

# CARANA

**Location:** Carana is located on the east coast of the 8<sup>th</sup> continent between the 8<sup>th</sup> and 10<sup>th</sup> latitudes. The total area of Carana is 120,000 square kilometers with 300 kilometers of coastline.

**Geography:** Carana is topographically divided into two major areas: the plains in the eastern and central parts of the country and the highlands in the West and Southwest areas. The three main rivers in Carana—the Kalesi, Mogave and Torongo—flow from the western highlands in an easterly direction and discharge in the ocean. The climate in Carana is hot and humid. Close to the equator, Carana has no distinct winter and summer. Carana was originally completely covered by jungle and dense bush land. Approximately 20% of the total area is currently in use for growing grain, millet, vegetables and fruit. The west and south of the country is still covered by jungle and dense bush land. Small areas in the jungle are used for agricultural purposes. Carana is rich in natural resources, which are not dispersed throughout the country.

## History:

The state of Carana was founded in 1904 as French colony. In 1955, the legal status of Carana changed from a French colony to a republic of the French community. In 1962, Carana gained full independence.

## Administration:

Carana is administratively divided into eight provinces. The national capital is Galasi. The provincial capitals are Galasi, Maroni, Sureen, Alur, Faron, Folsa, Amsan and Corma.

Carana is a member of the 8<sup>th</sup> Continent Regional Coalition (CRC). This coalition, consisting of the 12 countries of the continent, is focused primarily on improving the continent's economic well-being.

## Ethnic Distribution:

The population of Carana consists of more than 15 ethnic groups. Most of these groups are small in number and socially and politically marginalized. The three major ethnic groups, the Caran, Kori and Tatsi represent 90% of the population. The Kori (32%) live in the west and are the dominant ethnic group in the provinces of Tereni and Koloni. The Caran (44%) are the ethnic majority in the country and mainly live in the east and center of Carana. The Tatsi (14%) live in the south, and are the majority in Leppko Province.

## Religion:

According to 2010 World Bank estimates some 75% of the population of Carana are Christian. Islam is practiced by over 20%, mainly in the South. About 35% of the Christian population is Protestant Lutheran or Baptist, while 40% is Roman Catholic. In terms of ethnic distribution, the majority of the Caran are Catholic, while the majority of the Kori are Protestant. The Tatsi people are mainly Sunni Muslim.

## General Facts

<b>Total Population</b>	14 million
<b>Population Growth</b>	3.6%
<b>Age Distribution</b>	<15 : 44 % 15 to 18 : 13 % 18 to 60 : 39 % >60 : 4 %
<b>Fertility Rate</b>	5.1 children per woman
<b>Infant Mortality</b>	9.1 deaths per 100 live births
<b>Language</b>	French.

<b>GDP</b>	\$9.3 billion
<b>GDP per capita</b>	\$520
<b>GDP by sector</b>	Agriculture: 27% Manufacturing: 16% Mining: 32% Services: 25%
<b>GDP growth</b>	1919 to 1997: average 3% per year 2006: -4% 2007: -2.5% 2008: -2.8% 2009: -6.9%
<b>Currency</b>	CFr (Carana Franc) 100 CFr = 1.5 \$

### Post-Colonial Developments:

After independence, Carana went through a period of military coups and counter coups until 1994 when, under international pressure, free elections were conducted.

The PDC (Parti Démocratique de Carana) won the elections and Jackson Ogavo (PDC leader) became the first elected president of Carana. Initially the government was representative of the ethnic balance of the country, although still dominated by the Caran, and it followed democratic principles that were later enshrined in the 1995 constitution. However, Ogavo's focus changed and he became preoccupied with suppressing all opposition groups and enhancing his own power base. Since 2001 he expanded the influence of the central government on all economic and social activities by laws and administrative rules. The replacement of all key Kori and Tatsi government ministers with members of Ogavo's Caran tribe led to an increasingly repressive approach, administrative and economic inefficiency, and corruption. Since 2006, the previously growing economy has been in decline and regional humanitarian crises have been occurring on a regular basis.

**Government:** Carana is governed under a constitution adopted by a referendum in 1995. It is a presidential republic with a president as head of state, elected for a five-year term. Although the constitution supports a democratic political system, President Ogavo has gradually suppressed any effective opposition and Carana has effectively been a one-party state since 2001. Today the only legal political party is the Caran-dominated PDC (Parti Démocratique de Carana). All members of parliament are members of the PDC or have close ties to the PDC.

**Nutrition & Health:** Although all basic food is available at the market, large numbers of the population cannot afford the food necessary for sufficient nutrition. Almost no medical infrastructure exists in the rural areas. One of the main humanitarian concerns in Carana is the acute lack of functioning medical facilities in the rebel held south and west.

**Infrastructure:** Carana has an adequate road network with paved routes connecting most parts of the country and key urban centers. In the west and the north, these roads also link to the networks in neighboring Katasi and Sumora. A few paved roads can withstand the effects of the monsoon season, but the majority are in need of significant maintenance. Carana has also a comprehensive network of secondary (unpaved) roads and tracks, which often become impassable during the rainy season.

Bridges along the paved roads are normally steel and concrete constructions. Those along the unpaved roads are normally made from wood and need to be assessed individually before they can be used by UN traffic.

There are two railway lines running between Galasi and Akkabar, and between Maldosa and Mia. Both are partially operational but are in poor condition and in dire need of repair.

In Carana there are three deep-water harbors and a number of smaller fishing ports. The smaller harbors have no capacity to support the loading and unloading of ships, but they are suitable for coastal vessels.

The international airports in Galasi and Corma are both operational and meet international standards for air traffic. Both airports have runways suitable for heavy transport aircraft.

**Electricity & Water:** There are three power plants: the Kilu Dam, the Salobo Dam, and a coal power plant in Galasi. In recent years, Carana was a net exporter of electricity during and after the rainy season. During the fighting, most of the power supply equipment around the Salobo Dam was destroyed or damaged. The instability in the Hanno area, caused by the miners' unrest, has led to a shortage of coal and has limited the production of electricity.

Potable water is available in most parts of the country but the quality of water varies.

**Current Situation:** Because of the economic situation and discrimination against the Kori and Tatsi by the government, political opposition groups and rebel movements evolved in the mid-2000s. The government suppressed most of these groups, using the military and gendarmerie to suppress any challenge to Ogavo's regime. In 2006, some small rebel movements in the Tereni province joined the larger and better-organized rebel groups known as MPC (Movement Patriotique de Carana) and formed a well-structured and efficient military opposition. The MPC achieved some local success in the west over the Caran-dominated Carana Defence Force (CDF), gaining increasing support from the local population in the west of the country. In 2009, this culminated in the CDF losing control of significant parts of the western highlands. Though the MPC's military engagements were well coordinated and successfully executed, the rebels lacked a coherent political strategy and failed to capitalize on their success; their only stated objectives were to remove Ogavo from power and to secure better representation for non-Caran ethnicities.

Low-level but frequent MPC operations in the west increasingly tied down the CDF, leaving its presence in Leppko province (in the south of the country) weak and creating an opportunity for elements of the Tatsi minority to attack government institutions. Initially this amounted to little more than a few localized incidents, but it quickly escalated into more radicalized activities including particularly brutal reprisals against ethnic Caran civilians. Realizing that the government could do little against them, a number of these small rebel groups united and called themselves the CISC (Combattants Indépendants du Sud Carana).

### Rebel Groups

**MPC:** The MPC is an avowed secular organization with broad appeal that has an estimated 10,000 fighters, structured into groups of 700, with likely between 10,000 and 20,000 civilian supporters. Their level of public support is high in the west and cuts across religions. As a result of broad public support for the rebels and the dissatisfaction with the government, the new role of the MPC is well-accepted by the largely Kori population in the west.

**CISC:** The CISC is an unstructured formation of rebels with diverse backgrounds. Some members are Tatsi deserters from the CDF, while others are refugees from the war in Rimosa. It is estimated to have around 3,000 fighters. Public support for CISC is mainly in the Tatsi-dominated Leppko Province. The discipline and internal cohesion of this rebel group is currently low.

### Military

#### Structure of the CDF

The CDF has a total strength of approximately 10,000 troops (9,000 Army, 800 Air Force, 200 Navy). The chiefs of the services report directly to the president. The main service in the CDF is the army, primarily—but not solely—recruited from the Caran people. Its senior leadership is almost wholly Caran. Structured with four areas of command, it represents the power of the central government all over the country.

**Presidential Guard:** The Presidential Guard has a strength equivalent to two infantry battalions (about 1,500 personnel) and is not part of the regular defense force. The commanders and most officers are Caran and recruited by President Ogavo. In recent years, the Presidential Guard and Gendarmerie units have been used several times to fight against the rebel groups. The Presidential Guard has a reputation for being particularly brutal.

**Police and Gendarmerie:** Carana's law enforcement agencies are divided into the Carana National Police (CNP) and the Gendarmerie. In recent years, CNP and Gendarmerie have suffered a critical shortage of qualified personnel, aging population, low morale due to unpaid salaries, lack of logistical and financial resources, and training. Police presence in Carana is very low. The majority of police are Caran, including in areas populated mainly by minorities. Crime rates particularly in population centers are high and there are numerous reports of human rights abuses and looting perpetrated by the law enforcement agencies.

### Regional security

There is currently no external military threat to Carana, although relations with Carana's southern neighbor, Rimosa, and its Western neighbor, Katasi, are strained due to Tatsi and Kori irredentist movements.

### Internal security

Security in the country is volatile. The main internal security problems are around the ongoing conflict between armed groups and the government, which is weakening, and the high level of criminal activity (both urban and rural) resulting from the poor economic situation. In the north and west there is increasing evidence that criminal groups controlled by cartels based in Sumora are controlling the diamond mining, probably with government connivance and controlled by cartels based in Sumora. An estimated 12,000 people have been killed in the last six months and anything up to 200,000 forced to flee their homes as a result of the fighting between government forces and rebels in the north and the south. Many civilians have been abducted by armed groups, mainly by extremist rebel elements but also by the CDF. At the sector-wide level, there is no national security strategy nor policy. There is currently no national coordination mechanism in place to initiate the transformation of the security sector.

## PLANNING FOR A UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATION IN CARANA

**SITUATION:** The conflict in Carana has reached a stalemate in which the government can no longer control significant portions of the country and armed and extremist elements have increasingly stepped in to fill the vacuum. In the west, an alternative structure is evolving in areas controlled by the MPC while the south is increasingly fragmented, lacking any structure and reverting to control by individual local leaders splintering away from the CISC. No single entity is capable of achieving a successful military outcome to the conflict, resources are tight, and ethnic and religious tensions have become increasingly evident. Atrocities are being committed in a number of areas.

The CRC has played a significant role in moving the peace process forward including its efforts to promote **the Kalari Peace Agreement**—signed by the CDF, the MPC and the CISC—which offers the only real option for sustainable peace, and is an essential precursor to any long-term ability to address the root causes of the conflict. The provisions of the Peace Agreement provide for a fully representative **Government of National Reconciliation** under a consensus Prime Minister, Lucien Langata. Elections have been called for within one year. The functions of the CRC's light observer mission (CRCAC) will be folded into the UN peacekeeping operation and most of the observers will be re-designated. A specialist French force 'Operation Intrépide' remains in South Carana, with a counter terrorist mandate against extremists operating in the mountains along the Rimosan border with whom the peacekeeping operation will need to establish clear lines of cooperation and liaison.

**Security Council Resolution 1544** expressed the international community's engagement with Carana and its support of the Kalari Peace Agreement and established the United Nations Assistance Mission to Carana (UNAC).


**STRATEGIC DIRECTION:** The strategic direction for UNAC, as derived from the Secretary-General and the Security Council, is as follows:

"The objective of the United Nations should be to contribute to the creation of an environment conducive to national reconciliation and lasting peace, with the full and effective participation of women in the peace process. United Nations efforts will focus on establishing a sustainable peace, including through peacebuilding and stabilization efforts that engage civil society. The end desired end state is a peaceful, stable and united Carana, where the rule of law is upheld, human rights are respected, the protection of all civilians is assured and in which internally displaced persons and refugees can return home in safety and dignity."

This constitutes the UN system's objective for Carana, the achievement of which will include:

- The provision of advice and assistance to a transitional government including the election process;
- A peacekeeping force of about 8,000 military and police able to, inter alia, monitor the ceasefire and provide protection to civilians and to the UN personnel and facilities;
- The provision of humanitarian assistance; and
- The re-establishment of acceptable standards of human rights.

**INTEGRATION OF ALL UN EFFORTS IN CARANA:** A critical function of the mission concept is to integrate the work of all mission components behind clearly established mission-wide priorities to ensure maximum coherence and unity of effort. Individual components of the mission - substantive, military, police and support - will be expected to align their respective concepts of operation on the basis of the mission concept. The UNCT will participate actively in, and contribute to, the planning process in order to ensure proper alignment, coordination, and consistency in the development of the UN system-wide response. This involvement comes in addition to that of the UNDG and ECHA planning capacities and individual agencies represented on the ITF. A comprehensive strategic communication strategy will be developed in consultation with UN partners as soon as possible. This strategy should be implemented well in advance of the UN mission assuming responsibility. The strategy will have the objective of promoting an understanding among local communities, the parties to the peace process and the public at large, with regard to the role of a United Nations peacekeeping operation in Carana.







# TOPOGRAPHY

Sumora

Galasi

Katasi

**Carana**



Cereni

Lora

Turen

Maldosa

Eres

Rimosa

# ROADS AND LINES OF COMMUNICATION

Sumora

Galasi

Katasi

**Carana**

- Destroyed Road
- × Destroyed Object

Reference: Module 1/L, 7-Oct-07 slide 3 of 11

Rimosa


Cereni

Lora

Turen

Maldosa

Eres



# REBEL HELD AREAS

Sumora

Galasi

**MPC**

*Koloni*

*Hanno*

*Fellari*

*Tereni*

*Mahbek*

*Barin*

*Guthar*

Cereni

Lora

Turen



Maldosa

Eres

Katasi

Rimosa

**Carana**


-  Rebel Controlled Areas
-  CDF Positions

**CISC**

*Leppi*





# HUMANITARIAN SITUATION





# RISK ASSESSMENT





# UN Country Team Locations


Sumora

Galasi

Katasi

Carana

Rimosa



Opération Intrépide



## **CARANA GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS**

AICF	Action Internationale Contre la Faim
AO	Area of Operations
ARC	American Refugee Committee
AZ	Assembly Zones
BEC	Banque Economique de Carana
CAO	Chief Administrative Officer
CARE	Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere
CCP	Commission for the Consolidation of Peace
CDF	Carana Defence Force
CRCAC	CRC Assistance Mission to Carana
CISC	Combattants Indépendants du Sud Carana
UNPOL	United Nations Police
CNP	Carana National Police
CPD	(United Nations) Civilian Police Division
CRC	Continent Regional Coalition
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization & Reintegration
DDRR	Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration & Repatriation
DMZ	Demilitarized Zone
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DRC	Danish Refugee Council
DRCC	Demobilization and Resettlement Commission Committee
EUPOL Carana	European Union Police Mission in Carana
EUTC	European Union Training Mission in Carana
ELF	Elassasonian Liberation Front
FC	Force Commander
FCO	Field Communications Office
HOM	Head of Mission
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IO	International Organization



IRC	International Rescue Committee
JC	Joint Commission
JCC	Joint Commission for the Ceasefire
JLT	Joint Liaison Team
MDM	Medécins du Monde
MILOBS	Military Observers
MNF	Multinational Force
MODUK	Ministry of Defence of the UK
MPC	Movement Patriotique de Carana
MPS	Military Planning Service
MSF	Médecins sans Frontières
NGO	Non-Government Organizations
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
OHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
PDC	Parti Démocratique de Carana
PF	Patriotic Front (generic term)
PfP	Partnership for Peace
ROE	Rules of Engagement
SCR	Security Council Resolution
SOFA	Status of Forces Agreement
SMSG	Special Representative to the Secretary-General
TCC	Troop Contributing Country
UKDEL NATO	UK Delegation in NATO
UKMIS GENEVA	UK Mission in Geneva
UNAC	United Nations Assistance to Carana
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational and Scientific Organization
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNIDO	United Nations International Development Organization
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNNY	United Nations Headquarters New York
UN PKF	United Nations Peacekeeping Force
WB	World Bank

WHO	World Health Organization
WFP	World Food Programme
WV	World Vision (NGO)
ZOS	Zone of Separation



**Security Council**

Distr.  
GENERAL  
S/RES/2300 (20XX)  
22 M+3 20XX

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## **RESOLUTION 1544 (20XX)**

Adopted by the Security Council at its 8000th meeting on 22 M+3 20XX

The Security Council,

*Reaffirming* its strong commitment to the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Carana,

*Expressing* its utmost concerns at the dire consequences of the prolonged conflict for the civilian population throughout Carana, in particular the increase in the number of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs),

*Deploing* all violations of human rights, particularly atrocities against the civilian populations, including acts of sexual violence, in Carana, and recalling its resolutions 1325 (2000), 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009) and 1889 (2009) on women, peace and security, its resolutions 1612 (2005) and 1882 (2009) on children and armed conflict and its resolution 1674 (2006) and 1894 (2009) on the protection of civilians in armed conflicts,

*Commending* the efforts of, and reiterating its full support for, the Continent Regional Coalition, the United Nations Secretary-General, and the leaders of the region to promote peace and stability in Carana,

*Welcoming* the swift action by the French forces, at the request of the authorities of Carana, to assist the restoration of Carana's integrity,

*Stressing* the need to restore democratic governance, and constitutional order, including through the holding of free, fair, transparent and inclusive elections,

*Deploing* all violations of human rights, particularly against the civilian population, and urging the new Carana Government of National Reconciliation to take all necessary measures to put an end to impunity and to ensure the continued promotion and protection of human rights, and the upholding of the rule of law.

*Remaining* seriously concerned over the significant humanitarian crisis in the region and over the insecurity that hinders humanitarian access, exacerbated by the presence of landmines as well as the continued proliferation of weapons,

*Emphasizing* the need for all parties to safeguard the welfare and security of humanitarian workers and United Nations personnel in accordance with applicable rules and principles of international law,

*Mindful* of the need for accountability for violations of international humanitarian law and urging the Carana Government of National Reconciliation to ensure that the protection of human rights and the establishment of a state based on the rule of law and of an independent judiciary are among its highest priorities,

*Taking* note of the Peace Agreement reached by some of the key parties on 31 May xxxx and *urging* all parties to work without delay towards a broad political consensus on the nature and duration of the political transition,

*Welcoming* the human rights commitments contained in that Agreement,

*Stressing* the urgent need for substantial humanitarian assistance to the Carana population,

*Reaffirming* that the primary responsibility for implementing the Kalari Peace Agreement and the ceasefire agreement rests with the parties, and urging the parties to move forward with implementation of these agreements immediately in order to ensure the peaceful formation of a new Government of National Reconciliation.

*Taking* note of the listing of Combattants Indépendants du Sud Carana (CISC) and *reiterating its* readiness to sanction further individuals, groups, undertakings and entities in accordance with the established listing criteria,

*Noting* that lasting stability in Carana will depend on peace in the sub-region, and emphasising the importance of cooperation among the countries of the sub-region to this end, as well as the need for coordination of United Nations efforts to contribute to the consolidation of peace and security in the sub-region,

*Expressing its continued concern* over the serious threats posed by transnational crime in the region, and its increasing links, in some cases, with terrorism and *strongly condemning* the incidents of kidnapping and hostage-taking with the aim of raising funds or gaining political concessions,

*Determining* that the situation in Carana continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region, to stability in the 8<sup>th</sup> Continent sub-region, and to the peace process for Carana,

*Commending* the Continent Regional Coalition, as well as the Secretary-General, for their intensive efforts to solve the crisis in Carana, and *encourages* maintaining coordination in support of the stabilization of the situation in Carana, including the national political dialogue and electoral process,



Welcoming the deployment of the CRCAC to assist in overseeing and verifying the ceasefire,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Welcomes the measures to restore order and national unity in Carana, including the adoption of the Kalari Peace Agreement;
2. Requests the Secretary-General, in close coordination with the CRC, to support all dimensions of the Kalari Peace Agreement, with a view to its swift implementation;
3. Urges the Government of National Reconciliation in Carana to hold free, fair, transparent and inclusive elections as soon as technically possible, stresses the importance of ensuring an environment conducive to the holding of elections;
4. Decides to establish the United Nations Assistance Mission to Carana (UNAC), further decides that the authority be transferred from CRCAC to UNAC on 1 M + 3 2016 at which point UNAC shall commence the implementation of its mandate as defined in paragraph 7 below, for an initial period of 12 months and requests the Secretary-General to include in UNAC, in close coordination with CRC, CRCAC military personnel appropriate to United Nations standards;
5. Requests the Secretary-General to appoint expeditiously a Special Representative for Carana to direct the operations of UNAC and coordinate all United Nations activities in Carana;
6. Decides that UNAC will consist of up to 6,800 United Nations military personnel, including up to 200 military observers and 160 staff officers, up to 1250 police personnel, including formed police units, and up to 200 corrections officers, to assist in the maintenance of law and order throughout Carana, and the appropriate civilian component;
7. Decides that UNAC shall have the following mandate:

Support for the implementation of the Kalari Peace Agreement:

- (a) To assist the Government of National Reconciliation of Carana to implement swiftly the provisions of the Kalari Peace Agreement towards the restoration of constitutional order, democratic governance and national unity in Carana;
- (b) To exercise good offices, confidence-building and facilitation at the national and local levels, in order to anticipate, prevent, mitigate and resolve conflict;

- (c) To observe and monitor the implementation of the peace agreement and investigate violations of the ceasefire;
- (d) To establish and maintain continuous liaison with the field headquarters of all parties military forces;
- (e) To develop, as soon as possible, preferably within 30 days of the adoption of the resolution, in cooperation with relevant international financial institutions, international development organizations, and donor nations, and within the SSR/DDR National Commission, an action plan for the overall implementation of a voluntary disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and repatriation (DDRR) programme for all armed parties; as well as a national vision for the future security sector of the country, , with particular attention to the special needs of child combatants and women; and addressing the inclusion of non-Carana combatants;
- (f) To carry out voluntary disarmament and to collect and destroy weapons and ammunition as part of an organized DDRR programme;
- (g) To provide security to the highest priority locations within capabilities and areas of deployment;

*Protection of Civilians:*

- (h) To ensure the effective protection of civilians, including humanitarian personnel and human rights defenders, under imminent threat of physical violence, in particular violence emanating from any of the parties engaged in the conflict;
- (i) To ensure the protection of United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment;
- (j) To support the efforts of the Carana Government of National Reconciliation (GNR) to ensure the protection of civilians from violations of international humanitarian law and human rights abuses, including all forms of sexual and gender-based violence;

*Support for Humanitarian and Human Rights Assistance:*

- (k) To facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance, including by helping to establish the necessary security conditions;
- (l) To monitor and report on the human rights situation, to contribute towards international efforts to protect and promote human rights in Carana and to fight impunity, with particular attention to vulnerable groups including refugees, returning refugees and IDPs, abductees, women, children and demobilised child soldiers, as well as provide human rights technical assistance as needed in close cooperation with other United Nations agencies, related organizations, government organizations and non-governmental organizations;

*Support to Security sector reform:*

- (m) To assist the Carana Government of National Reconciliation (GNR) in the process of developing and implementing, as soon as possible and in close coordination with bilateral and multilateral partners, a national vision followed by a national strategy on Security Sector Reform (SSR), with a view to strengthening national authorities in creating an effective, representative and accountable security sector, able to provide security for the State and its peoples, without discrimination and with full respect for human rights and the rule of law,
- (n) To assist the Carana Government of National Reconciliation (GNR) in monitoring, and transforming the internal security forces of Carana, in accordance with international standards ;
- (o) To assist the Carana Government of National Reconciliation (GNR) in the formation of new representative and republican Carana military forces;
- (p) Coordinate international SSR efforts with all partners, including the European Union;

*Support for Implementation of the Peace Process:*

- (q) To assist the Carana Government of National Reconciliation (GNR) in conjunction with other international partners, in the reestablishment of national authority throughout the country, including the establishment of a functioning administrative structure at both national and local level;

- (r) To assist the new Carana Government of National Reconciliation (GNR) in preparing for national elections scheduled for no later than end 20xx;
  - (s) To assist the Carana Government of National Reconciliation (GNR) conjunction with other international partners in developing a strategy to consolidate governmental institutions, including a national legal framework and judicial and correctional institutions;
8. *Demands* that all the parties cease hostilities throughout Carana and fulfill their obligations under the Kalari Peace Agreement;
  9. *Reiterates* its demand that all States in the region cease military support for armed groups in neighbouring countries, take action to prevent armed individuals and groups from using their territory to prepare and commit attacks on neighbouring countries and refrain from any actions that might contribute to further destabilisation of the situation in the region, and declares its readiness to consider, if necessary, ways of promoting compliance with this demand;
  10. *Authorizes* UNAC to use all necessary means, within the limits of its capabilities and areas of deployment, to carry out its mandate as set out in paragraph 7 and *requests* UNAC's civilian and military components to coordinate their work with the aim of supporting the tasks outlined in paragraph 7 above;
  11. *Authorizes* French troops, within the limits of their capacities and areas of deployment, to use all necessary means, from the commencement of the activities of UNAC until the end of UNAC's mandate as authorized in this resolution, to intervene in support of elements of UNAC when under imminent and serious threat upon the request of the Secretary-General, further requests France to report to the Council on the implementation of this mandate in Carana and to coordinate reporting with the reporting by the Secretary-General referred to in paragraph 24 below and decides to review this mandate within six months after its commencement;
  12. *Encourages* UNAC within its capabilities and areas of deployment, to support the voluntary, safe and dignified return of refugees and IDPs;
  13. *Calls upon* all parties to ensure, in accordance with relevant provisions of international law, the full, safe and unhindered access of relief personnel to all those in need and delivery of humanitarian assistance, in particular to IDPs and refugees.



14. *Recognizes* the importance of the protection of children in armed conflict, in accordance with its resolution 1379 (2004) and related resolutions;
15. *Demands* that all parties cease all use of child soldiers, that all parties cease all human rights violations and atrocities against the Caranan population, and stresses the need to bring to justice those responsible;
16. *Requests* the Secretary-General to ensure full compliance of UNAC with the United Nations zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuses and to keep the Council fully informed if such cases of misconduct occur;
17. *Reaffirms* the importance of a gender perspective in peacekeeping operations and post-conflict peace-building in accordance with resolution 1325 (2000) and in particular women's rights under the Constitution to fully participate in the political, economic and social spheres of Caranan life, recalls the need to address violence against women and girls as a tool of warfare, and encourages UNAC as well as the Caranan parties to actively address these issues;
18. *Calls on* the international community to consider how it might help future economic development aimed at achieving long-term stability in Carana and improving the welfare of its people;
19. *Stresses* the need for an effective public information capacity, including the establishment as necessary of a United Nations radio station to promote understanding of the peace process and the role of UNAC among local communities and the parties;
20. *Calls on* the parties to engage for the purpose of addressing the question of DDRR on an urgent basis and urges the parties, in particular the Carana Government of National Reconciliation (GNR), and rebel groups MPC and CISC, to work closely with UNAC, relevant assistance organizations, and donor nations, in the implementation of a DDRR programme;
21. *Requests* the Carana Government of National Reconciliation to conclude a status-of-forces agreement with the Secretary-General within 30 days of adoption of this resolution, and notes that pending the conclusion of such an agreement the model status-of force agreement dated 9 October 1993 (A/45/594) shall apply provisionally;
22. *Calls upon* all parties to co-operate fully in the deployment and operations of UNAC, including through ensuring the safety, security,

and freedom of movement of United Nations personnel, together with associated personnel, throughout Carana;

23. *Call on* the international donor community to provide assistance for the implementation of a DDRR programme, and sustained international assistance to the peace process, and to contribute to consolidated humanitarian appeals;
24. *Requests* the Secretary-General to keep the Council regularly informed of the situation in Carana and the implementation of the mandate of UNAC, to report to the Council within 45 days of the adoption of this resolution and then every three months on the security situation, the priority political elements, relevant information on the progress, promotion and protection of human rights and international humanitarian law as well as a review of troop level, force generation and deployment of all UNAC constituent elements;
25. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.