There are five short scenarios within this module; each focuses on a different theme related to the protection of civilians (POC). They can be used separately or as part of one contiguous training.

POC Scenario 1: Massacre/Ethnic Tensions

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

Reports are coming in that the armed group the Combattants Indépendants du Sud Carana (CISC) is carrying out massacres near Maldosa, in the southern region. The group reportedly attacked two villages yesterday where it killed, mutilated, and raped civilians and abducted children. It is targeting Caran civilians and has called for their departure from all southern provinces.

The joint mission analysis center (JOC) has received information that the CISC is currently advancing toward a third Caran village (the source is the UN Refugee Agency and Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, confirmed by U2, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Carana’s (UNAC) military intelligence section, which received aerial imagery from UNAC drones). There is a UNAC company in Maldosa.

2. TASK

The Mission Leadership Team (MLT) is currently in a crisis management team meeting and has to discuss how the mission can address the protection of civilians (POC) crisis in Maldosa and decide what action to take.

3. DISCUSSION QUESTIONS

1. What should be done to respond to the two attacks that occurred and how can the third attack be prevented?
2. What is the comparative advantage of the different components and sections of UNAC?
3. What kind of information is needed?
4. What would be the strategic impact of the different possible courses of action?

4. INJECTS

There are no specific questions for these injects, but they should make participants reconsider their answers and proposals for the task outlined above.
Civil affairs just received a call from the Maldosa community liaison assistant, who reported that the field commander refuses to go out and engage with the CISC to prevent or stop the attack.

The Protection Working Group has just convened to discuss an operational response to the crisis, and a joint protection team (JPT)—which would include civil affairs, human rights, and child protection officers—is ready to go to Maldosa to assess protection needs. It requests the MLT’s authorization to proceed with the joint protection team.

This inject should be shared with the director of mission support or chief of mission support if they are present in the training audience. If there is no director of mission support, the facilitator should share this information verbally.

Mission support processes are delaying the joint protection team’s deployment. All UNAC helicopters are currently being used for the regular transport schedule to ensure that rations and support materials are being provided to all company operating bases and temporary operating bases in the mission’s area.

UNAC could deploy a quick reaction force (QRF), but the force is facing logistical and administrative issues with air assets. The only transport aircraft available to deploy the QRF is among those contracted to a private Russian company, which does not allow weapons on board.

The field commander says he cannot receive the JPT for security reasons. The human rights section has been pressing the MLT to deploy the joint protection team in order to preserve evidence of atrocities such as mass graves and to interview victims and witnesses as soon as possible for investigations. However, the field commander does not want to support the team for such a visit because his troops are already overstretched and cannot provide additional escorts. The Department of Safety and Security (DSS) is currently working to assess the security situation in Maldosa and cannot yet confirm the level of risk.

Following the attacks in Maldosa, a massive group of civilian IDPs is seeking shelter at the UN’s Maldosa regional office (a civilian compound) and military base. There are concerns that they will either try to get inside the UN camp or start forming an
improvised camp in the immediate vicinity of the official camp. There is also a possibility that armed elements are among the IDPs.

The head of office (HoO) of Maldosa is not currently in the country, and the field commander of Maldosa does not respect the acting head of office—a junior and relatively new staff member. The acting HoO intends to open the gates to let civilians inside the UN civilian compound. However, the field commander is refusing to let IDPs get inside the military base.

2 TASK

The MLT has to coordinate a strategic and operational response to this situation as soon as possible and to instruct the regional office how to proceed. There is an urgent call with the acting head of office scheduled in 15 minutes.

3 DISCUSSION QUESTIONS

1. What needs to be done immediately and in the longer term? By whom and when?
2. What is the comparative advantage of the different components and sections of UNAC?
3. What kind of information is needed?
4. What would be the strategic impact of the different possible courses of action?
5. What, how, and when do we communicate, and to whom?

4 INJECTS

There are no specific questions for these injects but the injects should make participants reconsider their answer and proposal for the task outlined above.

Inject 1

There are reports of CISC elements advancing toward Maldosa. These reports indicate that the combatants intend to attack the Caran civilians seeking shelter at both UN compounds. UN leadership has not yet allowed them to enter.

Inject 2

As the MLT is calling the acting HoO to share its views and decisions, it learns that he has just opened the gates, saying he could not wait any longer to protect civilians from impending attacks.

Inject 3

The compound is logistically overwhelmed, with 300 IDPs now being sheltered inside. These IDPs need food, water, and medical care, and the UN compound’s resources are limited.
The HoO is concerned about the lack of uniformed personnel protecting the compound. The HoO called the field commander for reinforced military protection, but the field commander said that his troops are overstretched.

After a few hours, there are new reports from the acting HoO and humanitarian actors at the compounds that a criminal gang is (already) operating within the camp, preying on civilians and looting humanitarian aid.

The CISC has attacked the third village (Village X), which has been under threat for some time (see Scenario 1). After the JPT deployed to the area to assess the security situation and protection needs, it confirmed that the village is now empty. A significant number of civilians from Village X fled to the areas around UN compounds in Maldosa. However, the human rights section has confirmed that at least 63 civilians have been killed in Village X and, after interviewing IDPs in the area, substantiated 38 cases of rape of women and children.

International media outlets have already reported the incident, and the UN is under heavy criticism for failing to protect civilians despite having received alerts. Village X was nine kilometers away from the temporary operating base in Maldosa.

UNHQ in New York has asked for a VTC with the under-secretary-general (USG) of the Department of Peace Operations (DPO) in one hour. The MLT has to discuss issues of accountability for the military units of Maldosa (which come from a country that contributes 37 percent of UN peacekeepers worldwide) and advise the USG accordingly.

**DISCUSSION QUESTIONS**

1. What needs to be done immediately? In the longer term? By whom and when?
2. What is the comparative advantage of the different components and sections of UNAC?
3. What kind of information does the MLT need?
4. What would be the strategic impact of each possible course of action?
5. What, how, when, and to whom should the MLT communicate?
There are no specific questions for these injects, but each should make participants reconsider their answers and proposal for the task outlined above.

**Inject 1**

Demonstrations have started in Galasi against the inefficiency of the UN and UNAC’s passivity when Carana civilians were threatened. There are reports of demonstrators throwing stones at UN vehicles. The government has also publicly criticized the UN for its failure to protect Carana’s population.

**Inject 2**

UNAC’s weekly press conference is about to start, and the media are likely to have many questions about the developments in Maldosa. The MLT must discuss the strategic communication plan for addressing UNAC’s failure to protect civilians in Maldosa and the subsequent events.

**POC Scenario 4: Engaging with Armed Groups**

In recent months, the government has adopted harsh rhetoric against the Mouvement Patriotique de Carana (MPC), accusing it of sabotaging the peace agreement, calling it the “enemy of peace,” and, more and more often, labeling its members “terrorists” threatening civilians. According to JMAC’s analysis, however, the MPC benefits from wide support from the population and does not constitute a major threat to civilians living in the territory it controls. Instead, its members are presenting themselves as protectors of the Kori, a minority group that was widely repressed by the central government in the past. Several massacres of Kori civilians were perpetrated by the government from 20XX to 20XX, causing widespread distrust of and profound grievances toward Galasi authorities.

Two weeks ago, the government started carrying out joint operations against the MPC with the support of UNAC. As a consequence, UNAC has been targeted by MPC elements because of its cooperation with the government. MPC has started a campaign calling for the population to turn against the UN and criticizing the mission for betraying its POC mandate by supporting a government known for perpetrating abuses against its own population. In several press releases, the MPC has also called on UNAC to distance itself from the government, to stop joint operations, and to support the MPC, “who are the real protectors of civilians in Carana.” Joint operations against the MPC are negatively perceived by the Kori population, which sees the MPC as its only protector.
2. TASK

The MLT is holding a meeting of the senior management group on protection about possible engagement with the MPC as well as risks and opportunities for POC in MPC-controlled areas. It specifically needs to decide on a response to the MPC.

3. DISCUSSION QUESTIONS

1. What needs to be done immediately? In the longer term? By whom and when?
2. What is the comparative advantage of the different components and sections of UNAC?
3. What kind of information does the MLT need?
4. What would be the strategic impact of the different possible courses of action?
5. What, how, when, and to whom should the MLT communicate?

4. INJECTS

There are no specific questions for these injects but the injects should make participants reconsider their answer and proposal for the task above.

Inject 1

Violent clashes between Kori and Caran communities have been reported to UNAC in the Karo area (in the Sureen area of responsibility, which is controlled by the MPC). The political leader of the MPC urges the UN to help the MPC protect civilians in the area, as the situation is getting out of control. The government strongly opposes any interaction and dialogue between UNAC and the MPC and pushes for more joint offensive operations to regain control of Karo from the MPC.

Inject 2

A community liaison assistant reports that a fraction of the MPC would be ready to accept a deployment of UN civilian staff to Karo, but not UN troops as long as the UN refuses to officially suspend joint operations with the government. DSS rules establish that civilians always need a military escort for movement in the western provinces. However, deploying a JPT to work on mediation and reconciliation between communities could greatly reduce POC threats in Karo.

Inject 3

DSS has joined the MLT meeting to discuss the possibility of sending civilians without an escort to Karo. DSS stressed its ardent opposition to doing so without the security conditions in place, given the need for physical protection of a civilian team.

Inject 4

The government has sent a new communication to the MLT—which was transmitted during the meeting with the senior management group on protection—sharing its
intention to launch a military operation in Karo. The government has invited UNAC to participate in this operation.

POC Scenario 5: Managing Host State Threats

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

The government has recently demonstrated a stronger posture against the MPC, which it has labeled as a terrorist and extremist group, as well as against the Kori community that the MPC protects. Human Rights Watch has just published a report on systematic human rights abuses perpetrated by government services against Kori communities, including arbitrary killings and detention, torture, and harassment. UNAC national staff of Kori ethnicity have also reported being harassed by national authorities.

The human rights section of UNAC has received allegations of killings and torture of Kori civilians by elements of the Carana Defence Force (CDF) in Sureen. There is one case in particular that the human rights section would like to investigate. This case involves CDF elements who allegedly killed all men and raped all women in Village Y (in the Sureen area).

2. TASK

The assistant secretary-general for human rights is visiting Carana tomorrow. He specifically wants to discuss the implementation of the human rights due diligence policy in Carana and the possibility of suspending joint operations with the CDF. The MLT is convening to prepare for this discussion and decide on whether to collaborate with the government.

3. DISCUSSION QUESTIONS

1. How should the MLT prepare for this visit?
2. How and on what should the MLT brief the assistant secretary-general for human rights regarding ongoing developments in Carana, specifically host state threats in Sureen?
3. What should UNAC recommend based on these joint operations?

4. INJECTS

There are no specific questions for these injects but the injects should make participants reconsider their answer and proposal for the task outlined above.

Inject 1

International NGOs have issued a joint communiqué calling on the UN to stop joint operations with the CDF and demonstrate its intention to implement and respect the human rights due diligence policy. According to the NGOs, Colonel XX—the object
of both an arrest warrant from the International Criminal Court (ICC) and UN sanctions—is participating in the planning of these joint operations.

**Inject 2**

A fact-finding mission was scheduled to go to Sureen, but the government has been obstructing the team’s movement and denied it access to Village Y. All flights scheduled to go to Sureen were denied clearance by national authorities. The human rights team tried to go there by road but was threatened by CDF elements at a checkpoint and was ultimately refused access.

**Inject 3**

The MLT receives information from the JMAC that the Human Rights Watch researcher investigating cases of abuse by Carana forces has received death threats. DSS reminds the MLT that since the beginning of the year, two UNAC human rights officers documenting similar abuses have been threatened and resigned and that community liaison assistants have increasingly reported security concerns when they work on threats to civilians perpetrated by host-state forces.