The facilitator can introduce the below questions at appropriate times during the exercise or during a post-exercise discussion. Ideally, participants will raise many of these points as they work through the scenario.

One to three hours have been allocated for the case study, depending on the context and facilitator’s discretion. The four injects may be issued as appropriate by the facilitator to develop the scenario and the discussion. Time will be tight.

Participants will need a map of Carana and familiarity with IPI’s Carana “Light” scenario. Facilitators can make other assumptions regarding facts and tasks relevant to the scenario based on experience in missions or knowledge of the Carana scenario.

### OBJECTIVES AND AUDIENCE

#### Objectives

Scenario-based exercises can help units train to handle potential situations effectively and efficiently. They allow trainees to think through problems and work out responses before challenges actually occur and can help them identify preventive measures that can preclude problems from arising. Scenario-based training also creates a dialogue platform for peers to develop and share alternative points of view and explore a range of perspectives and courses of actions.

The facilitator should highlight attributes of leadership and effective decision making, including the readiness, willingness, and ability to:

- Implement the mandate and exercise authority
- Assume responsibility and lead others
- Ensure robust performance by all under their authority and address bad performance or non-performance efficiently
- Coordinate with other UN components, including through a whole-of-mission approach to the protection of civilians
- Act with only the interests of the UN mandate in mind
- Act in accordance with a specific, measurable, achievable, risk-informed, and timely (SMART) strategic plan
- Consult with local communities and affected populations.
Target Audience

This module must be relevant to all aspects of a mission. The target audience is senior leaders at both the political and the operational levels, including:

- Special representatives of the secretary-general
- Deputy special representatives of the secretary-general
- Force commanders
- Police commissioners
- Key D2–P4-level staff (e.g., chiefs of staff, chiefs of joint operations centers, heads of sections, heads of regional offices, heads of sector-level offices, sector commanders, and directors/chiefs of mission support)

2 STAGES

Stage 1: Preparation

In the first stage, the facilitators become familiar with the training material, prepare role players, and brief the mentors and experts involved in the training. They also discuss with them the objectives of the training and ask each to articulate her or his understanding and expectations:

- What is the purpose of the training?
- What can be the added value of scenario-based training?
- What are the expectations related to the training and to this scenario-based format?
- What are the roles and objectives of role players/mentors?

Stage 2: Familiarization

In the second stage, the facilitators orient the training audience on the general situation, the current situation, the rules of engagement, and the discussion questions/task at hand. The facilitators discuss the general situation and the current “crisis” with the training audience and make sure the training audience has a shared understanding of the mandate and rules of engagement. This discussion is a first learning opportunity, whereby each participant clarifies her or his vision of the mission. The facilitator can ask the following questions to ensure a common understanding:

- What is the overall situation in Carana?
- Who are the main actors who are/should be involved, and what are the main stakes?
- What is the mandate and authority of each major actor: the United Nations Assistance Mission in Carana (UNAC), government forces, and Continent Regional Coalition Assistance Mission to Carana (CRCAC)?
- What UN principles are relevant to UNAC? This includes independence, impartiality, and exclusively international character.
• What aspects of a protection of civilians (POC) mandate are relevant to this scenario? This mandate includes not only refraining from harming civilians (doing no harm and minimizing or avoiding collateral damage) but also actively and proactively protecting them from physical violence or threats of violence by other actors, including government forces, rebels or insurgents, terrorists, and criminals.

• What are the relevant UN policies, including the zero tolerance policy for sexual exploitation and abuse, UN Human Rights Screening Policy, and UN Human Rights Due Diligence Policy?

• What are the roles of each player within the scenario?

• What are UNAC’s priorities with regards to the Caranese government?

Stage 3: Training

Either the training audience breaks into small groups to work through the situation or, depending on the size of the group (e.g., if under ten participants), discusses the unfolding of the scenario as a group.

The scenario has four phases:

1. The first phase aims to set the scene for why the senior leadership team has been gathered, what its task is, and the context. This first part of the scenario should be given out and jointly read by the participants. If they have any, participants may ask clarifying questions.

2. The second phase focuses on the task at hand. Once all is clear, the task should be given out, and the group should have a specific amount of time (10–15 minutes) to discuss among themselves.

   • The facilitator should observe the discussion and answer specific questions if needed and provide extra information if needed.
   • Once the time has ended, the facilitator should lead a brief discussion on the task to gauge responses.

3. Injects are introduced in the third phase. The objective is to reflect on the trade-offs and stakes related to the specific crisis/challenge/event at hand. The timing, sequence, and pace of actions and reactions should also be discussed.

   • Again, a specific amount of time should be given per inject (10 minutes), and the facilitator should be available to provide support. Not too much time should be given so as to replicate the pressure of crisis situations.
   • A brief discussion can be held after each inject, with a longer debriefing at the end of the exercise.

4. The last phase is the longer debriefing, and the facilitator should reserve a longer period of time (30 minutes) for the discussion. This should focus on the scenario, lessons learned, challenges faced, what is needed to better address these situations, and
how to prepare for the realities in the field. The notes below can be used to support this discussion.

**DISCUSSION QUESTIONS**

**Question 1: What do we know about the situation?**

This security situation is complicated by the number of stakeholders involved. The threatened site is owned by the UN Country Team (UNCT, i.e., it is shared by a number of UN funds, programs, and agencies), not by the United Nations Assistance to Carana (UNAC). However, the special representative of the secretary-general (SRSG) is responsible for the team’s personnel because of her added role as the designated official for security for Carana. While the victims come under the UN's Security Management System, the UN force and UN police are also stakeholders. UNAC’s protection of civilians (POC) mandate under Chapter VII of the UN Charter demands a response, as does its mandate to “protect UN personnel, facilities, installations and equipment.” There appears to have been a hostile act, which allows for the use of force where necessary, but it is not clear who has committed it.

The Mission Leadership Team (MLT) will likely include the SRSG; deputy SRSG for political affairs (DSRSG-PA); deputy SRSG/resident coordinator/humanitarian coordinator (DSRSG/RC/HC), who will be the conduit to the UNCT; force commander (FC); police commissioner (PC); chief of staff (CoS); director of mission support (DMS); chief of the Joint Operations Centre (JOC); and chief of the Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC). All these people would likely be in the Crisis Management Group (CMG) chaired by the SRSG. But given the nature of the crisis, it would be highly advisable to have other personnel such as representatives from the Strategic Communications and Public Information Office, the principal security adviser from the Department of Safety and Security (DSS), the senior legal adviser, the director of the Human Rights Division, and the chief of civil affairs help senior leadership address the crisis.

The MLT will have to balance the management of the crisis with the continuation of its mission-wide responsibilities. The mission has a crisis-management structure that includes a Crisis Management Working Group (CMWG) to provide continuous monitoring and assessment and provide recommendations to the CMG (which is effectively the expanded MLT). The JOC will be the main stakeholder charged with gathering many of the answers to Questions 1 and 2 and would be the likely location for the CMWG. The CMWG is normally chaired by a senior mission leader, a deputy SRSG, or the mission chief of staff. It would have senior representatives from the stakeholders represented in the CMG.

Faron has an integrated UN base. There is a head of office in Faron for Mhabek Province with a regional JOC. As the area security coordinator for Mhabek Province, he has responsibility for the security of all UN personnel in his area under the UN Security Management System. The sector HQ is at Faron, where there is also a battalion HQ, an infantry company, and other force elements, including a Level 2 hospital. The battalion
provides the sector quick reaction force (QRF) 30 minutes’ notice to move. A UN police (UNPOL) formed police unit is also collocated at Faron with a team of UN military observers.¹

The company at Perkes comes from the Faron battalion. It is heavily committed to cease-fire monitoring, force protection, and joint liaison work between the Carana Defence Forces and the Mouvement Patriotique de Carana (MPC). It is also committed to providing a platoon at one hour’s notice to move.

There is an Mi-8 helicopter at Faron. Participants should note the time of day and immediately start initiating procedures to request casualty evacuation or troop insertion. They would want to know if there is emergency helicopter lift capacity in Galesi. (There is, but it is one hour’s flying time away.)

**Question 2: What do we not know but need to know?**

Participants should think about the other information needed to help them make decisions and understand the situation. The JOC should provide situational assessments that are as current and accurate as possible. The facilitator may have to provide fabricated, but realistic, answers to inquiries from the participants, but in many cases, the desired answers would not be immediately available. The CMWG should attempt to understand the actors and their motivations as well as other situational factors. There may be a tendency to delay any decision making until all feel they have a complete understanding of the situation; however, perfect understanding is rarely achieved, and its pursuit may lead to inaction.

Participants will be heavily dependent on information from the head of office (HOO) in Faron as well as from the sector HQ. While they are in the same integrated camp, their respective operations rooms are not collocated, so there will be friction in the passing of information.

**Question 3: What has been done?**

At this stage, it is unlikely much will have been done apart from issuing alerts and situational warning orders and ordering the JOC and CMWG to stand to. These would be replicated by the HOO in Faron and at sector HQ.

**Question 4: What needs to be done immediately and in the longer term? By whom and when?**

Most of the required actions will occur at the local, tactical level, and the CMWG will have limited immediate impact. For example, the sector commander should decide to

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¹ A formed police unit (FPU) is deployed as part of a United Nations mission. An FPU consists of approximately 140 police officers, trained and equipped to act as a cohesive unit capable of accomplishing policing tasks that individual police officers could not address. For more information see https://police.un.org/en/formed-police-units-fpus.
deploy a response force and alert the Level II hospital to expect casualties without being directed. (Note that the Level II hospital is a military asset under the tasking authority of the director of mission support, but in these circumstances there would likely be a twin-track approach to issuing warning orders.) However, the CMWG should actively monitor events and, if necessary, alert subordinate organizations because of the potential strategic significance of the event. The CMWG should take steps to support the responding force, for example, by making helicopter support or aerial surveillance available and ensuring medical teams are on standby to evacuate casualties (even though the precise medical requirements are unknown). Consideration should be given to the deployment of an integrated, multidisciplinary assessment team from mission HQ in Galasi with the ability to secure evidence for any subsequent investigation or inquiry and timed to arrive shortly after the QRF.

**Question 5: What, how, and when do we communicate, and to whom?**

Information stovepipes work against good crisis management. Participants need to think through how to ensure that all stakeholders are sharing information in all directions and that UNHQ is provided a coherent report and subsequent updates. (Support from the integrated operational team in this crisis will be important.) Situational awareness program technology is critical to ensuring key stakeholders share a common understanding of the situation. It is worth stressing to participants that they have a responsibility to ensure that such technology is deployed, utilized, and institutionalized.

Multiple agencies will need to be notified, and the JOC should manage this process. The Military Operations Centre (MOC) and Police Operations Centre (POC) are often part of the JOC, and this is considered a best practice. Communications should be maintained between the JOC, MOC, POC, HQ Sector 2, and head of office in Mhabek. Other mission and UNCT organizations, including those in other provinces, should be notified in case this is the first of a series of attacks on UN organizations. It may be appropriate for MLT personnel to contact their counterparts in the Caranese government to inform them of the situation and possibly request assistance. The sector commander, head of office, and senior UNPOL representative may conduct similar engagements with Caranese officials at their level. Depending on relations with armed groups that may have conducted the attack, the mission may attempt to establish lines of communication with these groups.

Overall, the Strategic Communications and Public Information Office should prepare a communications strategy for the incident, including appropriate news bulletins, and manage external communications on the incident.

**Inject 1**

The JOC deputy chief enters the room with an update based on a second call from the HOO. The World Food Programme (WFP) employee had called again and reported that she thinks some of the attackers might be wearing uniforms of the Caranese Defence
It sounded like she was discovered by the attackers, and her phone call ended abruptly. The HOO has been unable to make additional contact with her or any other personnel at the sub-office.

1. **What should be done if the attackers are alleged to be members of Carana’s security forces?**

The CMWG will want to think through what has changed in its initial analysis of the five questions. Try to get them to ask the five questions for each inject. What has changed?

UNAC is mandated to assist the Government of National Reconciliation of Carana in a variety of ways, including by supporting governance and protecting civilians. If the allegation is true, it is extremely serious for the mission and the overall Kalari Peace Process. However, the attack may have been conducted by non-state armed actors posing as Caranese soldiers in an attempt to spoil the peace process. Alternatively, it could have been directed by a discontented Caran leader in the Carana Defence Forces unhappy with the direction of the peace process and the loss of Caran power and influence.

Question 2 has additional implications here. While the rules of engagement would permit the use of deadly force in such a situation, the political and future security implications would be complex. There could be issues with the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (HRRDP) if UNAC is helping restructure the armed forces of Carana. Nevertheless, it would be dangerous to jump to conclusions. The CMWG should try to establish the facts and find out what it does not know but desperately needs to know.

Meanwhile, the SRSG may wish to contact the prime minister in Carana’s Government of National Reconciliation personally regarding the event. If the incident indicates the government’s increased loss of consent to the UN’s presence, the SRSG should consult with the Department of Peace Operations and solicit support from New York to encourage influential member states to put pressure on Carana and the regional organization that brokered the peace agreement (the Continent Regional Coalition, which is equivalent to the AU).

Under Question 5, rumor control will be critical in this situation, and the CMWG will want to consider its communication strategy.

### Inject 2

The UN HOO in Faron asks for a UN military response to rescue the personnel being attacked at the Perkes UNCT site and to remain on-site to provide security to its staff. The sector commander estimates that he can get a platoon to the UNCT site from the company at Perkes within 30 minutes. However, any further help will need to come from the sector QRF at Faron, which will take over an hour to travel the 15 kilometers to the Perkes site because of poor road conditions and the uncertain security situation.
1. How can responsive quick reaction forces (QRFs) be created?

Although responsibility for QRFs lies at the tactical level, the force commander should ensure that the military and other components share common expectations of them. Because QRFs are provided by diverse contingents with different levels of proficiency, the force HQ should consider developing standard operating procedures for them, which must be regularly practiced. If caveats exist, they must be known. It is usually too late to discover them in a crisis.

While in principle all commanders should keep part of their force in reserve or as a QRF, such precautions are driven by the threat assessment. Normally, a battalion would designate a platoon for this role. Ideally, this would be the platoon’s primary responsibility, because if it has other tasks, its QRF capability will be degraded. However, missions are always overstretched and thinly spread, so corners are often cut. Nevertheless, the responsibilities and expectations of QRFs should be planned for and well known in advance.

We know it will take 30 minutes for the platoon from the Perkes Company to get to the UNCT site. Participants should consider the need to reinforce with the QRF from Faron, including a police and multidisciplinary capacity. Sector HQ would need to coordinate command-and-control arrangements for this option. We know travel time for this contingency would be at least an hour by road.

Participants should consider that deploying a helicopter could speed up the response and travel time. Unit staff must be able to prepare and issue orders quickly and maintain communications with the QRF while it is deployed. Sector HQ must also be prepared to sustain the QRF for an extended deployment, no matter how briefly a mission is anticipated to last, or to reinforce the QRF with a larger force. If the QRF deploys, sector HQ will need to reconstitute a second QRF to respond to another crisis. This will almost certainly require assistance and direction from force HQ.

The QRF could be pre-deployed to a secured location closer to the objective area if it is determined that moving would be prudent. It could be flown into the Perkes Company base itself. Other flight options would create additional vulnerabilities and would require risk assessments. Again, this would need to be managed at the sector level, in conjunction with the Mission Air Operations Centre (MAOC).

2. Who should accompany the response force to the UNCT site?

The platoon from the Perkes Company will have few resources apart from UN infantry soldiers, but it will be first on the scene. It would be a high priority for it to have some women soldiers or police, given that many of the victims are women.

The QRF from Faron will need to be augmented by medical personnel, interpreters, a senior member of the battalion, or sector staff to serve as incident commander; police (as the site is a crime scene); and civilian specialists such as staff from DSS, women
protection advisers, child protection advisers, or human rights officers. Assembling these personnel, however, will delay the QRF’s deployment.

The unit may have to add vehicles to the QRF to accommodate the additional personnel and any equipment. Such an arrangement could be part of the normal QRF package if it is likely to be the norm rather than the exception.

Participants should consider flying in the additional personnel on a Galesi-based helicopter once the site is secure.

3. What are the priority tasks for the response force?

All participants must be conscious that the scenario may be a “come-on” by spoilers to target UNAC. Therefore, depending upon the method of movement chosen, the force must maintain vigilant security while moving to Perkes. A hostile adversary may anticipate the QRF’s deployment and set up ambushes en route or at any likely helicopter-landing site (HLS), including the possible use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs). (This will be part of the MAOC’s risk assessment for flights into the area.)

Upon arriving to the objective area, immediate tasks include establishing security at the site, treating and evacuating casualties, and rendering a situation report to the sector HQ. The QRF should expect a hostile situation and be prepared to respond in accordance with the rules of engagement, including the use of deadly force if necessary. A hostile act has already been committed, and there is every reason to believe that hostile intent remains.

The QRF should maintain a defensive perimeter, convince looters to disperse, control access to the site, and establish a command post. Shortly after it arrives, the QRF should begin local security patrols. It should establish a helicopter-landing zone to support casualty evacuation, visits from investigative teams, and resupply. The QRF should prepare for an extended stay while disturbing the site as little as possible.

Inject 3

The response force arrives at the UNCT Perkes site and finds that the attackers have departed. Three of the UN personnel have been killed, and two others have been wounded and left behind. One of the survivors states that approximately five of his colleagues were bound, blindfolded, and taken away by the attackers in a truck. The office building and a large warehouse that stored humanitarian supplies have both been looted. Villagers are beginning to take many of the supplies and other items that were left behind by the attackers.

1. Should the mission HQ issue any guidance for the responding unit?

Mission HQ must avoid distracting the QRF with continual requests for information. Communications should be routed through the JOC and the sector HQ.
However, mission HQ should ensure that there are clear command-and-control arrangements on the ground, especially as there will be DSS, police, and military elements operating together. At the same time, it will need to provide information regarding any relevant strategic-level developments and any activities that might affect the QRF (e.g., impending mission-level visits or instructions regarding engagements with any Caranese government or military officials).

Mission HQ should be proactive in supporting the sector HQ and QRF. It may be advisable for it to dispatch a mission-level liaison to the sector HQ and QRF. Much will depend on personal relations and the leadership’s confidence in the competence of individuals and units. It may be unwise to assume that orders will be followed precisely and correctly. The sector commander, or even the force commander, may want to consider going onto the ground. The pros and cons of this can be debated.

2. What should be done regarding the abducted UN personnel?

The management of civilian abductees requires specialist support from DSS. This must be requested immediately. Meanwhile, the mission should attempt to learn the identities of the attackers and the locations and conditions of the abducted personnel. Witnesses and Caranese authorities may be able to assist. If quickly available, aerial surveillance may be able to spot the attackers’ vehicles.

Even if the abductees’ location is determined, the best option is for DSS to secure their release through negotiations with the abductors. Neither UNAC nor the Carana security forces are likely to have an elite special operations force capable of attempting a rescue with a high probability of success. Information-gathering activities should reinforce diplomatic efforts.

Inject 4

The abducted personnel, all national staff, were released by the attackers after they were beaten and some were raped. They made their way back to the UNCT site, arriving approximately an hour after the response force. The situation at the site is currently stable, but future attacks on any of the other UN facilities in the sector are possible.

1. What measures must be taken to mitigate the effects of the attack?

Participants should discuss medical support and counselling for the national staff victims, which will be the responsibility of the CMWG, to alleviate the worst effects of the crisis. This speaks to the senior leaders’ duty to care for their staff, both national and international. This must be balanced with the need to gather witness reports, which will be critical to investigating the crimes committed.

UNAC will need to invest in better situational analysis and intelligence collection, including through more social media monitoring. At the same time, it should craft strategic communications on the incident and review its strategic and political approach
with all stakeholders, particularly Carana’s Government of National Reconciliation and UNHQ in New York.

2. What measures might prevent or preempt such an attack from occurring?

All UN civilian personnel should be vigilant about potential threats; for example, they should be alert for suspicious persons who may be observing their activities in preparation for a future attack. Additionally, they should develop their internal incident-response plans and discuss them at their area security coordination meetings. DSS’s Security Management System is designed to produce security risk assessments, which are transmitted to the mission and the UNCT via the regular Security Management Team meetings. Clearly, there will need to be a reassessment in the Faron area. Meanwhile, the JMAC should routinely provide higher-level threat assessments to the mission, which may also be shared with the Security Management Team and UNCT.

Sector and battalion HQ should work closely with the heads of office, who are often the area security coordinators responsible for the UN’s Security Management System in their delegated area. Constructive relationships with local Carana security forces must be developed to enhance area security and provide a source of information on potential threats.

Assembly and deployment of QRFs should be rehearsed frequently. Practice alerts should occur daily and at different times. Periodically, the QRF should deploy to become familiar with routes and potential objective areas. Practice deployments, including patrols, can be conducted in conjunction with other missions, which will help maintain the mission’s presence in the operational area.

QRFs’ deployments and exercises should be coordinated with the relevant UN sub-offices. These offices should discuss potential scenarios, and the QRF should understand the strengths and activities of field office personnel. The DSRSG/RC/HC may have to stress the importance of such coordination throughout the UNCT to get them to cooperate. Responses may also be coordinated with local Caranese police and military forces, if these are deemed reliable agencies.

If indicators suggest that such an attack is likely and possible, the sector HQ may direct an increased presence in the area, such as through more frequent patrols. Additionally, small security forces may be positioned at the sub-offices. This security may be provided by other military units, the formed police unit, or Carana security forces, or by security guards hired by the UN under DSS control—but not from the QRF. The UN sites may need to be hardened with barriers and shelters. Finally, in extreme circumstances, participants will need to consider protecting UN civilian personnel within UN military compounds (although this would be strongly resisted by the UNCT), which is already happening in Faron.

Lastly, the mission should have a rapid after-action review or assessment and debriefing mechanism to determine what happened in the attack, preserve evidence, and determine early lessons learned for dissemination.
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