
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The State of UN Peace Operations Reform: An Implementation Scorecard

ARTHUR BOUTELLIS AND LESLEY CONNOLLY



Cover Photo: Secretary-General Ban Kimoon with Secretary-General-designate António Guterres, just before the General Assembly meeting appointing Guterres by acclamation as the next UN secretary-general, United Nations, New York, October 13, 2016. UN Photo/Evan Schneider.

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
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Abbreviations

AU	African Union
C-34	UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations
CAR	Central African Republic
DFS	UN Department of Field Support
DPA	UN Department of Political Affairs
DPKO	UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations
ECOSOC	UN Economic and Social Council
HIPPO	High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations
ICT	Information and Communication Technology
MINUSCA	UN Multidimensional Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic
PBC	UN Peacebuilding Commission
1 2 0	
PCC	Police-Contributing Country
PCC	Police-Contributing Country
PCC SDG	Police-Contributing Country Sustainable Development Goal
PCC SDG SG	Police-Contributing Country Sustainable Development Goal UN Secretary-General
PCC SDG SG TCC	Police-Contributing Country Sustainable Development Goal UN Secretary-General Troop-Contributing Country

Executive Summary

There are currently more peacekeepers on the ground than ever before, and they increasingly operate in contexts where the UN is being asked to manage conflict rather than restore or keep peace. This has led many both within and outside of the UN to challenge and question the foundational assumptions and doctrines of UN peacekeeping and to ask whether peace operations are "fit for purpose."

Against this backdrop, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon appointed a High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) in October 2014 to "take stock of evolving expectations of UN peacekeeping." The HIPPO released its report putting forward 166 recommendations in June 2015, followed three months later by a report from the secretary-general on the implementation of these recommendations. But one year after the release of these reports, no formal progress report on the implementation of their recommendations has been produced, and Secretary-General Ban Kimoon's term comes to an end on December 31, 2016.

This report, composed of a visual "scorecard" and accompanying narrative, aims to fill this gap. First, it presents a nuanced picture of progress to date by identifying where both the UN Secretariat and member states have taken the most concrete action across nine strategic areas: (1) prevention and sustaining peace; (2) the primary of politics; (3) capabilities and performance; (4) partnerships; (5) leadership and accountability; (6) field support; (7) finances and restructuring; (8) a people-centered approach; and (9) women, peace, and security. While significant actions have been taken in some areas-for example in committing to prevention and "sustaining peace" and supporting a push for better capabilities for peacekeeping operationsother areas have seen little or no movement. This is particularly true for issues such as finances and

restructuring that the current secretary-general left to his successor.

Second, the scorecard suggests how the next secretary-general and member states can take forward the HIPPO's recommendations across these nine strategic areas. The leadership of the next secretary-general is necessary for the essential shifts called for by the HIPPO to become reality and to have concrete impact on the ground. This will also require effective collaboration and trust among member states with diverging interests and views, and between member states and the UN Secretariat. Moreover, both the secretary-general and member states could build on emerging consensus to better integrate prevention and sustaining peace into the work of UN peace operations. Additional recommendations include the following:

- The next secretary-general should infuse new momentum into implementation of the HIPPO's recommendations by making bold, "gamechanging" proposals early in his term, particularly on restructuring the UN peace and security architecture, financing, and improved management of peace operations.
- The informal group of friends of HIPPO formed by member states, together with the broader UN membership, should carry forward the spirit of peace operations reforms as a package.
- Member states should champion and build consensus around key HIPPO recommendations the next secretary-general puts forward.
- Member states should pilot country-specific implementation of HIPPO recommendations, including the need for political solutions to guide the design and deployment of peace operations and for sequenced and prioritized mandates.
- The Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C-34) should continue discussing the HIPPO recommendations in its 2017 session.

Arthur Boutellis and Lesley Connolly

Introduction

Over the past seventy years, peace operations have evolved considerably to become the UN's most visible activity. UN peace operations range from small cease-fire monitoring and political missions to complex multidimensional peacekeeping operations. There are currently more UN peacekeepers on the ground than ever before, with 120,000 UN personnel (military, police, and civilians) deployed in sixteen peacekeeping missions across four continents with an annual budget exceeding \$8 billion. Another 3,700 personnel are serving in eleven field-based special political missions, including country-specific missions and regional offices.¹

With the growth of peace operations and changes to the environments in which they operate, however, many both within and outside of the UN have challenged and questioned the foundational assumptions and doctrines of UN peacekeeping. This has particularly been the case in situations where the UN is asked to manage conflict rather than restore and keep peace. Many question whether peace operations are "fit for purpose" to respond to the growing complexity of some local and regional conflicts, people's growing aspirations for change, the fluctuating consent of host-country governments, assertive regional organizations wanting to play a greater role in maintaining peace in their respective regions, and the spread of terrorism, violent extremism, and transnational organized crime.²

Against this backdrop, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon mooted the idea of a review "to take stock

of evolving expectations of UN peacekeeping and how the Organization can work toward a shared view of the way forward" fifteen years after the release of the Brahimi Report.³ He appointed a High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) in October 2014.⁴ The panel carried out wide-ranging regional consultations,⁵ reviewed a number of substantive submissions,⁶ and visited several capitals and UN missions.⁷

The HIPPO coordinated its work closely with two major peace and security reviews taking place in parallel—a global study on the implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace, and security and a review of the UN peacebuilding architecture-resulting in a relatively coherent set of important messages. However, unlike the HIPPO, these other two reviews were formal member-state-led processesthe global study on the implementation of Resolution 1325 was launched on the basis of a Security Council resolution (2122) and led to a new resolution (2242), and the review of the peacebuilding architecture was mandated in 2010 by concurrent Security Council and General Assembly resolutions (1947 and 65/7) and culminated in a joint Security Council/General Assembly resolution and the creation of a group of friends of sustaining peace.8 The HIPPO was entirely an initiative of the secretary-general.

In June 2015 the HIPPO released its report, which put forward 166 recommendations and called for four essential shifts in the future design and delivery of UN peace operations (see Box 1).⁹ This was followed in September 2015 by a report from the secretary-general on the implementation

¹ UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, "Peacekeeping Fact Sheet," August 31, 2016, available at

www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/factsheet.shtml/; UN Department of Political Affairs, "United Nations Political and Peacebuilding Missions," November 30, 2015, available at www.un.org/undpa/sites/www.un.org.undpa/files/ppbm_November_2015.pdf.

² Independent Commission on Multilateralism, "Armed Conflict: Mediation, Conciliation and Peacebuilding," Discussion Paper, May 2016.

³ The scope of the review was subsequently broadened from peacekeeping operations to include special political missions. "We Must Be Prepared to Invest More in Peacekeeping, Ban Tells Security Council Debate," UN News Centre, June 11, 2014, available at www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=48020#.V7Yiw5MrKb8.

⁴ The panel consisted of sixteen members. It was chaired by former President of Timor-Leste and Nobel laureate José Ramos-Horta and vice-chaired by former Under-Secretary-General for the Department of Field Support Ameerah Haq.

⁵ Consultations with member states, civil society, and academia were held in Dhaka, Bangladesh; Addis Ababa, Ethiopia; Cairo, Egypt; Brussels, Belgium; and Salvador, Brazil.

⁶ The panel received more than eighty written submissions from more than fifty member states, regional and other organizations, UN partner entities, civil society, academia, and research outfits.

⁷ The review included visits to Tokyo, Islamabad, New Delhi, Washington, Paris, London, Helsinki, Moscow, Beijing, and Kigali, as well as to UN peace operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mali, and Senegal.

⁸ Following the release of the report of the Advisory Group of Experts on the Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture in June 2015, it was discussed during intergovernmental negotiations co-facilitated by Angola and Australia, resulting in identical Security Council and General Assembly resolutions on sustaining peace, adopted on April 27, 2016 (Resolutions 2282 and 70/262, respectively). Mexico thereafter created a group of friends of sustaining peace.

⁹ United Nations, Uniting Our Strengths for Peace—Politics, Partnership, and People: Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, June 16, 2015, available at http://peaceoperationsreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/HIPPO_Report_1_June_2015.pdf.

of the HIPPO recommendations (see Box 2).¹⁰ But one year after the release of these reports, no formal progress report on the implementation of their recommendations has been produced, and Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon's term comes to an end on December 31, 2016.

While many recommendations have been acted upon or are in the process of internal review, a number of observers continue to see the glass as half empty, as the essential shifts called for by the HIPPO are not yet in evidence. Many also fear that, with the end of the current secretary-general's term and in the absence of a formal process led by member states, some of the most important recommendations will be lost in this time of transition. Also, as with the Brahimi Report, most key reforms will only ultimately have an impact on the conduct of peace operations if both the UN Secretariat and member states sustain attention on their implementation over the years to come.

This report, composed of a visual "scorecard"¹¹ and accompanying narrative, intends to address the above concern. It takes stock of peace operations reform and highlights key strategic recommendations from the HIPPO for the next secretary-general and member states to take forward and build new momentum around. This can ensure that the work of the review is not lost in the midst of Security Council paralysis, sexual exploitation and abuse scandals, and the lack of effective political strategies to guide the work of the missions in Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and South Sudan, among others.

Rather than looking at each and every recommendation from the HIPPO, the authors deliberately chose to highlight the status of what they judged to be the most important and concrete (and potentially most impactful) recommendations in nine strategic areas. This report is based on work conducted by IPI over the past year in support of the implementation of the HIPPO recommendations,¹² as well as a series of interviews carried out from June to September 2016 with representatives of key member states and the UN Secretariat.

The "scorecard" presented in this report summarizes progress to date in the implementation of the HIPPO's main recommendations across nine strategic areas (left columns) following a color code: green for recommendations that were implemented; yellow for recommendations in process; and red for recommendations that were not acted upon. It also lists a number of recommendations derived from the HIPPO report that the authors believe the next secretary-general, António Guterres, should prioritize come January 1, 2017, with member states taking the lead in championing critical reforms (right columns).

¹⁰ UN Secretary-General, The Future of United Nations Peace Operations: Implementation of the Recommendations of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations, UN Doc. A/70/357–S/2015/682, September 2, 2015.

¹¹ The authors were initially reluctant to call it a "scorecard," since the objective was not to assign scores to certain parts of the UN Secretariat or to certain member states but rather to assess overall collective progress toward implementing key recommendations from the HIPPO. An earlier draft of this visual representation was presented at the fourth ministerial dinner on peace operations held at IPI on September 21, 2016, entitled "Taking Stock, Looking to the Future: A High-Level Dialogue on United Nations Peace Operations," at which a number of foreign ministers called it "the scorecard." The authors thereafter decided to use the term despite their initial reluctance. See www.ipinst.org/2016/09/fourth-ministerial-dinner-on-peace-operations.

¹² Through a partnership with the Republic of Korea, IPI has been supporting the implementation of the HIPPO's recommendations through a series of research papers and meetings in Seoul (www.ipinst.org/2015/11/the-future-of-peace-operations-maintaining-momentum), New York (www.ipinst.org/2016/04/ban-ki-moon-we-cant-address-todays-challenges-with-yesterdays-mindset and www.ipinst.org/2016/05/applying-hippo-recommendations-mail), and Paris (www.ipinst.org/2016/07/assessing-un-peaceops-post-hippo). IPI has also been a member of the informal group of NGOs known as the "friends of HIPPO," which also includes Security Council Report (SCR), the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), the Center for International Cooperations c(ICC), the Challenges Forum, and the Quaker United Nations Office (QUNO). This group supports the implementation of the recommendations on peace operations reform from both the HIPPO and the secretary-general, including through an online knowledge platform that IPI manages (www.futurepeaceops.org/).

Box 1. Four essential shifts called for by the HIPPO report¹³

- 1. "Politics must drive the design and implementation of UN peace operations," with a focus on political solutions rather than military or technical ones. Member states should also help mobilize renewed political effort to keep peace processes on track when the momentum behind them falters.
- 2. "The full spectrum of UN peace operations must be used more flexibly to respond to changing needs on the ground." Missions should be well-tailored to the context with smoother transitions between phases rather than conforming to rigid "peacekeeping" versus "special political mission" templates. The UN should also strengthen analysis, strategy, and planning, and the Security Council should adopt "sequenced and prioritized mandates" to allow missions to develop over time.
- 3. "A stronger, more inclusive peace and security partnership is needed for the future" to respond to crises. Such a partnership should be based on enhanced collaboration and consultation, as well as mutual respect and mutual responsibilities.
- 4. "The United Nations Secretariat must become more field-focused and United Nations peace operations must be more people-centered."

Box 2. Three fundamental changes called for by the secretary-general in his follow-on report¹⁴

- 1. Prioritize prevention and mediation in order to break the cycle of responding to crises too late and with insufficient support.
- 2. Change the way the United Nations plans and conducts peace operations to make them faster to deploy, more responsive, and more accountable to countries and people in conflict.
- 3. Put in place a global-regional framework to manage today's peace and security challenges, starting with a reinforced partnership between the United Nations and the African Union.

13 United Nations, Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, p. viii.

14 UN Secretary-General, The Future of United Nations Peace Operations.

5

Taking Stock: Overview of Progress to Date

The first page of the "scorecard" highlights the main formal actions taken since the HIPPO report was released (see Box 3). For the UN Secretariat, these include the publication on September 2, 2015, of the secretary-general's follow-on report outlining his agenda and priorities and key actions to move the HIPPO recommendations forward by the end of 2016, when his term ends. Formal actions also include the secretary-general's informal briefing to the General Assembly on progress on the implementation of the three above-mentioned major peace and security reviews on June 9, 2016.

While the UN Secretariat has on various occasions stated that more than 90 percent of the recommendations the secretary-general made in response to the HIPPO report have either been acted upon or are in the process of being implemented, this has been difficult to assess and does not give the full picture. Given that the timing of the review of UN peace operations took place in the final months of Secretary-General Ban Kimoon's term in office, the secretary-general left some of the most important issues raised by the HIPPO to his successor. These notably include the recommendations in the area of "Finances and Restructuring" of Secretariat entities entrusted with managing the UN peace and security agenda (e.g., the HIPPO's recommendation to have a single "peace operations account" to finance all peace operations and their related backstopping activities). This is the only of the nine strategic areas where there has been "no action" (marked in red). Action in these areas is not only key for the shift toward a full spectrum of UN peace operations, but could arguably also catalyze the other shifts recommended by the HIPPO.

For member states, while discussions in the Security Council,¹⁵ General Assembly, Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C-34),

and Fifth Committee (the administrative and budgetary committee) have contributed to building momentum around the recommendations of the HIPPO and of the secretary-general, the membership remains divided on a number of critical issues. Nonetheless, a Security Council presidential statement on November 25, 2015, "takes note of" these recommendations and commits the council to "consider sequenced and phased mandates, where appropriate, when evaluating existing United Nations peace operations or establishing new United Nations peace operations."16 This has already been attempted in Mali, the Central African Republic (CAR), and South Sudan.¹⁷ Many also saw as positive the release of the report from the C-34's 2016 session in spite of important differences among member states (although the session was only able to address a limited number of HIPPO recommendations, with the remaining ones to be addressed during the C-34's next session).18 However, some important discussions of key HIPPO recommendations took place outside of formal intergovernmental bodies, notably in the informal "friends of HIPPO" group of permanent representatives of member states set up by Ethiopia, Norway, and the Republic of Korea (see Box 4).

The scorecard, with its color code, tries to present a more nuanced picture by identifying strategic areas where both the UN Secretariat and member states have taken the most concrete action. The strategic areas of "Prevention and Sustaining Peace" and "Capabilities and Performance" are those where most actions are marked "done" (in green). Indeed, the past year has seen a renewed rhetorical commitment to prevention, and although words will need to be followed by actions, the adoption of the joint Security Council/General Assembly resolution on sustaining peace (2282 and 70/262) and the subsequent creation of a group of friends on sustaining peace were significant developments. The Secretariat has also made progress in strengthening its preventive capabilities, including through the UN Development

¹⁵ For a detailed assessment of the Security Council and peace operations reform, see Security Council Report, *The Security Council and UN Peace Operations: Reform and Deliver*, May 2016, available at

 $www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/\%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9\%7D/research_report_peace_operations_may_2016.pdf.$

¹⁶ UN Security Council, Statement by the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/PRST/2015/22, November 25, 2015.

¹⁷ See, for example, International Peace Institute, "Applying the HIPPO Recommendations to Mali: Toward Strategic, Prioritized, and Sequenced Mandates," May 2016, available at www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/0605_MINUSMA.pdf.

¹⁸ UN General Assembly, Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations: 2016 Substantive Session, UN Doc. A/70/19, 2016.

Programme (UNDP)–Department of Political Affairs (DPA) Joint Programme on Building National Capacities for Conflict Prevention, which is now operating in over forty member states. However, DPA's call for increased core conflict prevention capacities has received a mixed response from member states.¹⁹

Similarly, in terms of capabilities and performance, both the UN Secretariat and a number of member states have supported the push toward a more strategic approach to force generation (including establishing a Strategic Force Generation and Capabilities Planning Cell) and toward improving the capabilities of peacekeeping operations. Nonetheless, most pledges made at the September 2015 Leaders' Summit and September 2016 Defence Ministerial in London, including to the Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System (PCRS),²⁰ have yet to be tested and translated into actual contributions. Moreover, while there has been a shift from a "numbers-based approach" to UN peacekeeping toward a "capability-driven approach"21 and increased focus on performance (including through the development of an evaluation framework), it is still early to assess the impact of these changes on the ground.

Significant action has also been taken in the critical area of "Leadership and Accountability." Some of the HIPPO report's stronger messages were on accountability, partly in response to sex abuse allegations in the Central African Republic around the time the report was released. These messages were directed both at UN staff—leading to the resignation of Babacar Gaye, then special representative and head of the UN Multi-dimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the CAR (MINUSCA)—and at troop-contributing countries. The Security Council also adopted the first ever resolution on sexual abuse by

peacekeepers, including a decision to repatriate military or police units "when there is credible evidence of widespread or systematic sexual exploitation and abuse."²² Toward the very end of his term, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon also ordered the immediate replacement of the force commander of the UN Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) after an independent special investigation commissioned by the UN concluded that the mission had failed to protect civilians during violence in South Sudan's capital in July 2016.²³

Other strategic areas have a more mixed record, as illustrated by the dominance of actions "in process" on the scorecard (in yellow). In the strategic area "Primacy of Politics," a small, centralized unit for analysis and planning has effectively been established in the secretary-general's office to enhance the capacity of the Secretariat to conduct conflict analysis and strategic planning across the UN system. The Security Council has also attempted to prioritize and sequence some mandates, including in Mali and South Sudan, where UNMISS was given a two-stage mandate. However, these actions have yet to translate into the primacy of politics in guiding the conduct of peace operations. Recent Security Council proposals to increase the number of uniformed personnel in Burundi, Mali, and South Sudan without investing as much energy in crafting effective political strategies to guide the work of the UN missions on the ground are cases in point.²⁴

There has also been limited progress in the area of "Partnerships." On the one hand, the joint UN-AU review of available mechanisms to finance and support African Union peace operations authorized by the UN Security Council issued a report.²⁵ The African Union also took a landmark decision on financing during its July 2016 summit, which

¹⁹ Only nine of the forty new DPA positions and 20 percent of the DPA budget requested by the UN Secretariat to support conflict prevention work were approved in General Assembly Resolution 70/248.

²⁰ See https://cc.unlb.org/default.aspx .

²¹ Adam C. Smith and Arthur Boutellis, "Rethinking Force Generation: Filling the Capability Gaps in UN Peacekeeping," International Peace Institute, May 2013, available at www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/publications/ipi_rpt_rethinking_force_gen.pdf.

²² UN Security Council Resolution 2272 (March 11, 2016), UN Doc. S/RES/2272, p. 2.

^{23 &}quot;UN Sacks South Sudan Peacekeeping Chief over Damning Report", BBC, November 1, 2016, available at www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-37840961.

²⁴ On Burundi, see Paul D. Williams, "Special Report, Part 2: The AU's Less Coercive Diplomacy on Burundi," *Global Observatory*, February 16, 2016, available at https://theglobalobservatory.org/2016/02/burundi-nkurunziza-african-union-maprobu/. On Mali, see Delphine Mechoulan, "Redefining State Authority in Mali," *Global Observatory*, June 28, 2016, available at https://theglobalobservatory.org/2016/06/mali-minusma-united-nations-peacekeeping/. On South Sudan, see Paul D. Williams, "Key Questions for South Sudan's New Protection Force," *Global Observatory*, September 12, 2016, available at https://theglobalobservatory.org/2016/09/south-sudan-regional-protection-force-kiir-unmiss/.

²⁵ United Nations, Report of the Joint African Union–United Nations Review of Available Mechanisms to Finance and Support African Union Peace Support Operations Authorized by the United Nations Security Council, UN Doc. S/2016/809, September 22, 2016.

was followed by the release of the Kaberuka report containing additional recommendations on financing.²⁶ It remains to be seen, however, if these actions will ultimately translate into more predictable support and financing for AU missions authorized by the Security Council.

In the area of "Women, Peace, and Security," the secretary-general endorsed the HIPPO recommendations that the "mission's senior Gender Adviser should be located in the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, reporting directly to the Special Representative" and that the Secretariat should "ensure that compacts between the Secretary-General and heads of mission specify performance indicators relating to gender."27 Nonetheless, much remains to be done. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon appointed a number of women leaders throughout the UN system, including the first-ever female force commander, Major General Kristin Lund in Cyprus. But the overall proportion of women in senior UN positions only increased from 20 percent in 2007 to 22 percent in 2015, and the UN actually registered setbacks for women in high-level staff appointments in 2016.28

The area of "Field Support" has also seen limited progress. While the Secretariat has made some progress in putting in place standing administrative procedures to expedite mission start-up, much remains to be done. These measures were piloted in setting up the latest special political mission in Colombia, where the Department of Field Support (DFS) delegated greater authority to the field and initiated special measures for start-up ahead of deployment.²⁹ In its 2016 report, the C-34 requested that the Secretariat further improve human resources procedures, establish standing administrative measures for mission start-up and crisis response, and revise procurement rules and regulations with the view to prioritizing local capacities. Reflecting on the importance of making UN peace operations more field-focused, the informal "friends of HIPPO" group of member states held a breakfast on the issue on June 22, 2016, during which Under-Secretary-General of DFS Atul Khare and Under-Secretary-General of the Department of Management Yukio Takasu briefed the group of ambassadors on progress and challenges.

The fourth shift called for by the HIPPO, in the area of a more "People-Centered Approach," did not garner much attention either. It remains to be seen how the UN Secretariat's new guidelines on how to integrate the views of local populations, its plan to consolidate protection functions, and its instructions to missions on communicating instances of failure to follow orders will translate on the ground. The secretary-general's report also did not pick up the HIPPO's recommendation to develop strategies for unarmed protection of civilians, except in a very perfunctory manner.³⁰

²⁶ The Kaberuka report recommended that the AU secure its funding through a 0.2 percent levy on imports to African countries. This could enable AU member states to fully fund the AU Commission and to cover 75 percent of the programs pledged by AU leaders at the summit in Sandton in 2015. It could also secure AU financing to fulfill the obligation of covering 25 percent of peacekeeping operations in Africa, while the United Nations would fund the other 75 percent from assessed UN contributions. See Liesl Louw-Vaudran, "A New Financing Model for the AU: Will It Work?" Institute for Security Studies, July 25, 2016, available at www.issafrica.org/iss-today/a-new-financing-model-for-the-au-will-it-work .

²⁷ United Nations, Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, p. 69.

²⁸ Ourania S. Yancopoulos, "An Evaluation of Gender Balance in the Leadership of the UN Secretariat," Carnegie Council, May 4, 2016, available at www.carnegiecouncil.org/studio/multimedia/20160504/index.html ; Karin Landgren, "The Lost Agenda: Gender Parity in Senior UN Appointments," Global Peace Operations Review, December 14, 2015, available at

http://peaceoperationsreview.org/commentary/the-lost-agenda-gender-parity-in-senior-un-appointments/ .

²⁹ International Peace Institute, "The Future of Peace Operations: Maintaining Momentum," November 2015, available at

www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/IPI_E-RPT-Future_of_Peace_Ops.pdf .

³⁰ On unarmed protection, see, for instance, Tor Kristian Birkeland, "Unarmed Civilian Protection: The Methodology and Its Relevance for Norwegian Church-Based Organizations and Their Partners," Future of Peace Operations, October 31, 2016, available at http://futurepeaceops.org/2016/10/31/unarmed-civilianprotection-the-methodology-and-its-relevance-for-norwegian-church-based-organizations-and-their-partners/.

Box 3. Formal action taken since the release of the HIPPO report

Secretariat

- September 2, 2015: The UN secretary-general released his report, *The Future of United Nations Peace Operations: Implementation of the Recommendations of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations.*
- November 20, 2015: The secretary-general briefed the Security Council on his action plan for taking forward the recommendations found in the HIPPO report.
- June 9, 2016: The secretary-general gave an informal briefing to the General Assembly on progress in implementation of the three peace and security reviews, including the HIPPO review (but he did not request a formal report on implementation of the HIPPO recommendations).

Member states

- November 12, 2015: The UN General Assembly adopted procedural Resolution 70/6 "taking note with appreciation of the initiative of the Secretary-General aimed at strengthening the United Nations system" and started considering recommendations from the reports of the HIPPO and the secretary-general within its various committees.³¹
- November 25, 2015: The Security Council issued a presidential statement taking note of the recommendations from the reports of the HIPPO and the secretary-general and committing the Security Council to "consider sequenced and phased mandates, where appropriate, when evaluating existing United Nations peace operations or establishing new United Nations peace operations."³²
- February 16–March 11, 2016: The Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C-34) took note of the reports from the HIPPO and the secretary-general, considered a number of their recommendations, and finalized and submitted its report to the General Assembly.³³
- April 27, 2016: The Security Council and General Assembly adopted identical resolutions on sustaining peace (Resolutions 2282 and 70/262, respectively). These resolutions were the conclusion of an intergovernmental process, co-facilitated by Angola and Australia, that considered the findings and recommendations of an Advisory Group of Experts in a report entitled *The Challenges of Sustaining Peace*.
- May 10–11, 2016: The president of the General Assembly held a high-level thematic debate focused on the three 2015 peace and security reviews, including that of the HIPPO, to engage in a strategic reflection on contemporary threats and challenges and ways to capitalize on the recommendations arising from the reviews.³⁴

Box 4. Informal "friends of HIPPO" group

When the HIPPO was set up, Ethiopia, Norway, and the Republic of Korea set up an informal cross-regional "friends of HIPPO" group of permanent representatives, which has subsequently met seven times to discuss different aspects of the follow-up process. The meetings have been well-attended by ambassadors from different regional groups and senior UN officials and have provided an opportunity for open and constructive discussions on how to move forward on the peace operations reform agenda. The most recent informal gathering, on June 22, 2016, focused on the status of internal reviews initiated by the Secretariat to remove administrative bottlenecks that hamper the UN's agility in the field. The co-organizers have expressed their intention to continue the group in order to maintain focus on the reform efforts, including during the period of transition to a new secretary-general.

³¹ UN General Assembly Resolution 70/6 (November 12, 2015), UN Doc. A/RES/70/6.

³² UN Security Council, Statement by the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/PRST/2015/22, November 25, 2015, p. 3.

³³ UN General Assembly, Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations: 2016 Substantive Session, UN Doc. A/70/19, 2016.

³⁴ Mogens Lykketoft, Conclusions and Observations by the President of the Seventieth Session of the UN General Assembly, May 19, 2016, available at www.un.org/pga/70/wp-content/uploads/sites/10/2015/08/Thematic-Debate-on-UN-Peace-and-Security-Conclusions-Observations-20-May-2016-1.compressed.pdf.

Moving Forward: Recommended Actions

This section revisits in more detail and in a forward-looking manner the nine strategic areas under which progress was assessed in the previous section. It reiterates a number of HIPPO recommendations (in gray in the right columns of the scorecard), both for the next secretary-general to pursue and infuse with momentum as a matter of priority (without starting anew) and for member states to champion and build consensus around toward effective implementation moving forward. Following the spirit and the letter of the HIPPO report, these recommended actions should not be seen in isolation from one another but rather as a "package." These nine areas are interlinked and need to be implemented together to ensure peace operations more effectively deliver results on the ground.

PREVENTION AND SUSTAINING PEACE

The HIPPO report noted that one of the reasons that approaches to conflict prevention and sustaining peace remain ineffective is that "the United Nations has not invested enough on addressing root causes of conflict. It must do that in partnership with others, while strengthening its own capacities to undertake prevention work, including through inclusive and equitable development."35 One of the report's first recommendations on how to encourage and institutionalize prevention is that the Security Council should "engage earlier to address emerging threats, including in partnership with regional and subregional organizations, and be open to early analysis and frank advice from the Secretary-General on situations threaten international peace and that may security."36

As previously highlighted, more action is needed to develop a system-wide approach to prevention and sustaining peace. Toward this end, the secretary-general should support member states in integrating prevention into national governance and development functions aimed at sustaining peace. This would also be an opportunity to take stock of the implementation of the Human Rights Up Front initiative as a system-wide tool that can refocus human rights work in peace operations away from its current protection focus to prevention more broadly.³⁷

Moreover, the next secretary-general should revisit the HIPPO recommendation to "convene an international forum on prevention that would periodically bring together Governments, regional organizations, civil society and the global business community to exchange conflict-prevention experiences and agree on innovative approaches that integrate conflict prevention, governance, development and human rights."38 While Ban Kimoon did not endorse this specific HIPPO recommendation in his report (nor did he explicitly leave it to the next secretary-general), such a forum could help move the discussion from rhetoric to practice and help member states prioritize political and financial resources for prevention, both at home and at the UN, in support of a more proactive (rather than reactive) UN. This forum could lead to the development of a global agenda on prevention, or a "New Agenda for Peace."39

The sustaining peace resolution already calls on the next secretary-general to report back on progress and options for funding sustaining peace at a high-level event during the seventy-second session of the General Assembly in September 2017.⁴⁰ This will be an opportunity to take stock of the HIPPO recommendation, seconded by this secretary-general, that:

Prevention and mediation efforts should be reinforced through a significant strengthening of and more reliable resourcing through the Regular Budget for the Secretariat's core capacities including monitoring and analysis, support to the Secretary-General's good offices and mediation support, including the standby mediation team, the deployment of peace and development advisers and small

³⁵ United Nations, Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, p. 9.

³⁶ Ibid., p. 21.

³⁷ Ibid., pp. 19, 21.

³⁸ Ibid., p. 21.

³⁹ See Independent Commission on Multilateralism, "Pulling Together: The Multilateral System and Its Future," International Peace Institute, September 2016, available at www.ipinst.org/2016/09/icm-final-report.

⁴⁰ UN Security Council Resolution 2282 (April 27, 2016), UN Doc. S/RES/2282.

multidisciplinary teams of experts to support the UN Country Team when needed.⁴¹

Member states should also explore how to leverage the comparative advantages of the Peacebuilding Commission and the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) in making prevention a cross-cutting theme, including through implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).⁴²

Finally, the next secretary-general, together with member states, should explore how peace operations can more explicitly integrate prevention and sustaining peace into implementation of their mandates.

THE PRIMACY OF POLITICS

One of the four essential shifts called for by the HIPPO was that "politics must have primacy." The HIPPO recommended that "the Security Council, Secretariat, regional actors and all Member States should work proactively to advance a political process and support other conditions for success, and should review regularly the viability of the mission."43 To make this shift, the HIPPO also recommended that "the Security Council should make use of sequenced and prioritized mandates as a regular practice, including a two-stage mandating process requiring the Secretary-General to return to the Security Council with proposals for prioritized mission tasks within an initial six month period."44 The secretary-general and C-34 seconded this recommendation,⁴⁵ and there has been some progress on implementing it, as previously discussed. Nonetheless, the Security Council will need to maintain focus on this recommendation in order to make sure mandates are sequenced, prioritized, and tailored to the context.

In addition, the next secretary-general should ensure that the small centralized unit for analysis and planning the current secretary-general created is empowered to help design peace operations that are guided by political strategies based on a solid understanding of the conflict, rather than the political interests of member states or bureaucratic tussles within the UN. As recommended in the HIPPO report, the Secretariat should ensure that "system-wide strategic analysis and planning is initiated earlier and planning processes are more strictly followed and supported by more rigorous situation assessments and conflict analysis."⁴⁶ It is key not only that member states support the institutionalization of this cell, but also that the Security Council give due consideration to the secretary-general's proposals, without exceptions.

Another important recommendation from the HIPPO is that the Secretariat should facilitate the development of a "compact between the UN and the host government."47 The current secretarygeneral has expressed his intention to explore such compacts with relevant host governments to ensure understanding of mandates and status-of-mission agreements and, as appropriate, to coordinate international engagement in support of the host country's commitments to peace. While the practicalities of such compacts still need to be worked out, the UN Secretariat started testing the idea in the context of its mission in the Central African Republic. Despite limited success so far, the idea should not be abandoned altogether. Its success will ultimately depend on the willingness and ability of a unified Security Council to put its collective political leverage behind such compacts. This should include supporting the UN mission and its leadership on the ground, engaging with the parties (including the host government) when needed, and pushing for long-term political solutions that will ultimately contribute to sustaining peace.

CAPABILITIES AND PERFORMANCE

In order to operate effectively and safely on the ground, the UN needs the right mix of capabilities, broadly defined as assets (uniformed personnel and equipment) and the ability of these assets to

47 Ibid., p. 39.

⁴¹ United Nations, Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, p. 21.

⁴² Ibid., p. 38.

⁴³ Ibid., p. 34.

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 48.

⁴⁵ In its 2016 report, the C-34 emphasized the need to "devise clear, unambiguous and achievable phased mandates and to generate and mobilize the necessary political, human, financial and logistical resources and information capacity for achieving those mandates." General Assembly, *Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations: 2016 Substantive Session*, UN Doc. A/70/19, 2016, para 83.

⁴⁶ United Nations, Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, p. 46.

perform particular tasks (which requires training, leadership, readiness, and will). This was an area highlighted by the HIPPO report, which encouraged member states "to offer their troops for United Nations operations so as to provide these missions with essential capabilities and to signal their resolve, in particular, in support of mandates to protect civilians." The HIPPO also recommended that "the Security Council should provide strong political support to the UN force generation process."⁴⁸

While this is one of the areas where the most progress has been made, it will be important for the next secretary-general and member states to take stock of how the Strategic Force Generation and Capabilities Planning Cell has worked together with troop-contributing countries toward effectively delivering on pledges, including those registered in the Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System. He should also assess what effects these pledges have had in enhancing the rapid deployment and effectiveness of peacekeeping operations overall. The idea is that with more pledges to choose from, the UN Secretariat will be able to choose the most appropriate offers and to hold contingents more accountable for their performance. The Secretariat should also act on the HIPPO's recommendation that it "present options to the Security Council and the General Assembly outlining what reductions in force generation and deployment times could be achieved by different additional measures or resources."49

While the concept of a vanguard unit was finalized and discussed at the September 2016 UN Peacekeeping Defence Ministerial in London, it will up to the next secretary-general to operationalize this concept by getting the needed capabilities from member states. Similarly, the performance evaluation framework for peacekeeping established by the Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) should be expanded, including for civilian components of missions. Such performance standards, including for specialist functions, would also open the way for the Secretariat to act on the HIPPO's

PARTNERSHIPS

One of the common themes that echoed throughout the HIPPO report and subsequent discussions is that the UN cannot single-handedly address the challenges associated with maintaining peace and security in the twenty-first century. In particular, a stronger global-regional peace and security partnership is needed, particularly with the African Union. The HIPPO emphasized that the UN-AU partnership should be underpinned by several principles, which could also serve as a baseline for other future partnerships: "consultative decision making and common strategy; the division of labour based on respective comparative advantage; joint analysis, planning, monitoring and evaluation; integrated response to the conflict cycle, including prevention; [and] transparency, accountability and respect for international standards."51 It also recommended that the "use of United Nations-assessed contributions be provided on a case-by-case basis to support Security Council-authorized African Union peace support operations including the costs associated with deployed uniformed personnel to complement funding from the African Union and/or African Member States."52

While there have been many recent discussions over the issue of financing for AU missions authorized by the Security Council, the UN-AU partnership needs to continue to be looked at more broadly. It was in this spirit that the Common African Position on the UN Review of Peace Operations highlighted the need to do more to systematize and institutionalize the UN-AU partnership, both at the political level (between the AU Peace and Security Council and the UN

recommendation to "develop options for reimbursing Member States for a capability rather than just for current equipment and personnel numbers."⁵⁰ As part of this capability drive, it will be essential for the UN Secretariat and member states to continue working together to improve the ability of peace operations to operate safely and effectively in asymmetric threat environments.

⁴⁸ Ibid., pp. 55-56.

⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 55.

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 56.

⁵¹ Ibid., p. 63.

⁵² Ibid., p. 65.

Security Council) and at the strategic level (between the AU commissioner for peace and security and the UN under-secretaries-general for peacekeeping operations and for political affairs).⁵³ The next secretary-general should finalize a new joint UN-AU framework for partnership on peace and security, including in the area of conflict prevention.

One of the keys to this strategic partnership resides in AU member states delivering on their commitment to cover 25 percent of the cost of AU peacekeeping operations authorized by the Security Council through a 0.2 percent levy on imports to African countries and overcoming the technical and political hurdles already identified. It also depends on UN member states considering a more formal UN-AU framework for predicable support and financing for the other 75 percent of the cost of AU missions authorized by the Security Council from assessed UN contributions.

LEADERSHIP AND ACCOUNTABILITY

The reports of the HIPPO and of the secretarygeneral and the subsequent Security Council and General Assembly resolutions on sustaining peace (Resolutions 2282 and 70/262, respectively) all directly linked their overarching message on accountability and effective governance to leadership in UN peace operations. Improving leadership, including by improving the process for selecting high-ranking UN officials, could help professionalize the organization, while transparent system for recruitment based on merit and expertise could help bring further accountability.54 The HIPPO report specifically recommended that the secretary-general "ensure that selection and appointment of senior leadership is reinforced through consistent application of a defined, merit-based selection process," something the next secretary-general should carry forward.

The HIPPO report also recommended that the secretary-general ensure that "those leading UN peace operations are held accountable, including

through performance management mechanisms such as '360 degree appraisals.³⁷⁵⁵ And the report recommended that the secretary-general be liable for meeting performance indicators, in particular on gender equality and on egregious conduct and discipline deficits, including sexual exploitation and abuse.⁵⁶

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While this secretary-general has taken some action on sexual exploitation and abuse, much remains to be done to improve overall leadership and accountability at the UN. The next secretarygeneral should carry forward the momentum on this issue and pursue robust implementation of the proposed measures to strengthen accountability for sexual exploitation and abuse. These measures include suspending payments to contributing countries where there are credible allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse implicating individual contingents or police personnel, repatriating contingents where there is a demonstrated pattern of abuse or non-response to allegations of misconduct, "naming and shaming," and creating an adequately resourced victim assistance program.57

This will also require member states to play their part by upholding and implementing commitments made by the C-34 and in General Assembly Resolution 70/114 (2015). These include the commitment to establish jurisdiction over crimes (as per domestic criminal laws) committed by member-state nationals while serving as UN officials, particularly crimes of a serious nature.

FIELD SUPPORT

The HIPPO report highlighted that the Department of Field Support (DFS)—created in 2007 as a single entity "with the full responsibility, authority and resources necessary to ensure that missions have what they need, when they need, to succeed in their mandates"—does not have the delegated authority to deliver the required support. It also noted that the Secretariat's administrative procedures have not been reviewed to meet the demands of the field.⁵⁸ This is despite the fact that

⁵³ AU Peace and Security Council, Common African Position on the UN Review of Peace Operations, AU Doc. PSC/PR/2(DII), April 29, 2015.

⁵⁴ Eli Stamnes and Kari M. Osland, "Synthesis Report: Reviewing UN Peace Operations, the UN Peacebuilding Architecture and the Implementation of UNSCR 1325," Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2016, p. 46.

⁵⁵ United Nations, Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, p. 73.

⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 73. "The Secretary-General should continue to appoint more women to senior mission leadership positions" and "review the obstacles and structural factors preventing women's recruitment and professional advancement and support the promotion of serving female staff to senior leadership roles."

⁵⁷ UN Secretary-General, The Future of United Nations Peace Operations, paras. 118-124.

⁵⁸ United Nations, Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, p. 84.

field missions account for over 80 percent of UN Secretariat spending, 55 percent of its staff, and 90 percent of its procurement.⁵⁹ One specific recommendation from the HIPPO was for the secretary-general to "empower the Department of Field Support (DFS) with the full delegated authorities required to support the efficient administration of field-focused policies and procedures and to expedite service delivery and recruitment." It also recommended the Department that of Management "provide a strategic quality assurance framework and oversight of performance."60

Given how technical some of these field support issues are, the next secretary-general should improve ways of communicating field support challenges to member states. He should also seek ways of ensuring that proposals put forward will make a difference on the ground and that "field needs and perspectives are adequately reflected in any proposed new policies and policy changes."⁶¹

Moreover, the next secretary-general should carry forward the work of the working groups on information and communication technologies (ICT), procurement, and human resources started by his predecessor and consider their recommendations. But he should also make bold proposals of his own for improving recruitment and personnel policies and procedures early in his term.

At the same time, a group of friends—which could be a subgroup of the existing informal "friends of HIPPO"—could champion proposals for reforming field support that the next secretarygeneral puts forward and commit resources to implementing them. While not necessarily the "flashiest" reforms, these carry some of the greatest potential impact on the way peace operations operate on the ground.

FINANCES AND RESTRUCTURING

Some of the most ambitious recommendations from the HIPPO were on headquarters management and reform. The HIPPO recommended that the secretary-general "develop options for restructuring the Secretariat peace and security architecture...with a view to strengthening leadership and management and to removing compartmentalized mindsets at Headquarters, and to ensure stronger and more effective field-oriented support to UN peace operations." This could be done through "the creation of an additional Deputy Secretary-General position, responsible for peace and security" and "a single 'peace operations account' to finance all peace operations and related back-stopping activities in future."⁶² The outgoing secretary-general explicitly left these recommendations to restructure the Secretariat's peace and security architecture for the consideration of his successor. His successor should also consider other restructuring options.

As a first step to considering a single "peace operations account" to facilitate tailored responses and smooth transitions, member states should endorse the recommendations of the HIPPO and the secretary-general on the Fifth Committee's review of funding and backstopping arrangements for special political missions. Improved "triangular cooperation" and timely interactions among the Security Council, Secretariat, and police- and troop-contributing countries, as recommended by the C-34's 2016 report, are also essential to moving forward member states' discussions on financing.⁶³

The next secretary-general should appoint an expert committee to explore different restructuring options and propose (in consultation with member states) ways to best carry forward the HIPPO recommendations on financing and restructuring. One specific area where the next secretary-general could make bold proposals is in improving outdated budgetary processes and focusing these on results and strategic issues rather than budgetary minutiae.

Although the HIPPO report suggested that a proposal for restructuring "should be cost neutral,"⁶⁴ it will not be. No matter how beneficial, restructuring will be a hard sell within the UN Secretariat and with member states. Such reforms would challenge established power structures, risk-averse behaviors, and differing mindsets of individ-

62 Ibid., p. 92.

64 Ibid., p. 91.

⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 83.

⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 86.

⁶¹ Ibid., p. 86.

⁶³ General Assembly, Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations: 2016 Substantive Session, UN Doc. A/70/19, 2016, para. 83.

uals, member states, and departments—particularly DPA, DPKO, and DFS, but also the Department of Management, which has been resistant to a more field-focused Secretariat.⁶⁵ The secretary-general will therefore need to build a compelling narrative—accompanied by concrete incentives— on the value and relevance of such reform.

Past experience shows that such high-level proposals can, in the end, produce new layers of bureaucracy and generate new turf battles instead of producing more accountability.⁶⁶ Options for restructuring should therefore consider that structural changes do not always achieve greater strategic coherence and that "form follows function," which was a guiding principle suggested by the June 2008 UN Policy Committee decision on integration.⁶⁷ Options for strategically restructuring Secretariat entities entrusted with the peace and security agenda should include establishing single-country or regional desks, merging thematic and service functions, and clarifying accountability and decision making.⁶⁸

Another suggestion would be for the next secretary-general to frame the restructuring of the UN peace and security architecture and the move toward a single "peace operations account" around the concept of "sustaining peace." This concept already benefits from the support of member states, including through a formal group of friends. For their part, member states could appoint an expert committee to look at how to make "sustaining peace" a shared responsibility across the organization, including peace operations. This committee could also consider the Advisory Group of Experts' recommendation that the Peacebuilding Fund receive core funding equivalent to 1 percent of the total UN peace operations budget.⁶⁹

PEOPLE-CENTERED APPROACH

"We the peoples" are the first words of the 1945 UN Charter. But UN peace operations today have been heavily criticized for neglecting the very people the UN is trusted to protect. This is despite the growing consensus that protecting civilians in armed conflict is a vital norm of the international community. The HIPPO report noted that "there is a clear sense of a widening gap between what is being asked of peace operations today and what they are able to deliver."⁷⁰ This is illustrated by the latest violence in South Sudan,⁷¹ issues of sexual exploitation and abuse in the Central African Republic,⁷² and the outbreak of cholera in Haiti⁷³ the latter two being cases of UN peacekeepers harming people they are deployed to assist. To address this gap, the HIPPO recommended a "renewed resolve on the part of UN peace operations personnel to engage with, serve and protect the people they have been mandated to assist."74 This was seconded by the C-34, which expressed its support for more people-centered approaches through local-level analysis that draws on more strategic engagement with communities and an understanding of local perceptions and priorities. It also encouraged the endorsement of the Kigali Principles on the Protection of Civilians.

The HIPPO, however, had very few concrete recommendations on making UN peace operations more people-centered. Its main recommendation on this issue was that "missions should develop strategies for community engagement at various stages of the mission cycle—from assessment, analysis, planning, implementation, review and evaluation—and make increased use of the resources of national staff in designing and implementing these strategies."⁷⁵ A step forward

75 Ibid., p. 66.

⁶⁵ Independent Commission on Multilateralism, "Armed Conflict: Mediation, Conciliation, and Peacekeeping," May 2016, available at www.icm2016.org/IMG/pdf/armed_conflict_discussion_paper-2.pdf.

⁶⁶ Arthur Boutellis and Andrea Ó Súilleabháin, "Working Together for Peace: Synergies and Connectors for Implementing the 2015 UN Reviews," International Peace Institute, May 2016, available at www.un.org/pga/70/wp-content/uploads/sites/10/2016/01/IPI-Rpt-Synergies.pdf .

⁶⁷ United Nations, Decision 2008/24 of the Secretary-General in the Policy Committee on Integration, June 25, 2008.

⁶⁸ See, for instance, Arthur Boutellis, "Driving the System Apart? A Study of United Nations Integration and Integrated Strategic Planning," International Peace Institute, August 2013, available at www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/publications/ipi_e_pub_driving_the_system_apart.pdf .

⁶⁹ United Nations, Report of the Advisory Group of Experts for the 2015 Review of the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture, p. 55.

⁷⁰ United Nations, Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, p. vii.

⁷¹ See Richard Gowan, "When Should Blue Helmets Walk Away from a Conflict?" *Global Peace Operations Review*, August 16, 2016, available at http://peaceoperationsreview.org/thematic-essays/when-should-blue-helmets-walk-away-from-a-conflict/.

⁷² See Margaux Benn, "U.N. Sex Abuse Scandal in Central African Republic Hits Rock Bottom," *Foreign Policy*, April 8, 2016, available at http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/04/08/u-n-sex-abuse-scandal-in-central-african-republic-hits-rock-bottom/.

⁷³ See "Haiti Cholera Epidemic Caused by UN Troops, Say Experts," BBC News, August 19, 2016, available at www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-37134361 .

⁷⁴ United Nations, Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, p. 9.

would include working and consulting with local communities to develop mandates in order to ensure the needs of people on the ground are being met. In particular, missions should consult with youth, who are essential stakeholders and too seldom included,⁷⁶ as well as with experts in the field such as anthropologists.77 The next secretarygeneral should therefore endeavor to better define what people-centered peace operations look like and require in practice, including linkages to sustaining peace and the 2030 Agenda and its Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

In addition to welcoming the DPKO guidelines on how to integrate the views of local populations, the Kigali Principles, and other guidance on protection of civilians, the next secretary-general should actively explore and develop guidelines for unarmed protection of civilians to complement these, in collaboration with national NGOs and religious leaders.⁷⁸ The HIPPO report's focus on unarmed strategies to protect civilians was not picked up and would merit renewed attention at a time when physical protection of civilians by uniformed personnel has shown its limits on the ground.79 At the same time, police- and troopcontributing countries should continue to be involved in discussions around protection of civilians and actively share analyses and assessments with the C-34.80

WOMEN, PEACE, AND SECURITY

The HIPPO pointed to several fundamental obstacles to the advancement of the women, peace, and security agenda, including the lack of national leadership in making it a political and governance priority and the persistently low proportion of women among mission managers (roughly 20 percent).⁸¹ This is despite the fact that even before

the women, peace, and security agenda formally existed, the UN made a commitment to achieving gender parity in managerial and decision-making roles by the year 2000.82

There is thus a vital need for the next secretarygeneral to focus on reform within recruitment and to work to address the reversal in gender equality in senior appointments. He should also invest in selecting, preparing, and managing performance and overall accountability of peace operations leadership teams, with specific attention and consideration to gender equality, starting with senior appointments early in his term. Member states also hold responsibility and should put forward and support competitive selection of qualified candidates (including female candidates) by the secretary-general for senior positions in peace operations and break with past practices of political interference. It is encouraging that the secretary-general-designate, António Guterres, already committed during his campaign to achieving gender parity in his leadership team.83

But beyond the top ranks, the next secretarygeneral should also "develop a gender-sensitive force and police generation strategy, including by encouraging troop- and police-contributing countries to develop and/or implement national action plans on Security Council resolution 1325."84 Member states, in turn, should put forward more female candidates for all levels of field positions, including a higher percentage of female staff officers. The first female UN force commander was only appointed in 2013,85 and between January 1 and December 10, 2015, twenty-two men and only two women were appointed as UN undersecretaries-general.86

The General Assembly ad hoc working group on

- 80 United Nations, Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, p. 25.
- 81 Ibid., p. 67.

83 Carol Morello, "Former Prime Minister of Portugal Poised to Become U.N. Secretary General," Washington Post, October 5, 2016.

⁷⁶ UN Security Council Resolution 2250 (December 9, 2015), UN Doc. S/RES/2250.

⁷⁷ For more information on this topic, see John Karlsrud, "How Can the UN Move towards More People-Centered Peace Operations," Global Peace Operations Review, September 23, 2015, available at http://peaceoperationsreview.org/thematic-essays/people-centered-reform-at-the-un/.

⁷⁸ United Nations, Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, p. 23; UN Secretary-General, The Future of United Nations Peace Operations, paras. 87-105.

⁷⁹ UN General Assembly, Evaluation of the Implementation and Results of Protection of Civilians Mandates in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, UN Doc. A/68/787, March 7, 2014.

⁸² UN General Assembly Resolution 50/164 (February 1, 1996), UN Doc. A/RES/50/164.

⁸⁴ United Nations, Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, p. 56.

Norway Mission to the UN, "UN's First Female Force Commander Ends Her Tour of Duty," July 28, 2016, available at

 $http://www.norway-un.org/NorwayandUN/Big_Issues/Peace_Efforts/UNs-first-female-force-commander-ends-her-tour-of-duty/\#.WCHmFMniuUk\ .$ 86 See www.un.org/press/en/content/appointments.

women, peace, and security and the Security Council itself should ensure that gender dimensions are integrated in thematic agenda items (on the rule of law, the protection of civilians, etc.) and country- or mission-specific work. To this end, the next secretary-general should implement the HIPPO's recommendation that "the Secretariat and missions should carry out gender-sensitive analysis throughout the analysis, planning, implementation, review, evaluation and mission drawdown processes,"⁸⁷ including through genderdisaggregated data collection.

Conclusion

In 2000, the Brahimi Report called for a "renewed commitment" of all member states to the maintenance of international peace.⁸⁸ Fifteen years later, while UN peacekeeping and the challenges it faces have evolved, the key conclusion of the HIPPO report is not very different: politics must drive the design and implementation of peace operations, and a renewed focus on prevention is needed to avoid deploying costly peacekeeping operations to manage conflict.⁸⁹

While the timing of the HIPPO report in the last year of Ban Ki-moon's second term was not ideal, and the HIPPO did not benefit from being a formal member-state-led process, a consensus has nonetheless emerged over the past year that the HIPPO report's recommendations remain valid and should form the basis for member states' engagement with the next secretary-general on peace operations reform.⁹⁰

A number of the recommendations of the HIPPO and of the secretary-general have been acted upon or are in the process of internal review. As this report highlights, however, the leadership of the next secretary-general is necessary for the essential shifts called for by the HIPPO to become reality and to have concrete impact on the ground. This will also require effective collaboration and trust among member states with diverging interests and views, and between member states and the UN Secretariat. Moreover, both the secretary-general and member states could build on emerging consensus to better integrate prevention and sustaining peace into the work of UN peace operations.

In this regard, Secretary-General Guterres should appoint an expert committee to propose, in consultation with member states, how to carry forward some of the key HIPPO recommendations that have not been taken up so far or on which member states remain undecided. Secretary-General Guterres will also likely want to put his own mark on peace operations reform and could do so by making bold, "game-changing" proposals early in his term during the so-called "honeymoon" period⁹¹—such as on finances and restructuring and on leadership and accountability.

Overall, successful change in the UN often happens incrementally over the long term, and the history of UN reform offers some lessons in this regard. First, it is important to manage expectations, and process matters at least as much as substance. Second, change requires a clearly articulated strategic vision from the secretary-general and buy-in from the UN Secretariat to overcome the challenge of bureaucratic resistance within the UN. Third, a rationale for change with a few concrete proposals can be more easily championed by member states. Lastly, longer-term five-to-tenyear plans aligned with General Assembly budget cycles are preferable to short-term rhetorical statements.⁹²

This "HIPPO scorecard" summarizes the key strategic areas of change that would benefit from the meaningful and focused attention of the next secretary-general and of member states, including through the "friends of HIPPO" group of permanent representatives. This group has been meeting on a regular basis in New York and is committed to continuing to support the implementation of the HIPPO recommendations in 2017, together with the broader UN membership.

⁸⁷ United Nations, Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, p. 69.

⁸⁸ United Nations, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, UN Doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809, August 21, 2000.


⁸⁹ Independent Commission on Multilateralism, "Armed Conflict: Mediation, Conciliation and Peacebuilding."


⁹⁰ For resources on UN peace operations reform, see www.futurepeaceops.org/ .


⁹¹ Thomas G. Weiss and Tatiana Carayannis, "January 1, 2017: Let the Honeymoon for UN Reform Begin," *Global Observatory*, September 19, 2016, available at https://theglobalobservatory.org/2016/09/united-nations-secretary-general-hippo-ban-ki-moon/.

⁹² Francesco Mancini, "Managing Change at the United Nations: Lessons from Recent Initiatives," International Peace Institute, October 2015, available at www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/IPI-E-pub-Managing-Change-at-UN.pdf.













	Taking Stock:	Stock: Progess to Date	Moving Forward: Re	Moving Forward: Recommended Actions
HIPPO Recommendations	Secretariat	Member States	Next Secretary-General	Member States
	Both the UN Secretariat and a supported the push toward force generation (including Generation and Capabilit capabilities for pea	Both the UN Secretariat and a number of Member States have supported the push toward a more strategic approach to force generation (including establishing a Strategic Force Generation and Capabilities Planning Cell) and better capabilities for peacekeeping operations.	The next SG should take stock of how the Strategic Force Generation Capabilities Planning Cell has functioned and strengthen the cell, if needed.	Troop-contributing countries should deliver on pledges made and synchronize with the UN force-generation process.
		Member states made record pledges at President Obama's September 2015 Leaders' Summit and at the September 2016 UN Peacekeeping Defence Ministerial in London.	The next SG should produce an assessment of pledges made, pledges delivered, and the effect these pledges have had on enhancing peacekeeping operations, including those registered in the Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System (PCRS),	
3. Capabilities and Performance	The concept of a vanguard unit was finalized and discussed at the UN Peacekeeping Defence Ministerial in London.	The General Assembly started to look into rapid deployment issues and to establish practices on partnerships with standby arrangements between the UN and AU.	The next SG should operationalize the concept of a vanguard unit.	Troop-contributing countries should offer sufficient pledges of rapidly deployable capabilities to operationalize the concept of a vanguard unit.
Highlights Done In process	The Secretariat established a performance evaluation framework for peacekeeping.		The next SG should lobby for an overall performance evaluation framework, including for civilian components, which includes options for reimbursing member states based on carpability rather than based on current equipment and personnel numbers.	Member states should give political support to the concept of a new performance evaluation framework.
No action Suggestions			The Secretariat and member improve the ability of peace o effectively in asymmet	The Secretariat and member states should work together to improve the ability of peace operations to operate safely and effectively in asymmetric thread environments.

	Taking Stock:	Stock: Progess to Date	Moving Forward: Re	Moving Forward: Recommended Actions
HIPPO Recommendations	Secretariat	Member States	Secretary-General	Member States
4. Partnerships			The next SG should finalize a new joint UN-AU framework for partnership on peace and security, including conflict prevention, to start the development of a stronger global-regional partnership.	
	A UN-AU review of available mechanisms to finance and support AU operations mandated by the Security Council has been published (S/2016/809).	The AU decided at its July 2016 summit in Kigali to finance its budget, including the peace and security budget, through a 0.2 percent levy on imports.		Member states should consider a more formal UN-AU framework for predicable support and financing for AU missions authorized by the Security Council.
5. Leadership and Accountability	The SG took action to send a clear signal that heads of peace operations are ultimately accountable for egregious conduct and discipline deficits, including sexual exploitation and abuse.	The Security Council adopted its first ever resolution an sexual abuse by peacekeepers, including a decision to repathiate military or police units "where there is creatible evidence of widespread or systemic sexual exploitation and abuse."	The Secretariat should pursue robust implementation of the SG's proposed measures to strengthen accountability for sexual exploitation and abuse.	Member states should uphold and implement commitments made by the C-34 and in General Assembly Resolution 70/114 (2015). This includes establishing jurisdiction over crimes (as
nigningnis Done In process Na action Suggestions		The Fifth Committee welcomed the work of the SG on sexual exploitation and abuse and welcomed the SG's creation of an external independent review on this issue.	The next SC should ensure that selection and appointment of senior leadership is reinforced through consistent application of a defined, merit-based selection process.	laws) committed by member-state nationals while serving as UN officials, particularly crimes of a serious nature.











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