The facilitator can introduce the below questions at appropriate times during the exercise or during a post-exercise discussion. Ideally, participants will raise many of these points as they work through the scenario.

One to three hours have been allocated for the case study, depending on the context and facilitator’s discretion. The three injects may be issued as appropriate by the facilitator to develop the scenario and the discussion. Time will be tight.

Participants will need a map of Carana and familiarity with IPI’s Carana “Light” scenario. Facilitators can make other assumptions regarding facts and tasks relevant to the scenario based on experience in missions or knowledge of the Carana scenario.

1. OBJECTIVES AND AUDIENCE

Objectives

Scenario-based exercises can help units train to handle potential situations effectively and efficiently. They allow trainees to think through problems and work out responses before challenges actually occur and can help them identify preventive measures that can preclude problems from arising. Scenario-based training also creates a dialogue platform for peers to develop and share alternative points of view and explore a range of perspectives and courses of actions.

This scenario aims to familiarize the Mission Leadership Team (MLT), particularly the SRSG, with budgetary responsibilities in the context of operational decision making. As of January 1, 2019, heads of mission will have greater responsibility and accountability for the operational and financial performance of their missions as part of the secretary-general’s management reforms.

The facilitator should highlight attributes of leadership and effective decision making, including the readiness, willingness, and ability to:

- Implement the mandate and exercise authority
- Assume responsibility and lead others
- Ensure robust performance by all under their authority and address bad performance or non-performance efficiently
- Coordinate with other UN components, including through a whole-of-mission approach to the protection of civilians
- Act with only the interests of the UN mandate in mind
- Act in accordance with a specific, measurable, achievable, risk-informed, and timely (SMART) strategic plan
- Consult with local communities and affected populations.

**Target Audience**

This module must be relevant to all aspects of a mission. The target audience is senior leaders at both the political and the operational levels, including:

- Special representatives of the secretary-general
- Deputy special representatives of the secretary-general
- Force commanders
- Police commissioners
- Key D2–P4-level staff (e.g., chiefs of staff, chiefs of joint operations centers, heads of sections, heads of regional offices, heads of sector-level offices, sector commanders, and directors/chiefs of mission support)

The above positions should be included in the scenario. Individuals might also be assigned to play the roles of the director of human rights, principal security adviser, and director of the electoral division and chief of DDR, or the mentor may intervene with comments in these roles per the relevant injects.

**STAGES**

**Stage 1: Preparation**

In the first stage, the facilitators become familiar with the training material, prepare role players, and brief the mentors and experts involved in the training. They also discuss with them the objectives of the training and ask each to articulate her or his understanding and expectations:

- What is the purpose of the training?
- What can be the added value of scenario-based training?
- What are the expectations related to the training and to this scenario-based format?
- What are the roles and objectives of role players/mentors?

**Stage 2: Familiarization**

In the second stage, the facilitators orient the training audience on the general situation, the current situation, the rules of engagement, and the discussion questions/task at hand. The facilitators discuss the general situation and the current “crisis” with the training audience and make sure the training audience has a shared understanding of the mandate and rules of engagement. This discussion is a first learning opportunity, whereby each participant clarifies her or his vision of the mission. The facilitator can ask the following questions to ensure a common understanding:

- What is the overall situation in Carana?
Who are the main actors who are/should be involved, and what are the main stakes?
What is the mandate and authority of each major actor: the United Nations Assistance Mission in Carana (UNAC), government forces, and Continent Regional Coalition Assistance Mission to Carana (CRCAC)?
What UN principles are relevant to UNAC? This includes independence, impartiality, and exclusively international character.
What aspects of a protection of civilians (POC) mandate are relevant to this scenario? This mandate includes not only refraining from harming civilians (doing no harm and minimizing or avoiding collateral damage) but also actively and proactively protecting them from physical violence or threats of violence by other actors, including government forces, rebels or insurgents, terrorists, and criminals.
What are the relevant UN policies, including the zero tolerance policy for sexual exploitation and abuse, UN Human Rights Screening Policy, and UN Human Rights Due Diligence Policy?
What are the roles of each player within the scenario?
What are UNAC’s priorities with regards to the Caranese government?

Stage 3: Training

Either the training audience breaks into small groups to work through the situation or, depending on the size of the group (e.g., if under ten participants), discusses the unfolding of the scenario as a group.

The scenario has four phases:

1. The first phase aims to set the scene for why the senior leadership team has been gathered, what its task is, and the context. This first part of the scenario should be given out and jointly read by the participants. If they have any, participants may ask clarifying questions.

2. The second phase focuses on the task at hand. Once all is clear, the task should be given out, and the group should have a specific amount of time (10–15 minutes) to discuss among themselves.

   • The facilitator should observe the discussion and answer specific questions if needed and provide extra information if needed.
   • Once the time has ended, the facilitator should lead a brief discussion on the task to gauge responses.

3. Injects are introduced in the third phase. The objective is to reflect on the trade-offs and stakes related to the specific crisis/challenge/event at hand. The timing, sequence, and pace of actions and reactions should also be discussed.

   • Again, a specific amount of time should be given per inject (10 minutes), and the facilitator should be available to provide support. Not too much time should be given so as to replicate the pressure of crisis situations.
• A brief discussion can be held after each inject, with a longer debriefing at the end of the exercise.

4. The last phase is the longer debriefing, and the facilitator should reserve a longer period of time (30 minutes) for the discussion. This should focus on the scenario, lessons learned, challenges faced, what is needed to better address these situations, and how to prepare for the realities in the field. The notes below can be used to support this discussion.

BACKGROUND CONSIDERATIONS

Participants should consider the responsibilities of the SRSG and director of mission support (DMS), as well as general principles governing flexibility in the use of funds. Other than the director/chief of mission support, members of the MLT are unlikely to be familiar with UN principles governing flexibility in the use of mission funds (e.g., reallocation within and between budget categories), potential impacts of reallocation, or prospects for overspending or securing additional support (for example, through a letter of assist to member states requesting urgent assistance). This section provides a general understanding to inform decision making in the context of the scenario.

Beginning on January 1, 2019, the secretary-general has granted delegation of financial authority to heads of mission. Prior to the secretary-general’s management reforms, authority was delegated by the secretary-general to the director/chief of mission support (DMS/CMS) first through the under-secretary-general for management, and then through the controller. With this reform, the SRSG will be accountable for mission performance and budget performance and will need to have greater awareness of the budgetary implications of operational decision making. Therefore, the SRSG is ultimately accountable, even if day-to-day management is delegated to officials such as the DMS/CMS or head of field office.

Mission budgets comprise three categories: direct costs related to uniformed personnel, including reimbursement for personnel and contingent-owned equipment (Group I); direct costs of civilian personnel, including salaries and entitlements (Group II); and operational costs, including everything else—consultants, official travel, air operations, ground travel, information and communications technology, facilities and infrastructure, quick impact projects, and other costs (Group III).

The MLT will need to think through the operational consequences of decisions to reallocate funds. Reductions to travel and consulting, for example, could affect multiple aspects of the mission’s mandate by restricting in-country field visits to monitor human rights, engage with communities on DDR, security sector reform (SSR), and elections, conduct good offices, and other functions. Similarly, a reduction in consulting costs will prevent the mission from hiring an expert on preventing violence against women in elections, as currently envisioned by the mission.
Any budget redeployment within and between groups and the reasoning for the redeployment should be fully documented and reflected in the mission’s budget performance report.

3 DISCUSSION QUESTIONS

Question 1: How urgent are the political and security risks posed by the delayed reintegration program? Should the mission extend the reinsertion activities as an interim measure?

UNAC is mandated “to carry out voluntary disarmament and to collect and destroy weapons and ammunition as part of an organized DDR program” (OP7a) and to assist the new Carana Government of National Reconciliation (GNR) in preparing for national elections scheduled no later than end of 20xx” (OP7r).

The MLT needs to assess the risks posed by growing frustration over the DDR process and operational trade-offs involved in re-tasking mission assets, which could impact ongoing preparations for the upcoming elections. If left unaddressed, there is a risk that ex-combatants from the Mouvement Patriotique de Carana (MPC) who leave the cantonment sites could take up arms again. In the near term, this could destabilize the security environment ahead of the elections. It could also undermine public confidence in the GNR, as many ethnic Kori are sympathetic to the MPC cause. In the worst case, the collapse of the DDR process could threaten a resumption of armed conflict and jeopardize the Kalari Peace Agreement.

Reinsertion projects generally include short-term income-generating activities, skills training and job placement, and rehabilitation and/or construction of relevant community infrastructure through labor-intensive activities.

Question 2: What budgetary implications does any change in operational priorities have for the mission? How will these affect other operational considerations?

The DMS will need to check on the progress of budget expenditure by the mission to determine whether there are sufficient funds, in either the budget line covering reinsertion projects (“other supplies, services and equipment”), elsewhere in Group III, or elsewhere in the overall budget.

Results of Budget Review: The budget for reinsertion projects was based on a fixed period, and the mission does not have unexpended funds in the available budget line item to extend the projects. There is underspend in two budget lines in Group III—“facilities and infrastructure” and “ground transport” (fuel)—which together would cover the projected cost of extending reinsertion projects for an additional three months.

**To be distributed by the facilitator to the DMS during discussion of Question 2**
Operations with a DDR (or related program) component are authorized to include in their budgets operational costs related to disarmament and demobilization, including reinsertion.

Reinsertion projects are short-term assistance support provided, through a mission’s assessed budget, to DDR or related program participants during the demobilization phase of a DDR or related program process.

Reinsertion projects fall under Group III (operational expenses). The DMS will need to determine whether there are unexpended funds elsewhere in Group III (e.g., consultants, travel, facilities and infrastructure, ground transport, air operations, or information and communications technology) that the mission could reprioritize for extending the reinsertion projects. It is within the authority of the SRSG and DMS to reallocate these funds to reinsertion.

The review of the budget progress indicates that there are unexpended funds in the “facilities and infrastructure” budget line, as an international donor has covered part of the planned rehabilitation of the Galasi airport terminal. Note that reallocation of these funds will impact the security upgrades in Inject One (below).

Since two battalions have not arrived, there is related underspend in Group III for fuel due to lower fuel consumption. This applies to rations as well. Concurrently, the delayed deployment would also result in lower-than-expected mission expenditure for military personnel in Group I (uniformed personnel). It is not clear when the battalions will arrive and how much of the unexpended budget will be required for its original purpose. The mission could move funds from Group I to Group III to fund the reinsertion projects. This would be seen as a last resort.

Overspending is not an option, but if there is a change in mandate or changes in the operational environment—outside of mission control—a revised estimate or support request is a possibility.

Any budget reallocation and the reasoning for the reallocation should be fully documented and reflected in the mission’s budget performance report.

**Question 3:** What are the messages that should be conveyed to UNHQ to sensitize the Secretariat, member states, and the budgetary bodies to the mission’s current challenges, inform them of its efforts to address them within its resources, and prepare them for the potential need for additional resources?

Reinsertion is an interim measure to bridge the time between disarmament and reintegration (which is usually a UNDP responsibility). The gravity of the dissatisfaction and impatience of the ex-combatants regarding its delay should not be understated; the potential impact of resulting unrest or postponed elections would be great. Extending the reinsertion program is likely the most effective means of preventing the current unrest from developing into a violent uprising, which would not only damage the mission’s credibility but could conceivably place the Kalari Peace Agreement at risk. With this in

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mind, the mission is looking to fund the extended reinsertion program with existing resources but may have to seek supplementary funding.

As noted, La Voix Nationale is one of the most widely read papers in Carana. Other outlets are likely to pick up the story, which will attract the attention of government officials, civil society organizations, and other partners in Carana as well as the broader public and the international community. The story is breaking as election preparations are in full swing. As such, it could undermine confidence in the security environment.

The MLT should ensure that the strategic communications and public information office reviews the mission’s overall communications strategy, updates it in light of the current situation, and prepares messaging and communications initiatives. These initiatives should convey UNAC’s response to the news article and measures it is taking to improve the DDR program.

The MLT should prioritize and carefully manage communication. This includes communication between the mission and UNHQ in order to sensitize the Secretariat, key member states, and the budgetary bodies to the mission’s current challenges, inform them of its efforts to address those challenges, and prepare them for the potential need for additional financial resources or other support (e.g., political support, humanitarian airlift capacity, or inter-mission cooperation).

The MLT should identify key audiences (both in-country and outside) and consider what internal and external messaging is needed. Target audiences should include MPC leaders and combatants in the cantonment sites. Additionally, as DDR is also a GNR responsibility, UNAC’s communications strategy needs to consider cooperating with the GNR to jointly address the story. To this end, it may be appropriate for MLT personnel to contact their counterparts in the government and other key opinion leaders to assess their attitudes towards the mission’s actions and inform them of the steps the mission will take.

**INJECTS**

**Inject 1**

The director of mission support (DMS) receives an email that the UN Department of Safety and Security (DSS), following a recent security assessment, has recommended that the UNAC regional office in Corma (Leppko Province) undergo physical security upgrades to add closed-circuit video cameras and monitors and replace two soft-skin vehicles with armored vehicles. The assessment follows the recent uptick in security incidents, including illegal checkpoints and shooting on GNR government vehicles. Many of the security incidents in Leppko have been attributed to a splinter group of the Combattants Indépendents du Sud Carana (CISC).
The following considerations would form the basis for the reasoning behind “overspending” in one budget line and the equivalent “underspend” in the budget line from which funds are being reallocated:

1. What impact will the additional security costs have on the mission’s operating budget?
2. What other solutions could minimize the cost and/or time needed to achieve these security enhancements?

**Results of Budget Review:** For the purposes of the scenario, the IT budget line has sufficient funding for the closed-circuit video cameras and monitors. The budget includes unspent facilities and infrastructure funds intended for the expansion of the airport runway in Corma (second international airport, in addition to Galasi). The mission budgeted for the additional armor vehicles and does have unexpended ground transport funding for the purchase of two additional cars.

**To be distributed by the facilitator to the DMS during Inject 1**

The regional electoral office complies with UN minimum operating security standards. However, in response to deteriorating security in Leppko, DSS is recommending additional security upgrades including alteration of vehicle entry/exit, relocation of the visitor entry, and installation of additional closed-circuit video cameras and monitors.

The SRSG, in consultation with the DMS, should determine the unexpended balance of the “facilities and infrastructure” and other related budget lines necessary for the security upgrades.

At present, all international cargo flights must land in Galasi and transship supplies along the road network, which is often unpassable during the rainy season. A tender for the work has already been posted, and bids are under review. However, work on the runway could be delayed and funds reprioritized to cover the physical security upgrades.

Armored vehicles are generally expensive and take a long time to procure. The mission could check to see whether the UN reserve in Brindisi has any available vehicles that could be deployed to UNAC. Cross-borrowing of assets between mission is not permitted.

**Inject 2**

The SRSG receives a phone call from the head of the Carana Human Rights Commission, who expresses concern about reports that women voters are being targeted for intimidation in CISC-dominated areas. The mission’s human rights unit briefed you on this last night and requested an external electoral gender consultant to devise an action plan.
1. What considerations should the SRSG—with input from the MLT and the advice of the director of mission support (DMS)—take into account when assessing whether to bring on an electoral gender consultant?

Results of Budget Review: UNAC’s consulting budget does not have sufficient resources to cover both the SSR and electoral consultants. The Fifth Committee cut the mission’s consultant budget in half last June, which has left the mission with limited flexibility.

**To be distributed by the facilitator to the DMS during Inject 2**

In line with UNAC’s mandate to assist the GNR on security sector reform, the mission has identified a candidate for short-term adviser on SSR who would support development of a national strategy and intends to use available funds to hire this person. Meanwhile, the mission’s chief of SSR position remains vacant, and UNAC lacks expertise on this issue.

The MLT, in consultation with the DMS, should consider the relative priorities of supporting the election and SSR. If the MLT determines that the mission will move forward with both priorities, there are several options. These include temporarily deploying an expert from another mission (the mission would have to pay for this) or arranging with UNDP to provide the needed expertise (such as through a donor-provided expert). Should the MLT decide to bring both consultants using the mission consulting budget, it would need to determine whether there are sufficient funds elsewhere in Group III (operational expenses) that could be reallocated to cover an additional consultant.

Alternatively, the mission could seek to use funds that were budgeted for deployment of the chief of SSR from Group II (civilian personnel) to cover anything beyond what the consultant line item can cover. Another option would be to find funding from within existing resources and request a general temporary assistance post from the controller.

Inject 3

The head of UNHCR reports to the DSRSG/RC/HC that a group of around 500 internally displaced persons (IDPs), mostly women and children fleeing violence in eastern Leppko, have arrived at UNHCR’s Camp Lora, outside Eres. She informs you that Camp Lora faces a critical lack of emergency supplies required for displaced and vulnerable populations and requests that UNAC use its air assets to enable humanitarian agencies to send additional staff and supplies from warehouses from Galasi to the camp.

1. What are the operational trade-offs involved in providing support to the humanitarian response?

Electoral support is an operational priority for the mission, and a decision to re-task the helicopters risks delays in prepositioning materiel. However, the humanitarian situation in IDP camps is severe, which UNAC assistance with delivery of supplies would ameliorate.
The UNAC mandate encourages the mission “within its capabilities and areas of deployment to support the voluntary, safe and dignified return of refugees and IDPs” (OP12).

Two of UNAC’s civilian utility helicopters are tasked with providing logistical support to the electoral process for the next two months. The remaining helicopter is on standby for medical/casualty evacuation (MedEvac/CasEvac) of mission personnel; last week two UN soldiers were evacuated near Mia after their patrol came under fire.

For the purposes of the scenario, the MLT should identify (but not seek to answer) the additional information required to assess operational trade-offs. For example, based on the quantity of humanitarian supplies, what is the demand on the helicopters? Is use of the utility helicopters the best option? How would re-tasking the helicopters affect the timeline of the elections? Finally, does the mission have other transport assets that could deliver assistance?

2. What are the possible budgetary implications and consequences?

The MLT should determine the budgetary consequences of re-tasking the mission’s utility helicopters. UNAC bases its air operations budget on a fixed number of flight hours; the additional flights between Galasi and Camp Loma will expend those hours for elections and other support. However, the flight budget can “absorb” the additional flights and fuel costs.

3. Are there alternatives to the use of UNAC air assets for delivering humanitarian personnel and supplies?

Member states might be approached regarding increased humanitarian air support (e.g., through a letter of assist with UNAC). However, identifying and negotiation an LOA with a member state could take several months, and aircraft under LOA are still mission air assets that would need to be covered under the mission’s air operations budget). Temporary detachment of air assets from another mission is not possible, as intermission cooperation (IMC) is only an option when explicitly authorized by the Security Council. Increased ground transport of humanitarian supplies and personnel could be an option.

When assessing alternative delivery methods, the MLT should consider the security environment, whether truck convoys are an option, and, if so, what the escort requirements are and how those requirements would affect UNAC’s ability to respond to other security concerns.
ANNEX: RESULTS OF BUDGET REVIEWS

To be distributed by the facilitator to the DMS during the specified time.

Results of UNAC Budget Review

Results of Budget Review: The budget for reinsertion projects was based on a fixed period, and the mission does not have unexpended funds in the available budget line item to extend the projects. There is underspend in two budget lines in Group III—“facilities and infrastructure” and “ground transport” (fuel)—which together would cover the projected cost of extending reinsertion projects for an additional three months.

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Inject 1 - Results of Budget Review

Results of Budget Review: For the purposes of the scenario, the IT budget line has sufficient funding for the closed-circuit video cameras and monitors. The budget includes unspent facilities and infrastructure funds intended for the expansion of the airport runway in Corma (second international airport, in addition to Galasi). The mission budgeted for the additional armor vehicles and does have unexpended ground transport funding for the purchase of two additional cars.

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Inject 2 - Results of Budget Review

Results of Budget Review: UNAC’s consulting budget does not have sufficient resources to cover both the SSR and electoral consultants. The Fifth Committee cut the mission’s consultant budget in half last June, which has left the mission with limited flexibility.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

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