The facilitator can introduce the below questions at appropriate times during the exercise or during a post-exercise discussion. Ideally, participants will raise many of these points as they work through the scenario.

One to three hours have been allocated for the case study, depending on the context and facilitator’s discretion. The two injects may be issued as appropriate by the facilitator to develop the scenario and the discussion. Time will be tight.

Participants will need a map of Carana and familiarity with IPI’s Carana “Light” scenario. It would be helpful for them to have a copy of Security Council Resolution 2272. Facilitators can make other assumptions regarding facts and tasks relevant to the scenario based on experience in missions or knowledge of the Carana scenario.

Scenario-based exercises can help units train to handle potential situations effectively and efficiently. They allow trainees to think through problems and work out responses before challenges actually occur and can help them identify preventive measures that can preclude problems from arising. Scenario-based training also creates a dialogue platform for peers to develop and share alternative points of view and explore a range of perspectives and courses of actions.

The facilitator should highlight attributes of leadership and effective decision making, including knowledge and understanding of how to navigate the handling and follow-up on allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) from a mission perspective, as well as critical analysis and judgment regarding:

- **Conduct**: reporting in a way that does not presuppose misconduct but does facilitate accountability for criminal acts, misconduct, or other breaches of UN policy
- **Care**: undertaking victim/survivor-centered investigations and responses
- **Command and leadership**: combining systemic issues, risk minimization, and prevention
- **Communications**: discerning multiple audiences, timeframes, and strategic purposes
- **Conscience**: maintaining and exhibiting mission ethics

Throughout the scenario, and at each escalation stage, the participants (acting as the mission leadership team, or MLT) should develop a dynamic response plan with the following elements:

1. **Prevention**, which may include:
   - Providing training on policy and preventive practice such as non-fraternization...
• Issuing directives to contingents
• Providing guidance on appropriate practice to prevent SEA
• Conducting outreach to communities (particularly to women’s groups) on UN policy and prevention
• Receiving complaints and assisting victims
• Identifying, mitigating, and managing risks (e.g., curfews for UN peacekeepers)

2. **Enforcement**, which may include:
   • Identifying who is responsible for what types of investigation (e.g., mission, contributing country, Office of Internal Oversight Services)
   • Setting information-gathering priorities
   • Determining capability requirements (e.g., personnel trained in trauma-sensitive investigation and evidence collection)
   • Determining how the mission should support contributing countries’ investigations
   • Encouraging victims and witnesses to come forward (e.g., working with local women’s groups, using female investigators, limiting repeat interviews)
   • Determining appropriate conduct accountability processes and disciplinary measures (e.g., leave without pay, immunity waivers, criminal proceedings, repatriation)
   • Identifying who is responsible for what types of accountability measures

3. **Remedial actions**, which may include:
   • Ensuring support to victims

4. **Strategic communications**, which may include:
   • Determining communication goals, messages, and target audiences
   • Determining appropriate communication forms and channels (e.g., press statements, media conferences, social media)

**Target Audience**

This module must be relevant to all aspects of a mission. The target audience is senior leaders at both the political and the operational levels, including:

• Special representatives of the secretary-general
• Deputy special representatives of the secretary-general
• Force commanders
• Police commissioners
• Key D2–P4-level staff (e.g., chiefs of staff, chiefs of joint operations centers, heads of sections, heads of regional offices, heads of sector-level offices, sector commanders, and directors/chefs of mission support)
STAGES

Stage 1: Preparation

In the first stage, the facilitators become familiar with the training material, prepare role players, and brief the mentors and experts involved in the training. They also discuss with them the objectives of the training and ask each to articulate her or his understanding and expectations:

- What is the purpose of the training?
- What can be the added value of scenario-based training?
- What are the expectations related to the training and to this scenario-based format?
- What are the roles and objectives of role players/mentors?

Stage 2: Familiarization

In the second stage, the facilitators orient the training audience on the general situation, the current situation, the rules of engagement, and the discussion questions/task at hand. The facilitators discuss the general situation and the current “crisis” with the training audience and make sure the training audience has a shared understanding of the mandate and rules of engagement. This discussion is a first learning opportunity, whereby each participant clarifies her or his vision of the mission. The facilitator can ask the following questions to ensure a common understanding:

- What is the overall situation in Carana?
- Who are the main actors who are/should be involved, and what are the main stakes?
- What is the mandate and authority of each major actor: the United Nations Assistance Mission in Carana (UNAC), government forces, and Continent Regional Coalition Assistance Mission to Carana (CRCAC)?
- What UN principles are relevant to UNAC? This includes independence, impartiality, and exclusively international character.
- What aspects of a protection of civilians (POC) mandate are relevant to this scenario? This mandate includes not only refraining from harming civilians (doing no harm and minimizing or avoiding collateral damage) but also actively and proactively protecting them from physical violence or threats of violence by other actors, including government forces, rebels or insurgents, terrorists, and criminals.
- What are the relevant UN policies, including the zero tolerance policy for sexual exploitation and abuse, UN Human Rights Screening Policy, and UN Human Rights Due Diligence Policy?
- What are the roles of each player within the scenario?
- What are UNAC’s priorities with regards to the Caranese government?

Stage 3: Training

Either the training audience breaks into small groups to work through the situation or, depending on the size of the group (e.g., if under ten participants), discusses the unfolding of the scenario as a group.
The scenario has four phases:

1. The **first phase** aims to set the scene for why the senior leadership team has been gathered, what its task is, and the context. This first part of the scenario should be given out and jointly read by the participants. If they have any, participants may ask clarifying questions.

2. The **second phase** focuses on the task at hand. Once all is clear, the task should be given out, and the group should have a specific amount of time (10–15 minutes) to discuss among themselves.
   - The facilitator should observe the discussion and answer specific questions if needed and provide extra information if needed.
   - Once the time has ended, the facilitator should lead a brief discussion on the task to gauge responses.

3. Injects are introduced in the **third phase**. The objective is to reflect on the trade-offs and stakes related to the specific crisis/challenge/event at hand. The timing, sequence, and pace of actions and reactions should also be discussed.
   - Again, a specific amount of time should be given per inject (10 minutes), and the facilitator should be available to provide support. Not too much time should be given so as to replicate the pressure of crisis situations.
   - A brief discussion can be held after each inject, with a longer debriefing at the end of the exercise.

4. The **last phase** is the longer debriefing, and the facilitator should reserve a longer period of time (30 minutes) for the discussion. This should focus on the scenario, lessons learned, challenges faced, what is needed to better address these situations, and how to prepare for the realities in the field. The notes below can be used to support this discussion.

### DISCUSSION QUESTIONS

**Question 1: What immediate actions should be taken to prevent SEA, investigate alleged misconduct, trigger remedial actions (including discipline and victim care), and ensure appropriate strategic communications?**

First, the MLT should assume that the allegations are genuine and will be verified. While it is possible that the reports will be substantiated, a team that first responds by trying to substantiate or prove allegations may not be fulfilling its responsibility to follow applicable investigations procedures and may delay the imperative to prevent harm, respond to victims/survivors, preserve evidence, and safeguard the mission’s reputation and effectiveness by being proactive rather than defensive.

Leadership should also immediately gather information and preserve evidence (as opposed to investigating) and conduct a risk assessment to prevent further occurrences. This is challenging when known information about the incident is incomplete. If reports
become actionable, caring for victims who are children will be a particularly complex priority, so the MLT should look at available resources and check protocol. In this case, an “actionable report” is one that contains enough information to initiate UN procedures for responding to SEA. This can include:

- Providing victim care
- Knowing what types of personnel are involved and engaging the appropriate track within the UN
- Identifying an appropriate source of more specific information to help reach a “decision point” about whether an SEA case should be reported as an allegation

Throughout this process, personnel deployed to do initial information gathering should be aware that they may discover warning signs of a wider problem. While it remains possible that these allegations won’t be substantiated or that they refer to an isolated incident, the MLT should be alert to the following:

- The possibility of multiple victims raises a red flag for systemic misconduct, suggesting a pattern of SEA.
- The fact that the report was anonymous may suggest inadequate community complaints mechanisms and/or concerns about the safety and confidentiality of procedures for reporting misconduct. Appropriate preventive actions may include community outreach to encourage reporting and facilitate relevant information gathering, while prioritizing victims' safety and confidentiality.
- The allegation that abuse may have occurred on the UN base raises another red flag for systemic misconduct, since it significantly increases the likelihood that others knew of the misconduct and did nothing (or not enough) to prevent it. The close living and working conditions of a typical UN base make it unlikely that such conduct went unnoticed.

This preliminary stage may not yet call for full public reporting, but protocol should be reviewed, and communications should be prepared. For example, the team might review roles and responsibilities, lines of communication, and arrangements at the local and HQ levels so that it is prepared if an actionable report is brought forward or the case escalates. The risk of not publicly disclosing reports should also be considered. At a minimum, mission leadership must recognize that the possibility of multiple complaints of SEA in multiple locations increases the likelihood of media scrutiny.

The MLT should also consider that:

- It should remain calm and not overreact (e.g., going straight to recording an allegation would be highly premature).
- The location of the alleged abuse speaks to the power relationships that are central to UN policy on conduct.
- Pre-deployment training and post-deployment follow-up should ensure that all personnel (not just those in the military contingent) have a working knowledge of UN standards of conduct and the “no excuses card” (see Additional Resources).
- The re-hatted contingent from Country X has likely changed in-mission dynamics, which may play a role in the sudden reporting of SEA (i.e., it is probably not a
coincidence that this came to light when another country’s troops joined the mission). Rather, it may be an indicator that there is a wider problem of SEA or other misconduct and could suggest a lack of trust between the local community and the re-hatted troops.

Throughout, the MLT’s response should be trauma-sensitive and victim-centered. Resolution 2272 directs the secretary-general to ensure “due consideration for the safety, security and confidentiality of victims” in investigations and to assist victims by “maintaining confidentiality, helping to minimize trauma and facilitating access, as appropriate, to immediate care, medical and psychological support.” Victim/survivor support should be a primary consideration at this stage, though this is complicated by the possibility of multiple cases.

**Question 2: How should the MLT address competences in care, conduct, command/leadership, communications, and conscience?**

In terms of care for victims, the response should consider that:

- Harm and trauma minimization is a crucial dimension of appropriate fact-finding, as it is both in the immediate interest of the victim and in the longer-term interest of seeing their case dealt with appropriately.
- The possibility of multiple victims would increase the resources needed to provide care.
- Medical and psychosocial services are likely to be grossly inadequate. Mapping support services (e.g., local support groups, the UN humanitarian team, international NGOs) and developing contingency plans to augment them if needed will not be a waste of time, no matter what happens.
- Follow-up should include wider assessment of the need for services for victims/survivors of sexual and gender-based violence as part of peacebuilding and exploration of possible courses of action.

In terms of the conduct of personnel, the response should recognize that:

- An isolated report could be a red flag for a more widespread problem across the mission (e.g., because it is operating in a context of broader sexual and gender-based violence), in a particular location (e.g., because of the specific vulnerabilities of people in an IDP camp), or in a particular national contingent (e.g., because of poor discipline, poor command, or other practices that make misconduct more likely).
- On-base abuse may indicate a systemic problem, since it is unlikely to occur without others’ knowledge. This means that misconduct now potentially has multiple dimensions—the conduct itself and the failure of others to report it—engaging a second layer of individuals.
- There may be barriers to reporting within the mission, including inadequate protections for those reporting misconduct and non-transmission of values and expectations around reporting misconduct that a peacekeeper may witness.
In terms of command and leadership, the response should:

- Prioritize discussing the implications for other mission activities (e.g., protection patrols/harm assessment).
- Consider whether this conduct, if real, could have gone unknown to colleagues of the individual in question.
- Demonstrate awareness that the misconduct may be systemic and could include failures of leadership in the command chain of the Country X contingent.
- Recognize other implications of the way the report was received, including the complainant’s decision to approach a woman peacekeeper, as well as the potential risks to the safety of women peacekeepers, especially the soldier the victim disclosed to if she is identified during the investigation.
- Monitor this case and each step taken, defining specific responsibilities and targets for information.
- Show that planning should focus on directing and coordinating information gathering, evidence preservation, and action to minimize harm to civilians while preserving the space for the appropriate agency to conduct subsequent investigations.

In terms of communications, the response should:

- Recognize that a communications strategy is an essential tool of the response.
- Recognize that, even if the leadership team does not consider that the threshold for public transparency of these reports has been crossed, it needs to prepare for a strategy to deal with potential media scrutiny.
- Identify appropriate reporting channels and processes both with HQ, the Department of Operational Support, the Department of Peace Operations, the Office of Internal Oversight Services, and the troop-contributing country and with host-country authorities.
- Facilitate community outreach, recognizing the importance of accessible, trusted community complaints mechanisms to facilitate reporting.
- Prepare the leadership team for media scrutiny.

A response guided by conscience should:

- Make an effort to strengthen prevention of SEA, including communication within the mission (e.g., encouragement of reporting) and to the local population (e.g., within the IDP camp in coordination with relevant agencies).
- Review the accessibility of complaint mechanisms and outreach activities.

Debriefing considerations

The overarching issue here is that there are often many more questions than answers in the beginning stages, but the mission leadership nonetheless needs to be committed to undertaking UN-mandated reporting and follow-up. Every participant should be aware of and able to connect the dots between:

- The UN’s overarching zero tolerance policy
The secretary-general’s bulletin
- How troops understand UN standards of conduct and the “no excuses card” (see Additional Resources)
- The possibility of noncompliance and subsequent action that should be taken, in accordance with the matrix of responsibilities and the flowchart for action (see Additional Resources).

That is the fundamental framework within which the MLT will need to operate in any situation where SEA has occurred; any doubts about that at this stage need to be resolved before proceeding.

**Memo to chief of staff from human rights officer** (excerpt): “Secondary reports have been received that some members of the Country X peacekeeping contingent have boasted of paying young women for sex.”

**Correspondence to force commander from Country X commander** (excerpt): “Investigations conducted by the Country X battalion have confirmed that two lieutenants deployed with that battalion engaged in prostitution. Those lieutenants have been confined to base, pending disciplinary actions directed from my capital.”

**Task:** UNHQ has requested a briefing from the MLT via VTC to explain the strategic response plan and detail the immediate next steps, including the directives to be given to all troop contingents, police units, and civilian personnel about the mission-wide prevention and risk management plan for SEA.

**Assessment of widespread misconduct:** The key issue is whether this new report might indicate a widespread pattern of misconduct or otherwise questionable behavior that is not (fully) compliant with UN standards of conduct and the “no excuses card” (see Additional Resources).

- Participants should recognize that transactional sex is misconduct, regardless of whether it is consensual. It is irrelevant whether prostitution is unlawful in Carana or the troop-contributing country; the response is based on UN policy, which prohibits such conduct.
- Participants should also recognize that payment doesn’t rule out the occurrence of rape and other sexual abuse.

**Reporting and communications:** Transactional sex is a trigger for an SEA response. While there is not enough information to record an allegation (see flowchart in Additional Resources) mission leadership has a duty to complete the fact-finding step. Multiple cases increase the likelihood of more public knowledge. If an allegation is made, the MLT is responsible for making a public announcement.
Competencies for assessment (human rights officer memo)

In terms of care for victims, the MLT should recognize that:

- The misconduct described is sexual exploitation and/or abuse and that it therefore triggers the mission’s obligation to provide care, support, and confidentiality for victims/survivors.
- Victims may face medical risks (e.g., sexually transmitted infections).
- Paternity claims could arise from this misconduct.
- The UN has taken on a duty to provide care in any case of SEA, even if it is said to be transactional sex, and that this duty has already commenced.
- The victims’ ages have not yet been determined and they may be children.

In terms of the conduct of personnel, the MLT should recognize that:

- Peacekeepers are prohibited from having sex with anyone in exchange for money, employment, preferential treatment, goods or services, regardless of the legal status of prostitution in the host or home country.
- Any form of nonconsensual sexual activity or sexual activity with children constitutes sexual abuse.
- Payment for sex does not preclude the possibility of serious sexual abuse, including rape.
- Reports may flag other types of disciplinary problems (e.g., if misconduct occurred on duty or on base).

In terms of command and leadership, the response should:

- Recognize the importance of a strong, united leadership response guided by the UN’s zero tolerance policy.
- Consider the need for in-mission training, awareness-raising, and other activities to promote understanding of the UN’s codes of conduct and related policies.
- Consider the implications of the way the report was received (e.g., outside of the chain of command).
- Recognize the risks to mission staff—such as the human rights officer—whose jobs require them to report misconduct.

In terms of communications, the response should:

- Revisit upward and outward reporting channels and processes—including with HQ, the Department of Operational Support, the Department of Peace Operations, the Office of Internal Oversight Services, the troop-contributing country, and host-country authorities—now that it seems clear that conduct contrary to UN policy took place.
- Acknowledge the need to follow up and engage further with the human rights officer who raised the issue and who may be a conduit for actionable reports.

A response guided by conscience should:
• Recognize that while, so far, the “prostitutes” involved are described as “young women,” both of these terms are open to interpretation.
• Recognize that “young women” could include those under 18 years of age, that any kind of sexual activity with anyone under 18 is prohibited, and that mistaken belief as to the age of the person is no excuse.
• Verify the ages of those involved.

**Competencies for assessment (Country X commander memo)**

The MLT must pursue a comprehensive response. The crucial issue here is the dynamic between elements of mission leadership; the case is now as much about how the battalion commander interacts with the rest of mission leadership as it is about the incidents in question. This is also the point at which mission leadership must consider investigating a member state.

Transactional sex constitutes SEA under UN policy. Mission leadership now has enough information to be at the decision point (on the flowchart in Additional Resources). The mission must now record the allegations as an SEA case for investigation and make a public announcement, with formal notification of the member state and a ten-day window for that member state to decide whether to investigate. Participants should also recognize that the battalion commander may be seeking to avoid suspension of payments to the member state (see flowchart in Additional Resources).

In terms of the conduct of personnel, the response should:

• Apply the system-wide responsibility matrix (see Annex V in Additional Resources) to consider the responsibilities of the troop-contributing country, the mission, and the UN for gathering information, preserving evidence, conducting investigations, and following up on allegations with accountability measures.
• Clarify that the disciplinary action implemented by the battalion commander does not close the matter from a UN perspective, and the battalion commander may need to be reminded that there are other duties to be fulfilled now that he is re-hatted.
• Assess whether supervisors behaved inappropriately or were not adequately observing their team’s conduct.

In terms of command and leadership, the response should:

• Assess the cooperativeness of the Country X battalion commander and the completeness of his response under UN policy.

In terms of communication, the response should:

• Show understanding of—and compliance with—the decision point in the flowchart (see Additional Resources), which includes determining when a public announcement from the mission is required.
• Review and further assess assumptions about the extent to which this information will be transmitted to the public and the implications of doing so.

A response guided by conscience should:

• Give attention to whether reporting through the chain of command, as required in this mission, is sufficient to identify misconduct among peacekeepers (e.g., consider whether and when supervisors of the accused were aware of their conduct and analyze the timeliness of the reporting and response).

Debriefing considerations (human rights officer memo)

• When can mission leadership start taking different forms of action? What is the appropriate verification threshold?
• How should mission leadership weigh responding to this with the many other demands of a difficult mission?
• How do the medico-legal risks (including, but not limited to, paternity) feature in the response to this report?
• The two reports together indicate that these are more than isolated problems of misconduct by the Country X contingent. How should this be discussed with the battalion commander?
• Is it the responsibility of mission leadership to consider repatriation of individuals?
• Is it feasible for mission leadership to take proactive measures to investigate the existence of systemic SEA?
• How was the designation of “prostitutes” established, and what are the implications?
• The individuals described as “young women” may be children. What additional care requirements would this raise? What are the implications of a potential direct connection to the earlier (and still unresolved) reports passed to the women peacekeepers?

Debriefing considerations (Country X commander memo)

• The “no excuses card” specifically covers this type of situation; it is not a matter of discretion (see Additional Resources).
• Does the response of the Country X battalion commander show willingness to deal with the issue properly, or was it more intended to do damage control, containing the situation to two soldiers and “merely” exploitation?
• How should the mission communicate the situation internally? Externally? Publicly?
• Review analysis of appropriate prioritization in the mission context, as the two reports together indicate a problem of misconduct and lack of discipline.
After two weeks, no information on disciplinary actions taken by Country X’s capital has been transmitted to the MLT.

**Correspondence to deputy SRSG from Refugees International** (excerpt):
“We have received reports from a local women’s group that a large number of women and children have been raped and otherwise sexually abused by peacekeepers from Country X. The peacekeepers reportedly left payment for their victims, a tactic commonly employed to ‘disguise’ rape as consensual sex. Refugees International intends to issue a press release within 24 hours noting that we have credible evidence that at least seven children and six women are victims of abuse by UN peacekeepers from Country X.”

**Twitter post: @rightsjusticenow (Rights and Justice International, an international human rights advocacy NGO active in Carana):**
“Rape, abuse and prostitution rampant in UN’s Carana: We have new reports of peacekeepers raping women and girls with impunity while the UN turns a blind eye. More soon.”

**Task:** UNHQ has requested a briefing from the MLT via VTC to discuss the strategic response plan in light of these new developments and outline immediate next steps.

**UN/member-state obligations:** In light of the non-response from Country X, mission leadership must request that UNHQ fully engage with the member state to fulfill its obligation to respond to SEA. Since the timeframe within which the member state should have acted or declined to act has now passed, the main goal is to coordinate a UN response.

**Assessment of systemic misconduct:** Participants should now be alarmed that the allegations indicate systemic problems and widespread misconduct sufficient to trigger repatriation and other disciplinary measures. The likelihood of breakdowns in the chain of command should also alert participants that they need to adjust the prevention strategy. Participants should note that the identity of the troops confined to barracks is not given, and that the seniority of personnel identified for disciplinary action is significant to assessing any breakdown in the chain of command (and thus the likelihood of systemic misconduct).

**Strategic communications:** The UN now faces a full-blown public communications crisis, which poses serious risks to its reputation in Carana and worldwide. Participants should be aware of the need to publicly report these allegations of misconduct—referring to the flowchart and/or Annex V (see Additional Resources)—but also that public
communications must be geared toward the larger strategic goal of preserving the UN’s legitimacy.

**Timing of allegations:** Note that it is unclear when the SEA reported by Refugees International occurred. It is possible that this case predates the re-hatting of Country X personnel, which could be a significant detail for the investigation. The timing is unlikely to affect strategic communications or risks to the UN’s reputation.

**Competencies for assessment**

In terms of care for victims, the response should recognize that:

- This development represents a significant escalation in the allegations and suggests that SEA is likely to be highly underreported.
- Even if all complaints known to Rights and Justice International predate the re-hatting timeframe, underreporting means that more cases are likely to come to light, and there is no reason to believe the misconduct ceased with the re-hatting.
- Child protection procedures should be triggered.
- The local women’s group is a significant asset. However, that group, survivors of SEA, and other members of the community may distrust UN personnel.
- If discipline in the Country X battalion is up to standard, the local women’s group, survivors of SEA, and other members of the community may be put at risk of reprisals by these reports. Those peacekeepers involved in escalating the matter or gathering information to substantiate the reports could also be at risk.

In terms of conduct of personnel, the response should:

- Use UN policy to trigger an investigation of the earlier “transactional sex” episode and seek policy guidance on how to connect these cases and proceed accordingly.
- Revise the assessment of whether or not supervisors behaved appropriately.

In terms of command and leadership, the response should:

- Demonstrate an ability to plan and respond to (rapid) escalation in the seriousness of the allegations, taking note that the MLT is now dealing with players outside the UN system (in particular those whose communications they do not control).
- Analyze coordination dynamics when interfacing with the international NGO, as well as with other civil society organizations and UN agencies.
- Recognize the need to preserve evidence and assess investigation capabilities, including the trauma-sensitivity of available personnel.
- Review prioritization of tasks.

In terms of communications, the response should:

- Review and further assess assumptions about how this information will be received publicly in Carana, in the member state, and in UN offices.
• Recognize that these allegations, as well as the scrutiny of non-UN organizations, represent a serious public communications crisis for the mission.

A response guided by conscience should:

• Revise the assessment of Country X’s battalion commander based on his cooperativeness thus far.
• Pay attention to whether reporting through the chain of command, as required by UNAC’s mandate, is meeting mission needs (e.g., whether supervisors are adequately maintaining conduct standards).

Debriefing considerations

• What new risks and opportunities for strategic communications does this development pose? Who are the important audiences for the mission when responding to the likely press coverage of the issue? What internal processes does UNAC need to reinforce against increasing media enquiries?
• At what point does this cross the "widespread and systematic" threshold for repatriation of a national contingent under Resolution 2272? At what point should leadership recommend that the secretary-general repatriate the abusive contingent? What are the implications of (potential) repatriation for the rest of the mission? Should these implications influence assessment of whether the conduct is “widespread and systematic”?
• Though the Country X battalion commander expressed some willingness to deal with the issue, does this new information raise additional concerns?
• How should the mission communicate the updated situation internally? Externally? Publicly?
• Has the response been sufficiently prioritized in line with the mission context, considering that the two reports together indicate a problem of misconduct and lack of discipline?
• What additional risks arise from this larger number of verified (or on their way to being verified) cases and the obvious public attention it will attract?

ADDITIONAL RESOURCES

• Report of the Secretary-General: Special Measures for Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse: A New Approach, UN Doc. A/71/818, February 28, 2017, available at https://undocs.org/A/71/818). Two components are especially important for this module:
  o The zero-tolerance policy
  o Annex V: “System-wide Matrix of Responsibilities to Prevent and Respond to Sexual Exploitation and Abuse" (this highlights the underlying need to
accept the possibility of noncompliance and the obligation for a leadership response)

- UN materials on individual conduct to support the zero tolerance policy can be found at the United Nations’ “Conduct in UN Field Missions” web page and are downloadable from https://conduct.unmissions.org. This is the source for the most up-to-date materials for all mission personnel.
- UN Peacekeeping Standards of Conduct’s infographic titled “Sexual Exploitation and Abuse: Management of Reports and Allegations Involving UN Personnel in Peacekeeping and Special Political Missions,” available at https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/standards-of-conduct. The leadership “decision point” in the flowchart is especially important, as it directly precedes recording the allegation of SEA in formal UN terms.
- Whether or not a formal investigation eventually occurs, the MLT needs to act in a way consistent with provisions of the UN Secretariat’s Protection against Retaliation for Reporting Misconduct and for Cooperating with Duly Authorized Audits or Investigations, UN Doc. ST/SGB/2017/2, January 20, 2017.

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