa, civil society groups continue to remain on the sidelines of government policies in the area of conflict management. In part, civil society's relative weakness stems from its failure to coordinate efforts internally and with sub-regional and national organizations. Participants at the Entebbe seminar also observed that the role of civil society is frequently limited by the actions of governments which often seek

Left to right: **Brigadier Dick Baly**, UK Department for International Development; **Charles Mwaura**, Intergovernmental Authority on Development; and **Lydia Abura**, Intergovernmental Authority on Development

to control and regulate the actions of NGOs. Kenya, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda were cited as regimes that have imposed the most restrictions on civil society organizations. Equally important, while involving civil society in peacebuilding strengthens efforts to expand the political participation of key actors in policy-making, not all civil society organizations are equally equipped or organized to participate effectively in conflict management.

Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons

Finding a durable solution to Eastern Africa's conflicts will involve addressing the problem of refugees. Flows of refugees into neighboring states and the large number of IDPs, are among the most negative effects of sub-regional conflicts. In countries like Sudan and Uganda, refugees have been a part of the landscape almost since independence, as conflicts have raged nearly continually since the 1960s.[39] Refugees and IDPs have the potential to destabilize their host state, given the fragility of most African economies. A sample of refugee flows across the sub-region reveals the scale of the problem. Approximately 82,000 Eritrean refugees are in Sudan; Ethiopia hosts about 32,000 Somali and 92,000 Sudanese refugees; Kenya hosts more than 220,000 refugees from Somalia, Sudan, Ethiopia, and the Great Lakes region; while, Tanzania, hosts 335,000 Burundian refugees.[40] These official estimates only reflect the number of refugees that have come forward to seek help. The actual number is most likely much higher.

Refugee camps can present serious security dangers. For most states, rebels have been known to recruit as well as hide within camps set up for refugees and IDPs. Furthermore, refugee camps provide an easy corridor for the movement of SALWs. Massive inflows of refugees have also led to conflicts spilling over into neighboring states.[41] For this reason, many policy-makers view refugees as liabilities rather than opportunities for the host country.

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[38] Odera, "The Role of Civil Society in Managing Conflicts in Eastern Africa."

[39] Sadako Ogata, "The Situation of Refugees in Africa," *Migration World*, vol. 28, no. 1-2 (2002), p. 24 (Electronic Version).

[40] Figures from: Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, *UNHCR 2003 Global Appeal, 2002*, pp. 89, 94, 102, 106, (available from http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/template/+2wLFqPp1xceUh5cTPeUzknwBoqeRSww+XXveRSww+XXvBdqeIybnM February 3, 2003).

[41] Ogata, "The Situation of Refugees in Africa," p. 24.

Most states in Eastern Africa lack specific policies on refugees. Regionally, countries generally focus on controlling and containing refugee populations. International organizations such as the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) seek to repatriate refugees back to their home countries.[42] UNHCR's evolving policy of favoring repatriation as a durable settlement results from a growing reluctance by refugee-receiving countries to integrate displaced people into local communities.[43] Several participants urged policymakers to view refugees and IDPs as tools for development instead of as a security threat. This mind shift would require a more coordinated approach to dealing with refugees. Other recommendations called for adopting a regional refugee policy, since the effects of refugee flows are regional: policies should also encompass the refugee-exporting nation and not just the needs of the host country.[44] The absence of coordinated strategies for dealing with the issue of refugees is not limited to countries in Eastern Africa. At the international level, UNHCR's interactions with humanitarian organizations such as the Red Cross, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the World Food Program, and NGOs have often been poorly coordinated.[45]

Small Arms and Light Weapons

The proliferation of illicit small arms and light weapons poses a threat to human security and has intensified conflicts in Eastern Africa. Violent conflicts in major cities like Nairobi; cattle rustling by pastoral communities in the Karamoja and Somali clusters;[46] and armed rebellions in southern Sudan and northern Uganda illustrate the scope of the problem. Generally, the proliferation of SALWs emanates from the failure of governance. States that cannot control the flow of SALWs across their borders are often politically and institutionally weak. In addition to porous borders, the police and other security forces in such states lack effective enforcement capacity. An overabundance of SALWs results in communities riddled with crime and violence, as well as rogue security forces that sometimes perpetuate insecurity and human rights abuses.[47] In fact, militias and rebel movements (which can easily arm themselves as a result of the proliferation of SALWs) are often as well-armed as government forces. To resolve the insecurity caused by rebels and militias, regional governments have often acquired more weapons, but this frequently results in an arms build up and the increased proliferation of weapons.

The Nairobi Declaration of March 2000 and the Bamako Declaration of December 2000 both provide potential mechanisms to manage the trade of SALWs. Together, they recommend political, legislative, and civil society cooperation in the control of the flow of SALWs. Only Kenya and Uganda have, however, established the National Focal Points (NFPs) called for by the Nairobi Declaration to control the proliferation of illicit weapons in this region. Even so, the NFPs have largely remained inactive, not involved civil society groups, and failed to put in place mechanisms to address the underlying concerns of human security and poverty that often drive people to acquire SALWs. Participants at the Entebbe seminar emphasized the need to involve civil society more actively in NFPs. They also urged security sector reform, poverty reduction, and joint border patrols to control the illicit trade in SALWs.

[42] Michael Barnett, "Humanitarianism with a Sovereign Face: UNHCR in the Global Undertow," *International Migration Review*, vol. 35, no. 1 (Spring 2001), pp. 260-63 (Electronic Version); and Charles B. Keely, "The International Refugee Regime(s): The End of the Cold War Matters," Ibid., p. 304 (Electronic Version).

[43] Barnett, "Humanitarianism with a Sovereign Face."

[44] This view is also expressed in Ogata, "The Situation of Refugees in Africa," pp. 26-27. See also the account by Tony Waters, "Assessing the Impact of the Rwandan Refugee Crisis on Development Planning in Rural Tanzania, 1994-1996," *Human Organization*, vol. 58, no. 2 (1999) (Electronic Version).

45 Ogata, "The Situation of Refugees in Africa," p.25.

[46] The Karamoja cluster refers to the border region in Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, and Uganda. The Somali cluster refers to the border areas of Ethiopia, Kenya, and Somalia.

[47] The background on SALWs is drawn from Kiflemariam Gebre-Wold, "Curbing the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Horn of Africa," paper presented at the International Peace Academy/Makerere University/Africa Peace Forum seminar in Entebbe, Uganda, 16-18 December 2002.

5. The Role of External Actors in Eastern Africa

While the involvement of external actors in Eastern Africa has been extensive, their impact has been mixed. External actors have fuelled as well as sought to contribute to conflicts in this region. Despite the proliferation of endemic conflicts in Eastern Africa, the UN has not been significantly involved in managing these conflicts. While the UN intervened in Somalia and Ethiopia/Eritrea, it has not contributed substantially to conflict management efforts in the sub-region. Its failure in Somalia led to a reluctance by powerful members of the UN Security Council to intervene in other regional conflicts. The Horn of Africa, however, is becoming an area of major geo-strategic importance for the US in its "war on terrorism." But the outcome of such a development for Africa is ambiguous. Japan and the EU have contributed economic assistance to countries in Eastern Africa selectively, but have yet to play a substantial conflict management role in the region.

The United Nations in Eastern Africa

In the last decade, the UN has deployed two peacekeeping missions to Eastern Africa: in Somalia between 1992 and 1995 and in Ethiopia and Eritrea between 2001 and the present. Many analysts have explained the absence of the UN from Eastern Africa as resulting from its experience in Somalia. The death of eighteen American soldiers in Mogadishu and an estimated one thousand Somalis in October 1993, resulted in the withdrawal of American forces from Somalia and the eventual end of the UN mission by 1995.

The following brief review of the UN's conflict management role in Ethiopia/Eritrea, Somalia, and Sudan shows renewed engagement in Eastern Africa on the part of the UN, while also drawing attention to the difficulties of post-conflict peacebuilding in the sub-region.

The United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea

The mandate of the UN Mission in Ethiopia/Eritrea broadly includes: the maintenance of a cease-fire; the separation of forces between Ethiopia and Eritrea in the Temporary Security Zone (TSZ); and assistance with the implementation of the Boundary Commission's decision of April 2002 on the demarcation of the border between both countries.[48] Legwaila Joseph Legwaila, the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative to Ethiopia/Eritrea, noted during the Entebbe seminar, that one of UNMEE's biggest successes has been the unprecedented Quick Impact Projects (QIPs). The QIPs have provided up to $15,000 for projects such as sending water trucks to remote villages, purchasing school desks, improving sanitation facilities, and providing local communities with non-medical equipment. They have served as a productive mechanism through which to build trust between the UN and civilians. Contributions have provided UNMEE with a total of $900,000 to fund QIPs. As of March 2003, eighty-one QIPs had been completed.[49]

After the boundary commission's decision on the demarcation of the border between Ethiopia and Eritrea in April 2002, the main impediment to proceeding with the territorial transfer is an agreement by both parties on when to do it and the context in which it should occur. In particular, there is disagreement on how long UNMEE should stay in the region after it completes the planting of the boundary pillars. While the agreement between UNMEE and Ethiopia and Eritrea states that once UNMEE sets the pillars along the border, it can leave,[50] the UN Special Representative warned that such a precipitate departure would create a dangerous

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[48] UN Security Council, 4197th meeting of the Security Council, Resolution 1320 (2000) [Resolution on the situation in Ethiopia and Eritrea] (S/RES/1320) 15 September 2000; and UN Security Council, 4600th meeting of the Security Council, Resolution 1430 (2002) [Resolution on the situation in Ethiopia and Eritrea] (S/RES/1430) 14 August 2002.

[49] See also, UN Security Council, *Progress Report of the Secretary General on Ethiopia and Eritrea*, 20 December 2002, (S/2002/1393), paragraph 22; and UN Security Council, *Progress Report of the Secretary General on Ethiopia and Eritrea*, 6 March 2003, (S/2003/257), paragraph 28.

[50] UN Security Council, Resolution 1320 (2000).

security vacuum. Instead, he urged UNMEE to stay until the completion of the territorial transfer.

Although at the time of the ruling - April 2002 - Ethiopia and Eritrea accepted the border demarcation, the Ethiopian government soon began to hinder its implementation. In particular, Ethiopia voiced doubts about the neutrality of the boundary commission and refused to meet for several months with the force commander of UNMEE. The Military Coordination Commission (MCC), which was charged with implementing the peace accord, did not meet for seven months. As a result, in early 2003, Ethiopia challenged the border demarcation ruling, threatening to cease compliance if the boundary commission did not address its concerns and change particular boundaries. However, as noted in the response by the boundary commission, it could not alter the demarcation ruling unless both Ethiopia and Eritrea agreed.[51]

Ambassador Legwaila Joseph Legwaila, Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Ethiopia/Eritrea

The UN in Somalia and Sudan

The UN is currently much less involved with the conflicts in Somalia and Sudan than with Ethiopia and Eritrea. Following the withdrawal of UNOSOM II in

1995, the UN created the United Nations Political Office in Somalia (UNPOS). Although, the UN played an important role in the Arta Peace Process of August 2000 which resulted in the establishment of a Transitional Government in Somalia, civil society actors and IGAD have been the main drivers of Somalia's peace process. In 2002, the peace process shifted venue to Eldoret, Kenya (under IGAD's leadership), where several hundred representatives of Somalia's civil society and political leaders signed the *Eldoret Declaration* on 27 October 2002 in an effort to end hostilities. The peace process has been hampered by the perception among many parties that Ethiopia and Djibouti are using the process to promote their own parochial agendas.[52]

On Sudan, Legwaila reported that the UN supported the peace process through its membership in the International Partners Forum, which works closely with Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda – the mediators of the process. However, the latest peace agreement in Sudan, the *Machakos Protocol* of July 2002, in which the UN also participated, was coordinated by IGAD.

The UN can contribute significantly to conflict management efforts in Eastern Africa. Specifically, the UN can provide the financial and military resources to intervene in these conflicts both militarily and politically, thus mitigating some of the regional impediments to effective conflict management.

The United States and Eastern Africa

Recently, Eastern Africa has experienced renewed interest from the US. But if history serves as a guide, American involvement in Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia, and Sudan warns of the need for cautious engagement by African states. Ethiopia and Somalia, in particular, served as key allies for both the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. The relationship ebbed and flowed according to the needs of Washington

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[51] Adekeye Adebajo, "Ending a Brothers' War: The Ethiopia/Eritrea Conflict," in David M. Malone (ed.) *The United Nations Security Council* (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers), forthcoming 2004.

[52] International Crisis Group, *Salvaging Somalia's Chance for Peace*, Africa Briefing, 9 December 2002, pp. 4-5 (Electronic Version); and International Crisis Group, *Negotiating a Blueprint for Peace in Somalia*, Africa Report No. 59, 6 March 2003, pp. 2-4 (Electronic Version).

and Moscow.[53] The security needs of the US in the aftermath of 11 September 2001 seem to have increased the strategic significance of this sub-region. As a result of greater involvement by the US, several participants at the Entebbe seminar expressed concern that African states may feel the need to submit to pressure from the US. Participants noted that anti-terrorism legislation passed in Tanzania in November 2002, was causing tensions among the country's Muslim community.[54]

Although the US has allies in Eastern Africa, which have included Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia, and Sudan, the anchor has always remained Ethiopia. For more than three decades, Ethiopia held geo-strategic importance for the US. In the 1940s, the US used the Kagnew station in present-day Eritrea, the location of a global radio communications network overlooking the Red Sea that could be used to contain and monitor the expansion of communism in the Horn of Africa. In order to blunt the perceived Soviet threat, Washington provided significant military and financial assistance to the government of Haile Selassie. American assistance ensured that Selassie remained in power, quelled opposition, and built up the country's armed forces. While the alliance proved mutually beneficial to both governments, it abetted the autocratic rule of Ethiopia's Emperor.[55] From 1951 – when the first treaty formalizing US economic and diplomatic assistance to Ethiopia was signed – until 1975, the US provided Ethiopia with $280 million in military assistance and $350 million in economic assistance. While the US also provided military assistance to Somalia after Mengistu seized power in 1974 and formed an alliance with Moscow, the relationship between the two countries was not as strong as between the US and Ethiopia.

Sudan's relationship with the US began after 1971 following a failed communist coup. The country received American military assistance and US support for financial assistance from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).[56]

As the cold war progressed during the 1970s and the 1980s, the US and the Soviet Union competed to undermine each other's influence in the region. Reacting to the perceived Soviet threat in Somalia, the US began to provide military assistance to Somalia. To counter Ethiopia's "tilt" to the Soviets, the Carter administration (1976-1980) began its "encirclement strategy:" essentially strengthening Ethiopia's neighbors as a means of retaliation and ensuring American military security in the sub-region. The Soviets also responded by continuing to provide military assistance to Ethiopia. In the end, the policies of the US and the Soviet Union resulted in the strengthening of the sub-region's militaries and coincided with the internal conflicts beginning in the Horn of Africa.[57]

Following the end of the Cold War, the US and the Soviet Union disengaged from a region they had flooded with billions of dollars worth of arms. In Somalia, American engagement ended with the death of eighteen soldiers during the US-led *Operation Restore Hope*, a humanitarian mission aimed at securing the delivery of food to Somalis. While the US adopted a policy of "no democracy, no aid" in the 1990s, it did not interfere in the internal affairs of the sub-region, allowing the oppressive governments of Ethiopia and Eritrea to flourish.[58] The administration of Bill Clinton (1992-2000) even described the leaders of

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[53] Peter J. Schraeder, "Removing the Shackles? US Foreign Policy Toward Africa After the End of the Cold War," in Edmond J. Keller and Donald Rothchild (eds.), *Africa in the New International Order: Rethinking State Sovereignty and Regional Security* (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996), pp. 187-205.

[54] Stephen Mbogo, "East African Muslims Protest New Anti-Terror Law," *World Wide Religious News*, 28 November 2002 (available from http://www.wwrn.org/parse.php?idd=6866 7 April 2003); and Daniel Msangya, "Tanzania Leads Region in Anti-Terrorism Efforts," *African Church Information Service*, 24 March 2003 (available from http://allafrica.com/stories/printable/200303250381. html 7 April 2003).

[55] Ruth Iyob and Edmond J. Keller, "US Policy in the Horn of Africa: Continuity and Change," paper presented at the International Peace Academy/Makerere University/Africa Forum seminar in Entebbe, Uganda, 16 - 18 December 2002.

[56] Ibid.

[57] Ibid.

[58] Ibid.

both countries as belonging to a new breed of African leaders. American military support to the governments of Eritrea, Ethiopia, Uganda, and Rwanda was also part of its efforts to isolate Sudan, a state Washington accused of sponsoring terrorism.

The United States and the "war on terrorism"

Eastern Africa is of strategic importance to the American "war on terrorism." The sub-region has directly suffered the effects of terrorism against the United States and Israel: In 1998, terrorists bombed the American embassies in Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya, killing more Tanzanians and Kenyans than Americans. In November 2002, a holiday resort frequented by Israelis in Mombassa, Kenya, was the target of a terrorist bomb. An Israeli airliner was also targeted by a missile.

Since the events of 11 September 2001, the US government has looked to Eastern Africa for assistance in locating and stopping terrorists. In the recently declared "war on terrorism," Washington has focused not just on Tanzania and Kenya, but also on other countries in the sub-region, concentrating on Somalia in particular. American fears that Somalia's anarchic state could provide a safe haven for would-be terrorists have driven this policy. Washington has actively supported the re-constitution of Somalia as a unified state with a strong central government. Re-engagement in the Horn of Africa has also meant providing funds for Kenya and Ethiopia to shore up law enforcement, border control, and airport security systems.[59] Furthermore, the US army trained in Djibouti in preparation for the war on Iraq and has since established an anti-terror task force and military base in the country to monitor potential terrorist activity in the sub-region.

As many participants noted, Africa *does* have an interest in ridding itself of terrorism because it has directly suffered from its effects. However, Eastern Africa must carefully manage the increased interfer-ence of the US in some of its countries in order to avoid sacrificing their sovereignty and to protect civil liberties. African states must articulate their own security interests, just as Washington pursues its own interests in the region. In other words, African states should strategically engage the new *Pax Americana* and build coalitions with other regional states. While African states need to adopt a security policy in reaction to the increased US role in the region, they should not adopt a policy that solely benefits the US.

A few participants feared that Washington's renewed involvement in Eastern Africa might negatively affect democratization efforts in the region, as the US might begin to prioritize the political *status quo* regardless of the human rights and democratization record of regimes. In this respect, the US may justify support for autocratic regimes by their support for America's "war on terrorism." In fact, such fears are not baseless, as the US policy in the Horn of Africa during the Cold War demonstrated. Recent events point to similar patterns. For example, evidence suggests that the US has recently collaborated with Somali warlords to capture terrorists inside Somalia. Logistical concerns also favor the *status quo*: for example, the US has discussed the construction of a military base in Eritrea, a country facing widespread criticisms for its human rights record. Regional governments may take advantage of the increased American need for security to suppress political opponents. Such an allegation was leveled at Tanzania's anti-terrorism legislation which caused consternation within the Muslim community.

The European Union and Japan in Eastern Africa

The European Union has focused principally on Sudan and Somalia in supporting conflict management efforts in Eastern Africa. In both Somalia and Sudan, the EU has directed its focus on humanitarian assistance, while peace processes have only been indirectly supported and left largely to IGAD to manage. A constant criticism of the EU's approach to conflict management is that it has been too short-sighted and uncoordinated.[60] But, the EU's relative weakness in crafting a pro-active policy on Africa may be due to

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[59] J. Stephen Morrison, "Somalia's and Sudan's Race to the Fore in Africa," *The Washington Quarterly*, Spring 2002, p. 197 (Electronic Version).

[60] Halima Noor, "The Role of the European Union in Eastern Africa," paper presented at the International Peace Academy/Makerere University/Africa Peace Forum seminar in Entebbe, Uganda, 16 – 18 December 2002. For EU documents, see *Annual Reports of the European Union* (available from http://ue.eu.int/pesc/default.asp?lang=en 11 February, 2003).

the structure of its institutions. The main mechanism for conducting foreign policy in the EU is the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), adopted in 1992. However, although the CFSP talks of the adoption of common policy statements in the international arena, each country is permitted to pursue its own defense policy.[61] Also, as highlighted by a participant, because the adoption of a common foreign policy requires consensus, common positions are usually the result of political compromises.

Japan intensified its involvement with Africa after the 1990 Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD-1). But like the EU, Japan has intervened only selectively in Eastern Africa. Kenya, seen as the key country in the region, received the largest Japanese economic assistance between 1990 and 1998, obtaining $831 million in Japanese development assistance. Tanzania received the second highest amount of development assistance in the same period, obtaining $106 million.[62] Japan supported the peace process in Ethiopia/Eritrea through the sponsorship of a symposium on conflict resolution in February 2000,

and Tokyo contributed humanitarian assistance to both countries. While some of this new attention toward Africa forms part of Japan's efforts to diversify its sources of raw materials and oil, another factor is Tokyo's goal of obtaining a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. Through its growing relationship with Africa, Japan hopes to benefit from Africa's influence in efforts to expand the UN Security Council.[63]

The EU, Japan, and the US, for different reasons, have shown an interest in increased involvement in Eastern Africa. Not unexpectedly, these interventions advance their own interests. To maximize the benefits of this renewed involvement, Eastern African states must clearly articulate their own priorities and carefully leverage such engagements. In particular, Africa's renewed commitment to collective security, as seen in the reformed AU and the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) as well as the establishment of sub-regional security mechanisms, would seem to suggest that the country-by-country approach pursued by many external actors is inadequate.

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[61] A general overview of EU/Africa policy may be found in Talitha Bertelsmann-Scott, "The European Union," in Baregu and Landsberg (eds.), *From Cape to Congo*, pp. 301-316.

[62] Kweku Ampiah, "Japan's New Initiatives Toward Africa," paper presented at the International Peace Academy/Makerere University/Africa Peace Forum seminar in Entebbe, Uganda, 16 – 18 December 2002.

[63] Ibid.

6. Policy Recommendations and the Way Forward

Participants at the Entebbe seminar provided recommendations that addressed Eastern Africa's inadequate response to regional conflicts, the region's mixed record of democratization, and the renewed interest of the US and other external actors in the region. Specifically, participants urged the strengthening of Eastern Africa's organizations to manage conflict; advocated for improved governance in the sub-region; strongly supported efforts to reform security sectors and manage problems related to nationalities, ethnic identity, and refugees; called for civil society actors to be included in conflict management efforts; and emphasized improving relationships with external actors.

• The Intergovernmental Authority on Development and the East African Community should develop greater institutional and operational capabilities for conflict management. Presently, IGAD and the EAC play relatively minor roles in managing Eastern Africa's conflicts, in contrast to the more active roles played by ECOWAS and SADC. In more concrete terms, all IGAD members were asked to support and participate more actively in its Conflict Early Warning System. Currently, only two members – out of the required four needed to bring it into force – have ratified IGAD's early warning protocol. Moreover, conflict resolution is not an explicit part of the EAC mandate, though its *raison d'être* of regional integration requires a secure sub-region.

IGAD and the EAC are poorly staffed, lack peacekeeping experience, and do not have permanent mediation bodies, rendering any interventions *ad hoc.* However, even as some participants called for IGAD to establish its capacity for peacekeeping, as ECOMOG has done in West Africa, others cautioned against the establishment of such a force. They voiced concerns about the lack of a potential regional hegemon comparable to Nigeria in West Africa and South Africa in Southern Africa, to lead such an

intervention force. Eastern Africa was also seen as too divided for such a force to be created by regional leaders. Several participants, however, noted that ECOWAS and SADC, like IGAD, continue to suffer from financial, logistical, and capacity constraints.

• IGAD and the EAC cannot work in isolation, but need to forge partnerships with civil society actors in Eastern Africa, other sub-regional and regional organizations, and external actors. Indeed, it was noted that state actors in Eastern Africa – in their roles as agents of both war and peace – have compromised their ability to intervene effectively in conflicts within the sub-region. Some participants advocated the organization of regular meetings between Africa's sub-regional and regional organizations in order to learn from each other's experiences. One recommendation called for the designing of a training program for IGAD and the EAC in cooperation with the African Union, ECOWAS, SADC, the Economic Community of Central African States, and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa. Several participants also called for a stronger relationship with the United Nations. Such a partnership would allow the UN to obtain accurate and timely data on the security situation in Eastern Africa.

• Managing and resolving conflicts requires an understanding of their root causes. Several participants therefore urged policymakers to produce summaries of lessons learned from current peace processes in Eastern Africa and to undertake a "conflict audit" to document the primary and secondary factors that impede the resolution of conflicts. From this information, data could be shared with sub-regional organizations, the AU, the UN, and policy institutes, with a view to developing a peace studies curriculum. Training programs can be conducted to hone the skills of policymakers and field practitioners to improve the methods through which Eastern Africa addresses conflicts. This would help develop an understanding of the detrimental effects of governance, crime, injustice, and policing policies on the stability of states in this region.

- Improved governance could promote the management of civil conflicts and instability in Eastern Africa. In particular, better governance will help to increase the legitimacy of regional states in undertaking neighborhood interventions. To this end, participants called for the adoption of common regional principles on the rule of law, human rights, strong democratic and oversight institutions, free and fair elections, and the creation of programs that aim to eliminate economic disparities between ethnic (or identity) groups. Improved governance must also involve control of the small arms and light weapons trade and better management of refugee flows and refugee camps.

- Poor governance, weak institutions, inadequately trained security forces, and porous borders, all facilitate the illicit trade of small arms and light weapons. While the Nairobi Declaration of March 2000 and the Bamako Declaration of December 2000 provide potential mechanisms to curb the illicit trade of small arms and light weapons, many of their legislative and operational components have not been implemented. In addition, civil society groups have been largely left out of the process. Participants urged that regional states address the illicit trade of small arms and light weapons by involving civil society organizations more significantly in these efforts; by seriously undertaking security sector reform; by coordinating joint-border patrols; and by implementing poverty reduction programs.

- In part, small arms and light weapons proliferate because several governments in Eastern Africa have politicized their security forces. Frequently, security forces have been used by autocratic regimes to retain political power, protect particular ethnic groups, or quell opposition. Even in supposedly democratizing states, security forces have been used to monitor the actions of opposition groups. As a result, human rights are often abused and some groups remain marginalized and unprotected. Moreover, as police forces have become weak, many states in the region have seen a rise in mob justice and vigilantism. Participants

urged the reform of the security sector as a critical component in reducing conflict. Reforming the security sector entails deep political restructuring, including democratization; adopting principles of good governance; training police and armed forces in human rights; and ensuring proportional representation of all ethnic groups in security forces.

- The conflicts in Eastern Africa have generated more than 750,000 refugees. Besides the heavy costs on the host countries, large numbers of refugees can pose security threats, as refugee camps serve as recruiting grounds for insurgencies and also provide a conduit for the flow of illicit small arms and light weapons. As a result, refugee camps contribute to the spreading of civil wars across borders. Presently, no coordinated regional policy on refugees and internally displaced persons exists to counter these effects. Participants urged Eastern African states to work more closely with each other to address not only the management of refugee camps in the host nation, but also the needs of the refugee-exporting country to stem the flow of refugees. Equally important, states must begin to develop programs that provide economic opportunities for refugees in order to remove the incentives to join insurgencies.

- Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan, and Somalia all struggle with demands from ethnic and regional groups to achieve greater autonomy, and even secession. According to one participant, Ethiopia's early experiment with fostering strong nationalism and building a strong central government resulted in the repression and marginalization of certain ethnic groups and formed the basis for the eventual secession of Eritrea. The governments of both Ethiopia and Eritrea have been accused of human rights abuses, as they have suppressed dissent to state policies. Participants urged governments to find a balance between allowing the political accommodation of different groups and strengthening central governments to deliver social services and provide security to their citizens.

• Historically, civil society organizations have not played significant roles in conflict management in Eastern Africa. In part, this has been due to the distrust with which governments viewed civil society organizations – considering them anti-government actors beholden to the agendas of external funders. While the relationship between government and civil society is changing, as evidenced by the prominent roles played by civil society organizations in the Somali and Sudanese peace processes, participants urged greater inclusion of civil society organizations, and women in particular, in efforts by sub-regional organizations, governments, and the AU to manage and resolve conflicts. To this end, civil society organizations must coordinate their activities internally and also with sub-regional organizations. Moreover, governments must reduce their control over the actions of civil society organizations. Still, participants cautioned against the indiscriminate involvement of civil society organizations in peacemaking efforts without understanding how they might most effectively participate in conflict resolution.

• Through the provision of financial and military resources, the UN can mitigate some of the regional impediments – such as inadequate resources for mediation and intervention – to effective conflict management. Presently, the UN's main involvement in Eastern Africa, the UN Mission in Ethiopia/Eritrea, is charged with maintaining a cease-fire, keeping Ethiopian and Eritrean forces separated in the Temporary Security Zone, and implementing the Boundary Commission's April 2002 decision on the demarcation of the common border between both countries. While the mandate of UNMEE requires that its mission ends following the demarcation of the border, Legwaila Joseph Legwaila, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General, recommended that UNMEE remain until the completion of the territorial transfer.

• The US "war on terrorism" has brought renewed external attention to the Horn of Africa. Washington has established a military base in Djibouti, it is negotiating with Eritrea to establish another base, and has provided Kenya with additional funds to improve security. Tanzania has adopted anti-terrorism legislation that some local civil society actors fear could be used to erode civil liberties and to clamp down on domestic dissent. Many participants voiced concerns that, as a result of the US

Participants at the seminar, Entebbe, Uganda, December 2002

"war on terrorism," anti-terrorism legislation may fan the flames of ethnic and religious animosity in Eastern Africa and impinge on the sovereignty of states, as governments respond to American demands for greater security measures. Eastern African governments must establish a balance between preventing the erosion of their sovereignty and protecting the interests of their citizens, while cooperating with the US to eliminate terrorism.

- In addition to the US, the European Union and Japan need to play a stronger role in Eastern Africa. The EU has supported conflict management efforts in Ethiopia/Eritrea and Sudan, but overall, its policies were criticized as short-term, ineffective, and uncoordinated. Japan has directed most of its economic assistance to Kenya, but has not played a high-profile role in conflict management efforts in Eastern Africa.

ANNEX I: Keynote Address

The Role of the United Nations in the Horn of Africa

Ambassador Legwaila Joseph Legwaila

Mr. Chairman
Distinguished Participants

Let me first of all thank the International Peace Academy (IPA) for the invitation extended to me to participate in this important seminar on "Building Peace in Eastern Africa."

"Building Peace" or "Peace Building" is a major preoccupation of the United Nations (UN) in this part of Africa. It is the culmination of steps in a continuum of peace-oriented activities. It is, in point of fact, a "work in progress." In the United Nations' *Agenda for Peace (1992)*, the UN Secretary-General at the time, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, appealed to the international community to ensure that conflicts are prevented before they happen, and when they happen, to assist with resolving them. The Secretary-General was talking about the "preservation of peace."

Our aims must be:

> To seek to identify, at the earliest possible stage, situations that could produce conflict, and try through diplomacy to remove the sources of danger before violence results.

> Where conflict erupts, to engage in peacemaking aimed at resolving the issues that have led to conflict.

> Through peacekeeping, to work to preserve peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted, and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers.

> To stand ready to assist in peacebuilding in its differing contexts: rebuilding the institutions and infrastructure of nations torn by civil war and strife; and building bonds of peaceful mutual benefit among nations formerly at war.

Role of the United Nations in the Horn of Africa

The Horn of Africa has been the most conflict-ridden part of the African continent. Some of the bloodiest intermittent wars in post-colonial Africa have been fought in this region over a period of forty years. In March 2000, Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary-General, made a profound statement before the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, when he said: "Preventing conflict is much less costlier than its aftermath." This is an incontestable fact, for all situations in which war has erupted. This statement is of particular relevance to the topic I shall address, namely, "The Role of the United Nations in the Horn of Africa." The countries in the Horn of Africa are Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia and the Sudan. With the exception of the Ethiopia/Eritrea situation, there are currently two situations of internal conflict: the Sudan and Somalia.

As far as the Sudan is concerned, the United Nations is actively following developments in this country. Mohammed Sahnoun, the UN Secretary-General's Special Advisor on Africa, has attended the talks at Machakos between the Government and the SPLA/SPLM. The United Nations and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) are in the International Partners Forum (IPF), that is working closely with the mediators: Kenya, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Uganda – members of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) – to help resolve the conflict. The UN Secretary-General remains supportive of the IGAD peace process and is continuously in touch with the leaders of the sub-region. A more recent and worrying development is the strained relations between Eritrea and Sudan, and the tense military situation along their common border.

Somalia is still in the throes of sporadic inter-clan conflict. When UNOSOM II was withdrawn in April 1995, the Secretary-General pledged that the UN would

not abandon Somalia, and would continue to engage the Somali parties, as well as regional and other external actors to facilitate the process of national reconciliation. The UN also affirmed that it would seek international support for humanitarian assistance. The United Nations Political Office in Somalia (UNPOS), based in Nairobi, is a tangible manifestation of the commitment the Secretary-General made. UNPOS played a crucial role in support of the Arta Peace Conference in Djibouti in 2000 that resulted in the establishment of the Transitional National Government (TNG).

The latest talks in Eldoret (Kenya) may yield fruit at last, now that twenty-one rival groups and the Transitional National Government have met, and will hopefully continue to meet with the aim of bringing to an end more than a decade of conflict and anarchy. The UN Secretary-General has encouraged the participants to rise to the challenge of re-establishing the nation of Somalia, seize the opportunity provided by the regional mediators, and find a political solution to the conflict. If the ceasefire holds and is subsequently extended, that would signal seriousness of purpose on both sides in pursuit of a framework agreement on the political settlement of that decade-old conflict.

The Horn of Africa is also the home of the African Union (AU) – the successor organization to the Organization of African Unity (OAU). In assessing the role of the United Nations in the Horn of Africa, one cannot fail to recognize that the UN has had a long-standing relationship with the erstwhile OAU (1963 –2001), and now, with the nascent African Union. A OAU-UN Cooperation Agreement was signed in June 1963 and updated in April 1990. The OAU-UN Cooperation Agreement provides a framework for political and diplomatic cooperation between both organizations on issues of peace and security on the African continent. Nothing highlighted that relation-ship more than the 1992 UN *Agenda for Peace* which gave momentum to the idea that regional organiza-tions have a role to play in the maintenance of interna-tional peace and security. Addressing members of the United States Senate and House of Representatives on 13 May 1992, the UN Secretary-General at the time, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, noted:

… A multipolar world should be led by a multiplicity of institutions. It is therefore logical that an effort should be made to decentralize the responsibilities for peacekeeping and peacemaking that today are continuously being entrusted to the United Nations. The regional organizations are the obvious candidates for larger roles…. I am however, convinced that regional organizations must be helped to carry a larger share of the burden in peacemaking as well as peacekeeping.

The efforts of the OAU to resolve the Ethiopia/Eritrea conflict are a vindication of the vision the UN Secretary-General set out about the role that regional organizations can play in peacekeeping in a multipolar world. This seminar is taking place against the backdrop of a conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea that is in the process of resolution, and thanks in no small measure, to the efforts of the OAU.

The Peace Process

When the conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia erupted in May 1998, the chairman of the OAU, president Abdelaziz Bouteflika of Algeria, took the initiative to resolve the conflict, with a visit to both countries. This was followed by intensive diplomatic and political negotiations and talks with the support of the European Union (EU), Algeria and the United States.

Over a two-year period (1998-2000), president Bouteflika continued, in spite of handing over the chairmanship of the OAU, with the efforts to launch a peace process between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Through active contacts with the parties in conflict and after endless meetings at various venues, the OAU assumed the principle role in the resolution of this conflict. The various chairmen of the OAU expended time and effort that resulted in the celebrated "OAU Framework on The Settlement of the Dispute Between Ethiopia and Eritrea and Modalities for its implementation."

- On 18 June 2000 Ethiopia and Eritrea signed The Algiers Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities.

- On 12 December 2000 Ethiopia and Eritrea reaffirmed their commitment to a peaceful resolu-

tion of their conflict, by signing the Algiers peace agreement.

• Article 1 of the Algiers peace agreement states that:

The parties shall permanently terminate military hostilities between themselves. Each Party shall refrain from the threat or use of force against the other.

The Parties shall respect and fully implement the provisions of the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities.

Today, Ethiopia and Eritrea are nurturing a relatively peaceful process, assisted in part, by a UN peacekeeping mission (UNMEE) and a Boundary Commission whose members were appointed by both sides. Ethiopia and Eritrea have made significant progress in the pursuit of a settlement of their border problem and of lasting peace. The hallmark of the peace process is the demarcation of their common border. It was largely the success of the efforts exerted by the OAU, the EU, Algeria and the US that consequently led to the authorization by the Security Council of a peacekeeping mission, and my appointment by the Secretary-General, as his Special Representative.

Mandate of UNMEE

The United Nations Mission in Ethiopia/Eritrea is a traditional United Nations peacekeeping mission that was mandated to:

• Monitor the Cessation of Hostilities.

• Assist in ensuring the observance of the security commitments agreed to by the parties.

• Monitor and verify the redeployment of Ethiopian forces from positions taken after 6 February 1999, which were not under Ethiopian administration before 6 May 1998.

• Monitor the positions of Ethiopian forces once redeployed.

• Simultaneously monitor the positions of Eritrean forces that are to redeploy in order to remain at a distance of 25 kilometers from positions to which Ethiopian forces shall redeploy.

• Monitor the Temporary Security Zone (TSZ) to assist in ensuring compliance with the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities.

• Chair the Military Coordination Commission (MCC) to be established by the UN and OAU in accordance with the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities.

• Coordinate and provide technical assistance for humanitarian mine-action activities in the TSZ and areas adjacent to it.

• Coordinate UNMEE's activities in the TSZ and areas adjacent to it with humanitarian and human rights activities of the UN and other organizations in those areas.

The establishment of the Temporary Security Zone – a de-militarized zone 25 kilometers wide and 1,000 km long – in April 2001, formally separated the armies of both countries, and made it possible for the "cessation of hostilities" to become a reality. Both parties have recognized the existence of the Zone even though they have not formally accepted it. The establishment of the Zone has made it possible for the overwhelming majority of Internally Displaced Populations (IDPs) to return to their homes and villages.

The governments of Ethiopia and Eritrea have been steadfast in their commitment to the peace process in spite of lingering bitterness at the level of the political leadership, the occasional targeting of UNMEE for criticism, and the mutual suspicions of each other's motives.

Delimitation/Demarcation of the Boundary

On 13 April 2002, the Ethiopia/Eritrea Boundary Commission (EEBC) handed down its decision on the delimitation of the border. The parties in fulfillment of their commitment under Article 15 of the Peace Agreement of 12 December 2000 accepted the decision

with jubilation. The Algiers peace agreement of 12 December 2000 states under Article 15:

> The parties agree that the delimitation and demarcation determination of the Commission shall be final and binding. Each party shall respect the border so determined, as well as the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the other party.

The parties have lived up to their commitments to date by repeatedly reaffirming their acceptance of the 13 April decision as "final and binding." The demarcation of the border is the sole responsibility of the Ethiopia/Eritrea Boundary Commission (EEBC).

UNMEE is currently assisting the process of demarcating the border by de-mining for demarcation. What this means is that, UNMEE de-miners would engage in mine clearance of 50 x 50 meter areas for the emplacement of the boundary pillars. UN Security Council resolution 1420 of 14 August 2002 authorized UNMEE to carry out de-mining and also to provide administrative and logistical support for the field agents of the Boundary Commission.

UNMEE has achieved its benchmarks as outlined in its mandate. The integrity of the Temporary Security Zone is intact, and the areas adjacent to it are calm and have remained so for quite a long time.

The recent incidents that have occupied UNMEE peacekeepers in the central sector of the TSZ include the abduction of individuals and the rustling of cattle, goats and sheep by people from both sides of the border. These incidents of animal rustling may not have anything to do with the core mandate of UNMEE, but have the potential to instigate violence. This therefore makes it imperative for UNMEE to be pro-active in assisting local authorities to resolve these problems. Since 9 October 2002, the incidents have died down, but UNMEE maintains intensive patrols in the most sensitive areas, to pre-empt possible confrontation between villagers living so close to each other along the southern boundary line of the TSZ.

Transfer of Territorial Control

The transfer of territorial control is an emotive and sensitive issue. The parties in their wisdom and with foresight, accepted Article 4 (16), of the Algiers peace agreement of 12 December 2000, which reads:

> Recognizing that the results of the delimitation and demarcation process are not yet known, the parties request the United Nations to facilitate resolution of problems which may arise due to the transfer of territorial control, including the consequences for individuals residing in previously disputed territory.

UNMEE has been mindful of this article, and has as a result made it a central issue in its discussions with officials of both governments in anticipation of the demarcation of the border and the consequences thereof. Its central focus has been to remind the parties that they have agreed to request the UN to help them deal with problems foreseen by Article 4 (16) cited above. We are not aware that the two governments have as yet informed their populations, especially the villagers living in those areas that would be affected, about the consequences of demarcation. The most encouraging statements I have heard so far, in both capitals, subscribe to the position of UNMEE: that the human rights of the populations that would be affected, their property rights, and the right to choose where they wish to live, would be respected. It remains to be seen whether this will become policy in both countries.

Humanitarian Assistance

I would like to point out that UNMEE is the first UN mission, to fund humanitarian Quick-Impact projects (QIPs). Each Quick-Impact project is funded up to a ceiling of $15,000. The projects that have been funded on both sides of the border have basically been the following:

- Provision of water to remote villages by trucks.
- Emergency water supply development.

- Purchasing school desks.
- Provision of non-medical equipment.
- Replacement of educational and sports equipment.
- Improvement of sanitation facilities.
- Rehabilitation of power supply at a hospital.
- Provision of energy-saving stoves for communities.
- Replacement of water pumps.
- Construction of school water reservoirs.
- Building maintenance and provision of furniture, and so on.

These projects are replicated many times and in many villages from Humera on the west near the border with Sudan, to Debaysima in the East. These projects have improved the lives of people in the Temporary Security Zone and the areas adjacent to it. They have made re-settlement of the Internally Displaced Populations a more bearable experience. The rewarding factor in all of this is that the people affected by the war have come to know and appreciate what the United Nations has done and is doing for them.

Today, UNMEE has the most prominent presence in the Horn of Africa. It has made impressive progress in shepherding the peace process. It has done so in spite of the occasional problems. Access to the political leadership and other military and civilian officials of the governments of the two countries are very good.

ANNEX II: Agenda

Monday 16 December 2002

9:15 am – 9:30 am   **Welcome**

Ambassador David M. Malone, President, International Peace Academy

Dr. Edward Kirumira, Dean, Faculty of Social Sciences, Makerere University, Uganda

Ambassador Bethuel Kiplagat, Director, Africa Peace Forum, Kenya

9:30 am – 11:30 am   **Session I: The Role of Sub-regional Organizations in Conflict Management**

Opening Addresses

Chair: H.E. Mr. Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, President of the Republic of Uganda, "Conflict Resolution in Eastern Africa," *represented by Honorable Eriya Kategaya, First Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Internal Affairs*

H.E. Mr. Nuwe Amanya-Mushega, Secretary-General, East African Community (EAC), "The EAC's Evolving Role in Conflict Management in East Africa"

Mr. Charles Mwaura, Co-ordinator, CEWARN Unit, Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), "IGAD's Role in Conflict Management in the Horn of Africa"

11:45 am – 1:30 pm   **Session II: Conflict Inter-linkages and the Security Architecture in Eastern Africa**

Chair: Dr. Edward Kirumira, Dean, Faculty of Social Sciences, Makerere University, Uganda

Ambassador Bethuel Kiplagat, Director, Africa Peace Forum, Kenya, "Conflict Inter-linkages in Eastern Africa"

Professor Ali A. Mazrui, Binghamton University, New York, and Professor Alamin M. Mazrui, Ohio State University, Ohio, "The Tensions of East African Integration: Failed Pan Africanism, Emerging Pax Africana?" *paper presented by Professor Ali Mazrui*

2:45 pm – 4:45 pm	**Session III: Governance, Civil Society, and Security Sector Reform**

Chair: Dr. Kinfe Abraham, President, Ethiopian International Institute for Peace and Development, Ethiopia

Professor Peter Anyang' Nyong'o, Member of Parliament, Kenya, "Governance and Democratization in Eastern Africa"

Dr. Josephine Odera, Africa Peace Forum, Kenya, "The Role of Civil Society in Managing Conflicts in Eastern Africa"

Dr. Paul Omach, Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Makerere University, Uganda, "Security Sector Reform in Eastern Africa"

Discussant: Professor Ali A. Mazrui, Binghamton University, New York

5:00 pm – 6:00 pm	**Book Launch:** *From Cape to Congo: Southern Africa's Evolving Security Challenges* **Comparative Lessons from Southern Africa for Eastern Africa**

Chair: Dr. Adekeye Adebajo, Director of the Africa Program, International Peace Academy

Dr. Mwesiga Baregu, University of Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania, and Dr. Christopher Landsberg, Director, Centre for Policy Studies, South Africa

8:00 pm – 10:00 pm	**Keynote Address**

Chair: Ambassador Matia Semakula Kiwanuka, Permanent Representative of Uganda to the United Nations, New York

Ambassador Legwaila Joseph Legwaila, Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Ethiopia/Eritrea, United Nations Mission in Ethiopia/Eritrea, "The Role of the United Nations in the Horn of Africa"

Tuesday 17 December 2002

9:30 am – 11:30 am	**Session III: Nationalism, Refugees, and the Proliferation of Small Arms**

Chair: Ambassador Bethuel Kiplagat, Director, Africa Peace Forum, Kenya

Dr. Dominique Jacquin-Berdal, London School of Economics, United Kingdom, and Ms. Aida Mengistu, International Peace Academy, "Nationalism and Identity in the Horn of Africa," *paper presented by Ms. Aida Mengistu*

Mr. Zachary Lomo, Director, Refugee Law Project, Uganda, "Refugees in Eastern Africa: Agents of Insecurity or Agents of Development?"

Mr. Kiflemariam Gebre-Wold, Project Director, SALIGAD, Bonn International Center for Conversion, Germany, "Curbing the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Horn of Africa"

11:45 am – 1:30 pm	**Session IV: The Role of External Actors in Eastern Africa**
	Chair: Ambassador John Hirsch, International Peace Academy

Professor Ruth Iyob, University of Missouri, and Professor Edmond Keller, University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA), "The US Role in the Horn of Africa"

Professor Kweku Ampiah, University of Stirling, United Kingdom, "Japan's New Initiatives Toward Africa," *paper summarized by Dr. Christopher Landsberg, Centre for Policy Studies, South Africa*

Dr. Halima Noor, Former Executive Director, EcoNews Africa, Kenya, "The Role of the European Union in Eastern Africa," *paper summarized by Dr. Josephine Odera, Africa Peace Forum, Kenya*

Professor Mwesiga Baregu, University of Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania, "The Impact of the war on terrorism on Eastern Africa"

2:45 pm – 4:15 pm	**Session V: Producing a Policy-Relevant Edited Book on the Seminar**

Chair: Ms. Lynne Rienner, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Colorado

Dr. Josephine Odera, Africa Peace Forum, Kenya

Dr. Paul Omach, Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Makerere University, Uganda

6:00 pm – 8:00 pm	**Dinner Address**

Professor Mondo Kagonyera, Minister of General Duties, Office of the Prime Minister of Uganda, "Civil Society and the State in Eastern Africa"

Wednesday 18 December 2002

9:30 am – 10:45 am	**Rapporteur's Report and Discussion**

Chair: Dr. Musifiky Mwanasali, United Nations Sub-Regional Centre for Human Rights and Democracy in Central Africa, Cameroon

Dr. Paul Omach, Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Makerere University, Uganda, and Dr. Dorina Bekoe, International Peace Academy

11:00 am – 1:00 pm	**The Way Forward**

Ambassador Bethuel Kiplagat, Director, Africa Peace Forum, Kenya

Professor Dent Ocaya-Lakidi, Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Makerere University, Uganda

Dr. Adekeye Adebajo, Director of the Africa Program, International Peace Academy

ANNEX III: Seminar Participants

1. **Dr. Kinfe Abraham**
    President
    Ethiopian International Institute for Peace and
    Development
    Ambassador at-large and Chief Political Advisor
    to the Foreign Minister
    Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

2. **Ms. Lydia Abura**
    Former Rapporteur on Political Affairs
    Intergovernmental Authority on Development
    Sudan Peace Process
    Nairobi, Kenya

3. **Ms. Anisia K. Achieng**
    Director
    The Sudanese Women's Voice For Peace
    Nairobi, Kenya

4. **Ambassador Ochieng Adala**
    Africa Peace Forum
    Nairobi, Kenya

5. **Ms. Zakia Abdissalam Alim**
    Save Somali Women and Children
    Nairobi, Kenya

6. **H.E. Nuwe Amanya-Mushega**
    Secretary-General
    East African Community
    Arusha, Tanzania

7. **Professor Peter Anyang' Nyong'o**
    Member of Parliament
    Nairobi, Kenya

8. **Ms. Andrea Armstrong**
    Research Associate
    Center on International Cooperation
    New York University
    New York, New York

9. **Brigadier Dick Baly**
    Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Department
    Department for International Development
    London, United Kingdom

10. **Professor Mwesiga Baregu**
    Univeristy of Dar-es-Salaam
    Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania

11. **Mr. Tom Forrest**
    Research Associate
    Kampala, Uganda

12. **Mr. Kiflemariam Gebre-Wold**
    Project Director, SALIGAD
    Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC)
    Bonn, Germany

13. **Dr. Solomon Gomes**
    Special Assistant to the Special Representative
    of the Secretary-General
    UN Mission in Ethiopia/Eritrea
    Addis Ababa, Ethiopia/Asmara, Eritrea

14. **Professor Ruth Iyob**
    Department of Political Science
    University of Missouri
    St. Louis, Missouri

15. **Professor Mondo Kagonyera**
    Minister of General Duties
    Office of the Prime Minister
    Kampala, Uganda

16. **Dr. Khoti Kamanga**
    Co-ordinator
    Centre for the Study of Forced Migration
    Faculty of Law, University of Dar-es-Salaam
    Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania

17. **Professor Edmond J. Keller**
    Department of Political Science
    University of California, Los Angeles
    Los Angeles, California

18. **Ambassador Bethuel Kiplagat**
    Director
    Africa Peace Forum
    Nairobi, Kenya

19. **Dr. Edward Kirumira**
Dean
Faculty of Social Sciences
Makerere University
Kampala, Uganda

20. **Ambassador Matia Semakula Kiwanuka**
Permanent Representative
Permanent Mission of the Republic of Uganda
to the United Nations
New York, New York

21. **Dr. Chris Landsberg**
Director
Centre for Policy Studies
Parktown, South Africa

22. **Ambassador Legwaila Joseph Legwaila**
Special Representative of the UN Secretary-
General
UN Mission in Ethiopia/Eritrea
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia/Asmara, Eritrea

23. **Mr. Zachary Lomo**
Director
Refugee Law Project
Makerere University
Kampala, Uganda

24. **Professor Lwanga Lunyiigo**
Special Assistant to the President of the Republic
of Uganda
Kampala, Uganda

25. **Mr. David Mafabi**
Director
Political Affairs
Pan-African Movement
Kampala, Uganda

26. **Professor Ali A. Mazrui**
Director
Institute of Global Cultural Studies
Binghamton University
Binghamton, New York

27. **Ms. Pamela Mbabazi**
Dean
Faculty of Development Studies
Mbarara University
Mbarara, Uganda

28. **Professor Joseph Mbwiliza**
Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation
Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania

29. **Colonel Kurt Mosgaard**
Counselor to the Minister
Military Adviser on Conflict Prevention and
Peacekeeping
Permanent Mission of Denmark to the
United Nations
New York, New York

30. **Dr. Felix E.N. Mosha**
Executive Director
African Dialogue Centre
Arusha, Tanzania

31. **Ambassador James Mugume**
Director
International Cooperation
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Kampala, Uganda

32. **Dr. Raufu Mustapha**
Queen Elizabeth House
Oxford University
Oxford, United Kingdom

33. **Dr. Joshua Muvumba**
Consultant
Uganda Defence Reform Program
Ministry of Defence
Kampala, Uganda

34. **Dr. Musifiky Mwanasali**
UN Sub-Regional Centre for Human Rights and
Democracy in Central Africa
Yaoundé, Cameroon

35. **Mr. Charles N. Mwaura**
Co-ordinator
CEWARN Unit
Intergovernmental Authority on Development
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

36. **Ms. Angela Naggaga**
Refugee Law Project
Makerere University
Kampala, Uganda

37. **Lt-General Humphrey Njoroge**
    Commandant
    National Defence College
    Karen, Kenya

38. **Dr. Josephine Odera**
    Africa Peace Forum
    Nairobi, Kenya

39. **Professor Dent Ocaya-Lakidi**
    Department of Political Science and Public
    Administration
    Makerere University
    Kampala, Uganda

40. **Dr. Paul Omach**
    Department of Political Science and Public
    Administration,
    Makerere University
    Kampala, Uganda

41. **Ms. Rose Othieno**
    Center for Conflict Resolution
    Kampala, Uganda

42. **Dr. Amna Ahmed Rahama**
    Chairperson
    Sudanese Women Civil Society Network for
    Peace
    Ahfad University for Women
    Omdurman, Sudan

43. **Ms. Lynne Rienner**
    Lynne Rienner Publishers
    Boulder, Colorado

44. **General David Tinyefuza**
    Uganda Peoples Defence Forces
    Kampala, Uganda

45. **General Daudi Tonje**
    Former Chief of General Staff
    Kenya Armed Forces
    Kitale, Kenya

46. **Dr. Martin Uhomoibhi**
    Deputy Head of Mission
    Embassy of Nigeria
    Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

47. **Mr. Mohammed Abshir Waldo**
    Director
    Sandi Consulting
    Somalia Development, Peace and Security
    Consultant
    Nairobi, Kenya

INTERNATIONAL PEACE ACADEMY

48. **Ambassador David M. Malone**
    President

49. **Dr. Adekeye Adebajo**
    Director
    Africa Program

50. **Ambassador John Hirsch**
    Senior Fellow

51. **Dr. Dorina Bekoe**
    Associate

52. **Ms. Aida Mengistu**
    Senior Program Officer

53. **Ms. Angela Muvumba**
    Senior Program Officer

54. **Mr. Harold Rodriguez**
    Program Officer

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