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### SITUATION OVERVIEW

During the Tarakoni era, the Carana government forces, mostly from the Carana majority, were responsible for committing violations of international human rights and international humanitarian law—including murder and rape—against the Tatsi minority. In 1982, several Tatsi elders were targeted for “elimination.” Johnny Tenn, a 30-year-old native of Carana raised in neighboring Rimosa after his parents were assassinated during this “elimination,” has spent five years using a family inheritance to recruit, arm, and train a ruthless paramilitary group that he calls Squad 10. With the recent instability in southern Carana—near the border with Rimosa—Squad 10 has successfully infiltrated Leppko Province, where it has been targeting the armed forces of Carana’s current government, the Government of National Reconciliation (GNR).

The Tatsi rebel group Combattants Indépendants du Sud Carana (CISC), on the other hand, is a signatory to the Kalari Peace Agreement. It has begun demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration (DDR) and is largely adhering to its obligations under the agreement. It has condemned all Squad 10 attacks and has denied any association with or support for the group.

Squad 10 has killed approximately 50 soldiers in successive attacks targeting the GNR military base near the Corma airport, as well as about 23 civilians who live or work on the base. The Squad 10 attacks have also caused tens of millions of dollars’ worth of property damage to the military base. Above all, it has profoundly embarrassed Opération Intrépide, deployed by Phantasia as a military force independent of the UN in the south of Carana.

#### Operational capacity of forces

##### Government of National Reconciliation (GNR)

25,000 military personnel  
 10,000 security forces  
 30,000 police personnel (only 4,000 properly trained)  
*No women in any component*

##### UN Assistance Mission in Carana (UNAC)

6,800 military personnel (including up to 200 military observers and 160 staff officers)  
 Up to 1,250 police personnel (including formed police units)  
 Up to 200 corrections officers  
*25% women in each uniformed component*

##### CRCAC (Continental Regional Coalition Assistance Mission to Carana)

5,000 military personnel (including 1,000 military observers)  
*10% women in each uniformed component*

##### Opération Intrépide

3,000 Phantasian military personnel (including 500 military observers)  
*40% women in each uniformed component*

##### Squad 10

4,500 operatives  
*5% women*

### **Standard Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA)**

Under the standard status of forces agreement (SOFA) drawn up between the GNR and the UN, the UN undertakes to operate “with full respect for the principles and rules of the international conventions applicable to the conduct of military personnel,” including the four Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols.

The host government also commits to abide by the Geneva Conventions, treating UNAC military personnel “with full respect for the principles and rules of the international conventions applicable to the treatment of military personnel.”

Finally, under the SOFA, the GNR shall “ensure that the provisions of the Safety Convention are adhered to and that it shall criminalise and prosecute attacks against the peacekeeping operation, its members and associated personnel.”

In response to the escalating situation in Carana, the government of neighboring Rimosa has issued an arrest warrant for Tenn and all known members of Squad 10. Although unequivocally condemning Tenn as a criminal, Rimosa has refused to label him or his operatives as terrorists, noting that Squad 10 has targeted military targets, not civilians. Rimosa has thus charged them with murder, transnational organized crime, weapons smuggling, and unauthorized border crossing for criminal purposes. It has also contributed 500 troops to the CRCAC to preserve regional stability.

In hopes of deterring further attacks by Tenn and his operatives, the GNR gendarmerie and police forces, with support from the GNR armed forces, have launched Operation Restoring Harmony, which quickly and tragically became an anti-Tatsi crackdown. While the operation has succeeded in significantly curtailing Squad 10 attacks, it has also caused significant loss of civilian—mostly Tatsi—life. In response, the CISC has threatened to withdraw from the cease-fire and peace agreement unless all those responsible for killing Tatsi civilians—whether government forces or terrorist infiltrators—are placed on the UN Security Council sanctions list and brought to justice and adequate compensation is paid to the victims and their families. The president of Rimosa has condemned the attacks by Squad 10 but has warned the GNR that “two wrongs don’t make a right,” threatening to pull the country’s troops from the CRCAC.

The UN Security Council held an urgent meeting and adopted a second resolution in which it:

- i. Recalled Security Council Presidential Statement 20XX/4 and Resolution 1544;
- ii. Welcomed the UN secretary-general’s letter confirming that UNAC has become fully operational and that the UN has concluded a status of forces agreement with the GNR;
- iii. Expressed satisfaction that all parties had adhered to the cease-fire and abided by the provisions of the peace agreement;
- iv. Called upon all parties to continue to respect the cease-fire and peace agreement;
- v. Stressed that UNAC should focus primarily on protecting civilians against all threats;
- vi. Urged the UN secretary-general to take the necessary steps to ensure that UNAC cooperates fully with all other legitimate authorities in the country;

- vii. Demanded that all forces in the country ensure respect for international human rights and international humanitarian law; and
- viii. Confirmed its intention to hold all those responsible for violations of international human rights and international humanitarian law accountable.

During its deliberations, the Security Council made it clear that, within its capacity and areas of deployment, UNAC should prioritize the protection of civilians from all threats of physical violence but should not engage in strategic counterterrorism operations. In his report on the establishment and operationalization of UNAC, the secretary-general defined strategic counterterrorism as offensive counterterrorism, which he distinguished from defensive and protective counterterrorism. He characterized the latter as fully in accordance with the mission's inherent right to use force in self-defense and its authorization to use force in implementing its protection of civilians mandate. UNAC will provide logistical support to the government as well as to the CRCAC forces.

The permanent representative of Carana to the United Nations just tweeted the following message: "My Gov. thanks UN for deploying UNAC. Together we will fight all foreign and domestic threats. Together we will crush John Tenn and his terrorist sympathizers."

In a recent call, the prime minister of Carana requested that the special representative of the secretary-general (SRSG) for UNAC ensure that all movements by UNAC forces are approved by the minister of defense and that all UNAC operations are conducted jointly with GNR forces. He also requested the SRSG to provide written assurances that UNAC will never investigate the actions of the GNR or its military and security forces. He concluded the call by saying that "the GNR never kills civilians; we only kill terrorists and their sympathizers. We have the right to defend ourselves. This is none of the UN's business! This is none of UNAC's business either."

## 2 TASK

The SRSG for UNAC and other members of the Mission Leadership Team should identify the key messages to include in an appropriate response to the prime minister's requests. It should:

- Confirm the parameters of the proper relationship between UNAC and the government and their respective forces
- Clarify UNAC's protection of civilians mandate
- Clarify UNAC's constraints under the UN Human Rights Due Diligence Policy
- Introduce the necessary mitigating measures to ensure compliance therewith

## 3 DISCUSSION QUESTIONS

1. What values reflected in the UN Charter do UN missions have to uphold in fulfilling their mandates?
2. How much authority does the force commander have within the unified structures of command and operational control for UN forces?

3. Under its protection of civilians (POC) mandate, can UNAC take action against GNR military or security forces if they attack or threaten to attack civilians?
4. Should UNAC conduct joint operations with GNR forces?
5. Does UNAC have to obtain the GNR's approval for its movements and operations?
6. Is UNAC responsible for investigating the GNR's alleged violations of IHL/IHRL under the UN Human Rights Due Diligence Policy?
7. What measures can be taken to stop any intentional or disproportionate loss of civilian life?

## 4

## INJECTS

### Inject 1

On June 3rd, with UNAC now fully operational, the president of Rimosa sent a letter to the UN secretary-general requesting that his troops immediately be re-hatted as UNAC troops. Two days later, Carana's minister for foreign affairs presented the SRSG with a file of "reports" by Carana nationals and local media outlets alleging various "crimes against the citizens of Carana" by the CRCAC, including its Rimosa contingent. The allegations involve paying women for sex and using excessive force in or near civilian areas.

Later the same day, the CRCAC force commander met with the UNAC force commander and suggested that UNAC and the CRCAC should co-locate their respective command centers in the GNR military base near the Corma airport to improve coordination between GNR, CRCAC, and UNAC forces.

The Mission Leadership Team should prepare a code cable to UNHQ and the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). It should:

- Summarize and assess the credibility of the allegations made by the minister for foreign affairs against the CRCAC forces, including the Rimosa troops
- Request OHCHR's assistance in investigating or assessing the allegations
- Share its assessment of the impact the UN secretary-general's decision will have on UNAC's relationship with the GNR and its ability to carry out its mandate

After consulting the Mission Leadership Team, the UNAC force commander should separately draft a short communication responding to the CRCAC force commander to either accept or reject his co-location proposal. It should state the basis for his decision.

1. Which UN actors are involved in the UN Human Rights Screening Policy?
2. What is the difference between the UN Human Rights Screening Policy and the UN Human Rights Due Diligence Policy?
3. Do the allegations against the CRCAC fall within the scope of the UN Human Rights Due Diligence Policy?
4. Is collocation of UNAC forces consistent with its mandate and UN values?

On June 15th, the Phantasian force commander showed the UNAC force commander satellite imagery revealing that, despite the crackdown, Squad 10 operatives were still moving large caches of arms into Carana. The Phantasian commander said the cache was likely heading toward the Corma airport to attack the GNR military base but opined that there was a possibility it was intended for a raid on the World Food Programme (WFP) warehouse nearby to resupply Squad 10. The UNAC force commander notified the Phantasian commander that WFP was contemplating moving its warehouse away from the airport and closer to UNAC HQ to enhance its security. The Phantasian force commander thanked the UNAC force commander.

One hour later, he sent the UNAC force commander an email stating, "After you left, I had a great idea. Why don't you embed elements of your forces in Corma sector with my stronger and better-equipped troops? It will make you look formidable to be part of our operation against Squad 10, and we will ensure your security. I'm signing off for tonight. I will call you in the morning."

The force commander and the rest of the Mission Leadership Team should prepare talking points for the force commander's call, including:

- Whether elements of UNAC can embed with the Phantasian forces
- What UNAC forces can do, within their mandate and maintaining a proper relationship with the Phantasian forces to help prevent the attack on the GNR military base
- What UNAC forces can do to prevent an attack on the WFP warehouse and the nearby village

The SRSG, in consultation with the Department of Peace Operations (DPO) and Office of Legal Affairs (OLA), should issue a one-page guidance note on the appropriate level of coordination and cooperation between UNAC and the parallel forces, including one point each on:

- Exchange of information and intelligence
  - Advance notice of movements and de-confliction
  - Joint patrolling
  - Joint operations
1. Should the UNAC force commander accept the Phantasian force commander's proposal? Why or why not?
  2. What are the limits, if any, on the exchange of information and intelligence between UNAC and the parallel forces?
  3. What are the limits, if any, on joint patrols or joint operations?
  4. What can UNAC do, within its own mandate and initiative, to respond to the report of an imminent attack on the GNR military base and WFP warehouse?