Deploying Combined Teams: Lessons Learned from Operational Partnerships in UN Peacekeeping

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Abbreviations

ASF    African Standby Force
AU     African Union
C-34   Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations
DFS    Department of Field Support
DPKO   Department of Peacekeeping Operations
EU     European Union
MINURCAT United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad
MINURCAT II United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad II
MINUSMA United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
MINUSTAH United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
MONUC   United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
MONUSCO United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
MOU    Memorandum of Understanding
NATO   North Atlantic Treaty Organization
PCC    Police-Contributing Country
SHIRBRIG Standby High-Readiness Brigade for UN Operations
TCC    Troop-Contributing Country
UN     United Nations
UNDOF  United Nations Disengagement Observer Force
UNFICYP United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
UNIFIL United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNMIL  United Nations Mission in Liberia
Executive Summary

To staff and sustain its many operations around the world, United Nations (UN) peacekeeping must rely on a variety of partnerships, including operational partnerships among troop-contributing countries (TCCs). Operational partnerships occur when military units from two or more countries combine to deploy as part of a peacekeeping operation. Between 2004 and 2014, forty-one such partnerships occurred in eight UN operations, most involving units from European and South American states.

The following are four types of partnerships, which differ based on command structure and the degree of integration of the operational sub-units:

- **Attached:** an independent operational unit from Country A works alongside and is under the operational command of a larger unit from Country B.
- **Embedded:** troops from Country A are integrated within existing operational units of Country B to form mixed units under Country B’s command structure.
- **Co-deployed:** distinct operational units from Country A and Country B operate as part of a multinational command structure involving officers from both countries.
- **Composite:** troops from two or more countries form bi-national or multinational mixed units that serve under a multinational command structure involving officers from two or more countries.

Partners can be junior, senior, or equal partners, as determined by the size of each country’s contribution. A senior partner is responsible for bringing the junior partner on board. Equal partners establish a division of labor where they either split the duties and personnel contribution evenly or rotate contributing the major share of personnel and command.

**BENEFITS OF PARTNERING**

Partnering benefits and challenges accrue for both the UN and the relevant TCCs. At least six benefits for the UN include the following: (1) a mission may fill a requirement for a unit; (2) a junior provider of a niche capability such as mine clearing, water purification, or medical services can serve the needs of the entire mission; (3) a junior partner can assume static tasks, such as guard duty, that allow a senior partner to take on time-sensitive kinetic activities; (4) the senior partner can take the junior partner on board and teach it the ropes; (5) the junior partner may graduate to deploying a larger unit on its own; and (6) the more TCCs in a mission, the more diplomatic support the mission leaders can summon when needed.

There are immediate benefits for the TCCs involved, depending on their role in the partnership. Fundamentally, junior partners get to deploy, and in a way in which they receive not only mentorship but also material and training from the senior partner. Equal partners also get to deploy in a manner that benefits and burdens both partners to roughly the same degree. In particular, larger combined units have greater operational autonomy, which is valued highly by deployed personnel. Senior partners could deploy alone, but partnering helps polish their reputations as leaders and allows them to turn over less attractive static or niche tasks to the junior partner. In addition, because unit or mission command in a UN operation often goes to the TCC with the greatest number of deployed troops, a senior partner benefits when the troop contribution of a junior partner fills out its contribution enough to reinforce the senior partner’s claim on command.

There are also overlapping political benefits for TCCs. They include (1) enhancing the cohesion and clout of a TCC’s region; (2) cementing relations with neighbors, affiliates, security guarantors, and rising powers; (3) earning recognition as a responsible and militarily active international citizen; (4) presenting a more attractive international profile to neighbors and beyond; (5) proving one’s worthiness to be a security and/or economic partner; and (6) enhancing the international or domestic support for a mission that engages one’s interests.

**CHALLENGES OF PARTNERING**

The challenges of forming a new operational partnership can be daunting. One is finding the right partner; although political motivations might determine specific partnerships, preference should be given to countries with similar linguistic, cultural, and military attributes, as well as some level of geographic proximity to facilitate combined
training. A second challenge is preparing for the inevitable frictions that arise when troops live together in relatively isolated camps where stress and boredom are present. A third challenge is the complexity of performing complex and sensitive tasks with someone else rather than alone. Many issues have to be addressed before deployment. When deploying alone, a TCC resolves these issues itself. When partnering, it must consider its partner’s concerns. A fourth challenge is addressing exposure to the scrutiny that comes with partnering. Fifth, for senior and equal partners, deploying as part of a team is costlier and more time-consuming than deploying alone. Sixth, partnerships can fracture, and personnel may be harmed if the partners have difficulty communicating or have not sorted out in advance how to respond collectively when confronting high risk.

The UN also faces challenges. First, there is the possibility of reduced operational effectiveness of mixed nationality units. Second, partnering can lengthen the time spent for TCCs to prepare themselves for a mission. The current deployment process is slow, and partnering could delay a unit’s arrival in theater. Partnering can also cause difficulties for elements of the UN Secretariat when smaller partners want their own memorandum of understanding (MOU). These memoranda can take considerable time and effort to work out; some in the UN would prefer to have the lead state negotiate one MOU for itself and its partners.

LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS

To Enhance the Effectiveness of Partnerships

1. Prospective partners must choose carefully and be prepared to overcome social and military incompatibilities. Military incompatibilities may not be eliminated, but their negative impact can be reduced. Even language incompatibilities can be reduced over time.

2. As the TCCs become more militarily compatible, through combined training, for example, the impact of their social incompatibilities will be less significant.

3. Tending to the size of a combined unit can mitigate problems of operational effectiveness.

Composite units (i.e., integrated operational units and integrated command structure) should not be formed below company level, and units operating in volatile environments should not be partnered below battalion level.

4. Frictions between partner personnel can be mitigated through command attention, leadership structures, and the encouragement of cooperative mindsets and trust-building.

5. The level of danger in a mission and the expectations of TCCs are critical to partnership success. Most TCCs in a UN mission are neither ready nor willing to act aggressively; if they have differing restrictive national caveats, then they should not partner in a mission or a section of a mission where they can predict their forces will be in hazard.

6. The challenges of partnership, while daunting, need not trump the benefits. Preparation and attention to detail are crucial. If the benefits of partnership are judged significant enough (even when they flow more to the partners than to the mission), then partnership makes sense for all, except predictably hazardous operations.

To Increase Partnerships

1. The UN and bilateral donors, such as the United States, should cooperate closely to raise general awareness of the opportunities for and the political and military benefits of operational partnerships in peacekeeping.

2. The UN and bilateral donors should continually share information on potential partnership opportunities among TCCs and how to help facilitate them.

3. Bilateral donors should continue to invest in pre-deployment preparations for partners, including assisting in relevant language training.

4. The UN and bilateral donors should strongly encourage and help enable the trend toward standby forces. Standby forces are already partnered and should be better prepared as a matter of course.

5. The UN or a member state should develop a short guidebook on operational partnership options and best practices.
Introduction

In its concept note for a summit on United Nations (UN) peacekeeping held in September 2014, the United States government noted that “peacekeeping is under strain, with peacekeeping numbers at all-time highs, peacekeepers operating in more complex and dangerous environments than ever before, and an architecture and infrastructure in need of continued modernization.”

Like several other initiatives before it, the summit’s goal was “to strengthen UN peace operations and take stock of the deep challenges we confront today.” One of the mechanisms that might aid in this goal is expanding the base of countries that can contribute to UN peacekeeping operations. The UN General Assembly’s Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C-34) and the UN departments of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and Field Support (DFS) have all emphasized the need for the UN to broaden the base of its troop- and police-contributing countries (TCCs and PCCs). In their 2009 “New Horizon” initiative, DPKO and DFS called for “an expanded base of troop- and police-contributing countries . . . to enhance collective burden-sharing and to meet future requirements.” The following year, the C-34 also emphasized the need to “expand the available pool of capabilities” and for the Secretariat to analyze “the willingness and readiness” of contributing countries and “develop outreach strategies” to strengthen contacts and longer-term relationships with current or potential contributing countries, encourage further contributions from existing contributors, and provide practical support to emerging contributors. It is hoped that such initiatives will generate new capabilities for UN operations and produce a more equitable sharing of the global peacekeeping burden—for which, as of February 2015, only fifteen UN member states provide 64 percent of the approximately 104,000 UN uniformed personnel deployed worldwide.

Operational partnerships are one potentially useful mechanism to further this agenda. They are partnerships between two or more actors to field capabilities relevant for UN peace operations. Such capabilities can assume various forms, from infantry platoons, companies, and battalions through to the specialized units that provide logistics, force protection, transportation, engineering, medical, aviation, or intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance functions.

In this study, we use the umbrella term “operational partnerships” to encompass the full range of these partnership arrangements found in the field. Specifically, we identify four types of operational partnerships, explained through a typology with two principal variables: the presence or absence of integrated, multinational command structures in military partnership; and whether or not the operational sub-units are mixed and multinational. The four categories of operational partnerships in contemporary UN peacekeeping operations are described as follows:

• **Attached**: an independent operational unit from Country A works alongside and is under the operational command of a larger unit from Country B.

• **Embedded**: troops from Country A are integrated within existing operational units of Country B to form mixed units under Country B’s command structure.

• **Co-deployed**: distinct operational units from Country A and Country B operate as part of a multinational command structure involving officers from both countries.

• **Composite**: troops from two or more countries form bi-national or multinational mixed units that serve under a multinational command structure involving officers from two or more countries.

This report assesses the major benefits and challenges of these partnerships for UN peacekeeping operations at both the political and...
operational levels. To accomplish this, it uses three generic categories of partners: junior partners; senior partners; and equal partners. While junior and senior partners play smaller and larger roles respectively, equal partners involve a roughly balanced contribution of assets.

**PRINCIPAL ARGUMENTS**

Sound political reasons exist to increase operational partnerships in UN peacekeeping operations. They include boosting the legitimacy of UN peacekeeping as a collective endeavor; strengthening political support for specific missions through increasing the numbers of TCCs; enhancing various projects aimed at regional military cooperation and integration; and broadening the base of UN contributors. There are also military/operational reasons for enhancing such partnerships, including the potential to expand the UN’s contributor base, generate additional capabilities for UN missions, facilitate a greater sense of esprit de corps among UN peacekeepers, and ease the boredom sometimes associated with some slower-tempo missions.

Most partnerships presume some political or security benefit in terms of strengthening the bilateral relationship between the countries involved. For “junior partners” specifically, partnering is often a necessity to be able to deploy. For “equal partners,” it facilitates deployment at the desired unit level as well as cost sharing. Partnerships allow “senior partners” to give their junior partners specific (often static) tasks to free up their own units. Beyond filling the requirement for a unit, senior partners can take the responsibility for bringing juniors on board and teaching them the ropes. Junior partners may eventually graduate to deploying their own contingents. The UN thus benefits from an expanded base of TCCs and a greater likelihood of filling capability gaps.

However, picking the right partner is crucial. Although political motivations might determine specific partnerships, preference should be given to countries with similar linguistic, cultural, and military attributes, as well as some level of geographic proximity to facilitate combined training. Moreover, those countries engaged in existing standby arrangements are more likely to function effectively in operational partnerships than countries that have not participated in similar endeavors. Ensuring that national caveats for proposed deployments are explicit and compatible is a necessary condition for effective partnership in the field.

Partnerships also pose military and operational challenges. The more hostile and complex the operating environment facing a UN peacekeeping operation is, the more likely it is that partnerships will generate military challenges and risks that hinder effectiveness. Partnerships must therefore be assessed holistically and include an awareness of threat levels and resource limitations. A key factor is the extent to which partnered troops can communicate effectively during periods of crisis. Given the organizational complexity of composite units (i.e., integrated operational units and integrated command structure), it was also generally not recommended to form them below the level of a company. More volatile operational environments would pose increased risks for effective operational partnerships below the battalion level.

Nevertheless, many of the operational challenges and obstacles generated by partnering can be overcome with the right type of preparation, compatible military doctrine, common standards and procedures, interoperable equipment, regular combined training, and cooperative mindsets between the partnering personnel. Ideally, mission-specific pre-deployment training would be conducted involving all members of the partnered units, not just key leaders. Ultimately, there is no substitute for peacekeepers being able to comfortably communicate in a common language, especially during times of crisis.

**STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT**

This report is organized into seven sections. The first section provides an overview of the different varieties of partnerships in contemporary UN peace operations. The second section describes the major patterns apparent in a new database of forty-one operational partnerships in UN peace operations from 2004 to 2014. The third section provides case studies of two UN missions that exhibit the full range of operational partnerships identified above: the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). The fourth section then explores why some UN member states engage in operational partnerships or might do so in the future. The reasons include a wide range of both
mission-specific concerns and broader political and security-related reasons. On the basis of the evidence presented in the first part of the report, the fifth section then summarizes the main factors that influence successful partnerships in the field, while the sixth section analyzes the principal benefits and challenges from these partnerships at both the political and operational levels. The final section identifies six major lessons and presents recommendations on how best to enhance operational partnerships so as to deliver more effective peace operations in the field.

Varieties of Partnerships in Contemporary UN Peacekeeping Operations

Operational partnerships in UN peacekeeping operations are not a new phenomenon, although they are poorly tracked and seldom researched. The UN has not kept a comprehensive record of such deployments in its missions, nor has it systematically studied the phenomenon. Scholarly literature on the subject is sparse.6

Two main variants of partnerships are relevant for our study:

- **Operational Partnerships**: military units in a peacekeeping operation composed of troops or command structures from two or more countries7
- **Standby Arrangements**: multinational units, typically from within one region, that engage in pre-deployment training, exercises, and other forms of cooperation in anticipation of deploying to peace operations

Within UN peacekeeping operations, mobile reserve forces composed of multinational units may perform a similar function to standby arrangements. Consequently, they represent a bridge between the two variants of partnerships, i.e., a standby arrangement within an existing operation. The rest of this section summarizes the main issues for each type of partnership.

**OPERATIONAL PARTNERSHIPS**

The primary focus of this report is on operational partnerships deployed within UN peacekeeping operations since 2004. Our analysis proceeds from our identification of four types of operational partnerships based on distinctions across the following two principal variables:

1. Does the partnership use integrated/multinational (i.e., comprised of personnel from two or more countries) command structures?
2. Does the partnership feature integrated/multinational operational units?

Table 1 depicts the four categories of operational partnerships in contemporary UN peacekeeping operations based on these variables. Examples of each type of partnership from the UNIFIL and UNFICYP missions are also illustrated in figures 1–4.

**Table 1. A typology of operational partnerships in UN peacekeeping operations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Single-nation command structure</th>
<th>Multinational command structure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Independent operational unit</strong></td>
<td>Attached</td>
<td>Co-deployed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Example: Italy and Slovenia</td>
<td>Example: Finland and Ireland</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(UNIFIL)</td>
<td>(UNIFIL)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Multinational (mixed) operational unit</strong></td>
<td>Embedded</td>
<td>Composite</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Example: Argentina and Paraguay</td>
<td>Example: Slovakia and Hungary</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(UNFICYP)</td>
<td>(UNFICYP)</td>
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6 The few relevant studies that exist either focus on the broader phenomenon of multinational military operations or on specific case studies with little analysis of the wider ramifications. See Appendix for further details.

7 Although many UN peacekeeping operations are now multidimensional, this study focuses on the military component and hence does not analyze police or civilian personnel in UN missions. In addition, it focuses on units and not individuals, such as staff officers and observers.
These operational partnerships are best described as follows:

- **Attached**: an independent operational unit from Country A works alongside and is under the operational command of a larger unit from Country B.
- **Embedded**: troops from Country A are integrated within existing operational units of Country B to form mixed units under Country B’s command structure.
- **Co-deployed**: distinct operational units from Country A and Country B operate as part of a multinational command structure involving officers from both countries.
- **Composite**: troops from two or more countries form bi-national or multinational mixed units that serve under a multinational command structure involving officers from two or more countries.

Figure 1. Attachment
Spain, Serbia, and El Salvador in UNIFIL: one-nation command and non-integrated units

Figure 2. Embedding
Argentina, Chile, and Paraguay in UNFICYP: one-nation command and integrated units

Figure 3. Co-deployment
Finland and Ireland battalion in UNIFIL: integrated command, independent units

Figure 4. Composite
Slovakia, Hungary, and Serbia in UNFICYP: integrated command, integrated units

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8 Two Croatian and two Ukrainian troops also served within this composite company at the time of our fieldwork. Croatian troops withdrew from UNFICYP in October 2014 and were replaced by soldiers from Slovakia.
In practice, these operational partnerships can also be further distinguished by the ways in which they approach three important sets of issues: legal, support, and training arrangements.

**Legal Arrangements**

The states involved in these operational partnerships are using a variety of legal arrangements. Specifically, different approaches have been taken to signing memoranda of understanding (MOUs) with DPKO and/or bilateral technical agreements signed among the partner countries. The purpose of bilateral technical agreements is generally to define and regulate the operational, and sometimes financial, relationship between the two countries.

In some cases, all of the countries involved in a partnership arrangement sign an MOU with DPKO via their permanent missions in New York. For example, in the Finland-Ireland battalion in UNIFIL, both countries sign an MOU with DPKO that specifies the number of personnel in their respective contingents and the details of their other contributions to the mission. In addition, both countries sign a bilateral MOU and technical agreement. These documents specify the detailed command and control, logistics, and support arrangements that will exist in the current partnership. For example, the technical agreement between Finland and Ireland has the following stated purpose:

…to establish the procedures, responsibilities, training and financial arrangements, where applicable, to be implemented by the Participants for the use of Camp Shamrock and other FINIRISH BATT [Finnish-Irish battalion] posts and in relation to arrangements in the FINIRISH BATT. The Finnish Defence Forces, as the Lead Nation (LN) is primarily responsible for the camp administration, command and control, infrastructure, procurement, security and services. The Finnish Defence Forces is not responsible for the infrastructure owned by other nations. The detailed responsibilities are described below in this TA [technical agreement].

Within UNFICYP, a similar relationship exists between Slovakia and Hungary. Both countries have MOUs with DPKO as well as a bilateral technical agreement detailing the support arrangements. In cases where a smaller unit attaches to a larger contingent from another country, the MOU with DPKO specifies the relevant details. For example, Slovenia’s MOU with DPKO about its contribution to UNIFIL specifies the total number of personnel. But it also sets out the relationship between the Slovenian unit and its host (Italy) by noting: “The Reconnaissance Detachment is embedded and forms an integral part of Italy-Sector HQ Company and Mechanized Infantry Battalion 1 and as such is not a stand-alone Unit.”

In other cases, however, not all contributing countries sign an MOU with DPKO. Instead, they rely on bilateral technical agreements with their partners, which must be approved by DPKO. Within UNIFIL, for example, neither El Salvador nor Brunei signed an MOU with DPKO. Instead, the Salvadoran platoon that was attached to the Spanish battalion relied on a bilateral technical agreement with Spain as the basis for its operations. Brunei had the same relationship with Malaysia. Part of the issue in this instance concerns which country has the “right” to these positions within the UN mission. Once a state signs its own MOU with the UN, it has a right to fill those positions. If a country deploys under the terms of its partner’s MOU with the UN, however, then those positions remain formally allocated to its partner.

Another variant is when the legal arrangements change over time. In UNIFIL, for example, the Serbian contingent initially relied on a bilateral technical agreement with its host, Spain. But after deploying several Platoons to the mission, in March 2014, Serbia signed an MOU with DPKO that specified the requirements under which the new Serbian company would operate, including stipulating that it would work under the operational control of the Spanish contingent.

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9 Interview with Finnish-Irish (FINIRISH) battalion officers, UNIFIL, September 5, 2014.
10 Briefing from FINIRISH battalion commander in UNIFIL, September 5, 2014.
11 Interview with Slovak and Hungarian officers in UNFICYP, September 8, 2014.
13 Interview with Salvadoran officer in UNIFIL, September 6, 2014.
14 Interview with Malaysian and Bruneian officers in UNIFIL, September 4, 2014.
15 Interview with Serbian officer in UNIFIL, September 6, 2014.
Support Arrangements

Each operational partnership also develops its own details for providing support to the individual contingents. A relatively uniform set of substantive issues are addressed in the MOUs and bilateral technical agreements. The differences across partnerships occur in the level of support that each country contingent requires, ranging from fairly minimal to more comprehensive support packages.

Support arrangements cover the entire range of substantive issues relevant to the smooth subsistence and operation of the military unit in the field. They include issues related to equipment, financing (for personnel and equipment), food, infrastructure, training (see the next section), discipline, and transportation. For example, the technical agreement between Italy and Slovenia in UNIFIL covered medical support; refueling services; security and disclosure of information; financial provisions (including means and timetables for reimbursement); strategic airlift/sealift; vehicle maintenance; crisis evacuation; settlement of disputes; commencement, duration, modification, interpretation, and termination of the agreement; accommodation; messing; electrical power provision; office allocation; and waste removal.¹⁶

The implementation and interpretation of the support arrangements take place at several levels but vary from partnership to partnership. Some partnerships have several layers of bureaucratic mechanisms for managing these issues. In the case of the Finland-Ireland battalion in UNIFIL, these include a bilateral military coordination group (at army command level), national mechanisms, such as financial and project advisory groups, as well as discussions among the peacekeepers in the field about whether required standards have been attained.¹⁷

At one end of the spectrum, the host country will supply virtually all of the material necessary for the attached country unit to function. El Salvador’s technical agreement with Spain for its deployment in UNIFIL, for instance, covers all necessary items, including uniforms and arms, vehicles, and food, as well as transport and training.¹⁸ In contrast, the Serbian technical agreement with the same Spanish battalion specifies that Serbian troops are responsible for bringing their own personal equipment.¹⁹

Training Arrangements

The extent and type of training conducted by these operational partnerships is the third important issue examined here. For UN peacekeeping, operations training is organized around three phases: (1) pre-deployment; (2) induction training in theater; and (3) ongoing training. Member states are responsible for pre-deployment training, whereas the UN and its field missions are responsible for induction and ongoing training. This arrangement presents a potential problem as neither the force commander of a UN mission nor the UN Office of Military Affairs have the budget or time to observe how pre-deployment training is conducted by the various TCCs.²⁰

There was a wide consensus among our interviewees that rigorous pre-deployment training is a necessary but not sufficient part of ensuring effective operational partnerships. Yet diverse pre-deployment training regimes exist for the countries involved. In-mission induction training is more uniform and is generally considered to take one to three weeks when transferring between rotations. Indeed, the challenge of developing some consistency among different national rotation schedules is one of the major management problems facing induction training regimes. The interviewees also emphasized that the social aspects of interacting with foreign troops during training are important for developing informal and personal bonds.

Variation in pre-deployment training was evident in our research across at least four dimensions. First, the amount of pre-deployment training varied across partnerships, with regimes ranging from about one to seven months depending on the national contingent.²¹ In most

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¹⁷ Interview with FINIRISH battalion officers in UNIFIL, September 5, 2014.
¹⁸ Interview with Salvadoran officer in UNIFIL, September 6, 2014. A similar situation occurs with the troops from Brunei embedded in the Malaysian battalion in UNIFIL. Interview with Malaysian officer in UNIFIL, September 4, 2014.
¹⁹ Interview with Serbian officer in UNIFIL, September 6, 2014.
²⁰ Interview with UNFICYP officer, September 8, 2014.
²¹ El Salvador’s four months of national pre-deployment training plus three months of joint pre-deployment training with Spain was the longest example.
cases, the pre-deployment training was mission-specific, a point that was repeatedly emphasized as crucial by numerous officials and peacekeepers. One example is the contingent from Brunei embedded within the Malaysian battalion in UNIFIL. This was the first contingent Brunei deployed in a UN peacekeeping operation. It engaged in one month of national pre-deployment training and then traveled to Malaysia to conduct three months of Force Integration Training (a form of mission-specific pre-deployment training), which included the entire battalion and took place at the “Malbatt Village” run by Malaysia’s peacekeeping training center. In addition, it is important to note that bilateral military training exercises have taken place between Malaysia and Brunei since the early 1980s.22 Similarly, the Salvadoran platoon attached with the Spanish battalion in UNIFIL underwent four months of national pre-deployment training in El Salvador and a further three months of combined training in Spain.23 In contrast, the Serbian company attached to the same Spanish battalion did not conduct combined pre-deployment training with the Spaniards, relying solely on combined induction training once deployed in theater.24

Second, the extent to which pre-deployment training is a national or combined enterprise differed across partnerships. Sometimes, countries conducted their own national pre-deployment training but did not meet their foreign counterparts until deployment in the mission theater, as in the Serbian-Spanish case mentioned above. At other times, pre-deployment training was conducted jointly involving some or all of the partnership countries. Bilateral partnerships are clearly easier to arrange than those involving several countries.25

A third variable is the extent to which pre-deployment training involves only so-called “key leaders” and officers or whether it includes all ranks. Training for all ranks would be particularly important in the cases that involve integrated, multinational units (i.e., embedded and composite partnerships). For example, Finland and Ireland both conduct national pre-deployment training for their personnel but combined pre-deployment training was reserved for the headquarters’ staff members who trained in Ireland or Finland, depending on which country was in command of their combined battalion in UNIFIL.26 Within UNFICYP, there was no combined pre-deployment training for the mobile force reserve (MFR) led by the United Kingdom. The MFR therefore had to rely on induction training and the hope that national officers from the partner countries (Argentina, Hungary, and Slovakia) would subsequently “cascade down” the training insights to the rest of their personnel.27 The two most commonly cited reasons that dictated against conducting combined pre-deployment training involving all ranks were the size of the contingents and the cost of travel (especially when partner countries were geographically far apart).

A final relevant area of variation was the extent to which pre-deployment training (national or joint) included English-language training (or French for Francophone missions). Some countries, including Slovakia and Hungary, built a language requirement into their pre-deployment training regimes and used English-language training materials. This was in addition to including English-language proficiency as part of their domestic selection process for choosing troops to deploy as UN peacekeepers. Our research did not analyze the substance of the pre-deployment training in each case, which could also vary considerably.

**STANDBY ARRANGEMENTS**

Standby arrangements are effectively operational partnerships in-waiting. They are multinational units that engage in pre-deployment training, exercises, and other forms of cooperation in anticipation of deploying to UN (and other) missions. Within the UN, there is a long history of (largely

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22 Interview with Malaysian and Bruneian officers in UNIFIL, September 4, 2014.
23 Interview with Salvadoran officer in UNIFIL, September 6, 2014.
24 Interview with senior Spanish officer in UNIFIL, September 6, 2014.
25 To the best of our knowledge, the five countries involved in UNFICYP Sector 4 (Slovakia, Hungary, Serbia, Croatia, and Ukraine) accounted for the highest number involved in a single company.
26 Interview with FINIRISH battalion officers in UNIFIL, September 5, 2014.
27 Interview with UNFICYP officer, September 8, 2014.
failed) efforts to create standby forces. In practice, these efforts have often been unable to surmount obstacles related to national sovereignty, combined decision making, financial and other resource limitations, and rapidity of deployment.

Today, numerous bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral arrangements exist where states prepare to deploy a combined unit prior to any crisis. Their aim is usually to develop the capability to assemble a unit of sufficient critical mass that each contributing country might not be able to assemble on its own. Preparations involved in standby arrangements could entail the earmarking of specific units that complement one another when deployed; identifying logistics chains; exchanging staff officers; conducting command post and field exercises; purchasing interoperable equipment; instructing in a common language (usually English or French); agreeing on common protocols and procedures; and rotating command among the participants.

Standby arrangements can be found in numerous parts of the world. At the global level, the now defunct Standby High-Readiness Brigade for UN Operations (SHIRBRIG) is a well-known example. Regionally, European states may have pioneered the concept of pre-deployment combined units (sometimes under the Partnership for Peace of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO]) such as the Nordic Battalion (NORDBAT), Baltic Battalion (BALTBAT), the South-Eastern Europe Brigade (SEEBRIG), Lithuanian-Polish Peace Force Battalion (LITPOLBAT), Central European Nations Cooperation in Peace Support (CENCOOP), Polish-Ukrainian Peace Force Battalion (POLUKRBAT), the Hungarian-Romanian Peacekeeping Battalion, and the Czech-Polish Peacekeeping Brigade, but there were also similar developments elsewhere, such as with the Central Asian Battalion (CENTRASBAT).

Key multilateral standby arrangements created in the last decade include the African Union’s African Standby Force (ASF) and the European Union’s battle groups. Similarly, several South American countries formed bilateral standby units. These are described below.

- The African Standby Force: Conceived in 2003 as one of the main tools of the new African Peace and Security Architecture, the ASF comprises five regional forces (now involving both military and civilian capabilities, including police) of approximately 4,500 personnel. It remains a work-in-progress with several regions—notably north and central Africa—lagging well behind their commitments and official timetable. The current deadline for the ASF to achieve full operational capacity is by the end of 2015. The ASF is intended to provide standby forces capable of responding to six scenarios ranging from small-scale observation missions to multidimensional peacekeeping and enforcement operations to stem atrocity crimes such as genocide. Embedded within the broader ASF concept is also a specific attempt to develop a “rapid deployment capability” that would allow the African Union (AU) and/or regional economic communities to field boots on the ground within fourteen days of the decision to deploy. Debate persists about the extent to which parts of the ASF have been operationalized before the current overall deadline. The AU’s assessment panel on the ASF concluded that “[d]espite significant progress towards operationalizing the ASF, significant shortcomings, gaps and obstacles still remain.” This left the panel sceptical that the 2015 deadline for full operational capacity would be met.

On the other hand, the massively increased scale and tempo of African-led deployments since 2003 led the panel to conclude “that the artificial distinction between the ASF and AU operations cannot be upheld, and that the ASF project is already significantly impacting on African and UN peace operations.”

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Deploying Combined Teams

Nevertheless, in large part because of the failure to ensure a rapid response to the crisis in Mali, in early 2013, these efforts were supplemented by a new interim mechanism known as the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC). This has received contributions from approximately a dozen African states. Drawing from a reservoir of 5,000 troops, the ACIRC is supposed to comprise tactical battle groups of 1,500 military personnel deployed by a lead nation or a group of AU member states and that would be sustainable for thirty days. Its purpose is to conduct stabilization and enforcement missions, neutralize terrorist groups, and provide emergency assistance to AU member states. Unlike the ASF regional standby forces, the ACIRC is a purely military capability without police or civilian elements.

- **European Union battle groups**: Established in light of the Helsinki Headline Goal for 2003, which called for European Union (EU) member states to make available rapid response capabilities, the EU’s battle group concept was finally agreed on in late 2006. The intention was not only to provide the EU with a workable rapid response capability as part of its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) but also to drive further capability development, to improve interoperability among EU militaries, and to help facilitate the transformation of EU militaries from a “Cold War” to expeditionary configuration. The EU battle groups are based on a combined-arms, battalion-sized force, reinforced with combat-support and combat service-support elements totaling approximately 1,500 personnel. They are supposed to be deployable within ten days of a European Council decision with the ability to be initially sustainable for thirty days and extendable to 120 days if resupplied appropriately. Initially, twenty-three states (twenty-two EU members plus Norway) committed to provide thirteen battle groups. The concept rested on the principle of multinationality, involving either a framework nation model or a multinational coalition model. Non-EU states have sometimes been invited to participate in battle groups. Once assembled, the battle groups are on standby for periods of six months as set out in the EU’s battle group roster. EU battle groups have been suggested for rapid deployment to crises in Africa on several occasions, most recently in late 2013 to the Central African Republic, but to date have never deployed. In practice, the battle groups have suffered from a variety of challenges related to lack of consensus or political will among all twenty-eight EU states, lack of sufficient common financing, and ensuring coherent pre-deployment training.

- **Southern Cross Joint and Combined Peace Force (Fuerza de Paz Conjunta Combinada Cruz del Sur)**: In 2006, Argentina and Chile created Cruz del Sur as a way to deploy peacekeepers under the UN Stand-by Arrangements System (UNSAS). It comprises a joint and combined command as well as fully equipped and self-sustaining land, naval, and air forces, including two mechanized infantry brigades, an engineering company, a mobile hospital, surface navy units, and transport helicopters. A bilateral working group was established to further develop the two states’ combined resources and capabilities regarding logistics, procurement, exercises, and doctrinal guidance. Cruz del Sur forces train with a computer simulation program designed to prepare troops for combined work in complex missions (Sistema Computacional de Simulación para Entrenamiento en Operaciones de Paz [SIMUPAZ]). Training rotates between each country’s national training center (El Centro Conjunto para Operaciones de Paz de Chile El Centro).
[CECOPAC] in Chile and El Centro Argentino de Entrenamiento Conjunto para Operaciones de Paz [CAECOPAZ] in Argentina.\textsuperscript{38} Cruz del Sur forces are currently awaiting a suitable deployment, with ongoing debate as to whether this should occur in a Chapter VII operation.

- **General San Martin Combined Engineering Company (Compañía de Ingenieros Combinada Peruano Argentina):** Established in 2006 by Argentina and Peru, this engineering company emerged from bilateral cooperation developed as part of the Permanent Committee for Coordination and Cooperation on Security and Defense (COPERSE in Spanish). A December 2011 directive (called a Resolución Suprema) by the Peruvian Ministry of Defense authorized a trip by a military delegation from Lima to Buenos Aires to take part in further negotiations regarding the future of the company but to date this unit has not deployed.\textsuperscript{39}

Many questions can be raised about the extent to which these arrangements are truly operational and which of them are likely to prove effective and sustainable. Indeed, the demise of SHIRBRIG in 2009 may hold a number of significant lessons for advocates of different operational partnerships today, not least of which is the difficulty of turning pledges into actual troop deployments.\textsuperscript{40} While this is an important area of debate to acknowledge, it is not the primary focus of this study.

### Patterns of Operational Partnerships in UN Peacekeeping Operations, 2004–2014

How common are operational partnerships in contemporary UN peacekeeping operations and what patterns are evident? To answer these questions, we compiled a database of cases from 2004 to 2014 using several research methods (see Appendix). The database includes forty-one cases of operational partnerships involving more than forty UN member states. Our database focuses solely on military units and hence does not include individuals (such as staff officers) or police contributions.\textsuperscript{41} These partnerships usually supplied infantry units but sometimes involved a range of more specialized forces, including engineers,

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\textsuperscript{38} For information on CECOPAC, see http://cecopac.cl/tag/alcopaz/. For information on CAECOPAZ, see http://www.caecopaz.mil.ar/web2014/. For further discussion, see also the country profiles for Argentina and Chile available on the Providing for Peacekeeping Project website at www.providingforpeacekeeping.org/profiles/.

\textsuperscript{39} “Peru Contributor Profile,” Providing for Peacekeeping Project, available at www.providingforpeacekeeping.org/profiles/.

\textsuperscript{40} Koops, “Effective Inter-organizationalism?”

\textsuperscript{41} Throughout, we have tried to follow unit integrity rather than adopt a specific numerical threshold, although in practice most units have comprised a dozen or more troops.
Table 2. Database of operational partnerships in UN peacekeeping operations, 2004–2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>TCCs (Partner type)</th>
<th>Duration*</th>
<th>Type of Unit</th>
<th>Ref. No.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MINURCAT II</td>
<td>Ireland (Equal) Finland (Equal)</td>
<td>March 2009–April 2010</td>
<td>Infantry battalion</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>France (Senior) Austria (Junior)</td>
<td>March 2009–Nov. 2009</td>
<td>Transport company</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Poland (Senior) Croatia (Junior)</td>
<td>March 2009–Sept. 2009</td>
<td>Infantry battalion/platoon</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Togo (Senior) Senegal (Junior)</td>
<td>March 2009–Nov. 2010</td>
<td>Reinforced company</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Norway (Senior) Serbia (Junior)</td>
<td>May 2009–May 2010</td>
<td>Level II hospital + staff</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINUSMA</td>
<td>Togo (Senior) Liberia (Junior)</td>
<td>July 2013–</td>
<td>Infantry battalion/platoon</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Senegal (Senior) Guinea (Junior)**</td>
<td>July 2013–</td>
<td>Infantry battalion/company</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINUSTAH</td>
<td>Morocco (Equal) Spain (Equal)</td>
<td>Nov. 2004–Feb. 2006</td>
<td>Infantry company</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chile (Senior) Ecuador (Junior)</td>
<td>Nov. 2004–</td>
<td>Combined engineer company</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Brazil (Senior) Paraguay (Junior)</td>
<td>Nov. 2006–</td>
<td>Infantry platoon</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chile (Senior) El Salvador (Junior)</td>
<td>Feb. 2013–</td>
<td>Infantry platoon</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Brazil (Senior) Canada (Junior)</td>
<td>June–Dec. 2013</td>
<td>Infantry platoon</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chile (Senior) Honduras (Junior)</td>
<td>Feb. 2014–</td>
<td>Infantry platoon</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONUC/MONUSCO</td>
<td>South Africa (Senior) Malawi (Junior)</td>
<td>2008–August 2010</td>
<td>Infantry company</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONUSCO</td>
<td>South Africa (Equal) Malawi (Equal)</td>
<td>June 2013–</td>
<td>Force Intervention Brigade battalions had separate operating areas but formed mixed task groups during anti-M23 operations.</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nepal (Junior)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDOF</td>
<td>Canada (Senior) Japan (Junior)</td>
<td>Jan. 2005–Feb. 2006</td>
<td>Logistics battalion</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>India (Senior) Japan (Junior)</td>
<td>March 2006–Nov. 2012</td>
<td>Logistics battalion + separate logistics platoon</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Poland (Senior) Slovakia (Junior)</td>
<td>2007–2008</td>
<td>Infantry company</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Austria (Senior) Croatia (Junior)</td>
<td>June 2008–March 2013</td>
<td>Infantry company</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fiji (Equal) India (Equal)</td>
<td>June 2013–</td>
<td>Logistics battalion</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fiji (Senior) Nepal (Junior)</td>
<td>July 2013–</td>
<td>Infantry company</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Task Force</td>
<td>TCCs (Partner type)</td>
<td>Duration*</td>
<td>Type of Unit</td>
<td>Ref. No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNFICYP</td>
<td>Argentina (Senior) Chile (Junior) Paraguay (Junior)</td>
<td>2004–2005</td>
<td>Combined task force</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Argentina (Senior) Peru (Junior)</td>
<td>2005–Nov. 2010</td>
<td>Naval infantry</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UK (Senior) Argentina (Junior) Slovakia (Junior) Hungary (Junior)</td>
<td>1997–</td>
<td>Mobile force reserve</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Slovakia (Equal) Hungary (Equal)</td>
<td>2001–</td>
<td>Composite infantry company</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Slovakia (Senior) Serbia (Junior)</td>
<td>2010–</td>
<td>Mixed infantry platoon</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hungary (Senior) Serbia (Junior)</td>
<td>2010–</td>
<td>Mixed infantry platoon</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Argentina (Senior) Chile (Junior)</td>
<td>2000–</td>
<td>Infantry platoon</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Argentina (Senior) Paraguay (Junior)</td>
<td>1998–</td>
<td>Infantry platoon</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIFIL</td>
<td>Finland (Equal) Ireland (Equal)</td>
<td>Oct. 2006–Dec. 2007</td>
<td>Finnish engineer company and Irish protective unit</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Italy (Senior) Slovenia (Junior)</td>
<td>Dec. 2006–</td>
<td>Recce unit</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Belgium (Senior) Luxembourg (Junior)</td>
<td>Oct. 2006–</td>
<td>Multirole engineer unit</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Belgium (Senior) Luxembourg (Junior)</td>
<td>Oct. 2006–Feb. 2009</td>
<td>Level II hospital</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Spain (Senior) El Salvador (Junior)</td>
<td>August 2008–</td>
<td>Infantry + health service unit</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Malaysia (Senior) Brunei (Junior)</td>
<td>Oct. 2008–</td>
<td>Embedded infantry</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Portugal (Senior) Timor–Leste (Junior)</td>
<td>Feb.–May 2012</td>
<td>Engineers</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Finland (Equal) Ireland (Equal)</td>
<td>April 2012–</td>
<td>Infantry battalion</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Spain (Senior) Serbia (Junior)</td>
<td>Nov. 2012–</td>
<td>Infantry platoon, then company</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Italy (Senior) Armenia (Junior)</td>
<td>Nov. 2014–</td>
<td>Force protection platoon</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Italy (Senior) Serbia (Junior)</td>
<td>Dec. 2014–</td>
<td>Force protection platoon</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIL</td>
<td>Ireland (Senior) Sweden (Junior)</td>
<td>Feb. 2004–Oct. 2006</td>
<td>Quick reaction force</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Cases without a listed end date were ongoing as of Dec. 2014.

** Guinea graduated to deploying its own company in MINUSMA in 2015.
logisticians, medical personnel, and reconnaissance, transportation, and aviation units. As depicted in figure 5 on page 12, the number of ongoing partnerships has risen gradually since 2004.

The partnerships were found in eight UN peacekeeping operations deployed in Chad/Central African Republic (MINURCAT), Cyprus (UNFICYP), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC/MONUSCO), Haiti (MINUSTAH), Israel/Syria (UNDOF), Lebanon (UNIFIL), Liberia (UNMIL), and Mali (MINUSMA).\(^4^2\) Roughly three-quarters (31 of 41, or 76 percent) of all the partnerships occurred in just four missions: UNIFIL (11), UNFICYP (8), MINUSTAH (6), and UNDOF (6). Operational partnerships were established most frequently by European and South American countries, with relatively few examples from the major TCCs from Africa and Asia.

Case Studies: Lebanon and Cyprus Missions

This section analyzes the main motivating factors behind the operational partnerships in UNIFIL in Lebanon and UNFICYP in Cyprus—the two UN missions with the most examples of partnership and the full range of variants identified previously (see table 1). It also examines the implications of these partnerships for the mission and the UN more broadly.

UNIFIL

As of September 2014, UNIFIL was composed of 10,109 peacekeepers from thirty-eight contributing countries, with the largest TCCs being France, Ghana, India, Indonesia, and Italy, each of which contributed more than 800 uniformed personnel. The mission is divided into two sectors: west and east. Sector West comprises five operational battalions led by Finland, Ghana, Indonesia, Italy, and Malaysia. Sector East comprises four operational battalions led by India, Indonesia, Nepal, and Spain. A mobile reserve is composed of a French battalion, and there is a combined maritime task force led by Brazil.

UNIFIL’s principal operational activities include liaison and coordination with and between the parties on the ground, assistance in building the capacities of the Lebanese Armed Forces, and monitoring the cessation of hostilities. Tactical activities include patrolling along the Blue Line,\(^4^3\) area domination patrolling, manning observation posts, conducting foot and vehicle patrols (sometimes in cooperation with the Lebanese Armed Forces), and conducting counter-rocket-launching operations. Since the popular uprising and subsequent outbreak of war in neighboring Syria, UNIFIL has dealt with an influx of refugees and a decrease in the numbers of Lebanese Armed Forces present, due to security responsibilities in other parts of the country, partly from spillover effects of the Syrian conflict.

Since 2004, UNIFIL has housed more operational partnerships than any other UN peacekeeping operation. As of December 2014, it contained seven such partnerships (see table 2). They were established for a variety of reasons. From the UN perspective, bringing more TCCs into a mission expands its contributor base and strengthens the legitimacy of the mission with both local and international audiences. However, from the perspective of TCCs, these partnerships stemmed from a range of alternative motivating factors.

One factor is the desire to become a UN TCC, with UNIFIL as the chosen venue. For example, Brunei deployed its first-ever contingent of UN peacekeepers to UNIFIL in late 2008, and Armenia deployed its first UN contingent to the mission in November 2014.

Another factor motivating partnerships is evident in those UN member states that wish to become a TCC in UNIFIL specifically but require assistance to deploy their preferred type of contingent. Examples include El Salvador, Slovenia, Ireland, and Finland. While El Salvador and Slovenia felt deploying a company was beyond their means and required assistance to deploy even smaller contingents, neither Ireland nor Finland was able to field a battalion alone, but both were able to operate one together. Another example is Serbia, which is a particularly interesting case, because, since 2010, it gradually ramped up its contributions to UNIFIL through a total of eight

\(^{42}\) The number is nine if MONUC and MONUSCO are counted as separate missions.

\(^{43}\) The line of withdrawal established in 2000 to confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon.
rotation cycles. It began by contributing staff officers, then two sequenced platoons, followed by two sequenced companies.\textsuperscript{44} This suggests that Serbia has used its operational partnerships as a way to boost its independent expeditionary capabilities as well as to assist in the overall modernization of its armed forces. Serbia’s ability to increase its deployment to company level is a concrete case of partnerships facilitating the UN’s goal of expanding its contributor base. Serbia recently announced its intention to more than double its contributions to UN peacekeeping in the near future.\textsuperscript{45}

Some states saw their participation in UNIFIL partnerships as a way to gain operational experience for their armed forces, since there were few chances for international deployment outside of UN missions. Examples included Brunei, Malaysia, and Serbia.

For some countries, their partnership in UNIFIL was also a way to help strengthen broader bilateral political and military relations with the country concerned. This was clearly evident in the cases of Italy-Slovenia, Spain-El Salvador, Finland-Ireland, and Malaysia-Brunei, all of which had prior experience of bilateral military cooperation. For these countries, the opportunity to engage in real operations as opposed to combined training exercises is important in moving the partnership to another level. One variant of this rationale was evident in countries, such as Serbia, seeking to strengthen ties with NATO and EU members in particular. Notably, this worked both ways with Italian representatives suggesting that they were supportive of Serbia’s accession to the EU and that its partnership with Serbia within UNIFIL was one way to facilitate political dialogue and demonstrate cooperation.\textsuperscript{46}

One operational reason for engaging in partnerships was for a country to free some of its troops from conducting certain tasks. In UNIFIL, conducting force protection for the mission headquarters is a task rotated among the operational battalions. Italy, however, preferred to allow troops from partner states to assume force protection duties for its battalion. The reason was to permit more Italian troops to be tasked with kinetic operations.\textsuperscript{47} A related operational reason was provided by the officers from the Finnish-Irish (FINIRISH) battalion, who stated that co-deployment and the rotation of battalion command allowed both partners to experience the burdens and responsibilities of commanding a battalion without having to carry the financial costs of deploying the entire battalion themselves.\textsuperscript{48}

As noted above, the major implication of these partnerships for the UN is that UNIFIL attracted more TCCs, which is also consistent with the UN’s goal of broadening its contributor base, and hence offered the mission’s leadership wider political support and leverage from more capitals. It could be seen as generating greater local and international legitimacy as a truly multinational mission.

Politically, UNIFIL provided a significant venue in which, since 2006, some important European powers reengaged with UN peacekeeping after a period of relative absence. Although not the focus of this study, it was also the site of the innovative Strategic Military Cell established in 2006.\textsuperscript{49} UNIFIL has also been a crucible in which political cooperation between partner countries has deepened.

From a more operational perspective, UNIFIL’s partnerships have facilitated learning across countries and led to the exchange and refinement of various military best practices, especially for relatively new UN TCCs. Moreover, the partnerships developed in UNIFIL will likely help make multinational operating environments more palatable for newer UN TCCs in future missions. One aspect of this relates to the improved English language skills that contingents develop in theater as they learn to work with new partners and other TCCs.

Although most interviewees were generally positive of UNIFIL’s operational partnerships,

\textsuperscript{44} Interview with Serbian officer in UNIFIL, September 6, 2014.
\textsuperscript{46} Interview with Italian government official, New York, May 19, 2014.
\textsuperscript{47} Interview with Italian government official, New York, May 19, 2014.
\textsuperscript{48} Interview with FINIRISH battalion officers in UNIFIL, September 5, 2014.
\textsuperscript{49} For an analysis that suggests the Strategic Military Cell had rather minimal impacts, see Ronald Hatto, “UN Command and Control Capabilities: Lessons from UNIFIL’s Strategic Military Cell,” International Peacekeeping 16, No. 2 (2009): 186–98.
some negative perspectives also emerged. These included the view that such partnerships could be problematic in regard to communication (i.e., language as well as technical issues), troop discipline/conduct, and different cultural approaches to some military tasks.\(^{50}\) Those raising these views felt that such challenges would be significantly intensified in situations of escalated tension and where peacekeepers were required to carry out more complex kinetic tasks.

Members of the mission also offered some points of caution about the challenges of operational partnerships in less benign environments. One perspective was that the size of such arrangements “should not be considered below battalion level” in war-fighting scenarios.\(^{51}\) A related view was that operational partnerships “could present some challenges in an escalation of tension situation.”\(^{52}\)

Retaining independent operational units was considered the least challenging way to conduct operational partnerships, while composite and embedded units were thought to present more challenges.

**UNFICYP**

As of August 31, 2014, UNFICYP consisted of 854 troops, 58 police, 38 international civil servants, and 112 local civilian staff. Four countries supply the bulk of the troops; the UK has 271; Argentina has 264; Slovakia has 159; and Hungary has 77.\(^{53}\) They are split among three sectors and a multinational headquarters group. The “Argentine contingent” has responsibility for Sector 1. It consists of 264 Argentines, 14 Paraguayans, 13 Chileans, and 1 Brazilian. There are two companies, one in the east and one in the west. The Chileans and Paraguayans command one platoon each in the western company led by an Argentine. Sector 2 is the responsibility of an infantry company made up of approximately 200 British troops. Sector 4 is a multilayered partnering affair among 96 Slovaks, 57 Hungarians, 45 Serbs, 2 Croatians, and 2 Ukrainians. Within the company are partnered a Hungarian platoon (whose 37 Hungarians in turn partner with 6 Serbs), a Serbian platoon (whose 25 Serbs in turn partner with 15 Slovaks), and a Slovak platoon (whose 29 Slovaks in turn partner with 12 Serbs) (see figure 4). This matryoshka effect makes Sector 4 the most intertwined or complex instance of partnering of any UN operation today. Finally the headquarters element includes a fully integrated mobile force reserve (MFR) of 54 Britons (who command the unit), 33 Argentines, 10 Slovaks, and 9 Hungarians. Because of its makeup, the MFR’s briefing proclaimed it to be the “flag-ship for intra UNFICYP cooperation.”

The UNFICYP TCCs offered several reasons why they partnered. Officials from Argentina stressed one factor: the partnering was directed by their country’s political leaders and by the foreign ministry. As a result, Argentina invited Chile and Paraguay to join. They were attractive partners because of the compatibilities in social customs and language. The *Cruz del Sur* initiative between Argentina and Chile furthered reinforced working with Chile (see page 11). Argentine troops are also integrated in the MFR under British command, which is notable given the hostile relationship between these two states a couple of decades earlier.\(^{54}\)

A second rationale was that partnerships led to a sharing of exposure to the political risks that can arise in peacekeeping missions such as UNFICYP where local parties can agitate and push their way into the buffer zone. Partnering could also plug gaps among the senior partner’s forces by integrating enabling capacities, including logistics and engineering.

Three intertwined rationales behind partnerships include the benefits for a country in improving its military by working with and learning from others; promoting regional cohesion by combining specifically with neighbors; and demonstrating to (potential) alliance members that it is or can be a worthy member of the alliance. This was especially the case with Eastern European countries that had been at odds with one another in the 1990s. Partnering together now in UN missions outside their neighborhood advanced those ends, including

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50 Briefing from UNIFIL headquarters, September 4, 2014, and interviews with UNIFIL personnel, September 6, 2014.
51 Briefing from UNIFIL headquarters, September 4, 2014.
52 Briefing from UNIFIL headquarters, September 4, 2014.
54 Argentine and British peacekeepers operated alongside one another in the Balkans operations in the 1990s.
the aim of serving in NATO missions. The Eastern Europeans emphasized their national efforts to adhere to NATO standards (including English language proficiency) and their preference, should it come to it, for participating in NATO missions over UN missions. Thus, while the UN comes across as the less attractive partner, it still has benefits at least in the short term.

Like UNIFIL, challenges were identified, including the sentiment that a single national unit was more effective than a partnered unit since the partners might differ in language, social customs, tactics, techniques, procedures, work ethic, enforcement of discipline, rules of engagement, and the like. In short, depending on circumstances, one needs to weigh the benefits of partnering with the implications for mission effectiveness. It was broadly accepted, however, that more benign missions were more forgiving when incompatibility problems inevitably surfaced. Nevertheless, with more careful preparations by partners to work together, the rough edges of incompatibilities can be smoothed down—but perhaps never eliminated altogether.

Motives for Operational Partnerships

Why do states participate in operational partnerships in UN peacekeeping operations? The short answer is that it facilitates deployment. Some states might be unable to participate on their own: the practical burdens of meeting personnel numbers, equipment requirements, standards of performance, lift, and the like are too great. Thus, if they are to participate, then they are driven to collaborate with TCCs willing to assist them. More practically, capable contributors may still want to share the (political and operational) burdens and thus are driven to take on the role of senior partners. Equal partners share or trade off command and operational burdens. A senior partner is unique in that it shares a junior partner’s practical burdens that would otherwise prevent its deployment. In other words, partners need not have the same motives. It is the synergy that counts.

Since 2004, approximately 120 countries per year were motivated to be UN TCCs, with more than forty participating in operational partnerships. Twenty-one of the fifty-seven governments surveyed by the authors expressed a willingness to do so in the future. Their specific reasons are concrete and more textured variations of the core motives driving peacekeepers in general.

POLITICAL AND FOREIGN POLICY MOTIVES

Some reasons for partnering may stem from a TCC’s foreign policies (see table 3). One is enhancing a region’s cohesion and clout. Both Argentine and Chilean officials noted that their partnering with other Latin American states resulted from national leadership directives to make their region more of a recognized player on the international scene and, in the course of accomplishing this, to make the region more self-sufficient and independent of the United States and

Table 3. Largely foreign policy motives for partnering

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Motive</th>
<th>Applicability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Enhance the cohesion and clout of the TCCs’ regions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Cement relations with neighbors, affiliates, security guarantors, and rising powers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Though possessing a modest military, be recognized as a responsible and militarily active international citizen</td>
<td>Junior partners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Present a new and more attractive international profile to neighbors and beyond</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Prove one’s worthiness to be a security and/or economic partner</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Enhance legitimacy and international or domestic support for a mission that engages one’s interests</td>
<td>Senior partners</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Partnering also augments the creation of the *Cruz del Sur* military cooperative arrangement referenced earlier. MINUSTAH provided the occasion for partnering, and it “was...crucial in creating operational and political capacity in the region while facilitating trust and confidence building among participating states. The joint Argentine–Chilean peacekeeping contingent was especially regarded as a remarkable example of bilateral cooperation.”

Austria’s survey response described its partnership with France in the non-UN European Union Force in Chad (EUFOR-Tchad) mission as driven by its support for the EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). While there was little emphasis on increasing their region’s clout, the Eastern European interlocutors strongly stressed the aim for greater regional cohesion against the backdrop of the breakup of the Soviet empire and the bloody wars they later experienced. Other interviewees suggested they might be more likely to consider partnering in the context of a regional rather than UN-led peace operation.

A second motive is cementing friendlier relations with one’s neighbors, affiliates, (potential) security guarantors, and rising powers. Both South American and Eastern European officials mentioned the aim of strengthening neighborhood relations. Even Chile, in the far south of the continent, relies on partnering to link up with distant northerly nations. As stated in its Ministry of Defense blog in June 2014:

Chile continues to forge military ties with some Central American nations. Under a program started last year and financed by Canada, Chile has been transferring know-how to El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala...for peacekeeping...and disaster and humanitarian aid... [T]roops from El Salvador and Honduras have joined Chile’s peacekeeping battalion in Haiti. Separately, [Chilean President] Bachelet praised military cooperation with Argentina and urged closer ties with Peru.

Particularly interesting is that Canada’s partnership with Brazil in MINUSTAH (Operation HAMLET) was an initiative that, according to Canadian army sources, had “been pitched for...two years as a way to increase bilateral ties with the emerging economic power.” Austria’s partnering with Slovakia and Croatia in UNDOF (and possibly with Hungary as well) fits in with its participation in the Danube River regional cooperation after the collapse of Yugoslavia.

Austrian interlocutors emphasized how those countries and Austria shared “more reactive fight-last” interpretations of self-defense in contrast with the “UK and French pro-active, fight-first” views. Spain specifically noted that its partnerships—presumably with Morocco in MINUSTAH and with Serbia, El Salvador, and Honduras in UNIFIL—were not only intended “to reinforce links among different Armed Forces” but also “to create synergies for other types of bilateral collaborations.”

The third motive results from the positive image associated with peacekeeping, which makes partnering particularly useful for states that cannot deploy on their own but want recognition as responsible and militarily active international citizens. This seems a motivating factor generalizable to junior partners, and it was either implied or explicitly stated by most of the interviewees mentioned thus far. Some states also believed that peacekeeping could present a new, more open, and friendlier international profile to the world in general and to their neighbors in particular.

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57 Interviews with Croatian government official, May 21, 2014; and UNIFCYP Sector 4 command elements (from Slovakia, Serbia, Hungary, Croatia, and Ukraine), Cyprus, September 8, 2014.


63 Interview with Spanish personnel, UNIFIL, September 6, 2014. The Honduras partnering ended while the Hondurans were still in pre-deployment training in Spain due to a coup in Tegucigalpa in 2009.
A fourth motive is proving one’s worthiness to be a security or economic partner on a one-on-one basis, multilaterally, or as a member of a standing organization. Eastern Europeans were quite open in admitting that peacekeeping partnerships were intended to impress and win the support of NATO and/or EU countries. They readily admitted that if they had to choose between partnering in a NATO/EU versus UN context that they would generally choose the former. Moscow’s recent destabilizing activities on their periphery strongly reinforced that preference. A related point was that contributions, including partnering, in UN missions could be linked to diplomatic efforts to become an elected member of the UN Security Council.65

Though not much addressed, a fifth political motive is bringing others on board a mission so as to enhance its legitimacy and international support. While falling short of our definition of an operational partnership, France’s assistance to Togo to deploy in MINURCAT II (as well as in non-UN missions) probably reflects its legacy and current interest in what happens in Francophone Africa and a desire to multilateralize operations to enhance legitimacy. A UNIFIL interview added a twist to the legitimacy issue, claiming that greater multinationality of the UNIFIL forces led to greater acceptability of UNIFIL by both Israel and Lebanon.66 Similarly, more TCCs were thought to provide a mission’s leadership with more capitals, which can put pressure on the local parties and on neighboring governments.67 More TCCs might also mean a greater sharing of political risks.68 Presumably for the UN, a contribution burden spread more evenly among a greater number of TCCs reduces the risk that one large TCC withdrawal could debilitate a mission.

Building mission legitimacy can be as important domestically as internationally. It is easier for a government to convince parliament or public opinion if it can point to partners who will share the load. This motive did not get explicit attention, but South American and Eastern European interlocutors did allude to a “We’re all in this together” phenomenon, for MINUSTAH in the case of the former and for UNFICYP in the case of the latter.

**MILITARY MOTIVES**

A second set of motives behind partnering is driven by primarily military concerns (see table 4 on the next page). First, partnering can make up for deficiencies in personnel, equipment, training, support and services capacities, lift, knowledge of general military and UN procedures, and the like. This motive is generalizable to junior and equal partners and even to some senior partners as well. Conversely, states that can provide their own units are less inclined to partner. As one Indian former senior UN peacekeeper put it, there is no need for India to partner since it “has no shortage of forces and [does] not need to borrow to complete a unit.”69

The smallest unit a TCC can deploy as a standalone unit to a UN operation is a company, i.e., ideally at least 100 troops usually assembled in three or more platoons. But some countries might struggle to field an infantry platoon on a rotating basis.70 They might, however, be able to deploy with the support of a senior partner. Many actual and potential junior partners readily admit that a, if not the, chief attraction of partnering is the prospect of improving their own militaries. Partnering for them means being provided with equipment, training, international experience, and exposure to the doctrines, procedures, and the organizational structures of other militaries that would not be otherwise available. For the individuals deployed, it may also mean extra personal monetary remuneration and improved promotion prospects. Serbian officials, for instance, stressed Serbia’s efforts to improve its knowledge both of UN and senior partner procedures and said that it adopted Spanish models for operational evaluations of Serbian troops and the buying of spare parts.71

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66 Interview with FINIRISH battalion command elements, UNIFIL, September 5, 2014.
67 Interview with former UNIFIL official, New York, July 15, 2014.
68 Briefing from UNFICYP official, Cyprus, September 9, 2014.
69 E-mail communication to authors, March 5, 2014.
70 A platoon may be as small as twenty to thirty personnel, but if a country is to provide one on a regular basis, rotating them heel-to-toe, it needs at least three platoons available, one that is deployed, one that has just returned from deployment, and one that is readying to deploy.
71 Interview with Serbian personnel, UNIFIL, Lebanon, September 6, 2014.
A second overlapping military motive derives from the standards and procedures that must be followed in order to become a UN peacekeeper. Most junior partners find navigating these requirements daunting. A Serbian officer in UNIFIL, for instance, recounted that the multiplicity and complexity of UN requirements drove Serbia to partner with Spain and Italy.\(^{72}\) This suggests that partnering with a more experienced TCC is a good way for emerging contributors to learn about UN peacekeeping procedures, force generation, reimbursement issues, as well as field activities.

A Chilean officer described both sides of the junior-senior dynamics by outlining how Chile, in a bid to raise its international profile in the late 1980s and 1990s, looked to UN peacekeeping as one way to do so. But at the time, Chile’s military was not well versed in these matters. Hence, it looked for invitations to work with partners, particularly the UK and other NATO members. The Stabilization Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina was a significant learning experience that allowed Chile “to become more choosy about where it deployed,” and to serve as a senior partner to Ecuador in MINUSTAH.\(^{73}\) Ecuador originally intended to deploy a small company to Haiti independently but was frustrated by the complexities of meeting UN MOU requirements. Chile signed an MOU on behalf of both countries, and the terms of Ecuador’s participation were in turn set out in a bilateral technical agreement.\(^ {74}\) A Japanese spokesman echoed the Chilean view. “It was initially important for us,” he said, “to learn about UN peacekeeping from an experienced and large contributor like Canada. But over time we have got better at these activities ourselves.”\(^ {75}\) Collaboration between them goes back to their “close cooperation” in UNDOF in 1999.\(^ {76}\)

A third overlapping motive is that for some countries, participating in peace operations may be the only route to gaining some operational experience in a multinational setting. Again, learning from

Table 4. Largely military motives for partnering

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Motive</th>
<th>Applicability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Make up for shortfalls that prevent or hinder deployment.</td>
<td>Junior and equal partners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Receive assistance in navigating UN MOU and other requirements.</td>
<td>Junior partners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Look for opportunities to carry out genuine military tasks and gain operational experience.</td>
<td>Equal partners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Share mission burdens to the mutual benefit of the partners.</td>
<td>Equal partners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Provide a mission with a required capability that no mission TCC could provide alone.</td>
<td>Equal partners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Get junior partners to take on niche or static roles that free up the senior partner to undertake other tasks.</td>
<td>Junior and senior partners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Fill out a senior partner’s unit so as to reinforce the senior partner’s claim to be the commander.</td>
<td>Senior partners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Enhance the political clout a mission commander can exercise against local parties by increasing the number of TCC states that have a stake in the mission’s success.</td>
<td>Senior partners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Provide scope to perform both national and international tasks at the same time.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{72}\) Interview with Serbian personnel, UNIFIL, Lebanon, September 6, 2014.

\(^{73}\) Interviews with Chilean government officials, Washington, DC, April 3 and May 12, 2014.

\(^{74}\) Interviews with Chilean government officials, Washington, DC, April 3 and May 12, 2014.

\(^{75}\) Interview with Japanese government officials, New York, May 19, 2014.

a more experienced TCC might deliver additional insights than if a new contributor worked alone.

A fourth reason applies particularly to partnering among equals. Equality in partnering is less an issue of improving one’s military as it is sharing burdens to the mutual benefit of the partners and/or the mission in general. The FINIRISH battalion in UNIFIL is a quintessential example of equality partnering for mutual military benefit. Both Finland and Ireland have proud traditions of being UN TCCs, but both faced defense cutbacks that made it difficult to deploy battalions independently. Battalions are the UN’s preferred basic unit, and deploying a battalion provides for crisper command and control both internally and up the chain to the UN force commander. A battalion is also large enough to have its own area of operations. However, neither TCC had the resources to deploy national battalions in back-to-back rotations. They had a cleverly executed compromise solution: For one rotation, one partner deployed approximately two-thirds of the battalion (two companies) and provided the commander and the bulk of his staff; they then switched for the next cycle. The battalion stood up in June 2012 with 356 Irish (including a support company and twenty-four soldiers in headquarters) and 170 Finns. The battalion commander was Irish. (He also served as deputy commander for the entire UNIFIL force.) Ireland handed over battalion command to Finland in 2013, at which time the Irish dropped to 180 personnel and the Finns increased to nearly 350 and now provide the support company and the bulk of headquarters personnel. They conducted combined pre-mission readiness training through the exchange of officers. An April 2013 exercise in Ireland included six Finns. 77

Though senior partners are militarily more capable than their junior counterparts, they too can benefit operationally. Niche contributors fill specialty requirements and can often do so working largely alone on one task. This lessens the senior partner’s burden integrating the junior partner’s unit. This occurred in Chad (MINURCAT) where Serbia provided personnel to help run a Norwegian Level II hospital. A Luxembourg official stressed how his country’s intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, water purification, and counter-IED capacities meant it was well suited to be a junior partner. 78 Speaking as seniors, French and Italian interviewees—with the latter preparing to bring on Serbia and Armenia in UNIFIL—stressed that a junior partner’s largely static force protection and mine-clearance units freed their own troops to undertake kinetic tasks suited to their mobile units with their organic communications. 79

Because unit or mission command in a UN operation often goes to the TCC with the greatest number of troops deployed, a senior partner benefits when the troop contribution of a junior partner fills out its contribution enough to reinforce the senior partner’s claim on command. Spain pointed out how partnering “allows [it] to command bigger structures in operations and offer to the UN major units with less manpower effort for the Spanish Armed Forces.” Spain benefited this way in 2012–2013 when it partnered with Serbia in UNIFIL. If the commander of a combined unit wishes to put political pressure on the local parties, then he or she can turn not only to his or her own government to do so but also to the partner’s government.

Finally, Chile added a variant on the benefits to a senior partner. Specifically, its partnership with Ecuador meant that it could meet both its UN peacekeeping requirements (for foreign policy reasons) and its internal domestic requirements. The internal domestic issue revolved around Chilean army engineers who are heavily utilized at home. To generate enough capacity to deploy some abroad as well, the army proposed a partnership with Ecuadorean engineers for MINUSTAH. 80 The proposal suited Ecuador since (as noted previously) it was looking for help in meeting the UN MOU requirements.

80 Interview with Chilean government officials, Washington, DC, April 3, 2014.
Factors for Successful Partnering

What factors help to ensure successful partnerships? The answer depends on who is asking the question. If a senior partner’s aim, for instance, is increasing the legitimacy of a mission and obtaining political cover for its own participation, then simply having the partner show up and plant its flag, no matter what else it accomplishes on the ground, is considered success by the senior partner. If a junior partner’s major aim is improving its own military with the help of a senior partner or the UN, then again just showing up may be enough for the junior partner. Indeed, one criticism of partnerships was that the other partner might be more concerned about not being blamed if something went wrong than ensuring that things went well.\(^{81}\)

Definitional issues aside, interlocutors fully agreed, in good Clausewitzian fashion, that all military operations generated friction, that the friction for partnered units was more intense than for self-contained national units, and that it was in everyone’s interests to reduce these frictions as much as possible lest partnering become intolerable.

There was broad consensus on the qualities of a good partner and on the circumstances that should be in place before and during partnership (see table 5 on the next page).

First, good partners had similar societal backgrounds and leanings. They shared the same or closely related language, social customs, cultural and/or religious roots, forms of government, international political leanings (e.g., pro-US or EU, neutral, non-aligned, anti-globalist, soft balancer), and self-identities (e.g., developed or developing state, regional or affinity group member). Malaysia and Brunei, for example, agreed that their collaboration in UNIFIL was facilitated by their good neighborly relations, similar ethnic background (Malay), common language, and membership in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).\(^{82}\)

It is useful to contrast the partnership of Malaysia and Brunei with that of Ireland and Finland, which was described as “a bit of an oddity.”\(^ {83}\) After all, Finland’s expected partners would seem to be fellow Nordics (Sweden, Norway, and Denmark), but the Nordics have had difficulty agreeing on a UN peacekeeping operation that they would all deploy to jointly. However, Ireland and Finland have the same international (neutral) political outlook; are partners but not full members of NATO; speak English easily; and are manned by officers with similar profiles and experience.\(^ {84}\) In addition, Ireland and Finland had previous partnering experience. In 2006 in UNIFIL, the Finns deployed an engineering company whose force protection was provided by an Irish mechanized company. In 2010, both countries deployed a combined infantry battalion to Chad (MINURCAT). A statement by the Irish Minister for Defense to the Dáil Éireann Select Committee on Justice, Defence, and Equality in November 2013 presaged continued partnering:

Partnership with other like-minded states has become an increasing element of our overseas peacekeeping operations. In the absence of partners, such as Finland, the range and nature of overseas operations which Ireland could undertake in support of international peace and security would be significantly curtailed. Such joint deployments further support interoperability, build experience and further deepen the excellent bilateral relationship between both countries.\(^ {85}\)

In short, various factors can make or break a partnership, but language is fundamental. Good partners easily understood what they were saying to each other and what they were being told in return. Entire contingents did not need to speak a common language as long as key personnel—officers, noncommissioned officers, platoon leaders, signal operators—could do so. English (or French in West Africa and Haiti) served as a common medium in bilingual or multilingual partnering, but only, of course, when the level of

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81 Confidential interviews.
82 Interview with Malaysian and Bruneian officers, UNIFIL, September 4, 2014.
83 Interview with UNIFIL officials, Lebanon, September 4, 2014.
84 Interview with Finnish government officials, New York, May 19, 2014.
Table 5. Factors enhancing the success of partnership

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Generic</th>
<th>Specific</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Similar social backgrounds</td>
<td><strong>Similarities:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• language</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• social customs</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• cultural or religious roots including dietary preferences</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• and perceived work ethic</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• forms of government</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• international political leanings</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• self-identities</td>
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<tr>
<td>Military compatibility</td>
<td><strong>Compatibilities:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• military traditions, doctrines, and discipline</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• training that ensures common tactics, techniques, and procedures</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pre-deployment designation of partners’ respective responsibilities</td>
<td>• the division of responsibility for payments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• the degree to which troops will be integrated, i.e., mixed or separated</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• determination of whether troops from one nation will work alone or participate in combined operations</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• determination of command-and-control arrangements</td>
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<td>• responsibility for bringing equipment</td>
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<td>• responsibility for maintenance and repair</td>
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<td>• responsibility for providing lift to the mission</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• the division of responsibility for communications and support services</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• responsibility for ensuring that the SOFA is acceptable to all</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• enforcement of discipline</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• determination of applicable rules of engagement</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• the scope for socializing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Careful planning to reduce frictions within the ranks</td>
<td>• Avoidance of dangerous missions when partnering for the first time</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Compatibility of national caveats on tasks and rules of engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• A mindset of cooperation and trust instilled and reinforced by commanders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Command structures that allow for broad input, but also the execution of a decision once it is rendered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consideration of the size and tasking of the junior partner’s unit</td>
<td>• Assignment of a platoon or smaller unit to niche or to largely static tasks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Preference for companies and battalions for infantry and “combat arms” formations, since they are more self-contained and can more readily be assigned to their own area of operation and be given kinetic tasking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continued partnership until the end of the mission and in any follow-on rotation</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
proficiency was adequate. This was the case, for instance, with the Irish and Finns, since both were fluent in English. Where proficiency was an issue, unit commanders sought to circumvent this through training and divisions of labor, but these solutions were not fully satisfactory. Eastern Europeans and Latin Americans, sometimes in rudimentary English, readily admitted the need to educate and deploy more key personnel who could bridge language boundaries. Good linguists were important for communicating not only with native English speakers but also with fellow multilingual partners such as among Hungarians, Slovaks, Serbians, and Ukrainians in UNFICYP.

Beyond language, three other societal factors elicited repeated comments. One factor was religion, specifically Islam because of its dietary requirements and the habit of practicing Muslims to stop and pray during work periods. A second factor was food. Soldiers who deploy to relatively isolated bases, in distant countries and for long periods, and who have considerable time on their hands, have few outlets for enjoyment that make them feel comfortable, remind them of home, and do not offend the palate. In short, food plays an oversized role. Experience from field missions has shown that junior contingents need to have either the ability to order their own food in English (as the rations system is English-language based) or, if they rely on the battalion, to ensure that the battalion rations officer will order food to their national preference. A third factor revolved around varied work ethics and how different national contingents often had quite different approaches to addressing particular challenges and problems. Whether this reflected personal as opposed to national proclivities is an open question.

To some degree, military compatibilities among partners can mitigate the impact of societal incompatibilities. These include common military traditions and doctrines, equipment interoperability, and combined pre-deployment training. If the partners have more common military traditions and doctrines, then they have greater understanding of how each will operate and react. For example, membership in or affiliation with NATO or EU military arrangements is excellent preparation. The same may be true over time as AU and Cruz del Sur standby forces mature. Other familiarities might relate to a shared military tradition imbued by former colonial powers, across Francophone and Anglophone Africa, for example. Indeed, the differences between the traditions are enough to cause some countries not to partner across them.

It seemed taken for granted that equipment interoperability, especially in communications, was important. Certainly interoperability makes for better meshing and eases operational planning. It also facilitates maintenance through common knowledge and the exchange of spare parts. In the technical agreement between Italy and Slovenia, Italy took responsibility to maintain only those Slovenian vehicles that were “compatible.” Interoperability means not only having similar equipment but also complementary equipment. Ensuring the latter requires careful combined pre-deployment planning and is often addressed in technical agreements. When equipment is more technical, then the efforts to ensure interoperability can become more complex, for example, with helicopter units.

Many commentators ranked combined pre-deployment training alongside language in importance. The aim of training is predictability and uniformity of tactics, techniques, and procedures. If the training is more productive, then it can compensate more for shortfalls in other areas, including language. The default option when combined pre-deployment training could not occur was several weeks of onsite training at the start of a mission. The default was not preferred since it ate into the time when the unit could be considered fully mission-ready, but it is expensive to lift and house troops at a foreign training site for combined pre-deployment training.86

Many combined pre-deployment training variants exist. The most thorough from case studies of UNIFIL and UNFICYP may be those conducted by Spain and El Salvador and by Malaysia and Brunei. In the former, the entire Salvadoran unit trained in Spain for three months and then deployed together with the Spanish to UNIFIL.87 In the latter, Brunei not only sent and trained its

86 Interview with UNFICYP official, Cyprus, September 8, 2014.
87 Survey response.
troops in Malaysia, but it also picked up the training tab. Chilean troops that partnered with Argentina in UNFICYP spent three weeks in Argentina, with the combined unit flying together to the mission. When Austria partnered with Hungary and Slovenia in UNFICYP and with Slovakia and Croatia in UNDOF, it provided the commanders with combined pre-deployment training. Serbia now no longer conducts pre-UNIFIL training in Spain. It used to conduct this training when it co-deployed platoons but stopped when its contribution increased to company level. Instead, Spanish officers now go to Serbia to help oversee the company’s evaluation exercises. This practice seems similar to the example of six Finns participating in an Irish pre-deployment exercise. When Finland deploys the headquarters personnel, its training takes place in Finland with Irish headquarters personnel attending. Hungary hosts key Slovak and Serbian personnel for one week prior to deployment.

Combined pre-deployment training is only a small part of what occurs before troops deploy to a mission. Prospective partners must address many other issues, and the permutations as to how they can do so are considerable (see third factor in table 5). In sum, pre-deployment preparations should be extensive and will be time-consuming, especially when states partner with each other for the first time. In many cases, the burden falls on the senior partner to synthesize the various parts. Most of the issues are addressed in a technical agreement among partners that is worked out before they deploy.

Once the partners have deployed, how smoothly they work together will depend on the circumstances in mission. These include the operational environment confronting the peacekeepers, uniform application of rules of engagement, mindsets, the size of certain units, command arrangements, and the staying power of each partner’s government.

Operational environments can differ with regard to the level of danger associated with a mission and/or with the specific tasks assigned to a unit. All interviewees agreed that the more dangerous the mission was, then the more the frictions that inevitably arose from partnerships would endanger the peacekeepers and call into question the wisdom of partnering. When most TCCs go to UN missions, they generally neither want nor expect to be placed in harm’s way or to undertake offensive operations to enforce a mandate. Interlocutors made clear or implied that their militaries would avoid partnering in predictably hazardous missions or in taking on predictably hazardous tasks such as confronting recalcitrant or aggressive local militias. In emergencies, soldiers need to be sure that their descriptions of situations and their requests for support are quickly and clearly understood. Commanders need assurance that their orders will be carried out exactly with no back-and-forth to clarify intent and no push-back against that intent.

If the mission or task is dangerous, then greater uniformity of agreement on rules of engagement is absolutely essential. National caveats, i.e., exceptions ordered by a capital limiting the applicability of mission rules of engagement to its soldiers or putting in place a more restrictive set of rules of engagement or tasks than the mission mandate, place undue burdens on the TCCs without such restrictions who have to pick up the slack. For the latter not to do so means that the entire mission could fail to implement its mandate. While rules of engagement issues should be resolved prior to deployment, caveats are more the rule rather than the exception and sometimes they are kept secret and declared only when a crisis develops. This is a challenge for mission leadership and partner unit commanders. Partners must either eschew caveats or ensure that they are “compatible” with those of their counterparts. To do otherwise risks badly undermining the “mindset of cooperation” or the trust that must exist between partners.

Instilling and maintaining a cooperative mindset requires constant attention of command elements. To UNIFIL personnel, how command was structured and how commanders acted were keys to resolving challenges, and commanders were mindful of the extra attention they devoted to ensuring unit cohesion among different nationalities, each of which had its own internal rules and regulations. Enforcing discipline can be particularly tricky for commanders vis-à-vis a transgressor of another nationality and vis-à-vis its own nationals who may resent it if a partner colleague is treated differently. In the FINIRISH battalion, the deputy commander, who was Irish, held the same rank as the commander, who was Finnish, so “that
they can talk as equals.” Yet the battalion leaders stressed as well that their partner must accept that the battalion commander has the last word, and the commander in turn must ensure that others understand the reasons for his or her decisions. He or she must be transparent, as the staff members must also be. The success of the Spanish and Moroccan partnership in MINUSTAH, for instance, was specifically attributed to the “excellent collaboration” among the staff members and to their “open and friendly relations.”

The size of the unit deployed by the junior partner received much comment in the research. Bigger was perceived as better, with company or larger status being preferred, except for niche contributions where a unit operates largely on its own. Nearly all commentators argued that an infantry or other “combat” platoon lacked the critical mass to be given independent tasks unless the platoon was split off to do guard duty or force protection alone, for example. A platoon is difficult to integrate effectively in a shared-tasks unit in contrast to a company that can be given its own area of operation and can participate in kinetic operations as a cohesive whole. While most company commanders can be expected to speak English or French, such is not the case with platoon leaders. It was strongly affirmed that more dangerous operational environments had bigger problems. A member of the UNIFIL command structure noted, for instance, that in the NATO Afghanistan operation, the smallest size of acceptable national contingent is the battalion.

Finally, good partnerships endure preferably until the end of the mission. For a junior partner to leave mid-stream, for instance, can significantly degrade the effectiveness of the senior partner who must take up the slack. The senior partner may also skip its next planned rotation if it believes it needs and cannot find a suitable partner who can be quickly brought on board.

Benefits and Challenges of Operational Partnerships

Considerable overlap exists in the benefits and challenges of partnering for TCCs and the UN. For the partners, the benefits are straightforward and need little elaboration: they get to advance one or more of the many political and military aims identified earlier in this report. It matters little that they have different aims; it is the synergy that counts. In short, if done well, operational partnerships are a win-win situation: junior partners get to deploy; equal partners get to do so in a manner suitable to them; and senior partners, who presum-

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<th>Table 6. Benefits of partnership for TCCs and the UN</th>
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<td><strong>For TCCs</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Junior partners serve their political or military ends by getting to deploy, which they could not do without partnering.</td>
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<td>• Equal partners also get to deploy and thereby meet their ends but in a manner that benefits and burdens both to roughly the same degree.</td>
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<td>• Senior partners could deploy on their own, but partnering provides benefits not available if they had deployed alone.</td>
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<td><strong>For UN</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>• DPKO fills a requirement for a unit.</td>
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<td>• A junior provider of a niche capability can serve the needs of an entire mission.</td>
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<td>• The mission also benefits if the junior partner’s contribution frees up a senior partner to take on more kinetic tasks.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• The senior partner takes the responsibility to bring a junior partner on board and teach it the ropes.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• A junior partner may eventually graduate to deploying on its own.</td>
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<td>• If there are more TCCs in a mission, then there is more political backing for the UN.</td>
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88 Interview with UNIFIL FINIRISH battalion officers, Lebanon, September 5, 2014.
90 Interview with UNIFIL officials, Lebanon, September 4, 2014.
ably would have deployed anyway, earn points they would not have if they had deployed alone.

For the UN, six benefits stand out. The first benefit is that the UN can fill a requirement for a unit that might not otherwise be filled. While it is easier for the UN and possibly more mission effective when a self-contained national unit deploys, it is still better to have a partnered unit than none at all. The second benefit is that a junior partner who provides a niche capability (such as health services, water purification, mine clearance, and the like) may be providing capabilities required by the entire mission. Third, the mission also benefits even when a junior partner is assigned only static tasks such as guard duty when doing so frees up the senior partner to take on more significant kinetic tasks. Fourth, unless the junior partner insists on its own MOU, the senior partner relieves the UN of the responsibility for bringing a junior partner on board and teaching it the ropes. Fifth, a junior partner may eventually graduate to deploying alone. Should that occur, it will be that much more prepared by virtue of its earlier partnership. And finally, the greater the number of TCCs in a mission, the more the UN may be able to count on their political backing.

The principal challenges confronting UN TCCs who (wish to) partner can be daunting (see table 7). One challenge is simply finding the right partner. This is compounded by a second challenge of preparing adequately for the inevitable frictions that will arise when people and units live together for six to twelve months in relatively isolated camps where stress and boredom are present. A third challenge is the added complexity of working with someone else rather than alone. Identified previously, for instance, were the many issues that have to be addressed before deployment; when deploying alone, a TCC resolves these issues itself, but when deploying with another, its negotiating partner will have ideas and concerns that cannot be ignored. A fourth challenge is exposure, as partners inevitably open themselves to close scrutiny by the other, but the results may not always be positive. And finally, for senior and equal partners, partnering is costlier and more time-consuming than deploying alone, and for all concerned, it can reduce mission effectiveness.

The list of challenges is no shorter for the UN. One is the possibility of lowered operational effectiveness when TCCs work as partners rather than alone. Senior Indian peacekeepers, for instance, said they “do not subscribe to” the view that operational partnerships are “good for sound military planning, conduct of operations or efficiency.”

The second challenge is that partnering can lengthen the time spent for TCCs to ready themselves for a mission. The process is already slow enough, and partnering could worsen the problem of timely deployments. The third

<table>
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<td><strong>For TCCs</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Selection of the right partner</td>
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<td>• Adequate preparation for inevitable frictions</td>
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<td>• Added complexities of working with another rather than alone</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Exposure to the close scrutiny of another</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Risk of negatively affecting mission effectiveness, higher costs, and more time-consuming than working alone</td>
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91 E-mail communication to the authors, March 5, 2014.
challenge is that if one partner leaves or does not renew, then the remaining partner may have to pull out or not renew as well if it cannot speedily find a replacement. And finally, partnering can cause difficulties for some elements of the UN Secretariat when each partner wants its own MOU. These memoranda can take considerable time and effort to work out; hence the UN would prefer to have the lead state negotiate one MOU for itself and its partners.\footnote{Interview with UN officials, New York, May 20, 2014.}

Lessons Learned and Recommendations

FOR ENHANCING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF PARTNERSHIPS

On the basis of our analysis, this study identifies six major lessons about operational partnerships:

1. Prospective partners must attend to both societal and military compatibilities and, probably even more importantly, to incompatibilities. In particular, military incompatibilities may not be eliminated, but their impact can be reduced. Partnering can be restricted to those states that share military doctrines and traditions. Interoperable equipment can be purchased. Combined pre-deployment training can be conducted and made intensive enough to knock the hard edges off incompatible practices. Even language incompatibilities can be reduced over time.

2. The more militarily compatible the TCCs are or become, the less significant may be the impact of their societal incompatibilities.

3. Tending to the size of a combined unit can mitigate problems of operational effectiveness. Composite units (i.e., integrated operational units and integrated command structure) should not be formed below company level, and units operating in volatile environments should not be partnered below battalion level.

4. Frictions between partner personnel will definitely surface, but they can be mitigated through command attention, effective leadership structures, and the ceaseless encouragement of mindsets of cooperation and the earning of trust.

5. The level of danger in a mission and the expectations of TCCs are critical to successful partnerships. Most UN TCCs prefer not to act threateningly or aggressively; if they have restrictive national caveats, then they should not consider partnering in a mission or a section of a mission where they can predict their forces will be in hazard.

6. Finally, our major takeaway is that the challenges of partnering, while daunting, need not trump the benefits. The keys to ensuring against challenging threats are preparation and attention. If the benefits of partnering are judged significant enough (even when they flow more to the partners than to the mission), then partnering makes sense for all but predictably hazardous operations.

FOR INCREASING PARTNERSHIPS

We also propose the following recommendations for the UN and member states:

1. The UN and bilateral donors, such as the United States, should cooperate closely to raise general awareness of the opportunities for and the political and military benefits of operational partnerships in peacekeeping.

2. The UN and bilateral donors should continually share information on potential partnership opportunities among TCCs and how to help facilitate them.

3. Bilateral donors should continue to invest in pre-deployment preparations for partners, including assisting in relevant language training.

4. The UN and bilateral donors should strongly encourage and help enable the trend toward standby forces in Europe, South America, Africa, and potentially elsewhere. Standby forces are already partnered and should be better prepared as a matter of course.

Appendix
METHODOLOGY

This report used a mixture of methodologies. Initially, the research team surveyed the relevant primary and secondary literature. The main primary sources consulted were mission-specific reports of the UN secretary-general, mission deployment maps, newsletters from specific UN peacekeeping operations, and other official UN documents. The secondary literature, primarily academic publications and reports by think tanks on UN peacekeeping operations, contained very few studies that focused on issues of operational partnerships. Those that did exist tended to focus on the broader phenomenon of multinational military operations, or specific case studies. Relevant journalistic reportage and TCC reports about their peacekeeping activities were also consulted.

A second step was to survey individual members of the “Providing for Peacekeeping” project’s network of experts, who are approximately sixty individuals with expertise in the peacekeeping-related debates of specific countries or broader thematic issues in contemporary peace operations. They were asked for any information regarding operational partnerships in UN missions. This inquiry returned a variety of anecdotal and empirical information about particular cases of operational partnerships in UN peacekeeping operations.

A third step was the compilation of a short questionnaire that asked representatives of UN member states to summarize instances of operational partnerships where their uniformed personnel had served in UN-led peacekeeping operations. This survey was distributed by the US Department of State on behalf of the research team to 111 members of the C-34. The research team received fifty-seven survey responses. Unfortunately, a number of respondents appeared to misinterpret the survey and provided generic information about their country’s UN peacekeeping deployments rather than specific information about instances of operational partnerships. Follow-up questions were distributed to those UN member states that had expressed an interest in pursuing co-deployment in a UN peacekeeping operation but had not yet done so. Only two UN member states replied with detailed answers to these follow-up questions.

A fourth step was to conduct field research with the UNIFIL and UNFICYP missions. On the basis of the information gathered in the previous three steps, these two missions were selected for their high number of operational partnerships in addition to their geographic proximity.

Throughout the project, all interviews and communications were conducted on a not-for-attribution and confidential basis. Overall, the research team consulted representatives of thirty-three UN member states as well as officials from DPKO.

A major obstacle in compiling the database was the difficulty of surmising from primary and secondary sources the precise form of operational partnership in question, i.e., the precise numbers of troops involved, variations over time, and the command-and-control arrangements of the respective unit(s). Not only is there very little prior research on this topic, but there is also the problem that the people involved in UN peacekeeping operations and many analysts writing about them do not use a common vocabulary in a consistent manner to describe these arrangements. Consequently, we were forced to interpret sometimes vague and ambiguous phrases depicting the operational relationships and command-and-control arrangements between military units in specific missions. We were able to overcome these problems by conducting fieldwork in the two case studies of UNIFIL and UNFICYP. For these missions, we were able to clarify the different forms of command-and-control arrangements in the different operational partnerships. Unfortunately, it was not possible to directly observe many of the cases listed in the database, and hence it has proved impossible to provide a fully comprehensive typology of the cases involved. This database should therefore be treated as illustrative rather than fully comprehensive.

95 The list of individuals is available at www.providingforpeacekeeping.org/ppp-network/.
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