Investing in Peace and the Prevention of Violence in the Sahel-Sahara: Second Regional Conversation

AUGUST 2017

Introduction

Violent extremism expresses itself in different ways depending on the context. Fed by both endogenous and exogenous factors, it is a phenomenon that, while occurring locally or nationally, also has regional and international dimensions. Violent extremism has broad societal, security, and governance implications and touches upon religion, ideology, economics, social issues, justice, and development, making it a complex problem that can be understood and analyzed differently, depending on the approach taken.

Are we witnessing the radicalization of Islamism or the Islamization of radicalism, to reference a well-known debate on this topic? In what ways do extremism and violence differ? Are they an attempt to bring about change or even a revolution (linked to political, social, or economic realities and the deterioration of state-citizen relations) or a quest for meaning (due to loss of traditional, historical, and normative guidelines)? What role do religion and religious education play in the emergence of the phenomenon? How can these questions be asked and a respectful dialogue be engaged in while protecting societies from violence? What should be the role of researchers, religious leaders, and scholars? Of politicians? Civil servants? The private sector? The media? Youth? Women?

In the hope of pursuing and deepening regional exchanges on such matters, the International Peace Institute (IPI), the United Nations (UN), and the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (DFAE) organized a second round of regional conversations for the prevention of violent extremism in N’Djamena, Chad, on May 31 and June 1, 2017, under the title “Investing in Peace and the Prevention of Violence in the Sahel-Sahara.”

The seminar brought together over 100 participants from fourteen countries in northern, western, and central Africa and approximately ten regional and international organizations, as well as a number of independent experts. They came from varied horizons: political leaders, civil servants, members of various armed forces and security organizations, members of civil society (men, women, youth, NGOs), religious and traditional authorities, media representatives (in their capacity as experts), private sector representatives, researchers, delegates from regional and international organizations, and diplomats. These conversations followed those held in Dakar in June 2016.

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and an initial seminar in Tunis in November 2015.²

The forum created by this initiative eighteen months ago appears to be unique and highly in demand. Its distinctive regional dimension (North and sub-Saharan Africa), the care taken to include participants from a variety of professional backgrounds, its space for free expression, and the possibility it presents to cover subjects that are often taboo were positive elements frequently stressed. The initiators of this forum were called upon to maintain those dynamics, and support was expressed for smaller-scale actions that could also feed into a further round of conversations.

During the previous seminars, it was noted that policies aimed at preventing violent extremism need to be based on joint action involving institutions (local, national, regional, and international) and communities. Only such action could lead to innovative responses suited to specific local contexts and perceptions. Therefore, this second round of regional conversations was further focused on state-citizen relations, political participation, inclusive dialogue, and various initiatives creating, even if unintentionally, alternatives to violence. These themes were covered in four working groups dealing with state-citizen relations, the specific role of defense and security forces, the role of the media, and the particular situation prevailing in the Lake Chad Basin.

Moreover, the violence of armed groups is no longer considered inevitable, but rather as something connected to various streams of violence permeating our societies. It is acknowledged that violence arises from social and economic inequalities, oppression, failure to respect minorities, uncontrolled behavior of armed groups, and political exclusion. Although still poorly integrated into responses from state systems and structures, this acknowledgement nevertheless is emerging as a factor in the thinking and actions of political actors. The feeling that the future of our societies is in danger has become more commonly shared. Economic and community rivalries, intolerance, and power struggles will not disappear, but violent extremism makes it more likely that they will affect the social and political foundations of our societies.

In order to better understand the opportunities and challenges facing investment in peace and the prevention of violence, the conversations in N’Djamena also examined how to articulate the responses and solutions envisaged. How can the delicate balance between security, political, socio-economic, ideological, and developmental responses be attained and sustained? How can local, national, and international responses be articulated? How can external agendas or understandings be prevented from holding back the development of local solutions that are well-suited and therefore sustainable? How can support be provided to both public and private efforts that are concretely strengthening prevention or very clearly aiming to do so?

A Range of Actors and New Relationships

The conversations in N’Djamena emphasized the multiplicity of actors involved in preventing violent extremism and reiterated the importance of reconciling responses at different levels. Starting from the notion that violent extremism is linked to governance failures, lack of dialogue, and the lack of a real social contract between the state and its citizens (among other things and according to the circumstances), participants nevertheless stressed the centrality of state action. Indeed, violent extremism directly affects state sovereignty, inciting the state to respond accordingly. Noting the importance of government leadership in developing and implementing prevention policies, participants expressed the wish that states would devote as much dynamism and willpower to prevention as they do to fighting violent extremism by military means.

Although the battle against violent extremism has long been the private domain of defense and security forces, and responses have too often remained primarily security-focused, these forces do not have a monopoly over security. They cannot take on the political or economic functions needed to face the issues arising from violent extremism. Moreover, while defense and security forces certainly promote stability, their behavior may just

as easily become a source of problems, particularly when the deployment of forces is accompanied by abuses, which can accelerate the radicalization of the population, or parts of it.

It is therefore important to make armies more inclusive, as well as to make police more local and thus more representative of their societies’ diversity and more likely to be in sync with the population. Also, a number of questions related to the responsibilities of defense and security forces call for non-security follow-up, such as the reception of returnees (former militants) or the management of the humanitarian aspects of areas affected by extremist violence. Governments still seem deficient in this regard, and a unified approach to national security and human security is necessary in all areas affected by violent conflict.

Starting from the notion that state structures and state action are necessary but inadequate, it is crucial to engage all of society—women, youth, religious and traditional leaders, the media, and the private sector—as key actors in preventing violent extremism; it is no longer enough to consider them simply as beneficiaries. In order to strengthen this participation, state-society relations must evolve in a way that reinforces the role of traditional structures wherever they have retained local legitimacy. It is also necessary to provide greater support for initiatives by women and youth and to create a space for each category of actors to fully play its role (including economic and commercial) in instigating initiatives that have shown themselves in many cases to be powerful drivers of prevention, whether locally, nationally, or internationally. Beyond the prevention initiatives that institutions and governments undertake themselves, the role of the state is to foster such initiatives, enhancing them and considering them a common good.

Many experiences and initiatives are already demonstrating civil society’s strong will to become involved, led in particular by women’s and youth organizations that are propagating dialogue fora and interdisciplinary projects (e.g., entrepreneurship trainings, various interventions in areas where violent ideologies and projects are prevalent, and even attempts to engage with defense and security forces to reflect on the issues surrounding violence and its prevention). Communities directly affected by violence have also developed preventive strategies by their own means. However, it is important to understand the differences among various contexts and forms of governance in order to assess the reactions of the communities directly affected, as they do not react in the same way in different places. Understanding the diversity of such responses should thus make it easier to identify the specific factors that foster clusters of positive reactions or worsen the situation in a given environment.

The discourse used to portray the dismay caused by violent extremism is rapidly evolving. Once global and condescending, descriptions of the complex phenomenon of violent extremism are becoming more subtle and closer to local realities. Awareness of the need to clearly define concepts, differentiate between distinct locations and behaviors, and undertake more concrete studies of multiple realities shows that our societies are gradually adapting to the clear need to evaluate each situation, however localized, on its own. The failure of approaches or discourses leading to generalized, undifferentiated measures or attempting to deal with only a few, often minor, factors contributing to violent extremism confirms the need for a more sensitive, patient, attentive, and open mindset.

As for the media (community radio broadcasters, social media networks, newspapers, audio-visual media), their importance in promoting and generating awareness of prevention (particularly in using appropriate language that can move efforts in a positive direction) goes without saying. Participants noted that the use of terms such as “barbarian” or “gangrène” to describe violent extremists or “rat extermination” to describe recommended actions against violent extremists emphasize the role of the media (a negative role, in this case) in forming public opinion. Community radio stations, for their part, can contribute to prevention and dialogue by not broadcasting hateful statements, as shown by broadcasts of “political cafés” with exchanges between political actors and civil society activists in the form of podcasts.

While journalists can contribute to prevention, they also face difficulties that limit their effectiveness: restrictions on freedom of the press that threaten their independence and lack of resources, training, and protection that would allow them to fulfill their vital role. The means that would enable
them to take a more preventive role should therefore be strengthened. The difficulties facing journalists validate the need for independent, professional media, as well as the rise of professionally run local radio stations. Pressure from international media expressing the need for neutral information also reinforces this return to basic journalistic principles.

**Convergence of Local, National, and Regional Initiatives**

First of all, and given the cross-border and transnational nature of violent extremism, regional organizations such as those that manage the Lake Chad Basin and share common operational concepts and rules of engagement should also undertake political, humanitarian, and developmental responses, not just security responses. It is expected that these organizations coordinate multi-sector, multi-partner, and multi-level actions, harmonize the policies of different states, and ensure the sharing of information throughout the region. Regional military responses such as those of the G5 Sahel, the Lake Chad Basin Commission, or the Liptako-Gourma Authority must develop without replacing responsible state policies.

Progress made in the development of regional security and military responses contrasts sharply with the slow advance of regional prevention plans and the lack of coordination between them. Such plans should include the development of regional legal approaches, a common disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) policy, and standard training sessions on human rights and international humanitarian law for armed forces. Fora for inclusive dialogue should also play an important role.

In the course of the year between the first and second rounds of regional conversations, there was a surge in events involving violent extremism in many parts of the world. For many, this brought about a new awareness: violence by states and international actors, far from reducing the violence perpetrated by armed groups, actually stimulated it. Attacks increased and became more widespread. This turmoil strengthened the conviction that military approaches are far from sufficient; the entire population needs to be engaged on the family, community, cultural, religious, social, and economic fronts, and through dialogue between all sectors of society. Authorities must more fully recognize that the population is the best protection against violence and that its cooperation is not only obviously and urgently needed—it is indispensable. Toward this end, participants stressed the role of vigilance committees and information received from communities, though that role is ambiguous and is still not given sufficient consideration, potentially leading to long-term difficulties.

Participants in the conversation were faced with an urgent need: to build or consolidate both horizontal and vertical links between the multiple actors involved in prevention. Establishing collaboration between governments, security forces, the army, civil society organizations, communities, the media, and the private sector will be particularly helpful in overcoming the lack of trust that often taints relations between those different actors. The participation of the population, though often just symbolic, and attempts at dialogue with the authorities certainly represent limited efforts at consultations. But they remain too rare, and civil society is generally seen to be absent from the discussions that take place around prevention.

As a matter of principle, national and regional approaches should be based on and support local initiatives. This involves building the capacity of civil society organizations in places where violent extremism is prevalent in order to amplify the many initiatives already in existence. For example, civil society, particularly women’s groups and local community groups, could assist in the rehabilitation and reintegration of radicalized individuals, as well as of minorities and direct victims of violent extremism. Above all, this should be an opportunity for engaging in a society-wide dialogue among the government, civil society, victims, and former combatants on the causes of violence. While this dialogue should seek forgiveness, it should not avoid frank examination of the sources of hatred and should reinforce a common resolve to work together to prevent it from enduring. With a view to future reconciliation, but above all to support prevention efforts, it is equally important to engage in dialogue with violent extremists and those who support them as quickly as possible, however difficult it may seem.

The many crises that disrupt society—in families,
in the workplace, within communities, and between the governing and the governed—have led to many responses from civil society. For example, youth centers have been created to raise awareness of the dangers of terrorism through various activities. Elders and religious leaders also play a key role by attempting to restore traditional values, revive social norms, and propose readings of religious texts that point to the problems of resorting to violence and question it.

It is important to capitalize on positive experiences by identifying and mapping past initiatives, any successes they have had, and how they were adapted to their specific context, while acknowledging that it is not always possible to perfectly replicate successful experiences. The short-term nature of such initiatives must account for the space and time required to implement them; even urgent action needs to be accompanied by a search for structural solutions (e.g., in addressing land disputes or tensions between farmers and herders, or in focusing on educational and economic opportunities for youth).

Finally, policies and instruments of prevention must be deployed quickly before crises flare up in order to counterbalance the adaptability of violent extremist groups, which know how to use time in their favor, since states often settle into inertia. In this respect, the response of the population to negative environmental change, including when violent (as in the Lake Chad Basin), confirms the need to take on crises in a different and fully informed way.

Supporting Local Actors, Engaging in Dialogue, and Deepening Collaboration

Three general recommendations emerged from the conversation: support local actors, engage in dialogue, and deepen collaboration wherever it occurs. On the other hand, participants also identified challenges related to each of those recommendations.

**SUPPORTING LOCAL ACTORS ENGAGED IN PREVENTION**

Because the population is at the center of the question concerning how to prevent violent extremism, it is important to gain its support, with a view to supporting a home-grown quest for solutions that have local legitimacy. To achieve this, three requirements should be prioritized: greater mobilization in support of coexistence by legitimate civil society actors, particularly community, religious, and traditional leaders; the creation of fora for dialogue, particularly between and within belief systems; and the implementation of innovative solutions for bringing youth involved with extremist groups back into the community by offering alternatives for them to achieve their legitimate aspirations rather than abandoning them.

However, supporting local actors raises a challenge that became a focus of discussion in the conversation: as many countries face a governance crisis, it is important for states and outside actors to support these local actors without delegitimizing them. With that in mind, local actors should be incentivized to practice inclusion, even as the political climate is poisoned by violence and communities take charge of their own security (community militias and vigilance committees are very present in Mali, Burkina Faso, Chad, Nigeria, and Cameroon). States and other actors in particular will need to discover how to protect community resources, as many countries in the region are seeing traditional community leaders gradually being replaced by politico-military leaders or pushed out by new generations opening up to a globalized world.

Women play a particularly essential role in today’s globalized world, protecting their children and society and often safeguarding progress and hard-won political victories. However, one challenge remains: women are often infantilized and not treated as actors in their own right when it comes to violence or its prevention. This is despite the fact that women can hold significant influence by holding back their husbands and children from engaging in violence and actively working for peace and inclusion or, on the contrary, by exhorting men to join armed groups, armed forces, or self-defense groups. It is also important for states to further consider women’s role and possible place within armed groups, armed forces, and intelligence services.

A specific warning was issued during the conversation: the tectonic movements affecting youth are not yet given due attention by the older generation, existing frameworks, state institutions, or civil
society. However, the speed with which youth develop awareness and the immediacy of their responses, in particular through the systematic use of social media, are already shaking up old habits. The creativity of youth is not yet adequately acknowledged and, as a result, may overtake traditional institutional frameworks. The limits that are still imposed on youth lead to feelings of abandonment, potentially accelerating acts of violence and increasing the number of youth who want to break with the old order, whether through violent extremism or otherwise.

This conversation came to the formal conclusion that there is a need to quickly address the generational divide, systematically listen to youth, immediately engage in dialogue with them, and give meaning to their lives to prevent the spread of new types of violence arising from discourse that is inaudible to older ears. It is imperative and urgent that youth be given the means for empowerment.

Taking a fresh look at questions related to religion, koranic schools, and the role of religious leaders helps avoid oversimplification and ready-made solutions. Moving away from a simplistic view of Islam reveals the significant, varied role it can play in prevention. This requires understanding the cultural aspects and many subtleties of religious questions, the futility of out-of-context efforts at de-radicalization, and the shaken position of religious leaders whose credibility has been damaged by their connection to intelligence services.

The conversation also reflected on another issue: youth, in particular, remain fragile and vulnerable in most of the countries in the region in part because economic development is not based on an equitable distribution of resources, and unemployed youth are the first victims of this inequality. Responses, therefore, must also offer economic opportunities for youth. While the responses of the UN and African Union (AU) already combine elements of security, development, and governance, particularly through the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), it is crucial that states follow suit.

ENGAGING IN DIALOGUE TO BUILD TOGETHER

Many participants commented on the importance of dialogue as a tool for preventing violence. The conversations themselves are a forum for dialogue and for creating bridges between multiple actors. Participants stressed their hope that all those involved in the conversations could collectively diagnose the problem of violent extremism; that only solutions thought through and developed collectively will receive the support required to implement them effectively; that only participatory implementation will benefit all; and that dialogue is essential to building the fragile trust that can sustain the social contracts that underpin peace.

This dialogue must take place at all levels and between all stakeholders, but most of all between the state—or more specifically the men and women who govern, administrate, provide justice, and ensure defense and security—and the citizens. These conversations have shown that dialogue is possible, even on sensitive and divisive matters, and that fear of the “other” or the unknown can be overcome. This presents a real opportunity for states to develop new, trust-based relationships with their citizens and to support preventive solutions, even when they are not the ones implementing them. That is the essence of citizen participation in nation-building.

DEEPENING COLLABORATION

Prevention of violent extremism is part of a number of regional strategies and, in some regions, of many local initiatives and projects. In the Lake Chad Basin, for example, a common security action plan has emerged between countries on the front lines, but there have been few or no other synergies or concerted actions among states, NGOs, and communities to meet the needs of local populations. How, then, can local and regional responses be formulated and scaled up? How can cooperation, which is still nascent in areas apart from security, be spurred on? As initiatives to prevent violent extremism can be hard to get financing for, particularly from donor agencies, because it is difficult to describe them and measure their impact, it is also important to consider how to break free from the constraints of inadequate resources.

It is equally essential to reinforce harmonization among different strategies in the same region. Regional strategies make it possible to propose transnational responses to transnational threats. They facilitate coordination between various actors and initiatives and the sharing of experiences—although with seventeen regional strategies for the
Sahel, there is reason to fear that the number of coordinators might exceed the capacity to coordinate. Regional initiatives can also help support donor agencies and mobilize resources. Moreover, they offer fora where it may be easier to discuss disagreements, particularly surrounding different understandings of local violence and how to respond in a way that avoids cookie-cutter approaches that ignore the specific context.

For their part, local strategies have the advantage of proximity, of the legitimacy of the actors involved, and of the specificity of the recommended solutions. On the other hand, how can all sides be convinced of the strategic importance of conducting or supporting multiple local initiatives that, because they address the realities of differing contexts, may seem disparate and fragmented? How can a large UN or regional mission be reconciled with a local approach? While regionalization promotes sharing of experiences, a local approach places more initiative in the hands of communities and enables small-scale measures with large-scale ambitions. The most important thing is to identify local approaches that have been successful and to pass on findings when they are relevant to other situations.

Conclusions

This regional conversation, which brought together actors from highly diverse backgrounds, was intended to promote mutual attentiveness, assess capabilities for collaboration, identify possibilities for working together, and share both difficulties encountered and successful experiences in preventing violent extremism. Despite the multitude of initiatives and widespread interest in this subject from a range of actors, there is still no real transnational collaboration beyond security matters or a strategy that goes beyond technical approaches.

The conversation reiterated the need to return to simple reflection processes to consider what is possible and what is successful without, simply for the sake of convenience, reproducing the often unsuccessful responses already tried elsewhere.

The first conclusion shared by participants was the need to create more fora for dialogue between all relevant sectors of society.

Second, success is often found by those with the ambition to accomplish small things, each at their own level, rather than waiting for national or international measures related to protection and prevention to get underway.

Third, governments hold the primary responsibility for establishing adequate governance based on the political will for prevention, even if engaging in dialogue with populations affected by violence is risky—and dialogue with armed groups that use extreme violence even more so.

Fourth, states need to show the same determination to obtain convincing results in their preventive action as they demonstrate in military engagements. To do so, states must find, build, and use bridges that will allow them to work hand in hand not only with each other but also with all political stakeholders in their societies.

Fifth, there have been successful initiatives to prevent violent extremism, and these are worth presenting and sharing, at least as much as, if not more so, than the violence that continues to occupy a large part of our day-to-day outlook.

This second round of conversations has shown that concerns about violent extremism, far from fading away, have become more salient. As a result, some of the recommendations made during the first round of conversations were worthy of renewed attention, since there is still a long road to travel before implementing them. These recommendations included the involvement of women in prevention efforts, the initiation of dialogue between governments and civil society, the promotion of the economic resilience of youth through private sector initiatives, and the creation of fora for dialogue in international institutions. Recurring challenges also came up again, including the obstacles to and slow progress of institutional change and the fact that the states in the region and their partners continue to prioritize security and military approaches. Preventive approaches therefore still require sustained and serious attention.
Agenda

Wednesday, May 31, 2017

8:15–8:45  Arrival and registration of participants

8:45–9:15  Opening remarks
Mohamed Ibn Chambas, *Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the UN Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS)*
Willi Graf, *Director of the Office of Swiss Cooperation in Chad*
Arthur Boutellis, *Representative of the International Peace Institute (IPI)*
Pierre Buyoya, *African Union High Representative for Mali and the Sahel*
Stephen Tull, *UN Resident Coordinator in Chad*

9:15–9:25  Launch of work
Hawa Outmane Djamé, *Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Chad*

9:25–10:00  Coffee break

10:00–11:30  First plenary session

**Investing in peace and prevention of violence: What are the opportunities and challenges?**
*This session will seek to revisit the main conclusions of the regional conversations on the prevention of violent extremism launched in Dakar and to pursue and deepen the discussion on preventive approaches based on political participation, the improvement of state-citizen/governing-governed relations, and inclusive dialogue in post-conflict societies in order to avoid new cycles of violence. In particular, the question of dynamics among sociopolitical actors will be raised.*

**President**
Arthur Boutellis, *International Peace Institute*

**Panelists**
Marie-Joëlle Zahar, *Professor of Political Science and Fellow, Center of International Studies and Research, University of Montreal, Canada*
Bakary Sambe, *Observatory of Religious Conflicts, Senegal*
Peter Harling, *Founder and Director of SYNAPS, Lebanon*
Abdoulaye Maïga, *Analyst in Chief, Head of Early Warning, ECOWAS*

11:30–1:00  Second plenary session

**Concrete signs of violent extremism in the Sahel-Sahara: What is the diagnosis of regional, national, and local actors?**
*This session will seek to continue sharing experiences on how states, citizens, and organizations from the region perceive and define the issue of violent extremism in the Sahel-Sahara. Local researchers and research centers will present their work conducted in various countries in the region on socioeconomic, political, and cross-border dynamics that can...*
contribute to violence as a starting point for the conversations.

Chair
Stephen Tull, Resident Coordinator of the United Nations in Chad, Humanitarian Coordinator, and UNDP Resident Representative

Panelists
Larry Gbevlo-Lartey, African Union Special Representative for Counter-Terrorism Cooperation and Director of the African Center for the Study and Research on Terrorism
Saïbou Issa, Director of the Maroua Ecole Normale Supérieure, University of Maroua, Cameroon
Herrick Mouafo Djontu, Research Fellow, Modus Operandi, France
Yvan Guichaoua, Brussels School of International Studies, University of Kent, Belgium
Séverin Kouamé, Professor and Researcher, University of Bouaké, Indigo Coordinator Côte d’Ivoire/Interpeace, Côte d’Ivoire

1:00–2:00
Lunch

2:00–5:30
Thematic working groups

Exchanges on successful experiences of prevention in the Sahel-Sahara (Central Africa, North Africa, and West Africa)
Four separate working groups (each with a designated rapporteur) will discuss the prevention of violent extremism in the Sahel-Sahara region by looking at factors associated with peaceful and resilient societies, with a particular focus on state-citizen/governing-governed relations, which once strengthened can form a bulwark against the outbreak and spread of violence (rather than looking only at factors that drive and sustain violent acts). Participants are encouraged to give concrete examples of how states, citizens, communities, and organizations can prevent violent extremism in this specific area. Answers that have been provided or are needed at the transnational level will also be discussed.

These small working groups will be composed of approximately fifteen people and will each deal with a particular dimension of the prevention of violent extremism. Participants are asked to initiate discussions based on their experiences (short interventions of four to five minutes maximum), but discussions will thereafter be conducted in an interactive manner. One rapporteur will be designated in each group to present the conclusions of the discussions of the working groups. Simultaneous French-English translation will be available.

Group 1: How can the potential of consultative structures, in particular those led by women and youth, be realized?

Chair
Hamid Boukrif, Ambassador, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Algeria

Rapporteur
Emmanuel Tronc, Expert Consultant; Former Senior Analyst, Médecins Sans Frontières

Group 2: How can media coverage contribute to prevention?

Chair and Rapporteur
Kouider Zerrouk, Chief of Communications and Public Information, UNOWAS
Group 3: How can defense and security forces contribute to prevention efforts?

Chair
General Paul Ndiaye, Centre of Advanced Studies on Defense and Security, Senegal

Rapporteur
Yvan Guichaoua, Brussels School of International Studies, University of Kent, Belgium

Group 4: Particularities of the Lake Chad basin: What are the challenges and opportunities for a preventive approach at the local, national, and regional levels?

Chair
Moussa Dago, Secretary General, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Chad

Rapporteur
Christian Pout, President, Centre d’études diplomatiques et stratégiques, Cameroon

Thursday, June 1, 2017

9:30–11:00 Third plenary session

Presentation of the results of the working groups

12:00–1:00 Lunch

1:00–2:45 Fourth plenary session

Toward a regional approach to the prevention of violent extremism
Based on the conclusions of the four working groups, participants will consider ways in which citizens, states, and their regional and international partners can most effectively work toward preventing violent extremism, including through a cross-border regional approach that takes into account the challenges and opportunities of the transnational context. The goal will be to make recommendations that can be implemented by practitioners from the region, both within states and through regional and subregional groupings, in some cases with support from the UN and its partners, including for existing or new mechanisms, processes, and initiatives at the local, national, and regional levels.

President
Mahamat Saleh Annadif, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for MINUSMA

Panelists
Najim El Hadj Mohamed, Permanent Secretary, G5 Sahel
Sanusi Imran Abdullahi, Executive Secretary, Lake Chad Basin Commission
Abdoulaye Mohamadou, Deputy Executive Secretary, Council of the Entente (“Conseil de l’entente”), Niger
Stephanie Wolters, Head of Peace and Security Research Program, Institute for Security Studies, South Africa
Jean-Hervé Jezequel, Deputy Director West Africa, International Crisis Group, Senegal
2:45–3:00 Coffee break

3:00–3:45 Conclusions and closing remarks

Marie-Joëlle Zahar, Professor of Political Science and Fellow, Center of International Studies and Research, University of Montreal, Canada
Mohamed Ibn Chambas, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of UNOWAS
Jean-Daniel Biéler, Special Advisor, Human Security Division, Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs
Arthur Boutellis, International Peace Institute
Participants

Sanusi Imran Abdullahi
Lake Chad Basin Commission

Christiane Agboton Johnson
Centre des hautes études de défense et de sécurité, Senegal

Mohamed Anacko
Regional council of Agadez, Niger

Hannah Armstrong
Consultant, Algeria

Aïssata Athie
International Peace Institute

Abdoulaye Ba
Cordoba Foundation of Geneva, Switzerland

Ahmat Mahamat Bachir
Ministry of Public Security and Immigration, Chad

Colonel Didier Badjeck
Ministry of Defense, Cameroon

Godefroy Barandagiye
African Union

Pauline Bend
Fondation Hirondelle, Niger

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Le Temps, Forum des responsables des médias de l’Afrique centrale

François Michel Moundor Diene
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and of Senegalese Living Abroad, Senegal

Colonel Babacar Diouf
Centre des hautes études de défense et de sécurité, Senegal

Bichara Issa Djadallah
Ministry of National Defense, Former Combatants, and Victims of War, Chad

Hawa Outmane Djame
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Chad

Enoch Djondang
G5 Sahel, Chad

Herrick Mouafo Djontu
Modus Operandi, France

Hillmann Egbe
United Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, Mali

Abou El Mahassine Fassi-Fihri
Search for Common Ground, Tunisia

Frej Fenniche
Human rights expert, Switzerland
Annalena Flury  
Office of Cooperation in Chad, Switzerland

Guibai Gatama  
L’Œil du Sahel, Cameroon

Gali Ngothe Gatta  
Deputy, Chad

Larry Gbevlo-Lartey  
African Union, Centre africain d’études et de recherche sur le terrorisme, Algeria

Aliyu Gebi  
Ministry of the Interior, Nigeria

Abderaman Ali Gossoumian  
Comité de suivi de l’appel à la paix et à la réconciliation, Chad

Willi Graf  
Office of Cooperation in Chad, Switzerland

Romain Guelbe  
Inter-confessional platform, Chad

Yvan Guichaoua  
Brussels School of International Studies, University of Kent, France

Peter Harling  
Synaps Network, Lebanon

Idayat Hassan  
Centre for Democracy and Development, Nigeria

Pascal Holliger  
Embassy of Switzerland in Nigeria

Mohamed Ibn Chambas  
United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel

Saïbou Issa  
University of Maroua, Ministry of Higher Education, Cameroon

Jean-Hervé Jezquel  
International Crisis Group, Senegal

Moussokoro Kane  
United Nations, Chad

Néné Konaté  
Institut malien de recherche action pour la paix, Interpeace, Mali

Séverin Kouamé  
Indigo Côte d’Ivoire/Interpeace, Côte d’Ivoire

Noélie Kouraogo  
Amnesty International, Mys”TIC, Burkina Faso

Ahmed Labnouj  
Interpeace North Africa, Libya

Muhammad Nurudeen Lemu  
Islamic Education Trust, Nigeria

Ngaryambang Madjimgaye  
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