The facilitator can introduce the below questions at appropriate times during the exercise or during a post-exercise discussion. Ideally, participants will raise many of these points as they work through the scenario.

**One to three hours have been allocated for the case study, depending on the context and facilitator’s discretion.** The four injects may be issued as appropriate by the facilitator to develop the scenario and the discussion. Time will be tight.

Participants will need a map of Carana and familiarity with IPI’s Carana “Light” scenario. Facilitators can make other assumptions regarding facts and tasks relevant to the scenario based on experience in missions or knowledge of the Carana scenario.

1. **OBJECTIVES AND AUDIENCE**

**Objectives**

Scenario-based exercises can help units train to handle potential situations effectively and efficiently. They allow trainees to think through problems and work out responses before challenges actually occur and can help them identify preventive measures that can preclude problems from arising. Scenario-based training also creates a dialogue platform for peers to develop and share alternative points of view and explore a range of perspectives and courses of actions.

The facilitator should highlight attributes of leadership and effective decision making, including the readiness, willingness, and ability to:

- Implement the mandate and exercise authority
- Assume responsibility and lead others
- Ensure robust performance by all under their authority and address bad performance or non-performance efficiently
- Coordinate with other UN components, including through a whole-of-mission approach to the protection of civilians
- Act with only the interests of the UN mandate in mind
- Act in accordance with a specific, measurable, achievable, risk-informed, and timely (SMART) strategic plan
- Consult with local communities and affected populations.
Target Audience

This module must be relevant to all aspects of a mission. The target audience is senior leaders at both the political and the operational levels, including:

- Special representatives of the secretary-general
- Deputy special representatives of the secretary-general
- Force commanders
- Police commissioners
- Key D2–P4-level staff (e.g., chiefs of staff, chiefs of joint operations centers, heads of sections, heads of regional offices, heads of sector-level offices, sector commanders, and directors/chiefs of mission support)

2 STAGES

Stage 1: Preparation

In the first stage, the facilitators become familiar with the training material, prepare role players, and brief the mentors and experts involved in the training. They also discuss with them the objectives of the training and ask each to articulate her or his understanding and expectations:

- What is the purpose of the training?
- What can be the added value of scenario-based training?
- What are the expectations related to the training and to this scenario-based format?
- What are the roles and objectives of role players/mentors?

Stage 2: Familiarization

In the second stage, the facilitators orient the training audience on the general situation, the current situation, the rules of engagement, and the discussion questions/task at hand. The facilitators discuss the general situation and the current “crisis” with the training audience and make sure the training audience has a shared understanding of the mandate and rules of engagement. This discussion is a first learning opportunity, whereby each participant clarifies her or his vision of the mission. The facilitator can ask the following questions to ensure a common understanding:

- What is the overall situation in Carana?
- Who are the main actors who are/should be involved, and what are the main stakes?
- What is the mandate and authority of each major actor: United Nations Assistance Mission in Carana (UNAC), government forces, and Continent Regional Coalition Assistance Mission to Carana (CRCAC)?
- What UN principles are relevant to UNAC? This includes independence, impartiality, and exclusively international character.
• What aspects of a protection of civilians (POC) mandate are relevant to this scenario? This mandate includes not only refraining from harming civilians (doing no harm and minimizing or avoiding collateral damage) but also actively and proactively protecting them from physical violence or threats of violence by other actors, including government forces, rebels or insurgents, terrorists, and criminals.

• What are the relevant UN policies, including the zero tolerance policy for sexual exploitation and abuse, UN Human Rights Screening Policy, and UN Human Rights Due Diligence Policy?

• What are the roles of each player within the scenario?

• What are UNAC’s priorities with regards to the Caranese government?

### Stage 3: Training

Either the training audience breaks into small groups to work through the situation or, depending on the size of the group (e.g., if under ten participants), discusses the unfolding of the scenario as a group.

The scenario has four phases:

1. The **first phase** aims to set the scene for why the senior leadership team has been gathered, what its task is, and the context. This first part of the scenario should be given out and jointly read by the participants. If they have any, participants may ask clarifying questions.

2. The **second phase** focuses on the task at hand. Once all is clear, the task should be given out, and the group should have a specific amount of time (10–15 minutes) to discuss among themselves.

   • The facilitator should observe the discussion and answer specific questions if needed and provide extra information if needed.
   • Once the time has ended, the facilitator should lead a brief discussion on the task to gauge responses.

3. Injects are introduced in the **third phase**. The objective is to reflect on the trade-offs and stakes related to the specific crisis/challenge/event at hand. The timing, sequence, and pace of actions and reactions should also be discussed.

   • Again, a specific amount of time should be given per inject (10 minutes), and the facilitator should be available to provide support. Not too much time should be given so as to replicate the pressure of crisis situations.
   • A brief discussion can be held after each inject, with a longer debriefing at the end of the exercise.

4. The **last phase** is the longer debriefing, and the facilitator should reserve a longer period of time (30 minutes) for the discussion. This should focus on the scenario, lessons learned, challenges faced, what is needed to better address these situations, and
how to prepare for the realities in the field. The notes below can be used to support this discussion.

3 DISCUSSION QUESTIONS

Question 1: What are the political implications that need to be considered in the overall political strategy?

This question is meant to help participants think through the broader implications of the election period as well as immediate actions related to security and electoral assistance. This situation could be viewed as crisis management, but the facilitator should encourage participants to consider how the elections fit into the broader political strategy and take into consideration the long-term implications of their decisions. This is because all electoral assistance needs to be supported by strong political analysis and political engagement.

The legitimacy of the election is a major consideration. Due to issues with voter registration and limited political space for emerging political parties, multiple actors are calling into questions the validity of the elections. Since this will be the first election held with UNAC present, broad participation—in terms of region, gender, and ethnicity—and, to the extent possible, inclusion of IDPs in the electoral process should be prioritized.

Another important aspect to continue to monitor is the CISC’s perception of the election. This group does not appear to be engaged in the electoral process and may be a threat if it feels that it has no representation either in presidential or legislative elections.

Question 2: What are the main threats to a credible and peaceful election? What groups are most likely to be involved?

One of the major threats to legitimate peace elections is lack of inclusivity. Multiple groups don’t feel invested in the electoral process or are unable to participate due either to government policies or to limited capacities and resources. These threats are mainly coming from those who feel disenfranchised. IDPs could be mobilized in protest—peaceful or violent—due to their inability to vote. It is also unclear what the CISC’s position is, though we know it does not support either of the leading candidates. Ethnic groups that do not feel that either candidate represents them could also create issues prior to or during election day.

Though reports have been limited, threats against women in some areas of Leppko are a major concern. Violence against women can cause voter intimidation and could decrease women’s participation on election day. Violence against women is also a major concern for the mission as a whole and should continue to be monitored both in the context of elections and within the broader framework of the mission’s goals.

Another major concern is the perception that those who will not support the PDC are being deliberately excluded from voter registration. Whether true or false, this perception
calls the election’s overall credibility into question. Strategic communication or good offices with political leaders can strengthen voters’ trust in the electoral system. Specifically, UNAC could use its good offices role to encourage the government to rethink its policy on having to vote in one’s home province, as this greatly reduces the ability of many eligible citizens to vote. It can encourage the government and political candidates to take actions that will increase the elections’ credibility, such as reminding them of their commitment to maintain open political space, freedom of the press during the period surrounding the elections, and a fair voter registration process. UNAC has also been working with political parties to build capacity and providing technical support to voter registration—areas in which it could encourage the government to abide by already agreed-upon rules.

It is important to consider the impact the decree on having to vote in one’s home province has on women voters. There are far more women than men in Caranese IDP camps, which means that women are disproportionately affected by the decree. This could also create a security issue if women in the IDP camps attempt to return to their places of origin to vote. The threats that originally made them leave may still be present, and it could be dangerous for them to return.

Political parties and their candidates view the situation as winner-takes-all. This could mean that they will employ violence or intimidation during the campaign or incite violence among their supporters. Losing candidates may also not accept the outcome. Political leaders must work to mitigate these risks. They are responsible for encouraging supporters to maintain the peace and should commit to only challenging election results through legal means.

**Question 3: What immediate actions should be taken and what partners should be engaged to mitigate risks?**

To address immediate security concerns, UNAC should be in close communication with the national police and armed forces to develop security plans for before, during, and after the election. This should be done in collaboration with the NEC, other electoral assistance providers (e.g., regional organizations), and civil society (especially groups representing women and IDPs) to ensure that security plans take all needs of the population into consideration. UNAC should likewise ensure that all relevant actors understand their own responsibilities and the responsibilities of others.

The special representative of the secretary-general (SRSG) can play a critical role through good offices by encouraging candidates to accept election outcomes and encourage political parties to actively discourage violence. The SRSG should be advocating for respect for fundamental rights as well as full participation of all members of society, especially women, minorities, and other disadvantaged groups. Another possible role for UNAC could be to encourage the government to allow IDPs to vote outside of their places of origin. This could alleviate some of the tension caused by the mass displacement. The mission should develop a communication strategy that highlights the mission as a neutral body doing everything possible to ensure inclusivity in the electoral
process. This can include communicating the exact role the UN will be playing in the elections in order to avoid future confusion.

To address specific issues around women’s disenfranchisement and security, the Mission Leadership Team (MLT) should be collecting gender-disaggregated data and gendered analysis from the government, civil society (especially women-led groups), and international NGOs working in the country (such as Mercy Corps and Oxfam) to understand the specific issues facing women. This will be important for both the political and security components of UNAC’s election strategy. This data collection should continue throughout the lifespan of the mission, but during the run-up to the elections, particular focus should be put on areas of concern such as voter intimidation and violence against women, as well as specific data on women IDPs. Relevant actors within the mission, from electoral assistants to gender experts, should work in close cooperation and apply a gender lens to all data collection and analysis. Based on the preliminary data collected and with the guidance of the gender expert, the mission should have a contingency plan for security and service provision in the event that gender-based violence emerges around the elections.

Civil society groups in Carana play an important role. They can spread messages of nonviolence, assist in increasing awareness of the role the UN is playing in the elections, and undertake projects aimed at conflict prevention. They can also provide vital early warning, as they are closer to local communities. Engaging quickly and effectively with civil society can be helpful. A civil society presence in the IDP camps can help disseminate information and dispel rumors around the election.

Targeting youth groups and civil society focusing on youth is also key. Because political parties often mobilize youth groups, encouraging youth to remain peaceful can mitigate the risk of violent mobilization. Finally, regional groups can help provide early warning and support security and good offices undertaken by the mission. It is important to make sure that the plans of regional organizations complement those of the mission.

**Question 4: Based on the risks identified, are there any immediate security actions that should be taken?**

As identified in Question 1, IDP camps are the main risk at this time. UNAC should increase security around the camps in preparation for any possible tensions. It should also undertake political engagement and dialogue with political parties and members of the CISC. The CISC is a potential spoiler in the peace process, especially if it feels that the elections are not credible, and it would be beneficial to understand the CISC’s position and identify any actions that could mitigate these risks.

**Question 5: What, how, and with whom does UNAC need to communicate?**

Immediate actions being taken by the mission should be communicated to the public. Through social media, television, and radio, the mission should develop a communication strategy that stresses that it is trying to increase logistical reach as much as possible, especially for voter registration. These messages should highlight that the UN is providing...
a supporting role to the government in terms of security and helping the NEC with media access, development of a code of conduct for political parties and candidates, and election monitoring. Communication should also stress that the UN’s position is objective, impartial, neutral, and independent. The message that all such engagement and assistance is being carried out in an objective, impartial, neutral, and independent manner should be embedded within the security strategy. Likewise, communication regarding voter education should target women and eligible youths, in partnership with civil society where possible. Campaigns should also focus on encouraging voters, the government, and political parties to stay peaceful during the election period. Collaborating with civil society can be advantageous in this regard, as it can increase the reach of these messages.

**Inject 1**

The JMAC has informed the MLT that IDPs from the three camps around Galasi are planning a peaceful protest on election day. They will be marching on the capital to protest their exclusion from the elections, which they view as a deliberate attempt by the GNR to exclude them.

Though the JMAC confirms that the intention of the protest appears to be peaceful, there are concerns about how PDC supporters within the city might react. They may perceive the protest as explicitly anti-PDC, especially since the majority of the protesters will belong to ethnic groups associated with the MPC.

It is also unclear what CISC members’ positions on the protest will be on election day, as many have repeatedly claimed that the election will not meet the requirements of the peace agreement, which would nullify the Kalahari Peace Agreement (KPA). A portion of the IDP population participating in the protests will likely be ethnically Tatsi, and it is possible that CISC members will come to the aid of members of their ethnic group if there are clashes.

**What role should the MLT play in the build-up to and on election day in light of these reports?**

Security around IDP camps in the run-up to and on election day is critical. The MLT should liaise with the government as well as police and military commanders to develop a security plan and ensure protests are peaceful. This should include consistent communication with civil society, women’s groups, and youth groups to ensure that any security plan considers the needs of vulnerable groups and to identify potential partnerships.

The SRSG should continue to use good offices to encourage the government to allow IDPs to vote, which may be enough to discourage the protest altogether. Though the immediate concern is the voting policy for IDPs, the SRSG should also be encouraging
the government to increase the participation of women, ethnic minorities, youth, and other marginalized groups. Broad inclusion is key for a free and fair election.

Protests could also anger those supporting the PDC. Leaders of the PDC should be encouraged to dissuade supporters from retaliating. This also has implications for the security plan, as many of the protesters will be women in the IDP camps and, as such, face a higher risk of gender-based violence. UNAC’s strategy should consider this.

The CISC’s involvement in the elections is another significant concern. It may not honor the outcome of the elections and could break the Kalahari Peace Agreement. Post-election security plans should consider this, but UNAC should also reach out to the CISC to understand its position.

Reports are now coming in from the capital that youth gangs have begun entering the IDP camps and attacking civilians. The violence is spreading rapidly, and there have been allegations on Twitter and other social media that the youth gangs are acting on the orders of PDC officials, some of whom are currently serving in the GNR. The reports allege that these attacks are retaliation to the planned protests.

PDC members and the presidential candidate have released statements saying that they are not involved in the attacks. Instead, they are claiming that this is an internal dispute between Tatsi and Kori IDPs and has nothing to do with the planned protests on election day.

What immediate actions should the MLT take to address the violence in the IDP camps?

UNAC peacekeepers should deploy jointly with national police and military in order to secure the IDP camps and end the violence as quickly as possible. It is not clear at this time what catalyzed the violence, but there is reason to believe that IDPs are being targeted. It would likewise be helpful to try to ascertain the root causes of the violence and whether or not it was organized through a leadership structure—the resources of the JMAC and civil affairs can be used to this end. The security plan must also consider the possibility of gender-based violence and engage with the gender advisor to strategize on how to prevent it and how to provide services for those who experience it (see the contingency plan discussed in Question 3).

UNAC should also communicate to the populations that actions are being taken to end the violence and that people should avoid the surrounding areas for the time being. This message can be combined with calls to end the violence, and the overall communication strategy can be strengthened by collaborating with the government and civil society actors.
How does the GNR’s possible participation in the attacks change the MLT’s strategy and engagement?

It is important to remember that these are allegations; there has been no confirmation that the government is involved in the violence against IDPs, nor that the violence is in retaliation to the planned election day protest. While definitively confirming or denying that the youth groups are linked to the government would be extremely difficult, UNAC should use all available measures to ascertain the command structure of those groups. Due to the allegations, it would be dangerous to have the national police or military participate in quelling the violence. Despite this risk, the participants should remember that state sovereignty dictates government security forces hold the primary responsibility to respond to unrest, with UNAC offering support where necessary.

The outbreak of violence has now changed the dynamics of the entire election. Though immediate crisis management is the first priority, the MLT will have to reconsider the political and security strategies for before, during, and after the elections. Whereas previously there was reason to believe that protests on election day would be peaceful, there is now a high probability that these protests will turn violent, and the MLT should actively discourage them from taking place at all.

Even before violence broke out, the public was concerned about pro-government bias within the electoral system. Now, the public perception is that the government does not want opposition supporters to vote—especially IDPs—and is willing to use violent youth gangs to intimidate voters. The SRSG can use good offices to encourage the government to revise voting policy to include IDPs. Given the election delays resulting in months of engagement with the GNR, the MLT will not be starting entirely from step one.

What will be the implications if the claims by the PDC are true?

Due to conflicting claims and confusion around the origin of the violent gangs, the JMAC and civil affairs must gather as much information as possible about the violence in the IDP camps. If the PDC’s allegations prove correct, this will reveal that there are tensions between Kori and Tatsi ethnic groups that went unnoticed by previous conflict analyses.

A week has passed since the violence in the IDP camps. Due to continued engagement between the special representative of the secretary-general (SRSG) and the GNR, the GNR has decided to revoke the decree stating that people must vote in their home province. This has quelled much of the tension with the IDPs, but there are still rumors that the government instigated the recent violence.

The deadline for officially registering as a presidential candidate was three weeks ago. This morning, the NEC ruled that the lead candidate of the MPC, François Maki, is ineligible to run. The NEC released an official statement claiming that Maki was
responsible for the violence in the IDP camps and was therefore in violation of the peace agreement that states that all parties will participate in the “cessation of hostilities... as well as all acts of sabotage and incitement of ethnic hatred.”

There is little evidence that Maki was involved in the violence in the IDP camps, and the announcement was met with strong resistance from supporters of the MPC. Le Monde Galasi has released an article featuring an interview with Maki, stating that he believes the GNR is interfering with the NEC to eliminate the strongest opposition candidate from the election.

**What actions should the MLT take in response to the NEC barring an opposition candidate from the election process?**

François Maki was barred because of claims that he was involved in the violence within the IDP camps. When engaging with the government and the NEC, the mission should be careful. Though the NEC is a government agency, it functions autonomously and should be treated accordingly. This is especially true in light of allegations that the government had influence over the NEC’s decision to bar Maki.

If an investigation into the allegations against Maki has not yet happened, the SRSG should use his or her good office to encourage the government to look into the allegations. The mission should also continue to collect information around the incident, building on what it has already gathered. It should likewise share any evidence collected with the government, if requested.

UNAC should also engage directly with the NEC. While it cannot advocate for the candidate to be reinstated, the mission can reiterate that the elections should take place in a free, fair, credible, and inclusive way. The mission can also gently remind the NEC that there is little evidence that Maki was involved in the violence. This can be done in tandem with communications with the government and the president to remind them or their responsibilities, emphasize that the international community is watching Carana, and encourage leadership to deter violence.

To strengthen the message that the elections should be inclusive, it may be beneficial to release joint statements with regional organizations such as the Continent Regional Coalition (CRC). Regional organizations may have influence that the mission does not; they can leverage this influence to encourage the government and the NEC to be as inclusive as possible in the electoral process.

Finally, Maki’s supporters are unlikely to take the announcement well. The mission should begin to develop strategies in partnership with government security forces and civil society actors to address violence or protests if they arise. The mission should also engage with opposition candidates—especially Maki—on encouraging their supporters to remain peaceful through the election cycle.
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