Nigeria’s Foreign Policy after the Cold War: Domestic, Regional and External Influences

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JULY 2003 • OXFORD, UNITED KINGDOM
Acknowledgements

The International Peace Academy (IPA) gratefully acknowledges the support of the governments of Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID), which made publication of this report possible. Oxford University’s Centre for International Studies (CIS) gratefully acknowledges the generous financial contribution of the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation which sponsored the holding of the seminar in Oxford, on which this report is based, in July 2003.

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About the Rapporteur

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Executive Summary

Oxford University’s Centre for International Studies and its Centre for African Studies held a seminar on the domestic, regional and external dimensions of Nigeria's foreign policy after the Cold War. The seminar took place at St. Antony’s College, Oxford, from 11 to 12 July 2003, and featured about forty participants, mostly scholars and practitioners, with many of them based in Nigeria.

- At the heart of this conference on Nigeria’s foreign policy in the post-Cold War era was the question of whether a relatively resourceful and ambitious country like Nigeria can be a force for stability and democratization in Africa. This is an important question, given the enormity of Africa’s problems and the limited interest and commitment of many external actors to the continent following the end of the Cold War. The theoretical and practical aspects of Nigeria’s foreign policy, the institutions and processes of policy formulation, and the “concentric circles” of domestic, regional and external influences on Nigeria’s foreign policy were therefore the major issues discussed during the conference.

- The end of the Cold War has resulted in a fundamental change in the dynamics of contemporary international politics. Developing countries, like Nigeria, with oil wealth, a large army and a large pool of well-educated citizens are now able to play a leadership role in Africa, due to the reduced strategic significance of the continent for major external powers. However, while policymakers and executors of Nigeria’s foreign policy appear to be committed to responding to demands, pressures and influences from the external environment to contribute to regional peacekeeping, they also need to respond appropriately to domestic pressures and influences, especially those derived from popular public opinion. A civilian regime, unlike military governments, also faces pressure from the parliament and the press.

- While Nigeria’s immense potential is clearly based on its demographic size of over 100 million people, its multiethnic population, its vast oil reserves and its reservoir of highly skilled and educated people, the majority of its people remain poor with a per capita income of less than $500. Likewise, while Nigeria has played a vital role in international peacekeeping both under the auspices of the United Nations (UN), as well as ECOMOG (the Economic Community of West African States Ceasefire Monitoring Group), Nigeria itself has been immersed in conflict, either at the level of intra-elite struggles for power or conflicts within the context of its troubled federal experiment. Thus, while Nigeria possesses the necessary potential as well as institutional structures needed to formulate a vibrant foreign policy, its constraints lie in domestic factors, namely, the nature of the foreign policy elite and Nigeria’s economic dependence and vulnerability.

- Regionally, Nigeria has seen itself and been perceived by others, as a global player on the world stage, from its role in the African liberation struggle and its leadership of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) during the Cold War era to more recent peacekeeping operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Nigeria’s approach to both Africa and its immediate neighbors is based on a policy of decolonization, non-interference, respect for inherited borders, economic integration and commitment to practical policies that promote African unity.

- Externally, since its independence in 1960, Nigeria has sought to play a full and active role in the international community. Its leaders have attached even greater importance to this role because Nigeria has felt a special responsibility, as Africa’s most populous nation, to act as an unofficial spokesperson for Africa and for all black people in international fora. Some have defined this as a Pax Nigeriana, an effort to achieve hegemonic leadership in Africa by a country that accounts for over half of West Africa’s population and economic strength and has a 94,000-strong army that dwarfs the combined strength of those of its fourteen ECOWAS neighbors. Examining the ways in which Nigeria has pursued its foreign policy objectives through an extensive network of multilateral relations and the impact of external factors in its foreign policy formulation is a critical dimension in the study of Nigeria’s foreign policy.
after the Cold War. Likewise, an analysis of Nigeria's key bilateral relationships with South Africa, Cameroon, France, Britain, the United States (US) and Japan is also critical to understanding Nigeria's post-Cold War foreign policy.

Three of the key observations that emerged from the Oxford conference included the following:

- First, in order to understand how Nigeria's foreign policy has developed in the post-Cold War era, an analysis of the history of Nigeria's foreign policy should take a longer historical perspective, examining the problems that developed in the post-colonial period and the legacy this has bequeathed to Nigeria's contemporary foreign policy.

- Second, linked to the historical perspective, the continuing crisis of legitimacy of the Nigerian state needs to be addressed, a theme which recurred throughout the conference.

- Finally, understanding the impact of globalization, and in particular the communications revolution, was raised by several participants as being a critical subject, due to the way in which it has affected the context and nature of Nigeria's foreign policy formulation. Linking these factors and assessing their impact on Nigeria's foreign policy was a crucial goal of this conference.

Participants underscored the fact that the future of Nigeria's foreign policy will depend on astute “economic diplomacy” that tackles effectively issues like debt relief, foreign investment and promoting the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). It is therefore necessary that the country’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs be strengthened if it is to be effective in executing this policy. Nigeria’s diplomats must be better trained and its foreign missions better funded. In practical terms, six key policy recommendations were put forward, focused on the need for Nigeria's foreign policy to be guided by carefully crafted policies and actions. These include:

1. Nigeria should pursue goals of democracy, good governance and respect for human rights at home to ensure its leadership role is credible abroad. It should do this through the African Union (AU), ECOWAS, NEPAD and the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Co-operation in Africa (CSSDCA).

2. Nigeria must promote regional and pan-African economic integration building on the lead it has taken in fast-tracking the integration process in ECOWAS. Nigeria must strongly support the building of a common market in West Africa and the creation of a common currency.

3. Pan-African integration, based on self-reliance and self-sustained development, should be a top priority for Nigeria's development and should be sustained together with its strategic alliances with South Africa, Ghana, and possibly Egypt.

4. Nigeria must share its peacekeeping experiences with other regional and sub-regional organizations such as the African Union, the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA). It must also support the effective functioning of the ECOWAS security mechanism of 1999 and ensure that the UN shares the burden of peacekeeping more equitably.

5. Nigeria should help to ensure the full establishment of the institutions of the African Union, ensuring particularly that the AU has adequate powers and funds to carry out its mandate and helping to strengthen its work in the areas of peace, security, governance and economic integration and development.

6. Finally, Nigeria must pursue an active agenda in the World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations. In particular, it should support the decision at the WTO Ministerial Conference in Doha to launch a “development” trade round and work to secure agreements in the areas of market access for the agricultural and other goods of developing countries and trade-related intellectual property rights (TRIPS), particularly, in allowing developing countries the time to decide whether or not to grant patent protection in such vital areas as pharmaceuticals, food and other areas.
1. Nigeria’s Foreign Policy: Theory, History and Practice

Examining the domestic, regional and external influences on Nigeria's foreign policy after the Cold War was the key objective of a conference which was held at St. Antony’s College, Oxford, from 11 to 12 July 2003. The conference, organized jointly by Oxford University's Centre for International Studies and its Centre for African Studies, brought together a multidisciplinary and diverse group of international scholars who, having written papers on a wide range of topics on Nigeria’s foreign policy, convened to present their papers and to receive critical comments from participants.

Though Nigerian scholars were the main contributors of papers, nearly half of the researchers came from outside Nigeria: Ghana, South Africa, the United Kingdom, Canada, France and the United States (US). Three of the authors were themselves scholar-diplomats with intimate knowledge of Nigeria’s foreign policymaking process, including a former Foreign Minister of Nigeria, Professor Ibrahim Gambari. With high-level practitioners present at this conference, including the High Commissioner of Nigeria to the United Kingdom (UK), Ambassador Christopher Kolade, two members of the Nigerian Presidential Advisory Council on International Relations, Ambassador Akinjide Osuntokun (a former Nigerian ambassador to Germany), Professor Joy Ogwu (Director-General of the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs [NIIA]) and a deputy-director in the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID), Mr. Brian Thomson, the conference ensured that the results of the discussions on Nigeria’s foreign policy were communicated to relevant policymakers.

The “Concentric Circles”: Domestic, Regional and External Influences on Nigeria’s Foreign Policy

Nigeria is often described as the “Giant of Africa.” Its foreign policy is best understood and assessed in the context of its regional and continental ambitions which have been demonstrated over the course of the country’s 43-year history. Nigeria’s leaders of all political persuasions have come to see their country as the “natural leader” of the African continent. This aspiration to continental leadership, manifest since the country’s independence in 1960, is central to understanding some of the principal features of Nigeria’s foreign policy. It is clear from a historical examination of Nigeria’s foreign relations that its hegemonic ambitions have not, however, necessarily led to relevant, coherent and effective policies. Examining both the theoretical and practical aspects of Nigeria’s foreign policy is therefore key to understanding the country’s foreign policy.

The theory of Nigeria’s foreign policy has often been explained by Nigerian diplomats and scholars in terms of four “concentric circles” of national interest. The innermost circle represents Nigeria’s own security, independence and prosperity and is centered on its immediate neighbours - Benin, Cameroon, Chad and Niger; the second circle revolves around Nigeria’s relations with its West African neighbors; the third circle focuses on continental African issues of peace, development and democratization; and the fourth circle involves Nigeria’s relations with organizations, institutions and states outside Africa.¹ This concept still guides Nigeria’s foreign policy priorities. Participants at the Oxford conference examined these four “concentric circles,” starting with domestic security issues, focusing on the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the West African sub-region, assessing key bilateral relations with South Africa and Cameroon, and finally, analyzing Nigeria’s relations with key bilateral (France, Britain, the US and Japan) and multilateral actors and organizations outside Africa (the UN, the European Union [EU] and the Commonwealth).

In practical terms, examining the interplay of domestic forces and the external environment in the formulation of foreign policy in Nigeria is essential to understanding the intertwined factors that have influenced the country’s foreign policy in the post-Cold War era. Domestically, the importance of issues

such as human security was felt by many participants to be an important dimension in the study of the domestic influences on Nigeria’s foreign policy. Other internal considerations such as the impact of a reputation for corruption on Nigeria’s foreign relations, was also seen as a key issue affecting Nigeria’s foreign policy. Indeed on this issue, a strong recommendation emerging from the conference was a call for the Nigerian government to examine urgently why corruption is such a major problem in society, since this not only affects Nigeria’s international image, but also its ability to attract foreign investment to Nigeria. Corruption in Nigeria constrains the country’s economic development and consequently its economic and political reach regionally and internationally.

The role of personalities on Nigerian foreign policy formulation was also discussed. Several participants argued that there has been no continuity in Nigeria’s foreign policy because each leader has implemented his own ideas, making it difficult to define Nigeria’s national interest. The example of the current president, Olusegun Obasanjo, was cited in support of this point, with a few participants accusing him of wanting to be his own foreign minister. Questions surrounding Nigeria’s approach to Zimbabwe and Liberia were also raised in the context of personalities and the implications of a personality-driven approach on democratic accountability in Nigerian foreign policymaking. Others disagreed with these views, arguing instead that foreign policy in any state is by its very nature elite-driven. They took issue with the assertion that Nigeria’s foreign policy was inconsistent and lacked direction, arguing instead that while the tone and style of Nigeria’s foreign policy may have changed with each succeeding regime, the substance of the policy and its focus on Africa as its centerpiece has remained consistent since 1960.

At the external level, the end of the Cold War has resulted in a fundamental change in the dynamics of contemporary international politics. Developing countries like Nigeria to exercise power and influence in an international system that is no longer dominated by the bi-polar conflict of the superpowers, lies at the heart of its foreign policy in the post-Cold War era.

Key policy recommendations in this area include: first, the need for Nigeria’s foreign policy to be built around core national interests based on the promotion of peace and security, as well as development and democratization at home and abroad. Second, Nigeria’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs needs reshaping and strengthening, with foreign policy objectives translated into more specific national interests and a program of action designed to respond in a timely manner to changes in the external environment. Finally, Nigeria, having led efforts to create ECOWAS in 1975, should be at the forefront of efforts to build viable and effective economic communities in Africa. Along with South Africa, Nigeria should champion the building of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and the African Union (AU).

A History of Nigeria’s Foreign Policy

Analyzing the history of Nigeria’s foreign policy, how it has shaped events in Nigeria’s external relations, and how this history is manifested in the country’s contemporary foreign relations, was an essential dimension of this conference. An examination of the institutions, psychological variables, and significant issues like oil, the military, ethnicity and religion that make Nigeria’s foreign policy distinct, is vital to understanding Nigeria’s foreign policy. Many of these issues are interconnected. All of them have shaped and continue to shape Nigeria’s foreign policy in complex ways.

While there is an instinctive tendency to view Nigeria’s foreign policy as starting from 1960, Nigeria had no tabula rasa, but rather brought with it a century-old colonial relationship with Britain, the ramifications of which continue to be manifested in its foreign policy today. The enduring impact of the heavy British influence on Nigeria’s foreign policy and its ruling elite continued until the late 1960s when the lessons of the Nigerian civil war of 1967 – 1970 compelled Nigeria’s foreign policy elite to reappraise its stand towards external actors. The impact of the civil war on Nigeria’s
foreign policy was significant, causing Nigeria’s leaders to draw five major lessons from the experience: first, that the country’s survival as a sovereign state could not be taken for granted; second, that, based on France sending arms to secessionist Biafra through Gabon and Côte d’Ivoire, there was a compelling need to have friendly governments in neighboring countries – a reality which partly explains why Nigeria in the aftermath of the civil war spearheaded the creation of ECOWAS; third, that the existence of minority white-owned regimes in Southern Africa, which backed Biafran secessionists during Nigeria’s civil war, was a threat to Nigeria’s security; fourth, that it was dangerous to depend disproportionately on one power bloc for the supply of arms required to maintain internal security (Britain had been slow in providing arms to the Nigerian government which turned to the Soviet Union for arms); and fifth, that publicity and propaganda were vital in the conduct of external relations.

Other specific factors which have contributed to giving Nigeria its current foreign policy profile include oil, the military and the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs. The issue of oil as a key domestic factor influencing Nigeria’s foreign policy was raised by several participants and is a subject that recurred throughout the seminar. Indeed, the serious implications of the impact of oil on the very future of Nigeria was raised from the outset. According to this view, Nigeria’s oil wealth has thrown up centrifugal subnational forces and separatist groups which, if not handled properly, could result in the disintegration of the Nigerian state. The view that Nigeria’s oil is a divisive and disintegrating force was contested by some participants who argued that oil can be seen to have been a unifying and integrating force in Nigeria, since oil revenues have from the early 1970s contributed about 80 percent of government revenue, half of which is then distributed to local and regional governments.

Alternative Futures of Nigeria’s Foreign Policy

Oil is just one of the domestic factors influencing Nigeria’s foreign policy. A key message emerging from the Oxford conference was the way in which Nigeria’s
Three major domestic factors were identified as being key determinants in Nigeria's foreign policy formulation: first, the country's ravaged and weak economy; second, the personality and character of Nigeria's leaders and their perceptions of how to nurse and revive the economy; and third, the issue of ethnoreligious diversity in a federal context, which more often than not makes consensus on national issues difficult to achieve. While other domestic factors such as historical traditions, domestic environmental factors, organized vested interests and public opinion have impacted on Nigeria's foreign policy, it can be said that the three major factors identified above are more decisive in the Nigerian context.

An in-depth examination of foreign policy formulation during Nigeria's First Republic (1960-1966); during the first phase of military rule (1966-1979); during its Second Republic (1979-1983); during the second phase of military rule (1983-1998); and in the current period of democratic transition (1999-2003), demonstrates, according to several participants, how successive Nigerian regimes have, in general, shown a lack of sensitivity and responsiveness to popular pressures and input into the foreign policy formulation process. As a result, foreign policy in Nigeria tends to be elite and government-driven. Significantly, this has been complicated by the phenomenon of prolonged military rule and the pervasive legacies of this past, which still condition and temper the current transition to democratic governance. Many participants raised the issue of the “crisis of rising expectations,” with Nigeria's masses expecting that as democracy in Nigeria develops, so too should consultation and the involvement of civil society in the country's foreign policy process. As a result, foreign policy in Nigeria tends to be elite and government-driven. Significantly, this has been complicated by the phenomenon of prolonged military rule and the pervasive legacies of this past, which still condition and temper the current transition to democratic governance. Many participants raised the issue of the “crisis of rising expectations,” with Nigeria's masses expecting that as democracy in Nigeria develops, so too should consultation and the involvement of civil society in the country's foreign policy process. How Nigeria's leaders manage these expectations will continue to be fundamental to the success of its future foreign policy. Some participants also raised the need to examine the role of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Nigeria in more detail, since many of them tend to be externally-funded, and are often accused by the government of pursuing foreign agendas.

While policymakers and executors of Nigeria's foreign policy appear to be committed to responding to demands, pressures and influences from the external environment, particularly in the context of the challenges posed by globalization, they also need to respond appropriately to domestic pressures and influences, especially those derived from popular public opinion. The move away from parliament and public opinion in Nigeria's foreign policymaking towards research institutes, which are intrinsically more exclusive and narrow, was said by several participants at the conference to have obstructed a more responsive and democratic foreign policymaking process in Nigeria. Thus, the fundamental challenge that Nigeria’s leaders face is to nurture a culture of openness, consultation and consensus-building in the country’s foreign policymaking, while continuing to benefit from the views of experts.

Discussion at the Oxford conference also focused on the extent to which personalities and characters have influenced foreign policy formulation. One view was that Nigeria's leaders since independence have had a tendency to improvise in the conduct of foreign policy. This view was challenged by other participants who argued that Nigeria's foreign policy has been pursued consistently since 1960 within established parameters. The placing of Africa at the center of Nigeria's foreign policy and the pursuit of policies such as “economic diplomacy” by successive regimes was said to demonstrate a level of continuity in the country's foreign policy that has been evident since the 1960s.

Nigeria: Nationhood, Identity and Foreign Policy

While much attention has been paid to the formal aspects of Nigeria's foreign policy formulation - the world inhabited by diplomats, technocrats and national institutions - two other distinct aspects or “faces” also feed into the outcomes of Nigeria's foreign policy process. One aspect is the way in which Nigeria’s “fractured” nationhood has impinged on the foreign policy process; and the second is the impact of Nigeria’s global reputation or “identity” for corruption on its foreign policy. Both of these factors directly affect the costs of realizing Nigeria’s foreign policy objectives.

While the formal institutions of Nigeria's foreign policy are not directly responsible for the limited legitimacy of the state or the widespread perception of Nigeria and Nigerians as corrupt, the task of articu-
lating a national interest and representing this interest effectively to the outside world has been seriously affected by both problems. In terms of Nigeria’s fractured nationhood, key policy recommendations that emerged from the Oxford conference included: the need for Nigeria’s foreign policy establishment to enhance its own sectoral legitimacy by consulting more widely in the country and by adopting a proactive stance of explaining its fundamental objectives to the wider Nigerian society. On the issue of corruption and criminal activity, it was suggested that active efforts must be made, in conjunction with Nigerian and foreign policy agencies, to apprehend, punish and deter criminal elements who persist in giving Nigeria a bad reputation. While it may not be possible to end such crimes, changing the way in which Nigeria is perceived is possible and must be done if the efforts of its formal foreign policy are to achieve maximum results.

The subject of corruption in Nigeria and its impact on how the country is perceived abroad triggered much debate and discussion among participants. On the issue of criminality, one participant set out the broader context of the factors contributing to criminality in Nigeria and its impact on Nigeria’s international reputation, citing the repercussions of citizens not having the necessary channels to realize their talents and ambitions in Nigeria, which has contributed to criminality within Nigerian society. How should the Nigerian government address the issue of freedom from fear and want for both Nigerians at home and abroad and thus tackle the underlying causes of corruption? Some participants felt that the problem of apprehending and punishing Nigerians guilty of corruption was already being tackled and that the real problem was how the international media reports on this issue. According to one participant, groups like Transparency International publish “studies” on people’s perception of Nigeria by asking leading questions such as: “How corrupt do you think Nigeria is on a scale of one to ten?” Other participants suggested that the Nigerian government and its overseas diplomatic missions could do more to examine how the country could best access the international media to tell their own story. Organizations such as Africans Without Borders could also play a central role in facilitating this dialogue. Several participants suggested that the Nigerian media could be given a greater role in mobilizing and motivating the domestic public on critical foreign policy issues.

3. The Domestic Context: Institutions and the Military

Institutions, Processes and Policy Formation

Following Nigeria’s holding of elections in 1999 and 2003, international expectations about Nigeria’s role as a regional power in Africa and beyond have increased. It is therefore particularly important to re-examine the interface between domestic issues and foreign policy in assessing the possibilities and challenges that Nigeria faces in the post-Cold War era. In analyzing the role of the key institutions involved in Nigeria’s foreign policy formulation, specifically the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs and the Presidential Advisory Council on International Relations, it is clear that the institutions and processes of Nigeria’s foreign policy formulation cannot be separated from the country’s political economy, the character of the state or the worldview of its ruling elite. It is therefore necessary to address the issue of the fundamental nature of the Nigerian state and its connections with the wider society.

While Nigeria’s immense potential is clearly based on its demographic size of over 100 million people, its multiethnic population, its vast oil reserves and its reservoir of highly skilled and educated people, the majority of its people remain poor with a per capita income of less than $500. Likewise, while Nigeria has played an important role in international peacekeeping both under the auspices of the United Nations (UN), as well as ECOMOG (the Economic Community of West African States Ceasefire Monitoring Group), Nigeria itself has been immersed in conflict, either at the level

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of intra-elite power struggles or identity conflicts within the context of its troubled federal experiment. Thus, while Nigeria possesses the necessary potential as well as institutional structures needed to formulate a vibrant foreign policy, its constraints lie in domestic factors, namely, the nature of the foreign policy elite and Nigeria’s economic dependence and vulnerability. Eghosa Osaghae’s description of Nigeria as a “crippled giant” is perhaps most pertinent in this regard.\(^3\)

An examination of the domestic constraints on Nigeria’s foreign policy reveals the ways in which the country’s foreign policy has been characterized by reactive and uncoordinated policies in the post-Cold War era. Since the 1990s, the Nigerian state has had to contend with multiple crises including the fall in global oil prices and a crisis in the very legitimacy of the state, as a result of the disintegration of the “social contract” arising from the erosion of previous welfare gains fueled by the oil boom of the 1970s. A consequence of diminishing resources produced by the state has led some Nigerians to withdraw into ethnic laagers in order to capture resources or press for the decentralization of federal power and end the federal government’s monopoly over the distribution of oil resources. Following the return to civilian rule in 1999, and in the context of the return to democracy in the 1990s, previously pent-up grievances and demands have been unleashed to devastating effect and resulted in communal violence across Nigeria that has resulted, along with religious-based violence, in an estimated 10,000 deaths. While many of these conflicts have erupted over issues such as contested boundaries and sharing of resources, other conflicts have also involved matters relating to “settlers” versus “indigenes” or “oil producing communities” versus “oil multinationals,” all of which have fuelled instability and led to a questioning of a national Nigerian identity.

In addition to these domestic factors, there is also a sense in which aspects of Nigeria’s domestic base have been “globalized.” This has been evident particularly in the Niger Delta where global oil giants such as Shell, ExxonMobil and Chevron-Texaco – as partners of the “Nigerian petro-state” - have become entrenched and “localized.” The blurring of the domestic/global boundary is yet another conceptual challenge that analysts of Nigeria’s foreign policy must come to terms with.

One of the conclusions drawn as a result of this examination of the domestic interface of Nigeria’s foreign policy, and specifically the role of Nigeria’s institutions in foreign policy formulation, are that, once unfettered by its domestic contradictions and with a committed and visionary leadership, Nigeria could become the key to fulfilling the dreams of the unfinished project of Pan-Africanism: the political and economic integration of Africa as a united bloc. The success of such a venture will ultimately depend on resolving Nigeria’s multiple contradictions through a democratic project that has a firm national-social anchor which emphasizes equity and the well-being of all Nigerian citizens.

Regarding the institutions responsible for the formulation of Nigeria’s foreign policy, many participants at the Oxford conference agreed on the importance of strengthening Nigeria’s Foreign Service by addressing issues such as the training of diplomats and the funding of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. A comparative analysis of foreign policy formulation in parliamentary democracies vis-à-vis presidential forms of government was also suggested by one participant.

**Military and Security Issues in the Development of Foreign Policy**

The role of military and security issues in Nigeria’s foreign policy has not received the critical scholarly attention that it deserves. Addressing the dearth of studies on Nigeria’s national security, as well as the traditional silence on this issue at government level, is therefore an essential dimension in any comprehensive study of Nigeria’s foreign policy after the Cold War. This includes an examination of both individual security issues such as the Bakassi border dispute between Nigeria and Cameroon; Nigeria/Chad border skirmishes; Libya’s role in Chad; and the security situation in potentially oil-rich Equatorial Guinea.

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Such a study also needs to focus on internal threats to national security, namely religious and ethnic tensions.

It is important to adopt an integrated approach to examining the military and security issues that Nigeria faces, addressing issues such as the maintenance of the country’s territorial integrity; security from internal armed subversion; the viability of the political system; economic and resource security; and the security of lives and property of Nigerians in general. Other important issues include: the threat posed by intra-state conflicts in West Africa; the proliferation of small arms and light weapons; the phenomenon of child soldiers; and the trans-border activities of armed rebels and mercenaries. The most potent threat to Nigeria’s security comes from the vulnerability of Nigeria’s major oil installations, and its leaders must take urgent action to address this problem.

The view that military and security issues in Nigeria’s foreign policy have not been properly harmonized was a central concern of the Oxford conference. This deficiency is said to be reflected in the naivété of successive civilian and military administrations in Nigeria, which have failed to conceptualize the inextricable link between national security and foreign policy. However, some participants felt that the problem of lack of synergy between foreign policy and national security had substantially changed over the last two years (2001-2003), as demonstrated by the drawing up of a government document on National Security and Foreign Policy.

Perhaps the most pertinent question on the study of military and security issues is whether the Nigerian government has sufficiently understood the grave situation that the country faces in terms of both internal and external security threats. Are the nation’s armed forces adequately prepared to meet the challenges of the post-Cold War era in terms of their strength, orientation, training and weapons inventory? One participant urged the current administration to embark on a proper modernization of its military and security infrastructure to reposition itself for the challenges and uncertainties the country faces in a new era. These reforms should include the updating of Nigeria’s weapons inventory and the retraining and reorientation of officers and foot soldiers so that they are able to meet the challenges of sub-regional peacekeeping. In addition, the navy’s pivotal role in the defense of the nation’s economy, particularly its oil installations, must be recognized, while the role of the air force in the defense of the nation’s airspace must be strengthened.

With regard to the harmonization of military/security issues and foreign policy, it was suggested that the current regime of Olusegun Obasanjo focus on the Nigerian Foreign Defence Council and the Joint Intelligence Agency, as well as the 1986 decree creating the National Security Act. It was also suggested that the role of the Office of National Security Adviser be assessed to be able to contribute more effectively to foreign policy formulation. Some participants further felt that the Obasanjo regime should analyze the impact of the events of 11 September 2001 and the current US war against terrorism on how Nigeria has positioned itself strategically in the post-Cold War era.

4. The Domestic Context: Oil and Foreign Policy

Oil-rich “Minority” Areas, Shell and International NGOs

The role that oil plays in Nigeria’s foreign policy cannot be underestimated. One can argue that in examining the actions and motivations of Royal Dutch/Shell, international NGOs, and Nigeria’s oil-producing “minority” groups, each in its own way questions the very idea of “Nigeria” as it is presently constituted. Ethnic “minorities” in oil-producing states demand a more inclusive democratic society founded on fiscal federalism as a way of reclaiming the rewards of full citizenship from what they regard, particularly under military regimes, as a parasitic state. Nigeria’s elite have often interpreted this view as a challenge to their dominance and control of the state and its strategic resources. They have thus often fought the demands of these groups through violence. According to one participant, foreign oil companies yearn for a return of a “golden age” in which political authoritar-
ianism and regular military expeditions to the Niger Delta ensured the uninterrupted supply of cheap oil. International NGOs continue to speak of “good governance” and “civil society” when the issue is not so much what form the state takes, as the nature of the state itself. As a result, these three players undermine the building of a cohesive and self-sustaining political order without which Nigeria’s regional and continental ambitions cannot be realized.

Using the example of the relationship between the Ogoni people, Nigeria’s elite and Shell as a case study, it can be argued that the inability of Nigeria’s elite to tackle successfully the deep-rooted problems of state legitimacy, national citizenship, democracy and development — which the murder of Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight Ogoni activists in November 1995 dramatized so powerfully — means that Nigeria’s efforts to build a united nation, as well as its regional ambitions, will not be realized without resolving its internal problems.

Oil lies at the heart of persistent policy failures in Nigeria. Where once colonialism thrived on the expropriation of the resources of local people and managed power with the help of a complicit “indigenous” elite, in post-independence Nigeria, relations between federal governments and oil companies are still structured in ways that help the government to maintain a firm grip on strategic resources. This is, according to one participant, a replication of colonial power relations in new forms. Powerful multinational corporations such as Shell have taken the place of the British imperial power. However, a converse view strongly advanced by another participant, suggested that rather than oil being the obstacle to the realization of Nigeria’s leadership ambitions, oil has actually tested the resilience of Nigerian society, and the country has been able to absorb much of this pressure. This resilience provides some hope for the future.

It is clear that in the post-Cold war era, and more importantly, in the era of America’s war on terrorism, Nigeria’s position as the world’s eighth largest oil-producer means that the country must now also contend with the coming realignment of forces in West Africa driven by American and other Western oil interests. This is the central challenge that Nigerian policymakers will have to grapple with: securing Nigeria’s borders and natural resources while containing predatory external forces.

The issue of the accountability of foreign oil firms was raised by a number of participants who questioned whether Nigerians sufficiently hold their governments to account for the money they receive from oil revenues and how these funds are disbursed. The case of the recent initiative by the British government - the “Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative” – which Nigeria has signed up to, was raised by one participant as a potential means through which this issue can be addressed. While this “publish what you pay” agenda is a sensitive one and requires a careful approach, it was cited as a step in the right direction that needs to be encouraged. Other participants questioned whether this non-binding approach could really be effective in resolving such deep-rooted problems.

Some participants questioned the likely consequence of Shell withdrawing from Nigeria. Several people felt that such a development would be a negative step since oil production would not stop, but would probably be handed over to a firm or firms with even less concern for human rights than Shell. Others asked that the discussion be broadened beyond Shell, to examine the role of other foreign companies such as Chevron-Texaco, Elf and ExxonMobil. On the issue of “ownership” of Nigeria’s oil, one participant wondered how oil-producing African states such as Nigeria can establish a common framework to regulate foreign oil firms and other global investors. This participant suggested that this issue be put on the agendas of the African Union and NEPAD.

5. The Regional Context:
Diplomacy and Trade

Nigeria and Its Neighbors

Nigeria has always looked beyond its borders. While Africa has been the cornerstone of its foreign policy, Nigeria has seen itself and been perceived by others, as a global player on the world stage, from its role in the
African liberation struggle to its recent peacekeeping operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone. While Nigeria’s foreign policy appeared to tilt towards the capitalist West during the Cold War era (largely because of its historical economic ties), Nigeria has often acted in what it considered to be its national interest. This can be seen in the way that Nigeria played significant roles in the creation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1963, and used the arena of the Commonwealth and in particular, the United Nations, to advance national, as well as African interests.

Nigeria’s approach to both Africa and its immediate neighbors has been based on a policy of decolonization, non-interference, respect for inherited borders, economic integration and a commitment to practical policies that promote African unity. During the 1960s, Nigeria’s foreign policy towards its neighbors was characterized by regional co-operation. Nigeria established functional bodies to exploit common resources for economic development, as seen in the creation of the Lake Chad Basin Commission in 1965; and the setting up of the Niger River Basin Commission and subsequent Nigeria-Benin and Nigeria-Niger joint commissions in 1973. The Nigerian civil war of 1967-1970 brought a fundamental shift to Nigeria’s relations with its neighbors, changing its policy of “benign neglect” towards its neighbors. The establishment of ECOWAS, an initiative led by Nigeria in 1975, sought, among other goals, to provide an institutional framework for managing relations with its West African neighbors, as well as attempting to reduce their dependence on France.

One participant suggested that, as the dynamics of La Francophonie in West Africa changes, Nigeria needs to exploit the fundamental cultural affinities that exist across its borders by harmonizing its interests with those of its neighbors through regional organizations and mechanisms like ECOWAS, the Lake Chad Basin Commission and the newly-formed Gulf of Guinea Commission. In assessing Nigeria’s relations with its neighbors, conference participants discussed the issue of Africa’s arbitrary colonial divisions and its continuing impact on Nigeria’s relations with its neighbors. Some participants focused on ways in which the fundamental commonalities, as seen in traditional kingdoms straddling borders, could better contribute to Nigeria’s foreign policy formulation in the regional context: Benin and Cameroon have broached the idea of “cultural diplomacy” in this regard, with traditional rulers on both sides of the border visiting each other and strengthening ties between communities on both sides of the border. The impact of shared indigenous languages on Nigeria’s foreign policy was also discussed, with an emphasis on the role that common local languages have played, and could play, in unifying West Africa. Nigeria and Benin share the Yoruba language, while Nigeria and Niger share the Hausa language.

Informal Economic Networks and Regional Integration in West Africa

In addition to the formal state-to-state relationships between Nigeria and its neighbors, an analysis of the informal relationships, in particular Nigeria’s informal cross-border economic networks, provides dynamic insights to the regional dimensions of Nigeria’s foreign policy. The focus on both the formal and informal aspects of diplomacy and trade led to questions about whether modern state structures can adapt to today’s global economic realities in the same way that organic, traditional networks appear to have done.

The Oxford seminar assessed the impact of Nigeria’s informal economic networks and the opportunities they present for regional integration and the economic development of West Africa, based on Nigeria’s role as the region’s largest economy and home to the largest and most sophisticated informal financial and trading networks. As a consequence of the poor performance of official regionalist institutions such as ECOWAS, new approaches to regional integration have developed, known as the “new regionalism,” which, in the context of economic liberalization and globalization, have seen a growing range of regional networks operating outside the purview of formal policy initiatives, driven by bilateral, private and even popular forces. One view favors these developments, seeing the new regionalism as a structured response to the transformations that globalization has brought about. The new regionalism is thus hailed, in this perspective, as everything that the old regionalism was not:
outward looking, shaped by real economic processes from “below” and within and driven by a range of state and non-state actors. A second view on the new regionalism offers a far more negative picture in which West Africa’s informal networks are viewed as being forces for economic disorder, criminality and violent conflict.

It can be argued that informal cross-border trade has tended to undermine productive investment and impeded effective regionalism in West Africa. Far from providing a hegemonic force for regionalism, Nigeria’s dominant role in informal regional trade has weakened regionalism from all sides. In conjunction with the structural adjustment programs of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), informal trade has intensified a rent-seeking rather than productive logic accumulation, both within the state and in the private sector. These developments have also facilitated the withdrawal of popular forces into identity-based patronage networks as alternative sources of access to incomes and social welfare collapse. This volatile situation has been further compounded by the continued fiscal strangulation of the Nigerian state, which, starved of revenue by the informalization of external and internal trade, is increasingly less able to provide an alternative and more politically stable basis of social incorporation.

While Nigeria is not destined inevitably to be a force for regional chaos and “ungovernance,” the productive deployment of Nigeria’s dynamic and sophisticated informal economy for national as well as regional development, must involve more than simply unleashing these formidable economic and social forces on the rest of the subregion. Successful regional integration depends on strengthening the capacity of the state to provide an effective framework to regulate economic interaction in the wider public interest, both nationally and regionally.

Other contributions from participants on Nigeria’s informal economic networks included suggestions that it is important to explore early examples of the “new regionalism,” for example, the situation in Ghana in the 1950s where cheap goods were exported to francophone countries such as Togo and Côte d’Ivoire. The only losers then were the French colonial administrators. Therefore, in assessing the impact of informal economic networks on regional integration, it is necessary to assess who benefits from informal trading networks and who loses. The varying impact of informal cross-border trade was also said to be an important consideration that requires more attention, as differences between sectors can mean that informal trade may be a source of integration in some sectors and of disintegration in others. For example, the positive benefits of cross-border trade in foodstuffs in the 1970s when cash crops were distorting food supplies, was cited. Some participants also suggested that the role of ECOWAS must be addressed in greater detail, examining why the organization has failed so far to cope with informal trade networks. At the state level, one participant also suggested that, while many of the actors involved in informal cross-border trade are known to government officials, not least through the semi-official trade associations that exist, the capacity of formal institutions to organize parallel organizations is often lacking.

6. The Regional Context: Security, Conflict and Hegemonic Co-operation

Nigeria’s Military Interventions: Hegemony on a Shoestring

In examining the role of Nigeria’s military interventions after the Cold War, specifically in Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 1990s, it is necessary to begin by placing it in context. Since independence, Nigeria has aspired to hegemonic leadership in Africa, an enduring ambition, described by some as Pax Nigeriana. This aspiration to continental leadership is central to understanding some of the principal features of Nigeria’s foreign policy such as the breaking of diplomatic relations with France in 1961 over the issue of nuclear testing in the Sahara; the creation of ECOWAS in 1975; Nigeria’s membership of the “Frontline States” in the struggle against Rhodesia and apartheid South Africa; its long-term chairmanship of the UN Special Committee against Apartheid; and its leadership of peacekeeping missions in Chad (1979-1982), Liberia (1990-1998) and Sierra Leone (1997-2000).
West Africa is one of the world’s most unstable regions, being at the epicentre of many of the world’s contemporary civil conflicts. In the last decade, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau and Senegal have all experienced some form of civil conflict, while Côte d’Ivoire, formerly a model of stability, has recently experienced its own civil war. Nigerian-led interventions into Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 1990s lasted eleven years, resulted in over 1,000 Nigerian fatalities, and cost the Nigerian treasury billions of dollars (although some of these funds were embezzled by some of Nigeria’s corrupt military leaders). Although Nigeria was itself enmeshed in its own political, financial and military difficulties, these interventions were the first in the post-Cold War era to be launched by a sub-regional organization, ECOWAS, and the Liberia mission between 1993 and 1997 was the first time that the UN had deployed peacekeepers alongside an existing sub-regional organization. The failure of the ECOMOG mission in Guinea-Bissau (involving Benin, Gambia, Niger and Togo) in 1999, to which Nigeria did not contribute troops, further demonstrated the indispensable role of Nigeria to sub-regional peacekeeping efforts.

While there is no real question about Nigeria’s leadership role in maintaining peace and security in the region, many questions have been raised about its unilateral style. As a pivotal state in the region, Nigeria must learn to treat its neighbors with respect and avoid the perception that it is pursuing a policy of arrogant unilateralism. Nigeria must also insist on burden-sharing within the ECOWAS security mechanism of 1999, as well as supporting democratic governance and efforts at preventing unconstitutional changes of regime through the mechanisms of the African Union and NEPAD. The role of the UN in accepting primary responsibility for maintaining global peace and security should also be stressed when discussing regional capabilities. The UN must work out a proper division of labor with ECOWAS. UNAMSIL (the UN Mission in Sierra Leone) could serve as a potential model, with the mission being based on a Nigerian-led core of regional peacekeepers of about 5,000 troops, while 15,000 other troops came from outside West Africa. Finally, returning to a theme that ran through the conference, it is clear that in discussing Nigeria’s role in peace and security in the region, if Nigeria does not deal with its domestic problems, it cannot be a credible intervener abroad. Nigeria must provide not just the military muscle for regional peacekeeping, but needs domestic political stability and a sound economy for its leadership ambitions to be taken seriously by others.

**Nigeria and South Africa: Constructing the AU and NEPAD**

Nigeria and South Africa have undoubtedly played an indispensable role in the construction of the African Union and NEPAD. One could even go so far as to say that, without the leadership role of South Africa and Nigeria, the creation of the AU and NEPAD would have been more difficult, if not impossible. Even if NEPAD and the AU had been created without the involvement of Abuja and Pretoria, their nature, purpose and timing, would likely have been very different and much slower in coming about.  

Over the past four years, it is clear that the level of activity, discourse and diplomacy between presidents Olusegun Obasanjo and Thabo Mbeki, as well as their governments and respective diplomatic corps, means that it is accurate to speak of an evolving strategic alliance between Nigeria and South Africa, the fulcrum of which have been their efforts to build the African Union and promote NEPAD. While some critics regard this alliance as presumptuous on the part of South Africa and Nigeria, in order to turn their relationship into a strategic partnership for the advancement of Africa, advocates of a strategic partnership between Abuja and Pretoria have argued that there are a number of rationales that underscore the need for, and importance of, such a partnership.

First, in some public and scholarly circles, the two countries are often equated with “giantism”, and the two countries are seen as Africa’s political, military

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and economic giants. Some analysts go so far as to suggest that the future of the entire continent rests on these two countries. The impact of high-profile US foreign policy actors like secretary of state, Colin Powell, emphasizing the strategic importance of these two countries and their collective role in Africa, has also contributed to the view that as potential hegemons, Nigeria and South Africa have a vital role to play in Africa. One should not underestimate the personal dimensions of the role of presidents Mbeki and Obasanjo in the construction of the AU and NEPAD, nor the importance of their own bilateral relationship. Finally, the fact that the two leaders are also attempting to play a global role as spokesmen for Africa in fora like the Group of Eight (G8) is also important in understanding the “the diplomacy of giantism.” Thus, despite their own enormous domestic challenges and problems, both Nigeria and South Africa continue to try to act as Africa’s giants on the continent and on the world stage.

While the two African giants have taken the idea of partnership to unprecedented levels over the last four years and established a binational commission (BNC) for bilateral cooperation, it would be premature to exaggerate the potential of this bilateral relationship to alleviate Africa’s political and socio-economic problems based on the strength of democracy in the two countries. Both countries continue to experience significant stresses and strains on the domestic front which may impact negatively on the role that Nigeria and South Africa can play in leading Africa’s recovery. Several participants, however, noted that both countries would do well to stress the importance of partnership with other African states. They cautioned against romanticizing the alliance, and noted that there could still be tensions between both countries, especially in dealing with matters such as conflict management and the promotion of democracy in Africa. Even beyond Africa, there is still a lingering debate about the future of a reformed UN Security Council, with both Nigeria and South Africa vying for a permanent African seat on a reconstituted council.

In relation to the role of the two countries in the construction and development of the AU and NEPAD, the impact of the personalities of the leaders of both countries will be important to the future survival of these initiatives. It was noted that the relationship between Nigeria and South Africa will need to be institutionalized. Several participants also noted the discomfort of some Nigerian analysts that Obasanjo appears to have ceded intellectual leadership of NEPAD to Mbeki.

**Nigeria and Cameroon: The Bakassi Dispute**

The Bakassi case before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) is deeply rooted in the legacy of inherited colonial boundaries and questions of self-determination and identity. The dispute revolved around the delimitation and demarcation of the land boundary from Lake Chad to the Bakassi region and the maritime boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria. Cameroon claimed sovereignty over the Lake Chad and Bakassi peninsula areas on the basis of its inherited title and claim of ownership. Its claim relied on border demarcations drawn up under the respective colonial rules of Germany, France and Britain between 1913 to 1931. Nigeria contested Cameroon’s ownership, and grounded its defense and counter-claims on historical consolidation of title and peaceful possession of certain Lake Chad and Bakassi areas. Abuja further argued that it held sovereignty over the disputed territories based on its post-colonial administration.

The ICJ examined the claims of both parties and delivered a judgment in October 2002 which was largely in favor of Cameroon. In reference to the land boundary in the Lake Chad and Bakassi peninsula, the World Court rejected Nigeria’s claim of sovereignty over areas in Lake Chad, stating that there was no evidence that Cameroon had acquiesced its title in favor of Nigeria. Furthermore, and most importantly, the Court did not recognize Nigeria’s claim over the Bakassi peninsula, and accepted the Anglo-German Agreement which delimited the boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria in Bakassi in 1913.

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5 See the International Court of Justice decision of 10 October 2002 in the case Concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria.
Critics have suggested that this bilateral dispute is a case that highlights the way in which those charged with the conduct of Nigeria’s foreign policy have often acted before thinking, often foregoing any thorough analysis of what is in the best interests of the country. It could be argued that Cameroon was more consistent in its approach to the boundary dispute, ratifying the Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties in 1991 and accepting the ICJ’s compulsory jurisdiction in 1994, no doubt in anticipation of its government bringing Nigeria before the World Court. According to one participant, this case should serve as a lesson to Nigeria’s policymakers, that they should always take seriously the instruments that they ratify and examine their legal, economic and political ramifications. If Nigeria considers itself a major player in African and world affairs and wants to be viewed as a major actor internationally, it must also respect established norms and standards of international law. It should not be compelled to observe and enforce ICJ judgments, but comply with agreements it has agreed beforehand to be binding.

7. The External Context: Key Multilateral and Bilateral Relations

Nigeria’s Major Multilateral Relations: The Commonwealth, the EU and the UN

Since independence, Nigeria has sought to play a full and active role in the international community. The country has attached even greater importance to this role because it has felt a special responsibility as Africa’s most populous nation, in acting as an unofficial spokesperson for Africa and black people in the Diaspora. Examining the ways in which Nigeria has pursued its foreign policy objectives through an extensive network of multilateral relations and the impact of external factors in its foreign policy formulation, is therefore a critical dimension in any study of Nigeria’s foreign policy. Nigeria’s diplomatic relations with three major multilateral organizations, namely, the UN, the Commonwealth and the European Union (EU), were also analyzed at the Oxford conference. Nigeria’s ties with these three organizations are among its oldest, most diverse and most enduring.

Relations with these three organizations have been largely determined by three considerations: first, the extent to which the programs and objectives of these organizations have met the specific objectives and purposes of Nigeria’s foreign policy; second, the prevailing domestic situation in Nigeria, given the inherent asymmetry between the domestic situation and foreign policy projection and performance; and third, the prevailing global political environment. Despite the occasional upheavals within multilateral relations, the ties between Nigeria and these three organizations can be said to have been mutually beneficial over the last four decades. Nigeria’s long-term interests are therefore best served by sustaining and reinforcing these ties.

It is important that Nigeria enhances and maximises its relations with the UN, the Commonwealth and the EU by firstly, wherever possible, working in collaboration and cooperation with other countries willing to share experiences, and secondly, by strengthening the country’s economic base to increase its capacity for an enhanced relationship with these key multilateral institutions. Some conference participants also suggested that, in examining relations between Nigeria and the EU, it is important to consider the role of Britain and France in harmonizing EU policy toward Africa.

The Switchback and the Fallback: Nigeria-British Relations

Turning to Nigeria’s relations with Britain, the dynamics of Nigeria’s relationship with its former colonial power has been described as a complex history of the circumstantial and the continuous. On the one hand, as a result of instinctive responses in times of crisis, Nigeria’s forty-three years of independence have often looked like a switchback ride, moving from the reasonably cordial, to degrees of tension and animosity which has often led to an impression of a relationship of incoherent variables. These ups and downs have however mainly been at the government-to-government level. On the other hand, the long-term reality of the bilateral relationship between Abuja and London belies this view, as evidenced by a continuous framework which underpins these relations. This
framework can be described as the “fallback” position where traditional ties have meant that there were a whole range of relationships already in existence which often facilitated smooth ties between both countries. The importance of traditional bilateral ties is underlined by the people-to-people connections which should not be excluded when examining the nature of Nigeria-British relations. While there will always be an undercurrent of suspicion and resentment as a result of the colonial legacy, there is also something of an acceptance by Nigeria of the connection that exists with Britain. This connection has helped to define Nigeria’s identity, and since it cannot be wished away, it can at least be used for the mutual benefit of the bilateral relationship.

In examining key periods in the bilateral relationship from Nigeria’s independence to the present as well as the impact of the underlying currents of the colonial legacy on the relationship, it is clear that Nigeria-British relations are no longer primarily focused on government-to-government relations, but are far more multifarious, operating at a number of levels and impacting upon the foreign policy of governments in both countries. The relations between Abuja and London have mutated and become a question of the relations of peoples as well as governments. The increasing importance of people-to-people links is seen in the demographics, with some estimates putting the number of Nigerians in Britain at around one million. The significance of the relationship is particularly evident in the impact that the new generation of British-Nigerians is having on British society; and members of this group are increasingly represented in many sectors of British life including business, the arts and culture.

In assessing the history of this relationship, some participants raised the issue of Britain’s position during the Nigerian civil war of 1967-1970, when the British government only belatedly supported the federal government and many Britons openly supported the Biafran secession. The fact that the Nigerian civil war was the first to have been extensively covered by television was also said to have had an enduring impact on the way in which Nigeria has been perceived in Britain. One participant suggested that an assessment should be made of the current British policy towards Africa, examining what its interests actually are. Is trade now the defining issue of British policy towards Africa, and Nigeria in particular? The example of Britain’s rationale for intervening in Sierra Leone in 1999 was raised as a case study that could be examined in more detail.

A Tale of Two Giants: Nigeria-US Relations

Another important bilateral relationship involves Nigeria’s relations with the world’s sole superpower: the United States. A number of recent events have meant that Washington has been challenged to take a fresh look at its relations with Abuja. Nigeria was in the forefront of African countries that publicly opposed the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. The growing influence of Islam in northern Nigeria has also been a cause of concern to some policymakers in Washington, particularly in light of America’s war on terrorism. It is however important that Nigeria-US relations should be set within a broader context of more than the events of the last decade. There are a plethora of cultural, historical and political reasons why Nigeria has been important to the US from cultural aspects, which see Nigeria’s one-thousand year history earn it a place in American art galleries rivalled only by Egyptian-Nubian art of the pharaonic period, to Nigeria’s population, oil resources and economic and military dynamics, which make the country clearly one of the two regional giants on the African continent, along with South Africa.

Following the end of military rule with presidential elections in 1999, the US reinvigorated diplomatic relations with Nigeria and stressed that its overarching national interest in Africa was to promote democracy, and that “Nigeria’s successful transformation is key to anchoring the climate of peace and rapid development that our citizens hope to see throughout Africa.” Economic assistance from the US also increased after

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6 Ambassador Howard Jeter, Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, Testimony before the House International Relations Committee’s Subcommittee on Africa, 3 August 1999.
the democratic transition in Nigeria, rising to $78.5 million in 2000 from $23.6 million in 1999. In 2003, US economic assistance to Nigeria is estimated at $65.2 million. Before 11 September 2001, the American challenge in its policy towards Nigeria was to formulate a substantive bilateral partnership with this oil-rich country that provides 8 percent of America’s oil needs.

Initially, the George W. Bush administration’s policy towards Africa continued to be dominated by three traditional factors: bilateral economic affairs, regional security and governance. The events of 11 September, however, resulted in a shift of American focus towards giving priority to homeland security, which has had a significant impact on Nigeria-US relations. The central question now is whether Washington will continue to provide the policy focus and foreign assistance that can help Nigeria to address its “democracy-development” problems, or whether it will cut back on assistance in the face of other security challenges. Some participants suggested that Nigeria needs to be concerned about US involvement in Nigeria’s religious affairs based on the threat of growing Islamic militancy in northern Nigeria, while others felt that American involvement in this area was legitimate and limited to support for inter-faith dialogue through the funding of Nigerian NGOs working on these issues.

According to one participant, policy analysts agreed that the following five recommendations should form the basis of a coherent US policy towards Nigeria:

- First, greater consistency in the US-Nigeria military-security relationship. Washington should recognize that its national interest is best served if Nigeria is able to be a force for democracy and stability in the region. Military and security collaboration between the two countries, and in Africa generally, can only increase given the threat of terrorism worldwide;

- Second, increasing America’s diplomatic reach within Nigeria by establishing arenas for US exchanges with critical areas, such as its oil-producing areas in the Niger Delta and in northern Nigeria where the US closed down consular offices. Such diplomatic reach could help the US to make a contribution to conflict management in Nigeria;

- Third, developing a strategy for an economic action agenda in Nigeria, which must involve business and government actors in the US and Nigeria, as well as inviting input from the non-governmental sector. Such a strategy should focus on three priorities: first, an acknowledgement of the business community’s responsibility to be a constructive player in Nigeria’s economic and democratic transition; second, a focus on restructuring the extractive industry to curb corruption; and third, a focus on restoring agricultural industries to help alleviate rural poverty, curb rural-urban pressures and strengthen trade and export;

- Fourth, eliminating debt overhang and investing in education, health and human development; and

- Fifth, strengthening democratic institutions and governance structures which involves supporting democratic dialogue across the political spectrum, as well as assisting in training for elections and parliamentary and political party development.

8. The External Context: The French Factor and Japan

Nigeria, France and Africa

Examining relations between Nigeria and France in the context of evolving relations between the two countries reveals a complex and ever-evolving situation. While political relations between Abuja and Paris have been characterized from the outset by distrust, hostility and conflict, strong economic relations appear to have developed almost independently of the political context. This is demonstrated by

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the fact that Nigeria has historically been among the top three African economic partners of France, well ahead of francophone African countries.

The term Françafrique has been used to describe the negative nature of Franco-African relations, based on French support for African dictators and the covert use of violence and corruption. The term has also been used in a more analytical and comprehensive way to explain the enduring system of Franco-African relations. More recently a more neutral interpretation of the term has been employed to describe the permanent and organic system of the privileged relations.

The rationale for the political frictions that have existed between Nigeria and France can be said to derive from Nigeria's role as the “Giant of Africa,” coupled with its geo-political position as a country surrounded by four former French colonies: Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Benin. Because of the “special relationship” that France established with its former colonies, Paris has been seen as being the main obstacle to the fulfillment of Nigeria's regional ambitions. For France, Nigeria has been the most potent threat to extending its influence in the region. Since francophone African colonies obtained their formal independence from France in the early 1960s, relations between Paris and La Francophonie have been transformed. The French presence and influence in Africa has declined since the 1990s, and France can no longer be seen as the threat to Nigeria's regional ambition that it once was. But Nigeria has also changed because of the fragility of its domestic economic and political problems, which have prevented it from achieving its regional ambitions. Hence, it can be argued that France is no longer the problem for Nigeria, and vice-versa.

France's waning influence in Africa and the normalization of its relations with francophone states should therefore facilitate normalization of bilateral ties with Nigeria. In the post-Cold War era, the priority for France should no longer be about which country will be the leading power in West Africa, but rather about how to prevent the sub-region’s zone of turmoil and insecurity escalating or spreading further. In this regard, what should therefore be more worrying for France, Nigeria's neighbors, and other actors, is the continuing economic and political instability in Nigeria.

Some participants suggested the need for greater analysis of the French response to shifts in British and American policy toward Africa. They also called for more analysis of the disparate nature of French government policy towards Africa, and Nigeria in particular, to focus on the approach that the Quai d’Orsay (the Foreign Ministry), the Matignon (the Office of the Prime Minister) and the Elysée (Presidency) have taken towards Africa, and the role of personal ties in influencing French policy towards Africa.

**Japan, Africa and Nigeria**

In explaining why Japan was included in discussions at the Oxford conference, it was noted that because of the colonial legacy and other factors, Africa is still obsessed with Europe and the West when other countries such as Japan have substantial capital flows into Africa, a fact that is likely to increase in the future. Japan has in fact become the world's second largest aid donor and has, over the last decade, taken an active interest in Africa.

This has not, of course historically always been the case. It is clear that from the early 1960s to the early 1970s, Japan’s policy towards sub-Saharan Africa was characterized by a profound vacuity proudly justified by Japanese policymakers as being the result of Japan’s non-involvement in Africa’s colonial history. The lack of “historical guilt,” as its policymakers viewed it, thus exempted Tokyo from assisting substantially in Africa’s economic development.

Since the early 1990s, however, Japan reassessed its relations with Africa and appears to have decided to adopt a more pro-active approach towards the continent, a policy which has been orchestrated through the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD). According to one participant, TICAD, which began in 1993, represented a major shift in Japan’s attitude towards Africa and the region’s developmental problems. (Another TICAD meeting was
held in October 2003, at which Japan pledged $1 billion to Africa’s development over five years). At the heart of this change in attitude lie economic interests brought about by Japan wanting to correct its own decade-long economic stagnation by helping to support Africa’s economic development, as Tokyo had earlier done in Southeast Asia. Another factor which has often been put forward to explain Japan’s engagement with Africa in the last decade includes Japan’s interest in having a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, which it is suggested, requires African support.

Japan’s new approach towards Africa includes engagement with a Nigerian civilian government, which in 1999 saw the first economic trade mission from Japan to Nigeria, while January 2001 saw the first visit by a Japanese prime minister, Yoshiro Mori, to Africa. This Africa visit included Nigeria as one of the three countries visited: a recognition of Nigeria’s leadership role in Africa by Japan. The Japanese prime minister also visited South Africa and Kenya. In May 2001, Nigeria’s president Obasanjo, visited Japan and something of a “special partnership” between Abuja and Tokyo may be evolving.

At the heart of this bilateral relationship lie economic issues. Once again, the impact of domestic issues on Nigeria’s foreign relations can be seen in the way in which Japanese investment in Nigeria is constrained by inadequate infrastructure, corruption, and unreliable institutional structures. Despite Nigeria’s enormous economic potential, Japan has focused 70 percent of its African investments on South Africa and has been hesitant about investing in Nigeria.

9. Conclusions

- At the heart of this conference on Nigeria’s foreign policy in the post-Cold War era was the question of whether a relatively resourceful and ambitious country like Nigeria can be a force for stability and democratization in Africa. This is an important question, given the enormity of Africa’s problems and the limited interest and commitment of many external actors to the continent following the end of the Cold War. The theoretical and practical aspects of Nigeria’s foreign policy, the institutions and processes of policy formulation, and the “concentric circles” of domestic, regional and external influences on Nigeria’s foreign policy were therefore the major issues discussed during the conference.

- The end of the Cold War has resulted in a fundamental change in the dynamics of contemporary international politics. Developing countries, like Nigeria, with oil wealth, a large army and a large pool of well-educated citizens are now able to play a leadership role in Africa, due to the reduced strategic significance of the continent for major external powers. However, while policymakers and executors of Nigeria’s foreign policy appear to be committed to responding to demands, pressures and influences from the external environment to contribute to regional peacekeeping, they also need to respond appropriately to domestic pressures and influences, especially those derived from popular public opinion. A civilian regime, unlike military governments, also faces pressure from the parliament and the press.

- While Nigeria’s immense potential is clearly based on its demographic size of over 100 million people, its multiethnic population, its vast oil reserves and its reservoir of highly skilled and educated people, the majority of its people remain poor with a per capita income of less than $500. Likewise, while Nigeria has played a vital role in international peacekeeping both under the auspices of the United Nations, as well as the Economic Community of West African States Ceasefire Monitoring Group, Nigeria itself has been immersed in conflict, either at the level of intra-elite struggles for power or conflicts within the context of its troubled federal experiment. Thus, while Nigeria possesses the necessary potential as well as institutional structures needed to formulate a vibrant foreign policy, its constraints lie in domestic factors, namely, the nature of the foreign policy elite and Nigeria’s economic dependence and vulnerability.
Regionally, Nigeria has seen itself and been perceived by others, as a global player on the world stage, from its role in the African liberation struggle and its leadership of the Economic Community of West African States during the Cold War era to more recent peacekeeping operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Nigeria’s approach to both Africa and its immediate neighbors is based on a policy of decolonization, non-interference, respect for inherited borders, economic integration and commitment to practical policies that promote African unity.

Externally, since its independence in 1960, Nigeria has sought to play a full and active role in the international community. Its leaders have attached even greater importance to this role because Nigeria has felt a special responsibility, as Africa’s most populous nation, to act as an unofficial spokesperson for Africa and for all black people in international fora. Some have defined this as a Pax Nigeriana, an effort to achieve hegemonic leadership in Africa by a country that accounts for over half of West Africa’s population and economic strength and has a 94,000-strong army that dwarfs the combined strength of those of its fourteen ECOWAS neighbors. Examining the ways in which Nigeria has pursued its foreign policy objectives through an extensive network of multilateral relations and the impact of external factors in its foreign policy formulation is a critical dimension in the study of Nigeria’s foreign policy after the Cold War. Likewise, an analysis of Nigeria’s key bilateral relationships with South Africa, Cameroon, France, Britain, the United States and Japan is also critical to understanding Nigeria’s post-Cold War foreign policy.

Three of the key observations that emerged from the Oxford conference included the following:

- First, in order to understand how Nigeria’s foreign policy has developed in the post-Cold War era, an analysis of the history of Nigeria’s foreign policy should take a longer historical perspective, examining the problems that developed in the post-colonial period and the legacy this has bequeathed to Nigeria’s contemporary foreign policy.

- Second, linked to the historical perspective, the continuing crisis of legitimacy of the Nigerian state needs to be addressed, a theme which recurred throughout the conference.

- Finally, understanding the impact of globalization, and in particular the communications revolution, was raised by several participants as being a critical subject, due to the way in which it has affected the context and nature of Nigeria’s foreign policy formulation. Linking these factors and assessing their impact on Nigeria’s foreign policy was a crucial goal of this conference.

Participants underscored the fact that the future of Nigeria’s foreign policy will depend on astute “economic diplomacy” that tackles effectively issues like debt relief, foreign investment and promoting NEPAD. It is therefore necessary that the country’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs be strengthened if it is to be effective in executing this policy. Nigeria’s diplomats must be better trained and its foreign missions better funded. In practical terms, six key policy recommendations were put forward, focused on the need for Nigeria’s foreign policy to be guided by carefully crafted policies and actions. These include:

1. Nigeria should pursue goals of democracy, good governance and respect for human rights at home to ensure its leadership role is credible abroad. It should do this through the AU, ECOWAS, NEPAD and CSSDCA.

2. Nigeria must promote regional and pan-African economic integration building on the lead Nigeria has taken in fast-tracking the integration process in ECOWAS. Nigeria must strongly support the building of a common market in West Africa and the creation of a common currency.

3. Pan-African integration, based on self-reliance and self-sustained development, should be a top
priority for Nigeria’s development, and should be sustained together with its strategic alliances with South Africa, Ghana, and possibly Egypt.

4. Nigeria must share its conflict management experiences with other regional and sub-regional organizations such as the AU, the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA). It must also support the effective functioning of the ECOWAS security mechanism of 1999 and ensure that the UN shares the burden of peacekeeping more equitably.

5. Nigeria should help to ensure the full establishment of the institutions of the African Union, ensuring particularly that the AU has adequate powers and funds to carry out its mandate and helping to strengthen its work in the areas of peace, security, governance and economic integration and development.

6. Finally, Nigeria must pursue an active agenda in the World Trade Organization negotiations. In particular, it should support the decision at the WTO Ministerial Conference in Doha to launch a “development” trade round and work to secure agreements in the areas of market access for the agricultural and other goods of developing countries and trade-related intellectual property rights, particularly, in allowing developing countries the time to decide whether or not to grant patent protection in such vital areas as pharmaceuticals, food and other areas.
ANNEX I: Dinner Address

The Nigerian Revolution Reconsidered (summarized version)

Chief Allison A. Ayida, Former Head of the Nigerian Civil Service

Introduction

The reconsideration of my book, The Nigerian Revolution 1966-1976, is a Herculean task. With the benefit of hindsight, it is an uphill task. However, it can be accomplished. With my head bowed and subdued, I can say with little hesitation that the Nigerian Revolution never took place. Alternatively, it did take place, but in the wrong direction.

There have been revolutionary changes. However, the resultant effect of the changes has been negative and we are yet to see the positive changes. A cursory review of the changes shows that, like all revolutions, the early victims were the leaders – the sons and daughters of the revolution. The military leaders, the top civil servants and university dons all fell by the wayside. In this case, the political class was a major casualty and many left the country in exile.

After some deep reflection, I have decided to share some of my inner thoughts on the past, present and future of Nigeria with you, by analyzing the social and economic forces that have determined the course of events in this country since 1966.

Part of the thesis of this address is the contention that there have been many complex factors at play in Nigeria since the attainment of independence, and that since 1966, the method and organization of the Nigerian society has undergone some fundamental changes, which if not arrested, could qualify as the beginning of a national revolution. Unfortunately, the Nigerian Revolution is a revolution without a vanguard. The prediction is that unless a vanguard can be evolved to provide the leadership and the impetus for the revolutionary forces at work, the Nigerian revolution is bound to prove abortive.

Some Benchmarks of the Military Revolution

We are concerned at this stage with fundamental changes introduced by the advent of the military – changes that could not easily have occurred under the rivalry and the rigidities of party politics. The distribution of economic power and the public patronage among individuals and ethnic and rural groups, is one of the main issues of our recent experience. Other equally important issues include the creation of states, the distribution of resources, and the incorporation of civilian advisers by the military.

Indigenization of the Economy

Orthodox economics cannot explain the current crusade of indigenization of certain expatriate businesses if we were preoccupied with efficiency and economic growth. Just as most of us would not have become permanent secretaries, general managers of public corporations, high-ranking military officers and even university professors, if the expatriate holders of such posts did not surrender their jobs to us at independence, political necessity dictated that the private sector adopt strategies and yardsticks similar to those that necessitated the Nigerianization of the public sector at independence. The program of indigenization of the economy may turn out to be one of the most important landmarks of the military. There is therefore no need for the authorities to continue to adopt an apologetic stance in a matter of historical necessity and national pride. It should be pointed out that the program of indigenization began in earnest with the introduction of the famous Part 10 of the Companies Decree of 1968 that compelled all alien enterprises to register as Nigerian entities. The program also includes the current commitment of the federal government to assume “the commanding heights of the economy” through effective participation in the strategic sectors of the economy, notably in...
the petroleum, banking, commerce and agriculture industries.

The Creation of States

A second landmark development under military rule was the creation of states. The official pronouncement by General Yakubu Gowon, head of the Federal Military Government between 1966-1975, outlined five criteria for state formation. First, no one state can dominate another. Second, each state must conform to a geographical area. Third, states could form on the basis of administrative convenience, history and the people’s wishes. Fourth, states must be administratively viable. Fifth, new states must be created at the same time.

Although this is not the place to give a detailed account of how the states came to be established on 27 May 1967, I wish to mention four aspects of the creation of states that may be relevant in the future, as the country may consider the creation of more states. First, the criteria laid down demonstrate that the number twelve is of no strategic value as such. Second, the linguistic principles were conspicuously set aside or subsumed when using “the facts of history” as a criterion. Third, the most sensitive potential threat to the stability of the Nigerian federation was and remains a North-South confrontation. It was of great strategic importance that the number of states in the “northern” parts of the country should be seen to be equal to the number of “southern” states (this was an important consideration which could not be made explicit in the days of “the gathering storm” in early 1967). Fourth, there had to be a Lagos state without splitting the Yoruba heartland, as part of the strategy of containing the former conditional secessionists in the then Western region, who were convinced that, if the Nigerian federation disintegrated through the breakaway of the Eastern region, Lagos would automatically become part of the new “Republic of Oduduwa.”

Despite the use of federalism as a stabilization tool, the next threat to the continued existence of Nigeria will not come from the East. The next crisis is most likely to have its origins in basic economic issues and social conflict – the equitable allocation and proper management of the disposable resources of the federation and the familiar class conflict between the haves and the have-nots. What Nigeria lacked most in the past (and one can add, the present), has been a national sense of purpose, particularly in economic matters. The federal government must therefore occupy the commanding heights of the economy in the quest for purposeful national development and provide the leadership and honest administration necessary for the attainment of a national sense of purpose. Government intervention in economic matters, designed primarily to protect and promote the public interest, is therefore fully justified.

Distribution of Resources

The establishment of the new states and the issue of equitable geographical distribution of available resources led to the appointment by the federal government of the Interim Revenue Allocation Review Committee in July 1968 under the chairmanship of the late Chief I. O. Dina. The Dina Committee was to “look into and suggest any change in the existing system of revenue allocation as a whole as well as new revenue sources.” In its conclusion, the Committee declared that “fiscal arrangements in the country should reflect the new spirit of unity to which the nation is dedicated...[A]ll the sources of revenue of this country [are] to be used for executing the kinds of programmes which can maintain this unity.”

Many of the Committee’s most controversial recommendations were implemented, with suitable amendments where necessary. Two important recommendations from the Dina Interim Fiscal Review Committee Report relate to its recommendation on the formula for allocating revenue among the states and the issue of offshore oil revenues. The former generated so much heated debate among the states that the Supreme Military Council adopted a “compromise” formula based on 50 per cent equality and 50 per cent population. The proportions due to each state on the application of these two factors were quantified in the report. The Dina report also recommended that offshore oil revenue should be shared through the new Distributable Joint Accounts, which allocated 60 per cent of oil revenues to the federal government and 40 per cent to the states. But a subsequent decision
provided the federal government with 100 per cent of oil revenues. It was the first time in the country’s fiscal history that the regions lost a major revenue source to the center, since the introduction of fiscal federalism in 1954. The previous situation had placed the country at a crossroads: the more revenue the federal government lost to the states, the weaker its capacity to assist poorer states; the states could not eat their cake and have it, too.

Civil Advisers to the Military

The last benchmark of the military revolution is the role of civilian advisers under the military. Of the many advisers and pressure groups, two groups are notable: 1) the senior civil servants and university dons; and 2) civil commissioners. Civilian advisers were to assist the military to govern by interpreting the wishes of the people to the military and vice-versa. Unfortunately, although civil advisers appointed to the Federal Executive Council in June 1968 had full ministerial powers, the military was in power, and not political parties. Thus, if civil commissioners appeared sidelined, it is because commissioners were not appointed to run the government as political masters, but as servants of the military, the new political masters.

Nonetheless, it is erroneous to conclude that the military marginalized civilian advisers for three reasons. First, between 15 January 1966, when the military came to power, and 12 June 1967, federal permanent secretaries headed ministries without ministers until commissioners were appointed on a later date. It is not generally realized that during this period, all ministerial powers were vested in the Federal Executive Council and not in individual permanent secretaries. When the military first seized power, one of their first suggestions was to draw members of the federal cabinet from the military, the universities and some federal permanent secretaries. We declined to serve and preferred to retain our traditional role as advisers. Second, during the civil war, some civil commissioners were called upon to defend the government, leading some to conclude that civil commissioners had lost their independence. Last, while senior civil servants are called upon to serve on the boards of public corporations and other statutory agencies, they may not be visible. However, it is not often realized that because a permanent secretary may be scheduled to sit on many boards, he often designates a representative to serve in his place.

Those who are anxious to criticize the so-called new role of senior officials under the military should remember that the military administration is a “corrective” or revolutionary regime of all the talents drawn from the universities and other walks of life. My personal impression is that the military rulers are very receptive to new ideas, provided they are well articulated. What the country suffers from is the poverty of new ideas and well-thought-out policy reform proposals based on a full knowledge of the workings of the system.

Aims of the Revolution

While the motivations behind the coup d’état of 15 January 1966 died with its plotters, there is enough evidence to indicate that the event of 29 July 1966 was planned mainly as a revenge coup, with no political program on what was to follow. The original aim of the military administration was very limited: to restore order and return the country to civil rule in six months. By 30 November 1966, the picture had changed dramatically. The ad hoc committee on the constitution was dissolved and the military rulers assumed full responsibility for political decisions and for keeping the country together. The mandate and the positions of the regional delegates to the ad hoc Constitutional Conference differed considerably. Unable to achieve any positive results, they had to be disbanded. As such, by the time the Aburi decisions were reached in 1967, the military leaders were no longer on the same wavelength; even the words used in Aburi had different meanings for the various participants. This much was clear to the group of federal permanent secretaries who had gone on a pilgrimage to State House, Enugu, in November 1966 to plead with the former military governor, Colonel Emeka Ojukwu, not to carry out his secession threat.

The real difficulty with Aburi, which was never made public at the time, was that the military leaders agreed in a private session, which was not recorded at the request of Colonel Ojukwu, that Colonel Yakubu
Gowon was to become the Commander-in-Chief (in place of the title of Supreme Commander) and Ojukwu agreed to serve under him in the spirit of Aburi. We are all familiar with the tragic pattern of events that followed the press charges and counter-charges of bad faith.

One could speak at length on the tragic events of the war and their impact on the post-war situation. But on this occasion, our interest is in the post-war situation and the probable course of events around 1976. In this respect, the so-called Nine-Point Program is important. Seven out of the nine points are major social reform measures. Specifically, the Nine-Point Program proposes the re-organization of the armed forces; the repair of the damage and neglect of the war; the eradication of corruption in our national life; the settlement of the question of the creation of more states; the introduction of a new revenue allocation formula; the conducting of a national population census; and the reorganization of genuinely national parties. The other two points, preparation and adoption of a new constitution and the organization of elections for the installation of popular governments at the state and the central levels, can be regarded as steps on the road to civilian rule.

One of the main tasks facing the Armed Forces, that of re-organizing itself, is indeed a difficult one in the post-war situation. Reform was hindered by the army’s rapid expansion coupled with the undefined role of security forces in peace time. Moreover, soldiers who fought to “protect civilians” expected an enhanced status in peace time. Notwithstanding such difficulties, the military administration embarked on an ambitious program of social reforms and legislation. Policy initiatives spanned policies from the abortive price control measures, to rent control decrees, to the laws governing divorce.

**Institutional Reforms**

By 1976, it was evident that nothing had changed after ten years of military rule. Critical issues in need of resolution then and now include the nature of political parties, the management of the economy and ensuring the de-politicization of the civil service.

**Nature of Political Parties**

Ten years after the onset of military rule, strategies had yet to be developed that would encourage the formation of parties with a national outlook. The country has no mechanism to judge the degree of nationalism in each party’s platform. Moreover, while a party can have support in more than one state, it does not guarantee that it will be genuinely “national” in outlook. The country could pursue two possible paths. Under one approach, the military administration could declare party politics open and leave democratic forces to settle the issue of national leadership. In pursuing this route, understanding the causes of the failure of the 1966 ad hoc constitutional conference would be important. Alternatively, the military could sponsor a national movement outside the country to which no serious opposition would be allowed. Yet, this alternative would have very serious implications – namely, it risks the politicization of the military.

**Military rule without the total mobilization and involvement of the people is an aberration and is basically unstable.** On the other hand, in light of our recent history, there is equally convincing evidence to demonstrate that a national leadership acceptable to the country as a whole did not emerge after 1976 through an autonomous election. In mobilizing people, organizing parties on state or ethnic bases should be avoided at all costs. It could lead to a return of the military, probably without any clearly defined purpose or sense of mission. Instead, the federal constitution could provide for statutory grants to all officially recognized parties to reduce their dependence on the unofficial “contribution by patronage” of their members in office in the states or at the center. Although, this creates a dangerous potential for a “one-party state.”

**Management of the Economy**

A second critical area, economic management, should encompass institutional reforms that create a supreme National Economic Council. Such a national economic council would have decision-making power over national planning, development projects, and revenue allocation. The central planning office in the ministry...
of economic development should serve the proposed national economic council. In turn, the ministry should, with the enhanced developmental and coordinating power of the federal government, eventually attain the status of a national planning commission. Equally important, government must carefully navigate the opening of the economy to the free market, while protecting small and medium size companies from the effects of globalization. Indeed, even with privatization as an end, the government may have to provide the seed money for starting new projects and promoting indigenization – strong proof that the government cannot abandon all responsibility for economic growth.

Politicization of the Civil Service

Under no circumstances should the civil services of this country be politicized. Federal civil service personnel should, in the interest of national stability, continue to be recruited from all parts of the country. Additionally, while insisting on reasonable standards, the civil service should not institute a quota system. A non-political civil service, adequately staffed to give non-partisan and competent advice without fear or favor, remains the best guarantee of a modern and stable administration in this country. Is it totally unrealistic to expect the same of the military after 27 years in power? Assessments differ.

From 1976, succeeding governments have been worse than previous governments in matters of resource misallocation and abuse of office. The best that the current administration of Olusegun Obasanjo can do is to stop the rot. We are yet to see the upturn. When we do, that will mark the turning point and the rebirth of the Nigerian Revolution.
ANNEX II: Agenda

Friday 11 July 2003

9:30 am – 10:00 am  Welcoming Remarks

Dr. Abdul Raufu Mustapha, Queen Elizabeth House and
St. Antony’s College, Oxford University, United Kingdom

Dr. Yuen Foong Khong, Director, Centre for International Studies,
Oxford University, United Kingdom

10:00 am – 11:20 am  Panel I: Nigeria’s Foreign Policy: Theory, History and Practice

Chair: Dr. Christopher Kolade, High Commissioner of Nigeria to the
United Kingdom

Professor Ibrahim Gambari, Special Adviser to the UN Secretary-General
on Africa and former Nigerian Foreign Minister, “The Theory and Practice
of Nigeria’s Foreign Policy” (Tabled Paper)

Professor Kayode Soremekun, Department of International Relations,
Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Nigeria, “A History of Nigeria’s
Foreign Policy”

Professor Joy Ogwu, Director-General, Nigerian Institute of International Affairs,
Lagos, Nigeria, “Nigeria’s Foreign Policy: Alternative Futures”

11:20 am – 12:50 pm  Panel II: The Domestic Context: Discordant Notes

Chair: Ms. Joy Ezeilo, University of Nigeria, Enugu Campus, Nigeria

Professor Attahiru Jega, Director, Mambayya House, Bayero University,
Kano, Nigeria, “Domestic Influences on Foreign Policy Formulation”

Dr. Abdul Raufu Mustapha, Queen Elizabeth House and St. Antony’s College,
Oxford University, United Kingdom, “Nigeria: Nationhood, Identity
and Foreign Policy”

2:00 pm – 3:45 pm  Panel III: The Domestic Context: Institutions and the Military

Chair: Chief Allison A. Ayida, Former Head of the Nigerian Civil Service, Nigeria

Dr. Cyril Obi, Senior Research Fellow, Nigerian Institute of International Affairs,
Lagos, Nigeria, “The Domestic Interface of Nigeria’s Foreign Policy: Institutions,
Processes and Policy Formulation”
4:00 pm – 5:00 pm  
**Panel IV: The Domestic Context: Oil and Foreign Policy**

Chair:  
Professor Douglas Rimmer, Birmingham University, United Kingdom

Dr. Ike Okonta, Post-Doctoral Fellow, University of California, Berkeley, California, United States, “The Disease of Elephants: Oil-rich ‘Minority’ Areas, Shell, and International NGOs”

6:30 pm – 9:30 pm  
**Dinner and Special Presentation**

Chair:  
Dr. Haroun Al-Rashid Adamu, Adamu and Associates, Garki, Abuja, Nigeria

Chief Allison A. Ayida, Former Head of the Nigerian Civil Service, Nigeria, “The Nigerian Revolution Reconsidered”

**Saturday 12 July 2003**

9:30 am – 10:45 am  
**Panel V: The Regional Context: Diplomacy and Trade**

Chair:  
Professor Gwendolyn Mikell, Georgetown University, Washington D.C.

Professor Akinjide Osuntokun, University of Lagos, Lagos, Nigeria, “Nigeria and Her Neighbors”

Ms. Kate Meagher, Nuffield College, Oxford University, United Kingdom, “New Regionalism or Loose Cannon? Informal Cross-Border Trade and Regional Integration in West Africa”

11:00 am – 12:50 am  
**Panel VI: The Regional Context: Security, Conflict and Hegemonic Cooperation**

Chair:  
Mr. A.H.M. Kirk-Greene, Emeritus Fellow, St. Antony’s College, Oxford University, United Kingdom

Dr. Adekeye Adebajo, Director, Africa Program, International Peace Academy “Nigeria’s Military Interventions: Hegemony on a Shoestring”

Dr. Christopher Landsberg, Director, Centre for Policy Studies, Johannesburg, South Africa, “The Diplomacy of Giantism? South Africa and Nigeria’s Construction of the AU and NEPAD”

Ms. Joy Ezeilo, Faculty of Law, University of Nigeria, Nigeria, “Nigeria and Cameroon: The Bakassi Dispute”
2:15 pm – 3:15 pm  
**Panel VII: The External Context: Key Multilateral and Bilateral Relations**

Chair: Dr. Yuen Foong Khong, Director, Centre for International Studies, Oxford University, United Kingdom

Dr. Martin Uhomoibhi, Deputy Head of Mission, Embassy of Nigeria, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, “Nigeria’s Major Multilateral Relations: The Commonwealth, the EU & the UN”. (Paper presented by Dr. Abiodun Alao, King’s College, London, United Kingdom)

Mr. Kaye Whiteman, Former Editor, West Africa Magazine, London, United Kingdom

Professor Gwendolyn Mikell, Georgetown University, Washington D.C.
“Nigeria-US Relations”

3:30 pm – 4:30 pm  
**Panel VIII: The External Context: The French Factor and Japan**

Chair: Professor Joy Ogwu, Director-General, Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Lagos, Nigeria

Professor Jean-Francois Medard, CEAN, Institut d’Etudes Politiques, University of Bordeaux, Montesquieu, France, “Nigeria, France and Africa”

Dr. Kweku Ampiah, Sterling University, Scotland, “Japan, Africa and Nigeria”

4:30 pm -5:30 pm  
**Discussion: Publication of the conference report and producing a policy-relevant edited book on the conference.**

Chair: Dr Adekeye Adebajo, Director, Africa Program, International Peace Academy

5:30 pm – 7:00 pm  
**Closing Remarks**

Dr. Abdul Raufu Mustapha, Queen Elizabeth House and St. Antony’s College, Oxford University, United Kingdom

7:00 pm  
**Closing Dinner**

Courtesy of African Studies

Welcome by Professor William Beinart, Chair of Race Relations, St. Antony’s College, Oxford University, United Kingdom
ANNEX III: List of Participants

1. Dr. Haroun Adamu  
   Adamu & Associates  
   Abuja, Nigeria

2. Dr. Adekeye Adebajo  
   International Peace Academy  
   New York, New York

3. Mr. Richard Adejola  
   Nigerian High Commission  
   London, United Kingdom

4. Dr. Abiodun Alao  
   King's College  
   London, United Kingdom

5. Dr. Kweku Ampiah  
   Sterling University  
   Scotland, United Kingdom

6. Chief Allison A. Ayida  
   Former Head of the Nigerian Civil Service  
   Lagos, Nigeria

7. Mr. Usman Baraya  
   Nigerian High Commission  
   London, United Kingdom

8. Mr. Craig Dowler  
   Inter-Faith Coalition on Africa  
   Toronto, Canada

9. Ms. Joy Ezeilo  
   University of Nigeria  
   Nsukka, Nigeria

10. Dr. William Fawole  
    Obafemi Awolowo University  
    Ile-Ife, Nigeria

11. Professor Attahiru Jega  
    Director  
    Mambayya House  
    Bayero University  
    Kano, Nigeria

12. H.E. Dr. Christopher Kolade  
    Nigerian High Commissioner  
    London, United Kingdom

13. Mr. Yomi Kristilolu  
    University of Essex  
    Essex, United Kingdom

14. Dr. Christopher Landsberg  
    Director  
    Centre for Policy Studies  
    Parktown, South Africa

15. Professor Jean-Francois Medard  
    University of Bordeaux  
    Montesquieu, France

16. Professor Gwendolyn Mikell  
    Georgetown University  
    Washington, D.C.

17. Ms. Rosemary Nuamah  
    International Policy Officer, Labour Party  
    London, United Kingdom

18. Dr. Cyril Obi  
    Nigerian Institute of International Affairs  
    Lagos, Nigeria

19. Professor Joy Ogwu  
    Director-General  
    Nigerian Institute of International Affairs  
    Lagos, Nigeria

20. Mr. Ayo Oke  
    Nigerian High Commission  
    London, United Kingdom

21. Dr. Ike Okonta  
    University of California  
    Berkeley, California

22. Professor Akinjide Osuntokun  
    University of Lagos  
    Lagos, Nigeria
23. Mr. Olly Owen  
   London, United Kingdom

24. Mr. Dapo Oyewole  
   Centre for Democracy and Development  
   London, United Kingdom

25. Professor Douglas Rimmer  
   University of Birmingham  
   Birmingham, United Kingdom

26. Professor Kayode Soremekun  
   Obafemi Awolowo University  
   Ile-Ife, Nigeria

27. Professor Elliot Skinner  
   Columbia University  
   New York, New York

28. Ms. Nicole Stremlau  
   School of Oriental and African Studies  
   London, United Kingdom

29. Mr. Olukayode Thomas  
   The Guardian Newspaper  
   Lagos, Nigeria

30. Mr. Brian Thomson  
   Department for International Development  
   London, United Kingdom

31. Mr. Kaye Whiteman  
   Former editor  
   West Africa Magazine  
   London, United Kingdom

Oxford University  
   Oxford, United Kingdom

32. Dr. Patrick Davies  
   St. Antony’s College

33. Dr. Georg Deutsch  
   St. Cross College

34. Dr. Yuen Foong Khong,  
   Nuffield College

35. Mr. A.H.M. Kirk-Greene  
   St. Antony’s College

36. Ms. Kate Meagher  
   Nuffield College

37. Dr. Abdul Raufu Mustapha  
   Queen Elizabeth House and St. Antony’s College

38. Ms Kathryn Nwajiaku  
   Nuffield College

39. Mr. Gavin Williams  
   St. Peter’s College