Partners and Competitors: Forces Operating in Parallel to UN Peace Operations

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CONTENTS

Abbreviations ........................................ iii

Executive Summary ................................. 1

Introduction ......................................... 2

Parallel Forces: Context, Actors, Legal Authority, and Oversight ....................... 3

   CONTEXT
   ACTORS
   LEGAL AUTHORITY
   OVERSIGHT AND REPORTING MECHANISMS

Why Are There Parallel Deployments? ........... 11

   TO RESPOND RAPIDLY AND ROBUSTLY TO A CRISIS SITUATION
   TO SERVE NATIONAL INTERESTS
   TO OPERATE OUTSIDE UN PEACE OPERATIONS

The Challenges of Parallel Forces ............... 17

   COORDINATION OF A STRATEGIC VISION
   INFORMATION SHARING
   CAPABILITIES OF ACTORS
   LEGITIMACY AND PERCEPTIONS
   BEYOND PEACEKEEPING: WORKING WITH A PARALLEL COUNTERTERRORISM FORCE

Future Prospects for Parallel Forces to UN Peace Operations ....................... 24

   OPPORTUNITIES AND RISKS: PARTNERS OR COMPETITORS?
   CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Annex ................................................. 28
## Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFISMA</td>
<td>African-Led International Support Mission to Mali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>AU Mission in Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIS</td>
<td>Commonwealth of Independent States</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOMOG</td>
<td>ECOWAS Monitoring Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOMICI</td>
<td>ECOWAS Mission in Côte d’Ivoire</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU CAP</td>
<td>EU capacity building mission</td>
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<td>EUFOR</td>
<td>EU force</td>
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<td>EULEX</td>
<td>EU rule of law mission</td>
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<td>EUSEC</td>
<td>EU security sector reform mission</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUMAM</td>
<td>EU military advisory mission</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUMAM</td>
<td>EU military advisory mission</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUPOL</td>
<td>EU police mission</td>
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<td>EUTM</td>
<td>EU training mission</td>
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<td>HIPPO</td>
<td>High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>IFOR</td>
<td>Implementation Force (Bosnia and Herzegovina)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTERFET</td>
<td>International Force for East Timor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Force (Afghanistan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISF</td>
<td>International Stabilisation Force (Timor-Leste)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KFOR</td>
<td>Kosovo Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MICOPAX</td>
<td>Peace Consolidation Mission in CAR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINUSMA</td>
<td>UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MISCA</td>
<td>African-Led International Support Mission to CAR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONUC</td>
<td>UN Mission in the DRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
RRF          Rapid Reaction Force (former Yugoslavia)
SFOR         Stabilization Force (Bosnia and Herzegovina)
UNAMA        UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNAMET       UN Mission in East Timor
UNAMI        UN Assistance Mission for Iraq
UNAMIR       UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda
UNAMSIL      UN Mission in Sierra Leone
UNIFIL       UN Interim Force in Lebanon
UNITAF       Unified Task Force (Somalia)
UNMIK        UN Mission in Kosovo
UNMIT        UN Integrated Mission in East Timor
UNOCI        UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire
UNPROFOR     UN Protection Force (former Yugoslavia)
UNTAET       UN Transitional Administration in East Timor
UNOSOM       UN Operation in Somalia
Executive Summary

Since the end of the Cold War, the UN Security Council has authorized or recognized the deployment of more than forty parallel forces that operate alongside UN peace operations. These parallel forces have included deployments by regional organizations, ad hoc coalitions, and individual member states, with their duration ranging from several months to many years and with a range of mandates. Most have been deployed where there is a need to use force, which is often beyond the capabilities of UN missions. However, as the Security Council has deployed peace operations in increasingly non-permissive environments, the division of labor between UN missions and parallel forces has blurred, and their goals have sometimes come into conflict. This raises the question of whether they are partners or competitors.

Various factors guide the Security Council, UN Secretariat, regional organizations, and member states in determining whether to deploy a parallel force. In many cases, parallel forces have filled a gap in the capabilities of a UN peace operation during its start-up or in a crisis situation. Such interventions have also offered member states an opportunity to align their engagement with their national interests, whether to protect their nationals, defend against a potential security threat in the region, or support their broader security interests. For some Western countries, parallel forces have been a way to contribute to peacekeeping indirectly, bypassing a command-and-control structure they distrust.

While parallel forces often allow UN peace operations to be more flexible and to draw on the comparative strengths of different organizations and member states, challenges have emerged. UN peace operations and parallel forces often struggle to coordinate on a strategic vision, which can cause them to compete with each other and undermine operational coordination. Both parallel forces and peace operations are sometimes reluctant to share information with each other. As parallel operations are expensive, they have generally been launched by Western states or organizations, although that has started to shift in recent years. The actions of parallel forces can also threaten the legitimacy or perceived impartiality of UN operations, especially when the forces are not clearly distinguished.

Peace operations and parallel forces tend to better avoid these challenges when they deliver on different mandates, complement one another, and have limited overlap in their areas of operation. On the other hand, these challenges are exacerbated when peace operations are deployed alongside counterterrorism forces that affect the way they are perceived by local actors and pose legal risks. When such situations are unavoidable, peacekeeping stakeholders need to be equipped to manage these partnerships effectively. Toward that end, the UN Secretariat, Security Council, member states, regional organizations, and other stakeholders could consider the following:

- **Strengthening coordination of assessments, planning, and application of UN standards:** The UN and actors deploying parallel forces should conduct joint assessments and planning when deploying or reconfiguring missions. The UN Security Council should also engage more regularly with parallel forces and encourage the continued development of human rights compliance frameworks for these forces.

- **Clarifying roles, responsibilities, and areas of operation:** Peace operations and parallel forces should clearly delineate their responsibilities and areas of operation, assess the risks of collocating, and improve strategic communications with the local population. The Security Council should also continue to put in place mechanisms to strengthen the accountability of parallel forces, especially when peace operations are providing support that could contribute to counterterrorism operations.
Introduction

The history of UN peace operations is full of arrangements by which the UN has sought the support of other actors, whether political or military, to fill gaps in its capacities. Similarly, the UN has often been requested by other actors, whether its member states (bilaterally or as a coalition) or a regional organization, to intervene to share the burden of crisis management. Indeed, the UN Charter envisaged the organization operating alongside other actors by giving the Security Council the power to delegate action to maintain international peace and security. However, as the council has continued to deploy peace operations in increasingly non-permissive environments, the need to clarify the roles and responsibilities of its “blue-helmeted” operations vis-à-vis those of others has become more pressing.

While the reasons for having other forces deployed in parallel to a UN peace operation have been varied, most have been deployed when there is a need to use force. There has been a tacit understanding among member states, the Security Council, and the UN Secretariat that using force is often beyond the capabilities of a UN peace operation and would be done better by a non-UN actor. This actor has often been a Western state or organization that can bear the cost of these expensive endeavors.

This division of labor has gradually been codified in UN peacekeeping. For instance, the Brahimi Report acknowledged in 2000 that “where enforcement action is required, it has consistently been entrusted to coalitions of willing States, with the authorization of the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter.” That spirit of the Brahimi Report, and later the Capstone Doctrine, suggested, as Arthur Boutellis underlined, that a peace operation may need to deploy “with a parallel non-UN rapid response and/or counterterrorist multinational force doing the fighting necessary to stabilize the situation and create space for the UN to support a political process through impartial good offices.”

However, the deployment of blue helmets in environments where they are facing terrorist threats has changed the nature of their relationship with parallel forces. While recent independent reviews and assessments of UN peace operations have recognized that parallel forces play a valuable role, they have also acknowledged that their roles and responsibilities need to be more clearly defined. Following the deployment of a counterterrorism operation alongside a UN peacekeeping mission in Mali, the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) underlined that when operating alongside “a parallel force... engaged in offensive combat operations it is important for UN peacekeeping operations to maintain a clear division of labor and distinction of roles.” Similarly, in the Declaration of Shared Commitments on the secretary-general’s Action for Peacekeeping initiative, member states and the Secretariat agreed to “enhance collaboration and planning between the UN and relevant international, regional and sub-regional organizations and arrangements... while recognizing the need for a clear delineation of roles between respective operations.”

This points to the value of parallel deployments that fall outside the UN’s peacekeeping framework and its command and control. At the same time, it suggests that there remains uncertainty about whether UN peace operations and parallel forces pursue the same goals—that is, whether they are partners or competitors. Indeed, the presence of multiple parallel forces with various mandates, means, and objectives and without a clear political process or common strategic goal to guide them has at times created a “security traffic jam.” If peace operations and parallel forces are not cooperating toward the same goal, how can they deliver peace?

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This report examines the missions that have operated in parallel to UN peace operations to identify how to strengthen these partnerships in the future. It draws on desktop and field research, including interviews conducted in Mali with personnel from the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), Operation Barkhane, and the EU training and capacity building missions (EUTM and EUCAP) in February 2018. First, the report analyzes and categorizes the types of parallel forces that have been deployed to understand the context, actors, legal authority, and oversight mechanisms that have guided them. Second, it examines the rationales for deploying parallel forces. Third, it looks at strategic and operational challenges, including the challenges unique to operating alongside a counterterrorism force. Finally, drawing on lessons from past and current parallel deployments, it offers eight recommendations for member states, the Security Council, and the UN Secretariat.

Parallel Forces: Context, Actors, Legal Authority, and Oversight

For the purposes of this paper, a parallel force is defined as an international, predominantly military or police operation deployed alongside a UN peace operation (either a special political mission or a peacekeeping mission) with authorization or recognition from the Security Council through a resolution or presidential statement. That resolution or statement may reference the parallel operation directly (i.e., explicitly identify a particular member state, regional organization, or military operation) or indirectly (i.e., direct “member states” to undertake military action).

In order to limit the scope of analysis in this paper, that definition does not include military operations or security sector reform programs undertaken bilaterally or through regional organizations without the explicit and direct acknowledgement or authorization of the Security Council (e.g., some EU training or police missions), naval blockades or operations, or military operations undertaken by the host country in cooperation with a UN peace operation. This definition also does not include arrangements where the UN and another entity are operating in a hybrid or “joint” formation under the same command-and-control arrangements, which has distinct challenges.

Based on this definition, there have been more than forty parallel forces over the last seventy years (see Annex). All of these deployments have taken place since the end of the Cold War. In the early 1990s, the Security Council started to explicitly authorize or acknowledge forces operating in parallel to peace operations in order to share the burden of crisis management as operations became more complex and mandates became more detailed and lengthy. The first parallel force recognized by the council was a no-fly zone set up in the former Yugoslavia in 1992 alongside the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR). Since then, the geographic footprint of parallel forces has followed that of the UN, with deployments in Europe, Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. As of September 2019, there were parallel forces operating alongside six UN peace operations in Afghanistan, the Central African Republic, Iraq, Kosovo, Mali, and Somalia.

It is difficult to categorize the many types of parallel forces. No two have been the same. They have included deployments by regional organizations, ad hoc coalitions, and individual member states, with their duration ranging from several months to many years and with a range of different

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7 There is an earlier precedent in the Organization of American States’ force that deployed alongside the Mission of the Representative of the Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic (DOMREP), a “small-scale peacekeeping operation,” in 1965. But although the role of the Organization of American States was actively discussed in the Security Council, it was not explicitly referenced in Resolutions 203 and 205 authorizing the deployment of the UN mission. See UN General Assembly, Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, 16 June 1964 to 15 June 1965, Supplement No. 1, UN Doc. A/6001, September 15, 1965. See also Bernardo Rodrigues dos Santos, “Mission of the Representative of the Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic (DOMREP),” in The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, Joachim A. Koops, Thierry Tardy, Norrie MacQueen, and Paul D. Williams, eds. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).

8 This force was called Operation Sky Monitor. UN Security Council Resolution 781 (October 12, 1992), UN Doc. S/RES/781.

9 The sui generis nature of parallel forces was noted in a report for the UN in 2004. Bruce Jones, with Feryal Cherif, “Evolving Models of Peacekeeping: Policy Implications and Responses,” UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2004.
and evolving mandates (see Figures 1 and 2). Nonetheless, there are some common features that allow us to broadly categorize these missions. This section examines parallel forces according to the political and security context in which they are deployed, the actors that are part of them, the legal authority they have to operate, and the mechanisms put in place to oversee them.

**CONTEXT**

Like UN peace operations, the nature, design, mandates, and purposes of parallel forces are as varied as the circumstances of their deployment. Also like peace operations, parallel forces have largely been guided by the UN’s efforts to find a political solution to a conflict. Unlike peace operations, however, their scope and mandate have been almost entirely security-focused (see Table 1).

As such, parallel forces have implemented the security-related provisions of peace agreements (e.g., IFOR and SFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina, KFOR in Kosovo, ISAF in Afghanistan) and performed military tasks outside the capacity of the UN, such as the establishment of a no-fly zone (e.g., Operations Sky Monitor and Deny Flight in the former Yugoslavia). In many instances, parallel forces have filled a temporary gap in a UN mission’s military capacity to respond to a crisis (e.g., RRF in the former Yugoslavia, Operation Palliser in Sierra Leone, Operation Artemis and EUFOR in the DRC). Parallel forces have also acted as “insurance forces” to reinforce the mission if required or to deter other actors (e.g., ISF in Timor-Leste, EUFOR in the DRC, Operation Licorne in Côte d’Ivoire). Others have implemented tasks a UN peace operation could undertake but for which it lacked the necessary resources or mandate (e.g., Operation Artemis and EUFOR in the DRC). Others have stayed alongside the UN operation throughout their mandate, providing critical support (e.g., the CIS peacekeeping force in Georgia, KFOR in Kosovo, ISAF in Afghanistan, Operation Licorne in Côte d’Ivoire). Some were deployed before the UN peace operation and stabilized the security situation to prepare the ground for it to deploy (e.g., UNITAF in Somalia, Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti, Operation Licorne in Côte d’Ivoire, EUFOR in Chad/CAR, Operation Sangaris in CAR). At least one was deployed to enable a peacekeeping mission to depart safely (Operation United Shield in Somalia). In a few of these cases, the parallel forces integrated some of their units into the UN peacekeeping mission when leaving (e.g., INTERFET in Timor-Leste, EUFOR in Chad/CAR).

Parallel forces also differ in the manner in which they are deployed and their relationship with the UN peace operation. Some of them are deployed throughout the area of operations (e.g., KFOR in Kosovo, ISAF in Afghanistan), while others have limited geographic scope (e.g., Operation Artemis in the province of Ituri in the DRC, EUFOR DRC in Kinsasha). In some cases, the parallel force has led military operations, relying on a UN special political mission to complement its activities politically. Most notably, the International Security

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10 The figures provided in this map are only approximate and intended to be indicative in nature. They draw on publicly available data from a range of sources, including the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s yearbooks, the Global Peace Operations Review by NYU’s Center for International Cooperation, data from the Berlin Center for International Peace Operations, EU fact sheets, and mandate authorizations. Where possible, it provides the maximum level of authorized personnel, although it does not offer a point-in-time reference for comparison between operations. Rather, the data is provided to give an indication of the size of different forces that are part of the international presence in the country or region of operation.

11 In spring 1995, UNPROFOR was restructured and became part of the UN Peace Forces deployed in the former Yugoslav republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Macedonia, before it was terminated soon after the Dayton Peace Agreement was signed in November 1995. See Thierry Tardy, “United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR—Bosnia and Herzegovina),” in *The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*. 
Figure 1. Past and current parallel forces around the world.
Assistance Force (ISAF), which had up to 150,000 soldiers at its height in June 2011, led military operations in Afghanistan while the UN mission (UNAMA) supported the political process. A similar relationship existed between the Multinational Force in Iraq and the UN mission in that country (UNAMI).

Parallel forces also differ in the number of personnel deployed, depending on the security context, the mandate, and the interests of the contributing countries. Some have been punch forces of 1,000 to 2,000 soldiers or technical assistance missions of a few dozen experts (often from Western countries). More often, however, parallel forces have been more robust than the UN operation. NATO, which generally supports smaller-footprint UN peace operations focused on political processes, has tended to deploy parallel operations that are more than five times bigger (e.g., in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Afghanistan). As a result, parallel forces have often cost much more to deploy than their UN counterparts.

**ACTORS**

Another way to categorize parallel forces is based on the type of actor or organization involved. In this sense, parallel forces can be categorized as bilateral, regional, or multinational (see Table 2).

### Table 1. Mandates of parallel forces in relation to peace operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parallel force mandate</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
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| Military stabilization          | Fight wars or undertake kinetic military, counter-insurgency, or counterterrorism operations that are beyond the remit or capabilities of UN peace operations | ISAF (Afghanistan)  
IFOR and SFOR (Bosnia and Herzegovina)  
KFOR (Kosovo)  
Operation Barkhane (Mali)  
G5 Sahel Joint Force  
AMISOM (Somalia)  
Operations Sky Monitor and Deny Flight (former Yugoslavia) |
| Crisis response                 | Intervene to provide reinforcement when there is a crisis a UN peace operation lacks the capacity to respond to  | Operation Sangaris (CAR)  
Operation Licorne (Côte d’Ivoire)  
Operation Artemis and EUFOR (DRC)  
Operation Palliser (Sierra Leone)  
Operation United Shield (Somalia)  
INTERFET and ISF (Timor-Leste)  
RRF (former Yugoslavia) |
| Insurance or deterrence         | Stand by or prepare to intervene when a UN peace operation is unable to do so, providing a form of “insurance” or deterring other actors by their presence  | Operation Licorne (Côte d’Ivoire)  
EUFOR (DRC)  
Operation Barkhane (Mali)  
ISF (Timor-Leste) |
| Capacity building               | Undertake a technical task such as security sector reform that a UN peace operation has outsourced  | EUPOL (Afghanistan)  
EUTM and EU CAP (Mali) |
NATO was the first actor to be delegated the task of supporting a peace operation, first as a provider of air power in the former Yugoslavia, then as an implementer of the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement. NATO cooperated only loosely with the UN at the political level, where the UN was in the lead. It was the first time NATO and UN missions divided labor in this way.14

While many of the actors launching parallel operations have been guided by a humanitarian

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12 Although the Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) reported to UN command, it operated separately and was not “blue-helmeted” as part of the mission. It was also funded partly through voluntary funding and in-kind contributions. This contrasts with more recent cases, such as the Force Intervention Brigade in the UN mission in the DRC (MONUSCO), which was blue-helmeted and funded through assessed funds and is therefore not considered a parallel force.


14 This division of labor was set forth in Annex 11 of the Dayton Peace Agreement.
imperative, they often have overriding strategic or historical interests that prompted them to intervene outside the auspices of a UN peace operation. These interests have included maintenance of a zone of influence (e.g., NATO and the EU in the Balkans); prosecution of the war on terror (e.g., NATO in Afghanistan\(^{15}\) and the US, UK, and other coalition members in Iraq); maintenance of influence in a former colony (e.g., France and the UK in several African states); and historical and geographic links (e.g., Australia in Timor-Leste). In the case of the EU, interventions have also been motivated by institutional developments (i.e., the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy).

The majority of these deployments have been undertaken by Western states or by regional organizations they dominate. Four of the five permanent members of the Security Council have either led or deployed military personnel in support of missions that operated in parallel to UN peace operations.\(^{16}\) These are the states that have the means to undertake such operations, whether through a regional organization or on their own.

This has started to shift in the last two decades, with the African Union and subregional organizations in Africa more regularly engaging alongside UN peace operations on the continent. However, such deployments remain rare. African states and organizations have mostly been contributors to parallel forces led by others (e.g., Operation Turquoise in Rwanda, Operation Artemis in the DRC). When they have launched parallel forces, it has usually been alongside a UN special political mission meant to be soon relieved by a UN peace operation (e.g., ECOMICI in Côte d’Ivoire, AMISOM in Somalia, AFISMA in Mali, MISCA in CAR). There have been some exceptions to this: the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) launched in parallel to the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), and the Peace Consolidation Mission in CAR (MICOPAX) deployed in parallel to the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in CAR (BINUCA) were not relieved by a UN peace operation.

More recently, Western states have focused on developing regional capacity to conduct counter-terrorism operations. In particular, France and several other European states supported the creation of the G5 Sahel Joint Force in the hope that other European parallel forces (e.g., Operation Barkhane) could withdraw and hand over to national forces. However, it has struggled to carry out its mandate due to lack of funding and the limited capabilities of the contributing countries.

**LEGAL AUTHORITY**

Parallel forces can also be categorized according to their means of authorization and legal authority. Legally, there are two types of parallel operations:

- UN-authorized operations sanctioned by a UN Security Council resolution that can give a specific mandate to that operation; and
- UN-recognized operations that are simply “welcomed” by a Security Council resolution or endorsed in another official document such as a Security Council presidential statement.

Parallel forces that do not need to use force (such as EU or NATO training missions) have only been recognized rather than authorized by the council, while those using force have generally been authorized (hence respecting Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and Chapter VIII in the case of regional organizations). However, there have been exceptions to this, where the council has only recognized rather than authorized parallel forces using force: the Dutch-French-UK Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) in the former Yugoslavia, the Australian-led International Stabilisation Force (ISF) in Timor-Leste, and the G5 Sahel Joint Force. In the case of the RRF, the resolution recognizing the operation was not adopted by unanimous vote, showing division among members of the council over its creation.

In some cases, peace agreements have assigned parallel forces a role in maintaining security while loosely cooperating with the UN at the political level (e.g., the CIS peacekeeping force in the

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\(^{15}\) However, NATO started its commitment in Afghanistan on a different footing, as ISAF was initially limited to providing security in Kabul. It was only when the US was looking to wind down Operation Enduring Freedom and merged its command with that of NATO that NATO expanded its role in the country and engaged in counterterrorism activities.

\(^{16}\) China was and still remains the only exception for having exclusively contributed to UN peacekeeping.
Agreement on a Cease-fire and Separation of Forces, IFOR and SFOR in the Dayton Peace Agreement, KFOR in Security Council Resolution 1244, ISAF in the Bonn Agreement). Some parallel forces have been suggested by member states, while others have been requested by the secretary-general, usually through a letter to the Security Council (e.g., Operation Palliser in Sierra Leone, Operation Artemis and the EUFOR in the DRC). Rarely have they been requested only by the host state.

The language the Security Council uses in its resolutions has varied according to the circumstances described above. This language can impact the political legitimacy of the parallel force. On a few occasions, the council has named the exact member states leading the force (e.g., Russia for the CIS peacekeeping force in Georgia, “French forces” for Operations Licorne in Côte d’Ivoire and Barkhane in Mali). Resolution 1528 creating the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) in 2004 was the first time the council specifically authorized a member state’s parallel force to support a UN peace operation (France’s Operation Licorne). The council provided a detailed mandate to the parallel force and requested France “to report to the Council periodically on all aspects of its mandate in Côte d’Ivoire.” Usually, however, the council does not mention specific states. In the case of the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) in Somalia, for example, Resolution 794 did not mention the United States “as part of a strategy to alleviate the fears of developing states about major power interference in the internal affairs of other states.”

Likewise, the Security Council has sometimes only recognized member states “acting nationally or through regional organizations.” Other times it has named specific organizations, like the AU, Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and EU. The council has made a clear distinction between the regional organizations it does not formally recognize (NATO) and those that are UN partners (AU, EU).

**OVERSIGHT AND REPORTING MECHANISMS**

When it authorizes parallel forces, the Security Council requests the state, coalition, or regional organization responsible to report back on progress toward its general or specific mandate. These reports have taken various forms.

The responsible authority often sends reports to the UN secretary-general, who then submits them to the Security Council through an exchange of letters with the council president. Other times, parallel forces report directly to the Security Council. NATO was required to submit a monthly report to the council on its Stabilization Force (SFOR) in the former Yugoslavia; for the Kosovo Force (KFOR) and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, it had to submit first monthly and then quarterly reports. None of these reports are detailed, limiting the council’s oversight. They cover cooperation with international organizations, including support to the UN mission, UN agencies, and other regional organizations but rarely offer details on the exact coordination mechanisms.

Like regional organizations, member states conducting a parallel operation also report to the council on technical aspects of coordination and on actions provided in support of the UN. For example, Operation Barkhane has been required to report to the council on its activities supporting MINUSMA, including

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17 One of the tasks of the UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) was to observe the CIS peacekeeping force.

18 It was only in a July 2000 presidential statement that the Security Council “expressed its appreciation to the United Kingdom for the valuable logistical support provided” to UNAMSIL to conduct the operation leading to the release of captured peacekeepers.

19 UNOCI’s and Operation Licorne’s mandates were thereafter renewed in a single paragraph, up until the last resolution (Resolution 2284 in 2016). Diplomats referred to both forces as “impartial forces.”


21 In the case of NATO, for IFOR and SFOR in the former Yugoslavia the Security Council authorized “the Member States acting through or in cooperation with the organization referred to in Annex 1-A of the Peace Agreement”, for KFOR in Kosovo it authorized “Member States and relevant international organizations” and for Afghanistan it authorized “Member States participating in the ISAF.” In all three cases, the council refers first and foremost to the text of the peace agreements in which those parallel operations are being deployed.


24 NATO also reports on its operations (in terms of the number of personnel being deployed and the state of the overall security situation) and cooperation and compliance by the parties to the conflict.
any in extremis support, when requested by the secretary-general.

One of the more comprehensive and transparent forms of reporting has been that submitted by the EU rule of law mission (EULEX) in Kosovo to the Security Council since 2009. These reports are annexed to the secretary-general’s report on the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), indicating that EULEX is coordinating with the UN and respecting its primacy in crisis management.\(^\text{25}\) However, that unusual reporting mechanism is the result of a constraint: due to divisions in the council on Kosovo and the impossibility of voting on a resolution replacing Resolution 1244, the EU had to accept that EULEX would operate “under a UN umbrella.”

More recently, reports have been done in line with the technical agreements or memoranda of understanding negotiated and signed by the UN (the Department of Peace Operations and Office of Legal Affairs) and the authorities operating the parallel force to define their mutual support. This has particularly been the case with the French parallel operations (e.g., Operations Licorne, Serval/Barkhane, and Sangaris), as well as with the EU force in Chad and CAR. The AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) has fluctuated between no reporting and poor reporting to the Security Council, which is why Resolution 2378 in 2017 called for a new reporting framework between the AU and UN.

While these various forms of reporting allow the Security Council to exert some degree of oversight of parallel operations, accountability and transparency are otherwise limited.

### Why Are There Parallel Deployments?

A combination of factors guides regional organizations and UN member states in determining whether to deploy personnel to a force operating alongside a UN peace operation: the need for a rapid and robust response either at the start-up of a mission or due to a deterioration in the security situation during the deployment, the strategic interests of particular states, or some states’ preference to operate outside UN structures.

#### To Respond Rapidly and Robustly to a Crisis Situation

Deploying a UN peace operation takes time. As the HIPPO report concluded in June 2015, “the average deployment time for a United Nations contingent is six months.”\(^\text{26}\) Both before and during deployment, the UN often lacks the capacity to rapidly generate and deploy robust reinforcements. This can often be attributed to a lack of coordination across the mission, a lack of political will or operational readiness from troop contributors to implement the mandate and protect civilians, the absence of effective force reserves or quick reaction forces, or poor leadership.\(^\text{27}\) Member states also often take their time to commit to deploying personnel and equipment, usually basing their decision on the nature of the mission mandate, the security situation in the country or region of deployment, and overriding national interests.

As a result, in crisis situations, the UN secretary-general, the Security Council, or the host government have regularly requested the help of outside actors, relying on the states or organizations most willing and able to send soldiers. Indeed, parallel deployments usually aim to address what UN peace operations have most lacked: rapid deployment capability and a force reserve (either strategic, on standby in a neighboring country, or theater-level).\(^\text{28}\)

Most parallel forces have been designed to conduct offensive operations beyond the capabilities of a UN peacekeeping mission when required. For example, when the UN Mission in the DRC (MONUC) was unable to effectively respond to a rapid deterioration in the security situation in the province of Ituri, the secretary-general requested

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\(^\text{27}\) For instance, from July 8 to 11, 2016, following the crisis in Juba, South Sudan, “a lack of leadership on the part of key senior Mission personnel culminated in a chaotic and ineffective response to the violence.” UN Security Council, Executive Summary of the Independent Special Investigation into the Violence in Juba in 2016 and the Response by the United Nations Mission in South Sudan, UN Doc. S/2016/924, November 1, 2016.

the Security Council to consider “the rapid deployment to Bunia of a highly trained and well-equipped multinational force, under the lead of a Member State, to provide security at the airport as well as to other vital installations in the town and protect the civilian population.” This request was supported by the host government, some parties to the conflict, and the neighboring states of Rwanda and Uganda. Operation Artemis deployed on a “strictly temporary basis” (three months) with the purpose of reinforcing MONUC’s presence in the city of Bunia. This provided the UN with some “breathing space” to reconfigure the mission and generate the personnel and equipment to deploy a further four MONUC battalions while contributors from the EU, led by France, quickly deployed to prevent an “impending humanitarian crisis.”

Parallel forces have also been deployed alongside a UN peacekeeping mission to react when required and provide a sort of “safety net” for the international presence. This has generally been done bilaterally. For example, Operation Licorne supported the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) at critical times, especially during the 2010–2011 post-election crisis. Serving as a reserve force (or a reinforcing force) for UNOCI, Operation Licorne helped the peacekeeping mission sustain its use of force even as the security situation deteriorated and some countries were reluctant to contribute troops or use force. In the words of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations’ military adviser, it was “a back-up force which gave a strategic depth” to UNOCI. This military back-up was particularly helpful when UNOCI faced issues with the command and control of its forces.

Other parallel forces have provided “over-the-horizon” capacity as back-up to UN missions deployed in a different theater of operations. For example, the EU force in the DRC, with a French contingent on standby “over-the-horizon” in Libreville, Gabon, provided back-up to MONUC during the presidential elections of 2006. Similarly, although Operation Barkhane in Mali is focused on delivering its counterterrorism mandate, it also has the scope to intervene when required by the mission in extremis to provide a more robust response. As one interlocutor put it, “Barkhane is the insurance policy for everybody here.”

In some cases, a parallel force has been deployed prior to a UN peacekeeping mission but in parallel with a small political mission that is not equipped to defend itself or the population in a crisis situation. This was the case following the referendum in Timor-Leste in 1999, when the UN Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) was not positioned to respond to the outbreak of violence. To fill the gap, the Security Council authorized the International Force for East Timor (INTERFET), a multinational, Australia-led force of approximately 11,000 personnel and with numerous military assets and capacities that deployed within a month. This provided the UN Secretariat and Security Council time to plan and prepare for the deployment of a UN peacekeeping mission, which occurred in October 1999 when the Security Council transformed UNAMET into the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). In February 2000, INTERFET was re-hatted and absorbed into the military component of UNTAET, marking the end of the parallel operation. This re-hatting ensured the continuation of INTERFET’s capabilities in the new mission, while the appointment of an Australian as deputy force commander offered continuity in leadership.

Like INTERFET, many parallel interventions by coalitions of the willing to address crises have relied

29 UN Security Council Resolution 1484 (May 30, 2003), UN Doc. S/RES/1484, para. 2. The objective of Operation Artemis was to support the small Uruguayan MONUC contingent, which had already deployed, and subsequently create a security environment in which the remainder of the MONUC force could be deployed. Thomas Mandrup, “Multinational Rapid Response Forces in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Another Example of Winning Battles, but Losing the Peace” in Multinational Rapid Response Mechanism, p. 97.
32 Interview with EU official, Bamako, February 2018.
34 UN Security Council Resolution 1271 (October 22, 1999), UN Doc. S/RES/1271.
on a strong “lead nation” with the necessary political will and means. This ensures a sufficient number of reliable forces to achieve the main military objectives, as well as the coherence in command and control needed to use the necessary degree of force and to deter spoilers. As underlined by Alan Ryan, “For such a coalition strategy to be successful, the lead nation must be able to exercise strong control, command and intelligence systems must be effective, and a degree of regional cooperation is essential for coalition legitimacy.” Such multinational forces with a lead nation or bilateral forces have tended to be the most effective in mobilizing a rapid response to a security or humanitarian crisis. Through such deployments, these lead countries have also served their national interests.

TO SERVE NATIONAL INTERESTS

Member states’ decision to deploy as part of or in parallel to a UN peace operation are strongly guided by their own political, economic, and security interests. In general, interventions in support of national interests may be divided into three broad and overlapping categories: interventions to protect a country’s nationals, to defend against a potential security threat in the region, and to support broader multilateral and international security interests.

Many bilateral interventions in parallel to UN peacekeeping missions have been led by one of the Security Council’s permanent members (largely France, the UK, or the US) to evacuate their nationals from countries that are a former colony or part of their geographic sphere of influence. Operation Palliser, the British military intervention in Sierra Leone in May 2000, is a useful case study. As the British permanent representative to the UN in Sierra Leone in May 2000, is a useful case study.

As the British permanent representative to the UN noted to the Security Council, the deployment was “primarily for the evacuation of United Kingdom nationals,” but he went on to note that the UK also believed it contributed to the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) by freeing it up for other tasks. What was initially (on May 6th) an operation to evacuate Commonwealth citizens became (on May 12th) a 1,200-soldier operation supporting UNAMSIL and Sierra Leone’s army with military planning and technical advice; by May 15th, it had driven rebel forces several miles back from the outskirts of Freetown.

Similarly, France intervened in Côte d’Ivoire in September 2002 to evacuate its 15,000 citizens from the country (as well as some other Europeans). At first guided by national interests, Operation Licorne became a pivotal supporter of the UN Security Council’s permanent members (largely France, the UK, or the US) to evacuate their nationals from countries that are a former colony or part of their geographic sphere of influence. Operation Palliser, the British military intervention in Sierra Leone in May 2000, is a useful case study. As the British permanent representative to the UN noted to the Security Council, the deployment was “primarily for the evacuation of United Kingdom nationals,” but he went on to note that the UK also believed it contributed to the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) by freeing it up for other tasks. What was initially (on May 6th) an operation to evacuate Commonwealth citizens became (on May 12th) a 1,200-soldier operation supporting UNAMSIL and Sierra Leone’s army with military planning and technical advice; by May 15th, it had driven rebel forces several miles back from the outskirts of Freetown.

The evacuation of nationals, as well as of UN staff, was also foremost among Australia’s considerations before it agreed to lead the International Force for East Timor (INTERFET). In this case, the deployment of the parallel force also addressed Australia’s wider geopolitical concerns. While Australia had a precarious relationship with Indonesia, its largest neighbor and the occupying power of Timor-Leste, it was the state in the region that was most capable, willing, and somewhat acceptable to lead a multinational force. Regional engagement and support were viewed as critical given the politically sensitive nature of the mission, and the force rapidly deployed capabilities that were well beyond those that could be mobilized by

35 Examples include the United States for the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) in Somalia; France for Operation Artemis in the DRC and EUPFOR Chad/CAR; Australia for INTERFET and the ISF in Timor-Leste; Germany for EUFOR DRC; the United Kingdom then Turkey for ISAF in Afghanistan before its command was taken over by NATO; and Russia for the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) peacekeeping force in Georgia.
38 “The British naval force was also anchored close off the Freetown harbor while British aircraft conducted demonstrations overhead, including dropping leaflets discouraging anyone from interfering with British forces.” Larry J. Woods and Timothy R. Reese, Military Interventions in Sierra Leone: Lessons From a Failed State (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2008), p. 62.
40 The Australian Defence Forces (ADF) started planning for Operation Spitfire (as it was named) on May 11, 1999, to assess “the possible involvement of the ADF in an evacuation of UN, Australian and certain other nationals from East Timor.” Australian National Audit Office, Management of Australian Defence Force Deployments to East Timor, Audit Report No. 38, 2002, p. 29.
41 See the Australian permanent representative’s remarks to the Security Council in UN Security Council, 4143rd Meeting, UN Doc S/PV.4043, September 11, 1999.
the UN.42 Under these circumstances, a UN mandate was important for Australia "to ensure international legal coverage and to ensure that the mission was not seen as an Australian neocolonialist land grab."43 As summarized by James Cotton, "The INTERFET formula depended upon the existence of a lead nation, not excessively constrained by the political requirement to involve many other partners in order to guarantee the overall legitimacy of the mission."44

While their motivation for initially intervening may be narrow and national in scope, member states are often keen to demonstrate that their parallel force remains in place to support broader regional and multilateral interests. For instance, the US has led multinational forces alongside UN missions in Somalia (1992) and Haiti (1994), though at times it has resisted international pressure to lead such interventions (e.g., in Liberia in 2003).45 The EU has mobilized and deployed missions to Africa as part of its support to the rules-based global order and multinational security (although these also support the safety of EU citizens). The deployment of the EU training forces in the Sahel, as well as of the French counterterrorism Operation Barkhane, is guided by security concerns around migration and terrorism in North Africa that are considered to have a direct impact on European states.

In the case of AU-led operations, countries have generally been motivated by concerns about security and the stability of border areas and a preference to focus on regional solutions to continental crises. But despite African states' national interests driving them to initially engage as a parallel force (often before the deployment of UN peacekeepers), the lack of funding to support these operations has seen most of them transition to UN peace operations.

These national motivations prompt a broader question: Why have countries deployed bilaterally, as part of a multinational force, or through a regional mission rather than joining the UN peace operation once it is established? Why is it not in their interest simply to deploy to the UN peace operation? The answer is that many of these countries and regional organizations prefer to operate outside UN peace operations.

Box 1. The case of France and its multiple parallel forces

France has launched five bilateral operations in parallel to existing or forthcoming UN peace operations (Operations Turquoise, Licorne, Sangaris, Serval, and Barkhane), has been a “framework nation” for two EU forces (Operation Artemis in the DRC and EUFOR Chad/CAR), and has contributed to all of NATO's main parallel forces (in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Afghanistan) and to some others (UNITAF in Somalia, RRF in the former Yugoslavia, and INTERFET in Timor-Leste). As a result, France has contributed to the vast majority of parallel forces launched in support of the UN since the end of the Cold War—more than any other country. As underlined by Marina Henke, "France is one of the most interventionist countries in the world," and one of the few that retains the ability to project force.46

In all the contexts where it has launched a bilateral operation or served as an EU framework nation, France initiated discussions and held the pen in the Security Council. This has helped France to shape other

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42 Beyond the immediate region, contributions to the INTERFET force were made by Canada, France, Italy, Jordan, Kenya, and the United Kingdom, as well as by New Zealand. The United States provided logistics and intelligence support. Japan facilitated the launch of INTERFET by providing a fund of $100 million to assist in meeting the expenses of less-developed coalition members. See James Cotton, "Australia’s East Timor Experience: Military Lessons and Security Dilemmas," 2003.


44 He explained further that “liaison with other national force components was maintained not by the presence of their representatives at that HQ but in a somewhat ad hoc but nevertheless effective fashion involving personal contacts, frequent joint briefings and visits by Maj Gen Cosgrove to other contingents.” Cotton, “Australia’s East Timor Experience.”

45 The secretary-general had requested the US to spearhead the multinational intervention authorized by the Security Council on August 1, 2003, in Liberia, but the US declined to do so. The US was viewed as the natural lead given its colonial connections with Liberia, but also because France and the UK had already intervened bilaterally in support of other West African nations in recent years. See World Peace Foundation, "Liberia Short Mission Brief," available at https://sites.tufts.edu/wpf/files/2017/07/Liberia-brief.pdf.

46 Between the end of the Franco-Algerian War in 1962, which officially terminated the French colonial empire, and today, France has launched more than thirty-five military interventions abroad—all of them in Africa. Marina E. Henke, “Why Did France Intervene in Mali in 2013? Examining the Role of Intervention Entrepreneurs,” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 23, No. 3 (2017).
countries’ analysis of these crises and to convince the council to authorize these parallel forces (often a posteriori) and deploy a peace operation if one was not already deployed (though French forces remained alongside them).

France has had several rationales for deploying these parallel forces. First, like their Western partners, France’s political and military elites were traumatized by the experience of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Somalia in the 1990s. In the 2000s, many of the subordinate officers deployed in the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) and UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM), where they directly experienced the limits of UN peacekeeping, came to hold high-ranking positions in the military establishment. They have a profound distrust of the command-and-control structure of the UN and consider the UN’s culture to be incompatible with the requirements of military action. Perceiving the UN as structurally ill-adapted to the requirements of military crisis management, many French military leaders prefer to operate bilaterally or through NATO or the EU.47

Second, beginning with Operation Turquoise in Rwanda and the Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) in the former Yugoslavia, France has been more willing than most states to use military action. By framing these operations within a doctrine centered on the use of force, France has moved away from the UN’s political-military culture and approach to conflict resolution. When the French army became purely professional in 1999, it decided to develop the identity of its soldiers as “warriors” who need freedom of action and the possibility to resort to coercion.48 This identity conflicted with the concept of peacekeeping, which was seen as a dilution of what soldiers should be trained for.

Finally, although its contributions to UN-led operations are modest (it ranks 30th out of 122 contributors; see Figure 3), France considers the deployment of forces in parallel to UN peace operations to be part of its overall contribution to peacekeeping. The French narrative is that “these other missions are UN-mandated and therefore are complementary with UN-led operations,” countering those who would highlight the low number of French soldiers and officers in peace operations.49 At the same time, France has sought to keep some military control over peacekeeping forces by staffing key positions in the UN missions in both Mali and CAR (chief of staff, U5, U3), as well as in the DRC (deputy force commander). In Mali, French control of those positions is regarded by some as having influenced MINUSMA to support France’s counter-terrorism force.50

In deploying parallel forces, “France has developed an alternative model of cooperation that suits its requirements better,” giving it the flexibility and robustness of a limited engagement.51 This model allows it to remain outside the UN command-and-control structure while remaining close to debates on peacekeeping and justifying a French national holding the post of under-secretary-general for peace operations.52 France has been driven to do this more so than any other member state in part by its national interests, as many conflicts that have required a peacekeeping presence have been in former French colonies or spheres of influence. In the end, France has been effective at securing decisions in various political fora that align the UN, the EU, or bilateral partners with French foreign policy priorities, reinforce its vision of UN peace operations, and support its own operations.


49 Ibid.

50 Interviews with MINUSMA staff, Bamako, February 2018.

51 Tardy, “Peacekeeping Contributor Profile: France.”

TO OPERATE OUTSIDE UN PEACE OPERATIONS

One of the main reasons some member states and regional organizations deploy in parallel to UN peace operations is that they distrust their command-and-control structure when they resort to force and therefore seek to bypass it. This is the case with the majority of Western countries, NATO, and the EU. This reluctance to contribute directly to UN peacekeeping has been a source of resentment among other contributors.

Most parallel operations have been deployed by countries or regional organizations that are more militarily advanced than many of the countries contributing police or troops to UN peacekeeping. As a consequence, their military leaders often have concerns about executing particular tasks under the command and control of the UN and as part of an operation that lacks interoperability and a common doctrine. They also have reservations about the availability of medical and casualty evacuation capabilities in the “golden hour” (during which wounded soldiers have the highest chance of survival), broader safety and security, and the reliability of other troop-contributing countries to fulfill their mandated objectives and responsibilities (including not to abandon their posts, particularly if they are there to provide force protection). In Mali, for example, Western countries (e.g., Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden) lacked confidence in the UN’s command and control and its protection capacities, leading them to deploy their forces to MINUSMA in separate bases (e.g., Camp Castor in Gao).53

Many member states and regional organizations (e.g., NATO, the EU) also feel uncomfortable with civilian control over military assets and some of the political constraints on UN operations. Due to past experiences, they often do not trust the special representative of the secretary-general or the force commander of a mission to exercise authority over military assets.

As a result, these states often choose to operate outside the UN framework and instead to prepare the ground for follow-on UN operations or to bolster existing ones. This bypassing of the UN can create debate in the Security Council. For example, council members were divided about the deployment of Operation Turquoise by the French, as some countries, such as New Zealand, stressed the importance of investing capacity in the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR). The

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The deployment of French forces in parallel to UNAMIR was also opposed by the mission’s force commander, who would have preferred strengthening the UN mission and transitioning it to a more robust mandate rather than introducing a new operation into the country.  

The UN has been working with member states over the last two decades to address some of the shortfalls that have discouraged countries from deploying as part of UN peace operations. It has sought to improve the security of peacekeepers (by implementing the findings of the Cruz Report, for instance) and their performance and operational readiness (by ensuring that troop and police contributors are meeting the required standards). In some instances, member states have supported ad hoc approaches to bolster oversight at UN headquarters, as it did with UNIFIL’s Strategic Military Cell, which seconded officers from (largely European) troop contributors to the Office of Military Affairs to provide additional oversight to the mission from 2006 to 2008. But these efforts have been ad hoc and temporary, and there is a considerable way to go. Western member states remain largely unconvinced that reforms, particularly those focused on more advanced capabilities and performance, have gone far enough. And there will always be instances where some countries’ national interests will lead them to prefer to operate in parallel with the UN.

The Challenges of Parallel Forces

Parallel forces allow UN peace operations to be more flexible and to draw on the comparative strengths of different organizations and member states. However, challenges have emerged time and time again over the last three decades. As a result, while parallel forces can at times be genuine partners of UN peace operations, they can also be competitors that do not follow the same rules, even if approved by the Security Council. This section examines five challenges in that regard: coordination around the strategic goals set by the Security Council, the capabilities of different actors, tensions at the strategic and operational levels when sharing information, the legitimacy of the actions of parallel forces from the perspective of the local population, and the particular challenges arising from parallel counterterrorism forces.

COORDINATION OF A STRATEGIC VISION

Members of the Security Council, particularly the five permanent members, often have different views on the rationale for the deployment of a UN peace operation or the political context of a conflict situation, depending on their national interests. They can also be profoundly divided on the issue of the use of force. As a result, Security Council resolutions authorizing UN peace operations (and sometimes parallel forces) use compromise language rather than clearly stating strategic priorities and objectives or providing a comprehensive vision for the international presence. Without such a vision, UN peace operations and parallel forces are often guided by different motivations and compete for visibility. The lack of a comprehensive vision for international operations can also lead to poor oversight of the activities of parallel forces by the Security Council.

In some situations, peace agreements and international conferences have been able to provide political momentum and unity of purpose at the beginning of a peace operation. However, this often does not last as deployments become protracted; the longer missions are deployed, the more likely it is that they will not share the same strategic vision or desired end state. This is in part because countries deploying personnel to a parallel force may be influenced by domestic political constituencies rather than international agreements, but also because attention tends to wane when there is not a crisis situation to address. Furthermore, countries deploying parallel forces are often focused more on militarized approaches rather than on the need to invest in “a wider peace strategy.” As a result, rather than complementing...

54 The Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations during the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda found it “unfortunate that the resources committed by France and other countries to Operation Turquoise could not instead have been put at the disposal of UNAMIR II.” UN Security Council, Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations during the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, UN Doc. S/1999/1257, December 16, 1999.
one another, the forces may end up competing to achieve different objectives.

Effective coordination around a strategic vision may be challenged by the interests of more influential actors providing personnel or support to a parallel force. Member states deploying personnel to a parallel force are likely to have greater political influence in the decision-making process within the Security Council or in the region. These are what Marina Henke calls “pivotal states”—those that recruit third parties to join the coalition. As one interlocutor stated, “Parallel deployments are often a vehicle for great or regional powers to shape security outcomes in their sphere of influence.” The council’s discussions are usually led by these powerful stakeholders, and shifts in their priorities and messaging by more powerful nations may weaken the overall strategic vision.

The lack of a common vision at the strategic level in headquarters translates into a lack of mutual understanding and communication of the respective means, capabilities, and limitations of UN peace operations and parallel forces on the ground. This can undermine coordination and information sharing at the operational level.

INFORMATION SHARING

One of the first and main objectives of coordination mechanisms at both the strategic and the operational levels is to share information (see Box 2). Information sharing is particularly important in order to better coordinate policy and messaging directed toward the host state or spoilers and to strengthen protection of both operations by preventing incidents such as targeted attacks. It is also a way for the UN to access a different type of information, as most parallel forces have been led by Western countries with more advanced systems for information gathering and intelligence assessment than UN peace operations (despite the development of a peacekeeping intelligence policy and framework in 2017).

However, information is the most difficult asset to share between organizations and operations. In general, parallel forces have been reluctant to share information with UN missions, as the UN does not have a respected classification system for its documents or, most importantly, a system of sanctions for information breaches. For example, during NATO operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, “most NATO members were unwilling to share intelligence with UNPROFOR because they were concerned that sensitive information might be obtained by personnel from non-NATO countries.” One particular problem was that “the lack of a formal agreement for sharing classified information complicated their communication on security-related matters.” The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and UNAMA faced the same problem in Afghanistan, and “often ISAF was even unwilling to share nonmilitary information.” As Michael Harsch relates in his book on UN-NATO cooperation, “A NATO general remarked dryly that ISAF and UNAMA could not even talk about the weather because NATO classified its forecasts.”

While intelligence sharing is difficult in such settings where both missions share more or less the same goals, it becomes even more problematic when a UN mission operates alongside a counterterrorism force. Many interlocutors in MINUSMA were clear that the mission should not share information with (let alone provide logistical support to) Operation Barkhane or the G5 Sahel Joint Force. However, they acknowledged that the lines are frequently blurred. MINUSMA’s intelligence-sharing architecture remains quite basic, despite the issuance of a policy from UN headquarters. According to this policy, MINUSMA is only meant to share intelligence if the special representative of the secretary-general has agreed to it and “to protect itself or to target a group that can threaten the mission.” Sharing of intelligence is therefore meant to be conditional (e.g., so that

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59 Interview with researcher, New York, June 2018.
62 Ibid., p. 114.
63 Ibid.
64 Interview with MINUSMA official, Bamako, February 2018.
Operation Barkhane can use it to target groups that are threatening MINUSMA but not for anything else).

But it is not always possible to guarantee the information is being used only as intended. The United States and many European contingents send intelligence back to their home countries. In the case of evidence, such as the remnants of an improvised explosive device, information is usually collected by Operation Barkhane forces but may be examined by UN police components in MINUSMA or in some cases sent to the US Federal Bureau of Investigation for further analysis. While this may be drawing on the comparative advantages and areas of expertise of different forces, it presents legal challenges for MINUSMA, which may be perceived to be serving as a “direct auxiliary to counter-terrorism.”

According to a number of interlocutors, some now see MINUSMA as openly supporting a military operation with a counterterrorism mandate. This presents a broader problem for peacekeeping, as it challenges the doctrine and principles that it rests on—and its wider legitimacy within the international and local communities.

Likewise, some officials said that Operation Barkhane, because it is a counterterrorism operation, does not readily share information with MINUSMA. As one interlocutor pointed out, “Barkhane only gives information after an operation has happened; it conducts operations without informing anyone,” except occasionally when these relate to imminent threats. There is a perception that when Operation Barkhane does share information, it is on an informal, need-to-know basis, mostly with NATO people in MINUSMA. French officials have argued that the reality of information sharing is more complex, as this information often needs to be kept discreet for operational reasons.

CAPABILITIES OF ACTORS

Since most parallel forces have been the remit of members of the European Union or other Western countries, they have largely been self-funded. This has meant the UN has benefited from the services of capable contributing countries without increases to the peacekeeping budget. It has also meant, however, that only a handful of parallel forces have been launched by African states and none by Asian or Latin American states.

On a few occasions, trust funds have been established to support parallel forces, particularly when there is an interest in securing regional engagement from less capable contributors (thereby providing broader political legitimacy) or when many of the contributors are developing countries. In the case of INTERFET, the trust fund was well-funded as the operation was guided by a strong lead nation and complemented by other self-sufficient contributors from the region. By contrast, the UN trust fund established to support the deployment of AU forces in Mali struggled to generate the necessary funds and was limited in application as many donors earmarked the funds for non-lethal assistance.

More recently, a trust fund has been established to support the G5 Sahel Joint Force (managed by the EU and MINUSMA). But as with some previous trust funds, it has struggled to generate the funding required to support the operational requirements of

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65 Interview with legal representative from MINUSMA, Bamako, February 2018.
66 Ibid.
67 Interview with MINUSMA official, Bamako, February 2018. Other research conducted by the Danish Institute for International Studies had similar findings: “We interact, but Barkhane is doing their own thing—in my opinion, they think it’s their war, and MINUSMA is seen as a ‘pain in the ass.’ We give them a lot of info about our planning and where we operate, but we don’t hear anything from them. They warn us that they will do something in a particular area, and then we can’t do an operation there. That’s part of the deconfliction. It can be a struggle, because they are not as open as we are.” According to the researchers, “This statement illustrates how Barkhane, as one of several stakeholders with competing agendas in Mali, shapes the political context in which MINUSMA operates.”
68 In the case of INTERFET, Australia had noted that “the trust fund should be available primarily to fund the contributions of those troop contributors who do not have the capacity to fund their own contribution. It is important to obtain as diverse a range of contributors as possible and to include as many countries of the region as possible.” See UN Security Council, Letter Dated 4 October 1999 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc S/1999/1025, October 4, 1999, p. 6.
69 Australia administered the INTERFET Trust Fund and “undertook to carry costs for some eligible countries if these costs were incurred as a result of participating in the INTERFET deployment and would not be paid from the Trust Fund.” Australian National Audit Office, Management of Australian Defence Force Deployments to East Timor, Audit Report No. 38, 2002, p. 39. Australia had provided advance payment to guarantee regional force participation before the trust fund finances were available. See Michael G. Smith and Moreen Dee, “East Timor,” in William J. Durch, ed., Twenty-First-Century Peace Operations (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace and Stimson Center, 2006), p. 412.
71 This trust fund was established as there was strong opposition (primarily from the United States) to fund such a force with UN assessed contributions.
Box 2. Examples of coordination mechanisms between UN operations and parallel forces

All Security Council resolutions authorizing the deployment of parallel forces have requested the establishment of “appropriate mechanisms or means for coordination” or “the need for full cooperation and close coordination” (see table in Annex). These mechanisms can be at the strategic or operational level.

Strategic level

During its operations in the Balkans in 1993, NATO appointed a liaison officer to the Situation Center in the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations to improve communication and coordination.\(^\text{72}\) NATO’s Operations Sky Monitor and Deny Flight reported to the UN Flight Coordination Center in Zagreb. As pointed out by Michael Harsch, “The flight ban required—for the first time—continuous operational coordination between the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) and NATO.”\(^\text{73}\)

In Timor-Leste, following the authorization of the UN Integrated Mission in East Timor (UNMIT) and ongoing deployment of the International Stabilisation Force (ISF), the Timorese Government, UNMIT and the ISF (through the Government of Australia) signed a memorandum of understanding establishing a Trilateral Coordination Forum. This was set out as a mechanism “to discuss issues relevant to the stabilization of the security environment in Timor-Leste, including security operations.”\(^\text{74}\)

Similarly, when the EU force in Chad and CAR deployed alongside a UN mission, there was “a well-established network of coordination mechanisms at all levels…, including reciprocal visits to New York, Brussels, Paris and [the force headquarters at] Ndjamen or Abéché, and the integration of EU planners from the [operational headquarters] for the planning of the transition phase.”\(^\text{75}\) Both organizations also jointly conducted a mid-term assessment in the region in June 2008 to give recommendations on the shape of an international military presence after the expiration of the EU force’s mandate in March 2009.

Operational level

On the ground, two main types of coordination mechanisms are generally established. First, peace operations and parallel forces hold regular meetings at various levels of command to coordinate activities between mission leaders and components. In Mali, there are weekly synchronization meetings between MINUSMA, Operation Barkhane, the EU training mission, the G5 Sahel Joint Force, and the national armed forces to ensure awareness of any operations, harmonize military footprints, share operational planning, and coordinate the use of air space.\(^\text{76}\) As of February 2018, there were also meetings between the force commanders and mission leaders of MINUSMA, Operation Barkhane, the EU training mission, and the G5 Sahel Joint Force every three weeks to share information on important topics, including operations (though these meetings require security precautions over sharing information).\(^\text{77}\) There are also bilateral or trilateral meetings on specific topics, such as between MINUSMA and the EU capacity building mission on border security. In Afghanistan, there was a regular “breakfast of principals.”

Second, parallel forces’ liaison officers to UN missions (or vice versa) help coordinate the action on the ground, inform decisions and actions by both headquarters, and ease potential tensions between the organi-

\(^\text{72}\) NATO Assistant Secretary-General Michael Legge helped negotiate the initial agreement for this position, which focused primarily on improving military contacts between the organizations. NATO liaison officers had also been placed in UN field missions such as the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) and the UN Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium (UNTAES), even serving on the Steering Committee on Transition of Responsibilities in the former Yugoslavia. See Kent J. Kille and Ryan C. Hendrickson, “NATO and the United Nations: Debates and Trends in Institutional Coordination,” January 2011.

\(^\text{73}\) Harsch, The Power of Dependence, p. 41.

\(^\text{74}\) UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (for the Period from 9 August 2006 to 26 January 2007), UN Doc S/2007/50, February 1, 2007, p. 13. The forum was chaired by the prime minister of Timor-Leste, with the participation of key ministers, the deputy special representative of the secretary-general for security sector support and the rule of law, the UN police commissioner, chief of UNMIT’s Military Liaison Group, and the commander and deputy commander of the ISF. See Memorandum of Understanding between the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, the United Nations, and Australia on the provision of assistance to the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, January 26, 2007.


\(^\text{76}\) Interview with MINUSMA official, Ramako, February 2018.

\(^\text{77}\) Interviews with MINUSMA and Operation Barkhane officials, Ramako, February 2018.
zations. UN liaison officers tend to have backgrounds and nationalities that could help win the trust of the parallel force: “Certain level[s] of access requires [a] certain nationality and background,” as one interlocutor put it. The UN Mission in Kosovo’s (UNMIK) military liaison teams, deployed in all regions of the country, acted as focal points for coordination between UNMIK regional representatives and the Kosovo Force (KFOR) brigade headquarters. In Côte d’Ivoire, twenty-six French officers of the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) filled the role of liaison officers. UNOCI and Operation Licorne forces operated together, with command-and-control structures that were separate but in constant communication. Similarly, in Chad and CAR, there was an EU military staff liaison officer in New York and a UN liaison officer in the EU operational headquarters to help build confidence and support the effective flow of information. In Mali, French officers in MINUSMA’s sector headquarters (holding J5 and J2 positions) act as informal liaison officers with Operation Barkhane on top of their official tasks with MINUSMA (though this more serves to de-conflict operations than to coordinate them).

In some instances, the Security Council has directly requested the secretary-general to enhance cooperation between different actors in a regional context through the provision of liaison officers on the ground. In the case of UNOSOM, the council invited the secretary-general “to attach a small UNOSOM liaison staff to the Field Headquarters of the unified command [UNITAF].” More recently, this has been the case in Mali, where the council has requested the provision of intelligence and liaison officers from G5 member states to MINUSMA.

the parallel force. Even in the rare case of AMISOM where the Security Council has continued to authorize assessed funding for a logistics support package (through the UN Support Office for AMISOM), there have been restrictions on how the money can be used (generally non-lethal applications), meaning the parallel force has been reliant on a combination of trust funds and bilateral assistance (including through the EU) to carry out its mission.

In the case of AMISOM, like the G5 Sahel Joint Force in Mali, the Security Council has remained divided on whether to provide more sustainable funding through assessed contributions.

While the council has shown a willingness to politically support security operations deploying alongside peace operations, this willingness has generally not extended to funding them. This means that going forward, parallel forces will continue to be limited by the funding and capabilities of those contributing to or supporting them. With Western countries shifting priorities and facing domestic financial constraints and most other member states (in particular in Africa) lacking the necessary capacities, this lack of funding may be an impediment to future robust parallel deployments.

LEGITIMACY AND PERCEPTIONS

In contexts with potential spoilers, it is critical to manage local perceptions. Local populations and security forces sometimes consider UN peace operations or parallel forces as illegitimate actors because they are “foreigners.” Actions by one force that are perceived as illegitimate may have ramifications for the legitimacy of other forces.

79 Interview with UN staff, New York, May 2018.
81 Interview with MINUSMA official, Gao, February 2018. Security Council resolutions are clear on the need to coordinate operations but never to launch them jointly, as this would further jeopardize the need for the two operations to keep their distance.
82 See UN Security Council Resolution 794 (December 3, 1992), UN Doc. S/RES/794, para. 15.
83 The positions were intended to “strengthen cooperation on border security issues and intelligence sharing.” UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Mali, UN Doc. S/2016/819, September 29, 2016, p. 17.
85 See, for example, UN Security Council, 8398 Meeting, UN Doc. S/PV.8398, November 14, 2018.
86 Interview with MINUSMA official, Bamako, February 2018.
operating in the same area.\textsuperscript{87} This is a particular risk for UN peace operations, which are meant to be impartial. To address this risk, the UN has chosen either to keep its distance from the parallel force (e.g., in Afghanistan, Iraq), to cooperate with it fully (e.g., in Côte d’Ivoire, CAR), or to cooperate and coordinate with it on a case-by-case basis (e.g., in Mali).

If used effectively, coordinated strategic communication between UN peace operations and parallel forces can help distinguish between them and their respective mandates within both the local and the international communities. For instance, the commander of the Australia-led coalition in Timor-Leste communicated with the media “to shape and influence events in a non-kinetic way to contain collateral damage—both physical and political in nature.”\textsuperscript{88} This is all the more important in a context where the parallel force is engaging in counterterrorism activities. As the secretary-general noted before MINUSMA deployed, “It is critical that a clear distinction be maintained between the core peacekeeping tasks of an envisaged United Nations stabilization mission and the peace enforcement and counter-terrorism activities of the parallel force that will necessarily need to be established to present the hard-won security gains achieved so far.”\textsuperscript{89}

There were different views within MINUSMA on whether the local population could tell the difference between the international forces operating in Mali. Some personnel argued that the local population understood the differences between the French and UN flags, whereas others argued that they were all simply viewed as foreigners. Many acknowledged that both MINUSMA and Operation Barkhane needed to sensitize the population more on their mandates.\textsuperscript{90} However, the fact that some MINUSMA contingents refuse to paint their vehicles or aircraft white can add to confusion between the two forces.

Legitimacy and perceptions are also important when it comes to parallel forces’ compliance with international humanitarian and human rights law. In Afghanistan, for example, UNAMA monitors and reports on the protection of civilians by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). While this has at times caused friction between the forces, overall it has provided greater transparency to the local and international communities.\textsuperscript{91} In CAR, on the other hand, MINUSCA failed to respond to allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse by Operation Sangaris in 2015. The independent review that followed found that the peacekeeping mission did have a responsibility to report on these incidents as part of its wider responsibilities under the UN human rights policy framework.\textsuperscript{92}

In the case of Mali, where the UN is operating alongside parallel counterterrorism operations, the Security Council has attempted to ensure greater oversight of and compliance with human rights, particularly by the G5 Sahel Joint Force. The council has called upon the members of the G5 Sahel “to establish a robust compliance framework to prevent, investigate, address and publicly report on violations and abuses of human rights law and violations of international humanitarian law.”\textsuperscript{93} That same resolution also encourages relevant partners to support the implementation of the compliance framework, while underlining the need for the G5 Sahel Joint Force to take into account gender perspectives when implementing its strategic concept of operations. While the application of the framework is still being explored, it offers an interesting model for ensuring that human rights

\textsuperscript{87} In the case of Rwanda, the force commander decided to evacuate forty-two peacekeepers from francophone African countries that were serving in the UN mission (UNAMIR) and replace them with other personnel due to negative reactions from the Rwandan Patriotic Front as a consequence of their participation in Operation Turquoise. See UN Security Council, Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations during the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, UN Doc. S/1999/1257, December 16, 1999.

\textsuperscript{88} Blaxland, The Australian Army from Whitlam to Howard, p. 145.


\textsuperscript{90} Interview with MINUSMA official, Gao, February 2018.

\textsuperscript{91} See, for example, UNAMA, “Midyear Update on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict: 1 January to 30 June 2019,” July 30, 2019.


\textsuperscript{93} See UN Security Council Resolution 2391 (December 8, 2017), UN Doc. S/RES/2391, para. 21.
is considered when UN peace operations are working with security partners. It also prompts questions about wider efforts to ensure that parallel forces complement efforts by UN peace operations to further standards in areas around protection of civilians and women, peace, and security.

**BEYOND PEACEKEEPING: WORKING WITH A PARALLEL COUNTERTERRORISM FORCE**

The increasing deployment of peace operations in contexts where there is no peace to keep, where spoilers and rebels are actively undermining peace efforts or targeting civilians or where there is an ongoing threat of terrorism, led the HIPPO to state that “United Nations peacekeeping missions, owing to their composition and character, are not suited to engage in military counter-terrorism operations.” The report went on to note that such activities “should be undertaken by the host Government or by a capable regional force or an ad hoc coalition authorized by the Security Council.”

The presence of a counterterrorism force in parallel to a UN peace operation has taken challenges related to their cooperation to a different level. This has happened in four cases: in Afghanistan between UNAMA and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) after the latter merged its command with Operation Enduring Freedom in 2004; in Iraq between UNAMI and US-led coalition forces; in Somalia between AMISOM and the UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) and UN Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS); and in Mali between MINUSMA, on the one hand, and Operation Barkhane and the G5 Sahel Joint Force, on the other.

In such situations, the HIPPO report stated that “a clear division of labor and distinction of roles must guide their respective operations.” Another concern is that undertaking these operations would undermine the UN’s impartiality and restrict space for building peace.

Many see these concerns as being born out in Mali. Because Operation Barkhane and MINUSMA are collocated in northern Mali (in Kidal, Tessalit, and Timbuktu), many interlocutors consider MINUSMA to have become a party to the conflict and, as such, no longer impartial. The Security Council has recommended through its latest resolutions on Mali that the two forces “work more closely together.” Moreover, a number of MINUSMA’s contingents are sharing intelligence with Operation Barkhane, and both operations provide each other logistical support. The risk is that the UN will no longer be distinguishable from other military forces operating in the area. That lack of distinction could be instrumentalized by those seeking to undermine the peace process by targeting MINUSMA—the weakest element of the international presence. This raises questions about the level of cooperation and operational overlap that should be taking place between such parallel forces and UN peace operations.

For this reason, the UN has often tried to keep its distance from counterterrorism forces. In Iraq, the Security Council delinked the resolution renewing UNAMI’s mandate and the one renewing the authorization of the multinational forces in 2005, pointing out each year that “the presence of the multinational force in Iraq is at the request of the Government of Iraq.” In Afghanistan, and contrary to former parallel deployments, “the NATO and UN missions… had no joint tasks such as the provision of security. To ensure maximal organizational autonomy, both sides interpreted their mandates in a way that limited cooperation.” In 2006 and 2007, the relations between the two organizations got tense when UNAMA started to systematically monitor civilian casualties, including those caused by ISAF. UNAMA considers this to be an important mechanism for asserting its

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96 Ibid., p. 46.
97 It is worth remembering that the UN headquarters and mission headquarters are not organized to handle the sensitive information required to conduct counterterrorism operations. They barely have a functioning intelligence system, and almost all computers are connected to the Internet. Ablova and Novoseloff, “Demystifying Intelligence in UN Peace Operations.”
independence and impartiality, and it is something the UN is currently looking into in Mali. 100

However, what can be done relatively easily by a political mission (as in Afghanistan and Iraq) is more complicated for a blue-helmeted mission. It is especially complicated when some Western peacekeepers would rather be in the parallel force than the UN mission, as in Mali. This has generated a debate between MINUSMA’s civilian and military components. While most civilians want to keep the two forces strictly separated, the military was more inclined to seek the protection of Operation Barkhane and did not see any issue with being collocated. But as Namie di Razza states,

MINUSMA cannot afford to be reduced to a service provider for counterterrorism forces and needs the political and operational autonomy to distinguish itself from counterterrorism agendas…. There is a need to clearly distinguish between kinetic military operations aiming at counterterrorism and multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations aiming at supporting the peace process and protecting the population.101

As Richard Gowan also notes, the UN “is now a service-provider for more robust deployments by other actors that it cannot control,” even though it has less capacity.102

**Future Prospects for Parallel Forces to UN Peace Operations**

Parallel forces have been a part of UN peacekeeping for the last three decades, and it is unlikely this will change. They provide member states, including troop and police contributors, host countries, and members of the Security Council, a wider range of tools to respond to threats to international peace and security. But the assumption that the interests of a parallel force will always align with the goals of a UN peace operation needs to be tested. These forces tend to have a one-way relationship guided by the states or organizations that provide the parallel force, making it a challenge for the UN to manage. The motivations and roles of a parallel force need to be understood to assess whether it is enabling the peace operation to fulfill its mandate or hindering it and to determine whether the strategic direction of the peace operation may need to be adjusted. This can help answer the question: Are peace operations and parallel forces partners or competitors, and to what degree are they mutually reinforcing?

**OPPORTUNITIES AND RISKS: PARTNERS OR COMPETITORS?**

Parallel forces often act as valuable partners to UN peace operations. In many cases, short-term deployments of parallel forces have bolstered a peace operation and enabled it to more effectively deliver its mandate. By focusing on tasks that are cumbersome for peace operations to coordinate and deliver (e.g., building capacity and training), they have freed up peace operations to focus on what they are good at (e.g., supporting political processes). In some recent examples, parallel forces have offered partnerships and capabilities that bolster regional cooperation to address transnational threats to security, which is often outside the scope and capability of a peace operation. Through burden sharing, peace operations have been able to draw on their own strengths when needed and to rely on other actors when they fall short, particularly in the event of a crisis.

However, many of these advantages also come with challenges. In some contexts, UN peace operations and parallel forces may not work together cooperatively. This may be due to divergent mandates and immediate interests, an unwillingness to cooperate by mission leaders and commanders on the ground, a preference for international and local visibility over cooperation, or poor coordination and consultation at the strategic level. In Mali, for example, there is clear competition between MINUSMA and the EU training and capacity building missions over their roles in security sector reform. The EU believes it is a more effective and capable provider of capacity building, given its experience conducting training missions and its access to a larger pool of military trainers. In theory,

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such a mission should complement the UN operation by building the capacity of local security forces and possibly reducing the amount of time it needs to be deployed. But if even parallel capacity building missions, which have relatively narrow mandates, cannot cooperate effectively with the UN, there is cause for concern about complex parallel forces’ ability to cooperate on military operations.

 Nonetheless, cooperation may not always be the preferred approach. The deployment of a UN peacekeeping mission alongside a parallel counterterrorism mission in Mali has highlighted some of these risks. For instance, there is a risk that the lines between peace enforcement and peacekeeping become even more blurred (for the local population, the spoilers, and their respective contributors), thereby diminishing the unique legitimacy and comparative advantage of UN peacekeeping while making the UN a party to the conflict. In addition to the potential legal consequences, this can undermine the safety and security of peacekeeping personnel, who may more readily be treated by spoilers or the local population in the same way as the parallel force—in other words, as an enemy.

 Even though there may be clear terms and restrictions defining how the UN and parallel operations should cooperate in these circumstances, the effectiveness of these can be limited by the operations’ different military cultures and command-and-control structures. For instance, military personnel may not be aware or may disregard that the UN peace operation they are serving in is guided by different principles than their national military. As a result, they may not see any reason not to cooperate with parallel forces on a range of issues (as in the case of NATO-trained troops serving in MINUSMA and cooperating with Operation Barkhane). At the same time, those serving in the parallel force may see no issue with seeking information or support from the UN peace operation, as in their view the parallel force is better placed to use this information to stabilize the security situation and support and protect the UN.

 The lines of cooperation can be blurred even in areas where the UN mission and a parallel force have formally agreed to cooperate (as when MINUSMA flies and houses personnel from the EU training and capacity building missions or is collocated with Operation Barkhane).103

 Furthermore, though there may be oversight mechanisms, the ability of the Security Council, and subsequently of the UN peace operation, to influence the actions of parallel forces is limited. This is particularly the case when the Security Council has only welcomed or acknowledged a parallel force rather than had a direct role in authorizing it or shaping its mandate. Reporting mechanisms can offer a limited avenue for accountability and should keep being encouraged. Similarly, reporting on the human rights records of parallel enforcement or counterterrorism forces (as done by UNAMA) or human rights frameworks (as that put in place for the G5 Sahel Joint Force) can provide accountability for compliance with the norms UN peace operations are expected to adhere to (even if resented by the parallel force).

 At first glance, parallel forces do not seem to be competitors to UN peace operations. In most instances, they are partners supporting the mission mandate or providing a capability that member states are unwilling to put under UN command. But at the same time, these arrangements demonstrate the limits of partnership, as states and organizations contributing to parallel forces could make UN peacekeeping more effective if they were to contribute directly to UN missions. When these states and organizations have directly offered capabilities to peace operations (rather than maintaining or deploying a parallel force), they have mostly done so on a temporary or conditional basis. For example, when INTERFET was re-hatted to UNTAET in Timor-Leste, Australia ensured it had a significant role in that mission by placing Australians in key positions such as the role of deputy force commander.104 When France armed UNIFIL’s reserve force in 2006, strengthening the

103 As a researcher pointed out, “This is not seen as legitimate by the armed groups—even the signatory ones. It’s got legal-rational legitimacy due to them being authorized under the same Security Council resolutions, but this clearly does not translate into local legitimacy, and that is arguably more important for MINUSMA’s effectiveness.” Interview with researcher, New York, June 2019.

overall capacity of the mission, it also requested changes to ensure more Europeans were in place to provide oversight for the mission in a strategic military cell within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations in New York.  

Solely from the standpoint of the effective delivery of UN mandates, there is no reason some of these parallel capabilities could not be incorporated into existing UN peace operations; where the goals of parallel forces and UN missions are consistent, the forces are separate mainly because of contributors’ national interests and their distrust of UN peacekeeping when it comes to force generation and command and control. And these rationales for parallel forces are unlikely to change. As Madeleine Albright, then US ambassador to the UN, put it in 1994, “If we are to respond effectively to the variety of conflicts we see in the world today we must be flexible enough to accept imperfect solutions when no perfect solutions are available to us.” If contributors are not willing to strengthen UN peace operations, or if these operations’ mandates do not allow them to undertake certain tasks, then we should ensure there are measures in place to make parallel forces effective partners to UN peace operations rather than competitors that detract from their objectives.

**CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

Peace operations tend to work best alongside parallel forces when they are delivering on different mandates, complement one another, and have limited overlap in their areas of operation. They tend to face the most challenges when deployed alongside counterterrorism forces that affect the way they are perceived by local actors and pose legal risks. The UN and peacekeeping stakeholders need to avoid these situations if possible, such as by deploying a light-footprint political mission instead of a multidimensional peacekeeping mission. But if the Security Council opts to deploy a multidimensional peacekeeping mission, as it did in Mali, peacekeeping stakeholders need to be equipped to manage these partnerships effectively.

As the UN continues to reform and strengthen peacekeeping through the Action for Peacekeeping initiative, the UN Secretariat, Security Council, member states, regional organizations, and other stakeholders need to consider how they can work together to enable UN peace operations and other partners to support conflict-affected countries requiring assistance. They also need to reflect on the limits of peacekeeping by revising the 2008 Capstone Doctrine to ensure that UN peacekeepers are not deployed in a context that requires more offensive action and where a multinational force would be better suited.

The following recommendations are for the consideration of these stakeholders to ensure that parallel forces effectively enable the work of UN peace operations going forward.

**Strengthen Coordination of Assessments, Planning, and Application of UN Standards**

1. The UN and actors deploying parallel forces should conduct joint assessments and planning for future missions or significant reconfigurations of missions. This may not be possible from the outset if there is no clarity on the need for a parallel force or there is no standing capacity to draw on. However, efforts should be made to identify and engage member states that may wish to provide other military support at the earliest opportunity. In cases when there is no UN peace operation already on the ground but it is anticipated one may deploy, leading actors could ask the UN to be part of assessment and planning missions as a contingency measure.

2. The UN Security Council should develop mechanisms to engage with parallel forces through more regular, informal consultations. These consultations could be held after the release of the report these forces are required to submit by Article 54 of the UN Charter. This could be done through the Military Staff Committee or the Security Council Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations. This has

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105 This was also done as the Lebanese government only agreed on the reinforcement of the UN mission, and not on the deployment of a multinational force as initially planned by some capitals. See Gowan and Novosseloff, “Le renforcement de la Force intérimaire des Nations Unies au Liban.”


happened in the past, as when the Military Staff Committee revised AMISOM’s concept of operations and the Security Council working group engaged with AMISOM’s troop contributors. The Military Staff Committee could also build relationship with the leaders of parallel forces, which would allow for more cooperation and a better transition when there is a handover from one force to another.108

3. The UN Security Council should encourage the development of human rights compliance frameworks to guide parallel forces. These should involve cooperation between the UN and national authorities, civil society, and other international forces on the ground.

Clarify Roles, Responsibilities, and Areas of Operation

4. Where a parallel force is engaged in peace enforcement or counterterrorism operations, it should work with the UN peace operation to clearly delineate their responsibilities and areas of operations, to the extent possible. This should take place both at the strategic level (through clear mandates and discussions between respective authorities at the highest level) and at the operational level (with clear instructions in concepts of operations, technical agreements, logistical support arrangements, and intelligence-sharing mechanisms).

5. UN peace operations should work with parallel forces undertaking counterterrorism operations to assess the risks of collocating and, where possible, seek to establish their forces in separate locations. Although collocation enables operations to share certain capabilities, it is likely to increase the risk of attacks on UN peacekeeping facilities while further confusing the local population’s perceptions of the distinct mandates of the different forces.

6. UN peace operations and parallel forces should improve their mutual dialogue and strategic communications with the local population about their respective mandates and responsibilities. Engagement with the media and strategic communications can help them shape the perceptions of the local community and host government about the distinct roles of different forces.

7. The Security Council should continue to put in place oversight mechanisms to strengthen the accountability of parallel forces. For example, the council should request more detailed reporting on parallel forces’ operations, cooperation, and compliance with any of its requirements. This is particularly important when a UN peace operation provides support in areas such as intelligence or logistics and parallel forces draw on this support to undertake counterterrorism operations.

8. The Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C34) could request lessons learned by the UN from the deployment of previous parallel forces.109 These lessons could inform the development of strategic and operational guidance for UN peace operations working alongside parallel forces in areas including planning, operations, command and control, intelligence sharing, safety and security, logistics, protection of civilians, human rights compliance, and women, peace, and security.

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109 Such a request could build on the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations’ existing acknowledgement that “in situations where a peacekeeping operation operates in parallel with counter-terrorism forces, the respective role of each presence should be clearly delineated.” UN General Assembly, Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations: 2018 Substantive Session, UN Doc. A/72/19, 2018, p. 20.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of parallel operation</th>
<th>Date and place of deployment</th>
<th>Actors launching operation</th>
<th>UN peace operation</th>
<th>Security Council reference</th>
<th>Security Council decision and mandate</th>
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<tr>
<td>Operation Sky Monitor</td>
<td>October 1992 to April 1993 Former Yugoslavia</td>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>UNPROFOR</td>
<td>Resolution 743 (February 21, 1992)</td>
<td>Calls upon States to take nationally or through regional agencies or arrangements all measures necessary to provide assistance to UNPROFOR, based on technical monitoring and other capabilities to monitor compliance with the ban on military flights.</td>
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<tr>
<td>United Task Force (UNITAF), or Operation Restore Hope</td>
<td>December 1992 to May 1993 Somalia</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>UNOSOM Resolution 751 (April 24, 1992)</td>
<td>Resolution 794 (December 3, 1992) Adopted unanimously</td>
<td>Welcomes the offer by a Member State described in the Secretary-General’s letter to the Council of 29 November 1992 (S/24868) concerning the establishment of an operation to create such a secure environment. Acting under Chapter VII, authorizes the Secretary-General and Member States cooperating to implement the offer referred to in paragraph 8 above to use all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia. Requests the Secretary-General and the Member States to establish appropriate mechanisms for coordination between the United Nations and their military forces. Invites the Secretary-General to attach a small UNOSOM liaison staff to the field headquarters of the unified command.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG)</td>
<td>August 1990 to February 1998 Liberia</td>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>UNOMIL Resolution 866 (September 22, 1993)</td>
<td>Resolution 866 (September 22, 1993) Adopted unanimously</td>
<td>Noting that this would be the first peace-keeping mission undertaken by the United Nations in cooperation with a peace-keeping mission already set up by another organization, in this case ECOWAS.</td>
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110 Forces authorized by the council are shaded.
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<td>Operation Deny Flight (superseded in August 1995 by Operation Deliberate Force)</td>
<td>April 1993 to December 1995 Former Yugoslavia</td>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>UNPROFOR/UNPF Resolution 743 (February 21, 1992)</td>
<td>Resolution 816 (March 31, 1993) Adopted with 14 votes in favor and 1 abstention (China) Resolution 836 (June 4, 1993) Adopted with 12 votes in favor and 2 abstentions (Pakistan and Venezuela)</td>
<td>Authorizes Member States acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements to take under the authority of the Security Council and subject to close coordination with the Secretary-General and UNPROFOR all necessary measures in the airspace of the Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina to ensure compliance with the ban on flights. Decides that Member States acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, may take, under the authority of the Security Council and subject to close coordination with the Secretary-General and UNPROFOR, all necessary measures, through the use of air power, in and around the safe areas of the Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina, to support UNPROFOR in the performance of its mandate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIS Collective Peacekeeping Forces in Tajikistan</td>
<td>October 1993 to April 1999 Tajikistan</td>
<td>CIS</td>
<td>UNMOT Resolution 968 (December 16, 1994)</td>
<td>Resolution 968 (December 16, 1994) Adopted unanimously</td>
<td>To maintain close contacts with the parties to the conflict, as well as close liaison with the CSCE Mission in Tajikistan and with the Collective Peace-keeping Forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States in Tajikistan and with the border forces.</td>
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| Operation Turquoise | June to August 1994 Rwanda | France, with some African states (Chad, Egypt, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, Niger, Republic of the Congo, Senegal) | UNAMIR Resolution 872 (October 5, 1993) | Resolution 929 (June 22, 1994) Adopted with 10 votes in favor and 5 abstentions (Brazil, China, New Zealand, Nigeria, and Pakistan) | Welcomes the Secretary-General’s letter dated 19 June 1994 (S/1994/728) and agrees that a multinational operation may be set up for humanitarian purposes in Rwanda until UNAMIR is brought up to the necessary strength. Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, authorizes the Member States cooperating with the Secretary-General to conduct the operation referred to in paragraph 2 above using all necessary means to achieve the humanitarian objectives set out in subparagraphs 4 (a) and (b) of Resolution 925 (1994). Welcomes also the offer by Member States (S/1994/734) to cooperate with the Secretary-General in order to achieve
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<th>Name of parallel operation</th>
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<tr>
<td>CIS peacekeeping force in Georgia</td>
<td>July 1994 to October 2008 Georgia</td>
<td>CIS</td>
<td>UNOMIG Resolution 858 (August 24, 1993)</td>
<td>Resolution 937 (July 21, 1994) Adopted with 14 votes in favor (Rwanda did not take part in the vote)</td>
<td>Welcomes the contribution made by the Russian Federation of a peace-keeping force, in response to the request of the parties, pursuant to the 14 May Agreement, in coordination with UNOMIG. Notes the Secretary-General’s intention to write to the Chairman of the Council of Heads of State of the CIS on the respective roles and responsibilities of UNOMIG and the CIS peace-keeping force and requests the Secretary-General to establish an appropriate arrangement to that effect, and requests the commanders of UNOMIG and the CIS peace-keeping force to conclude and implement the appropriate arrangements on the ground described in the Secretary-General’s report of 12 July 1994 (S/1994/818) for coordination and cooperation between UNOMIG and the CIS peace-keeping force in the implementation of their respective tasks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation Uphold Democracy</td>
<td>September 1994 to March 1995 Haiti</td>
<td>US-led coalition with 28 other states</td>
<td>UNMIH Resolution 867 (September 23, 1993)</td>
<td>Resolution 940 (July 31, 1994) Adopted with 12 votes in favor and 2 abstentions (Brazil and China; Rwanda did not take part in the vote)</td>
<td>Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, authorizes Member States to form a multinational force under unified command and control and, in this framework, to use all necessary means to facilitate the departure from Haiti of the military leadership, consistent with the Governors Island Agreement, the prompt return of the legitimately elected President and the restoration of the legitimate authorities of the Government of Haiti, and to establish and maintain a secure and stable environment that will permit implementation of the Governors Island.</td>
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<td>Rapid Reaction Force</td>
<td>July to December 1995</td>
<td>France, the Netherlands, and the UK</td>
<td>UNPROFOR Resolution 743 (February 21, 1992)</td>
<td>Resolution 998 (June 16, 1995) Adopted with 13 votes in favor and 2 abstentions (China and Russia)</td>
<td>Welcomes the letter of the Secretary-General of 9 June 1995 on the reinforcement of UNPROFOR and the establishment of a rapid reaction capacity to enable UNPF/UNPROFOR to carry out its mandate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation United Shield (Combined Task Force)</td>
<td>February to March 1995 Somalia</td>
<td>US-led coalition with contributions from France, India, Italy, Malaysia, Pakistan, and the UK</td>
<td>UNOSOM Resolution 751 (April 24, 1992)</td>
<td>Resolution 954 (November 4, 1994) Adopted unanimously</td>
<td>Requests member states to provide assistance in the withdrawal of all UNSOM II military forces and assets, including vehicles, weapons and other equipment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementation Force (IFOR)</td>
<td>December 1995 to December 1996 Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>UNMIBH/IPTF Resolution 1035 (December 21, 1995)</td>
<td>Resolution 1031 (December 15, 1995) Adopted unanimously</td>
<td>Authorizes the Member States acting through or in cooperation with the organization referred to in Annex 1-A of the Peace Agreement to establish a multinational implementation force (IFOR) under unified command and control in order to fulfill the role specified in Annex 1-A and Annex 2 of the Peace Agreement.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Stabilisation Force (SFOR)</td>
<td>December 1996 to December 2004 Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>UNMIBH</td>
<td>Resolution 1088 (December 12, 1996) Adopted unanimously</td>
<td>Authorizes the Member States acting through or in cooperation with the organization referred to in Annex 1-A of the Peace Agreement to establish for a planned period of 18 months a multinational stabilization force (SFOR) as the legal successor to IFOR under unified command and control in order to fulfil the role specified in Annex 1-A and Annex 2 of the Peace Agreement.</td>
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<td>Resolution 1270 (October 22, 1999)</td>
<td>Adopted unanimously</td>
<td>Commends the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and its Military Observer Group (ECOMOG), deployed in Sierra Leone, on the important role they are playing in support of the objectives related to the restoration of peace and security.</td>
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<td>Resolution 1181 (July 13, 1998)</td>
<td>Adopted unanimously</td>
<td>Noting the objectives set by ECOWAS for its Military Observer Group (ECOMOG) as described in paragraph 17 of the report of Secretary-General. Welcomes the commitment of ECOMOG to ensure the security of United Nations personnel, and in this regard welcomes also the intention of the Secretary-General to establish security arrangements for United Nations personnel with the Chairman of ECOWAS. Stresses the need for full cooperation and close coordination between UNOMISIL and ECOMOG in their respective operational activities.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kosovo Force (KFOR)</td>
<td>June 1999 to present Kosovo</td>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>UNMIK</td>
<td>Resolution 1244 (June 10, 1999) Adopted with 14 votes in favor and 1 abstention (China)</td>
<td>Authorizes Member States and relevant international organizations to establish the international security presence in Kosovo as set out in point 4 of annex 2 (i.e. under unified command and control) with all necessary means to fulfil its responsibilities. Further requests the Secretary-General to instruct his Special Representative to coordinate closely with the international security presence to ensure that both presences operate towards the same goals and in a mutually supportive manner.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Interim Force for East Timor (INTERFET)</td>
<td>September 1999 to February 2000 Timor-Leste</td>
<td>Australia-led coalition with 22 troop-contributing countries, including many members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
<td>UNAMET Resolution 1246 (June 11, 1999) UNTAET Resolution 1272 (October 25, 1999)</td>
<td>Resolution 1264 (September 15, 1999) Adopted unanimously</td>
<td>Authorizes the establishment of a multinational force under a unified command structure, pursuant to the request of the Government of Indonesia conveyed to the Secretary-General on 12 September 1999, with the following tasks: to restore peace and security in East Timor, to protect and support UNAMET in carrying out its tasks and, within force capabilities, to facilitate humanitarian assistance operations, and authorizes the States participating in the multinational force to take all necessary measures to fulfil this mandate. Requests the leadership of the multinational force to provide periodic reports on progress towards the implementation of its mandate through the Secretary-General to the Council.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation Palliser</td>
<td>May to September 2000 Sierra Leone</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>UNAMSIL Resolution 1270 (October 22, 1999)</td>
<td>Presidential Statement 2000/24 (July 17, 2000)</td>
<td>Expresses its appreciation to the United Kingdom for the valuable logistical support provided to UNAMSIL to conduct the operation leading to the release of peacekeepers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOWAS Mission in Côte d'Ivoire (ECOMICI)</td>
<td>February 2003 to April 2004 Côte d'Ivoire</td>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>MINUCI Resolution 1479 (May 13, 2003)</td>
<td>Resolution 1464 (February 4, 2003) Adopted unanimously</td>
<td>Welcomes the deployment of ECOWAS forces and French troops with a view to contributing to a peaceful solution of the crisis and, in particular, to the implementation of the Linaas-Marcoxis Agreement. Authorizes Member States participating in the ECOWAS forces in accordance with Chapter VIII together with the French forces supporting them to take the necessary steps to guarantee the security and freedom of movement of their personnel and to ensure, without prejudice to the responsibilities of the Government of National Reconciliation, the protection of civilians immediately threatened with physical violence within their zones of operation. Requests ECOWAS, through the command of its force, and France to report to the Council periodically, through the Secretary-General, on all aspects of the implementation of their respective mandates.</td>
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| Operation Licorne         | September 2002 to January 2015 Côte d'Ivoire | France                   | MINUCI/UNOCI, Resolution 1528 (February 27, 2004) | Resolution 1528 (February 27, 2004) Adopted unanimously | Authorizes for a period of 12 months from 4 April 2004 the French forces to use all necessary means in order to support UNOCI in particular to:  
- Contribute to the general security of the area of activity of the international forces,  
- Intervene at the request of UNOCI in support of its elements whose security may be threatened,  
- Intervene against belligerent actions, if the security conditions so require, outside the areas directly controlled by UNOCI,  
- Help to protect civilians, in the deployment areas of their units;  
Requests France to continue to report to it periodically on all aspects of its mandate in Côte d'Ivoire. |
| Operation Artemis         | May to September 2003 DRC (Ituri Province) | European Union Joint Action 2003/423/CFSP (June 5, 2003) | MONUC, Resolution 1279 (November 30, 1999) | Resolution 1484 (May 30, 2003) Adopted unanimously | Authorizes the deployment until 1 September 2003 of an Interim Emergency Multinational Force in Bunia in close coordination with MONUC to contribute to the stabilization of the security conditions and the improvement of the humanitarian situation in Bunia, to ensure the protection of the airport, the internally displaced persons in the camps in Bunia and, if the situation requires it, to contribute to the safety of the civilian population, United Nations personnel and the humanitarian presence in the town.  
Requests the leadership of the Interim Emergency Multinational Force in Bunia to report regularly to the Council through the Secretary-General, on the implementation of its mandate.  
Requests the European Union and the Secretary-General to ensure a close cooperation during the preparation of the establishment of Eufor RD Congo and for the duration of its mandate, and until its full disengagement  
Requests the European Union to report regularly to the Security Council on the implementation of Eufor RD Congo's mandate. |
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<tr>
<td>EU police mission in the DRC (EUPOL DRC)</td>
<td>July 2007 to September 2014 DRC</td>
<td></td>
<td>MONUC</td>
<td>Resolution 1856 (December 22, 2008) Adopted unanimously</td>
<td>In coordination with international partners, including the European Union operations EUSEC and EUPOL, to contribute to the efforts of the international community to assist the Congolese Government in the initial planning process of the security sector reform, to build credible, cohesive, and disciplined Congolese armed forces and to develop the capacities of the Congolese national police and related law enforcement agencies (Resolution 1856).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU security sector reform mission in the DRC (EUSEC DRC)</td>
<td>June 2005 to June 2016 DRC</td>
<td>European Union Joint Action 2005/355/CFSP (May 2, 2005)</td>
<td>MONUC</td>
<td>Resolution 1856 (December 22, 2008) Adopted unanimously</td>
<td>In coordination with international partners, including the European Union operations EUSEC and EUPOL, to contribute to the efforts of the international community to assist the Congolese Government in the initial planning process of the security sector reform, to build credible, cohesive, and disciplined Congolese armed forces and to develop the capacities of the Congolese national police and related law enforcement agencies (Resolution 1856).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Stabilisation Force (ISF), or Operation Astute</td>
<td>May 2006 to May 2013 Timor-Leste</td>
<td>Australia with Malaysia, New Zealand, and Portugal</td>
<td>UNOTIL</td>
<td>Resolution 1690 (June 20, 2006)</td>
<td>Expresses its appreciation and full support for the deployment of international security forces by the Governments of Portugal, Australia, New Zealand and Malaysia in response to the request of the Government of Timor-Leste and their activities aiming to restore and maintain security in Timor-Leste. Calls upon the international security forces to continue to work in close coordination with the Government of Timor-Leste as well as the United Nations Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL).</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU force in the DRC</td>
<td>June to November 2006 DRC</td>
<td>European Union Joint Action 2006/319/CFSP (April 27, 2007)</td>
<td>MONUC Resolution 1279 (November 30, 1999)</td>
<td>Resolution 1671 (April 26, 2006) Adopted unanimously</td>
<td>Authorizes, for a period ending four months after the date of the first round of the presidential and parliamentary elections, the deployment of Eufor RD Congo in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Decides that Eufor RD Congo is authorized to take all necessary measures, within its means and capabilities, to carry out the following tasks, in accordance with the agreement to be reached between the European Union and the United Nations: (a) to support MONUC to stabilize a situation, in case MONUC faces serious difficulties in fulfilling its mandate within its existing capabilities, (b) to contribute to the protection of civilians under imminent threat of physical violence in the areas of its deployment, and without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, (c) to contribute to airport protection in Kinshasa, (d) to ensure the security and freedom of movement of the personnel as well as the protection of the installations of Eufor RD Congo, (e) to execute operations of limited character in order to extract individuals in danger.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EULEX Kosovo EU rule of law mission in Kosovo</td>
<td>February 2008 to present Kosovo</td>
<td>European Union Joint Action 2008/124/CFSP (February 4, 2008)</td>
<td>UNMIK Resolution 1244 (June 10, 1999)</td>
<td>Presidential Statement 2008/44 (November 26, 2008)</td>
<td>The Security Council welcomes the cooperation between the UN and other international actors, within the framework of Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999), and welcomes the continuing efforts of the European Union to advance the European perspective of the whole of the Western Balkans, thereby making a decisive contribution to regional stability and prosperity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUFOR Chad/CAR</td>
<td>January 2008 to May 2009 Eastern Chad and Northwest CAR</td>
<td>European Union Joint Action 2007/677/CFSP (October 15, 2007)</td>
<td>MINURCAT Resolution 1778 (September 25, 2007)</td>
<td>Resolution 1778 (September 25, 2007) Adopted unanimously</td>
<td>Authorizes the European Union to deploy, for a period of one year from the date that its initial operating capability is declared by the European Union in consultation with the Secretary-General, an operation aimed at supporting [MINURCAT], and decides that this operation shall be authorized to take all necessary measures, within its...</td>
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<td>International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)</td>
<td>December 2001 to December 2014 Afghanistan</td>
<td>Coalition of member states (NATO took over in 2003)</td>
<td>UNAMA Resolution 1401 (March 28, 2002)</td>
<td>Resolution 1386 (December 20, 2001)</td>
<td>Adopted unanimously</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multinational force in Iraq, or Combined Joint Task Force 7</td>
<td>March 2003 to December 2011 Iraq</td>
<td>Coalition led by the US (Operation Iraqi Freedom) and</td>
<td>UNAMI Resolution 1500 (August 14, 2003)</td>
<td>Resolution 1511 (October 16, 2003)</td>
<td>Adopted unanimously</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO Training Mission in Iraq</td>
<td>June 2004 to December 2011 Iraq</td>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>UNAMI</td>
<td>Resolution 1546 (June 8, 2004) Adopted unanimously</td>
<td>Requests that the United States, on behalf of the multinational force, report to the Security Council on the efforts and progress of this force as appropriate and not less than every six months.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)</td>
<td>January 2007 to present Somalia</td>
<td>African Union</td>
<td>UNPOS Secretary-General decision (See Secretary-General's Report S/1995/231) April 15, 1995 UNSOM Resolution 2102 (May 2, 2013) UNSOA/UNSOS</td>
<td>Resolution 1744 February 20, 2007 Adopted unanimously</td>
<td>Decides to authorize member States of the African Union to establish for a period of six months a mission in Somalia, which shall be authorized to take all necessary measures as appropriate to carry out the following mandate: (a) To support dialogue and reconciliation in Somalia; (b) To provide protection to the Transitional Federal Institutions to help them carry out their functions of government, and security for key infrastructure; (c) To assist with implementation of the National Security and Stabilization Plan; (d) To contribute to the creation of the necessary security conditions for the provision of humanitarian assistance; (e) To protect its...</td>
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| African-Led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) | December 2012 to July 2013 Mali | African Union | UNOM Resolution 2085 (December 20, 2012) | Resolution 2085 (December 20, 2012) Adopted unanimously | Decides to authorize the deployment of AFISMA for an initial period of one year, which shall take all necessary measures to carry out the following tasks: (a) To contribute to the rebuilding of the capacity of the Malian Defense and Security Forces, in close coordination with other international partners involved in this process, including the European Union and other Member States; (b) To support the Malian authorities in recovering the areas in the north of its territory, while taking appropriate
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<tr>
<td>Operation Sangaris</td>
<td>December 2013 to October 2016 CAR</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>BINUCA Presidential Statement 2009/5 (April 7, 2009)</td>
<td>Resolution 2127 (December 5, 2013) Adopted unanimously</td>
<td>Authorizes the French forces in the CAR, within the limits of their capacities and areas of deployment, and for a temporary period, to take all necessary measures to support MISCA; requests France to report to the Council on the implementation of this mandate in the CAR and to coordinate its reporting with the reporting by the African Union.</td>
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</table>

Requests the African Union, in close coordination with Ecowas, the Secretary-General and other international organizations and bilateral partners involved in the Malian crisis, to report to the Security Council every 60 days on the deployment and activities of AFISMA.

Requests the Secretary-General to establish a multidisciplinary United Nations presence in Mali, in order to provide coordinated and coherent support to (i) the on-going political process and (ii) the security process, including support to the planning, deployment and operations of AFISMA.
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<tr>
<td>African-Led International Support Mission to CAR (MISCA)</td>
<td>December 2013 to September 2014 CAR</td>
<td>African Union Peace and Security Council Communiqué PSC/PR/COMM.2(CCCLXXXV)</td>
<td>BINUCA</td>
<td>Resolution 2127 (December 5, 2013) Adopted unanimously</td>
<td>Authorizes the deployment of MISCA for a period of twelve months after the adoption of this Resolution, consistent with the concept of operations adopted on 19 July 2013 and reviewed on 10 October 2013, to contribute to: (i) the protection of civilians and the restoration of security and public order, through the use of appropriate measures; (ii) the stabilization the country and the restoration of State authority over the whole territory of the country; (iii) the creation of conditions conducive to the provision of humanitarian assistance to populations in need; (iv) the DDR or DDRRR process led by the Transitional Authorities and coordinated by BINUCA; (v) national and international efforts to reform and restructure the defence and security sectors. Underscores the need to establish appropriate coordination mechanisms between BINUCA and MISCA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation Serval</td>
<td>January 2013 to July 2014 Mali</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>MINUSMA Resolution 2100 (April 25, 2013) Adopted unanimously</td>
<td></td>
<td>Authorizes French troops, within the limits of their capacities and areas of deployment, to use all necessary means to intervene in support of elements of MINUSMA when under imminent and serious threat upon request of the Secretary-General, further requests France to report to the Council on the implementation of this mandate in Mali and to coordinate its reporting with the reporting by the Secretary-General referred to in paragraph 34 below and decides to review this mandate within six months after its commencement.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Operation Barkhane</td>
<td>August 2014 to present Mali</td>
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<td>EU training mission in Mali</td>
<td>January 2013 to present Mali</td>
<td>European Union Council Decision 2013/34/CFSF (January 17, 2013)</td>
<td>MINUSMA Resolution 2100 (April 25, 2013) Adopted unanimously</td>
<td></td>
<td>Welcomes the deployment of EUTM in Mali which is providing training and advice for the Malian Defence and Security Forces towards contributing to strengthening civilian authority and respect for human rights and calls upon the EU, notably its</td>
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<td><strong>EU force in CAR (EUFOR CAR)</strong></td>
<td>January 2014 to March 2015 CAR</td>
<td>European Union Council Decision 2014/73/CFSP (February 10, 2014)</td>
<td>MINUSCA Resolution 2149 (April 10, 2014)</td>
<td>Resolution 2134 (January 28, 2014) Adopted unanimously</td>
<td>Authorizes the European Union to deploy an operation in the CAR as referenced in the letter dated 21 January 2014 from the High Representative of the European Union (S/2014/45), and to take all necessary measures within the limits of its capacities and areas of deployment from its initial deployment and for a period of six months from the declaration of its full operational capacity. Requests the European Union to report to the Council on the implementation of this mandate in the CAR and to coordinate its reporting with the reporting by the African Union.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EU capacity building mission in Mali</strong></td>
<td>June 2014 to present Mali</td>
<td>European Union Council Decision 2014/219/CFSP (April 15, 2014)</td>
<td>MINUSMA Resolution 2100 (April 25, 2013)</td>
<td>Resolution 2164 (June 25, 2014) Adopted unanimously</td>
<td>Welcoming the decision of the European Union (EU) to establish EUCAP Sahel Mali to provide strategic advice and training for the Police, Gendarmerie and Garde nationale in Mali. Calls upon the EU, notably its Special Representative for the Sahel and its EUTM Mali and EUCAP Sahel Mali missions, to coordinate closely with MINUSMA, and other bilateral partners of Mali engaged to assist the Malian authorities in the Security Sector Reform (SSR).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Resolute Support Mission</strong></td>
<td>January 2015 to present Afghanistan</td>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>UNAMA Resolution 1401 (March 28, 2002)</td>
<td>Resolution 2189 (December 12, 2014) Adopted unanimously</td>
<td>Welcomes the agreement between NATO and Afghanistan to establish the post-2014 non-combat Resolute Support Mission, which will train, advise and assist the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces at the invitation of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. Looks forward to the leadership of Resolute Support Mission working with the Government of Afghanistan and in close coordination and cooperation, where relevant, with the UNAMA and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name of parallel operation</td>
<td>Date and place of deployment</td>
<td>Actors launching operation</td>
<td>UN peace operation</td>
<td>Security Council reference</td>
<td>Security Council decision and mandate</td>
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<td>EU military advisory mission in CAR (EUMAM CAR)</td>
<td>March 2015 to July 2016 CAR</td>
<td>European Union Council Decision 2015/78/CFSP (January 19, 2015)</td>
<td>MINUSCA Resolution 2149 (April 10, 2014)</td>
<td>Resolution 2196 (January 22, 2015) Adopted unanimously</td>
<td>Welcoming the decision of the European Union to establish a one-year military advice mission based in Bangui (EUMAM-RCA), as requested by the CAR transitional authorities, in order to contribute to providing them with expert advice on reforming the CAR Armed Forces (FACA) into a multi-ethnic, professional, and republican armed forces.</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU training mission in CAR (EUTM CAR)</td>
<td>July 2016 to present CAR</td>
<td>European Union Council Decision 2016/610/CFSP (April 19, 2016)</td>
<td>MINUSCA Resolution 2301 (July 26, 2016) Adopted unanimously</td>
<td></td>
<td>Welcoming also the launch of the EU training mission (EUTM) which will extend the support provided to reform the FACA into multi-ethnic, professional and representative armed forces, as indicated in the letter of the High Representative of the EU for Foreign and Security Policy dated 30 May 2016.</td>
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<tr>
<td>G5 Sahel Joint Force</td>
<td>January 2017 to present Mali</td>
<td>G5 Sahel (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger)</td>
<td>MINUSMA Resolution 2100 (April 25, 2013)</td>
<td>Resolution 2359 (June 21, 2017) Adopted unanimously</td>
<td>Welcomes the deployment of the FC-G5S throughout the territories of its contributing countries, with up to 5,000 military and police personnel, with a view to restoring peace and security in the Sahel region. Urges the FC-G5S, MINUSMA and the French forces to ensure adequate coordination and exchange of information, through relevant mechanisms, of their operations, within their respective mandates, and reiterates in this regard its request to the Secretary-General to enhance cooperation between MINUSMA and the G5 Sahel Member States through provision of relevant intelligence and liaison officers from the G5 Sahel Member States to MINUSMA.</td>
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</table>
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