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Prioritization and Sequencing of Security Council Mandates: The Case of MINUSCA

NOVEMBER 2022



STIMSON

On October 11, 2022, the International Peace Institute (IPI), the Stimson Center, and Security Council Report organized a workshop to discuss the mandate and political strategy of the United Nations Multidimensional Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA). This discussion was part of a series of workshops that examine how the activities included in peace operations' mandates can be better prioritized, sequenced, and grounded in a political strategy. This was the sixth consecutive year in which these partners convened discussions in support of the mandate negotiations on MINUSCA. The meeting note was drafted collaboratively by IPI, the Stimson Center, and Security Council Report. The meeting note summarizes the main points raised in the discussion under the Chatham House rule of non-attribution and does not necessarily represent the views of all participants. The project is funded with the support of the German Federal Foreign Office and the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs.

Introduction

The UN Security Council is expected to renew the mandate of the United Nations Multidimensional Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) in November 2022. The upcoming negotiations among council members will unfold against the backdrop of renewed momentum for implementation of the country's peace agreement. And while security dynamics in the Central African Republic (CAR) are somewhat more stable compared to the period leading up to last year's mandate renewal, human rights and protection threats to civilians persist alongside underlying challenges of limited service provision, poor socioeconomic development, and significant humanitarian needs.

In this context, the International Peace Institute (IPI), Security Council Report, and the Stimson Center co-hosted a roundtable discussion on October 11, 2022, to discuss MINUSCA's mandate renewal. This roundtable offered a platform for member states, UN officials, civil society stakeholders, and independent experts to share their assessments of the situation in CAR in a frank and collaborative manner. The discussion was intended to help the Security Council make more informed decisions with respect to the prioritization and sequencing of MINUSCA's mandate and the mission's strategic orientation and actions on the ground.¹

Participants agreed that MINUSCA's strategic vision and priority tasks are still relevant to the UN's overall engagement in the country. Participants also emphasized that the current mandate provides the mission with appropriate guidance to pursue the strategic direction provided by the Security Council while also giving the mission enough flexibility to pivot as new priorities or crises emerge. The mission will likely need to balance the following issues over the next mandate cycle:

- Supporting the government's implementation of the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation (the APPR) and the Luanda Joint Roadmap;²
- Encouraging widespread civic engagement with and promoting the inclusivity of the formal political process;
- Continuing to coordinate political support from CAR's regional and international partners;

¹ UN Security Council Resolution 2605 (November 12, 2021), UN Doc. S/RES/2605.

² International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, "Final Communiqué: Mini-Summit of ICGLR on the Political and Security Situation in Central African Republic," September 16, 2021.

- Strengthening its capabilities to conduct proactive, robust, and mobile protection efforts across the country;
- Safeguarding its human rights monitoring and investigation responsibilities;
- Maintaining a constructive dialogue with Central African authorities to ensure the mission's freedom of movement and the effectiveness of its operations; and
- Laying the groundwork for accelerated delivery of humanitarian aid and long-term, locally driven development programming.

Participants emphasized that these points should all feature in the upcoming mandate and should be reinforced with unified political support from the Security Council and the country's bilateral and regional partners.

Conflict Analysis

Recent political developments suggest renewed momentum toward and consensus around the implementation of the peace process in CAR among national, regional, and international partners. However, participants were concerned that the government's increased ownership of the peace process was not accompanied by substantive engagement with civil society and marginalized communities, including women's organizations. Recent political concerns sparked by the attempted constitutional revisions and increasing restrictions on civic space could jeopardize progress on the implementation of the peace process. The security situation in CAR has somewhat improved in recent months with MINUSCA's efforts to enhance its robust posture to reduce the activities of armed groups and its joint patrols with the armed forces to protect civilians. However, human rights and protection threats to civilians persist alongside underlying challenges of limited service provision, poor socioeconomic development, and significant humanitarian needs.

Political Dynamics

Over the past year, the Central African government has taken some steps to renew its support to the peace process and to mobilize momentum for its implementation. In a landmark meeting facilitated by the government in June 2022, key national and regional partners worked to renew momentum behind the implementation of the 2021 Luanda Joint Roadmap.³ The meeting resulted in the creation of a permanent platform to monitor both progress and challenges in the implementation of the joint roadmap and the APPR on a quarterly basis.⁴

Participants in the workshop highlighted the convergence of views on the APPR between the government of CAR, partners in the subregion, and strategic partners as a sign of renewed national ownership of the political process. President Faustin-Archange Touadéra assigned his prime minister to lead the relaunch of the peace process. The prime minister has subsequently held four coordination meetings at the ministerial level, and several ministries are actively working on the implementation of the joint roadmap. As part of this process, the government met with signatory armed groups to the APPR in September 2022 to discuss implementation of the joint roadmap.⁵ However, bringing back the six armed groups that left the peace process will be a challenge. Some participants warned that some of the non-signatory armed groups may increase their operations as the rainy season concludes.⁶

Participants highlighted a disconnect between the political emphasis on the APPR and the limited involvement of the broader population in the renewed efforts to implement the peace agreement. Some speakers felt that this disconnect came from the government's lack of strategic communication and outreach to civil society with regards to the joint roadmap and recent developments, arguing that few communities knew these processes were

³ Ibid.

⁴ UN Doc. S/2022/762, para. 13.

⁵ UN Doc. S/2022/762, para. 14.

⁶ International Crisis Group, "CrisisWatch: October Alerts and September Trends," October 2022.

underway. They also felt that civil society remained on the margin of these initiatives and that previous efforts to incorporate marginalized communities had not been sustained.

Political debates emerging after the conclusion of the Republican Dialogue held earlier in 2022 have received significant attention. Recommendations from the Republican Dialogue were submitted to the government and broadly reflect outcomes of the Bangui Forum and the APPR.⁷ However, the Coalition de l'opposition démocratique 2020 (COD-2020) boycotted the dialogue because it excluded some armed groups from the process, among other concerns.⁸ President Touadéra's efforts to revise the constitution sparked significant outcries and protests.⁹ In September 2022, the Constitutional Court declared the current initiatives to amend the constitution invalid.¹⁰

Civil society organizations have been closely following the government's attempts to draft a new constitution, which could, inter alia, remove the two-term limit for the presidency. Multiple speakers acknowledged that these developments had "sucked the air" out of conversations around the peace agreement. Another speaker mentioned that the attempted revisions were undertaken in an increasingly restricted civic space, with curtailed civil liberties and rising hate speech and misinformation. They also argued that the APPR's priorities are increasingly disconnected from the concerns facing civil society in CAR today. Some participants warned that deteriorating public trust in the government could jeopardize progress on the peace process.

Armed Conflict Dynamics

The security landscape in CAR continues to evolve following the armed rebellion in 2020–2021, the government's declaration of a unilateral cease-fire in late 2021, and the government's more proactive

approach to countering non-signatory armed groups. Following the government's declaration of a unilateral cease-fire in October 2021, the Central African armed forces made territorial gains in provinces previously occupied by the Coalition of Patriots for Change (CPC).¹¹ Armed groups have since regained control of some mining sites by attacking areas where national forces were less present, taking advantage of their diminished mobility due to the fuel crisis.¹²

Violations of the APPR persist, and both state and non-state forces pose direct threats to civilians throughout the country, in part due to "forced displacement, serious human rights violations, and deterioration of the humanitarian situation."¹³ Between June and October 2022, 431 security violations of the APPR took place, a 15 percent increase compared to earlier in the year, with most of the violence targeting civilians. This trend speaks to the changing tactics of conflict actors: on the one hand, the government is engaging in more proactive operations against armed groups and more partnerships with bilateral forces, and on the other, armed groups are compensating for their diminished ability to capture and hold territories by targeting less protected communities and prioritizing the illegal trafficking of natural resources.¹⁴

MINUSCA is attempting to manage these changing security conditions and persistent human rights abuses through the adoption of proactive and preventive measures.¹⁵ These efforts aim to improve the mission's ability to respond rapidly and deploy flexibly to hot spots and prevent armed groups from reasserting territorial control, especially in the country's central and eastern regions.¹⁶

Conflict dynamics also make it challenging for international partners to effectively deliver humanitarian aid and impact MINUSCA's ability to conduct operations and protect its personnel.

7 UN Doc. S/2022/762, para. 3.

8 UN Security Council, *Central African Republic: Report of the Secretary-General*, UN Doc. S/2022/491, June 16, 2022, para. 5.

9 Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), "Central African Republic: The Drafting of a New Constitution Must Not Undermine Peace and Reconciliation say UN Experts," press release, August 29, 2022.

10 UN Doc. S/2022/762, para. 8.

11 UN Security Council, *Central African Republic: Report of the Secretary-General*, UN Doc. S/2022/491, June 16, 2022, paras. 40, 92.

12 UN Doc. S/2022/762, para. 23.

13 UN Security Council, *Central African Republic: Report of the Secretary-General*, UN Doc. S/2022/762, October 16, 2022, para. 47.

14 UN Doc. S/2022/762, para. 24.

15 UN Doc. S/2022/762, paras. 48, 49, and 108.

16 UN Doc. S/2022/762, paras. 23–24.

The UN reported sixty-eight incidents affecting humanitarian workers, from June to October 2022.¹⁷ Speakers brought attention to the death of three Bangladeshi peacekeepers following a roadside bomb explosion near the border with Cameroon on October 5, 2022.¹⁸ This incident, against the backdrop of 272 security incidents involving UN personnel between June and October 2022, underscores the operational challenges that MINUSCA confronts.

Human Rights, Justice, and the Restoration of State Authority

Human rights conditions in CAR remain deeply concerning, with a notable increase in human rights violations since early 2022 and continued incidents of sexual and gender-based violence.¹⁹ MINUSCA reported 625 human rights violations and abuses of international humanitarian law during its most recent reporting period, most of which were committed by state security forces (45 percent) and signatory armed groups (44 percent).²⁰ Participants welcomed progress made on human rights issues but were concerned about the rising share of the violations committed by the country's defense forces and their allies.²¹ Following her four-day visit to CAR in early October 2022, UN Assistant Secretary-General for Human Rights Ilze Brands Kehris emphasized that monitoring and reporting on human rights violations remain essential tools in the fight against impunity, especially as armed groups and militias adapt their tactics to the evolving security context.²²

Human rights issues also intersected with discussions about accountability and the restoration of state authority, including in the field of justice. Participants welcomed ongoing efforts by the

government to fight impunity, highlighting, for example, the investigations into and start of trials for war crimes and crimes against humanity by the Special Criminal Court and the recent establishment of the Truth, Justice, Reparation and Reconciliation Commission.²³ They emphasized, however, that these mechanisms remain in need of political support and funding from the government, with assistance from the international community.

Progress was also noted on the disarmament and demobilization of ex-combatants under the APPR.²⁴ In recent months, Central African authorities have also facilitated workshops aimed at improving parliamentarians' oversight of the security sector.²⁵ In July, the Strategic Committee for Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration, Security Sector Reform, and National Reconciliation, chaired by President Touadéra, endorsed the new National Security Policy and the draft National Security Sector Reform Strategy, "both of which emphasized governance, accountability and the coordination of actors in the security sector."²⁶

Economic and Humanitarian Conditions

The deteriorating economic situation continues to exacerbate the conflict in CAR and prevent long-term sustainable peace and development. Global pressures on food and commodity prices have worsened the economic crisis in the country and forced the government to reduce its 2022 national budget by \$122 million compared to the 2021 budget.²⁷ The worsening economic and fiscal situation negatively impacts the government's ability to ensure the delivery of basic services to the

¹⁷ UN Doc. S/2022/762, para. 44.

¹⁸ UN News, "Guterres Says Central African Republic Must 'Spare No Effort' to Help Bring Killers of UN Peacekeepers to Justice," October 5, 2022.

¹⁹ From June 2nd to October 1st, MINUSCA documented forty-seven incidents of conflict-related sexual violence. See: UN Doc. S/2022/762, para. 69.

²⁰ UN Doc. S/2022/762, paras. 64–65.

²¹ The government adopted a law against trafficking in persons and the abolition of the death penalty and appointed two minister counsellors to lead work on human rights, good governance, and efforts against sexual violence in conflict. See: OHCHR, "Central African Republic: Top UN Human Rights Official Welcomes Improvements, Urges Continued Efforts," press release, October 12, 2022.

²² Ibid.

²³ The Special Criminal Court started its deliberations in August after having completed the hearings of its first trial. OHCHR, "Central African Republic: Top UN Human Rights Official."

²⁴ UN Doc. S/2022/762, paras. 3, 105.

²⁵ UN Security Council, Central African Republic: Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc S/2022/491, June 16, 2022, para. 45.

²⁶ UN Doc. S/2022/762, paras. 52–54.

²⁷ UN Doc. S/2022/762, para. 11.

population in line with the National Recovery and Peacebuilding Plan, as urged by the special representative of the secretary-general (SRSG) in a briefing to the Security Council.²⁸ The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund warned that the government's adoption of a volatile cryptocurrency as legal tender would further undermine domestic policy objectives and raise financial, transparency, and legal issues.²⁹

In 2022, 63 percent of the population, or 3.1 million Central Africans, required humanitarian assistance. From April to August 2022, 2.2 million people, nearly 50 percent of the population, experienced high levels of acute food insecurity, including 638,000 who were in an emergency situation.³⁰ The living conditions of internally displaced people (IDPs) particularly deteriorated over the last year. As of October 1, 2022, there remained a funding gap of \$132 million in the 2022 humanitarian response plan for CAR, which aimed at providing life-saving assistance for 2 million people.³¹

Armed groups' activities are increasingly directed toward control of the country's illicit economic networks, putting civilians at further risk of exploitation and insecurity. The most recent report of the secretary-general identified multiple instances where armed groups intentionally targeted locations around mining sites and natural resource deposits, committing abuses against civilians and imposing illegal taxation.³² Participants agreed that more efforts must be made to undercut armed groups' control of the extractive sector and trafficking routes, which sustain their operations, notably along the Sudanese border. In the context of deteriorating socioeconomic conditions, joining armed groups has also become a more appealing economic prospect for CAR's youth.³³

Prioritizing and Sequencing MINUSCA's Mandate

Participants agreed that the strategic vision and priorities reflected in MINUSCA's current mandate are still relevant and encompass the critical issues that should guide the UN's engagement in CAR. Although UN peacekeeping operations are not meant to be long-term presences, the mandate's emphasis on UN support to a long-term and durable peace remains an effective anchor for its strategic vision.³⁴

Participants acknowledged that the country's political and security contexts have changed considerably between each of the previous Security Council mandate cycles and that the current mandated priorities afford MINUSCA consistent guidance and enough flexibility to respond to emerging crises. They noted that MINUSCA continues to conduct critical protection work, especially through its human rights component. A few participants acknowledged that there may be opportunities to "fine tune" MINUSCA's mandate to highlight its essential elements while also making it easier for the mission to engage with the Central African population on all aspects of its work.

Most of the discussions focused on how MINUSCA could adjust its current efforts to either improve its effectiveness or reprioritize aspects of its mandate implementation. Participants recommended that the Security Council support MINUSCA's good offices role and that the mission help localize the renewed political process with communities across the country. They also encouraged Security Council members and troop- and financial-contributing countries to continue supporting the mission's efforts to improve its rapid response and flexible

28 MINUSCA, "La MINUSCA étend sa posture robuste et proactive à Sam-Ouandja pour protéger la population, indique la représentante spéciale," August 17, 2022.

29 Loni Prinsloo, "Bitcoin Adoption by Central African Republic a Concern, IMF Says," May 4, 2022.

30 UN Doc. S/2022/762, paras. 40–41.

31 UN Doc. S/2022/762, paras. 45.

32 UN Doc. S/2022/762, paras. 23, 26, 28, 31.

33 International Crisis Group, "Avoiding the Worst in Central African Republic," September 28, 2017.

34 UN Doc. S/RES/2605, para. 31.

deployment capabilities. They stressed the imperative of unified political support from the Security Council and the CAR's international partners at this critical juncture in the political process. They also encouraged the Security Council to reinforce the mission's work on human rights monitoring and its support to the country's justice institutions.

Unified Support to an Inclusive Political Process

Supporting the Central African authorities in sustaining momentum around the political process is critical. Participants acknowledged that the upcoming mandate needs to reflect recent political developments and the government's consolidation of different political tracks following the strategic review meeting on June 4, 2022. Adapting the mandate's already strong language on the APPR, the joint roadmap, and the cease-fire to reflect this unified political pathway would help guide the mission's work. The mandate should establish clear expectations with regards to the identified implementation priorities while recognizing progress made and reaffirming its support to the government.

Some speakers encouraged MINUSCA to act as a bridge builder between the "track 1" political efforts and the rest of the Central African population. During earlier phases of its support to CAR, MINUSCA played a critical role in facilitating local mediation efforts and linking these efforts to the formal peace process.³⁵ Participants emphasized that public engagement on the political process was limited at best and may have been overtaken by the government's efforts to amend the country's constitution. The presence of MINUSCA's civil affairs officers throughout much of the country could help not only raise awareness of these recent political developments but also channel the perspectives, priorities, and concerns of Central Africans into these conversations. The remobilization of grassroots organizations from the provinces, including women's and youth organizations, should focus on aligning the implementation of the joint roadmap with other community-based activities

like community violence reduction projects.

Consolidating MINUSCA's support to the Central African authorities in organizing the upcoming local elections was also considered to be important. A few participants noted that the government had not yet announced a new election date after it postponed the local elections that were scheduled to take place in September 2022 due to insufficient funding. Another participant suggested that it was important for the government to sustain its political momentum in support of the local elections even if they do not get rescheduled immediately, especially considering that the country's last local elections took place in 1988. While some speakers suggested that MINUSCA's current mandate provides the mission with enough guidance and flexibility to support the elections, others noted that additional international political and financial support would be critical in the coming months.

The sustainability of the ongoing political process depends in part on unified political support from CAR's international partners. Participants welcomed MINUSCA's efforts to align critical regional partners such as the African Union (AU), Economic Community of Central African States, the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, Rwanda, and Angola around a coherent strategy to support this endeavor (including to help shape the Central African government's strategy for dialogue with CPC-affiliated armed groups).³⁶ The UN Peacebuilding Commission has been playing an important role in mobilizing support for local elections. The Security Council was also seen to be a critical vehicle for this international political support, and its consistent attention and unified support for MINUSCA was seen as foundational to the mission's overall strategy. One participant acknowledged that persistent divisions among the Security Council's permanent members had strained previous discussions on CAR. Despite these tensions, they noted that this new phase of the country's political process offered a tangible avenue for council members to find common ground on support to CAR.

³⁵ UN Doc. S/2022/491, para. 17.

³⁶ UN Doc. S/2022/762, para. 14.

Protecting Civilians and Reinforcing MINUSCA's Force

Participants affirmed that MINUSCA's efforts to protect civilians are among its essential contributions. There was consensus that the protection of civilians should remain the highest priority on the list of MINUSCA's mandated tasks based on the overarching strategic direction provided by the Security Council, the expectations of Central Africans, and the ways in which MINUSCA allocates its resources and operationalizes its mandate.

The linkages between the mission's political and protection efforts were a prominent focus of the discussions. Because of the changing interests and capabilities of the non-signatory armed groups and militias, MINUSCA's efforts to eliminate all threats to civilians depends not only on its protection approaches but also on the extent to which it can bring these groups into the political process. One speaker emphasized that MINUSCA's political and security roles are intertwined and that the use of force can be a valuable tool if it is underpinned by clear political objectives and in line with the mission's mandate. Toward this end, MINUSCA should help the Central African government engage with rebels through disarmament, demilitarization, and reintegration programs that provide a path for those who were disenfranchised by the 2019 peace process.³⁷

Participants also acknowledged not only that the mission has progressed in implementing a "comprehensive and integrated approach" to protecting civilians but also that the arrival of the new SRSG has moved the mission toward a more robust and proactive posture. In practice, this means that MINUSCA has prioritized more frequent reviews of identified and potential conflict hot spots and engaged in more mobile operations, active patrolling, and temporary operations in hard-to-reach parts of the country. This approach falls in line with some of the requests from the Security Council in MINUSCA's 2021 mandate.³⁸

Although there were no specific recommendations to changes to the mission's mandated tasks on the protection of civilians, some participants acknowledged that the Security Council could more explicitly affirm the benefits of this new force posture. One participant emphasized that the sustainability of this approach depended on troop- and financial-contributing countries providing MINUSCA with sufficient capabilities to sustain this resource-intensive approach in the long run.

Additional suggestions focused on supplementing the missions' comprehensive approaches to the protection of civilians. For example, some participants raised the emerging danger of improvised explosive devices for both the Central African population and UN peacekeepers; they encouraged the mission and UN member states to reinforce MINUSCA with the necessary technology and capabilities to reduce this threat.

Safeguarding Human Rights and Accountability

Several speakers reiterated that the renewed mandate should maintain existing language on the promotion and protection of human rights. At the same time, they also encouraged council members to reinforce the mission's role in promoting accountability for human rights violations, including through its mandated tasks on human rights monitoring.

In addition to maintaining existing operational language on human rights reporting, the Security Council could also use the mandate to provide MINUSCA with stronger political support so that it is better positioned to hold difficult conversations with the Central African government when its armed forces or those of its partners are accused of committing violations of international human rights law. Participants agreed that in the context of the Wagner Group's presence in the country, MINUSCA's mandate should emphasize compliance with the UN Human Rights Due Diligence Policy to avert the risk of complicity in these violations.

³⁷ UN Doc. S/2022/762, para. 97.

³⁸ UN Doc. S/RES/2605.

The relationship between MINUSCA and the host government has improved over the past several months. Beyond continued monitoring and reporting on human rights conditions, multiple participants emphasized the need for MINUSCA to sustain its constructive relationship with Central African authorities on accountability-related issues. MINUSCA's current SRSG has prioritized enhancing the relationship between the mission and the government, in part to create space to address these challenging issues. The coordination structures established in April 2022 by CAR's Ministry of Foreign Affairs to bring together security partners such as MINUSCA, the AU, the EU, and the heads of the armed forces have provided new opportunities to address the implementation of the status-of-forces agreement (SOFA).³⁹

Multiple participants affirmed that the number of reported SOFA violations declined over the past few months.⁴⁰ Nonetheless, some participants highlighted potential areas of concern. In particular, MINUSCA continues to be limited by the government's operational restrictions on mission flights at night, which inhibit MINUSCA's ability to project its presence across the country and presents a security risk for its peacekeepers.

MINUSCA's mandate should continue to prioritize accountability for violations of international human rights and humanitarian law while clearly reaffirming the government's responsibility to deliver justice. Impunity for serious human rights violations and other crimes is at the heart of the violence in CAR, highlighting the need to build social cohesion around a common memory, identify victims, and provide them with reparations. The mission should continue assisting justice institutions in CAR and, in particular, call for more consistent funding for the Special Criminal Court and the Truth, Justice, Reparation and Reconciliation Commission.⁴¹ Recognizing that legal processes take time, participants urged patience, transparency, and expectation management. They also suggested that MINUSCA create

opportunities to share, and communicate on, the outcome of internal investigations into attacks on civilians with the populations directly concerned.

Strategic Communications

Several speakers urged MINUSCA to continue prioritizing strategic communications in all aspects of its mandate implementation. The current mandate makes only two references to strategic communications (both related to the implementation of the mission's protection of civilians mandate).⁴² Nonetheless, participants pointed to multiple issues related to misunderstandings among the civilian population about MINUSCA's mandate, including unresolved expectation gaps about what the mission can or cannot achieve and the pervasive impacts of disinformation and hate speech. Multiple participants emphasized that MINUSCA should deepen its work with community-based organizations, including journalists and media companies, to continuously explain all aspects of its mandate and engage in a meaningful dialogue about what the mission has the mandate and capabilities to achieve.

Conclusion

Recent political developments suggest that CAR may be slowly emerging from the most damaging and volatile consequences of the 2020–2021 armed rebellion. Nonetheless, the deep-seated structural drivers of violence that fuel repeated cycles of armed conflict persist and continue to make CAR among the most challenging operational contexts for UN peacekeeping. While MINUSCA is only one stakeholder in the broader constellation of national and international partners supporting the country, its political engagement throughout the country, the widespread physical protection it provides, and its support to critical administrative and governance efforts remain invaluable.

Workshop participants agreed that MINUSCA's strategic vision and mandated priorities continue to

³⁹ Security Council Report, "What's in Blue: Central African Republic Briefing and Consultations," June 2022; UN Doc. S/2022/491, para. 79.

⁴⁰ UN Doc. S/2022/762, para. 80.

⁴¹ OHCHR, "Human Rights Council: High Commissioner Expresses Concern over Increasing Incidents Involving Serious Human Rights Violations and Abuses in the Central African Republic," press release, March 30, 2022.

⁴² UN Doc. S/RES/2605.

steer UN engagement in the right direction. They suggested several slight revisions to the mandate language and MINUSCA's strategies to strengthen the mission's contributions in the coming months:

- Support the government's comprehensive implementation of the Luanda Roadmap and the 2019 APPR;
- Expand civic engagement in the formal political process and make the process more inclusive;
- Coordinate political support from the CAR's regional and international partners;
- Strengthen its capabilities to conduct proactive, robust, and mobile protection efforts across the country;
- Safeguard its human rights monitoring and investigation responsibilities;
- Maintain a constructive dialogue with Central African authorities to ensure the mission's freedom of movement and the effectiveness of its operations; and
- Lay the groundwork for accelerated and timely delivery of humanitarian aid and long-term, locally driven development programming.

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