

# CARANA

**Location:** Carana is located on the east coast of the 8<sup>th</sup> continent between the 8<sup>th</sup> and 10<sup>th</sup> latitudes. The total area of Carana is 120,000 square kilometers with 300 kilometers of coastline.

**Geography:** Carana is topographically divided into two major areas: the plains in the eastern and central parts of the country and the highlands in the West and Southwest areas. The three main rivers in Carana—the Kalesi, Mogave and Torongo—flow from the western highlands in an easterly direction and discharge in the ocean. The climate in Carana is hot and humid. Close to the equator, Carana has no distinct winter and summer. Carana was originally completely covered by jungle and dense bush land. Approximately 20% of the total area is currently in use for growing grain, millet, vegetables and fruit. The west and south of the country is still covered by jungle and dense bush land. Small areas in the jungle are used for agricultural purposes. Carana is rich in natural resources, which are not dispersed throughout the country.

## History:

The state of Carana was founded in 1904 as French colony. In 1955, the legal status of Carana changed from a French colony to a republic of the French community. In 1962, Carana gained full independence.

## Administration:

Carana is administratively divided into eight provinces. The national capital is Galasi. The provincial capitals are Galasi, Maroni, Sureen, Alur, Faron, Folsa, Amsan and Corma.

Carana is a member of the 8<sup>th</sup> Continent Regional Coalition (CRC). This coalition, consisting of the 12 countries of the continent, is focused primarily on improving the continent's economic well-being.

## Ethnic Distribution:

The population of Carana consists of more than 15 ethnic groups. Most of these groups are small in number and socially and politically marginalized. The three major ethnic groups, the Caran, Kori and Tatsi represent 90% of the population. The Kori (32%) live in the west and are the dominant ethnic group in the provinces of Tereni and Koloni. The Caran (44%) are the ethnic majority in the country and mainly live in the east and center of Carana. The Tatsi (14%) live in the south, and are the majority in Leppko Province.

## Religion:

According to 2010 World Bank estimates some 75% of the population of Carana are Christian. Islam is practiced by over 20%, mainly in the South. About 35% of the Christian population is Protestant Lutheran or Baptist, while 40% is Roman Catholic. In terms of ethnic distribution, the majority of the Caran are Catholic, while the majority of the Kori are Protestant. The Tatsi people are mainly Sunni Muslim.

## General Facts

<b>Total Population</b>	14 million
<b>Population Growth</b>	3.6%
<b>Age Distribution</b>	<15 : 44 % 15 to 18 : 13 % 18 to 60 : 39 % >60 : 4 %
<b>Fertility Rate</b>	5.1 children per woman
<b>Infant Mortality</b>	9.1 deaths per 100 live births
<b>Language</b>	French.

<b>GDP</b>	\$9.3 billion
<b>GDP per capita</b>	\$520
<b>GDP by sector</b>	Agriculture: 27% Manufacturing: 16% Mining: 32% Services: 25%
<b>GDP growth</b>	1919 to 1997: average 3% per year 2006: -4% 2007: -2.5% 2008: -2.8% 2009: -6.9%
<b>Currency</b>	CFr (Carana Franc) 100 CFr = 1.5 \$

### Post-Colonial Developments:

After independence, Carana went through a period of military coups and counter coups until 1994 when, under international pressure, free elections were conducted.

The PDC (Parti Démocratique de Carana) won the elections and Jackson Ogavo (PDC leader) became the first elected president of Carana. Initially the government was representative of the ethnic balance of the country, although still dominated by the Caran, and it followed democratic principles that were later enshrined in the 1995 constitution. However, Ogavo's focus changed and he became preoccupied with suppressing all opposition groups and enhancing his own power base. Since 2001 he expanded the influence of the central government on all economic and social activities by laws and administrative rules. The replacement of all key Kori and Tatsi government ministers with members of Ogavo's Caran tribe led to an increasingly repressive approach, administrative and economic inefficiency, and corruption. Since 2006, the previously growing economy has been in decline and regional humanitarian crises have been occurring on a regular basis.

**Government:** Carana is governed under a constitution adopted by a referendum in 1995. It is a presidential republic with a president as head of state, elected for a five-year term. Although the constitution supports a democratic political system, President Ogavo has gradually suppressed any effective opposition and Carana has effectively been a one-party state since 2001. Today the only legal political party is the Caran-dominated PDC (Parti Démocratique de Carana). All members of parliament are members of the PDC or have close ties to the PDC.

**Nutrition & Health:** Although all basic food is available at the market, large numbers of the population cannot afford the food necessary for sufficient nutrition. Almost no medical infrastructure exists in the rural areas. One of the main humanitarian concerns in Carana is the acute lack of functioning medical facilities in the rebel held south and west.

**Infrastructure:** Carana has an adequate road network with paved routes connecting most parts of the country and key urban centers. In the west and the north, these roads also link to the networks in neighboring Katasi and Sumora. A few paved roads can withstand the effects of the monsoon season, but the majority are in need of significant maintenance. Carana has also a comprehensive network of secondary (unpaved) roads and tracks, which often become impassable during the rainy season.

Bridges along the paved roads are normally steel and concrete constructions. Those along the unpaved roads are normally made from wood and need to be assessed individually before they can be used by UN traffic.

There are two railway lines running between Galasi and Akkabar, and between Maldosa and Mia. Both are partially operational but are in poor condition and in dire need of repair.

In Carana there are three deep-water harbors and a number of smaller fishing ports. The smaller harbors have no capacity to support the loading and unloading of ships, but they are suitable for coastal vessels.

The international airports in Galasi and Corma are both operational and meet international standards for air traffic. Both airports have runways suitable for heavy transport aircraft.

**Electricity & Water:** There are three power plants: the Kilu Dam, the Salobo Dam, and a coal power plant in Galasi. In recent years, Carana was a net exporter of electricity during and after the rainy season. During the fighting, most of the power supply equipment around the Salobo Dam was destroyed or damaged. The instability in the Hanno area, caused by the miners' unrest, has led to a shortage of coal and has limited the production of electricity.

Potable water is available in most parts of the country but the quality of water varies.

**Current Situation:** Because of the economic situation and discrimination against the Kori and Tatsi by the government, political opposition groups and rebel movements evolved in the mid-2000s. The government suppressed most of these groups, using the military and gendarmerie to suppress any challenge to Ogavo's regime. In 2006, some small rebel movements in the Tereni province joined the larger and better-organized rebel groups known as MPC (Movement Patriotique de Carana) and formed a well-structured and efficient military opposition. The MPC achieved some local success in the west over the Caran-dominated Carana Defence Force (CDF), gaining increasing support from the local population in the west of the country. In 2009, this culminated in the CDF losing control of significant parts of the western highlands. Though the MPC's military engagements were well coordinated and successfully executed, the rebels lacked a coherent political strategy and failed to capitalize on their success; their only stated objectives were to remove Ogavo from power and to secure better representation for non-Caran ethnicities.

Low-level but frequent MPC operations in the west increasingly tied down the CDF, leaving its presence in Leppko province (in the south of the country) weak and creating an opportunity for elements of the Tatsi minority to attack government institutions. Initially this amounted to little more than a few localized incidents, but it quickly escalated into more radicalized activities including particularly brutal reprisals against ethnic Caran civilians. Realizing that the government could do little against them, a number of these small rebel groups united and called themselves the CISC (Combattants Indépendants du Sud Carana).

### Rebel Groups

**MPC:** The MPC is an avowed secular organization with broad appeal that has an estimated 10,000 fighters, structured into groups of 700, with likely between 10,000 and 20,000 civilian supporters. Their level of public support is high in the west and cuts across religions. As a result of broad public support for the rebels and the dissatisfaction with the government, the new role of the MPC is well-accepted by the largely Kori population in the west.

**CISC:** The CISC is an unstructured formation of rebels with diverse backgrounds. Some members are Tatsi deserters from the CDF, while others are refugees from the war in Rimosa. It is estimated to have around 3,000 fighters. Public support for CISC is mainly in the Tatsi-dominated Leppko Province. The discipline and internal cohesion of this rebel group is currently low.

### Military

#### Structure of the CDF

The CDF has a total strength of approximately 10,000 troops (9,000 Army, 800 Air Force, 200 Navy). The chiefs of the services report directly to the president. The main service in the CDF is the army, primarily—but not solely—recruited from the Caran people. Its senior leadership is almost wholly Caran. Structured with four areas of command, it represents the power of the central government all over the country.

**Presidential Guard:** The Presidential Guard has a strength equivalent to two infantry battalions (about 1,500 personnel) and is not part of the regular defense force. The commanders and most officers are Caran and recruited by President Ogavo. In recent years, the Presidential Guard and Gendarmerie units have been used several times to fight against the rebel groups. The Presidential Guard has a reputation for being particularly brutal.

**Police and Gendarmerie:** Carana's law enforcement agencies are divided into the Carana National Police (CNP) and the Gendarmerie. In recent years, CNP and Gendarmerie have suffered a critical shortage of qualified personnel, aging population, low morale due to unpaid salaries, lack of logistical and financial resources, and training. Police presence in Carana is very low. The majority of police are Caran, including in areas populated mainly by minorities. Crime rates particularly in population centers are high and there are numerous reports of human rights abuses and looting perpetrated by the law enforcement agencies.

### Regional security

There is currently no external military threat to Carana, although relations with Carana's southern neighbor, Rimosa, and its Western neighbor, Katasi, are strained due to Tatsi and Kori irredentist movements.

### Internal security

Security in the country is volatile. The main internal security problems are around the ongoing conflict between armed groups and the government, which is weakening, and the high level of criminal activity (both urban and rural) resulting from the poor economic situation. In the north and west there is increasing evidence that criminal groups controlled by cartels based in Sumora are controlling the diamond mining, probably with government connivance and controlled by cartels based in Sumora. An estimated 12,000 people have been killed in the last six months and anything up to 200,000 forced to flee their homes as a result of the fighting between government forces and rebels in the north and the south. Many civilians have been abducted by armed groups, mainly by extremist rebel elements but also by the CDF. At the sector-wide level, there is no national security strategy nor policy. There is currently no national coordination mechanism in place to initiate the transformation of the security sector.

## PLANNING FOR A UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATION IN CARANA

**SITUATION:** The conflict in Carana has reached a stalemate in which the government can no longer control significant portions of the country and armed and extremist elements have increasingly stepped in to fill the vacuum. In the west, an alternative structure is evolving in areas controlled by the MPC while the south is increasingly fragmented, lacking any structure and reverting to control by individual local leaders splintering away from the CISC. No single entity is capable of achieving a successful military outcome to the conflict, resources are tight, and ethnic and religious tensions have become increasingly evident. Atrocities are being committed in a number of areas.

The CRC has played a significant role in moving the peace process forward including its efforts to promote **the Kalari Peace Agreement**—signed by the CDF, the MPC and the CISC—which offers the only real option for sustainable peace, and is an essential precursor to any long-term ability to address the root causes of the conflict. The provisions of the Peace Agreement provide for a fully representative **Government of National Reconciliation** under a consensus Prime Minister, Lucien Langata. Elections have been called for within one year. The functions of the CRC's light observer mission (CRCAC) will be folded into the UN peacekeeping operation and most of the observers will be re-designated. A specialist French force 'Operation Intrépide' remains in South Carana, with a counter terrorist mandate against extremists operating in the mountains along the Rimosan border with whom the peacekeeping operation will need to establish clear lines of cooperation and liaison.

**Security Council Resolution 1544** expressed the international community's engagement with Carana and its support of the Kalari Peace Agreement and established the United Nations Assistance Mission to Carana (UNAC).

**STRATEGIC DIRECTION:** The strategic direction for UNAC, as derived from the Secretary-General and the Security Council, is as follows:

"The objective of the United Nations should be to contribute to the creation of an environment conducive to national reconciliation and lasting peace, with the full and effective participation of women in the peace process. United Nations efforts will focus on establishing a sustainable peace, including through peacebuilding and stabilization efforts that engage civil society. The end desired end state is a peaceful, stable and united Carana, where the rule of law is upheld, human rights are respected, the protection of all civilians is assured and in which internally displaced persons and refugees can return home in safety and dignity."

This constitutes the UN system's objective for Carana, the achievement of which will include:

- The provision of advice and assistance to a transitional government including the election process;
- A peacekeeping force of about 8,000 military and police able to, inter alia, monitor the ceasefire and provide protection to civilians and to the UN personnel and facilities;
- The provision of humanitarian assistance; and
- The re-establishment of acceptable standards of human rights.

**INTEGRATION OF ALL UN EFFORTS IN CARANA:** A critical function of the mission concept is to integrate the work of all mission components behind clearly established mission-wide priorities to ensure maximum coherence and unity of effort. Individual components of the mission - substantive, military, police and support - will be expected to align their respective concepts of operation on the basis of the mission concept. The UNCT will participate actively in, and contribute to, the planning process in order to ensure proper alignment, coordination, and consistency in the development of the UN system-wide response. This involvement comes in addition to that of the UNDG and ECHA planning capacities and individual agencies represented on the ITF. A comprehensive strategic communication strategy will be developed in consultation with UN partners as soon as possible. This strategy should be implemented well in advance of the UN mission assuming responsibility. The strategy will have the objective of promoting an understanding among local communities, the parties to the peace process and the public at large, with regard to the role of a United Nations peacekeeping operation in Carana.

