The facilitator can introduce the below questions at appropriate times during the exercise or during a post-exercise discussion. Ideally, participants will raise many of these points as they work through the scenario.

**One to three hours have been allocated for the case study, depending on the context and facilitator’s discretion.** The four injects may be issued as appropriate by the facilitator to develop the scenario and the discussion. Time will be tight.

Participants will need a map of Carana and familiarity with IPI’s Carana “Light” scenario. It would be helpful for them to have a copy of Security Council Resolution 4455 and the UN Transitions Policy. Facilitators can make other assumptions regarding facts and tasks relevant to the scenario based on experience in missions or knowledge of the Carana scenario.

### 1 OBJECTIVES AND AUDIENCE

#### Objectives

The facilitator should highlight attributes of leadership and effective decision making, including the readiness, willingness, and ability to:

- Implement the mandate and exercise authority
- Assume responsibility and lead others
- Ensure robust performance by all under their authority and address bad performance or non-performance efficiently
- Coordinate with other UN components, including through a whole-of-mission approach to the protection of civilians
- Act with only the interests of the UN mandate in mind
- Act in accordance with a specific, measurable, achievable, risk-informed, and timely (SMART) strategic plan
- Consult with local communities and affected populations.

#### Target Audience

This module must be relevant to all aspects of a mission. The target audience is senior leaders at both the political and the operational levels, including:

- Special representatives of the secretary-general
- Deputy special representatives of the secretary-general
- Force commanders
- Police commissioners
Key D2–P4-level staff (e.g., chiefs of staff, chiefs of joint operations centers, heads of sections, heads of regional offices, heads of sector-level offices, sector commanders, and directors/chefs of mission support)

2 STAGES

Stage 1: Preparation

In the first stage, the facilitators become familiar with the training material, prepare role players, and brief the mentors and experts involved in the training. They also discuss with them the objectives of the training and ask each to articulate her or his understanding and expectations:

- What is the purpose of the training?
- What can be the added value of scenario-based training?
- What are the expectations related to the training and to this scenario-based format?
- What are the roles and objectives of role players/mentors?

Stage 2: Familiarization

In the second stage, the facilitators orient the training audience on the general situation, the current situation, the rules of engagement, and the discussion questions/task at hand. The facilitators discuss the general situation and the current “crisis” with the training audience and make sure the training audience has a shared understanding of the mandate and rules of engagement. This discussion is a first learning opportunity, whereby each participant clarifies her or his vision of the mission. The facilitator can ask the following questions to ensure a common understanding:

- What is the overall situation in Carana?
- Who are the main actors who are/should be involved, and what are the main stakes?
- What is the mandate and authority of each major actor: the UN Assistance to Carana (UNAC), government forces, and Continent Regional Coalition Assistance Mission to Carana (CRCAC)?
- What UN principles are relevant to UNAC? This includes independence, impartiality, and exclusively international character.
- What aspects of a protection of civilians (POC) mandate are relevant to this scenario? This mandate includes not only refraining from harming civilians (doing no harm and minimizing or avoiding collateral damage) but also actively and proactively protecting them from physical violence or threats of violence by other actors, including government forces, rebels or insurgents, terrorists, and criminals.
- What are the relevant UN policies, including the zero tolerance policy for sexual exploitation and abuse, UN Human Rights Screening Policy, and UN Human Rights Due Diligence Policy?
- What are the roles of each player within the scenario?
• What are UNAC’s priorities with regards to the Caranese government?

Stage 3: Training

Either the training audience breaks into small groups to work through the situation or, depending on the size of the group (e.g., if under ten participants), discusses the unfolding of the scenario as a group.

The scenario has four phases:

1. The **first phase** aims to set the scene for why the senior leadership team has been gathered, what its task is, and the context. This first part of the scenario should be given out and jointly read by the participants. If they have any, participants may ask clarifying questions.

2. The **second phase** focuses on the task at hand. Once all is clear, the task should be given out, and the group should have a specific amount of time (10–15 minutes) to discuss among themselves.

   • The facilitator should observe the discussion and answer specific questions if needed and provide extra information if needed.

   • Once the time has ended, the facilitator should lead a brief discussion on the task to gauge responses.

3. Injects are introduced in the **third phase**. The objective is to reflect on the trade-offs and stakes related to the specific crisis/challenge/event at hand. The timing, sequence, and pace of actions and reactions should also be discussed.

   • Again, a specific amount of time should be given per inject (10 minutes), and the facilitator should be available to provide support. Not too much time should be given so as to replicate the pressure of crisis situations.

   • A brief discussion can be held after each inject, with a longer debriefing at the end of the exercise.

4. The **last phase** is the longer debriefing, and the facilitator should reserve a longer period of time (30 minutes) for the discussion. This should focus on the scenario, lessons learned, challenges faced, what is needed to better address these situations, and how to prepare for the realities in the field. The notes below can be used to support this discussion.
DISCUSSION QUESTIONS

Question 1: What initial steps in planning should the mission and UN country team take? Who should lead and who should be consulted? What is the sequencing of these steps?

Before answering this question, participants should reflect on two points. First, either transition planning can be integrated into existing frameworks (an integrated transition plan), or leadership can draft a stand-alone transition plan. The Mission Leadership Team (MLT) can use the mission’s Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF) or consult the UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) to weigh the pros and cons of creating a stand-alone plan. One advantage of pursuing this course of action is that it would ensure that the transition plan aligns with the mission’s and UN country team’s (UNCT) existing priorities, and day-to-day work could continue during the development process. However, it may also be too restrictive, and issue areas that fall outside of the existing priorities may be missed. For example, the MLT must gauge whether the UN transition policy provides adequate guidance for a context such as Carana, which is facing both elections and a transition.

Second, the MLT should reflect on key work streams and questions relevant to a transition process. These should include questions around the following:

- Understanding the political process; ensuring the UN continues to play a good offices role in the country
- Pursuing integration between the UNCT and UNAC to set up the UNCT for success
- Including human resources and assets in the mission drawdown
- Defining the UNCT’s programmatic goal in the country and assessing its capacity to achieve this
- Communicating with UN staff and the local population throughout the transition process

With these issues in mind, the MLT can develop a plan and consider what financial resources are necessary to achieve a smooth transition (this will be addressed by Question 2).

Participants should note that the transition will happen in phases, so planning should follow that sequencing. The first phase includes closing field offices, drawing down half of UNAC’s uniformed personnel, and handing over security responsibilities to the Caranse national security forces. This short-term plan should be developed alongside planning the long-term transition to the complete mission withdrawal and transition to the UNCT. Within this long-term approach, leadership should think beyond simple logistical planning to consider the future UNCT’s strategic vision and how it can continue political engagement.

If the leadership were to develop an integrated transition plan, UNAC’s MLT would need to work with the entire mission, agencies, funds, and programs that will remain in the country, and the national government and Caranse civil society. Participants should
ensure the leadership has a clear and unanimous understanding of Security Council Resolution 4455 as well as UNAC’s broad mandate and responsibilities. Leadership should clearly communicate with government counterparts to ensure political understanding and align their agendas. Subsequent actions should include a process to map out the plan’s phases, its timeline, team responsibilities, and a detailed overview of tasks. Throughout this, leadership should be considering field office closures, the security handover, and communication with national staff and key actors. The mission should not simply transfer existing activities to the remaining UN presences in the country without taking into account the mandate, capacity, and financing. A working group should be set up to determine how organizations remaining on the ground should prioritize sustaining peace. Participants should spend some time reflecting on how this working group could work with the government during the planning process. It is important to note the current lack of integration between the UNCT and UNAC. This existing lack of integration is likely to pose a challenge to the handover.

The first step toward the security handover is for UNAC to develop a timeline with the government to ensure that both parties are aware of their responsibilities. Though UNAC has trained Caranese security forces for the last ten years, it will be important to take stock of goals the national security apparatus will need to complete on its own. The timeline should include some straightforward, measurable benchmarks to work toward accomplishing those goals. As field offices close, UNAC should analyze the presence of both UN and Caranese security forces across the country, not just in the capital. Low numbers of security forces compounded by field office closures could pose a risk to continued stability, especially in remote areas.

When considering closing field offices, there are a few points that the participants should consider. Logistically, UNAC would need to determine what should happen to the physical offices and the equipment within. These could be handed over to the government, encouraging them to maintain a similar presence. UNAC or the government could also dismantle them and return the equipment to UNAC headquarters. It is also important to consider the role that field office staff play in regional stability. Mission leadership should approach field office closure in regions with histories of violence and unrest, such as Leppko, with particular caution.

Participants should also consider the political nature of a transition. Technical aspects—such as field office closures and staff drawdown—are important but unlikely to generate much interest from senior management due to the mundane technical aspects of the process. Thus, participants should work to ensure that senior management is involved in transition planning and actively ensuring meaningful political engagement after the mission’s withdrawal. Following the loss of both the mission’s resources and the special representative of the secretary-general’s (SRSG) leverage, the remaining, limited UN presence in the field will need a strategy that ensures it is able to continue its good offices role within the new structure.

One possible way to offset these risks is to liaise with regional civil society and local government. Many civil society organizations are adept at early warning and able to mitigate threats before they spiral. Partnerships with these kinds of organizations can
address some of the risks associated with the field offices’ closure, especially if there is limited or no security presence in the region (or if the local population does not trust the existing security presence).

Working with civil society groups focused on women and gender dynamics will be important. The UNCT will most likely not have specialized expertise or focus on women without the presence of UN Women. Still, women will face unique political and security concerns. UN groups and civil society located outside of the capital should pay attention to these concerns and make sure that gender-sensitive programming and analysis is taking place after UNAC departs.

Participants should also be thinking about the second phase of the transition, even as they discuss the initial steps. Within the UN, planning should ensure a seamless transition from the mission presence to the UNCT. Because the UNDAF will expire the same year UNAC closes, the UNCT and UNAC should work closely with the government to develop a new UNDAF. If the government were not yet adhering to agreed-upon priorities, this would be a good time to encourage it to do so. If relevant, the UN should also support development of a new national development plan. If possible, the UNDAF should be designed around the national development plan or at least in close cooperation with the government to ensure shared development priorities.

Creating a UNDAF takes time, especially when a transition of priority programs is looming, along with the possibility that the framework may not be complete by the time the transition happens. Priority programs should be based on the expected capacity of the UNCT and the government’s development priorities. All conversations require strong cooperation between UNAC, the country team, and the government.

Another important consideration is Carana’s economic climate. Because the mission and its staff are contributing to the economy, the closure of the mission without proper economic planning could be debilitating. While the Caranese government is primarily responsible for the country’s economic planning, the SRSG and deputy SRSG/resident coordinator/humanitarian coordinator (DSRSG/RC/HC) should use their good offices role to encourage the government to begin planning for the decrease in income related to real estate and businesses such as hotels and restaurants that are especially dependent on mission staff. The mission should seek to provide advisory support at the government’s request but should not take the lead on any economic planning.

The closure of the mission will mean the end of assessed contributions. This means that the resident coordinator’s (RC) office will need to procure sustainable funding for the new UN presences. UN agencies, funds, and programs will maintain their current funding streams, but there is a possibility that the closure of the mission will decrease interest in funding programs, as it may indicate that Carana is no longer a priority country.
To mobilize donor support, transition plans should address ongoing, long-term resource requirements and include strategies on how to fill resource gaps. This should include national budget processes as well as UN and other donor funding and advocacy. UN leadership should work closely with the World Bank and other partners to encourage national planning for budgeting processes that can prepare Carana for financial and capacity gaps that national institutions are likely to experience due to the drawdown and withdrawal of the mission. The UN should support national partners to use gender-responsive budgeting to adequately allocate resources to women’s needs and priorities.

The RC’s office must consider and then articulate a programmatic vision for the UNCT to consolidate peace in the country post-transition (e.g., what are the UN’s goals in the country?). Establishing an overarching vision for the UNCT will be vital. With this in mind, the RC’s office should initiate a capacity mapping; this will look at the capacities the office will retain when UNAC leaves and how those capacities correspond with the UN’s continuing priorities. In the case of Carana, it is likely that the RC’s office will require capacity for continued political analysis, as some root causes of the unrest have not been addressed.

A comprehensive review of the UN Development Programme (UNDP) should be undertaken to examine what capacity gaps that office could take on, what programs it may inherit, and how its work will be impacted by the withdrawal of UNAC. Consideration should be given to all the agencies, funds, and programs that will remain in Carana, all of which will be undertaking a similar review exercise at this time.

Once potential capacity gaps have been identified, UNAC and the RC will have to start lobbying for funding for these positions. As per the latest resolution on funding for the UN development system (73/424) of October 2018, the costs for these new positions will be funded through cost-sharing arrangements of the UN Secretariat and agencies, funds, and programs (the UN Secretariat, UNDP, UNICEF, and the World Health Organization), a 1 percent coordination levy applied to all development-related activities earmarked for “a single agency, single programme or project,” and voluntary, predictable, multi-year contributions to a dedicated trust fund.

If there is a line item within UNAC’s budget for transitions, participants should discuss using those funds to assist in joint programming efforts based on the UNDAF. But long-term funding still needs to be addressed as well. The UN should coordinate with donor countries already present in Carana to make sure that priority projects and posts have support.

Participants could consider a multi-partner trust fund (MPTF) that would be dedicated to Carana and would receive support from the Peacebuilding Fund and bilateral donors. MPTFs are perceived as the UN system’s principle financial support mechanism for sustaining peace programs following the withdrawal of a peacekeeping mission. Having a dedicated funding source for Carana would ensure a smooth transition process and support to the new UNCT and government. It will be key to ensure that the activities the MPTF can support are defined and the process of providing funds along a set timeline are clear while Carana’s post-mission transition is on the Security Council agenda. If planning an MPTF is left for too late, bilateral donors will be unlikely to dedicate funds. In
eligible countries, the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) can also be explored as a tool to fill emergency gaps and catalyze long-term national peacebuilding processes, programs, and sustainable donor support. Carana is a PBF eligible country.

International donors’ and development partners’ continued support of programs in Carana will be central to the transition, and they may have to take on more programming responsibilities. UNAC and the RC should ensure clear and open communication with these actors, keeping them updated on developments, and discuss potential funding options for both staff positions and programming. One idea could be to establish a formal structure for communication. The importance of relying on traditional donors and exploring new partners should be emphasized. For both the RC’s office and agencies, funds, and programs, coordination with the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) will be important, especially once UNAC closes. The PBC can advise on and advocate for sustained international attention on and support to Carana’s peacebuilding priorities throughout and beyond the UN transition processes.

Ultimately, as voluntary funding of the UN’s follow-on presence is unlikely to match the resources of the assessed budget of peacekeeping operations and, to a lesser extent, the budget for the special political mission, the UN mission and UNCT leadership must carefully manage national stakeholders’ expectations and encourage them to establish their priorities and ensure that national plans and programs will be sustainable in the long term.

**Question 3:** What are the principal audiences that UNAC and the UN country team should be engaging with during the transition? What are some of the key messages and channels to be used for strategic communications?

Expectation management—for the host government, key national and local stakeholders, the international community, and mission staff—is intrinsic to a transition and requires clear and consistent communication both at the field level and at UNHQ. Mission transitions can increase uncertainty and anxiety; therefore, they should be managed and communicated carefully. The UN mission and UNCT leadership should work together to develop joint communications strategies, drawing on analysis of the perceptions, concerns, and priorities of key stakeholders. Maintaining a public information officer/spokesperson as part of the liquidation team should also be considered.

The main actors involved in the communications strategy should be the government, civil society, NGOs, the private sector, the international donor and development community, intergovernmental actors present in Carana, and the broader Caranese population. It is vital that strong communication from UNAC prepares the government for the exit of the mission. The UN should regard the government as a partner on developing the communications strategy, which should clearly identify the following: the steps and timeline of the transition from the UN side, government responsibilities once the mission is no longer present (and preparation for it to undertake those responsibilities), and the needs and priorities of the government.
The communications strategy for the general public should, first and foremost, highlight that the UN is not leaving; it is merely shifting the structure of its presence to a UNCT. This will include communicating exactly what components of the UN will remain, how the transition will take place, and what the general public can expect from the UNCT. Leadership should also manage expectations by including what the general public cannot expect from the UNCT in its communications plan. This is a complex issue to communicate; thus, the means by which it is done will determine the public reaction. Radio, television, newspapers, and social media should be utilized to reach as much of the population as possible.

The UN should also communicate with civil society actors in Carana, as many of these rely on the UN for funding. The UN needs to clearly communicate what will still be available to civil society, as well as what will change, in order to create a realistic understanding of post-UNAC Carana. Additionally, if UNAC clearly communicates the transition process and the structure of UNCT’s set-up and its capacities, civil society actors will be able to coordinate their own programs and projects to preemptively fill any gaps. Further, civil society can help communicate with the public and share the UN’s message.

The leadership team should consider a monthly meeting bringing together the international donor community, Caranese government, and UN system to open up lines of communication and allow for transparency throughout the transition process. Participants should also discuss the possibility of including private sector representatives in this meeting; however it happens, participants should acknowledge the importance of liaising with the business community, as it, too, will suffer from the withdrawal of international staff.

Communication among and with the UN staff in-country—national and international—must also be considered. National staff will be concerned about their future employment and will want to know and understand how their concerns are being considered. UNAC’s leadership should call a town hall with the staff to explain the strategy, plans, timeline, and provisions for those who may lose their jobs. A web resource could be developed to explain all of the UN’s internal rules and regulations about staffing during transitions as well as to consolidate required paperwork and administrative support into one online portal.

Leadership must also determine a strategy to communicate with UNHQ, including the Security Council and the PBC. The Security Council has some control over the transition process, and it is important to communicate not only progress but also the ongoing needs on the ground. UNAC and the UNCT need to be clear about what both the UN presence in the country and the country as a whole need from headquarters during the process. A strong PBC chair can, among other things, articulate the communications strategy more frequently in New York, convene multidisciplinary meetings to share the message, and work with the government to engage donors. UNAC leadership should see the PBC as a partner in communication. Communicating with the donor community will also be important, and leadership should undertake this in tandem with the UNDAF so that all parties’ development priorities are aligned.
The SRSG has just received a call from the president of Carana, who expressed serious concern over the timeline for the security handover and the drawdown of UNAC forces, as mandated by Security Council Resolution 4455. She argues that the timeframe is too short to adequately train the national police and notes that the police are not widely trusted by the people. She further argues that the police are entirely dependent on the mission for logistics support outside of provincial capitals, and they will not be able to respond quickly in the event of violence in the countryside. She informs the SRSG that she is prepared to call the secretary-general directly.

The SRSG asks for guidance on how to engage with the president and for a formal communications strategy for the transition, including engagement with national and international actors in Carana, civil society, and national staff.

1. **What would be included in a communications strategy, and what are the steps involved in the process? How would this connect to the ITP?**

There are two elements at play here: communication with the president on the transition as a whole, and concerns about the security transition. In terms of the first element, drawing on what was said in the response to Question 3, the UN needs a clear and effective communications strategy, and UNAC’s SRSG needs to be in constant communication with the president regarding the transition and its impact on the country as well as role of the government. The SRSG—with the DSRSG/RC/HC if she is going to stay on as RC—should set up weekly meetings with the government to brief it on the transition and invite key members of the president’s team to meetings at UN headquarters with the transition planning team. The president must be included in the planning; ideally, there should be one integrated transition plan shared by the UN and the government.

With regard to the security transition, participants may assume that if the president’s concerns about the timeline of withdrawal and the ability of the country to maintain security and peace in a post-mission context are valid, measures will need to be taken to mitigate those risks. Delaying the security handover would be difficult and could weaken trust in the security forces, as it may indicate to the general public that the UN does trust the security forces either. The SRSG should take all possible measures to first gain the support of the president and then address his concerns.

Any points that participants have not covered in the first section pertaining to the security handover should be touched upon here. These include:

- Increasing training programs where possible (taking into account that training of police should have been taking place for the last ten years)
• Partnering with civil society organizations and community-based conflict-prevention mechanisms to develop early-warning platforms and projects to enhance conflict-prevention tools in areas where there is little security presence.

To mitigate fears about the security handover, the SRSG should ensure that the government understands that UN support to the security sector will not stop immediately. Participants should think about undertaking substantive programming that provides an entry point for sustained, continued support. This could include quick-impact projects such as partnering with civil society to increase trust between civilians and security forces. Security programming should focus on high-risk areas (in this case, Leppko and Hanno provinces), with the eventual goal of transitioning to long-term security and justice sector reform projects supported by the government.

Decreased logistical and operational capabilities should also be of concern to the MLT, as this can drastically decrease police and military presence across the country. UNAC could look into the possibility of handing some equipment (e.g., vehicles and generators) over to the government—providing training on its usage—to help boost its logistical capabilities.

While communicating with the president to find solutions to these concerns, leadership should develop a communications strategy that targets the general public. It should highlight the security handover, as well as reassure the public that the UN trusts the Caranese security forces. It would also be beneficial to highlight some of the projects the UN is undertaking with civil society not only to increase trust in conflict-prevention mechanisms but also to provide education on and awareness of different mechanisms and institutions available to civilians in case of violent conflict.

**Inject 2**

The UNAC national staff association has sent the MLT an email demanding some form of job security. The message states that the mission has a responsibility to ensure that staff are provided with continued employment and notes that of the 421 national staff in UNAC, a majority have worked for the mission for more than five years. The email further emphasizes that there are limited job opportunities outside of UNAC, and that uncertainty around when staff will be released from the mission makes it difficult to plan for finding new employment. According to the staff union, if the mission does not take immediate steps to address these demands, it will take the story to the local press. An official from the Ministry of Labor has contacted the SRSG’s office to ask for clarification on the status of national staff, implying that the minister of labor is considering a public statement on what he considers to be UNAC’s obligations under Caranese labor law.

1. **Which UNAC and UNHQ offices should be involved in supporting the SRSG in dealing with these issues? What resources/references should they draw upon?**

Staff management is a particularly critical and sensitive aspect of UN transitions, as uncertainty can generate anxiety for both national and international staff. The need to retain staff in the mission to support operations through to the end of the mandate should
be balanced with staff’s concern about finding other employment in a timely manner. Missions should undertake a staffing needs assessment to determine the skills required throughout the liquidation phase and fill critical staffing gaps through flexible contractual arrangements including temporary duty assignments and temporary appointments to replace staff who leave before the end of the liquidation process.

A few key resources for dealing with the transition process include the following:

- For an example of a mission that has been through this challenge, refer to Report 2018/015 from the Office for Internal Oversight Services’ Internal Audit Division: Auditing the Phasing out of Human Resources in the United Nations Mission in Liberia during the Drawdown Period

In terms of key departments to work with, the SRSG should liaise with the Department of Peace Operations (DPO), the integrated regional structure of DPO and the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA), and the Department of Operational Support (DOS), specifically the Field Personnel Division (FPD) at UN headquarters. The SRSG should also bring in UNDP to discuss the follow-on mission presences and options for staffing it. Additionally, the SRSG could engage the Inter-Agency Task Force based in UN headquarters, which is working to plan for the transition and follow-on mission. The SRSG should clarify who is in this task force (it is usually DPO, DPPA, and UNDP). To a certain extent, the Executive Office of the Secretary-General is involved in this task force as well.

On the mission side, the SRSG should generally engage the heads of UN agencies, funds, and programs; the DSRSG/RC/HC; the heads of field offices; and all relevant entities that represent or work with national staff, especially those that will remain in Carana post-transition.

The Liquidation Manual requires missions to “plan for downsizing of internationally recruited staff as early as possible but no later than six months before the anticipated end of the mandate.” In line with this, at the time of planning, decisions on which staff should be retained should take follow-on staffing requirements into account. The mission should develop a plan to reduce the number of international and national staff and UN volunteers. Participants should note that UN staff regulations and rules require a mission to give advance notice of at least 90, 30, or 15 calendar days for staff with continuing, fixed-term, or temporary appointments, respectively.

Where a transition involves the start-up of a follow-on mission and a change in mandate and mission profile, planning should balance the need for different staffing profiles with an effort to provide continuity and employment opportunities for existing staff. Transition
planning should therefore include the development of a targeted workforce plan, identifying staff numbers, skills, experience, and training requirements for the follow-on mission. This should be done as early as possible in order for DOS to find additional capacity where required and to identify reassignment options for the staff who will be retained through the liquidation process.

Successful capacity development programs from the outset of the mission will permit national staff to assume greater responsibility throughout and after the transition and make them more competitive in the labor market. Particular attention should be paid to certifying nationally recognized skills, assisting with CVs and mock interviews, and organizing job fairs or similar opportunities for potential employers to meet national staff as mission closure approaches. The SRSG should provide full support and leadership to such programs to ensure they are accessible, effective, and successful.

2. What options does the mission have to help ease the transition for national staff?

Though it will be impossible for the UNCT to absorb all of UNAC’s national staff, options to accommodate as many as possible should be explored. As this will likely be a small number—if any—other measures will need to be taken to ease the transition. It should be noted that responsibilities will differ between national staff and individual contractors.

UNAC should have been working on enhancing the capacity of UN national staff from the start of their employment. If this has not been happening, a skills-development training program for national staff should be developed immediately. This should happen in tandem with training for Caranese military and police components, and participants should be aware that the limited training budget will often force the prioritization of security forces over other groups. Additionally, the mission should try to locate and share job vacancies for both national and international jobs as well as fellowships, scholarships, and grants as possible opportunities for national staff.

Given low economic growth, there are unlikely to be enough jobs in Carana to realistically absorb national staff who are not kept on by the follow-on mission, even with further training. For this reason, working with the government to strengthen the economy will be very important. This can be done in tandem with the donor community—especially those present on the ground—to ensure that the UN, the Caranese government, and donors are all prioritizing job creation and economic growth. This may be reflected in an existing UNDAF, but if a UNDAF is currently being developed, quick-impact projects can be put in place.

3. How and to whom should these processes and efforts be communicated?

This situation is complicated by the fact that the Ministry of Labor, and therefore the government, feels that UNAC is solely responsible for providing jobs for national staff. This is not the case, and that needs to be clearly communicated. Part of the communication process should be providing information about the kinds of programs the mission plans to undertake to ease the transition process; job provision for all is not its responsibility. Despite this, it is important that the mission not appear as though its leadership does not care
what happens to national staff post-transition. This should be reflected in clear communication with the government, national staff, and the population at large.

In terms of responsibilities, the Liquidation Manual specifies the mission’s exact responsibilities and tasks in regards to supporting national staff. This should be used as a basis for planning the transition and developing the communications strategy. For consistency, this message should be shared with national staff, the national staff association, the government, and the broader public.

**Inject 3**

The DSRSG for political affairs receives a call from the head of office in Sureen expressing concern that, following the closure of the UNAC field office, there will be no UN presence in Sureen. She wants to discuss the impact of the mission’s transition. She notes that due to rapid population growth during the war, Sureen’s infrastructure is severely overburdened. There are not enough police, and police who are present often do not have basic equipment like radios, non-lethal crowd-control apparatuses, or ammunition. Many neighborhoods are informal settlements. She says she has repeatedly advocated for UNDP to extend its presence outside of the capital, noting that heads of offices in other provinces have expressed similar concerns despite the presence of other UN agencies.

1. What actions should UNAC take as these decisions are made (e.g., conducting joint assessments with the government)?

Addressing these issues is primarily the responsibility of the government, but the UNCT can aid in addressing them. It would be beneficial—both for program planning and for developing the UNDAF post-transition—to undertake joint assessments of the population’s needs at the provincial level. Participants should particularly be asking about local government structures and whether UN programming meaningfully incorporates them at all levels. If the government’s capacity is very limited at the subnational level, UNAC should gauge what resources and capacity are available to implement and support programs—addressing the gaps left by the mission’s withdrawal—at the community level in order to determine priorities. The UNCT should then assess how important the logistical backbone of the mission is and how much it would cost the remaining and proposed UN field presences to operate without it.

Partnerships with civil society organizations will continue to be important. The joint assessments should outline not only the needs of each province but also their existing capacities, including civil society. As much as possible, joint programming between the UN, the Caranese government, and civil society will allow for burden sharing as the population’s needs are addressed across the country.

Identifying the criteria for country offices to remain open and where there will be a UNCT presence will be key to answering this question. Additionally, participants should discuss criteria for determining the level and strength of staffing in these offices. Determining clear criteria will mitigate potential backlash against the leadership team’s decisions.
2. Are there agencies, funds, and programs that should be present outside the capital?

In Sureen, it appears that the primary needs would be met by UNDP, UNICEF, and possibly the World Food Programme (WFP). However, joint assessments may reveal that in certain areas, such as Leppko, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) should move in. The joint assessments will help with this prioritization.

3. What communications strategy can be used to let the public know that the UN is not leaving completely?

A broad strategy should already be in place to highlight that the UNCT will be staying. Depending on the results of advocating for the continued presence of the UNCT in the field, leadership should determine a way to communicate such decisions to the Caranese public. This could happen via radio, local television channels, and social media. Pointing to specific examples of what the UN will continue to do in Carana should ease stress about the mission’s departure.

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