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### Abbreviations

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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>AFISMA</td>
<td>African-Led International Support Mission in Mali</td>
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<td>AMIB</td>
<td>AU Mission in Burundi</td>
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<td>AMIS</td>
<td>AU Mission in Sudan</td>
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<td>AMISEC</td>
<td>AU Mission for Support to the Elections in the Comoros</td>
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<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>AU Mission in Somalia</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>BINUCA</td>
<td>UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic</td>
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<td>ECOMICI</td>
<td>ECOWAS Mission in Côte d’Ivoire</td>
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<td>ECOMIL</td>
<td>ECOWAS Mission in Liberia</td>
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<td>ECOMOG</td>
<td>ECOWAS Monitoring Group</td>
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<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<td>EUFOR-RCA</td>
<td>EU Force in the Central African Republic</td>
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<td>MAES</td>
<td>AU Electoral and Security Assistance Mission in the Comoros</td>
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<td>MINUSCA</td>
<td>UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic</td>
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<td>MISCA</td>
<td>International Support Mission to the Central African Republic</td>
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<td>MONUSCO</td>
<td>UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<td>ONUC</td>
<td>UN Operation in the Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>TCC</td>
<td>Troop-contributing country</td>
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<td>UNAMID</td>
<td>AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur</td>
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<td>UNFICYP</td>
<td>UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus</td>
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<td>UNAMSIL</td>
<td>UN Mission in Sierra Leone</td>
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<td>UNMIL</td>
<td>UN Mission in Liberia</td>
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<td>UNMISS</td>
<td>UN Mission in South Sudan</td>
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<td>UNOCI</td>
<td>UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire</td>
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Executive Summary

Logistics support—ensuring the movement and maintenance of deployed personnel and equipment—is both critical to the safety and health of peacekeepers and vital to success at every stage of a peace operation. Contemporary peace operations are based on logistics partnerships, with support provided by a range of actors including states, international organizations, and commercial contractors. These operations can be divided into those where logistics support is mainly provided by actors participating in the operation (mission self-reliance) and those where actors outside the mission provide key logistics support (external partner dependence).

Seven types of actors may provide logistics support for contemporary peace operations: (1) troop-contributing countries (TCCs); (2) logistics “framework states”; (3) host states; (4) lead international organizations; (5) commercial contractors; (6) external partner states; and (7) external partner international organizations. It is important, however, to distinguish the provision of logistics support from its financing. In many cases, actors are only able or willing to assume one of these tasks, yet logistics support must be both provided and paid for. The need for partnership arises because actors differ not only in their logistics capacity but also in their ability or willingness to finance logistics. At the same time, partnerships raise their own challenges of coordinating and controlling logistics within missions.

This report focuses on the two main kinds of logistics partnerships that involve the UN: those supporting UN operations and those supporting regional peace operations in Africa. Drawing on two UN missions (in Cyprus and the Central African Republic) and fifteen regional operations in Africa deployed since 1990, it describes, compares, and traces the evolution of these two kinds of logistics partnerships and provides recommendations for improving them.

UN peacekeeping operations benefit from a broad suite of tools that the UN has developed incrementally over seven decades of peacekeeping experience. These tools are anchored in the UN’s ability to use assessed contributions from member states to finance most (but not all) of the logistics support provided. More recently, UN operations have diversified the kinds of external partners they draw on for logistics support. As more UN operations deploy as successors to or in parallel with regional operations, states and international organizations engaged in those regional missions have increasingly become (modest) logistics partners to UN operations. The UN has also promoted inter-mission cooperation on logistics.

In regional operations in Africa, there are five main trends in logistics partnerships. First, most African TCCs have been unable to provide all the logistics support necessary to deploy and sustain their contingents. Second, the international organization authorizing the mission has sometimes been able to fill some but not most of the logistics gaps left by the TCCs. Third, since the end of the Cold War, the UN has provided the most frequent logistics support to African regional operations, though since 2004 the EU has also supported most AU and AU-authorized operations. Fourth, bilateral partners have provided and financed crucial logistics support to regional peace operations in Africa. Finally, private contractors have played an important role in providing logistics support in most African operations.

Recommendations for improving logistics support for UN operations:

1. The UN should adapt its existing administrative and logistics policies and procedures to the realities of high-threat environments.
2. The UN should determine whether it requires a new set of policies and procedures for providing logistics support to other missions deployed to high-threat environments.
3. UN peacekeeping operations should leverage logistics partnerships with previous or parallel regional operations, including through early joint planning to develop logistics support structures that meet their standards and needs.
4. The UN should explore ways to make inter-mission cooperation more effective, including pooling assets to increase the efficiency of these partnerships.
5. Despite the importance and potential of external logistics partnerships, the UN should continue to focus on enhancing the logistics self-reliance of its missions.
6. To build the self-reliance of missions, the UN should work to ensure that internal partners have adequate logistics personnel and assets—and incentives to deploy them.

**Recommendations for improving logistics support for regional peace operations in Africa:**

7. The UN, AU, and other regional organizations should clarify when regional operations can receive UN funding for logistics support.

8. External partner states, particularly France and the UK, should explore cooperation arrangements similar to the 2015 US acquisition and cross-service agreement with the UN and relevant regional organizations. However, issues of affordability must be addressed.

9. External partners should increase coordination to avoid duplication of efforts and to identify and address gaps in logistics support.

10. The AU and interested external partners should continue to build the AU Commission’s capacity to support missions.

**Introduction**

In March 2017 the UN deployed 82,712 troops, 1,821 military observers, 11,944 police officers, 5,062 international civilian staff, and 1,577 volunteers to sixteen peacekeeping operations covering 7 million square kilometers of terrain. These 103,119 individuals from over 120 countries required transport to, from, and within the mission areas; accommodation and work space; food, water, and electricity; and medical, office, and myriad other supplies. Their equipment required transportation, storage, and maintenance, as well as gasoline, oil, and other lubricants. In short, contemporary UN peacekeeping operations generate a staggering demand for logistics support.

UN missions are not the only operations raising such demands. The personnel and equipment in the eight peace operations led by regional organizations in 2016 had similar requirements. In many cases the UN is also called upon to help support these. In 2015, for example, the UN provided logistics support to over 20,000 African Union (AU) troops and 10,900 Somali National Army soldiers with whom it was carrying out coordinated operations.

Logistics support can be more formally defined as ensuring the necessary movement and maintenance of a peace operation’s personnel and equipment. It includes: (1) the transportation of personnel to, within, and from the mission’s area of operations; (2) the transport, storage, maintenance, and eventual evacuation or disposal of mission equipment; (3) the acquisition, distribution, and ultimate disposal of mission supplies; (4) the acquisition or construction, maintenance, and operation of mission facilities, such as accommodation, offices, and warehouses; and (5) the acquisition or provision of services required in the mission, such as catering or cleaning.

Adequate logistics support is crucial both to the safety, health, and comfort of deployed peacekeepers and to the effectiveness and success of contemporary peace operations. Peace operations increasingly deploy to high-risk environments; in December 2015, 43 percent of the area of operations covered by UN peacekeeping missions was assessed as presenting a “substantial, high or extreme danger,” compared with 25 percent in December 2011, and two-thirds of UN peacekeepers were deployed in conflict environments. Under these circumstances, adequate logistics support to peacekeepers is both extremely challenging and vitally important to mitigating the risks of deployment.

At the same time, effective logistics support is critical to the operational success of a peacekeeping

1. Data from UN, available at www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/fmnote0317.pdf and www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/factsheet.shtml. UN peacekeeping operations also included 10,278 local civilian personnel, who are excluded from the total here as they do not pose the same logistics support challenges. The civilian personnel figure is as of November 30, 2016.


mission at every stage of its existence. There can be no rapid deployment without the ability to transport personnel and equipment and to accommodate and sustain them in the mission area. Once deployed, civilian and military peacekeepers cannot fulfill their mandates unless they are adequately sheltered and provisioned, are mobile, and have access to serviceable equipment and the electricity and fuel to operate it. The impact that peacekeepers may have on the host country also depends on how and from what sources their needs are provided for and how their waste is managed. The end of a mission, meanwhile, raises not only transportation challenges but also questions about the responsible disposal of equipment, facilities, and supplies that cannot be repatriated. Thus, while even the best logistics support cannot in itself guarantee mission success, inadequate support can cripple a mission, making logistics “the arbiter of strategic opportunity.”

This is especially true in the high-threat operating environments where both UN and regional peace operations are increasingly deployed. Armed conflict simultaneously raises logistics support requirements and makes them more difficult to meet. It increases the need for mission manpower, equipment, and mobility, exacerbates force protection challenges, compounds transportation difficulties by heightening security concerns and damaging transportation infrastructure, and severely limits local resources (e.g., buildings and supplies) the mission can use or acquire. It may also lead states, international organizations, and private contractors to decline to provide logistics capabilities or to limit their use in the mission. Reflecting these challenges, the 2015 High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations called on UN member states and officials to “define a new United Nations logistical support model for the future that would enable greater tactical responsiveness in large, austere and insecure settings.”

All contemporary peace operations are based on logistics partnerships. Logistics support is invariably provided by a range of actors, including states, international organizations, and commercial contractors. Typically at least some of this logistics support is financed not by the actor providing support but by others, thereby deepening and complicating partnership arrangements. These circumstances inevitably raise questions related to the coordination and control of logistics support.

Different types of partnership arrangements are associated with different kinds of peace operations. This report focuses on the two main kinds of logistics partnerships that involve the UN: those supporting UN operations and those supporting regional operations in Africa. Drawing on two cases of UN missions (in Cyprus and the Central African Republic) and fifteen regional operations in Africa deployed since 1990, it describes, compares, and traces the evolution of these two broad types of logistics partnerships and provides recommendations for improving each of them.

**Logistics Partnerships in Contemporary Peace Operations**

“Logistics partnerships” can be understood in two ways. As a descriptive term, it captures the reality that in contemporary peace operations, logistics support invariably comes from a variety of actors. Yet “logistics partnerships” can also be understood as having an aspirational dimension, suggesting the smooth and efficient cooperation of these various actors to ensure that a peace operation has all the necessary logistics support to efficiently implement its mandate. In this second sense, logistics partnerships are far less common in contemporary peace operations, and this report offers some recommendations for moving closer to this goal. To do so, however, we must first understand the current empirical reality of logistics partnerships.

A peace operation’s logistics support require-

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8 A high-threat environment corresponds to situations with active fighting, high risk from mines, improvised explosive devices, or unexploded ordnance, and targeted attacks against international forces. UN General Assembly and Security Council, *Identical Letters Dated 22 September 2016 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council*, UN Doc. A/71/410-S/2016/809, p. 9.
9 Coleman, “Overcoming Logistics Difficulties.”
ments depend on its mandate, size, composition, and operating environment. The mandate of a peace operation under the auspices of an international organization is established by the relevant political body (such as the UN Security Council or the AU Peace and Security Council), which typically draws on crisis assessments and preliminary planning reports from the organization’s secretariat. The resolution mandating the operation may also specify a maximum number of troops to be deployed. Mission planners develop a mission concept and refine a military (and, where relevant, a police) strategic concept of operations outlining how the mandate is to be achieved with the authorized force levels. They can then deduce the mission’s force requirements and assess its expected logistics support needs based on the envisioned mission structure and information about the operating environment gleaned from technical assessment missions.

In contemporary peace operations, seven types of actors may supply this logistics support:

1. **Troop-contributing countries** (TCCs) usually provide at least some support for their own contingents (“first-line logistics”), deploying units that have some self-sustainment capabilities such as the ability to store fuel, purify water, cook rations, and maintain basic equipment. Many units also deploy with some means of transportation.

2. Particular TCCs may assume the role of a logistics “framework state,” providing support not only to their own units but also to others deployed in the same area of operations (for example, by sharing their transport or accommodation) or to the mission as a whole (for example, by supplying aviation, medical, transport, or engineering capabilities).

3. In consent-based peace operations, the **host state**—to the extent it is able—provides access to its transportation infrastructure (seaports, airports, roads, and railways). The host state may also offer access to other infrastructure (including military bases, housing, office space, and warehouses) or offer supplies (such as water and fuel) or services (such as waste disposal, medical support, or engineering work).

4. If an international organization is coordinating the peace operation (i.e., there is a **lead international organization**), it may directly contribute logistics assets (such as vehicles, tents, or electrical generators) or services (such as management or procurement).

5. **Commercial contractors** are engaged in many peace operations to meet mission logistics requirements including transportation, facilities maintenance and security, and food, water, and fuel distribution.

6. Countries that are not TCCs can become **external partner states** by providing individual TCCs or the mission as a whole with logistics support in the form of assets (including vehicles, tents, or communications equipment) or services (such as transportation of troops and equipment). They may also provide access, basing, and overflight rights that are vital to providing logistics support.

7. **External partner international organizations** may also provide logistics assets and services, supplementing the support provided by other actors.

It is important, however, to distinguish the provision of logistics support from its financing. One of these seven actors never entirely self-finances its logistics support: commercial contractors aim not only to recoup costs but also to make a financial profit. A second type of actor—host states—is often required to self-finance a significant part of its logistics support: UN status of forces agreements typically bar host states from imposing port or transportation charges on peace operations and stipulate that premises for headquarters and camps be provided free of charge. The other five types of actor sometimes self-finance their logistics support, but not always. TCCs, logistics framework states, and external partner states may only be willing to supply expensive logistics capacities such as strategic lift (transport to and from the mission area) if they are reimbursed for the associated costs.

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11 Sometimes this is done via national support elements, which TCCs may decide to deploy to provide their deployed contingents with logistics services that may exceed or differ from the stated UN requirements. These additional personnel would be on top of those personnel envisaged in the UN operation. See UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, *Policy on National Support Element*, November 1, 2015, available at [http://dag.un.org/handle/11176/387380](http://dag.un.org/handle/11176/387380).

12 For this reason, we would not include the UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS) as a commercial contractor.
Lead international organizations may require external funding to provide logistics support. External partner international organizations may only be authorized to provide their organizational assets and capacities if cost-recovery mechanisms are in place. On the other hand, all actors except commercial contractors may in some cases judge it to be in their interest to fund the logistics support provided by another actor, either in addition to or instead of providing such support themselves.

Table 1 captures the various possible constellations of logistics support for a peace operation, with the seven types of actors potentially providing support and the six potentially financing that support. Cells on the top-left to bottom-right diagonal indicate self-financed logistics contributions; other cells denote contributions that are provided and funded by different actors. It is important to recognize that these cells are not mutually exclusive: a single mission can—and often does—receive logistics support from numerous actors under varied funding arrangements. Indeed, some arrangements involve more than two actors and can therefore only be imperfectly captured in this table. For example, an external state may pay a contractor to help a TCC develop the self-sustainment capacities it needs to deploy, for which the TCC may then be reimbursed by the lead international organization. Nonetheless, Table 1 offers at least a stylized picture of the main logistics partnerships available to peace operations.

The color of the cells corresponds to degrees of

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<th>TCC</th>
<th>Framework state</th>
<th>Host state</th>
<th>Lead international organization</th>
<th>Contractor</th>
<th>External partner state</th>
<th>External partner international organization</th>
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<td>TCC</td>
<td><strong>TCC self-reliance</strong></td>
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<td>Framework state</td>
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<td>Host state</td>
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<td>Lead international organization</td>
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<td>Contractor</td>
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<td>External partner state</td>
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<td>External partner international organization</td>
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logistics self-reliance within a mission. Absolute self-reliance (dark green cell), where each TCC provides and pays for its own logistics support, is neither possible nor even particularly desirable in a modern peace operation. For multinational operations, logistics partnerships among TCCs and between TCCs and the lead international organization provide economies of scale. If each TCC were to purchase and ship its own fuel, for example, it would likely not only increase costs but also put additional pressure on scarce transportation infrastructure such as ports and roads, increasing competition among TCCs for access to these assets.

Even unilateral interventions typically cannot dispense with logistics partnerships. For example, while France’s 2013–2014 intervention in Mali (Operation Serval) was a unilateral operation and benefited from France’s extensive logistics capacities, it relied on several logistics partnerships. The US provided airlift, air-to-air refueling, and satellite communications capabilities, and Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, and the UK provided additional airlift support. France relied on private contractors for sealift support and for ground transportation through Côte d’Ivoire, Burkina Faso, and Niger; overall, private contractors supplied some 86 percent of inter-theater transport of equipment and logistics support. Operation Serval made use of preexisting bases in Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, and the Gambia and used Ngaoundéré, Cameroon, as its main staging area. It used the railway line from Dakar (Senegal) to Bamako (Mali), the roads between Gao (Mali) and Niamey (Niger), and rail and road networks within Mali. Algeria granted overflight permission.

Some of these partners self-financed the support they provided, while others (including the contractors) required payment. Financing arrangements can also change over time: the United States, for example, self-financed its support to Operation Serval but sought reimbursement for some of the support provided to its successor, Operation Barkhane. One constant feature in Operation Serval, however, was that France retained overall command and control over logistics planning and execution, which was critical to the mission’s effectiveness in this high-threat environment.

With such a low likelihood of any contemporary peace operation being undertaken by fully self-reliant TCCs (the dark green cell in Table 1), the major distinction among operations is the extent to which logistics support is generated from actors participating in the operation (TCCs, framework states, lead international organizations, host states, and contractors paid by one of these actors) as opposed to external partner states and international organizations. Peace operations that depend primarily on internal partnerships, as well as any support TCCs provide themselves, have a high degree of mission self-reliance (light green cells). Operations that rely on external partner states and international organizations are more externally dependent (blue cells).

The following sections show that it is the relative weight of a mission’s self-reliance or dependence on external partners that distinguishes logistics partnerships in UN operations from those typically found in regional operations in Africa. This affects both the challenges these types of operations face and the recommendations for enhancing logistics partnerships in each context.

**Logistics Partnerships in UN Peacekeeping Operations**

The UN has launched seventy-one peacekeeping operations since 1948. Sixteen of these are currently active, requiring the UN to operate approximately 14,000 vehicles, 310 medical clinics, 158 helicopters, fifty-four airplanes, twenty-six unarmed, unmanned aerial vehicles, and seven ships. The UN thus has had a long history in which to develop a robust system for providing and

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14 "France to Foot Bill for US Military Aid in Africa," Agence France-Presse, October 2, 2014.

15 Unless otherwise noted, the above information is derived from Gros, "Libya and Mali Operations," and from the authors’ interactions with relevant logistics professionals.

financing logistics support for its operations, and it has a clear present need for such a system. The annual cost of UN peacekeeping—which exceeds $7.87 billion for the 2016/2017 fiscal year—testifies to the UN’s ability to mobilize significant financial resources for these operations. A significant portion of these resources is used to finance logistics support by both the UN and a host of other actors. Table 2 captures the UN’s key role in financing logistics support. However, it also indicates departures from this primary logistics support model, including expanded cooperation with external partner states and international organizations in recent years.

This section explores the UN’s historical development of logistics partnerships within missions and recent overtures to more external logistics partnerships. It illustrates these trends by examining logistics partnership arrangements in one of the UN’s oldest peacekeeping operations, the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), and one of its most recent, the UN Multi-

Table 2. Pattern of logistics support in contemporary UN peacekeeping operations
dimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA).

UN peacekeeping emerged as an ad hoc innovation, first in the form of small monitoring missions in the late 1940s, and from 1956 onwards also as peacekeeping forces with formed military units. The latter quickly raised contentious questions about financing, among other issues. In particular, the 1960–1964 UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC) raised concerns not only about the desirability and feasibility of peace enforcement missions but also about financial burden sharing, given total UN expenditures exceeding $400 million. The French and Soviet refusal to finance ONUC and the UN Emergency Force in Egypt (UNEF) through UN budget contributions precipitated a severe financial crisis within the UN, which persisted despite a 1962 advisory opinion by the International Court of Justice indicating that peacekeeping expenditures could be apportioned among member states. Only in 1973 did a compromise solution emerge in the form of using assessed contributions from member states to pay for UN peacekeeping separately from the UN operating budget, with costs apportioned according to an assessed scale. The specific rates for each member state are now renegotiated every three years.

The UN’s assessed contributions for peacekeeping help finance, among other things, the provision of logistics support to UN peacekeeping operations by multiple actors within those missions:

First, it allows TCCs and logistics framework states to be reimbursed for costs incurred for: (1) self-sustainment of deployed personnel (e.g., laundry and cleaning services, provision of tentage); (2) the operation of major equipment directly related to logistics support (e.g., water and fuel storage, vehicles); and (3) the maintenance of all major equipment, including armaments. Since 1996, the applicable reimbursement rates have been standardized in the UN Contingent-Owned Equipment Manual, and they are again specified in the memorandum of understanding each TCC is supposed to sign with the UN. Standardized equipment and maintenance rates facilitate budgeting and enhance the transparency of the reimbursement process. However, they also create a financial incentive for states to deploy relatively old (but functional) equipment that just meets the minimum standards for reimbursement and to minimize maintenance costs, including by limiting the use of their assets.

Second, logistics support provided directly by the UN is also financed by assessed peacekeeping contributions. This includes administrative and management support provided by staff at UN headquarters in New York (financed through the peacekeeping support account), the UN Global Service Centre (consisting of the UN Logistics Base in Brindisi, Italy, and the UN Support Base in Valencia, Spain), and at the Regional Service Centre in Entebbe, Uganda. It also includes supplies, vehicles, and engineering equipment available in the strategic deployment stocks of the UN Logistics Base.

Finally, peacekeeping assessed contributions allow the UN to engage contractors to provide logistics support for its peacekeeping operations. Peacekeeping procurement for 2016 exceeded $3.2 billion, including $575 million for air transport, $403 million for fuels, and $438 million for food and catering services (the UN is responsible for supplying all its peacekeeping operations with food rations, water, and gasoline, oil, and other lubricants).

The UN’s assessed contributions for peacekeeping do not, however, fund all logistics in UN peacekeeping operations. If TCCs or logistics framework states provide logistics support beyond

20 UN General Assembly, Letter Dated 28 February 2014 from the Chair of the 2014 Working Group on Contingent-Owned Equipment to the Chair of the Fifth Committee, UN Doc. A/C.5/69/18, January 20, 2015.
what they have agreed to in their memorandum of understanding or letter of assist with the UN, they are not reimbursed for the additional costs. They also are not reimbursed for any costs that exceed the stipulated reimbursement rates. Moreover, as noted above, the UN usually does not pay the host state for the use of its transportation infrastructure or state-owned land and buildings.

Box 1. Evolving logistics partnerships within the UN Force in Cyprus

The UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) provides a clear illustration of how far the UN has come in developing its suite of tools for self-reliant logistics support within UN missions. Mandated in 1964, UNFICYP’s initial force design called for six TCCs to deploy one major contingent each in one of Cyprus’s six districts. Each contingent was to be a “self-sustaining unit, able to manage and support itself when given the necessary back-up.”

Thus “in addition to command set-up and operational troops, each contingent needed mechanics, clerks, cooks, personnel and finance specialists, drivers, communicators, religious information and welfare personnel, supply technicians, repairmen, and medical personnel.” An Austrian offer to provide just a field hospital was only reluctantly accepted.

Moreover, given the financial crisis precipitated by the 1960–1963 Congo operation, the UN could not finance UNFICYP logistics support through its regular budget. TCCs had to bear the costs of their own deployment, with some financial support from Cyprus and from voluntary contributions to a special fund created by the secretary-general. The initial structure of UNFICYP thus approached TCC self-reliance (the dark green box in Table 1) to a greater extent than any contemporary UN operation.

Today, by contrast, UNFICYP has a broad array of logistics partnerships within the mission. It is a small mission, with 878 troops and 69 police officers from twenty-three countries as well as 36 international civilian staff deployed in March 2017. The three largest troop contributors (Argentina, Slovakia, and the UK) not only provide some of their own logistics support but also support smaller troop contributors through various embedded and composite unit arrangements. Argentina, for example, supports troops from Chile and Paraguay at San Martin Camp in UNFICYP’s Sector 1, while Slovakia has supported Hungarian, Serbian, and other Eastern European personnel in Sector 4.

The UN directly provides logistics support, including a projected 172 UN-owned vehicles and ninety generators in 2016/2017. The UN also contracts commercial providers for logistics support: UNFICYP’s 2014/2015 acquisition plan included $1.8 million for daily rations, $1.4 million for vehicle and generator fuel, $1 million for vehicle rentals, $1.8 million for catering services, and $3.3 million for travel management services. Cyprus, as the host state, also provides logistics support, including free use of offices and accommodations (including UNFICYP’s headquarters) with an estimated market value of $917,000 in 2016/2017.

With the exception of Cyprus’s contribution, this logistics support is largely financed through the UNFICYP budget, which totaled $55.6 million in 2016/2017. Since 1993, most of these costs have been distributed among UN member states according to the peacekeeping scale of assessments. Uniquely, however, Cyprus finances one-third of UNFICYP’s budget through voluntary contributions and Greece contributes an additional $6.5 million annually, adding a dimension of host state and external partner state financing.

25 Ibid., p. 356.
30 Ibid., para. 43.
31 United Nations, Approved Resources for Peacekeeping Operations for the Period from 1 July 2016 to 30 June 2017: Note by the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/C.5/70/24, June 22, 2016.
Despite its sophistication, the UN’s suite of tools for achieving mission self-reliance through partnership logistics remains best adapted for comparatively small missions deployed in relatively benign operating environments (see Box 1). More recent, larger UN peacekeeping operations deployed in high-threat environments raise two additional challenging dimensions of logistics partnerships.

First, high-threat environments pose urgent questions about the command and control of logistics capabilities under partnership arrangements. Formally, once deployed in a UN mission, all logistics capabilities “regardless of origin, are considered common to the mission as a whole, and fall under the responsibility of the Director/Chief of Mission Support, who coordinates second- and third-line support to all components and segments of the mission.” In practice, however, a mission’s control over deployed assets is more tenuous, not least because TCCs may either formally or informally limit how their capabilities can be used. This generates considerable friction, particularly for missions in high-risk operating environments, where the mission’s need for robust logistics capabilities increases at the same time as TCCs may be more inclined to protect their capabilities by restricting their use. Another source of friction, considering the often-competing demands of the civilian, police, and military components of the mission, is that the director/chief of mission support coordinates the allocation of logistics capabilities. To effectively conduct high-tempo operations in high-threat environments, the force commander arguably needs to have greater control of operational logistics capabilities, including aircraft.

Second, more recent, larger UN peacekeeping operations deployed to high-threat environments have helped prompt a multifaceted evolution of external logistics partnerships.

In UN operations, such external partnerships have historically consisted largely of external partner states providing support either directly to the UN operation or to one of its TCCs. When directly supporting the UN operation, the external partner state typically negotiates a letter of assist with the UN that provides for reimbursement of its costs at a specified rate. Given persistent gaps in logistics support in recent missions, the UN has also begun to explore seeking targeted, short-term logistics support from specific states to fill specific gaps. The 2015 High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations sensibly recommended establishing a more flexible contribution system and “more creative administrative support solutions” to “enable Member States to contribute short- or medium-term specialist capabilities—uniformed or otherwise—to achieve a particular critical output, a time-bound task or a specific service during the mission start-up phase, or essential services during a new phase.”

By contrast, when external partner states provide bilateral logistics support to a particular TCC, they do not necessarily formally declare it to the UN. This has historically meant that the UN makes any applicable reimbursement payments to the TCC with which it has signed a memorandum of understanding, and it becomes a matter of bilateral negotiation whether these are transmitted to the external partner state. In 2012, however, when the Security Council authorized reimbursement to troop contributors to the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) for UN-funded equipment, it explicitly excluded donated equipment. This decision raised parallel questions about reimbursement for donated equipment in UN missions. In January 2017 the UN Contingent-Owned Equipment Working Group recommended that in the case of donated equipment where the donor is not providing maintenance support, the TCC should be reimbursed only for maintenance, not for the deployment of the equipment itself, which the external partner state is deemed to have offered bilaterally at no cost to the TCC.

36 In 2011, for example, Germany’s Federal Agency for Technical Relief directed construction of living quarters for UN civilian personnel in Sudan.
The UN has also explored cooperation between UN missions (“inter-mission cooperation”) as a special form of external logistics partnerships. In these cases, personnel or assets from one UN mission are temporarily deployed or made available to another mission. The fact that UN missions are designed to operate independently of each other, and have separate budgets, makes this cooperation a form of external logistics partnership. In 2014, the UN Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions noted “an increasing tendency” toward such cooperation among missions deployed in the same region. Examples included three Mi-17 utility helicopters and a C-130 aircraft that the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) made available to facilitate the initial deployment of the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), and temporary redeployments of uniformed personnel and assets between the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) in 2010 and 2011. In addition, in 2012/2013 and 2013/2014, civilian staff had collectively spent 56,432 days on temporary duty assignments to other missions.39

The advisory committee also insisted, however, that missions receiving support should reimburse their counterparts for the full cost of personnel or assets provided through inter-mission cooperation. In practice, this remains unworkable. A compromise has developed whereby the mission providing support continues to reimburse the costs of the deployed units, while the receiving mission covers rations, water, and other operational costs.40 A key practical constraint on inter-mission cooperation, however, is that it depends on the availability of resources in the mission providing support and on the mobility of these resources, which may be limited by transportation difficulties or by the contributing actor’s refusal to condone their redeployment. Inter-mission cooperation is thus limited to ad hoc, temporary arrangements that are difficult to integrate into mission planning.

Finally, external logistics partnerships in UN missions have evolved because of the contemporary trend toward UN operations deploying as successors to or in parallel with regional operations. While the UN often acts as an external logistics partner to these regional missions (see next section), it can also draw logistics support from them. UN operations may benefit from infrastructure built or improved by previous or parallel missions and may face fewer transportation challenges thanks to “inherited” equipment or “re-hatted” personnel. In some cases, the UN pays for assets it receives from regional operations, while in others, external partners are willing to transfer assets without payment, and thus finance as well as provide this logistics support. UN logistics challenges also diminish if previous missions have reduced the level of conflict in the host state. A more benign operating environment typically permits more extensive use of ground rather than air transportation, increases the availability of commercial logistics providers and reduces their cost, and facilitates the provision of adequately secure offices, accommodations, and warehouses for UN peacekeepers.

Critically, however, these benefits are contingent on the effectiveness and quality of the previous or parallel missions. Re-hatting inadequately trained and equipped contingents, for example, may ultimately aggravate rather than ease the logistics challenges facing a UN mission.41 Moreover, where partnerships with external states and international organizations are successful, their benefits to the UN are predominantly operational, addressing critical UN weaknesses regarding rapid deployment and enforcement and counterterrorism capacities.42 Their logistics benefits are more incidental and should be seen in the context of the well-developed UN machinery for mission self-reliant logistics support.

40 Communication with UN official, April 14, 2017.
Box 2. External logistics partnerships in the UN mission in Central African Republic

The UN mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) illustrates both this new dimension of external logistics partnerships in UN peace operations and its limitations. Created in 2014, MINUSCA’s immediate predecessors were a UN political mission with a guard unit (the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic, BINUCA), an AU peace operation (the International Support Mission to the Central African Republic, MISCA, see below), a French peace enforcement operation (Operation Sangaris), and a European Union mission providing stability in Bangui (the EU Force in the Central African Republic, EUFOR-RCA).

Operation Sangaris and EUFOR-RCA formally supported MISCA, and all three operations became bridging missions to MINUSCA. The Security Council also authorized the secretary-general to deploy military enablers from downsizing UN operations or through inter-mission cooperation in order to facilitate MINUSCA’s rapid deployment.43 BINUCA was subsumed into MINUSCA, providing already deployed personnel (including the 560-person guard unit) and a “legacy” aircraft.44

MISCA ceased when MINUSCA’s military component became operational, and the transfer of authority on September 15, 2014, saw some 6,000 MISCA troops and police officers re-hatted as MINUSCA peacekeepers. This represented 61 percent of MINUSCA’s authorized strength.45 However, the logistical—and operational—benefit to the UN was partially undercut by the fact that “most of the contingents…had equipment and self-sustainment capabilities that remained below United Nations standards.”46 Some 800 troops from the Democratic Republic of the Congo were ultimately repatriated without being replaced in January 2016, with the formal explanation that the necessary levels of vetting and equipment had not been reached.47

EUFOR-RCA was initially scheduled to conclude in December 2014 but was extended until March 2015 to allow MINUSCA more time to reach full operational capacity. EUFOR-RCA transferred control of Bangui’s M’Poko airport to MINUSCA in November 2014, and in March 2015 MINUSCA took over EUFOR-RCA’s headquarters, paying $11.9 million. No EUFOR-RCA personnel were re-hatted under MINUSCA, as the European TCCs were unwilling to agree to the UN’s request for uniformed personnel. Operation Sangaris operated alongside MINUSCA until October 30, 2016, and provided critical reinforcement and rapid-reaction capacity. Its logistics support to MINUSCA was relatively limited, however, and none of its troops were re-hatted under the operation, though France did transfer several drones.

In short, while MISCA, EUFOR-RCA, and Operation Sangaris were operationally valuable, their logistics support had only limited benefits for MINUSCA. Instead, much of MINUSCA’s logistics support came from more traditional sources. External logistics partner states provided bilateral support to the mission and individual TCCs. Gabon, for example, received French and US assistance to airlift essential equipment to its MINUSCA contingent48 and engaged the French company Sovereign Global to help ensure its contingent met UN equipment and self-sustainment standards. In addition, MINUSCA featured a full range of logistics partnerships within the mission. With a budget of $921 million in 2016/2017, it has reimbursed TCCs and framework states for their logistics contributions, funded direct UN logistics support to the mission (including support from the Regional and Global Service Centres and over 900 UN-owned vehicles49), and financed commercial logistics contracts expected to total $349 million in 2016/2017.50

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45 UN General Assembly, Budget Performance of MINUSCA for the Period from 1 July 2014 to 30 June 2015, p. 3.
47 There were also allegations of sexual misconduct by some peacekeepers from the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
49 Overall, the mission deployed 22,363 UN-owned equipment assets in 2015/2016 and was expected to deploy over 40,000 in 2016/2017. UN General Assembly, Budget for MINUSCA for the Period from 1 July 2016 to 30 June 2017, UN Doc. A/70/712, February 3, 2016, pp. 41, 66.
Logistics Partnerships in Regional Peace Operations

The UN has never had a monopoly on peacekeeping. Between 1946 and 2016, thirteen regional organizations conducted sixty-five peace operations, of which forty-eight—roughly seventy-four percent—took place after the end of the Cold War in 1989. Since 1989, nearly three-quarters of all regional peace operations were deployed to Africa. The fifteen peace operations conducted by regional organizations since 2004 have all taken place in Africa.

This section therefore draws all its examples from operations in Africa. These regional operations displayed a wide range of logistics partnerships, as illustrated in Table 3. These partnerships usually extended beyond the TCCs and the international organizations authorizing the missions to include external states and international organizations. Since 1989, nearly three-quarters of all regional peace operations were deployed to Africa. The fifteen peace operations conducted by regional organizations since 2004 have all taken place in Africa.

Table 3. Patterns of logistics support in contemporary regional peace operations in Africa

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51 Williams, “Global and Regional Peacekeepers.”

52 Since eight of Africa’s regional economic communities and two regional mechanisms (the Eastern Africa Standby Force and the North African Regional Capability) are officially recognized as building blocks of the African Peace and Security Architecture, we do not count logistics support between these institutions and the AU as constituting external partnerships (i.e., the blue cells in Table 3).
three multinational enforcement missions authorized by the AU in Comoros, Central Africa, and the Lake Chad Basin.53

These case studies point to five factors underlying the evolution of logistics partnerships in peace operations in Africa since 1990. First, in all cases, most of the African TCCs were unable to provide all the logistics support necessary to deploy and sustain their contingents. Nevertheless, some TCCs stand out as being able to sustain themselves and also support other contributing countries, notably Nigeria and South Africa.

Second, the international organizations authorizing the operations, while sometimes able to fill some of the logistics gaps left by the TCCs, were consistently unable to remedy all or most of the shortfalls. Both the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the AU were unable to deploy and sustain their missions in the field and hence relied upon logistics support from external partners. Both organizations, but especially the AU, have been developing logistics support frameworks and mechanisms, as well as instruments for financing their own logistics support and that provided by TCCs, but these are not yet fully operational. Moreover, in operations conceived as “bridging missions” to UN operations, African actors have declined even to strive for mission self-reliance, presenting external logistics partnerships as a precondition for deployment.

Third, with regard to external partner international organizations, since the end of the Cold War the UN has provided the most frequent logistics support to African regional operations. This support has ranged from technical expertise and assistance to significant packages of direct logistics support in the field. However, the UN is not the only international organization providing logistics support for regional peace operations in Africa. Since 2004, the EU has used its African Peace Facility to support most AU and AU-authorized operations, principally by paying personnel allowances and other operational costs. NATO has intermittently provided strategic airlift support and some technical assistance.

The fourth factor has been the regular role of external partner states, most notably the US, France, and the UK. During the 1990s, these states were the most important external providers of logistics support to regional peace operations in West Africa. They provided logistics capabilities, equipment, training, advice, and financial aid both to individual TCCs and to missions as a whole, usually by supporting command and planning elements. They have continued to play important roles in all subsequent operations during the twenty-first century.

Finally, private contractors have provided logistics support in most of these African operations, primarily with funds from external partner states and international organizations.

**WEST AFRICAN OPERATIONS, 1990–2003**

Between 1990 and 2003, West Africa was the epicenter of regional peace operations on the continent. These operations were conducted by ECOWAS and involved a variety of logistics partnerships. Major logistics support typically took the form of largely self-financed contributions from logistics framework states and external partner states. These operations were thus highly dependent on the ability and willingness of a few key states to provide and finance the necessary logistics support. International organizations, including ECOWAS and the UN, played at best marginal logistics support roles. This period did witness the emergence of some institutional structures permitting a less ad hoc approach to logistics support. Yet at the same time, regional actors came to favor relatively short-term “bridging” missions (with significant logistics support from external partners) over open-ended regional missions that required far more national resources.54

**ECOMOG in Liberia (1990–1997)**

ECOWAS countries provided the troops for the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), and most contributed to the logistics support of their own contingents. In addition, Nigeria, which

contributed about 70 percent of the force, provided considerable logistics support to other contingents, for example by supplying all ECOMOG contingents with gasoline.\textsuperscript{55} ECOMOG itself was not able to provide or finance significant logistics support; an initial commitment that the ECOWAS secretariat would be responsible for logistics support and centrally coordinate the resupplying of ECOMOG contingents after thirty days of deployment was abandoned.\textsuperscript{56}

ECOMOG also received external logistics support from several sources. In terms of financing, an ECOWAS Special Emergency Fund created in 1990 attracted no contributions from outside the region, but a UN trust fund established in 1993 received approximately $130 million, including major donations from the US and UK, while Germany provided some transportation support.\textsuperscript{57} Nonetheless, the total amount donated paled in comparison to the cost borne by the ECOMOG contributors,\textsuperscript{58} and the majority of funds were earmarked for humanitarian assistance rather than logistics support.

The UN played a very minor role in providing logistics support. Although from 1993 onwards ECOMOG operated in parallel with the UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL), this mission did not provide significant support. Instead, external logistics support came mainly from bilateral partners.\textsuperscript{59} The US supported the deployment of the contingents from Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Senegal, and Mali. Nigerien troops were airlifted into the theater by Nigeria and later evacuated by France. There was even an attempt to provide support to troops from Tanzania and Uganda, but ultimately these did not deploy.

Moreover, in 1996 the US State Department contracted the company PAE to provide logistics support to the West African forces, including establishing “the Depot” (officially called the ECOWAS Logistics Training Facility and Center for Excellence in Freetown, Sierra Leone). In May 1998 PAE’s contract was extended to support ECOMOG’s deployment to Sierra Leone (see below).\textsuperscript{60} In 2002 “the Depot” became the ECOWAS facility for first-response capabilities across the region. Since then, it has supported the ECOWAS Missions in Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia (ECOMICI and ECOMIL), the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS), the UN-AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), the African-Led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA), and even AMISOM when Sierra Leone deployed a battalion to Somalia in 2013.\textsuperscript{61}


When ECOWAS embarked upon its second ECOMOG operation, in Sierra Leone, Nigeria was once again the leading contributor, providing about 90 percent of the troops.\textsuperscript{62} Nigeria claimed its operations in Sierra Leone cost $1 million per day.\textsuperscript{63} Yet the quality of logistics support was poor, with one analyst noting that most of the “worn-out equipment from Liberia was simply transferred to Sierra Leone,” leaving ECOMOG 2 lacking “not only in helicopters and gunships, but also sufficient trucks, tanks, ambulances, communication equipment, spare parts, uniforms, medical supplies, and office equipment.”\textsuperscript{64}

Once again, therefore, the UN established a trust fund, but its contributions in 1998 and 1999 were negligible. As in Liberia, the small UN observer mission (UNOMSIL) that operated in parallel with ECOMOG provided no significant logistics support. When Nigeria threatened to withdraw, the US, UK, Canada, and the Netherlands provided some additional contributions to the trust fund. The US initially gave PAE and its subcontractor a $3.9 million contract for logistics support to


\textsuperscript{57} Agoagye, *ECOMOG*, pp. 287–290.


\textsuperscript{60} It was extended from May 2000 to support the re-hatted forces in UNAMSIL, and from November 2001 until August 2002 to support the refurbishment of vehicles and equipment.


ECOMOG, but this lasted only about six months.\textsuperscript{65} Most of the money was spent on maintenance for two Russian helicopters; the rest went to truck transportation and the setting up of service depots in two towns.\textsuperscript{66} The Netherlands donated a fleet of eighty trucks that it brought over from Liberia.\textsuperscript{67} The end result, however, was a re-hatting of ECOMOG forces into a new UN peacekeeping mission (UNAMSIL), in part because of the lack of logistics capacity to sustain ECOMOG.\textsuperscript{68}

**ECOMOG 3 in Guinea-Bissau (1998–1999)**

ECOWAS deployed to Guinea-Bissau concurrently with its ongoing mission in Sierra Leone. Nigeria’s decision not to participate in the operation deprived it of the key source of internal logistics support in other ECOMOG deployments. Since neither ECOMOG 3’s TCCs nor ECOWAS were able to compensate for this absence, the operation was heavily dependent on external logistics partners.

International organizations provided only limited support. At ECOWAS’s request, a Group of Friends of Guinea-Bissau was established at the UN, and the UN organized two donor meetings, receiving pledges of $200 million. However, these funds were earmarked for humanitarian and peacebuilding purposes, so once again little UN logistics support materialized. By contrast, France emerged as a critical external logistics partner, transporting ECOMOG troops to Guinea-Bissau on one of its vessels and providing military trucks, communications equipment, and troop stipends of $16 per day.\textsuperscript{69} France also provided RECAMP (Reinforcement of African Capacity to Maintain Peace) training to most of the TCCs.

**ECOMIL in Liberia (2003)**

The resumption of civil war in Liberia in 2003 led to the creation of a new ECOWAS force, the ECOWAS Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL), comprising eight TCCs including Nigeria. At Nigeria’s insistence, ECOMIL was envisaged from the start as an interim mechanism that would transition to a UN peacekeeping operation within two months.\textsuperscript{70} Nigeria and other TCCs provided some logistics support. For example, Ghanaian officers took control of military planning that the ECOWAS secretariat was unable to provide.\textsuperscript{71} However, ECOWAS also announced that mission self-reliance was out of the question; ECOMOG “needed financial and logistical assistance from the international community,” including “per diem, airlift, logistical and equipment assistance.”\textsuperscript{72}

The initial hopes of ECOWAS and Nigeria that this support would take the form of a joint operation with the US were dashed, but after some debate over the size of the support package, the US did become a major external logistics partner. It provided nearly $26 million in contracted logistics, equipment, and airlift support for ECOMIL forces, who would go on to make up the first contingent of the new UN mission (UNMIL). The US also deployed a marine expeditionary unit off the Liberian coast. Additional external logistics support was provided by the UN, which diverted a Nigerian battalion deployed to the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) to Liberia.\textsuperscript{73}


The ECOWAS Mission in Côte d’Ivoire (ECOMICI) had an overall logistics system that one respected analyst described as “ad hoc and incoherent,”\textsuperscript{74} and ECOWAS had limited capacity to provide or finance logistics support. As a result, ECOMICI relied heavily on Nigeria (which was a reluctant troop contributor but paid the “administrative bills and salaries” of top civilian and military staff)\textsuperscript{75} and external partner states.\textsuperscript{76}

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\textsuperscript{65} Hirsch, Sierra Leone, p. 74.
\textsuperscript{66} Hirsch, Sierra Leone, p. 74; Howe, Ambiguous Order, p. 167.
\textsuperscript{67} Hirsch, Sierra Leone, p. 74.
\textsuperscript{68} Berman and Sams, Peacekeeping in Africa, pp. 111–125.
\textsuperscript{69} Adebajo, Building Peace in West Africa, p. 122.
\textsuperscript{71} Mark Malan, “Africa: Building Institutions on the Run,” p. 93.
\textsuperscript{72} Coleman, “Liberia,” p. 218.
\textsuperscript{74} Malan, “Africa: Building Institutions on the Run,” p. 94.
\textsuperscript{75} Ifeoha Azikwe, Africa: Conflict Resolution and International Diplomacy (Milton Keynes: AuthorHouse, 2009), p. 217.
\textsuperscript{76} The small UN observer mission initially deployed in parallel to ECOMICI (MINUCI) did not provide significant logistics support.
French forces already in Côte d’Ivoire as part of Operation Licorne provided key logistics support, including helping cover for the lack of a force headquarters for over 100 days. France also provided support to most TCCs, including radios and communications equipment. The UK assisted the Ghanaian contingent. Belgium supported Benin by providing vehicles and some €650,000 in logistics support but did so later than promised, delaying the contingent’s deployment. The Netherlands also contributed some €1 million, and Germany, Denmark, and Norway also provided funding. Once again, the US contracted PAE to provide equipment, transport, medical, and communications support, paying for about half the cost of the mission, which was estimated at about $24 million.77

Despite this support, ECOMICICI did not prove sustainable. In November 2003 ECOWAS petitioned the UN to mandate a follow-on UN mission, and the Security Council established such a mission (UNOCI) in February 2004.

AFRICAN UNION OPERATIONS, 2003–PRESENT

Since its creation in 2000, the AU has become increasingly active both in mandating and in leading regional peace operations. It has also developed institutional mechanisms to provide and fund logistics support for such operations. In 2002 it formally created the African Standby Force as a key element of the African Peace and Security Architecture, which incorporates both continental elements (from the AU) and subregional elements (from regional economic communities and regional mechanisms). The African Standby Force was envisioned as consisting of: (1) five regional standby forces complete with planning, engineering, medical, transportation, equipment maintenance, and self-sustainment capacities and supported by regional logistics depots; and (2) an AU strategic headquarters able to provide strategic lift, equipment, and logistics support, including through a continental logistics base.

The AU is also formally responsible for funding logistics support for the African Standby Force, including by reimbursing TCCs for the support they provide in a manner similar to the UN’s contingent-owned equipment system.77 As in the UN, the logistics support concept is envisioned to include reimbursement for self-sustainment by TCCs and financing of commercial contracts.

The operationalization of these structures has been slow, however, and remains incomplete. The capacity of TCCs, the AU, regional economic communities, and regional mechanisms to provide logistics support suffers from significant shortfalls. The continental logistics base is not yet fully operational, and regional logistics depots are still being developed.79 Lack of strategic lift capabilities remains a critical challenge, though work on an AU strategic lift concept and on continental and regional movement-control centers has begun. Despite efforts to mobilize more resources from the continent, as of July 2016 African states provided only 2 percent of the financing for AU peace and security initiatives.80

In practice, therefore, there is little indication that regional peace operations in Africa will quickly emerge from a historical pattern of heavy dependence on external partner states and international organizations for the provision and financing of logistics support. Issues of coordination and control also facing logistics partnerships in UN peacekeeping operations are further exacerbated under these circumstances, as the TCCs and lead international organizations of African peace operation have little influence over the level or type of support external partners choose to provide or fund.


The AU decision mandating the AU Mission in Burundi (AMIB) specified that the TCCs were to sustain themselves for the initial two months, after which logistics support would be centralized. South Africa was the only TCC to deploy in April 2003, with the bulk of the Ethiopian and Mozambican contingents not arriving until September and October. However, no significant centralized AU logistics support materialized. South Africa therefore provided its own logistics support and

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79 Progress has stalled on two regional logistics depots in North Africa.
later helped sustain the Ethiopian and Mozambican contingents.\textsuperscript{81} To support the estimated $110 million budget for AMIB’s first year of operations, the AU established a trust fund, but it was only able to marshal $300,000 from its own coffers.\textsuperscript{82}

External logistics partnerships thus proved critical for AMIB. The EU was the most important external international organization partnering with AMIB, providing €25 million in support. AMIB did not receive a logistics support package from the UN, but the UN did provide some technical assistance via its mission in the neighboring Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) and helped mobilize financial resources.\textsuperscript{83} The rest of AMIB’s logistics support came from bilateral partners. The US financed deployment of the Ethiopian contingent with about $6.1 million of in-kind support, including airlift support and 60 days’ sustainment once it was in the mission area.\textsuperscript{84} The UK financed deployment of the Mozambican contingent with about $6 million.\textsuperscript{85} Germany, Denmark, and Italy also provided more modest contributions to the AMIB trust fund.

**AMIS in Sudan (2004–2007)**

The AU’s second armed peace operation, the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS), also fell critically short of self-reliance. Initially there were problems transporting and accommodating the military observers at their regional camps. These problems were not overcome despite Nigeria and Rwanda each deploying a company of troops in August 2004 and the establishment of the Darfur Integrated Task Force to provide planning and support via the AU Commission in January 2005. By April 2005, the AU had only received $43 million of the $248 million pledged by October 2004.

The net result was that the mission “had to operate with about half its critical force enablers, such as vehicles, [information and communications technology] equipment and other logistical requirements.”\textsuperscript{86} Some later TCCs did provide logistics capabilities; South Africa, for example, contributed an engineering company and explosive ordnance disposal capabilities. Nevertheless, TCCs in AMIS proved unable to adequately sustain their contingents or secure the required equipment, and the AU could not remedy these deficiencies.

AMIS therefore received logistics support from various external partner states and international organizations. The UN provided several forms of logistics support, including technical assistance (experts on logistics, communications, and transport)\textsuperscript{87} and the novel “light support” and “heavy support” packages in 2006. The light and heavy support was envisioned as a means of transitioning AMIS into a hybrid AU-UN operation (UNAMID) and did not directly support or report to AMIS. The backbone of these packages was provided by the existing UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS).\textsuperscript{88} The light package saw the UN deploy 105 military, 33 police, and 48 civilian personnel to immediately enhance the management of AMIS through a proactive advisory role, as well as eight fly-away kits, thirty-six GPS units, 360 night-vision goggles, thirty-six armored personnel carriers, and equipment for public information campaigns.\textsuperscript{89} The heavy package involved the deployment of a transport unit, four engineering units, a signals unit, a logistics unit, a Level 2 and a Level 3 hospital, a reconnaissance unit with three fixed-wing aircraft, an aviation unit with six light tactical helicopters, an aviation unit with six multipurpose helicopters, three formed police units, 301 individual police officers, and 1,136 civilian staff to

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\textsuperscript{82} African Union, AMIB: An Explanatory Memorandum (AU internal document, October 2003).


provide administrative and management support. In addition to UN support, AMIS also received logistics support from two more international organizations: the EU and NATO. EU support came in the form of over forty police officers and military experts and €255.7 million from the African Peace Facility, mainly for allowances for observers and troop, salaries for international and local civilian staff, rations, and fuel. NATO provided strategic airlift for the deployment of AMIS troops from June 2005 through the end of the mission, transporting 31,500 troops using a fleet of Antonov An-124s chartered from Ukraine. Several states also provided external logistics support to AMIS. Canada and the Netherlands paid for eighteen Mi-8 transport helicopters, Canada provided 105 armored personnel carriers, and the UK provided over 1,000 4x4 vehicles and Thuraya satellite phones through Crown Agents. The US contracted PAE to handle camp construction and the provision of water, rations, and laundry services. Overall, the US provided about $280 million to support AMIS from June 2004 through September 2006, primarily to build and maintain the thirty-two camps that housed AMIS forces throughout Darfur.

AMISEC and MAES in Comoros (2006–2008)
The AU’s two monitoring missions in the Comoros were arguably its most self-sufficient operations, principally because South Africa played the role of the framework state and provided some logistics support to other contributing countries. In the AU Mission for Support to the Elections in the Comoros (AMISEC), at the AU’s request South Africa oversaw the planning and sustaining of the entire force. South Africa did this via Operation Triton IV, through which it at one stage deployed a battalion of troops.

Nevertheless, both AMISEC and the AU Electoral and Security Assistance Mission in the Comoros (MAES) relied on some support from external partners. Neither mission received UN logistics support, but MAES received bilateral support from partner states, mainly from the US and France, which airlifted the troops to the islands. For MAES, there was the added complication of requiring naval elements despite not having trained naval personnel in the mission. In terms of logistics financing, both missions received EU funds from the African Peace Facility, which spent €4–5 million on AMISEC and €3.5 million on MAES.

AMISOM in Somalia (2007–Present)
The AU Mission in Somalia’s (AMISOM) original mission support strategy was based on the African Standby Force principle of initial self-sustainment by the TCCs, with direct support from external partners, notably the US, UK, EU, and UN. This was in line with the AU’s initial view that AMISOM could expect no support from the host state and would act as a bridging operation before being taken over by the UN. To date, however, the UN has not taken over the mission and the AU was unable to provide the necessary logistics support. Moreover, with AMISOM’s first two TCCs, Uganda and Burundi, unable to self-sustain their operations and the AU unable to compensate for these shortfalls, external partner states and international organizations have been required to provide direct logistics and other support.

Since 2007, the UN has provided AMISOM with technical assistance in the form of seconded planning staff. In 2008 the UN also provided AMISOM approximately $7 million-worth of assets from the liquidated UN Mission in Ethiopia.

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92 Ibid., pp. 22–23.
95 Ibid., p. 18.
and Eritrea (UNMEE).\textsuperscript{99} In 2009 the UN authorized the UN Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA) to deliver a logistics support package financed from UN assessed peacekeeping contributions.\textsuperscript{100} Other international organizations have also provided logistics support. NATO has provided and financed strategic lift support since June 2007,\textsuperscript{101} and the EU has provided over €1.3 billion from its African Peace Facility, mainly to pay troop allowances, allowances for the police and civilian components, and operational costs of the AMISOM offices in Nairobi and Mogadishu.

External partner states, notably the US and UK, have provided various forms of support. The UK has contributed planning capacity to the force headquarters and funds for reimbursing TCCs for the use of their non-lethal equipment. The US has donated a large range of equipment and contracted several private firms (including PAE, DynCorp, Bancroft Global Development, AECOM, and Osprea Logistics) to support AMISOM. Between 2006 and mid-2015, the US provided approximately $950 million of direct support to AMISOM and its TCCs.\textsuperscript{102} AMISOM also had a perhaps unique relationship with Bancroft, which between 2008 and 2010 worked directly with the Ugandan and Burundian governments to support their AMISOM contingents in the field.\textsuperscript{103}

AFISMA in Mali (2012–2013)

In Mali, the AU assumed the lead role after earlier ECOWAS initiatives failed to deploy a stabilization mission. The subsequent mission, the African-Led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA), deployed shortly after a unilateral French force, Operation Serval (discussed above), and involved personnel from nine African TCCs, all but one of which (Chad) were members of ECOWAS. AFISMA’s military component included an engineering unit, a Level 2 medical unit, an aviation unit, and a logistics unit. These assets formed part of the mission’s integrated service support, which coordinated the functioning of all logistics resources, personnel, and equipment.

Conceived as an interim presence before transitioning to a UN peacekeeping operation, AFISMA received some UN logistics support but no equivalent to the UN Support Office for AMISOM or the light and heavy support packages for AMIS. This was despite requests by ECOWAS and then the AU for a UN-funded logistics support package for the mission.\textsuperscript{104} Instead, the UN provided AFISMA with “soft” technical assistance, and then with life-support services. This came in the form of military and security planners to assist ECOWAS and the AU,\textsuperscript{105} and then in the establishment of the UN Office in Mali (UNOM) to support AFISMA’s planning, deployment, and operations.\textsuperscript{106}

Once the transition to MINUSMA started, the UN helped to prepare AFISMA contingents for re-hatting by assuming life-support requirements and providing mission-support services. Specifically, in March 2013 the UN Secretariat identified “critical shortfalls among AFISMA troops” and tried, among other things, to “upgrade equipment and self-sustainment capabilities.” Despite these efforts, as noted, at the time of handover several TCCs “had equipment and self-sustainment capabilities that remained below United Nations standards.”\textsuperscript{107}

The UN also set up a trust fund for AFISMA and helped organize a donor conference in January 2013 that generated pledges of approximately $455 million.\textsuperscript{108} In reality, however, the trust fund only

\textsuperscript{99} This included prefabricated accommodation, electricity generators, air-conditioning units, ablution units, and soft-skin vehicles. Unfortunately, most of these assets were worn out, unserviced, or missing parts, and some were obsolete.

\textsuperscript{100} For details, see Paul D. Williams, “UN Support to Regional Peace Operations: Lessons from UNSOA,” International Peace Institute, February 2017, available at www.ipinst.org/2017/02/un-support-regional-peace-ops-unsOA.


\textsuperscript{102} Interview with US official, June 16, 2015.


\textsuperscript{105} UN Security Council Resolution 2071 (October 12, 2012), UN Doc. S/RES/2071, para. 7.

\textsuperscript{106} UN Security Council Resolution 2085 (December 20, 2012), UN Doc. S/RES/2085, para. 23.

\textsuperscript{107} UN Security Council, Letter Dated 2 January 2015, p. 6.

received $44 million. For the first time, AU member states also pledged $50 million to support AFISMA and the Malian security forces, although only some $6 million were deposited. Once again, the EU provided funds from its African Peace Facility, contributing €27.9 million, mainly for troop allowances and to strengthen the capacity of the TCCs.

Bilateral external logistics support came primarily from the US, UK, and France, all of which provided planning officers to AFISMA headquarters and liaison officers to AFISMA units. France’s Operation Serval assisted with logistics in northern Mali and provided security that facilitated other international support. France also supported the Togolese Level 2 hospital in Mopti and provided in extremis evacuation support. The US provided equipment to support AFISMA headquarters, donated field kitchens to AFISMA units, and equipped a logistics company and contracted a private company to support it. The US also airlifted the Chadian and Togolese contingents. The UK airlifted the Ghanaian contingent and donated vehicles and other equipment.


In response to the deepening crisis in the Central African Republic, the AU deployed the International Support Mission to the Central African Republic (MISCA) to take over from a smaller mission (MICOPAX) that had been deployed by the Economic Community of Central African States in mid-2008. MISCA’s military component of about 2,500 troops included engineers, fire support, air assets, and logistics units. As in AFISMA, an integrated civilian-led support team involving military, police, and civilian personnel was meant to coordinate these troops and oversee the main logistics base in Bangui and logistics hubs in the mission sectors. Additional contractual support was to be sought where feasible, and the AU contracted EDA to provide some rations and fuel and carry out minor engineering work.

Also like AFISMA, MISCA never aimed at self-reliance. MISCA, too, was conceived as an interim force, and once again the AU called for a logistics support package financed by UN assessed contributions. This was not forthcoming, but external partner states and international organizations were nevertheless central to the mission’s logistics.

The UN provided technical experts and deployed a support team in February 2014, which was embedded in and funded through the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic (BINUCA). They assisted in operationalizing the transition plan and linking operational planning with donor-support planning. The team later served as the nucleus of the transition team. The UN also trained MISCA staff officers on unexploded ordnance and weapons management, and MINUSCA provided access to rations and fuel before absorbing MISCA personnel.

The UN also established a trust fund to allow its members to support MISCA financially. The AU identified several logistics priorities for this trust fund, including reimbursement for contingent-owned equipment, rations, troop reimbursement, fuel, use of UN medical facilities, and use of UN air transport. Most of the pledges made by donors, however, were earmarked for non-lethal assistance and therefore precluded the AU using them to reimburse states for contingent-owned equipment. Moreover, only $5 million was received, which was used by the UN to procure communications equipment for the mission. The EU provided €81.5 million from its African Peace Facility, mainly for troop and police allowances, salaries of civilian personnel, facilities and infrastructure, and other operational costs, including transport and medical services.

Bilateral support from external partner states came principally from France and the US, which

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114 Ibid., p. 7.
seconded military and civilian experts to support MISCA in the areas of command and control, administration, and information and communications technology, and to provide training. France’s Operation Sangaris provided medical support to MISCA, including a Level 2 hospital and options for medical evacuation, while the US provided pre-deployment training to several contingents and direct logistics support in terms of strategic airlift and communications.115 The US contribution totaled nearly $100 million.116

AU-AUTHORIZED MULTINATIONAL FORCES, 2008–PRESENT

Starting in 2008, the AU has also authorized multinational coalitions of states to undertake enforcement measures on its behalf. These missions differ fundamentally from AU operations as they are not commanded or controlled by the AU. However, their direct AU mandate suggests that they have a closer relationship with the continental organization—and arguably a greater claim to any logistics support it can provide—than the ECOWAS operations of the 1990s. They thus present a novel set of logistics support challenges and questions. These are especially acute in the missions in central Africa and the Lake Chad basin, where the troop-contributing countries are, for the most part, operating on their national territory rather than deploying abroad.

Operation Democracy in the Comoros (2008)

Operation Democracy in the Comoros, a small and short enforcement operation, took place over a few days in March 2008 to eject the illegitimate incumbent president of the island of Anjouan from power. It occurred without UN logistics assistance. Given the short duration of the operation, sustainment was not a major issue. France was the only non-African country to provide some logistics support to the small force of primarily Tanzanian and Sudanese troops, principally by transporting the Tanzanian troops to the Comoros along with me thirty tons of equipment.117 Libya also provided transport for the Sudanese contingent and equipment to the Comoros National Army.118

Regional Task Force against the Lord’s Resistance Army (2011–Present)

Unlike most peace operations, the Regional Task Force against the Lord’s Resistance Army (part of the Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the Lord’s Resistance Army) involves most of the TCCs (Uganda, South Sudan, DRC and CAR) operating on their own national territory. The force includes an engineering unit and some aviation assets, including some aircraft for transport and medical evacuation. The logistics concept is one of self-sustainment by the TCCs with bilateral support from their respective partners. The AU provides some support to the Regional Task Force headquarters in Yambio, South Sudan.

In practice, the Regional Task Force receives various forms of external logistics support that respond to the significant logistics gaps identified by the AU.119 The UN provides support via MONUSCO, which assisted with a joint operations center to link the various elements of the task force;120 the UN Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA); the UN Office to the AU (UNOAU), which supports the task force’s communications strategy;121 and MINUSCA, which shares information related to the regional threat posed by the Lord’s Resistance Army but provides no logistics support.122 The UN Security Council has also encouraged MONUSCO and UNMISS to provide logistics support to the Regional Task Force within

their existing mandates and resources. The EU provides €3 million from its African Peace Facility, mainly for operational costs of the mission’s Joint Coordination Mechanism, to organize meetings, and for staff allowances.

The principal bilateral support comes from the US, which by early 2014 had deployed nearly 300 military advisers to provide logistics, intelligence, training, and other forms of support, including enhanced air mobility support.123 The US also provides assistance to the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic (BINUCA), MONUSCO, and UNMISS to strengthen their efforts in areas affected by the Lord’s Resistance Army.124

Multinational Joint Task Force in the Lake Chad Basin (2015–Present)

Like the Regional Task Force against the Lord’s Resistance Army, the Multinational Joint Task Force against Boko Haram primarily involves armies operating on their own national territory, albeit with the possibility of cross-border “hot pursuit” operations against the militants. The mission support concept sees the five TCCs (Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria) working through their own national support units and supply chains but with some additional logistics support from the AU and other partners, mainly focused on the force headquarters in N’Djamena, Chad. The UN does not provide logistics support, but the EU has pledged €50 million from its African Peace Facility. The EU has given these funds to the AU as it considers the Multinational Joint Task Force inadequately configured to receive funds directly.125

Bilateral logistics support comes from the US, UK, and France, all of which have deployed advisers to the mission’s Cooperation and Liaison Cell and provided bilateral training programs to the TCCs. The US has also provided strategic lift support for AU equipment that was moved to Chad from the Central African Republic (after MISCA finished its operations). In addition, it has provided advisers, intelligence, training, logistics support, and equipment bilaterally to the Multinational Joint Task Force’s TCCs, totaling over $100 million.126

LIMITATIONS IN LOGISTICS SUPPORT FOR REGIONAL OPERATIONS

These fifteen regional peace operations indicate a clear pattern of limitations in terms of logistics support. First, external partner states have regularly provided considerable support to regional operations, but it has been delivered through ad hoc initiatives. Given the importance of predictable and effective logistics support in high-risk peace operations, external partner states and international organizations could better prepare for such eventualities by putting in place agreements with African organizations to smooth the pathway for future operations.

Second, coordination between the various external partners has also usually been ad hoc, which can lead to inefficiencies, duplications, or gaps in the provision and financing of logistics support. The establishment of the Africa Logistics Forum in 2014 is therefore a welcome development. The Forum is intended to evaluate key challenges facing African states in peace operations, examine the domestic and external resources necessary to strengthen logistics capacity at the national and regional levels, and design strategies for African states, regional organizations and their partners to develop the necessary structures.

Third, regional enforcement operations authorized by the AU to reduce the threat posed by particular non-state armed groups have raised the issue of what support both the AU and the UN should provide when there is no peace process or settlement to implement. This is increasingly the case, most recently with the AU authorization of both the Multinational Joint Task Force in the Lake Chad Basin and the new counterterrorism force set

up by the Sahel G5 states (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger). If the UN agrees to provide logistics support to such operations, this also raises the practical issue of whether the UN has the capacity to deliver the support necessary to maintain high-tempo kinetic operations. As noted above, the UN has struggled to meet such requirements in its support to AMISOM.

Finally, it is evident that the AU Commission can provide very little logistics support on its own because of a desperate lack of capabilities.

**Recommendations**

Each peace operation is unique and faces a distinctive set of logistics support challenges. Since addressing these challenges is vital to mission safety and success, however, international organizations that mandate and lead these operations—beginning with the UN, and more recently also the AU and African sub-regional organizations—have developed structures and practices to help provide and finance the required logistics support. Yet despite significant progress, fully effective logistics partnerships remain elusive for both UN peacekeeping operations and regional peace operations in Africa.

Recommendations for improving logistics support for UN operations:

1. **Adapt existing policies and procedures to high-threat environments:** The UN should adapt its existing administrative and logistics policies and procedures to the realities of contemporary missions operating in high-threat environments, where peacekeepers are frequently and deliberately targeted by armed groups. These circumstances typically require more equipment maintenance, higher supply and self-sustainment standards, more rapid mobilization of logistics support, nimble logistics systems able to support greater mobility for deployed forces, and greater control of operational logistics assets by the force commander.

2. **Determine whether new policies and procedures are needed:** The UN should clarify whether it requires a new set of policies and standard operating procedures for providing logistics support to regional and other missions authorized by the Security Council that deploy to high-threat environments and frequently conduct kinetic operations. The UN and AU have already conducted some analysis of this issue that could be further developed.\(^\text{127}\)

3. **Leverage logistics partnerships with predecessor or parallel regional operations:** As UN peacekeeping operations continue to deploy in parallel with or in succession to regional operations (which may themselves have external partner states and international organizations), they should enhance their own potential for external logistics support.\(^\text{128}\) Early joint planning with both the regional organization and its external partners can facilitate the development of logistics support structures (infrastructure, equipment, and personnel) that meet the standards and needs of the successor UN operation. Such planning must also address the financial dimension of logistics support, including which actors will pay for the initial creation of these support structures and how much the UN operation will be expected to pay to “inherit” these structures. Such financial arrangements are likely to entail questions about inspection rights and what (if any) guarantees are made about the transfer of logistics assets. For the UN to enter into these negotiations, the Security Council’s early commitment to a follow-on UN operation is crucial.

4. **Explore ways to make inter-mission cooperation more effective:** Inter-mission cooperation provides an important but limited avenue for logistics partnerships between UN peacekeeping operations. Its effectiveness is limited by the scarcity of resources in potential partner missions and the difficulty of moving logistics assets. Recent efforts to seek greater synergies and economies of scale between missions by “upstreaming” cooperation to logistics support arrangement outside individual missions (e.g., pooled administrative support through the Regional Service Centre, consolidated supply-chain management, potential joint staging

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127 See UN General Assembly and Security Council, *Identical Letters Dated 22 September 2016 from the Secretary-General Addressed*.
128 Ibid.
areas or joint strategic reserves) may have larger impacts, but fall at the outer edges of the definition of “inter-mission” cooperation. One possible step to consider is to establish a regional air fleet managed through the Transportation and Movements Integrated Control Centre in the Regional Service Centre, which would allow more efficient use of some strategic airlift assets across missions in the region, potentially including non-UN missions that the UN is mandated to support.

5. **Focus on logistics partnerships within missions:** Despite the importance and potential of external logistics partnerships, mission self-reliance remains crucial and is a fundamental strength of UN peacekeeping operations. Enhancing these internal logistics partnerships should remain a key UN priority.

6. **Work to ensure that internal partners have adequate personnel and logistics assets – and incentives to deploy them:** To attain mission self-reliance, UN peacekeeping operations depend on TCCs and framework states having the requisite personnel and logistics assets. Therefore:

   a. International efforts to build the peacekeeping capacities of potential TCCs should focus on self-sustainment capabilities and privilege training and equipping units to meet UN demands for critical logistics capacities and enablers. One example of such a targeted initiative is the Triangular Partnership Project between the UN, Japan, and African TCCs to train military engineering personnel for the UN’s project on enhancing rapid deployment of African engineering capabilities. Training initiatives are most impactful, however, if they are accompanied by measures ensuring that prospective TCCs have access to the equipment required to deploy the target capacity.

   b. States with advanced logistics capacities (including Western states) should reengage in UN peacekeeping in a more significant manner.

   c. The UN should further refine its ability to incentivize states to provide critical logistics capabilities. In 2013 the General Assembly endorsed a financial premium for “key enabling capacities” provided to UN peacekeeping operations and a troop reimbursement penalty for contingents with missing or nonfunctional equipment. The penalty has been implemented since 2014, and the first premium for enabling capacities was paid to Senegal for its December 2015/January 2016 deployment to MINUSCA. As it was being implemented, the premium was also used to reward rapid deployment. The UN should assess the initial impact of these measures and consider strengthening the financial incentives for self-sustainment and logistics support, including by creating separate financial mechanisms to incentivize rapid deployment and the provision of key enabling capacities. The UN should also revisit the question of capability-based rather than per capita reimbursement (i.e., reimbursing TCCs for the actual capabilities they provide rather than the number of troops they deploy), which was raised but deferred in the 2012 Senior Advisory Group report on reimbursement rates. The forthcoming inclusion of statements of unit requirements in the memoranda of understanding with TCCs—which outline the capabilities TCCs are expected to deploy and the tasks they are expected to undertake—is a step in the right direction.

**Recommendations for improving logistics support for regional peace operations in Africa:**

7. **Clarify when regional operations can receive UN funding for logistics support:** The UN, AU, and other regional organizations should agree on the circumstances under which regional operations can access logistics support packages funded through the UN’s assessed

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130 UN General Assembly, Letter Dated 9 November 2012 from the President of the General Assembly to the Chair of the Fifth Committee, UN Doc. A/C.5/67/10, November 15, 2012, para. 82.
peacekeeping contributions.\textsuperscript{131} Among other things, this will require clarity over: (1) whether the UN’s assessed peacekeeping contributions should be used in future enforcement operations unconnected to a peace process; and (2) whether to support the security forces of a UN member state operating in their own territory, thereby playing the role of both TCC and host state simultaneously.

8. **Explore cooperation agreements with external partner states:** Other external partner states, particularly France and the UK, should consider replicating the US decision to enter into an acquisition and cross-service agreement\textsuperscript{132} with the UN (September 2015) and relevant regional organizations.\textsuperscript{133} To date, however, accessing US logistics assets through this agreement has been more expensive for the UN than engaging a commercial contractor, which limits its utility for UN and regional peace operations. Consideration should therefore also be given to revising the financial aspects of this cooperation to make it a more viable option for peace operations.

9. **Increase coordination among external partners:** Greater coordination among external partner states and international organizations is necessary to avoid duplication of efforts and identify and address gaps in the support they provide. The Africa Logistics Forum held under AU auspices and co-sponsored by the US Africa Command provides an important potential forum for longer-term coordination between the AU and external partners. It could be further enhanced through closer engagement with the UN and with African regional economic communities and regional mechanisms.

10. **Build the AU Commission’s capacity to support missions:** The AU and interested external partners should invest further in enhancing the AU Commission’s capacity to provide logistics support to missions, including by operationalizing the continental logistics base for the African Standby Force and pursuing the Maputo Roadmap.\textsuperscript{134}


\textsuperscript{132} Such agreements are used by the United States to acquire logistics support, supplies, and services directly from or provide them to a foreign government of organization. For details, see www.acq.osd.mil/ic/ACSA.html.


\textsuperscript{134} The Maputo strategic work plan 2016-2020 is intended to inform the mandating process for the African Standby Force as well as issues arising during the phases of force preparation, force employment, and post-force employment.
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