This case study has five shorter scenario covering five different issues related to the protection of civilians (POC). The facilitator can decide, depending on time, to use all five or pick specific cases. Each can be used independently. Each scenario has injects which may be issued as appropriate by the facilitator to develop the scenario and the discussion. Each scenario will take approximately one hour.

Participants will need a map of Carana and familiarity with IPI’s Carana “Light” scenario. It would be helpful for them to have a copy of Security Council Resolution 1544. Facilitators can make other assumptions regarding facts and tasks relevant to the scenario based on experience in missions or knowledge of the Carana scenario.

1 OBJECTIVES AND AUDIENCE

Objectives

Scenario-based exercises can help units train to handle potential situations effectively and efficiently. They allow trainees to think through problems and work out responses before challenges actually occur and can help them identify preventive measures that can preclude problems from arising. Scenario-based training also creates a dialogue platform for peers to develop and share alternative points of view and explore a range of perspectives and courses of actions.

This particular scenario aims to encourage integrated planning in regards to crises encompassing protection of civilians (POC). The sub-scenarios go through possible protection threats and raise strategic, operational, and tactical questions for the mission. Senior mission leaders are invited to reflect upon these scenarios from a strategic perspective, emphasizing the role of a team in this process and the need for leaders' critical thinking to consider all implications of an action and the full spectrum of actors involved in a process.

The facilitator should highlight attributes of leadership and effective decision making, including the readiness, willingness, and ability to:

- Implement the mandate and exercise authority
- Assume responsibility and lead others
- Ensure robust performance by all under their authority and address bad performance or non-performance efficiently
- Coordinate with other UN components, including through a whole-of-mission approach to the protection of civilians
- Act with only the interests of the UN mandate in mind
• Act in accordance with a specific, measurable, achievable, risk-informed, and timely (SMART) strategic plan
• Consult with local communities and affected populations.

**Target Audience**

This module must be relevant to all aspects of a mission. The target audience is senior leaders at both the political and the operational levels, including:

• Special representatives of the secretary-general
• Deputy special representatives of the secretary-general
• Force commanders
• Police commissioners
• Key D2–P4-level staff (e.g., chiefs of staff, chiefs of joint operations centers, heads of sections, heads of regional offices, heads of sector-level offices, sector commanders, and directors/chiefs of mission support)

**2 STAGES**

**Stage 1: Preparation**

In the first stage, the facilitators become familiar with the training material, prepare role players, and brief the mentors and experts involved in the training. They also discuss with them the objectives of the training and ask each to articulate her or his understanding and expectations:

**What is the purpose of the training?**

• Reinforce the mission leadership team’s (MLT) knowledge of the integrated approach to POC.
• Strengthen the MLT’s readiness for decision making related to the POC crisis.
• Sensitize the MLT to tactical developments related to POC and their impact on the strategic positioning of the mission, its overall credibility, and its political strategy.
• Highlight the potential tensions between POC and other mandated tasks and reinforce the MLT’s readiness to prioritize POC and to articulate POC with the political strategy of the mission.
• Strengthen consideration of strategic communication and long-term political strategies while implementing POC mandates.

**What can be the added value of scenario-based training?**

• Real-time unfolding of events and practical exercises will provide more tailored and easily replicable learning.
• The setting enables participants to safely test options the MLT may be more reluctant to pursue in real life.
• Team building is a crucial aspect of the learning exercise.
What are the expectations related to the training and to this scenario-specific format?

- The MLT should work toward its goals regarding POC in an integrated and collaborative manner.
- The MLT should make decisions in a timely manner.
- The MLT should prioritize POC and anchor its implementation in longer-term political strategies.

What are the roles and objectives of role players/mentors?

- Mentors highlight areas of consideration for the different tasks and questions, provide strategic guidance, share lessons learned and best practices that could be useful in the scenario, and provide feedback to participants.
- Role players tackle the tasks and questions in an integrated manner with the team while remaining aware of their assigned role’s function and responsibilities.

Stage 2: Familiarization

In the second stage, the facilitators orient the training audience on the general situation, the current situation, the rules of engagement, and the discussion questions/task at hand. The facilitators discuss the general situation and the current “crisis” with the training audience and make sure the training audience has a shared understanding of the mandate and rules of engagement. This discussion is a first learning opportunity, whereby each participant clarifies her or his vision of the mission. The facilitator can ask the following questions to ensure a common understanding:

- What is the overall situation in Carana?
- What is the current case study about?
  - Responding to increasing threats of physical violence against civilians
  - Dealing with internal issues related to the implementation of POC activities
  - Considering political challenges related to the implementation of POC, including managing relations with the host state and armed groups
  - Implementing strategic communication around a POC crisis
  - Applying an integrated approach to POC and coordination
  - Practicing effective and timely decision making to protect civilians, including within the framework of competing mandated tasks
- Who are the main actors who are/should be involved and what are the main stakes (MLT roles and functions)?
- What is the United Nations Assistance Mission in Carana’s (UNAC) mandate? What are UNAC’s rules of engagement (see below)?
- What are UNAC’s priorities with regards to the Caranese government?
- What are the roles of each player within the scenario?

Stage 3: Training

Either the training audience breaks into small groups to work through the situation or, depending on the size of the group (e.g., if under ten participants), discusses the unfolding of the scenario as a group.
The following POC scenario includes five sub-scenarios. These sub-scenarios can be chosen according to the audience and the specific mission being trained.

Each sub-scenario has four phases:

1. The first phase aims to set the scene for why the senior leadership team has been gathered, what its task is, and the context. This first part of the scenario should be given out and jointly read by the participants. If they have any, participants may ask clarifying questions.

2. The second phase focuses on the task at hand. Once all is clear, the task should be given out, and the group should have a specific amount of time (10–15 minutes) to discuss among themselves.
   - The facilitator should observe the discussion and answer specific questions if needed and provide extra information if needed.
   - Once the time has ended, the facilitator should lead a brief discussion on the task to gauge responses.

3. Injects are introduced in the third phase. The objective is to reflect on the trade-offs and stakes related to the specific crisis/challenge/event at hand. The timing, sequence, and pace of actions and reactions should also be discussed.
   - Again, a specific amount of time should be given per inject (10 minutes), and the facilitator should be available to provide support. Not too much time should be given so as to replicate the pressure of crisis situations.
   - A brief discussion can be held after each inject, with a longer debriefing at the end of the exercise.
   - The facilitator can choose the relevant injects to use, according to the evolution of the discussion and time management requirements.

4. The last phase is the longer debriefing, and the facilitator should reserve a longer period of time (30 minutes) for the discussion. If several sub-scenarios are used, this last phase could be consolidated at the end of the exercise rather than after each sub-scenario. This de-briefing should focus on the scenario, lessons learned, challenges faced, what is needed to better address these situations, and how to prepare for the realities in the field. The notes below can be used to support this discussion.

There are five shorter scenarios in this section dealing with five different themes/challenges related to POC. These scenarios are independent of one another and can be used in any order. The facilitator should choose which scenarios to use, as there may not be time to implement all of them.
POC Scenario 1: Massacre/Ethnic Tensions

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

Reports are coming in that the armed group the Combattants Indépendants du Sud Carana (CISC) is carrying out massacres near Maldosa, in the southern region. The group reportedly attacked two villages yesterday where it killed, mutilated, and raped civilians and abducted children. It is targeting Caran civilians and has called for their departure from all southern provinces.

The joint mission analysis center (JOC) has received information that the CISC is currently advancing toward a third Caran village (the source is the UN Refugee Agency and Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, confirmed by U2, UNAC’s military intelligence section, which received aerial imagery from UNAC drones). There is a UN Assistance to Carana (UNAC) company in Maldosa.

2. TASK

The Mission Leadership Team (MLT) is currently in a crisis management team meeting and has to discuss how the mission can address the protection of civilians (POC) crisis in Maldosa and decide what action to take.

3. DISCUSSION QUESTIONS

1. What should be done to respond to the two attacks that occurred and how can the third attack be prevented?
2. What is the comparative advantage of the different components and sections of UNAC?
3. What kind of information is needed?
4. What would be the strategic impact of the different possible courses of action?

4. INJECTS

Participants are not provided with specific questions for these injects, as they are simply designed to make participants reconsider their answers and proposals for the task below. However, facilitators are provided with suggested follow-up questions for each inject. These can help to guide conversation and ensure that participants are considering the myriad angles of each scenario.
Inject 1

Civil affairs just received a call from the Maldosa community liaison assistant, who reported that the field commander refuses to go out and engage with the CISC to prevent or stop the attack.

Follow-up questions:

1. How should the MLT (and the force commander/military component) communicate with the field commander, alleviate his concerns, and encourage engagement or action? What other means, including unarmed strategies, are available to UNAC to deter an attack?
2. Are there other possible nonmilitary courses of action (such as political engagement with the CISC or leveraging of other partners or actors)?

Inject 2

The Protection Working Group has just convened to discuss an operational response to the crisis, and a joint protection team (JPT)—which would include civil affairs, human rights, and child protection officers—is ready to go to Maldosa to assess protection needs. It requests the MLT’s authorization to proceed with the joint protection team.

Follow-up questions:

1. What is expected of the JPT?
2. What are some other key issues the team should consider (regarding protection) beyond the provision of immediate physical protection?
3. What are the security requirements for this JPT, and how should the mission support deployment of a JPT more broadly?

Inject 3

This inject should be shared with the director of mission support or chief of mission support if they are present in the training audience. If there is no director of mission support, the facilitator should share this information verbally.

Mission support processes are delaying the joint protection team’s deployment. All UNAC helicopters are currently being used for the regular transport schedule to ensure that rations and support materials are being provided to all company operating bases and temporary operating bases in the mission’s area.

Follow-up questions:

1. What are contingency plans for mission support processes?
2. Which actors should the MLT engage with in this situation? How can the MLT prioritize POC?
UNAC could deploy a quick reaction force (QRF), but the force is facing logistical and administrative issues with air assets. The only transport aircraft available to deploy the QRF is among those contracted to a private Russian company, which does not allow weapons on board.

**Follow-up question:**

1. What are the contingency plans and possible entry points for a QRF?

The field commander says he cannot receive the JPT for security reasons. The human rights section has been pressing the MLT to deploy the joint protection team in order to preserve evidence of atrocities such as mass graves and to interview victims and witnesses as soon as possible for investigations. However, the field commander does not want to support the team for such a visit because his troops are already overstretched and cannot provide additional escorts. The Department of Safety and Security (DSS) is currently working to assess the security situation in Maldosa and cannot yet confirm the level of risk.

**Follow-up questions:**

1. How should the team address security concerns so that the field commander can receive the JPT and human rights concerns can be addressed?
2. Should the JPT be deployed, or should priority be given to other options?

**Scenario 1: Key Considerations**

**On substance:**

- **Consider the role of the host state in potential responses to POC threats,** including information sharing and common analysis, and in provision of security to the JPT. The MLT should engage the host state on POC as much as possible.

- **Consider humanitarian assistance needs and liaise with partners on the ground,** including the World Food Programme (WFP) and Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), but also, where possible, non-UN actors like the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). As immediate physical protection appears critical in this scenario, humanitarian partners can provide much-needed information on unfolding developments, protection needs, and security conditions, as well as advice on courses of action, while the MLT attempts to circumvent blockages related to the readiness of the field commander to intervene, security conditions, and logistics. Attempting to create a viable channel for communication with partners in Maldosa as a backup entry point for civilian protection can be one option if UNAC civilian staff and the QRF cannot be deployed. Throughout, the MLT should be weighing pros, cons, and tradeoffs of this form of “decentralized” engagement. (Relevant to Injects 1 and 2).
• **Analyze the strength and intent of armed groups.** This information would be particularly crucial for field commanders, peacekeeping forces, the QRF, and the MLT at large. Does the field commander have this information and, if so, can he share it with the MLT? If not, can the joint mission analysis center (JMAC) or joint operations center (JOC) be engaged to provide it? Does civilian staff have this information? This is important, as is consideration of the possible deployment of a joint protection team (JPT)—with or without physical protection/mission support to the civilian team. If needed, the facilitator can communicate to participants that 30 armed fighters have begun advancing toward the third village and that the modus operandi of this unit seems to be to kill all Carans. This way, participants can define an operational response and put the strength of this group into perspective. (Relevant to all injects.)

• **Consider liaising with CISC leadership.** Liaising with the CISC could be an alternative option if a military response is delayed and, in any case, should be pursued parallel to any military response. The MLT should consult with the field office and field commander about this option (and possibly push the field office and field commander to undertake such engagement). It would be preferable for the head of office or field commander to engage with the CISC and MLT to support this process. Another key consideration is how engaging with the CISC—whether by the MLT or by field personnel—would affect the UN’s relationship with the host state and other armed groups, as well as how it might upset the balance of power or fuel perceptions of partiality. Strategic communication is key in this scenario. While considering the strategic impact on any course of action, including engaging with armed groups, participants need to prioritize POC. (Relevant to all injects.)

On leadership:

• **Seek fruitful collaboration between the military, police, and civilian members of the MLT.** Given the interrelated challenges of physical protection, human rights monitoring/promotion, and logistical support, all missions’ components must be engaged and actively involved in a multidimensional protection response. The MLT must ensure an integrated approach, play a central role in improving communication among the components, and clarify their respective tasks, mandates, and areas for coordination.

• **Come to a decision on the QRF and JPT.** For the quick reaction force, mission support should engage with the Russian contractor to see if weapons could be allowed, given these exceptionally grave circumstances. If there is no way to do so, assess whether weapons can be channeled by other means, for example by other air assets—though these may be limited—while the Russian contractor transports the troops. Consider the partners on the ground (including, possibly, French forces) and their ability to protect civilians.

Regarding the JPT, a clear priority appears to be the prevention of additional massacres through mediation and sensitization. Another objective of the JPT is the protection of mass graves for investigation—through deployment might be
impossible due to lack of security guarantees and mission support. Participants should recall that UNAC’s mandate includes protection of human rights defenders and humanitarian actors and activities. They should consider security requirements as a condition for deployment, as well as whether there is real added value to sending a civilian team now; this may not be a top priority and could put staff at risk.

- **Find creative solutions for responding.** For example, assess all available logistical means for deployment of either a JPT or a QRF in-country and check whether there are neighboring countries in the region with a UN field presence or peace operation that could support UNAC in this situation by deploying air assets for support in an emergency. Consider the role of both French and Caranese forces in POC.

- **Think of long-term needs at the operational level.** For instance, liaise with UNHQ, the Secretariat, and members of the Security Council on acquiring a naval brigade. Considering that eastern areas on or near the coastline are particularly vulnerable to attacks and massacres, this would address significant protection concerns. A naval brigade would alleviate overreliance on air assets, which are not always available, and on land assets deploying certain mission components. The naval brigade can help facilitate logistics, deliver equipment and humanitarian assistance, and quickly respond to provide protection or credible deterrence. The rationale for this option can be bolstered by a new or consolidated assessment of risks, threats, and vulnerabilities on and near coastal areas.
POC Scenario 2: Civilians Seeking Protection at UN Base

1. **SITUATION OVERVIEW**

Following the attacks in Maldosa, a massive group of civilian IDPs is seeking shelter at the UN’s Maldosa regional office (a civilian compound) and military base. There are concerns that they will either try to get inside the UN camp or start forming an improvised camp in the immediate vicinity of the official camp. There is also a possibility that armed elements are among the IDPs.

The head of office (HoO) of Maldosa is not currently in the country, and the field commander of Maldosa does not respect the acting head of office—a junior and relatively new staff member. The acting HoO intends to open the gates to let civilians inside the UN civilian compound. However, the field commander is refusing to let IDPs get inside the military base.

2. **TASK**

The MLT has to coordinate a strategic and operational response to this situation as soon as possible and to instruct the regional office how to proceed. There is an urgent call with the acting head of office scheduled in 15 minutes.

3. **DISCUSSION QUESTIONS**

1. What needs to be done immediately and in the longer term? By whom and when?
2. What is the comparative advantage of the different components and sections of UNAC?
3. What kind of information is needed?
4. What would be the strategic impact of the different possible courses of action?
5. What, how, and when do we communicate, and to whom?

4. **INJECTS**

Participants are not provided with specific questions for these injects, as they are simply designed to make participants reconsider their answers and proposals for the task below. However, facilitators are provided with suggested follow-up questions for each inject. These can help to guide conversation and ensure that participants are considering the myriad angles of each scenario.
Inject 1

(10 minutes)

There are reports of CISC elements advancing toward Maldosa. These reports indicate that the combatants intend to attack the Caran civilians seeking shelter at both UN compounds. UN leadership has not yet allowed them to enter.

Follow-up questions:

1. Who are the key actors to liaise with on the ground, and who can ensure protection of IDPs/civilians?
2. What are the assets available to the force in Maldosa?
3. What would be the strategic and operational consequences of opening the gates or not opening them? Is there another way to ensure the protection of civilians?
4. What political and mediation tools could the mission use? What should the MLT plan in terms of strategic communication?

Inject 2

(10 minutes)

As the MLT is calling the acting HoO to share its views and decisions, it learns that he has just opened the gates, saying he could not wait any longer to protect civilians from impending attacks.

Follow-up questions:

1. What are the risks that come with this decision, and how will it affect the safety and security of the camp and UN staff, as well as of civilians and IDPs?
2. How can the MLT mitigate those risks?
3. How can the MLT ensure that the field commander will provide the necessary security and logistical support to the HoO despite their current disagreement?
4. What posturing is needed in case of threats by CISC elements against the compound? What type of political engagement would be relevant?

Inject 3

(10 minutes)

The compound is logistically overwhelmed, with 300 IDPs now being sheltered inside. These IDPs need food, water, and medical care, and the UN compound’s resources are limited.

Follow-up questions:

1. What actors can be engaged with to respond to the needs of the IDPs?
2. How can these discussions mutually reinforce the urgent physical protection and safety concerns?
3. How can the mission ensure that humanitarian assistance can be provided inside the compound if needed?
4. Should UN police (UNPOL) be deployed to ensure safety inside the camp?
5. How should civilian components work with the IDPs?

**Inject 4**

**(10 minutes)**

The HoO is concerned about the lack of uniformed personnel protecting the compound. The HoO called the field commander for reinforced military protection, but the field commander said that his troops are overstretched.

Follow-up question:

1. What are some alternative options for mobilizing uniformed personnel or other forces for protection?

**Inject 5**

**(5 minutes)**

After a few hours, there are new reports from the acting HoO and humanitarian actors at the compounds that a criminal gang is (already) operating within the camp, preying on civilians and looting humanitarian aid.

Follow-up questions:

1. How does this new information affect the previous options considered?
2. What actors can be engaged to deal with criminality within UN compounds? What is UNAC’s mandate on this, and how does it relate to protection?

**Scenario 2: Key Considerations**

On substance:

- **Liaise with the UN country team, French forces, and the host-state government.** Assess all available options for dispatching/deploying forces that can protect populations in or near UN compounds. Assess which forces can engage with CISC elements robustly and act as a credible deterrent, and weigh the pros and cons of each option. Liaise with the UN country team regarding risk assessments and vulnerabilities in Maldosa, as well as options for deploying humanitarian actors inside UN compounds, possibly alongside reinforcements from the French and the government. Consider the pros and cons of engaging with high-level political and military French representatives in the country and Caranese government officials to determine whether they can provide more to the UN compound.
• **Consider the presence of armed elements among IDPs.** This is a crucial consideration for the safety and security of UN compounds, UN staff, and civilians. Liaise with the JMAC and JOC as well as field commander and the acting HoO for any information or insights regarding this issue, and determine the likelihood that armed elements are present. Discuss and devise options and possible courses of action for each component.

• **Consider dispatching formed police units (FPU)/UNPOL.** Assess how quickly and realistically this can be done in a context of potential attacks by the CISC. Consider whether police-contributing countries (PCC) are ready for disarmament operations and counter-crime search-and-arrest operations. Does the POC mandate enable UNPOL to use force for disarmament, even if UNPOL does not have an executive mandate in Carana? Clarify the UNAC mandate that includes protecting humanitarian personnel and activities and discuss how this could be carried out robustly by an FPU. Liaise with the JMAC and JOC on any new information that may have been retrieved regarding armed elements among civilians/IDPs seeking shelter or already in the base. Consider the option of having troops “police” the camp, even if they may not be trained to do so; consider what humanitarian space is needed.

• **Consider an alternative location to protect IDPs.** Liaise with humanitarian actors to discuss options. Consider the strategic impact and potential perception of moving civilians, especially considering the ethnic dimensions of the conflict. Liaise with the JMAC and JOC as well as UNAC’s military force to determine and confirm whether there is any safer location for civilians.

• **Clarify whether the UN compounds in Maldosa are civilian or military bases** (as the civilian nature of an IDP site should be ensured). The facilitator can then explain that the “civilian compound” actually hosts both civilians and troops. Clarify where specifically in the UN compounds civilians and IDPs are sheltered. This is pivotal to determining the way forward and which actors to liaise with. In both cases, the situation has significant ramifications for POC, humanitarian action, and the security of UN staff in general.

**On leadership:**

• **Consider engaging the acting HoO and the field commander in both separate and joint conversations to improve communication.** This would create the necessary conditions for improved joint decision making and fix a key communication gap for preventing or responding to similar situations in the future. A necessary ingredient in any effective crisis response is strong communication channels and trust among all stakeholders involved.

• **Consider all available options and assets.** Conduct a thorough review of all possible mission assets—including indirect ones from partners—keeping in mind that this review must be limited given the urgency of the situation. Partners include the French forces, the host government, and possibly troops from the QRF. The MLT should weigh the urgency of the situation with the distance/time it would take to
deploy other assets/partners. While the FPU/UNPOL are critical assets fit precisely for the task of sheltering IDPs/civilians in UN compounds, an attack on the compounds would warrant a strong, robust military force, with uniformed personnel both garrisoned in the camp and present around it. Make sure the training audience clarifies whether the troops inside the UN base are sufficient for this purpose and assess whether troop-contributing countries (TCCs) at Maldosa base have any caveats that could impact their performance. Do this same for PCCs of the FPU.

- **Consider the human and political costs of decisions.** For instance, the decision by the HoO to open the compound gates may be poorly perceived or received by the Maldosa field commander—and may have an impact on TCCs willingness to contribute troops if they will be put in charge of “policing” camps or put in harm’s way. Likewise, the UN’s inability or failure to protect civilians, humanitarian actors, and UN staff in compounds may have an adverse impact on public perception of UNAC and its POC activities, even if the very act of opening the gate will be perceived positively in terms of UNAC’s commitment to protect civilians. A good working relationship with humanitarian actors will be crucial in such a context, and the protection cluster should be consulted. Moreover, consider the importance of maintaining communication with all stakeholders consulted (including the UN country team, the French military, and the host government) throughout the unfolding developments.

The events in Maldosa may also have a ripple effect, prompting civilians to seek shelter at other UN locations in the country. The MLT should be prepared to plan accordingly and prevent the multiplication of POC sites that would overstretch the force’s projection and capacities.

- **Consider short-, mid-, and long-term outcomes.** Consider the readiness and professionalism of troops/TCCs and police/PCCs, inquire internally if there is a need for more uniformed personnel and, if so, which kind and how many. Consider a discussion with the USG, secretary-general, and Security Council members about adjustments to the mandate and further deployments to respond to the specific needs arising from this emergency situation (e.g., an adjustment to the mandate for police/FPU, criminality and protection in camps, a higher troop ceiling).
POC Scenario 3: Accountability & Strategic Communication

1 SITUATION OVERVIEW

The CISC has attacked the third village (Village X), which has been under threat for some time (see Scenario 1). After the JPT deployed to the area to assess the security situation and protection needs, it confirmed that the village is now empty. A significant number of civilians from Village X fled to the areas around UN compounds in Maldosa. However, the human rights section has confirmed that at least 63 civilians have been killed in Village X and, after interviewing IDPs in the area, substantiated 38 cases of rape of women and children.

International media outlets have already reported the incident, and the UN is under heavy criticism for failing to protect civilians despite having received alerts. Village X was nine kilometers away from the temporary operating base in Maldosa.

2 TASK

UNHQ in New York has asked for a VTC with the under-secretary-general (USG) of the Department of Peace Operations (DPO) in one hour. The MLT has to discuss issues of accountability for the military units of Maldosa (which come from a country that contributes 37 percent of UN peacekeepers worldwide) and advise the USG accordingly.

3 DISCUSSION QUESTIONS

1. What needs to be done immediately? In the longer term? By whom and when?
2. What is the comparative advantage of the different components and sections of UNAC?
3. What kind of information does the MLT need?
4. What would be the strategic impact of each possible course of action?
5. What, how, when, and to whom should the MLT communicate?

4 INJECTS

Participants are not provided with specific questions for these injects, as they are simply designed to make participants reconsider their answers and proposals for the task below. However, facilitators are provided with suggested follow-up questions for each inject. These can help to guide conversation and ensure that participants are considering the myriad angles of each scenario.
Demonstrations have started in Galasi against the inefficiency of the UN and UNAC’s passivity when Caran civilians were threatened. There are reports of demonstrators throwing stones at UN vehicles. The government has also publicly criticized the UN for its failure to protect Carana’s population.

Follow-up questions:

1. How can the mission secure UN staff and respond to demonstrations and popular unrest?
2. How can the UN engage with demonstrators and civil society to manage expectations and perceptions and defuse tensions?
3. How can the MLT better manage public relations at the local, national, and international level?
4. How can the UN adjust communications according to the needs and concerns at each level of engagement?

UNAC’s weekly press conference is about to start, and the media are likely to have many questions about the developments in Maldosa. The MLT must discuss the strategic communication plan for addressing UNAC’s failure to protect civilians in Maldosa and the subsequent events.

Follow-up questions:

1. What are the possible benefits, opportunities, costs, and risks of having the MLT at the press conference?
2. How can the MLT best manage this from a strategic communications perspective? What should and should not be communicated?

Scenario 3: Key Considerations

- **Consider the relationship with the host state and communities on the ground.** For example, the MLT could work to regain trust by implementing confidence-building measures at the strategic level.

- **Liaise with the host state about the management of demonstrations and added security measures to guarantee the security of UN personnel.** Consider the role of FPUs in crowd control and the potential risks of their involvement. Engage with civil society to manage expectations and perceptions, defuse tension, and demonstrate the UN’s readiness to serve Carana’s population.
• Consider the role of the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) and internal investigations and liaise with the TCC on its own investigation. Consider the opportunities and costs of any accountability measures on operations, both on a political level and on a more organizational level (including issues of pride and motivation of troops and internal staff).

• Consider the role of the MLT in strategic communication (both external and internal) regarding the incident. The public information division (PID) has a specific role in managing public relations. Consider the involvement of PID in discussions related to POC, both for this specific incident and more generally. The PID can manage communication while the MLT focuses on ongoing abuses and logistical challenges related to UNAC’s response. Consider, at the same time, the strategic importance of communication in this context and whether senior leaders should be the ones speaking to the press.

• Recall the presence of the Carana Defence Force (CDF) in Maldosa and the responsibility of the host state. The MLT should discuss to what extent it will reference the responsibility of the host state government and CDF to prevent abuses and protect its population.

• Mention investigations/steps for accountability that are underway. Regarding the press conference, the MLT should discuss internally how to incorporate references to internal investigations and possible accountability measures at the mission level—even if these investigations have not yet begun. The MLT must also liaise with the PID and the USG for DPO to ask for advice on how to discuss this issue. The MLT must clarify who the actors conducting these investigations would be and standardize how to reference TCCs' and member states' accountability as well as the UN's mission-level accountability.

• Consider the safety of UN staff, the need for measures to ensure their security (including restriction of movement or even evacuation), and the human and political costs of these options.

• Consider long-term options and planning to prevent such situations from arising again. Share lessons learned on analysis, early warning, the chain of command, coordination, and preventive and reactive deployment with HQ and the USG.
POC Scenario 4: Engaging with Armed Groups

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

In recent months, the government has adopted harsh rhetoric against the Mouvement Patriotique de Carana (MPC), accusing it of sabotaging the peace agreement, calling it the “enemy of peace,” and, more and more often, labeling its members “terrorists” threatening civilians. According to JMAC’s analysis, however, the MPC benefits from wide support from the population and does not constitute a major threat to civilians living in the territory it controls. Instead, its members are presenting themselves as protectors of the Kori, a minority group that was widely repressed by the central government in the past. Several massacres of Kori civilians were perpetrated by the government from 20XX to 20XX, causing widespread distrust of and profound grievances toward Galasi authorities.

Two weeks ago, the government started carrying out joint operations against the MPC with the support of UNAC. As a consequence, UNAC has been targeted by MPC elements because of its cooperation with the government. MPC has started a campaign calling for the population to turn against the UN and criticizing the mission for betraying its POC mandate by supporting a government known for perpetrating abuses against its own population. In several press releases, the MPC has also called on UNAC to distance itself from the government, to stop joint operations, and to support the MPC, “who are the real protectors of civilians in Carana.” Joint operations against the MPC are negatively perceived by the Kori population, which sees the MPC as its only protector.

2. TASK

The MLT is holding a meeting of the senior management group on protection about possible engagement with the MPC as well as risks and opportunities for POC in MPC-controlled areas. It specifically needs to decide on a response to the MPC.

3. DISCUSSION QUESTIONS

1. What needs to be done immediately? In the longer term? By whom and when?
2. What is the comparative advantage of the different components and sections of UNAC?
3. What kind of information does the MLT need?
4. What would be the strategic impact of the different possible courses of action?
5. What, how, when, and to whom should the MLT communicate?

4. INJECTS

Participants are not provided with specific questions for these injects, as they are simply designed to make participants reconsider their answers and proposals for the task below.
However, facilitators are provided with suggested follow-up questions for each inject. These can help to guide conversation and ensure that participants are considering the myriad angles of each scenario.

**Inject 1**

(15 minutes)

Violent clashes between Kori and Caran communities have been reported to UNAC in the Karo area (in the Sureen area of responsibility, which is controlled by the MPC). The political leader of the MPC urges the UN to help the MPC protect civilians in the area, as the situation is getting out of control. The government strongly opposes any interaction and dialogue between UNAC and the MPC and pushes for more joint offensive operations to regain control of Karo from the MPC.

Follow-up questions:

1. How would engagement with the MPC affect UNAC’s relationship with the host government?
2. How would engagement help or hinder protection of civilians in Karo? How do joint operations with government forces affect protection of civilians in the area?
3. What mechanisms could be used to alleviate concerns on each side (the host government and the MPC)?
4. How can UNAC leverage its human rights work (including the human rights due diligence policy) in this context?

**Inject 2**

(10 minutes)

A community liaison assistant reports that a fraction of the MPC would be ready to accept a deployment of UN civilian staff to Karo, but not UN troops as long as the UN refuses to officially suspend joint operations with the government. DSS rules establish that civilians always need a military escort for movement in the western provinces. However, deploying a JPT to work on mediation and reconciliation between communities could greatly reduce POC threats in Karo.

Follow-up questions:

1. Should there be an exception to DSS rules, and, if so, under what circumstances would such an exception be acceptable?
2. Would deployment of civilians be acceptable to the host state, and what could be the strategic consequences of doing so?
3. How can the MLT prevent the mission from being manipulated by a party to the conflict while still doing mediation work in that group’s area of control?
4. How would engagement with any part of the MPC affect relations with the host state?
Inject 3

(10 minutes)

DSS has joined the MLT meeting to discuss the possibility of sending civilians without an escort to Karo. DSS stressed its ardent opposition to doing so without the security conditions in place, given the need for physical protection of a civilian team.

Follow-up question:

1. How can the MLT address DSS security concerns? Should it deploy a civilian team without an escort? Might it be possible to use government or MPC escorts?

Inject 4

(10 minutes)

The government has sent a new communication to the MLT—which was transmitted during the meeting with the senior management group on protection—sharing its intention to launch a military operation in Karo. The government has invited UNAC to participate in this operation.

Follow-up questions:

1. How does this new information affect the MLT’s calculus on engagement with the MPC and how does it impact the prospect of deploying civilians? Does it add more challenges or more positive options?
2. What precautions should UNAC take before participating in such operations?
3. What would be the strategic risks and impact of participating in (or refusing to participate in) these operations?

Scenario 4: Key Considerations

- **Discuss the implications of a military operation to prevent intercommunal violence.** Such an operation could be conducted either unilaterally or with the government, but the MLT should consider the potential consequences of joint operations. The MLT may want to temporarily suspend military operations in light of the political developments on the ground and the allegations against the government, which can be assessed using the human rights due diligence policy (HRDDP).

- **Consider leveraging political engagement with the government.** The MLT should discuss possible issues with joint operations to regain control of Karo, given the dynamics of violence fueling killings of civilians. Consider the involvement of the MLT in political discussions with the government to reassess the approach toward the MPC and promote dialogue and advancement in the peace process. Consider how Caranese authorities might react to the deployment of civilian teams to Karo for protection purposes.
• **Consider possible benefits, risks, and costs of engaging with the MPC.** Discuss the possible political engagement of the HoO with the political branch of the MPC and the management of tensions with the government. Make sure field office personnel are aware of the political implications of engaging with armed groups. Discuss arguments to convince government authorities to engage with the MPC nonmilitary. The strategic perspective must include careful deliberation of opportunities, costs, and benefits of engagement/dialogue with all parties concerned. There is a need for a careful process to determine when and how to engage with the different actors and which actors to engage with, both armed and political.

• **Advocate for the possible long-term benefits of engaging with the government and the MPC to promote sustainable dialogue and protection of civilians.** Use POC concerns as an argument to convince both parties to compromise and open channels of communication, since both express their will to protect civilians and respond to the rise of intercommunal violence. Could a possible tripartite structure consisting of the government, UNAC, and elements of the MPC be envisioned to ensure security for the region?

• **Integrate the HRDDP into discussions when assessing support to national forces.** The HRDDP may impose additional restrictions on joint operations in Karo (and possibly beyond) and could even be an additional legal framework to leverage in negotiations with the host state to advocate for a halt to hostilities.

• **Liaise with the country team, humanitarian actors, and civil society to assess options.** Inquire what humanitarian and human rights actors are already present on the ground. Consider what reconciliation tools at the disposal of humanitarian actors if they were to act without UN civil affairs staff and human rights staff and consider the comparative advantages of each. Consider whether civilian protection can be “outsourced” to other actors as a backup if all negotiations or routes to dialogue are exhausted without bearing fruit. Remember to consider UNAC’s mandate to protect humanitarian actors and human rights defenders.

• **Discuss security policies for the movement of civilians from a strategic perspective.** Attempt to negotiate with DSS and explore concerns and options regarding deploying a civilian team without an escort. Consider other security measures, such as the mediation or intervention of partners (including French forces).

• **Consider deploying an FPU or individual police officers.** Determine whether the deployment of police instead of troops could be acceptable for the MPC and weigh how this could be done given the government’s refusal to engage with the MPC. Also weigh the risks of deploying police, who could be harmed by radical MPC elements or spoiler factions even if the MPC and the government were successfully consulted.

• **Think creatively for the short, medium, and long term.** For instance, consider what steps would be needed to ask for a DSS exemption from rules on deploying civilians to Karo. Also consider a “mixed” arrangement involving the government, UNAC,
and the MPC for the protection of civilians, although this would need to be well thought out.

POC Scenario 5: Managing Host State Threats

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

The government has recently demonstrated a stronger posture against the MPC, which it has labeled as a terrorist and extremist group, as well as against the Kori community that the MPC protects. Human Rights Watch has just published a report on systematic human rights abuses perpetrated by government services against Kori communities, including arbitrary killings and detention, torture, and harassment. UNAC national staff of Kori ethnicity have also reported being harassed by national authorities.

The human rights section of UNAC has received allegations of killings and torture of Kori civilians by elements of the Carana Defence Force (CDF) in Sureen. There is one case in particular that the human rights section would like to investigate. This case involves CDF elements who allegedly killed all men and raped all women in Village Y (in the Sureen area).

2. TASK

The assistant secretary-general for human rights is visiting Carana tomorrow. He specifically wants to discuss the implementation of the human rights due diligence policy in Carana and the possibility of suspending joint operations with the CDF. The MLT is convening to prepare for this discussion and decide on whether to collaborate with the government.

3. DISCUSSION QUESTIONS

1. How should the MLT prepare for this visit?
2. How and on what should the MLT brief the assistant secretary-general for human rights regarding ongoing developments in Carana, specifically host state threats in Sureen?
3. What should UNAC recommend based on these joint operations?

4. INJECTS

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International NGOs have issued a joint communiqué calling on the UN to stop joint operations with the CDF and demonstrate its intention to implement and respect the human rights due diligence policy. According to the NGOs, Colonel XX—the object of both an arrest warrant from the International Criminal Court (ICC) and UN sanctions—is participating in the planning of these joint operations.

Follow-up questions:

1. How can the MLT share its concerns about Colonel XX and allegations of human rights violations with the host and remind it of the HRDDP?
2. How should the mission make sure joint operations are compliant with the HRDDP, and what are the challenges of complying?
3. How can the UN balance host-state engagement with the reality of the ICC arrest warrant for Colonel XX?
4. How should the mission respond to the NGOs' communiqué?

A fact-finding mission was scheduled to go to Sureen, but the government has been obstructing the team’s movement and denied it access to Village Y. All flights scheduled to go to Sureen were denied clearance by national authorities. The human rights team tried to go there by road but was threatened by CDF elements at a checkpoint and was ultimately refused access.

Follow-up question:

1. How should the MLT respond to this obstruction? What can be done at the strategic level? What kind of assets and partnerships can be leveraged to influence the CDF’s behavior?

The MLT receives information from the JMAC that the Human Rights Watch researcher investigating cases of abuse by Carana forces has received death threats. DSS reminds the MLT that since the beginning of the year, two UNAC human rights officers documenting similar abuses have been threatened and resigned and that community liaison assistants have increasingly reported security concerns when they work on threats to civilians perpetrated by host-state forces.
Follow-up questions:

1. What follow-up information should the MLT obtain?
2. Should these concerns be shared with the host state and, if so, how?
3. How can the MLT ensure the security of human rights defenders, NGO employees, and UN staff?

**Scenario 5: Key Considerations**

- **Consider and discuss levers for influence (military, police, civilian, support) inside and outside the mission and at both strategic and operational levels.** The MLT should assess the benefits and gains from each lever, weigh them against each other, and decide how best to engage government authorities to obtain access, security guarantees, and good-faith cooperation on human rights. The communiqué from the international NGOs should be taken very seriously but should not distract from the ongoing need for dialogue with the host state and the difficult task of managing host-state consent. However, POC should be given priority in any decisions made.

- **Discuss the strategic impact of carrying out military operations in cooperation with Colonel XX and balance military operational gains, human rights, and POC considerations.** Assess the impact of refusing to carry out joint operations with the host state, not only with regards to the relation of Caranese authorities, but also to the protection of civilians and the safety and security of humanitarian actors/partners. For instance, could suspension of joint operations mean a less robust UN presence where needed, less ability to monitor human rights abuses and violations, and thus less leverage over government forces? Assess the adverse effects of non-engagement with government on protection of civilians and consider prioritizing accountability and mitigation measures rather than suspending all support. Ensure a modular approach, such as by stopping a specific operation for serious concerns of abuse and conditioning the resumption of cooperation on credible investigations and screening of personnel.

- **Engage with the host state and consider levers and arguments to strategically influence the host state to push for Colonel XX’s removal.** Consider possible “carrots” and “sticks” in negotiations.

- **Balance short-term and longer-term gains for the protection of civilians in any decision made about support to (or withdrawal of support from) the host state.**

- **Discuss how to engage with senior UN leadership at the HQ level regarding host-state threats, obstruction, and lack of cooperation.** Liaise with Security Council members about concerns related to strategic consent of the host state.

- **Carefully consider how to engage host-state authorities on threats against human rights personnel.** Ensure a do-no-harm approach and refrain from mentioning specific cases to prevent further retaliation. Advocate for the fight against
impunity and the support of UNAC (by police and civilian personnel) in criminal and human rights investigations conducted by Caranese authorities.

- Reinforce confidentiality measures and individual protection mechanisms and assess the resources needed for this.

- Build a common vision between military, police, and civilian leadership on the use of the HRDDP policy. Ensure that the force is on board with the implementation of the HRDDP.

**ABOUT THE AUTHOR**

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