Strengthening the Security-Development Nexus: Assessing International Policy and Practice Since the 1990s

Conference Report

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Acknowledgements

The International Peace Academy's Program on the Security-Development Nexus is funded by the Rockefeller Foundation and the governments of Australia, Canada (DFAIT and CIDA), Germany, Luxembourg, Norway, and the United Kingdom (DfID). This IPA program also greatly benefits from core support from the governments of Sweden and Denmark as well as from the Ford Foundation and the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation.

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Executive Summary

- Intra-state conflicts have become a major international concern in the last decade. Significant advances have been made by the international community in addressing the causes and consequences of these conflicts, leading to a reconsideration of the relationship between security and development. International actors are increasingly aware that these are interdependent and an integral part of comprehensive conflict management strategies. Yet, more research is needed on the conceptual underpinning of the security-development linkage, and on its implications for project analysis, planning and implementation.

- Three key sectors are regarded as essential for building sustainable peace and have generated extensive international programming: governance, security sector and rule of law. Rebuilding state institutions and enhancing their administrative capacity on the basis of good governance principles is now a key priority for most international actors. An effective, credible and accountable security sector is also crucial for conflict management. It provides an environment safe and secure enough to enable other initiatives a chance of taking root. Similarly, (re)-establishing the rule of law through judicial and legal reforms is regarded as a prerequisite for the development of stable and peaceful societies.

- A common theme emerges across the review of sectoral programming by international actors: the policy commitments to integration have yet to be systematically mainstreamed into programming. Achieving reform requires disentangling thick Gordian knots of management, leadership, attitudes, established behaviors and lack of public trust. However, systemic blockages do not alone explain poor programming outcomes. Conflict management design is often alien to the prevailing context, in part because there is insufficient engagement of local actors. Coordination among the many external agencies involved is rare, even within the sectors themselves. At the same time, efforts are burdened by unrealistic expectations that do not match the level of funding and staffing available.

- Realism and humility are required: the international community must do better rather than more. Reorienting these sectors is a difficult and long-term endeavor. Institutions need to learn lessons from past practice and devise strategic approaches. Solutions must be rooted in, and appropriate to the contexts within which they take place. The missions planned for Burundi, Ivory Coast, Haiti and Sudan will determine whether policy commitments to comprehensive and integrated conflict management can parlay into reality on the ground.
1. Introduction

Since the end of the Cold War, it has become commonplace to assert that security and development are interlinked, interdependent and mutually reinforcing. Long-term development is regarded as hinging upon security, and lasting security depends upon sustainable development. Consequently, programming in what traditionally were two discrete sectors is increasingly meshing. Institutions conventionally associated with ‘development’ are becoming involved in the ‘security’ sphere and vice versa. Bilateral and multilateral donors have integrated developmental and security considerations in responding to intra-state conflicts; United Nations agencies, most notably the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), increasingly take into account the linkages between security and development as they plan programming across the different conflict phases.

While there is also a growing body of academic and policy research on various dimensions of the link between security and development in conflict management, comprehensive analyses of the interplay between security and development approaches are still lacking. In three particular areas in which there has been extensive international programming—governance, security sector and rule of law—the ever-intertwining operations of development and security actors have direct implications for programming effectiveness at each stage in the conflict cycle (conflict prevention, peace making & implementation and postconflict peacebuilding).

Against this backdrop, the International Peace Academy organized the launch conference of the Security-Development Nexus Program1 in New York on 5 December 2003. Gathering together over 120 academics, practitioners and policy-makers, the aim of the conference was to:

a. examine advances that have been made in linking the UN Agendas for Peace and Development in the 1990s;
b. identify the challenges faced by the security and development communities in moving towards a more integrated conflict management approach; and
c. identify the difficult political, institutional, operational and policy challenges facing security and development practitioners, policy makers and researchers in the changed international environment of the early 21st century.

This report discusses some of the more relevant insights that emerged from the debate generated at the conference, with a view to furthering research and policy-making on the security-development nexus. It reviews the activities of development and security communities in the areas of governance, security sector and rule of law, highlights cross-sectoral concerns, suggests common approaches for more effective conflict management, and considers future trends and challenges.

II. The Security and Development Nexus

In the last ten years, intra-state conflicts have by far outnumbered international conflicts, causing over 7 million deaths, 75% of them amongst civilians, and annihilating basic public services and state institutions at the national and local levels.2 Many other states, while not at war, are seriously underdeveloped, unable to exercise effective governmental authority and at increased risk of violent upheaval. The international community has made important efforts to address the causes and consequences of intra-state conflicts. Security has been redefined to encompass people’s security, leading to an exponential growth in the number of peacekeeping missions with multidimensional mandates that include policing, rule of law

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1 See Program Description, Appendix II.
3 See for instance the OECD Study, “Security Issues and Development Cooperation: A Conceptual Framework for Enhancing Policy Coherence,” DAC Journal Vol.2 No.3 (2001), which states that “the security of states and the security of people should be seen as mutually reinforcing, suggesting that unmet social, political and economic needs may provoke popular unrest and opposition to governments, ultimately making them more vulnerable to internal and external threats,” p. 42.
and human rights elements. Development agencies have also shown interest in the relationship between conflict and social development, and have engaged in activities such as public sector, security sector and judicial reforms, and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) in post-conflict settings. In his keynote address, UNDP Administrator Mark Malloch Brown acknowledged the increasing nexus between security and development, and emphasized the need to develop a conceptual framework that captures the complexity of the relationship between conflict and development.4

The opening panel discussed the ways in which security and development agendas have merged and expanded over the past decade. While 'root causes' and comprehensive approaches to development may have been at first mere rhetorical repackaging, they eventually led to the emergence of conditionality approaches, implemented for instance by the European Union towards Kenya and Ivory Coast,5 and of post-conflict interventions in Cambodia or El Salvador.6 Thus, issues that were traditionally absent from the development discourse, such as governance, reconciliation, justice and security have been progressively regarded as essential components of development approaches.

However, it is the promotion of conflict prevention strategies that has most significantly affected the scope of the development and security agendas. The recent emphasis on the necessity to address the structural as well as the operational causes of conflicts has propelled development policies to the forefront of the conflict prevention agenda.7 This expansion of the conflict management remit is not without problems, however. Politically, the fact that conflict prevention now potentially targets all developing countries makes it particularly contentious with these very countries.8 It also requires an in-depth understanding of the intertwined functions of security and development actors in this arena. Finally, the added value of the expansion at the implementing level has been less than clear. For example, two tools in the conflict management arsenal—conflict assessment frameworks and early warning reports—still suffer from serious methodological flaws and appear to be of negligible use when a quick crisis response is needed. Based on the inescapable logic that war is far more expensive than peace, conflict prevention will nevertheless remain one of the top priorities of the international community, requiring further research on ways to ensure effective partnership between security, political and development actors.

4 See Appendix I.
6 P. Uvin, note above, p. 9.
Participants in the first panel concluded that a model or rationale that would justify the ever-expanding mandates of security and development institutions was still needed. As one contributor opined, the growth of research in this area is not so much elucidating the issues as illustrating how little is actually understood of the link between security and development. The effect of an international intervention upon a host country at any stage of the conflict cycle still remains to be fully investigated. One panelist even argued that a positive correlation between development assistance and peace had yet to be proven. In some cases, well-meaning development assistance may have had the effect of inflaming conflict or grievance, rather than dampening it. Too much aid at once may, for instance, have detrimental results such as rampant corruption and wage inflation. The argument for aid ‘front-loading,’ while appealing, needs to be tested with further research on the capacity to usefully absorb aid.

In addition to the need to improve conflict management strategies, fundamental questions remain to be addressed: can or should security and development strategies be necessarily linked? Are external interventions intended to avert conflict and build peace actually doing what they intend? What is the best way to promote and embed evolving policies at the intersection of security and development?

III. Areas of Programming

In order to address intra-state conflicts, security and development institutions have adopted comprehensive approaches, expanding their mandates through the addition of new programs and activities. Most of these activities can be grouped under three distinct sectors or areas of programming, that is, governance, security sector and rule of law. Support for governance activities has stemmed from the proposition that accountable and capable state institutions are a prerequisite for economic development. The realization that law and order is a priority in conflict management has contributed to the growth of security sector reform and rule of law programs.

Governance

Of the three areas of programming, governance remains the most difficult to conceptually pin down, and the potential scope of intervention seems limitless; in fact, rule of law and even security sector activities are sometimes subsumed under governance. The lack

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10 P. Uvin, note above, p. 11.
11 Studies by the World Bank showed that the peak absorption period tends to be around five years after the end of conflict. On this question, see D. Smith, “Getting Their Act Together: Towards A Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding,” study commissioned by the Evaluation Department of the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the Joint Utstein Study on Peacebuilding, November 2003, p. 59. The Utstein group was created in 1999 by the development ministers of Germany, the Netherlands, Norway and the UK, recently joined by Canada and Sweden, with the objective of improving coordination and coherence in their respective development policies.
12 UNDP includes under its governance practice access to justice and human rights, http://www.undp.org/governance/index.htm; the
of agreement on terms and definitions is most striking in this ever-growing area of international cooperation, which now takes over 40% of UNDP’s budget.\textsuperscript{13}

There is no internation ally agreed definition of governance, even though the promotion of good governance has been reiterated in countless international documents, and is now regarded as a core element of sustainable development.\textsuperscript{14} UNDP defines governance as “the exercise of political, economic, and administrative authority in the management of a country’s affairs at all levels,”\textsuperscript{15} while the EU considers it to be “the rules, processes, and behavior by which interests are articulated, resources are managed, and power is exercised in society.”\textsuperscript{16} It is, in other words, a technocratic synonym for politics used by international agencies to undertake programming in highly charged political environments. It is politics, “a grubby brokerage of interests and values without coming to blows,” that is in fact at the core of conflict prevention and post-conflict peacebuilding, claimed one panelist.

The concept of good governance is also fraught with difficulties. There is growing consensus that democratic processes, political participation, equality, accountability, effectiveness and transparency characterize good governance, but in turn the very definition of these concepts is still fiercely debated amongst political theorists and policy-makers. The current controversy over the electoral agenda in Iraq is one of many examples that illustrate the complexity of these issues.\textsuperscript{17}

Activities of governance programs range widely and include strengthening electoral and legislative systems, improving access to justice and public administration, supporting decentralization and developing greater capacity to deliver basic services. The whole spectrum of societal institutions is targeted: centralized, decentralized and local public institutions, the private sector and civil society. Programming in most cases is undertaken by development actors, except for electoral assistance in post-conflict contexts where it is often one of the main components of multidimensional peacekeeping.\textsuperscript{18} The UN executive mandates in Timor-Leste and Kosovo, and the complex state-building missions in Sierra Leone and Liberia, have also led to

\begin{itemize}
    \item The EU includes in its dialogue on governance, poverty reduction, security, human rights, migration and trade. See Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee on Governance and Development, COM (2003) 615 final, 20 October 2003, p. 2.
    \item 40.22% of UNDP’s budget went to governance in 2002, and 17.03% to crisis prevention and recovery, UNDP Annual Report 2003.
    \item See for example, UN Millenium Declaration para. 24-25, UNGA Res. 55/2, 8 September 2000; see also Resolution 2000/64 of the UN Commission of Human Rights on the role of good governance in the promotion of human rights, 26 April 2000.
    \item Governance for Sustainable Human Development, a UNDP Policy Document, January 1997. UNDP thus considers governance to reach beyond the political realm understood narrowly, ‘systemic governance’ encompassing economic, social and administrative processes as well.
    \item Communication from the Commission on Governance and Development, note above, p. 3.
    \item Within the UN, it is the Under-Secretary-General for political affairs, supported by the electoral assistance division created within
\end{itemize}
greater interest in governance issues as part of conflict management strategies.

The implementation of governance programming in these contexts presents specific challenges, such as the lack of effective government control over substantial parts of the state’s territory, non-permissive or insurgency environments, weak government capacity or the difficulty in finding appropriate local interlocutors. While governance approaches must be highly country-specific, there are some basic methodological and operational principles that are likely to be relevant in most cases. In the planning phase, the rationale for adopting particular approaches should be adequately explained, based on proper research and needs-assessment, so as to ensure methodological consistency in future operations. Progress has apparently been made in recent needs-assessment studies for Liberia and Afghanistan, but it remains to be seen whether their findings will bring significant improvement at the operational level. High flexibility in timing, sequencing and priority-setting at the implementation stage may also be recommended to respond to changing conditions in the field, but this may be a risky undertaking, as success may then be almost entirely dependent upon the drive and skills of field staff.

Panelists also concurred that governance programs should be introduced at the earliest stage in post-conflict settings and preferably as part of the process of political reconciliation, on the grounds that failure to provide assistance may create an institutional vacuum, with adverse consequences for the future. However, international involvement may be used by warring parties either to regroup or to seek political leverage in ongoing negotiations. A broad range of players have the ability to undermine peace processes, and one of the priorities of external actors should be to neutralize or at least limit the power of spoilers. In this respect, effective partnership with security actors in the conflict or immediate post-conflict phase is paramount, since the latter have greater experience in dealing with the complex political dynamics at play in these contexts.

Security Sector

In many conflict situations, the security sector is a potent symbol of wider conflict. An unaccountable and un-impugned security sector impinges directly upon development: it disenfranchises communities, contributes to poverty, distorts economies, creates instability and stunts political development. Consequently, reform to security sector institutions is a critical element of conflict prevention and peacebuilding strategies. It provides the opportunity to make a clean break from repressive traditions and provides a safe and secure environment to give political institutions and the economy space and opportunity to grow.

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DPA, which is the focal point for electoral assistance activities; see UNGA Resolution 46/137 of 1991 and Handbook on UN Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations, Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, December 2003, p. 148.


20 The Utstein study is particularly critical of the recurrent ‘strategic deficit’ in analysis and planning, note above, pp. 6, 46-48 and 50.


There has been a mushrooming of organizations involved in security sector reform (SSR) since the early 1990s.\textsuperscript{24} Traditionally seen as the purview of security actors, development agencies have increasingly engaged in programming activities in the security sector, ranging from the reform of the military, police restructuring, the strengthening of civil oversight mechanisms, to DDR programs.\textsuperscript{25}

Panelists agreed that SSR had shown itself to be an extremely costly, complex and challenging undertaking. Constructing new security sectors and refurbishing existing ones are fraught with daunting difficulties. Despite ever increasing resources funneled into it, SSR programming rarely seems to achieve its intended goals of reorienting the military and police from forces to be feared to services that are valued and trusted. Altering practice and increasing confidence among historically distrustful communities is a painstakingly slow process. Legacies of mistrust are difficult to overcome; a culture of reliance on, and trust in security institutions is difficult to create. Operating in tense political contexts, already difficult work is complicated further by the absence of legal and technical support that security forces elsewhere often take for granted.

Stabilizing the security sector, and stymieing the possibility that it spoils wider development processes, is crucial at all conflict stages. As argued by one of the panelists, the crumbling of local security providers in Iraq in the aftermath of the coalition advance demonstrated both the necessity of timely interventions and the deleterious consequences that can ensue in its absence. Nearly a year on, extensive military and police reform is underway in Iraq but is much more difficult now precisely because plans were not in place to effect it when it was needed most. Security sector reform has also been slow to take off in current interventions in Liberia and Afghanistan. Although many ‘lessons learned’ reports have emphasized the importance of strategic planning, this message has yet to permeate into programming.

Many actors are currently involved in facets of security sector reform programming but coordination is poor, and coherent approaches rare. As a result the next step–systematically joining sectoral programming with contemporaneous programming in governance and rule of law–rarely happens. To avert the perpetuation of what one panelist characterized as an “all over the place” approach, programming should conform to certain principles. Security sector reform needs to use solutions that are rooted in, and appropriate to, the different contexts within which they take place. Programming needs to understand that SSR is a long-term undertaking, and its sustainability is dependent upon consulting with local partners and tailoring programming to local needs in a much more rigorous manner than is currently the case.

**Rule of Law**

The rule of law is a general principle which demands that the law be applied fairly and equally to all natural and legal persons in a given community.\textsuperscript{26} In the last


\textsuperscript{26} The rule of law can also be defined as a "system in which the laws are public knowledge, are clear in meaning, and apply equally
decade, the international community has supported the implementation of programs designed to strengthen the rule of law in conflict-prone countries. Programming activities include advice on constitution and legislation drafting, judicial and law enforcement reforms, support to civil society and human rights organizations, and the establishment of transitional justice mechanisms.

While strictly speaking neither a development nor a security issue, rule of law programs have been embraced by both sets of actors. On the development side, UNDP, the World Bank (WB) and bilateral agencies are heavily involved in rule of law programming, but the restoration of the rule of law has also become an integral element of UN peacekeeping in the last few years. Beginning with police reform, this has expanded to include wider judicial reform and human rights protection, such as in Timor-Leste, Kosovo and Afghanistan.

Large sums have been invested by international donors, leading to the emergence of what one panelist characterized as a ‘rule of law industry’. While strengthening the rule of law and promoting human rights protection as part of conflict prevention and postconflict peacebuilding strategies is undeniably important, there is in the view of many actors an urgent need to reassess current rule of law programming, and to develop more systematic and in-depth knowledge of how international actors can strengthen the rule of law.

Areas of Programming

There is in the view of many actors an urgent need to reassess current rule of law programming, and to develop more systematic and in-depth knowledge of how international actors can strengthen the rule of law.

Rule of law programs have tended to focus on fundamental freedoms, constitutional, and criminal law, paying greater attention to central power structures and to the most egregious human rights violations. Panelists agreed that lower administrative authorities, lower courts, and ‘lower’ breaches of international human rights law had until recently been overlooked. If success is to be measured by the impact of reforms on the daily lives of the population, areas of the law such as administrative, family or property law, may indeed be as crucial. The first international civilian mission established in Haiti, the poorest country of the Western hemisphere, had for instance no mandate in the field of economic, social and cultural rights. Further efforts are also needed to protect the rights of vulnerable groups, such as women, children and the elderly. The adoption by the Security Council of a Resolution on women, peace and security and the ensuing study on the subject were landmark achieve-


27 UNDP includes access to justice under its governance and crisis prevention and recovery practices, while the World Bank focuses on the need to establish the rule of law for sustainable and equitable economic growth; see Legal and Judicial Reform: Strategic Directions (World Bank, 2003).

28 A criminal law and judicial advisory unit has been established in February 2003 within the civilian police division of DPKO; see Handbook on UN Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations, note above, pp. 95-96.

29 A Memorandum of Understanding was concluded in November 2002 between DPKO and the OHCHR (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights) laying down how human rights components are integrated within peacekeeping operations. Handbook on UN Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations, note above, p. 102.


ments, but the principles endorsed by the Council now need to become a reality on the ground. 33

It also emerged in the conference that rule of law reforms have been addressed in far too technocratic a fashion, with little consideration for political dynamics and specific socio-economic contexts. International actors tend to adopt one single model that is applied in a whole range of countries, and is often alien to prevailing socio-political structures. As with governance, the political nature of legal reforms and processes, and the presence of spoilers with conflicting interests have been often neglected. In many cases, external interventions have been unsystematic, and rule of law reforms fragmented, partly due to competing political agendas and national legal models on the donor side. In Haiti, the international community paid insufficient attention to the need to address the reform of the criminal justice system in a holistic manner. 34 In spite of greater coordination efforts in Guatemala that included the mapping of a justice sector matrix by the UN, and the establishment of “coordination commissions” by the national authorities, some donors continued to “chase their own priorities and projects without bothering to plug in to the process.” 35 In Cambodia, the struggle between those supporting the adoption of a common law system and the defenders of a civil law system was particularly damaging. This is regrettable above all in view of the fact that international human rights law actually enshrines many of the basic norms that are relevant to the development of the rule of law. 36

Finally, consideration of the specific circumstances that characterize the various phases of the conflict cycle is needed. The chaos that arises from conflict creates favorable conditions for all kinds of wrongdoing, such as illegal occupation of land or property, trafficking or private vendettas. Anti-discrimination policies and alternative dispute resolution mechanisms also offer interesting potentials as conflict prevention tools. The greatest challenge, however, continues to be the long-term sustainability of rule of law reforms, as tragically illustrated by backsliding in Cambodia and Haiti.

IV. Shared Sectoral Problems

Across the sectors a common theme emerged from the panels: in spite of significant improvement in devising innovative strategies for conflict management, there remains a real disconnect between what is envisioned in international assistance programs and what transpires on the ground. Shared problems confront would-be reformers across the sectors. Some are structural but others are self-made and self-perpetuated. Operating in the least propitious of environments, powerful structural factors inhibit programming. Achieving and embedding reform in any of the sectors requires disentangling thick Gordian knots of management, leadership, political will, set attitudes, established behaviors and lack of public trust. At the same time, however, systemic blockages alone are not enough to explain poor programming outcomes. Four of the many problems facing the international

community in its efforts to address internal conflicts are highlighted below:

Achieving and embedding reform in any of the sectors requires disentangling thick Gordian knots of management, leadership, political will, set attitudes, established behaviors and lack of public trust.

Lack of Coordination

The frequent absence of intra- and inter-agency choreography and learning has resulted in fragmented and inconsistent approaches. Poor coordination has meant both duplication of effort and large gaps in programming activities. Programs within one sector are often internally disjointed themselves, and coordination between the sectors is rare. Indeed, so diffuse and disconnected is programming that panelists found it hard to divine something that could constitute a body of good practice. Knowledge gained tends to be content-specific and it is hard for institutions to maintain any programming continuity with high staff rotation and their reliance on consultants with even shorter time commitments.

While channels of communication and cooperation among many UN and donor agencies at headquarters level were credited as having significantly improved, this has been slow to percolate downwards to the field level. All too often, agencies seem more interested in leveraging institutional advantage for themselves than in developing cooperative mechanisms for the benefit of transforming the societies within which they are operating.

The Gap between Policy and Practice

As with other areas of international cooperation, conflict management suffers from an awning disparity between policy and implementation. While policy may make perfect sense when devised in headquarters, it does not permeate down to the field offices charged with implementation. Oftentimes, policies are too utopian and unreflective of the prevailing reality on the ground. At the same time, many of those discharged with implementing them neither follow nor internalize doctrine and have a blurry understanding of how sectoral issues relate to one another.

The Absence of Real Local Involvement

Although often couched in idioms such as ‘participation’ and ‘partnership’, little more than mere lip service is often paid to local ownership. Programs are frequently designed, overseen or implemented by foreign—generally Western—consultants with little in-depth knowledge of prevailing local contexts. The reluctance to develop relationships results in rushed programming that, precisely because it is bereft of local agency, lacks foundations that are either legitimate or sturdy enough to last once the international agencies depart.

Insufficient Resources/Capacity

There is still a stark asymmetry between the resources that are assigned to sectoral programming and the expectations that accompany it. Many of the organizations lack either the resources or the capacity to intervene in a timely fashion (when it is needed most), often compounded by sclerotic bureaucratic procedures. This lack of personnel and funding means that one can barely make an identifiable dent in the problem with which one is grappling. At the same time, funding allocated to these sectors is often unsustainable under local ownership. Panelists agreed that donor dependency is too frequently a side-effect of programming.
V. Ways Forward: Shaping the Future of Conflict Management Strategies

Problems in the fields of governance, rule of law and security sector reform are well known, yet finding solutions to them is more elusive. A gnarl of forbidding political context, sheer scale of the undertaking and haphazard nature of some sectoral programming contribute to the persistent gaps between international programming and local outcomes. More fundamentally, while there has been a tendency to make conflict management ever-more comprehensive by constantly including additional activities to the existing toolbox, the time may have come “to reflect on how to do less rather than more, how to minimise our reach while maximising our impact.”

The following issues, while far from new, should be granted additional attention by international actors:

The Need for Research Relevance

While it is tempting to call for more research to overcome these gaps, this desire should be tempered by appreciation that few have time to absorb the deluge of information that already confronts them. Research must be demand-driven and responsive to actual needs at the field level. Practitioners slated too much research as being cumbersome, irrelevant and hence unusable for those in the field.

Local Participation

The international community needs to address the underlying tension between the commitment to local ownership and the establishment of peace missions with increasingly wide mandates. Local program staffs need to be engaged far more than in the token manner that they currently are. As local staff will remain long after international agencies depart, their involvement is essential in determining whether these internationally supported endeavors will be judged as successes or failures. One participant described local actors as “the drivers of change,” and without their input and ‘buy-in’, the intervention will lack local agency and be at risk of foundering. Here again, delicate conflict dynamics need to be better understood, as local partners are also inevitably interested parties in the outcomes of ongoing political processes. Locally-based researchers also need to be engaged far more actively by external partners. Steeped in the local culture and conversant in the language, they bring an incomparable understanding of traditional norms and processes. Their early input into research and project design may be key to improving the success of external interventions.

Strategic Approaches to Conflict Management Interventions

While the need to address conflict management in a comprehensive manner is now widely endorsed, many panelists noted that the implementing challenges of complex peace missions have not been fully comprehended yet. The joint study commissioned by the Utstein group showed that there is an acute need for an ongoing process of strategic analysis, planning and evaluation that could help improve the outcomes of international interventions. Conflict analysis is often not properly carried out in the pre-planning phase, and analytical frameworks tend to be confused or superficial. The study also found that over half of the projects assessed were not clearly linked to a broader strategy. Moreover, few sectoral programs have been systematically evaluated to ascertain the effectiveness of either their design or their implementation. Even fewer of the

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37 P. Uvin, note above, p.13.
38 See, for example, R. Paris, who describes the ‘quasi-governance’ institutions established in peace missions implemented in the last decade, note above, p. 645.
39 See note above, pp. 48-50.
results of these evaluations have been disclosed or acted upon. This can be construed as bespeaking a real lack of preparedness to change. Evaluation has shown itself to be a useful means of improving practice and analysis, and a powerful tool if properly integrated into the process of planning and designing implementations.40

Long Term Engagement Required

Strengthening the rule of law, embedding good governance, and reforming the security sector are long-term processes that require years of patient and concerted endeavors for improvements to be detected. In other words, they do not lend themselves to the short project cycles that donor funding is disbursed. Given that it is unlikely for funding periods to be lengthened, programs should be structured and sequenced so that change can be benchmarked. This would more easily demonstrate progress and ensure greater likelihood of receiving the required funding continuity.

VI. Conclusion

The launch conference of the IPA Program on the Security-Development Nexus highlighted the complex linkages between security and development concerns in an increasingly unstable global context. Although significant advances have been charted in the last ten years, international actors still face major challenges in establishing peace and security in war-torn countries. The peace missions planned for Burundi, Haiti, Ivory Coast and Sudan will be an important test of the international community’s commitment to strategic, coordinated, comprehensive and long-term approaches to conflict management. More fundamentally, improved conflict management strategies will be highly dependent upon the ability of international leaders to address unprecedented global threats, such as extreme poverty, income disparity, environmental degradation and terrorism, a task assigned by the Secretary-General to the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change convened in 2003.

It is through a mix of macro- and micro-level research, policy analyses and practical assessments that the Security-Development Nexus Program will take part in this ongoing debate. As is described below (Appendix II), the Program will pursue research and contribute to policy development on the conceptual underpinnings of the security-development nexus, the design and implementation of security and development policies in specific countries and regions, and the evaluation of rule of law and security sectors activities as part of conflict management strategies.

40 C. Church and J. Shoul dice, The Evaluation of Conflict Resolution Interventions: Framing the State of Play (Derry/Londonderry: INCORE, 2002).
Strengthening the Security-Development Nexus: Conflict Peace and Development in the 21st Century

Launch Conference
5 December 2003
Helmsley Hotel, New York City

Agenda

08:30 - 9:00  Breakfast

09:00 - 09:30  Welcome: David M. Malone, President, International Peace Academy

Keynote Speaker: Mark Malloch Brown, United Nations Development Program Administrator

09:30 - 11:00  Panel 1: The Changing Context for the International Peacebuilding Agenda in the 1990s: An Assessment from the Security and Development Perspectives

Chair: David M. Malone, President, International Peace Academy

Speakers: Dr. Peter Uvin, Henry J. Leir Associate Professor of International Humanitarian Studies, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy

Dr. Rex Brynen, Professor, Department of Political Science, McGill University

Mr. Francisco Sagasti, Director; Agenda: Peru

Discussant: Dr. Roland Paris, Department of Political Science and International Affairs, University of Colorado at Boulder (on leave)

11:00 - 11:15  Coffee break

11:15 - 12:45  Panel 2: Governance: A Key to Peace and Development

Chair: Louise Marchand, Director General, International Humanitarian Assistance, Multilateral Programs Branch, Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA)

Speakers: Mr. Bernd Hoffmann, Head of Division 42 “Governance and Democracy”, German Bureau for Technical Cooperation (GTZ)
Ms. Gita Welch, Principal Adviser and Group Leader, Institutional Development Group, Bureau for Development and Policy, UNDP

Discussants: Mr. Bernard Wood, President, Bernard Wood and Associates

Ambassador Jorge Valdez, Regional Coordinator, Andean Regional Stability Project

12:45 - 1:45 Lunch

1:45 – 3:15 Panel 3: Security Sector Reform: Overlapping Mandates

Chair: H.E. Ms. Ellen Margrethe Løj, Permanent Representative of Denmark to the United Nations

Speakers: Ms. Nicole Ball, Senior Fellow, Center for International Policy, Washington, D.C. and Visiting Senior Research Fellow, CIDCM, University of Maryland

Dr. Ann Fitzgerald, Senior Lecturer, Department of Defence Management and Security Analysis, Cranfield University

Mr. Kayode Fayemi, Director, Center for Democracy and Development, Nigeria

Discussant: Dr. Johanna Mendelson-Forman, Senior Program Officer, Peace, Security, Human Rights, United Nations Foundation

3:15 - 3:30 Coffee Break

3:30 - 5:00 Panel 4: Rule of Law: Normative and Practical Challenges

Chair: Dr. Danilo Türk, Assistant Secretary-General, United Nations Department of Political Affairs

Speakers: Dr. Jamal Benomar, Special Advisor to the Assistant Administrator and Director, Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, United Nations Development Program

William O’Neill, Consultant

Discussants: Ms. Nina Lahoud, Special Advisor to the Executive Director of the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) (on loan from the Department of Peacekeeping Operations)

Mr. Louis Aucoin, Associate Research Professor, Institute for Human Security, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy
5:00-5:45 Concluding Session: Strengthening The Nexus Between Security and Development: The Road Ahead

Chair: Necla Tschirgi, Vice President, International Peace Academy

Panelists: Ms. Sam Barnes, Chief, Strategic Planning Unit, Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, United Nations Development Program

Dr. Sunday Ochoche, Director General, Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution, Nigeria

Mr. Matthias Stiefel, Executive Director, WSP International

Dr. Joanna Spear, Director, The United States Foreign Policy Institute, George Washington University
Appendix 1

Text of Address by
Mark Malloch Brown,
Administrator of The United Nations Development Programme
to
The International Peace Academy Conference:
Strengthening the Security-Development Nexus: Assessing International Policy
and Practice Since the 1990s

5 December 2003

I would like to begin by thanking the International Peace Academy for organizing this important conference. For more than thirty years the IPA has worked tirelessly in seeking to identify how the international community can better respond to the complex, inter-linked security and development challenges we face through its highly regarded policy research and development programmes. In a world where, according to some estimates, nearly one quarter of the world’s population face some type of crisis or post-conflict situation, identifying and implementing solutions on how to prevent conflict, manage crisis situations and assist countries in their recovery, has never been more necessary.

Beyond the misleading generalities, it is nevertheless clear, that there is a high coincidence between poverty and conflict. Some 22 of the 34 countries furthest away from achieving the Millennium Development Goals are suffering as a result of current or recent conflicts. And when we look at the impact on development trends of protracted conflict, not surprisingly, conflict is having a devastating impact on social indicators.

Take the example of Rwanda. After some years of very effective government in terms of trying to improve the social indicators, Rwanda is not yet back to pre-genocide levels and there is a huge catch-up still underway. The momentum of education enrollment or improvement in health services is set back a long way when conflict disrupts those services. And the same is often seen in the broader context of effective governance. Conflict derails the democratic process where people can be brought together in a broad social and political consensus around the direction of their country and instead substitutes confrontation, disagreement and violence.

Consequently, in an organization like UNDP we must be terribly concerned with the issue of the links between conflict and development, and the role of development in avoiding conflict, and the devastating damage that conflict does to development. But we also need a framework that recognizes the complexities of the inter-relationship between poverty and conflict and the differing economic, political and social factors at work globally and in individual countries.

Many organizations are working hard to develop assessment frameworks for evaluating both conflict...
vulnerability and identifying the interventions that might avoid conflict, including UNDP’s Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR). There are three countries that are on our list for the conflict assessment methodology - Colombia, Nepal and Nigeria - which highlight just how difficult it really is identify the development interventions that can make a difference.

In the case of Colombia, there is clearly a very intractable political problem related to a fundamental, long-term distrust between a guerrilla leadership and government, one complicated by the presence of right wing militias. When that guerrilla leadership is contesting the government for control of the regions of the country, which it considers its base, it is very hard to know what is the development strategy that could help resolve what is fundamentally a political conflict.

Nepal is an example of a country that has had an enormously high level of international development spending over many years, and yet, the Maoist insurgency has in recent years continued to grow. So here too, I am wary of any automatic belief that by channeling more development assistance into a region where that insurgency is strong will avert conflict. While development assistance is clearly worth doing in its own right because there are a lot of poor people with big needs, I think we need to be wary of believing that more economic assistance to disadvantaged regions would overturn an insurgency whose roots have outgrown simple economics and are much more ideological and political in character.

And in the case of Nigeria - a country I know rather well and care deeply about and a country which I believe is absolutely theynch pin of a successful development strategy for the broader sub-Saharan African region- it is clear that there is no simple development approach of sufficient scale that can, by itself overcome the deep-rooted ethnic, social and religious tensions that exist, which sadly have been inflamed by the country’s oil wealth.

I raise these examples to lift the bar of the debate on these issues and to prevent us believing that there are any easy solutions. Instead, as a starting point, I think we need to acknowledge two rather different sets of countries that require related but conceptually separate approaches.

First there are those countries that are not in conflict, but which might under the worst scenario, lapse into conflict. There intervention is aimed at reducing the likelihood of this outcome. The second are the post-conflict group of countries, often where the Security Council has done its bit and where combatants have initialed a peace treaty, but little has been done to construct a peace-building process beyond that. The interventions for these two types of situation need to be different.

A. Pre-conflict countries

Economic factors

Let me start with those countries that have not yet lurched into conflict but where there is a risk of national disintegration, whether it is ethnic, social or religious in character. More often than not these conflicts are fueled by economic inequality or what is viewed by people as uneven access to the economic wealth of the country. The issue of resource control in countries, particularly resource-rich countries, has meant that petroleum has arguably become the single greatest driver of conflict in today’s world. Building equitable systems where the benefits of petroleum or other resource revenues are shared equitably across societies is critical.

Clearly we do have some development-related activities that we can do which can make a very significant difference on this issue. The first is, oil revenue management. And here the most important starting point is a transparent system of demonstrating to the citizens of the country, wherever in that country they live, how oil revenue is being used. The World Bank’s efforts, pushed by civil society, to create such a regime for the Chad-Cameroon pipeline, were an early important example of that. And there are other examples, now in Kazakhstan and elsewhere in Central Asia, of trying to demonstrate open, transparent, democratic accountability for oil funds by isolating them from other government revenues and reporting on how they are used, and allowing some international monitoring or oversight of that effort.
Political factors

The second issue that exists in many of the countries I would characterize as pre-conflict is a crisis of democratic institutions. Many are what I would call “nominal democracies.” Not in the old sense of that term -- that they stuff the ballots-- but rather that they have reasonably fair elections, but democracy is just that: five yearly elections. There is no broader set of democratic features in the country, which allow a free media to hold the executive to account; which allow strong parliamentary scrutiny, and oversight of the behaviors of the executive. There isn’t a system of rule of law that produces justice in a reasonable time for the poor, as well as the rich. This set of broader democracy issues and above all, perhaps, a democratic culture, is missing in many of these pre-conflict countries, and with devastating consequence, because it removes the option of peaceful competitive democratic struggle as a way of resolving political differences and has the effect of pushing these conflicts onto the streets and the barrios, often turning them violent.

More broadly, however, as democracy has become the incumbent in a growing number of countries, it is increasingly being held to account for failing to reduce economic inequalities; it is seen to have failed as a system in which the poor can place their trust as a system of government that is going to deliver results for them. In large part this is because often the poor do not see these institutions as speaking for them. Parliaments and other democratic institutions are often perceived as having narrowed their base to that of a self-seeking political class alone.

There are two ways of addressing this and UNDP is doing both. One is to try to strengthen democratic governments. And this is the nuts and bolts of what UNDP does: bringing people together within nations and around the world, to build partnerships and share ways to promote participation, accountability and effectiveness at all levels. The other is through national dialogues. In Latin America for example, there have been increasing to bring together parties in a conflict, and more importantly, potential bridge builders, often churches, trade unions and other civil society organizations, into a dialogue where parliaments and congresses are so singularly failing to do so in the region. And UNDP has recently organized several of these across the continent, from Argentina to Bolivia. But while they are extraordinarily important means of trying to rekindle conversation and dialogue at a time when everybody is polarizing into potentially conflicting camps, I do worry about the consequences of them becoming a substitute for formal institutionalized democracy. I believe that they have value as a short-term substitute when democratic institutions are failing, but that we have to find a way, as quickly as possible, to channel political participation back into re-ignited, re-invigorated formal democratic institutions.

Social factors

In addition to the economic and political factors at work in many pre-conflict countries, social and demographic factors play as important a role in the development of conflict. Poor people rarely start conflicts; it’s so often the children of the middle-class, speaking for the poor, who are the leaders of conflicts. But nevertheless, the major economic, demographic fact of so many of the countries that I would categorize as pre-conflict, is an exploding youth, without economic opportunity, often without a political voice for the reasons I’ve just described.

Across a great swathe of countries, from Pakistan moving in an arc across to West Africa, many countries are confronted with a huge youth unemployment problem, and beyond that, a youth participation problem. Already, a majority of the developing world is under the age of 25. We will add another billion people to that age group by 2015. It is a striking demographic. Economic systems are just not producing growth or jobs at a rate to absorb them into the labor market. Combine that with political systems that are not genuinely participatory and representative, and we are stoking up a crisis.

Add to that the social consequences of major migration from countryside to city, away from the more controlled social structures of the countryside to the more anonymous urban lifestyle and a marginal economic existence, and a cocktail of problems – social and economic problems are being created. While youth employment is almost certainly not the kind of issue that has a role in a short-term conflict prevention
strategy, if we are to make sure that conflict becomes less a part of our lives in coming years, we have to have an effective strategy for dealing with the wider issue. This is I believe a strategy contained in the Millennium Development Goals, agreed in the Millennium Declaration three years ago, to work to ensure that globalization works for the world’s poor.

B. Post-peace agreement countries

Turning to the second set of countries, the post-peace agreement set of countries, these have related, but slightly different problems. As Paul Collier and others have so persuasively argued, these countries have a great propensity to revert to conflict. The correlation between that propensity and how long they’ve been kept out of conflict is also important, because the risk goes down the longer there is peace. It’s like the heart attack victim who has a high risk of a second heart attack in the immediate period after the first, but as time elapses, the risk decreases. Conflict after a peace agreement follows the same lines. It becomes enormously important, like a good doctor in a cardiac ward, to have early effective intervention to a patient during that period of maximum risk. And yet, the whole organization of international intervention is set up to deal with the later rehabilitation period of the patient, when the period of greatest risk has passed. We are very poorly unorganized to intervene effectively during the high-risk period. Why? Because all too often the humanitarian intervention has been declared a triumph: conflict is over. The humanitarian donors have moved on to the next humanitarian crisis. Meanwhile development intervention is in the planning stage: it’s next year’s budget for the development donors, emerging from a process of careful needs assessment and sober programming and planning - not something thought to be subject to urgent, quick interventions.

We only have to consider the current situation in Liberia today. The greatest threat today to renewed conflict in Liberia is that young men with guns are not quickly disarmed and given alternative economic livelihoods.

It is trigger-happy individuals, starting a firefight that undermines a fragile, political agreement resting on a very low level of trust, which is most likely to re-ignite conflict. UNDP’s current funds for Liberia broadly only cover the planning function for a longer-term program. So when will the longer term program come? The donor conference for Liberia is not taking place until early February, and that means that resources for demobilization, small arms collection and related issues will not come until mid-2004. If we’ve made it until then in Liberia, it will be because the country is finding its own solutions to some of these problems, not because of other support.

The only institution with the resources to address this is the World Bank. But it cannot spend those resources in these contexts precisely because it is a bank: time after time we see these extraordinary situations where either out of its own loan monies, or out of trust funds supported by donor grant monies, it does have some financial availability in situations like this, but it is unable to deploy it. It is the same situation in the DRC where the World Bank has generously made monies available for UNDP and we are all set to operate in the east of the country where the Bank cannot. But this is months after these operations should have started: The funds must be in the hands of those who can use them in this cardiac ward phase.

C. Intervention with sufficient scale and resources

But even that is not enough – and this brings me to my main point, which is that we have also got to intervene to scale. The United Nations has reached an important moment in our work on post-conflict issues. If we go back to the Brahimi Report of 2000, then the big issue was institutional leadership. Within the UN, what does DPA do? What does DPKO do? What does UNDP do? What do the humanitarian agencies do in responding to crisis situations? And outside the UN, relations with the World Bank, with other bilaterals, questions on mandates and roles.
UNDP’s Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery has been working with counterparts in DPA and DPKO, as well as with counterparts in ECHA and OCHA to answer that question and I think we all understand what each of us has to do. This is now solved, and it would be a terrible mistake, in my view, to reopen these discussions and enter another long period of investigating whether we've got the right mandates. My key message today is that instead we really have to move to the next level operationally – and here it is clear that what we don't have is the resources or the capacity to intervene in a timely and effective way.

If we look at BCPR, it has all the right practice areas, from DDR and small arms collection, to transitional justice, to working with the World Bank on basic service provision where government delivery has broken down under the LICUS (Low Income Countries Under Stress) Initiative. We are doing all the right things. But there are two problems.

First, while BCPR, working with and drawing on the infrastructure of our Country Offices and Regional Bureaus, is at the center of multilateral efforts to intervene decisively after conflict in as many as 50 countries around the world, we do so with as little as 100 dedicated bureau staff. There has never been a more necessary time to scale-up the multilateral capacity to respond to conflict. The kind of bilateral model of post-conflict intervention we are seeing has just taken a terrible knock, most notably in Iraq, but also as we are seeing in Cote d'Ivoire where French soldiers are under attack. If ever there was a moment where we all recognize that the only politically neutral way of undertaking these kinds of interventions is through the UN multilateral route, it is now.

Within the UN we have DPA doing the politics, DPKO doing the peacekeeping, but at the centre of the web, doing the heavy lifting of the economic development interventions is UNDP and our country offices, supported by BCPR, operating in what are exceptionally dangerous situations. This is clearly underpowered for the scale of activity we are involved with.

Beyond that, I believe the financing is also not up to scale. We have a situation where small amounts of budget allow BCPR to do the planning to enable them to go to the donors and secure more resources for a particular land mine or small arms program, but they don't have the resources in hand for the kind of quick interventions that a peace agreement creates the opportunity for and what is needed if we're to improve the odds of countries not lapsing back into conflict.

Building up the Bureau of Crisis Prevention and Recovery by some multiple of its current size so that it can carry out these essential tasks is key. I am absolutely convinced that sadly this kind of crisis intervention is going to be a major part of our work in the coming years. We need to resource it at a much higher level than we currently are. I call on donors who share this vision to come on board and help provide the resources needed to play the role assigned to us in the international system.

There are a lot of issues to be tackled, not least the issue of finance. Some kind of quick-release mechanism, that allows these operations to be funded quickly and to scale, is I believe, absolutely critical.

On the staffing side, I also believe that there is an important role for secondments, not just from donor countries, obviously, but very much from developing countries, particularly from those countries which have just themselves had successful experiences in terms of managing these kinds of development interventions to avert conflict. We simply have to build a stronger capacity in this area.

And finally, we need to build into all of this a system of best practice and a lessons-learned approach. And with this, I come back to where we began. While a good literature has emerged in the last few years on steps to take in crisis intervention, I believe it has not yet adequately connected to actual best practice as it happens in the field. We need to do a much better job of systematically learning what's working and what is not, feeding it into how we work next time.

But above all, these actions are not about UNDP, but most importantly external partnerships with others. We need a network of partners if we are to really move forward on this issue. A network of partners helped by
the reputation and neutrality the UN brings, able to work with us to create interventions to scale in these kinds of situations.

The question so many of us is asking is, how many times does the bell have to chime on an Iraq or Cote d'Ivoire - but in a way more significantly, on a Liberia or a DRC or a Sri Lanka - before we are going to have the courage of our convictions, the courage of the reports we've written in recent years, and insist on putting crisis intervention on a scale, and on a level of professionalism that rises to the occasion of the crises we confront today?
Appendix II

The Security–Development Nexus: Conflict, peace and Development in the 21st Century

A Program of the International Peace Academy

Director: Dr. Neclâ Tschirgi
Program Associates: Dr. Agnès Hurwitz, Dr. Gordon Peake
Program Officers: Heiko Nitzschke, Flavius Stan, Kaysie Studdard

Program Description*

January 2004–December 2005

I. INTRODUCTION

Since the end of the Cold War, in addressing intra-state conflicts, security and development concerns have come to be seen as requiring integrated strategies in pursuit of conflict prevention, peacemaking & peace implementation and post-conflict peacebuilding.

There is now a large and growing body of academic and policy research on different dimensions of the link between security and development in pre-conflict, conflict, and post-conflict situations. Likewise, there has been considerable policy development and innovative practices among bilateral and multi-lateral donors to harmonize developmental and security considerations in responding to intra-state conflicts. UN agencies, most notably UNDP and DPKO, increasingly take account of the linkages between security and development as they plan programming across the different conflict phases.

However, there has been relatively little systematic assessment of the implications for policy and practice of the interplay between security and development concerns in conflict contexts and the effectiveness of current approaches to conflict management. Drawing on the growing body of literature as well as ongoing policy debates, the Security-Development Nexus program will seek to fill this policy gap through targeted conceptual, policy and operational research.

The underlying policy question that drives this project is the following: Based on more than a decade of international policy and practice since the publication by the United Nations of An Agenda for Peace and An Agenda for Development, how should security and development strategies be linked, both conceptually and operationally, in addressing violent conflicts?

II. OBJECTIVES

The program will undertake research that examines the nexus between security and development in conflict management, and explores the tensions and contradictions that exist between the security and development agendas. The program thus seeks to identify how the United Nations, and the broader international community, can make better use of the full range of political, security, humanitarian, human rights and developmental tools for conflict management. To this end, the program’s broad aims are to:

- Improve understanding of the rationale for linking security and development strategies in conflict management;
- Extract policy relevant lessons from country-based studies on how coherent and mutually supportive security and development policies can be designed and implemented;

* For a more detailed program description, please visit www.ipacademy.org.
• Evaluate the effectiveness of policy and program-
ning responses in two key areas—rule of law and
security sector—with a view to provide practical
recommendations on improving policies and
practice in these sectors;

• Generate intellectual exchange, policy analysis and
policy development by convening key stakeholders
including academics, experts, policy makers and
practitioners from the UN and the broader interna-
tional community to examine and assess research
findings throughout the course of the program.

III. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

• In light of the changed international context since
the end of the Cold War, to what extent are current
perspectives and approaches to security and
development appropriate for conflict management?

• How can security and development approaches be
made more compatible and mutually supportive for
conflict prevention, peacemaking & peace
implementation and post-conflict peacebuilding?
What are the inherent contradictions and tensions
and how can these be addressed?

• To what extent have the UN and the broader
development community been successful in
employing a mix of political, security and develop-
ment policies to respond to intra-state conflicts in
the post-Cold War era? What relevant lessons can
be extracted from a decade of international policy
and practice in responding to intra-state conflicts
through a commitment to more coherent and
complementary approaches to security and
development?

• How can the links between security and develop-
ment policies and programming best be understood
and enhanced from country-specific, regional and
sectoral perspectives?

IV. RESEARCH PROJECTS

The overall goal of the program is to contribute to
improving the international community’s conflict
management efforts through policy analysis and policy
development based upon conceptual and empirical
research. To this end, the program will undertake four
interrelated research projects. The first project will
examine the conceptual underpinnings of international
efforts to link security and development. The second
will examine current practices at the country level to
promote conflict prevention, peacemaking & peace
implementation and post-conflict peacebuilding
through better harmonization of security and develop-
ment strategies. The last two projects will focus on two
programming areas—security sector and rule of law
respectively.

Collectively, the four research projects are designed to
provide: a) a fuller understanding of current thinking
on the security-development interface; b) a review of
the nature and effectiveness of the policy and
programming innovations undertaken by security and
development actors in conflict management; and c) an
analysis of the impact of these innovations in concrete
contexts. Thus, foundational research on the way
security and development concerns intersect in
contemporary intra-state conflicts will provide critical
insights for designing and implementing more effective
policy and operational responses. Meanwhile, in-depth
research on rule of law and security sector program-
ing is expected to generate evidence-based
recommendations of what works and what does not
work in different conflict contexts. Finally, country-
based research will provide a detailed understanding of
how diverse approaches and strategies actually play
out in unique settings while exploring commonalities
across sectors and conflict cycles.

Each of the research projects is described in greater
detail below:

Security and Development: Critical Connections

This will be a collaborative project with a partner
institution to examine the security-development
nexus at the conceptual level. Policy and practice are
effective to the extent that they are solidly grounded
in an accurate understanding of the broader interna-
tional context within which they are situated. Since
the end of the Cold War, the international environ-
ment has changed radically—challenging existing perspectives on security, development, peace, conflict, international cooperation and multilateralism. In the last decade, numerous academic programs have been established to study violent conflicts by examining their security and developmental dimensions. However, many of these programs draw upon existing disciplinary perspectives to explain the complex interplay between the historical, socio-cultural, political and economic causes and consequences of contemporary intra-state conflicts. An interdisciplinary body of knowledge that systematically and critically explores the developmental as well as security aspects of these conflicts is yet to emerge. It is increasingly recognized that in the post-Cold War and post 9/11 context, intra-state conflicts present special challenges at the local, national, regional and international levels that cannot be understood through conventional security or developmental paradigms.

**Objectives**

Bringing together 10-12 researchers from the academic and policy communities, this project will examine how security studies and development studies have increasingly been moving closer together in an attempt to understand contemporary intra-state conflicts; it will also seek to identify a interdisciplinary framework that better corresponds to the changing nature of the security and developmental challenges in the post-Cold War international environment. Designed as a collaborative initiative with a partner institution, the project aims to generate a collected volume tentatively entitled “Security and Development: Critical Connections.” Because of the need for an innovative and interdisciplinary approach, the actual structure and contents of the proposed study will be established jointly by a select group of researchers and policy analysts through two workshops, first to identify the volume’s analytical framework, and second, to review the coherence among individual contributions within a common framework.

**Research Questions**

- To what extent are current analytical frameworks for development and security adequate to understanding and responding to intra-state conflicts in the post-Cold War era?
- What new factors and perspectives need to be taken into consideration?
- How can theory and practice be better aligned to provide a stronger base for effective decision making in the evolving international environment after September 11?
- How do normative developments at the national and international levels influence theory and practice?
- What are the opportunities and challenges for elaborating an interdisciplinary framework linking security and development?

**Country Case Studies: Experiences from the Field**

As instruments of conflict management in intra-state conflicts, security and development strategies need to be tailored to the special needs of each country depending upon the nature of the conflict and the conflict phase. Yet, current practice suggests that international responses to conflict management are often supply-driven and not adequately informed by or tailored to address the needs of a conflict-prone, conflict-torn, or post-conflict country. As a result, many well-intentioned interventions fail short of contributing positively to conflict prevention, peacemaking & peace implementation and post-conflict peacebuilding.

**Objectives**

Going beyond generic propositions about the security-development nexus, this project will involve up to nine

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41 A review of the relevant literature in the field is beyond the scope of this document. However, it is important to note that IPA’s own research on Peacebuilding, Ending Civil Wars, Transitional Administrations, Conflict Prevention, Economic Agendas in Civil Wars, Terrorism and the Security Council have, from different perspectives, underscored the need to examine the new international environment through radically new lenses.
country case studies. Guided by a common methodological framework that draws upon current knowledge on security and development challenges in conflict management, each study will be based on the existing body of literature on a given country as well as country-specific evaluation studies by donors and other actors. These will be complemented by field research, as well as interviews with local and international actors. Empirical and sectoral research will be conducted to examine differentiated needs and priorities of countries at different phases of the conflict cycle in order to identify targeted conflict management approaches and their effectiveness. Case studies will be selected from a provisional list including Bolivia, Guyana, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Haiti, Liberia, Nepal, Sudan, Somalia, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka and Tajikistan. However, the final selection of the cases will depend upon further consultations with key interlocutors in the UN system and the feasibility of field research in these countries.

The project will generate country-specific insights about the effectiveness of international approaches to designing and implementing conflict-sensitive developmental strategies as well as promoting sustainable security. Country case studies will examine the full range of developmental and security tools and instruments that international actors have deployed in a given country, with a special focus on programming in the rule of law and the security sector. In addition to generating country-specific recommendations for improved international assistance, the case studies will contribute to more general lessons about what works or what does not work in concrete conflict contexts, and why—yielding both theoretical and policy relevant insights.

Research Questions

- Operating in different conflict contexts, how have the UN and key international actors defined the nature of the conflict, and how has this influenced their programming?
- What is the strategic framework within which international assistance is provided at different phases in the conflict cycle?
- What are the specific windows of opportunity for international intervention in the different phases of the conflict? What are the limitations to intervention?
- How are programs prioritized, resources allocated, and accountability mechanisms established among international and local actors?
- How do international and local actors define success? What are their respective timeframes for achieving success? What are the major impediments to success?
- What general lessons can be extracted about the security-development nexus at the sectoral, programmatic, institutional and country-specific levels?

Security Sector in Conflict Management

Security Sector Reform (SSR) entails, among others, the restructuring of security institutions such as the army, police and prisons, the strengthening of the civilian oversight bodies to embed principles of good governance and the demobilization, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) of combatants in a post-conflict setting. As such, SSR has important—albeit varying—consequences for conflict prevention, peacemaking & peace implementation and post-conflict peacebuilding.

Traditionally provided by military or civilian security actors and increasingly built into peace agreements and UN peace operations, tasks such as SSR, civilian policing, and the maintenance of public security have gradually come to fall under the purview of development actors. It is widely recognized that economic and social development have little prospect of taking hold in an insecure environment. Thus, bilateral donors have increasingly engaged in programming activities that include the reform of the military, review of military expenditures and police reform.

Security sector reform efforts are now undertaken by different actors who often have diverse mandates, approaches, and objectives. Yet, there is an evolving consensus, that, going beyond traditional security...
instruments, security sector programming requires an accurate reading of the changing nature and dynamics of a given conflict and the identification of appropriate strategies for addressing the multiple military, political, and socio-economic dimensions of insecurity.

**Objectives**

Drawing upon a rich and growing body of literature and practice in security sector programming, IPA’s research project will begin with mapping out the state of SS programming engaged in by relevant actors as part of conflict prevention, peacemaking & peace implementation and post-conflict peacebuilding efforts. The objectives of this project are to a) evaluate current programming in the area of SSR; b) provide an understanding of how SSR is, and can better be integrated in conflict management policies and practice; and c) help present and publicize innovative and effective work to decision-makers at the UN in New York and the country level.

**Research Questions**

- **Why and to what degree has security sector programming become an integral element of conflict management strategies by the UN and the international development community? Have mandates reflected these changing priorities? What are the implications of development actors becoming more intimately involved in SSR?**

- **Based on different experiences with SSR programming across conflict stages in this sector by the UN and the international development community, which policy approaches and mechanisms seem to have worked, and which have not? What issues have not been addressed? What can the UN and donors—when they are engaged in similar programming—learn from each other?**

- **What are the governance dimensions of SSR and its linkages with rule of law programming? To what degree and with what success, have security sector programs taken these linkages into account to support conflict prevention, peacemaking & peace implementation, and post-conflict peacebuilding?**

- **How effectively is the multiplicity of actors parlaying into an approach that creates a sector that sustains, rather than impedes, development? To what extent does SSR programming impact differently on the security of the population, specifically the poor? Are there specific tools that promise to have direct impact on security and socio-economic well-being at the local level?**

- **Are interventions in this sector sustainable after the UN and development actors have left?**

**Rule of Law in Conflict Management**

The rule of law is a general principle which demands that the law be applied fairly and equally to all legal and natural persons in a given community. Programming in the rule of law area has generally included assistance in constitution and legislation drafting, capacity building of the judicial and government sectors, and the establishment of transitional justice mechanisms. Rule of law initiatives are directly related to governance and the security sector, through law enforcement, and legislatures, among others. While strengthening the rule of law plays an undoubtedly important role in conflict prevention, peacemaking & peace implementation and post-conflict peacebuilding, it is necessary to reassess current approaches and to develop more systematic and in-depth knowledge of how international aid can improve programming in this area.

Programs aimed at establishing or strengthening the rule of law have primarily been undertaken by development actors. However, the security community has more recently recognized the importance of integrating key rule of law initiatives in the hope of creating more sustained measures aimed at conflict management. For example, the United Nations has progressively integrated rule of law programs within peacekeeping missions, and moved away from the practice and belief that such activities should exist.

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42 The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is an exceptional case, since rule of law programming was integrated in its approaches in the early 1990s.
outside the realm of conflict management. In recent years the UN has expanded the civilian police mandate for peace operations to more comprehensive strategies aimed at reform and institution building. Recognizing that rule of law and police operations also require the existence of an effective judiciary and corrections facilities, UN peace operations have broadened to include judicial assistance and aid to the corrections sector in such missions as Kosovo, Timor-Leste and Afghanistan.

Objectives

Drawing upon a rich and growing body of literature and practice in rule of law programming, IPA’s research project will initiate its research by assessing the state of rule of law programming undertaken by relevant actors as part of conflict prevention, peacemaking & peace-implementation and post-conflict peacebuilding efforts. The objectives of this project are to a) evaluate current programming; b) provide an understanding of how rule of law strategies are, and can better be integrated in conflict management policies and practice; c) help present and publicize innovative and effective work to decision-makers at the UN in New York and at field operations.

Against this backdrop, the rule of law component of the Security - Development Nexus Program will probe the following questions, both as a means of creating more effective rule of law programming as well as to provide greater insight into the strengths and limitations of an integrated security and development strategy.

Research Questions

- Why and how have rule of law activities come to be seen as an essential element of comprehensive peace and security approaches?
- With over a decade of programming in rule of law by the UN and other international actors, what key lessons have been learned about the policy objectives, the choice of activities and the implementation of these programs?
- How can specific rule of law strategies be identified for conflict management that, in a particular phase of a conflict, produce tangible benefits in terms of advancing conflict prevention, peacemaking & peace implementation and post-conflict peacebuilding?
- How and with what success have rule of law programs been linked to similar innovations in the security sector and governance to support conflict management? How and to what degree is programming in this area dependent on a country or regional-specific context?
- What are the contradictions and tensions inherent in a unified approach to rule of law and peace and security issues?