

IPI

INTERNATIONAL
PEACE
INSTITUTE

Federal Ministry for

European and International Affairs



FEDERAL MINISTRY OF DEFENCE AND SPORTS

The International Peace Institute's forty-third annual Vienna Seminar took place on May 14-15, 2013, amid ongoing discussions surrounding northern Mali and the Sahel region, the regional threat of the conflict in Syria, the passing of a General Assembly resolution on regulating the international trade in conventional arms, and the drug war in Mexico. More than 100 participants took part, including representatives from the diplomatic corps and the military as well as journalists, students, and experts from think tanks.

Organized in partnership with the Austrian Federal Ministry of Defence and Sports and the Austrian Federal Ministry for European and International Affairs, the seminar focused on the links among criminal, insurgent, and terrorist groups and ways the international, regional, and local communities can cope more effectively with these nonstate actors.

This meeting note was drafted by Mara Pfneisl and Walter Kemp with input from Maximilian Meduna. It reflects the rapporteurs' interpretation of the seminar discussion and not necessarily the views of all other participants.

IPI owes a debt of gratitude to its many donors for their generous support. In particular, IPI would like to thank the government of Austria for forty-three years of support for the Vienna Seminar.

Vienna Seminar 2013

A Dangerous Nexus: Crime, Conflict, and Terrorism in Failing States

NOVEMBER 2013

A Convergence of Crime and Conflict

In his introductory remarks, IPI President Terje Rød-Larsen noted that when the United Nations was established after the Second World War, organized crime had almost nothing to do with international peace and security. It was a problem in a few big cities and isolated regions, but it was not a topic of international relations. In the 1980s, the situation began to change. The collapse of Communism opened new markets, and criminals began to take advantage of instability in conflict zones and fragile states. Globalization created new opportunities for illicit activities to flourish thanks to new technologies, new markets, and greater openness. Increases in trade, financial transactions, and communications made it easier for criminals to do business around the world and to launder money. Criminal groups also exploited unstable regions. As a result, by the beginning of the twenty-first century, organized crime had gone global, reaching macroeconomic proportions and posing a threat to international peace and security.

A multilateral response was necessary to confront this transnational threat. As a result, in December 2000, UN member states signed the *Convention against Transnational Organized Crime*, also known as the Palermo Convention. However, after the attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, the world's attention switched from organized crime to terrorism.

In the past few years, organized crime has returned to the top of the international agenda because of its impact on stability in a number of theaters, including Afghanistan, Central America, and West Africa. Some older forms of crime, such as piracy, smuggling of migrants, and human trafficking have reemerged, while new ones like cybercrime and sophisticated types of economic crime have become big business. All states are affected, either as countries of origin, transit, or demand for illicit goods and services. As Mr. Rød-Larsen pointed out, "failing states are particularly vulnerable since weak governance and underdevelopment attract crime, and crime undermines governance and development. Where governance and the rule of law are weak, the profits of crime can even buy power." In addition to fragile states, there are now "fragile cities" where crime is both a cause and consequence of the inability of municipal authorities to provide public services and public security.

The particular focus of the 43rd Vienna Seminar was on the links among organized crime, insurgency, and terrorism, which have been evident in Afghanistan, Colombia, and most recently in Mali and the broader Sahel region. The seminar addressed the following questions among others: "How

serious is the problem”? Are we really seeing the emergence of “mafia states”? What is the impact, particularly in terms of peace, development, and security? And what can be done?

The Origins, Scope, and Impact of Organized Crime

The first session looked at the nature of the threat posed by organized crime as well as its impact. It was noted that crime takes many different forms and has a variety of consequences—mostly harmful, but in some case beneficial. Therefore it is essential to understand the specific conditions in each case in order to tailor the response accordingly.

Despite the growing awareness that organized crime is an increasing threat to international peace and security, the response thus far has been inadequate. Participants highlighted the perceived “crisis of competence” among leaders to deal with the problem and raised concerns that it might take a catastrophic event on the scale of 9/11 to wake up decision makers to the severity of the threat. One participant noted that the nature of organized crime is more slow-burning and less dramatic than terrorism. There will be no “big bang” event, but rather a quiet infiltration into states and institutions will take place.

The consequences of “softened” or “weakened sovereignty” were discussed. In some cases, entire regions are out of the control of the central government. In other cases, criminal groups control certain neighborhoods or sectors of the economy. In such cases, illicit actors—rather than the state—offer the public with protection and governance where actual government structures are weak or absent. Providing benefits to the population marginalized by the state may even give these actors a degree of social legitimacy. It was further pointed out that the rise in alternative governance structures is not necessarily the result of weak states, and it may be due to governance gaps within a state. These gaps seem to be increasing as a by-product of globalization.

One participant gave three reasons why

organized crime is flourishing and why states are becoming weaker. First, globalization and the increase in connectivity have exposed the inability of states to control global flows of all kinds. Second, the inability of states to provide for the growing needs of their polity leads citizens and even some political elites to turn to illicit activities to satisfy their needs. Lastly, the bonds of traditional or alternative identities (ethnic, clan-based, religious, or gang-related) that provide support mechanisms have proved to be stronger than loyalty to a state unable or unwilling to honor its share of the social contract.

Another participant described five strategies that criminal groups use to wield power. These include the *warlord strategy* where criminal groups seek to control territory for rent-seeking. The second is the *mafia strategy* where, instead of choosing to carve out a territory to rule relatively autonomously, criminal organizations may choose to embed themselves as dispersed networks intermediating between the state and population. The third approach is the *terrorism strategy* where criminals confront the state rather than seeking accommodation with it. The fourth type of strategy that was mentioned was the *Blue Ocean strategy* where criminals seek to exploit new markets—either geographic or sectoral. Examples cited included the decision by al-Qaida to move into the Sahel and the infiltration of West Africa by Latin American cartels for cocaine trafficking. The fifth strategy that was mentioned was a *joint-venture strategy* where state and criminal elites team up to share power and wealth. Under such an arrangement, political actors use criminal organizations as an instrument of statecraft, and criminal actors use political assets within their criminal business models and operations.¹ The worst-case scenario of a joint-venture is what has been described as a “mafia state.”² The example of Imam Bheel, a Pakistani drug lord who literally got away with murder after killing a senior government official in his driveway, was cited as an example of how the bullet and the bribe can enable criminals to operate with impunity.³

It was stressed that one must understand the

1 James Cockayne, “Chasing Shadows: Strategic Responses to Organized Crime in Conflict-Affected Situations,” *RUSI Journal* 158, No. 2 (April 2013).

2 Moisés Naím, “Mafia States: Organized Crime Takes Office,” *Foreign Affairs* 91, No. 3 (May/June 2012): 100–111.

3 Matthew Green, “Special Report: Murder Spotlights Pakistan’s ‘Hero Kingpin,’” *Reuters*, September 5, 2012.

political economy of the situation in order to properly assess the scope and impact of organized crime since criminals are predominantly motivated by economic factors. For that reason, economic solutions—and not only law enforcement—are necessary.

Vulnerability and Resilience

Factors that increase vulnerability to organized crime as well as ways of increasing resilience to it were discussed. Underdevelopment, corruption, the lack of liquidity, demographic trends, the growth of cities, readily available weapons, and the demand for drugs were cited as factors that need to be addressed. However, since it is impossible to eliminate crime entirely, the point was made that it is important to strengthen resilience against such factors. Resilience was described as the ability of a system to cope, adapt, and respond to challenges—to bend but not to break. Resilience is not about resistance to change rather about how to adapt to it.

It was noted that underdevelopment increases vulnerability to crime, therefore crime prevention and development strategies must go hand in hand.

The corrosive impact of corruption, both as a crime in itself and a lubricant for other types of crime were highlighted. One participant said that “corruption is the norm,” suggesting that very few countries are not affected by it. He noted how corruption can be used to challenge, break, and erode the rules of the state. In using corruption, organized criminals try to neutralize the role-making power of the state in order to gain protection and control. The result is what was described as “the criminalization of governance.”

The lack of liquidity due to the financial crisis was raised as a factor that has increased vulnerability to corruption and money laundering. One speaker suggested that dirty money helped to prop up some banks during the financial crisis: “It’s not the mafia looking for banks; it’s the banks looking for the mafia.”

Demographic trends were cited as another factor contributing to an increase in vulnerability to crime. As the number of unemployed youth swells, more young people become susceptible to the temptation of job opportunities in the illicit economy. It was noted that illicit activity is also appealing to people with legitimate jobs, either as

accomplices to criminal activity (through money laundering, banking, and real estate), or, as one speaker said, “working for the government during the day and the mafia during the night,” including for example police and intelligence agents.

The unchecked growth of cities, particularly in coastal regions, was characterized as a potential time bomb. Inequality within cities, the growth of slums, and the inability of municipal governments to cope with rapid growth increases the risk of “failing cities,” or at least neighborhoods out of control.

The point was made that, particularly in societies where weapons are readily available, violence is often used as a commodity. Either one has to pay for it (for example to be used against one’s opponents), or the threat of it can extract payments (in other words extortion).

From a more global perspective, the point was made that drug control has had the unintended consequence of empowering criminal groups. It is therefore vital to reduce demand for drugs. Recognizing the stagnating efficiency of current international drug control efforts, some suggested that the decriminalization of drug use could reduce the incentives for trafficking.

In terms of increasing resilience, it was stressed that strengthening social antibodies at a local level is crucial. The suggestion was made to engage and support local communities (“accentuate the positive”) rather than just going after the “bad apples.” Local, bottom-up strategies (especially when there is high-level corruption) can empower communities and make them less conducive environments for criminal, insurgent, or terrorist groups. By focusing on assisting the local communities, nongovernmental organizations and international organizations can help promote local activism and educate the local community on their rights and privileges. They can also develop criminal justice and development frameworks that can have benefits well beyond fighting crime.

It was stressed that in peacebuilding processes it is important to understand the incentives that motivate various actors. For example, for some actors, illicit activity may be a means of survival, and therefore efforts to curtail it will be fiercely resisted. For others, like armed groups, the postconflict period can be exploited to grab wealth

and power and to enter business and politics. The question was asked: is it better to take on such groups at an early stage at the risk of violent resistance, or to disregard their presence for the sake of short-term expediency at the risk that these groups will consolidate their position in the long term?

It was suggested that there should be different incentives or sanctions for the criminal elites on one hand and the foot soldiers of crime on the other. Disrupting financial flows would increase risks to illicit activity for the “big fish,” while providing incentives (such as legitimate employment) would create viable alternatives to crime for the small-time operators. The timing and sequencing of responses was discussed. Some participants noted that in some cases the people that are part of the problem need to be won over in order to become part of the solution, for example through recognition, material incentives, or bringing networks into licit supply chains. Others cautioned about the danger of rewarding bad behavior.

The limitations of strictly national approaches were stressed. It was emphasized that a multilateral response is vital. Furthermore, because the threat posed by organized crime in a globalized economy affects all countries and all strata of society, it is crucial to have a holistic response based upon responsible individuals and the public at large. One speaker went so far as to say “we are not external to the system, we are part of the system” and therefore have to assume some responsibility for changing the incentives to crime.

Some of the suggestions for strengthening resilience to organized crime were: improving governance and accountable institutions; strengthening capacity; ensuring effective anti-corruption and financial intelligence institutions; and creating employment. It was also stressed that it is essential to build public confidence in the idea that transition is possible. It was noted that national institutions are sometimes not resilient enough to buffer external threats. In such cases external assistance may be necessary.

Operational Responses to Organized Crime

One session focused on operational responses to organized crime. The question was asked, “How can police, counterterrorism efforts, and peace

operations become more effective at dealing with the threat of violent nonstate and transnational actors?” The observation was made that “while organized crime and terrorism have gone global, law enforcement responses are still predominantly national.” And yet, transnational threats require multilateral solutions.

In the past twenty years, the capacities of transnational organized crime networks have increased immensely, presenting significant challenges for national law enforcement agencies. One of the main limitations of such national entities is their reluctance to share information on organized crime for fear that the information will be leaked. Meanwhile, criminals share a great deal of information with one another; are often better armed and better equipped than the police; and are able to move money quickly, use technology effectively, and move freely across borders.

There was a lively discussion on how law enforcement agencies can work more effectively across borders, for example in dealing with cybercrime. Lessons learned from Europol and INTERPOL were shared. The question was asked whether it was time to consider creating a law enforcement agency with global reach—a type of “globo-cop.” It was also suggested that criminals involved in transnational organized crime could be brought to justice in an international court. At the same time, it was stressed that local policing is essential to address local problems and has the advantage of being based on an understanding of local conditions.

It was also noted that although organized crime is increasingly having an impact in theaters where the UN has peace operations, the UN has been slow to adapt to this challenge. For example, few peace operations have either the mandates or the means to address organized crime. It was suggested that peace operations should be designed and equipped to better factor the political economy of illicit activity into their work in order to better understand the motivations of actors and to deal with possible spoilers. That said, it was observed that it is difficult to recruit personnel from contributing countries with sufficient experience and skills in dealing with organized crime.

Suggestions were made on how to increase multilateral cooperation to counter organized crime. These included: making more effective use

of organized crime threat assessments; improving the gathering, sharing, and analysis of intelligence; strengthening the crime-fighting skills of police experts involved in peace operations; looking at the situations in relation to holistic peacebuilding strategies; and supporting community violence reduction projects to help build local resilience. The importance of engaging all relevant stakeholders—for example including the private sector and civil society—in order to fight crime was also stressed.

At the same time, it was noted that while law enforcement is necessary, it alone is insufficient. Social and economic issues must also be factored in. As one participant mentioned, the framing of challenges as “organized crime” and branding all actors involved in organized crime as “criminals” may limit the options for effectively addressing these issues as they tend to set up a public expectation for a legal response as opposed to other responses, whether political or regulatory, that could be more effective in the short or even long term.

Trouble in the Sahel

One session focused on a specific case study, namely the current dangerous nexus among crime, conflict, and terrorism in the Sahel, particularly in Mali. Northern Mali was described as a good example of a region where the control of the central government is weak. Nevertheless, it is not an “ungoverned space” since there are “alternative governance structures” provided by a variety of groups that control territory.

The Sahel region has historically been vulnerable to trafficking of all kinds due to weak governance, underdevelopment, and uncontrolled borders, but in the past this was seldom considered a major threat to security. In recent years this has changed due to a combination of factors including the civil war in Algeria, cocaine trafficking through West Africa, and instability in Libya. Religious and ethnic groups have taken advantage of—and exacerbated—the instability in northern Mali. Alliances have been struck between insurgent groups like the Toureg National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad and al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb. The collusion of state actors was also noted.

Operation Serval, the French intervention in

Mali, was discussed. It was argued that France felt obliged to intervene on January 10, 2013, when a jihadist movement approached the southern part of Mali with the intention to move toward the capital city of Bamako and threatened to topple the incumbent government and install a jihadist regime. This posed a threat to France’s strategic interests in the region and to the approximately 6,000 French citizens living in Bamako. It was explained that Operation Serval had four strategic objectives: (1) to prevent the establishment of a jihadist state; (2) to restore the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Mali; (3) to prepare for the installation of an international peacekeeping force; and (4) to find and liberate French hostages. The French government also hoped that its action would spur the international community into becoming more active in northern Mali and to promote long-term stability. It was pointed out that while the French intervention has stabilized the situation, it has not solved the problem.

This provoked a broader discussion about past interventions, for example in Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya. It was noted that while external interventions can effectively address the immediate effects of a crisis, they are seldom able to provide long-term solutions. The need for local empowerment and local solutions was stressed, with the support of regional and international parties if necessary.

The role of the international community in Mali was discussed. It was noted that the Sahel had been outside the focus of the international community for many years. One of the reasons was that until recently Mali was considered a success story of an exemplary new African democracy. Now international and regional actors—like the UN, the African Union, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the European Union—are scrambling to restore stability and promote good governance. Stabilization will also require buy-in from all major players, institution building, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration as well as security sector reform. It was noted that the number of actors involved, as well as overlapping mandates, is causing some friction. It was also stressed that success will require a long-term commitment that may be hard to maintain at a time of limited resources and numerous crises. The need for a regional approach was also

emphasized.

It was observed that while international actors are aware of the threat posed by the nexus between crime, insurgency, and terrorism, they are uncertain about how to address it, or hesitant to act. Mali is just the latest example.

Conclusion: Global Responses to Transnational Threats?

The final session looked at the threat posed by nonstate actors and transnational criminal groups to state sovereignty and its implications for the future. The debate started with the proposition that we need to look at an alternative paradigm in order to understand this new threat: the periphery is coming to the core rather than vice versa. This notion of the “revenge of the periphery” implies that the state is in long-term decline and sovereignty is under threat, both from within and from external actors. Furthermore, it was stated that it is not just some states that are fragile, the international system as a whole is under stress due to globalization and the inability of states to control cross-border flows of all kinds (digital, human, financial, illicit).

States can no longer protect their sovereignty and cannot meet the needs of their citizens. This is opening up the field to other actors, including malign ones like insurgents, terrorists, and criminals. It also means that the state is now only one unit of analysis in a dramatically shifting kaleidoscope of international relations. A more effective global response to organized crime will therefore require a better understanding of these new dynamics and the links between crime, conflict and terrorism.

In assessing the nexus among crime, conflict, and terrorism, one participant suggested that there are four trends that need to be more closely examined. These trends include (1) a changing set of relationships, (2) appropriation of methods, (3) emergence of hybrid crime/terrorist organizations, and (4) the transformation of a group’s activities from terrorism to criminal or from criminal to terrorism.

A number of points were made in the debate. For example, there are more shared interests between insurgents and criminals than between criminals

and terrorists. However, one should avoid a simplistic assumption that there are always connections among crime, insurgency, and terrorism. One speaker even said that while the idea of a nexus among these malign forces is “politically appealing,” it is “analytically appalling.” It was suggested instead to look at the complex set of relationships among these actors that are sometimes cooperative, sometimes conflictual, and in some cases have nothing to do with each other. Examples were given, such as the conflict between the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and Turkish drug lords, or the collusion between criminal gangs and jihadi groups on kidnapping and ransom in the Sahel.

Another observation was that there seems to be a progressive shift in the appropriation of methods being used by some groups (for example the FARC and the Taliban), as they move from providing protection to criminals, to taxing criminals, to being themselves fully involved criminals in the drug trafficking scene.

It was also observed that there appears to be an emergence of hybrid groups that have both criminal and terrorist aspirations. These hybrid groups seem to be playing an increasingly important role in connecting the worlds of organized crime and terrorism, making it more difficult to deal with these growing threats.

Finally, the transformation within a group from criminal to terrorist or terrorist to criminal may result in what one participant referred to as the “criminalization syndrome.” This syndrome tends to provide great benefits to the group in the short term, but causes dramatic problems in the long term, including a sense of division and tension within the group, an erosion of common identity, and the undermining of the group’s legitimacy and status.

How can we deal with these growing threats? Do we need more multilateralism? According to one participant the strategy for dealing with these threats requires a three-stage process that starts with recognizing and understanding the threat, then adjusting our methods to deal with the threat, and finally preventing the threat from causing harm by implementing long-term solutions. It was noted that in order to implement this strategy, multilateral responses are essential. It was stressed

that involving all relevant actors including governments, multilateral organizations, financial institutions, the private sector, experts, academic institutions, and civil society can lead to joint strategies that look at the various components of the problem, consider the issue in a broader perspective (not strictly local or national), and work towards holistic solutions (not strictly law enforcement). A comprehensive approach is needed because, as one participant observed, “the strength of the policy is determined by its weakest link.”

The knock-on effect of instability was mentioned, namely how instability attracts criminal activity. One speaker warned of the “Lebanonization” of Syria and how it is becoming a new center of gravity for illicit activity and regional instability. It was mentioned that failure to deal with the crisis in Syria through overt political dialogue has pushed action into the shadows, involving illicit actors, insurgents, and terrorists on the one hand, and covert actors (e.g., special forces, militias, and intelligence operatives) on the other.

Current approaches taken by regional organizations to deal with transnational threats were

discussed. The specific challenges faced in the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) area and its neighborhood along with the organization’s operational responses were outlined. It was stressed that the OSCE is trying to ensure that transnational threats are being countered in a way that does not compromise fundamental values. Furthermore, it was noted that the complexity and variety of challenges and the number of multilateral actors dealing with transnational threats necessitates closer cooperation.

Overall, it was concluded that the traditional Westphalian state system is under attack, and that a complex, interlinked, and potentially dangerous cocktail of trends and actors are creating new threats and challenges to states and the international system that could have unpredictable results. It was therefore stressed that to avoid a world of “slumland” and “gangland,” governments and multilateral organizations should “wake up” to the dangers posed by transnational threats, look at security in a new way, and adapt their approaches in order to reduce risk and support resilience.

Agenda

A Dangerous Nexus: Crime, Conflict, and Terrorism in Failing States

Vienna, Austria

Tuesday, May 14, 2013

09:00–09:30 **Registration at the Ministry for European and International Affairs**

09:30–10:00 **Welcoming Remarks**

Mr. Terje Rød-Larsen, *President, International Peace Institute*

10:00–11:30 **Session 1: Transnational Organized Crime: How Serious is the Threat and What Is Its Impact?**

Organized crime is increasingly on the agenda of multilateral bodies like the G8 and the UN Security Council. The growing threat that it poses is leading to changes in security policy, military planning, as well as cooperation among law enforcement agencies. The focus is also widening to consider the impact of organized crime on development and the rule of law. How serious is the threat posed by organized crime? Is there a nexus among crime and terrorism as well as insurgency? What is the impact of organized crime, particularly, on stability?

Chair

H.E. Prince Zeid Ra'ad Zeid Al-Hussein, *Permanent Representative of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to the United Nations, NY*

Speakers

Mr. Fraser Cameron, *Director, EU-Russia Centre, Brussels*

Mr. James Cockayne, *King's College, London*

Mr. Antonio Maria Costa, *former Executive Director, UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)*

11:30–11:45 **Coffee Break**

11:45–13:15 **Session 2: “Mafia States” and “Ungoverned Spaces”: State Fragility with Global Consequences**

Organized crime contributes to instability in a number of regions around the world, including many of those where there are peace operations. Expressions like “mafia states,” “ungoverned spaces,” and “captured states” have been used to describe the most acute cases. How accurate are such descriptions? Why is crime attracted to these regions, and what are the consequences for national, regional, and international security? What are some lessons learned from concrete examples?

Chair

H.E. Mr. Christian Wenaweser, *Permanent Representative of the Principality of Liechtenstein to the United Nations, New York*

Speakers

Ms. Anne Clunan, *Center for Contemporary Conflict, US Naval Postgraduate School; editor of "Ungoverned Spaces"*

Mr. Matthew Green, *Special Correspondent Afghanistan-Pakistan for Reuters*

Mr. David Kilcullen, *Founder, President, and CEO of Caerus Associates; author of "The Accidental Guerilla"*

13:15–14:30 **Lunch**

14:30–16:00 **Session 3: Strengthening Resilience Within States**

If malign threats such as organized crime and terrorism are like a cancer, how can resilience be strengthened within states to ward off the threat? What social antibodies can be created to strengthen integrity and reduce vulnerability? What are the implications for conflict prevention and peacebuilding, particularly in relation to enhancing development and the rule of law? What lessons from the fight against terrorism can be applied to the fight against organized crime?

Chair

Ms. Elisabeth Tichy-Fisslberger, *Head of Section IV, Austrian Federal Ministry for European and International Affairs*

Speakers

Mr. Mats Berdal, *Professor of Security and Development in the Department of War Studies, King's College, London*

Ms. Sarah Cliffe, *Special Adviser and Assistant Secretary-General of Civilian Capacities to the UN; main author of the World Development Report 2011*

16:00–16:15 **Coffee Break**

16:15–17:45 **Session 4: Operational Responses: How Can Police, Counterterrorism, and Peace Operations Become More Effective at Dealing with the Threat of Violent Nonstate and Transnational Actors?**

Organized crime and terrorism have gone global, yet law enforcement responses are still predominantly national. Crime knows no borders, while police usually stop at them. Transnational cooperation among criminals is much more efficient than international cooperation among police. Cybercrime is creating an unprecedented extraterritorial challenge for which the international community is still looking for solutions. Peace operations are struggling to cope with actors that they have never had to deal with in the past. What steps can be taken to combat the globalization of crime? What regional and international cooperation mechanisms have proven effective? What challenges remain, and how can they be overcome?

Chair

Mr. James P. Rubin, *Counselor to the Governor of New York State; member of IPI Board of Directors*

Speakers

Mr. Wibke Hansen, *Deputy Director and Head of Analysis, Center for International Peace Operations, Berlin*

Mr. Walter Kemp, *Director for Europe and Central Asia, IPI Vienna Office*
 Mr. Glyn Lewis, *Assistant Director for Public Safety and Terrorism, INTERPOL*
 Mr. Robert Oberloher, *Political Scientist and Criminologist, State Police of Hamburg—
 Hamburg University of Applied Police Sciences*

17:45–18:15 **Transport to Dinner Venue**

18:15–20:30 **Reception and Dinner**

Welcoming Remarks

Major General Johann Pucher, *Security Policy Director, Austrian Ministry of Defence and Sports*

Wednesday, May 15, 2013

09:00–09:30 **Registration at the Ministry for European and International Affairs**

09:30–11:00 **Session 5: Trouble in the Sahel: How to Deal with the Dangerous Nexus?**

The situation in the Sahel zone and northern Mali, in particular, highlights the real and present danger of the nexus among crime, conflict, and terrorism. Traffickers, terrorists, and criminal groups (such as al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa, and Ansar Dine) pose a serious threat to regional security and have already undermined the sovereignty of Mali. Grievances and separatist aspirations of local groups (such as the Touareg National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad), and the lack of governmental outreach throughout the state further exacerbate the situation. How do the groups operate, what are the links between them, and what can be done to deal with this threat beyond the military intervention?

Chair

Major General Johann Pucher, *Security Policy Director, Austrian Ministry of Defence and Sports*

Speakers

General Eric Bonnemaïson, *Deputy Director of the Directorate for Strategic Affairs, French Ministry of Defence*

Mr. Timothy Clarke, *Head of Division, Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) Policy, Partnerships and Agreements, European External Action Service*

Mr. Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou, *Head of the Regional Capacity Development Programme, Geneva Centre for Security Policy*

Major General (ret.) Julius Olakunle Sunday Oshanupin, *Nigerian Army*

Mr. Yahia H. Zoubir, *Professor of International Relations and International Management at Euromed Management, Marseille School of Management*

11:00–11:15 **Coffee Break**

11:15–12:45 **Session 6: Sovereignty Under Attack: What Are the Implications of the Dangerous Nexus on International Relations and Security Policy?**

How is the triadic nexus of crime, insurgency, and terrorism changing the way that wars are fought and peace is built? While weak states are particularly susceptible, all states are affected. How is the threat posed by organized crime changing the way that we look at sovereignty and the international system? How are military doctrines and strategies being changed? How can the interstate system deal with nonstate actors and transnational flows? What new challenges does cybercrime pose? What strategic assessment can be made for the future? Has any progress been made in the past few years, and what can be done to improve the effectiveness of multilateral responses to this transnational challenge? Are new structures and approaches needed?

Chair

Mr. Terje Rød-Larsen, *President, International Peace Institute*

Speakers

H.E. Mr. Xolisa Mabhongo, *Ambassador of the Republic of South Africa to Austria, Slovenia, and Slovakia*

Mr. Phil Williams, *Posvar Professor, University of Pittsburgh Graduate School of Public and International Affairs*

Mr. Lamberto Zannier, *Secretary-General, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)*

The **INTERNATIONAL PEACE INSTITUTE (IPI)** is an independent, international not-for-profit think tank with a staff representing more than twenty nationalities, with offices in New York, facing United Nations headquarters, and in Vienna. IPI is dedicated to promoting the prevention and settlement of conflicts between and within states by strengthening international peace and security institutions. To achieve its purpose, IPI employs a mix of policy research, convening, publishing, and outreach.



777 United Nations Plaza, New York, NY 10017-3521, USA

TEL +1-212-687-4300 FAX +1-212-983-8246

Freyung 3, 1010 Vienna, Austria

TEL +43-1-533-8881 FAX +43-1-533-8881-11

www.ipinst.org