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# Focus on 2020: Opportunities for the Twentieth Anniversary of Resolution 1325

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## Introduction

As the twentieth anniversary of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) on women, peace, and security (WPS) approaches, the ad hoc nature of and limited accountability for implementation of the WPS agenda are undermining its full promise. At the UN Security Council in particular, research shows that country-specific reports still largely lack crucial WPS analysis and recommendations. The council continues to overlook “the particular rights, concerns, and role of girls, adolescent girls, and young women in both country-specific and thematic agenda items.”<sup>1</sup>

These challenges persist despite increasing recognition that efforts to build and sustain peace are dependent upon the full participation of women and respect for their rights.<sup>2</sup> The WPS agenda has tremendous potential to transform the way gender is considered across international peace and security policy. By making this policy deeply inclusive, it can challenge power structures built on exclusion and inequality, strengthen responses to gender-based violence in all its forms, and promote an expansive understanding of “gender” that moves beyond seeing it as a simple stand-in word for “women.”

There is thus a need for concerted, strategic commitment to addressing the remaining gaps in implementation of the WPS agenda. This paper identifies opportunities for the twentieth anniversary of the adoption of Resolution 1325, particularly for the UN Security Council, its member states, and the UN system. It builds on IPI’s scene-setting issue brief “The Global Pushback on Women’s Rights: The State of the Women, Peace, and Security Agenda” and draws on a September 2019 consultation with member-state representatives, members of civil society, and WPS researchers.<sup>3</sup>

1 NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security, “Mapping Women, Peace and Security in the UN Security Council: 2017,” July 2018.

2 See the UN General Assembly and Security Council’s 2016 resolutions on sustaining peace (Resolutions 70/262 and 2282). For analysis of these challenges, see, for example: Nicola Pratt and Sophie Richter-Devroe, “Women, Peace and Security: New Conceptual Challenges and Opportunities,” Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre, March 2013; Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, “No Room for Marginalization: An Intersectional Approach to Gender-Sensitive Peace Processes,” May 2019; UN Women, “Indigenous Women and the Women, Peace and Security Agenda,” 2016; and Deborah Stienstra, “WPS, Gender and Disabilities,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Women, Peace, and Security*, Sara E. Davies and Jacqui True, eds. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019).

3 This consultation was convened by the International Peace Institute in partnership with the governments of Germany and the United Kingdom.

## Building a WPS Agenda: Resolution 1325 and Its Siblings

While women’s activism for peace is in no way a new phenomenon, the international community has only recently begun to understand the complex relationship between gender and conflict and its implications for building and sustaining peace. This has led, in recent decades, to the development of normative frameworks at the international and national levels, often following the lead of grassroots efforts.<sup>4</sup> These frameworks have sought to place women’s rights and roles at the forefront of all efforts to prevent, resolve, and rebuild after conflict and to protect civilians in conflict situations. Key among these frameworks are the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women—often referred to as the “women’s rights treaty”—especially its General Recommendation 30 on women in conflict prevention, conflict, and post-conflict situations; the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action agreed on at the fourth World Conference on Women in 1995; and the UN Security Council’s WPS agenda, first formalized in Resolution 1325.<sup>5</sup>

Resolution 1325 marked the formalization of the UN Security Council’s recognition that women’s agency and protection concerns are central to international peace and security. Stemming from this first resolution came eight additional resolutions that have addressed various aspects of the women, peace, and security agenda. These have included resolutions focused on peacebuilding (Resolution 1889), women’s participation in the substantive work of the UN and the Security Council (Resolutions 2122 and 2242), and (most robustly) a series of resolutions on conflict-related sexual violence (Resolutions 1820, 1888, 1960, 2106, and 2467).

These resolutions have addressed the WPS agenda from multiple angles, including by committing the UN Security Council to hearing from civil

society briefers, ensuring peacekeeping missions have sufficient gender expertise, and directing the UN system to conduct gender-specific country reporting and gendered conflict analysis. They have established a special representative of the secretary-general on conflict-related sexual violence, tasked the UN system with developing and measuring WPS indicators, and established a new mechanism within the Security Council—the Informal Expert Group (IEG) on WPS—to ensure dedicated consideration of WPS matters in its work.

The broad scope of the WPS agenda has proven challenging for policymakers to grapple with, leading to its initial separation into distinct categories: prevention, participation, protection, and relief and recovery.<sup>6</sup> These categories can make policymaking and programming on WPS more manageable and targeted but can also create divisions between related concepts that undermine implementation of the agenda as a whole. For example, while recent approaches to sustainable peace have been more holistic, those working on WPS often use prevention to refer primarily to the prevention of sexual violence or other specific harms. Participation is used to denote women’s participation in peace talks, especially in formal track I negotiations. Protection has often been used primarily to refer to protection from conflict-related sexual violence.

When taken individually and framed narrowly, these categories elide the scope—and therefore the transformative potential—of the agenda. For example, prevention refers not solely to the prevention of immediate violence but also to the prevention of conflict writ large—including by addressing its root causes—a project that requires improving governance and building resilience in ways that protect women’s rights and recognize their roles. A broader understanding of participation entails dismantling the barriers to women’s engagement not only in peace talks but in all decision making—from policymaking within security institutions to planning for displacement camps to elections in

4 J. Ann Tickner, “Peace and Security from a Feminist Perspective,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Women, Peace and Security*. See also: Cynthia Enloe, *Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1990).

5 *Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women*, New York, December 18, 1979; Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, *General Recommendation No. 30 on Women in Conflict Prevention, Conflict and Post-conflict Situation*, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/GC/30, November 1, 2013; *Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action*, Beijing, September 15, 1995; UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (October 31, 2000), UN Doc. S/RES/1325.

6 Paul Kirby and Laura J. Shepherd, “Reintroducing Women, Peace and Security,” *International Affairs* 92, no. 2 (2016).

conflict-affected communities. This, in turn, means dramatically changing the institutions and social norms that prevent this participation. Protection is similarly wide in scope, not limited to immediate protection in crisis or conflict settings; it is also about the threats women face when they attempt to participate in political processes or advocate for human rights and peace.<sup>7</sup> And protection is not solely about an immediate gendered threat; it also encompasses, for example, the need for justice mechanisms that can prevent future violations. As the WPS agenda has been developed in policy, including through UN Security Council resolutions, it has not consistently addressed the complexity of its core components.

While the normative frameworks on WPS have sought to place women's rights and roles at the forefront of all efforts to prevent, resolve, and rebuild after conflict and to protect civilians in conflict situations, there has also been a growing understanding of the need to challenge existing patriarchal power structures and heteronormativity, including within these frameworks. Increasingly, there is recognition that these norms can be used to maintain an exclusionary status quo rather than to facilitate long-term change in, for example, representation in peace efforts.<sup>8</sup>

## The Implementation of WPS in the Multilateral System: From Theory to Practice

Over the past twenty years, civil society, the United Nations, and national governments have worked to adhere to their obligations under these resolutions and to explore outstanding questions. In working to embed WPS into national structures and international and regional multilateral institutions, they have taken a variety of approaches, to varied effect. The African Union (AU), NATO, and the

United Nations have special representatives or special envoys on various aspects of the WPS agenda. The UN, AU, and European Union have committed to regional frameworks for monitoring and reporting on WPS and to zero tolerance for sexual exploitation and harassment. Eleven regional organizations have committed to regional action plans on WPS.

At the national level, more than eighty UN member states have worked to embed these resolutions in national action plans. While these numbers are encouraging *prima facie*, the effectiveness of these plans is subject to national and regional politics and resources. For example, only 43 percent of the plans are allocated a budget for implementation, which limits their achievable scope. Likewise, many are not comprehensive in their approach to WPS, leaving out important topics like disarmament.<sup>9</sup> Some member states have also appointed WPS envoys or ambassadors to help ensure that WPS discourse remains “in the room” during national policy decisions. Their effectiveness, however, depends on the resourcing of their offices and the political power with which they are vested.<sup>10</sup>

The Security Council remains a critical body for continuing to advance work on WPS, not least because of its ability to effect change in entities such as the Departments of Peace Operations and Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, including through requests to the UN secretary-general. It can set mandates and priorities for special political and peacekeeping missions and call for gender-sensitive information and analysis on country situations. Through the IEG, established in 2015, council members come together with senior mission leaders to discuss issues related to WPS in specific countries, producing meeting records that raise key concerns for the council to consider.<sup>11</sup> However, not all council members agree on the role of the IEG. Several have rarely attended the meetings and have spoken in the council about

7 Roudabeh Kishi, Melissa Pavlik, and Hilary Matfess “‘Terribly and Terrifyingly Normal’: Political Violence Targeting Women,” ACLED, May 2019.

8 The example of peace processes is given in the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute's report “No Room for Marginalization: An Intersectional Approach to Gender-Sensitive Peace Processes” from May 2019. The report points out that “peace processes privilege particular groups and tend to favour stability [status quo] over inclusion [meaningful participation].”

9 Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, “Member States,” accessed on October 22, 2019, available at <https://www.peacewomen.org/member-states>. For analysis of what makes national action plans effective, see Miki Jacevic, “What Makes for an Effective WPS National Action Plan?” Australian Strategic Policy Institute, March 25, 2019.

10 For an initial assessment of these envoys and ambassadors, see UN Women, “A Global Study on the Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325,” 2015, Chapter 10.

11 UN Security Council, *Guidelines for the Informal Expert Group on Women and Peace and Security*, UN Doc. S/2016/1106, December 27, 2016.

their objection to the group's establishment.<sup>12</sup> Additionally, while there have been situations in which analysis and recommendations of the IEG have been taken forward, in many cases the gender considerations meant to be mainstreamed across the work of the Security Council have not meaningfully extended beyond IEG meetings into broader deliberations, including negotiations on mission mandates.<sup>13</sup>

Despite commitments in WPS resolutions and the establishment of the IEG, Security Council mandates for peace operations still often lack concrete language on WPS, including requests for gender expertise and gendered conflict analysis—a consistent shortcoming since the council adopted Resolution 1325. While there has been considerable progress in the development of gender expertise within the Departments of Peace Operations and Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, mission mandates are still inconsistent in requesting it.<sup>14</sup> The council has indicated a preference for gendered analysis in Resolutions 2122 and 2242, but there is little accountability for missions when their briefings and reports do not consider gender. The secretary-general noted the continued dearth of this expertise in his 2019 report on WPS: “Gender expertise has to be strengthened across all United Nations peace, security and humanitarian entities. Gender expertise should also be included in all strategic assessment reviews. Similarly, gender perspectives are not consistently included in settings with protection concerns, including in humanitarian responses and protection of civilian mandates.”<sup>15</sup>

Broadly speaking, implementation of the WPS agenda has been incremental. Some components are prioritized over others—for example, the focus is more on women's participation in track I peace processes than broader efforts at conflict prevention. Issue-by-issue implementation undermines the foundations of WPS as a feminist and anti-war

agenda and minimizes its transformative potential. While policymakers and practitioners have often seen a siloed approach as the most expedient path to implementation (as evidenced in part by the specific issues the WPS resolutions have focused on), researchers and advocates have emphasized the importance of moving forward on the entire agenda for years.

Moving from discourse to action also remains a challenge. Nonetheless, WPS advocates recognize that words can mark a starting point for implementing the agenda. The introduction of the vocabulary surrounding WPS can provide an initial opening in institutions that had been resistant to the agenda, and this can subsequently be leveraged to make substantive progress. Even if language does not always lead to action, simply introducing a vocabulary can therefore be seen as progress.

At multiple levels, a lack of accountability has plagued implementation. There is little accountability for UN entities or member states for failing to implement policies or abide by requests from the Security Council, or for senior UN leaders for not championing the WPS agenda or staff for not implementing it. Experts note that while political will to engage on issues related to WPS has deepened and many political leaders have publicly expressed support for the agenda, WPS is almost always secondary to other political calculations.<sup>16</sup> From protecting women human rights defenders to ensuring justice for those who have perpetrated or orchestrated sexual violence in conflict, political actors have avoided the politically difficult actions needed to implement the WPS agenda.<sup>17</sup>

As a result, analyses of power dynamics are often stripped out of the agenda, with policymakers either avoiding or explicitly pushing back on the political nature of the issue. For example, efforts to promote women's “empowerment” or “capacity building” are sometimes presented as the primary components of implementation.<sup>18</sup> This places all

12 China and Russia rarely attend the IEG meetings. In its statement at the 2015 open debate on WPS, Russia noted its objection to the establishment of the IEG.

13 NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security, “Mapping Women, Peace and Security in the UN Security Council,” 2017.

14 UN Peacekeeping, “Promoting Women, Peace and Security,” accessed on October 22, 2019, available at <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/promoting-women-peace-and-security>; UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, “No Durable Peace without Inclusion: Promoting the Effective Participation of Women in Peace Processes,” accessed on October 22, 2019, available at <https://dppa-ps.atavist.com/no-durable-peace-without-inclusion>.

15 UN Security Council, *Women and Peace and Security—Report of the Secretary-General*, UN Doc. S/2019/800, October 9, 2019. Regarding language, see, for example, the shift from asking for gender expertise when “appropriate” in Resolution 2122 (2013), para. 4 to the direct request in Resolution 2242 (2015), para. 7.

16 Participant in IPI WPS consultation, New York, September 10, 2019.

17 On justice for sexual violence, see: Women's Initiatives for Gender Justice, “Overturn of 1<sup>st</sup> ICC Conviction for Crimes of Sexual Violence,” June 2018; “Statement on the Conviction of Bosco Ntaganda,” July 2019.

18 See Security Council members' statements at the annual open debate on WPS.



the onus for change on individual women, locating them solely as disadvantaged actors in need of training while ignoring the exclusionary power structures and individuals or groups that impede implementation, as well as women's existing contributions to peace processes, particularly at the grassroots level.<sup>19</sup> Similarly, it can overlook the structural factors behind, for example, the low number of women mediators and negotiators, including women's exclusion from political processes writ large and the resulting smaller pool of expertise to draw from. The Security Council has been particularly reluctant to address one of the most significant—and most political—outstanding areas of concern in the WPS agenda: ongoing threats and violence directed at women human rights defenders, whose work to build rights-respecting communities often puts them in direct conflict with their own governments, which are UN member states.

Underpinning and compounding these challenges are ongoing uncertainties in funding for work on WPS. The 2015 UN global study on WPS notes that “failure to allocate sufficient resources and funds has been the most serious and persistent obstacle to implementation of women, peace and security commitments over the past 15 years.”<sup>20</sup> Within the UN system, negotiations in the Fifth Committee have often resulted in insufficient funding for gender experts. Among donors, the trend toward short-term, project-based funding drives recipients to design projects that meet short-term funding objectives rather than assessed needs and undermines their long-term financial stability, particularly for small civil society actors. This is a particular obstacle to women's and women-led organizations doing long-term, community-based peacebuilding work, the results of which are often not measurable in donor-mandated frameworks for budgeting and recording impact.

## The Anniversary of Resolution 1325: A Marker of Progress or Pushback?

The annual October anniversary of Resolution 1325 has become a key inflection point in the implementation of the WPS agenda. It can be a moment to take stock of how far gender and security discourse has come and how far it still has to go; to clarify the intersection between politics, gender, peace, and security; or merely to reflect the passage of time.

Often, this anniversary has been leveraged to garner the interest and attention of the international community and mobilize political and financial resources. It has been the impetus for a number of the resolutions and institutional changes noted above, from Resolution 1889 (2009) calling for the development of indicators on WPS to Resolution 2122 (2013) providing the first comprehensive mapping of the Security Council's own obligations to implement the WPS agenda. The secretary-general produces an annual report on WPS, which the Security Council discusses every October in conjunction with the anniversary. Now that the Security Council specifically emphasizes conflict-related sexual violence, there is an additional report and debate on this issue in the first half of each year.

Five-yearly anniversaries have been seen as particularly salient political moments to assess and move forward implementation. In 2015, for the fifteenth anniversary of Resolution 1325, UN Women gathered experts to write a comprehensive report on progress on and challenges to the WPS agenda and to highlight emerging issues, including rights protection in humanitarian settings, countering violent extremism, and women's presence and active participation in the security

19 Participant in IPI WPS consultation, New York, September 10, 2019.

20 UN Women, “A Global Study on the Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325,” 2015, Chapter 13.

sector. The open debate on WPS that year saw the most speakers at a Security Council open debate in the UN's history.

While these anniversaries are indicators of broad-based support for the WPS agenda, a number of core components of the agenda are deeply political and therefore remain contested. At the annual open debate on sexual violence in conflict in April 2019, for example, the United States threatened to veto Resolution 2467 in response to attempts to include previously agreed language on the right to sexual and reproductive health.<sup>21</sup> When the resolution came to a vote, China and Russia abstained, making it the first WPS resolution not to be adopted unanimously. While these schisms were evident in statements by governments in previous WPS open debates, this was the first time that such fundamental challenges to the agenda were manifest in the council's formal decision. This demonstrates the controversial nature of the agenda's substantive implementation; even member states that do not put WPS at the center of their efforts to prevent and resolve conflict nevertheless consider the agenda to be a threat to their preferred world order.<sup>22</sup>

Security Council open debates on WPS have also offered opportunities for member states to affirm and reaffirm commitments to the agenda. But while some UN member states present comprehensive, actionable steps, others give statements "affirming support for WPS" but making "no specific commitments."<sup>23</sup> Reluctant to have a negative image on women's rights and status, they often agree on broad and relatively noncontroversial issues like increasing women's participation without grappling with the institutional change underpinning such an increase.<sup>24</sup> In addition, numerous Security Council members that are champions of the WPS agenda do not carry this

commitment into practice; for example, many of them manufacture and sell the weapons used in conflicts that WPS actors are working to end.<sup>25</sup> Genuine commitment to WPS requires that member states put their political capital behind the agenda and push for structural change. Without such change, the issue of women's rights will continue being "slowly emptied of its political content,"<sup>26</sup> and gender justice will be written out of the agenda.<sup>27</sup> Recent regressive policy decisions by some UN member states highlight the continued need to relentlessly pursue gender justice, feminist analysis, and a WPS agenda.

## Looking to the Twentieth Anniversary of Resolution 1325

As the twentieth anniversary of Resolution 1325 and twenty-fifth anniversary of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, 2020 provides a critical political moment for WPS stakeholders to take action. Given the agenda's current status and possible future, what multilateral steps can the United Nations and international community take to support substantive progress on WPS?

**Use creative mechanisms to increase women's participation:** Although the meaningful participation of women in all levels of decision making is a perennial challenge, there are recent developments and new opportunities the multilateral system can support. Bodies implementing the WPS agenda globally can capitalize on new initiatives such as the regional women mediator networks by leveraging them in all peacebuilding efforts.<sup>28</sup> New thinking on temporary measures such as quotas to increase women's participation not only in elections but also in peace efforts could more firmly locate WPS

21 Robbie Gramer and Colum Lynch, "How a U.N. Bid to Prevent Sexual Violence Turned Into a Spat over Abortion," *Foreign Policy*, April 23, 2019.

22 See, for example, Russian statements in the Security Council on the irrelevance of women's empowerment to the work of the council. For more analysis on this issue, see: Sarah Taylor and Gretchen Baldwin, "The Global Pushback on Women's Rights: The State of the Women, Peace, and Security Agenda," International Peace Institute, September 2019.

23 NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security and Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, "WPS Open Debate Commitments," October 2015, available at <https://www.peacewomen.org/sites/default/files/NGOWG%20and%20WILPF%20-%20WPS%20Open%20Debate%20commitments%20October%202015.pdf>.

24 Participant in IPI WPS consultation, New York, September 10, 2019.

25 Beth Oppenheim, "Europe Is at War over Arms Exports," *Foreign Policy*, September 18, 2019.

26 Participant in IPI WPS consultation, New York, September 10, 2019.

27 Taylor and Baldwin, "The Global Pushback on Women's Rights."

28 Peace Research Institute Oslo, "Launch of the Global Alliance of Regional Women Mediator Networks at UN Headquarters in New York," October 4, 2019.

as a political issue and address structural barriers. As one consultation participant framed it, there is a need to “think outside the damn box” and creatively deploy political capital to ensure political decision-making processes at all levels reflect gender considerations and include women.<sup>29</sup>

**Leverage the tools of the UN Security Council:** There are also a number of options for the UN Security Council to support implementation of the WPS agenda. Representatives of council members at all levels of the political hierarchy should consistently request gender-sensitive analysis and recommendations in reports and pressure senior leaders to mainstream the WPS agenda across all policies, in consultation with their gender advisers. Member states can also raise issues related to WPS at their monthly briefings with the president of the Security Council. The monthly president of the council has a particular opportunity to put WPS on the agenda. During its council presidency in April 2019, for example, Germany made sure all council members received letters with language on WPS to guide briefings and deliberations. Member states that claim they are committed to WPS must also commit to ensuring civil society actors guide the council’s agenda, including by continuing to support the increasing number of civil society briefers who share their expertise with the Security Council.<sup>30</sup>

The council already has a key tool it can use to drive these efforts: the IEG. Despite political pushback from within the membership of the council that could undermine this opportunity, the council can better integrate the work of the IEG into its daily work. Member states can more consistently draw on the analysis and recommendations in the IEG’s meeting notes and use them to inform negotiations on country situations, emphasizing the expert group’s work and signaling its importance. Council members can also make more creative and substantive use of the council’s various working groups to ensure this analysis and information are embedded in other areas of the council’s work, including in specific country situations.

**Significantly strengthen accountability:** Accountability will be one of the knottiest challenges to tackle. It will require increasing the political cost of not complying with the WPS agenda to pressure political leaders. This means changing the political calculus for engaging on the agenda. When WPS is siloed as a thematic issue, the political cost of noncompliance is less. But if WPS-related work is central to country-specific agendas, the political cost of noncompliance is far more evident, thereby elevating the agenda. In addition, implementation of the agenda needs to move from being solely a matter of individual responsibility to being embedded in institutional mandates, from the secretary-general to the Security Council. Holding member states accountable will be more challenging; how to create incentives and costs for them to comply remains an outstanding question.

The answer to accountability concerns will likely lie, in part, at the national level, as has been recognized by the relatively new WPS Global Focal Points Network, a member-state initiative to share national-level good practices.<sup>31</sup> For member states that have pledged to uphold and advance the WPS agenda, national legislation should reflect this commitment. While nominal commitment sends important political signals, concrete laws and policies will ensure that the agenda survives political ebbs and flows. Like the WPS agenda itself, legislation should be developed with intersectionality in mind; gender justice is inextricable from the interlinking power dynamics of race, class, ability, sexual orientation, and other categories used to structurally marginalize populations.

**Move the focus to the field:** A key reflection from experts is that dialogue around WPS needs to shift from UN headquarters in New York to focus more on the field. The current focus tends to be on elite-level policymaking—particularly in the UN Security Council as the pinnacle of decision making on peace and security—rather than on grassroots and community-driven peace efforts. Moving the focus to policymaking in countries and regions that have grappled or are grappling with

29 Participant in IPI WPS consultation, New York, September 10, 2019.

30 See forthcoming report on consultations with civil society on WPS from GAPS UK. Regarding civil society briefers in the council, see Resolution 2242, para. 5(c).

31 UN Women, “Women, Peace and Security Focal Points Networks Meets in Berlin to Promote Women’s Role in Peace Processes,” May 4, 2018.

conflict could help puncture the headquarters policy “bubble.”

**Increase financing:** Financing remains a fundamental concern underpinning all these challenges. In addition to the “projectization” of WPS funding, conflict tends to drive resources to the security sector, reducing the resources available to support gender equality and long-term peacebuilding.<sup>32</sup> Donors should consult with key stakeholders, including civil society organizations they are funding, to change how and for how long they allocate resources. More broadly, international institutions and national governments should increase their financial commitments to the WPS agenda, moving beyond discursive, non-binding commitments (both political and

financial) and tangibly supporting civil society organizations, national and regional action plans, and research on issues central to WPS.

For all the opportunities 2020 will provide, a deceptively simple question can be used to evaluate whether a particular set of policies and programs addresses gaps in implementation of the WPS agenda: Does the policy address a need identified by the relevant constituencies? If a course of action does not support victims and survivors, if it does not hold perpetrators to account, if it does not enhance women’s participation, if it does not build resilience to conflict, then it is not the course of action the women, peace, and security community is looking for.

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<sup>32</sup> See: Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, “Women, Peace and Security Financing,” accessed on October 22, 2019, available at <https://www.peacewomen.org/WPS-Financing>.









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