The AU in Sudan: Lessons for the African Standby Force

Catherine Guicherd, Rapporteur

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International Peace Academy
The International Peace Academy (IPA) is an independent, international institution dedicated to promoting the prevention and settlement of armed conflicts between and within states through policy research and development.

IPA initiated its Africa Program in 1992 to draw attention to the particular issues surrounding Africa’s conflicts and provide research and analytical support to efforts at political and economic transformation. Some 15 years later, the program remains a vital bridge between the United Nations (UN) and African organizations and leaders. The Africa Program gratefully acknowledges the generous support of the Governments of Canada, Finland, France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom; the family of Ruth Forbes Young; and the Ford Foundation. Additional support is received from IPA’s core funders, including the Governments of Denmark and Sweden.

This report stems from the discussions held among more than fifty senior police and military officers from African countries and partner nations and organizations at a seminar in Accra, Ghana from 10-12 October 2006. The seminar aimed to help shape the way forward for the establishment of the African Standby Force (ASF), the African Union’s flagship program for the development of its peacekeeping capacity. It was organized by the International Peace Academy and hosted by the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC), one of Africa’s leading centers of excellence in training and education for peace support operations. The discussions benefited from the active involvement of several former and serving senior Ghanaian diplomats and military officers. The event was generously supported by the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade of Canada.

Cover Photo: AMIS officer and troops in North Darfur. ©Refugees International.

The views expressed in this paper represent those captured by the rapporteur during the meeting and not necessarily those of IPA. IPA welcomes consideration of a wide range of perspectives in the pursuit of a well-informed debate on critical policies and issues in international affairs.

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## CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviations</td>
<td>i</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Summary of Recommendations</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Introduction</strong></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Planning</strong></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mission Structures and Command and Control (C2)</strong></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission Field Structure</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission C2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Managing Relations with Third Parties</strong></td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Host Country and Local Actors</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian Actors</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Partners</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The United Nations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Logistics</strong></td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Communications and Information Systems</strong></td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mission Staffing and Training</strong></td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job Definitions and Ranks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior Leadership</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police Component</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specialist Domains of Expertise</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian and Expert Hiring</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AU Multidimensional Missions:</strong></td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AU Multidimensional Missions:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>What Level of Ambitions?</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Level Ambitions and AU-UN Synergies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational Level Ambitions and Standards</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobilizing the AU Commission as a Whole</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increasing AU-RECs Synergies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Need for High-level Engagement of Member States</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Annex I                                               | 25   |
Annex II                                              | 27   |
Annex III                                             | 27   |
List of Participants                                   | 28   |
## Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>APCs</td>
<td>Armored Personnel Carriers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APSA</td>
<td>African Peace and Security Architecture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASF</td>
<td>African Standby Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2</td>
<td>Command and Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C_IS</td>
<td>Command, Control, Communications and Information Systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEWS</td>
<td>Continental Early Warning System</td>
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<td>CFC</td>
<td>Ceasefire Commission</td>
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<td>CIMIC</td>
<td>Civil-military Coordination</td>
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<td>CIS</td>
<td>Communications and Information Systems</td>
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<td>CISSA</td>
<td>Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa</td>
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<td>CIVCOM</td>
<td>Civilian Committee</td>
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<td>CIVPOL</td>
<td>Civilian Police</td>
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<td>COE</td>
<td>Contingent-Owned Equipment</td>
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<td>CONOPS</td>
<td>Concept of Operations</td>
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<td>CT</td>
<td>Country Team (UN)</td>
</tr>
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<td>DDR</td>
<td>Demobilization, Disarmament, and Reintegration</td>
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<td>DITF</td>
<td>Darfur Integrated Task Force</td>
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<td>DPA (I)</td>
<td>Darfur Peace Agreement</td>
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<td>DPA (II)</td>
<td>Department of Political Affairs (UN)</td>
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<td>DPKO</td>
<td>Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
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<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<td>DSS</td>
<td>Department of Safety and Security (UN)</td>
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<td>ECCAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of Central African States</td>
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<td>ECOMOG</td>
<td>ECOMOG Monitoring Group</td>
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<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>EUMC</td>
<td>European Union Military Committee</td>
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<td>EUMS</td>
<td>European Union Military Staff</td>
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<td>GoS</td>
<td>Government of Sudan</td>
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<tr>
<td>HCFA</td>
<td>Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement</td>
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<td>HoM</td>
<td>Head of Mission</td>
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<td>HQs</td>
<td>Headquarters</td>
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<td>IASC</td>
<td>Inter-Agency Standing Committee</td>
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<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally-displaced Person</td>
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<td>IFIs</td>
<td>International Financial Institutions</td>
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<td>IPA</td>
<td>International Peace Academy</td>
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<td>JLOC</td>
<td>Joint Logistics Operations Centre</td>
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<td>JOC</td>
<td>Joint Operations Centre</td>
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<td>KAIPTC</td>
<td>Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre</td>
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<td>LG</td>
<td>Liaison Group</td>
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<td>MAPEX</td>
<td>Map Exercise</td>
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<td>MILOBs</td>
<td>Military Observers</td>
</tr>
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<td>MSC</td>
<td>Military Staff Committee (MSC)</td>
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<td>OCHA</td>
<td>Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCRD</td>
<td>Framework for Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development</td>
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<td>PSC</td>
<td>Peace and Security Council (AU)</td>
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<td>PSC</td>
<td>Peace and Security Committee (EU)</td>
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<td>PSOs</td>
<td>Peace Support Operations</td>
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<td>PSOD</td>
<td>Peace Support Operations Division (AU)</td>
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<td>PTSG</td>
<td>Partners' Technical Support Group</td>
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<td>RECs</td>
<td>Regional Economic Communities</td>
</tr>
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<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
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<td>SML</td>
<td>Senior Mission Leaders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOFA</td>
<td>Status of Forces Agreement</td>
</tr>
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<td>SOMA</td>
<td>Status of Mission Agreement</td>
</tr>
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<td>SOPs</td>
<td>Standard Operating Procedures</td>
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<td>SRCC</td>
<td>Special Representative of the Chairman of the Commission (AU)</td>
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<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
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<tr>
<td>TCC</td>
<td>Troop Contributing Country</td>
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<td>ToR</td>
<td>Terms of Reference</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>UNMIS</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Sudan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Summary of Recommendations

In 2003, African Chiefs of Defense Staff began work on setting up the African Standby Force (ASF), a key component of the African Union’s (AU) “African Peace and Security Architecture” (APSA). Much progress has been made at the conceptual level during Phase I of the work plan (2005-2006). As Phase II begins, the experience of the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS) offers useful lessons that should be built into ASF development. This experience demonstrates, first, that determined action will be required from a variety of stakeholders if the AU is to be able to respond effectively to challenges of the magnitude and complexity of the Darfur conflict. Second, the AMIS experience raises the question of the level of ambitions of the ASF: can and should the AU undertake missions of such magnitude and complexity, and if so, what would be a realistic sequencing to move toward that goal? What would be a meaningful division of labor with partners, in particular the United Nations (UN) in this context?

The recommendations summarized below derive from an October 2006 exchange of experiences among some 50 military, police, and civilian representatives from African and partner nations/organizations who have directly participated in, or supported AMIS. Recommendations (a) to (c) elaborate on the political implications of the AMIS experience and point to the need for a fundamental conceptual and political debate on the level of ambitions of the AU and its relations to the UN. Recommendations (d) to (t) are more directly based on that experience itself as reflected at the seminar, and on the assumption that the AU would want to reiterate multidimensional missions of the size of AMIS. The observations and analysis underpinning all recommendations are developed in the ensuing report.

1. To the AU and the UN jointly:

a) The AU needs to define precisely its level of ambitions in terms of multidimensional missions. This requires the coordination of current work on the ASF and the Framework for Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) within the AU and further coordination with the UN in the context of the UN “10-year Action Plan” to support the development of African Peace Support Operations (PSO) capacity;

b) In this context, it is recommended that the AU seek in a first stage to reach a capacity to carry out “minimally multidimensional missions,” without aiming for full integration of all potential components of PSOs; existing functional competencies of the UN, its agencies, and associated bodies (World Bank, IMF) should be duly taken into account. Consequently in many PSO and post-conflict areas, the AU should seek to acquire a capacity to provide strategic guidance, liaise, and interact, but not to implement;

c) Assumptions about UN assistance underpinning the ASF Policy Framework should be checked with a view to sustainability. AU member states may have to examine alternative courses of action, including an increased African contribution and a major diplomatic engagement with large UN financial contributors to make possible direct financial assistance to ASF deployments.

2. To AU Member States:

d) National capitals of AU member states must engage in ASF work at the highest political level. If it is to succeed in tackling complex crises, the ASF cannot be left only to functional experts and/or the military;

e) Member states will have to revisit the APSA structures endorsed in 2002 in order to ensure that the Peace and Security Council (PSC) can receive guidance from bodies endowed with expertise encompassing key components and interactions of future ASF missions, particularly policing;

f) The ASF Policy Framework should be updated, and ASF documents reviewed, to specify the requirements for the police and civilian components of missions at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels; and also to sequence their incorporation according to a variety of multidimensional ASF mission scenarios;

g) As PSO are becoming a permanent feature of the AU’s agenda, member states have to review the size, composition, and working methods of their representations in Addis to ensure that the AU Secretariat is supported by a solid body of expertise in all the dimensions intended for ASF missions;

h) Each AU member state should review the curriculum of its military and police training programs, in particular at the senior level, in order to reflect the multidimensionality and liaison functions of modern PSOs;

i) Over time, the AU and the RECs should seek to reduce their technical and financial dependence on partners by (i) increasing Africa’s own financial efforts for PSOs; (ii) increasing African peacekeepers’ capacity in technical areas in

The AU in Sudan: Lessons for the African Standby Force
which African expertise is insufficient for the requirements of modern PSOs (contracting, communications, medical, aviation, fuel and mobility management, etc.). There will be no “African ownership” without a degree of self-sustainment.

3. To the AU Secretariat and Regional Economic Communities (REC)s:

  j) The AU Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD) should be endowed with the capacity to plan, and lead on the conduct of ASF deployments at the strategic level; AU member states should actively support this reinforcement, taking advantage of the experience accumulated by the Darfur Integrated Task Force (DITF);

  k) Appropriate linkages should be established between the PSOD and other divisions and departments of the AU Commission so as to facilitate synergies in support of ASF deployments; this includes not only other divisions in the Peace and Security Department but also the Political Department; the Social Affairs and Economic Affairs Departments; the Programming, Budgeting, Finance and Accounting, as well as Administration and Human Resources Development Departments;

  l) Training and education, beginning with the senior leadership level, must reflect, at best, the requirements of multidimensionality of ASF missions and, at minimum, their interaction with a large range of humanitarian and other actors;

  m) The ASF Doctrine needs to be clarified as regards the chain of command for ASF operations, including when operations are conducted by the RECs, and additional work is required on the development of the operational level command, in terms of SOPs, and command and control relationships between the tactical, operational, and strategic levels;

  n) Studies planned during Phase II of ASF development on the requirements for Logistics and Command, Control, Communication, and Information Systems (C_IS) should be informed by a detailed analysis of the AMIS experience in those areas.

4. To the RECs:

  o) Regular consultations with the PSOD; RECs offices in Addis should be staffed with a range of expertise reflecting the functional scope of

the cooperation in PSOs envisaged between each REC and the AU.

5. To International Partners:

  p) International partners have a shared responsibility with the AU to ensure that the development of the ASF is guided by sustainability concerns;

  q) Partners have a responsibility to anticipate the impact of their political discourse on ASF missions;

  r) As the AU undertakes Phase II ASF development work on logistics, partners should critically examine their experience in providing logistics support to AMIS in view of improving format, timeliness, coordination, and predictability;

  s) Current partner coordination mechanisms in Addis should be retained and partners should make full use of those mechanisms in order to avoid gaps and complications in AU management of partners’ assistance;

  t) Particular attention should be given to the coordination of EU and UN assistance efforts, the EU being the single main provider of financial support, and the UN the key technical standard setter for AU operations; all efforts should be made to avoid mismatches between resource allocation and technical advice.

Introduction

1. Over the past three years, Peace Support Operations (PSOs) have become a major area of endeavor for the African Union (AU) and its member states. AU monitors started arriving in Darfur in June 2004, in a prelude to a much larger deployment of peacekeepers in October of that year and the near doubling of the force by the following summer. By early 2006, the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS) had almost 6000 military and 1500 police in the field. Stepping into the Darfur conflict was a bold step reflecting the AU’s political determination to follow through on its commitment to non-indifference to intra-state conflicts on the continent. In May 2003, African Chiefs of Defense Staff endorsed a “Policy Framework for the Establishment of the African Standby Force (ASF),” later refined and complemented by a Roadmap for the development of the ASF (March 2005). With the completion of seven of the ASF

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1 For details on the deployment of AMIS, see the chronology in Annex I.
The AU in Sudan: Lessons for the African Standby Force

Workshops and their harmonization in October 2006, Phase I of the Roadmap is coming to an end.

2. The two strands, however—the operational and the conceptual—have interacted only informally, and there is little sign that the experience of AMIS in Darfur has been used to inform ASF work. This leaves an important gap in the process for several reasons:

- ASF development has been primarily militarily-driven, whereas the experience of AMIS demonstrates that PSOs can be complex endeavors, also requiring the contribution of police and civilian experts, and recourse to political decision-makers;
- The ASF Workshops have focused largely on the tactical level of PSOs, whereas, as AMIS shows, PSOs cannot succeed without proper planning and guidance at strategic and operational levels;
- Over the duration of AMIS, fundamental lessons relating to planning, command and control structures, and logistic support have been identified by various actors, including AMIS military and police contingent leaders and partners. These lessons would be lost for ASF development if not drawn upon quickly.

3. The main weaknesses of AMIS appeared to lie in the following fields:

- A lack of planning in the initial stages of the mission and insufficient remedial action taken to develop planning capacity in the course of the mission;
- The lack of clarity in the mission structure at the field level, and the inadequacy of that structure for the purpose of managing the interaction between the military, police and civilian components of what quickly became a multidimensional mission;
- Weaknesses in strategic management capacity, encompassing both the AU Secretariat and member states’ advisory bodies;
- The absence of effective mechanisms for operational level management;
- The lack of tools and know-how to handle the relations of the mission with a variety of external actors, including local communities, the Government of Sudan (GoS), external partners

2 Five original Workshops on Doctrine, Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), Logistics, Command, Control, Communication and Information Systems (CICS), and Training and Evaluation; additional Workshops on Legal aspects, Medical, the Civilian Dimension, and a Workshop on Finance planned for January 2007.
and agencies;
- Insufficient logistic support and ability to manage logistics;
- Insufficient capacity in the key area of communication and information systems, compounded by unclear reporting lines from the field to the AU Secretariat;
- Problems in force generation and personnel management;
- A quasi-total dependence on external partners to finance the mission, and over-dependence on partners' technical advice, with attendant constraints, delays, and political ambiguities.

4. This report aims to provide a detailed presentation and analysis of the weaknesses listed above, and to make a series of recommendations intended to assist the development of the ASF.

Planning

5. In the words of one of the seminar participants, “AMIS was never planned: it just happened.” It is generally accepted that the AMIS deployment as of AMIS II (October 2004) was put together in a rush because of political imperatives and that there was little time for proper planning. Staff, whether military, police or civilian, were given minimal guidance; and strategic level goals were not clearly articulated. The Special Representative of the Chairman of the Commission (SRCC), responsible for overall coordination of the mission, was nominated several months into the operation. Logistics constraints also had a major impact on the pace and format of the deployment. This was due largely to the fact that there was no structure for strategic guidance in place when the mission was initially launched in May-June 2004: the AU PSOD had hardly been formed at the time and the DITF was only created in January 2005. The gap was bridged by a fluctuating planning team that did have some African members, but was “partner heavy.” Later, successive changes were made in the mandate without proper examination of the availability of resources or agreement with partners. The fact that the mission deployed at all, and was able to expand from a force of less than 400 to over 7000 in a short time, is a credit to the AU. But the consequence was that the setting of goals, the integration of police, civilian and military planning, the sequencing of deployment, the provision of logistic support, and the overall coherent development of the mission tended to be all undermined.

6. The lack of planning has had a number of negative consequences, many of which continue to affect the mission:

- Lack of clarity about the division of labor between different components, e.g., the police and military observers, or Civil-Military Coordination (CIMIC) and Humanitarian and Human Rights Officers; insufficient mutual information; and a lack of mechanisms to achieve coherence;
- Lack of agreement on mission structures at field level (see para. 11-15);
- Particular difficulties affecting the police component (Civilian police or CIVPOL); CIVPOL was a late addition to the mission (October 2004), had difficulty establishing its role in a pre-existing structure, and suffered from a lack of logistic support;
- Deployments being driven by logistics, rather than by mission objectives, e.g., CIVPOL was unable to co-locate with camps of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), as originally foreseen, as there was no accommodation or protection available; deployment of CIVPOL was determined by availability of support from the military component, rather than by their Concept of Operations (CONOPs);
- Insufficient guidance from the top, which left much space for the blossoming of personal and national rivalries, to the detriment of overall aims;
- The inadequacy of the mandate and the tools to fulfill it (logistics, communication and information systems, intelligence), due to the lack of a proper pre-deployment assessment—several seminar participants noted the many difficulties involved in the rapid transition from an observer to a PSO mission (lack of preparedness, lack of acceptance of some local communities);
- Gaps in the Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA), which did not cover the CIVPOL, and delays in signing the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), resulting in peacekeepers being deployed without proper legal cover;
- More broadly, the inability to anticipate some of the difficulties later created by the GoS, which limited the capacity of the mission to carry out its mandate, e.g., the ability of the police to monitor and verify, or to carry out training activities of the GoS police;
- The absence of benchmarks, with the
This was recommended for UN operations by the Brahimi report in 2000 and implemented in the form of a $50 million Pre-mandate Commitment Authority granted to the UN Secretary General. The arrangement has significantly improved the planning and deployment of UN missions.

9. Lessons to be drawn include the following:

a) A proper planning process is necessary, based on a solid assessment, which enables the mission to take into account the situation on the ground, including cultural, political, and institutional features of the host population and government, and, if necessary, regional differences within the host country;

b) The planning process needs to be multidimensional from the beginning, reflecting the complexity anticipated for the mission (i.e., involving, as required, political, military, police, civilian, and humanitarian representatives), as well as taking into consideration key outside players, particularly national authorities, UN agencies, major donors, and the international financial institutions (IFIs);

c) Under the assumption that in the short to medium term ASF deployments will be heavily supported by partners, they need to be involved early in the planning, so that a clear and transparent agreement can be found between them and the AU on how resources will be sourced and distributed to match the strategic aims;

d) Particular attention needs to be paid to the police component of the ASF. This is a lesson not only from AMIS but from about every PSO carried out by the UN, the EU, NATO, and various coalitions in the past 15 years, who have systematically had to step up the police components of their operations;

e) There is an urgent need to build the capacity of the AU PSOD to plan missions and to enhance its capacity to support mission strategic management (the latter is addressed in more detail at para. 16-18);

f) Planning should begin prior to the formal mandating of a mission, so that political decisions on the shape and ambition of deployments are informed by a realistic assessment of what is achievable given conditions on the ground and available resources. This, however, requires that AU financial provisions for PSOs include a “pre-mandate commitment authority” allowing the Secretariat to begin planning missions ahead of mandate adoption;³

g) Mission leaders—political, military, police—should be chosen as early as possible to be able to participate in the planning of the mission that they will have to implement;

h) Validation exercises should, as much as possible, be incorporated into the planning for ASF missions;

i) The AU (and the RECs) should develop the capacity to undertake contingency planning to cover potential mission scenarios so that subsequent planning can be more effective once a particular operation is being launched or if planning assumptions change in the course of the mission. This would preserve the comparative advantage in rapid deployment demonstrated by African missions, while at the same time improving preparation.

### Mission Structures and Command and Control (C2)

10. AMIS command and control structures were, and continue to be, problematic. The two main issues are

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³ This was recommended for UN operations by the Brahimi report in 2000 and implemented in the form of a $50 million Pre-mandate Commitment Authority granted to the UN Secretary General. The arrangement has significantly improved the planning and deployment of UN missions.
one, the structure of the field presence and the relationship of the military with the other components of the mission in the field; and two, the weakness of the strategic level guidance setup, negatively impacting on the Secretariat’s ability to direct the mission and to establish the proper connections between the political process and the PSO.

Mission Field Structure

11. In any country as large and as lacking in infrastructure as Sudan, any mission would be notoriously difficult to organize. AMIS recognized—although belatedly—the imperative of a solid presence in Khartoum, in order to keep lines of communications open with a particularly uncooperative host govern-

A Few Benefits of Planning in General:

- It supports a long term approach in which all elements focus on their part in the achievement of the strategic objective, thereby helping to ensure that the causes of conflicts are addressed as well as immediate symptoms.
- It helps to avoid gross mismatches between the ends and the means of missions.
- Provided it is accompanied by a solid field assessment, it helps to avoid basing the mission on the wrong assumptions regarding the behavior of local actors and governments.
- It helps to establish clear lines of accountability, i.e., states clearly who is responsible for what, avoiding unsolicited initiatives from staff as well as key gaps in decision-making and action.
- It protects the mission against the vagaries of personal, national, or political preferences, which may detract from the mission aims, be detrimental to the quality of its work, and possibly lead to resentment.

And a Couple Benefits of Integrated Planning in Particular:

- It enables, and, to a large extent, compels political decision-makers to define what they mean by the success of the mission beyond the simple military component, looking at a long term perspective of security and stability. Generally, it is wrong for the military to seek an “exit strategy” independently of whether other aims of the mission have been achieved or not.
- It greatly facilitates the integrated conduct of operations.

12. One of the key misunderstandings between the military and the rest of the mission has revolved around the concept of a Joint Operations Centre (JOC) and, to a lesser extent, of a Joint Logistics Operations Centre (JLOC). The creation of both a JOC and a JLOC was recommended by the two technical assessment missions of March and December 2005, as well as by the MAPEX (Map Exercise) which preceded the reinforcement of AMIS in August 2005.4 However, by autumn 2006 the JLOC was just about functional, while the JOC still was not. The creation of a JOC met strong resistance from successive Force Commanders, who have seen it as a tool to deprive them of their control of the mission and its assets to the benefit of the senior political leadership in the field and the police. While more keen on the concept, the police staff has also expressed misgivings, fearing that a JOC might somehow subordinate it to the military component. In the absence of clear political backing at the strategic level, the HoM, and his political Deputy in the field, have been unable to impose the joint structure on AMIS officers. The latter, it has to be recognized, were exposed to the concept of a JOC for the first time.

13. Several problems have arisen concerning the relationship between the different components of the mission. Many of these problems, but not all, are related to the role and place of the police. For example, there was a degree of overlap between some

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of the roles of CIVPOL and the Military Observers (MILOBs), e.g., in the monitoring of developments and investigations of certain incidents. In addition, the absence of the police from the Ceasefire Commission (CFC) remains a lasting source of dysfunction—but not an easy one to remedy, as this would imply renegotiating the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement (HCFA). Furthermore, there was no undisputed authority to arbitrate resource allocation or re-allocation in response to needs, and the CIVPOL often saw themselves as the “poor parent” of the military in an environment of scarce resources (e.g., for mobility or communications). Moreover, no systematic efforts were made to prevent “grey zones” appearing in the coverage of the mission, e.g., at times when rebel controlled-zones were no-go areas for CIVPOL, while IDP camps were no-go areas for military components. Occasionally, police and military reports have offered conflicting accounts of single incidents, leaving the DITF at a loss on what course of action to recommend. Yet another area of conflict was the decision to place the position of the Police Commissioner on an equal level with that of the Force Commander who has authority over a much larger contingent and has a sizeable park of military hardware under his control.

14. Relations between the CFC and the Protection Force were a further area of contention at field level, with grievances on both sides and relations growing increasingly tense as AMIS was enhanced. At the beginning, the Vice-Chairman of the CFC (a job entrusted to an EU partner) was authorized to guide the conduct of MILOBs patrols in the Sectors; but after the first enhancement of AMIS in October 2004 provided for a stronger role for the Protection Force, the Force Commander requested and obtained command of the MILOBs. The decision was appropriate but its consequences not properly anticipated. As a result, the CFC appeared more and more as a parallel operation to that of the military and later CIVPOL, and the CFC felt sidelined. Conversely, as MILOBs were first on the ground, they were called to staff the Field HQ, a role for which many members of the Protection Force deemed them unsuited. In the absence of an agreed structure at the field level, with clear lines of authority to the HoM, there was no process to ensure coordination or resolve disputes. This led to several types of weaknesses: a decrease of motivation of aggrieved CFC personnel and the consequent loss of a vital tool for the mission; an inadequately manned Field HQ; and the lack of a mechanism to coordinate CFC and CIVPOL activities. Such a mechanism would have, among others, permitted the screening of complaints, separating ceasefire violations falling under CFC remit from criminal issues relevant to CIVPOL competence.

15. Steps that could be taken to avoid contention over the structures and lines of authority at field level in future ASF missions include the following:

a) The creation of clear generic modalities for the establishment and operations of the JOC, JLOC, as well as a Joint Mission Analysis Cell (JMAC) in the ASF Doctrine and Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), with a view to facilitating efforts of future ASF missions toward a common goal; these generic modalities could then be further detailed according to the specific needs of each mission;

b) As soon as it is anticipated that a mission will have more than just a military component, a JOC, a JLOC, and a JMAC should be included as key components of field level structure of the mission. This can help to avoid the need to review structures in mid-course and to preclude resistance to integration from components with vested interests in keeping their autonomy;

c) The early nomination of the HoM is also important. In principle, the HoM could be either military or civilian, but as most missions will require serious engagement in political and diplomatic mediation/negotiation, the HoM should in most cases be a civilian well-equipped with the required skills;

d) SOPs specifying delegations of authority in various branches of the mission can help to avoid gaps in decision-making during absences of commanding officers and personnel;

e) An intensive program of integrated training for mission leaders which could be inspired from the UN Senior Mission Leaders (SML) model should be instituted. Such training should be tailored to the needs of the ASF but could be delivered in a generic manner, once the AU has identified a pool of suitable candidates among potential future mission leaders, and in any case, prior to any new deployment;

f) Efforts by each AU member state to emphasize the multidimensionality of modern PSOs and the need for integrated efforts in the curricula of national military and police training programs, in particular at the senior level.

5 See chronology in annex on the origins of the CFC.
16. Command and control (C2) of a PSO, and the relationship between the strategic, operational and tactical levels of the mission is always a difficult issue. Traditional military operations, usually under national C2, have a relatively strict definition of the role of each level and precise SOPs to direct relations between them. This is not so in PSOs, which are usually multinational, increasingly multidimensional, and require a much more sophisticated horizontal (across the different actors involved, some of them national, others supranational) and vertical (strategic, operational, tactical) articulation of decision-making. Different models are possible (see box). Two overall requirements need to be met for a multidimensional PSO to be effective: structures that are mandated and equipped for direction at the strategic level; and clarity on the relationships between the strategic and operational levels. One of the main weaknesses of AMIS is that none of its possible centers of direction and guidance have been strong.

17. The DITF does provide elements of strategic level direction to the mission, but the set-up has had two weaknesses. The first stemmed from the fact that DITF action has been insufficiently linked to the political level management of the Darfur crisis (Abuja and other negotiations). The consequence has been the inability of AMIS to anticipate the consequences of political developments, with a recurrent negative impact on the mission. Examples cited at the seminar included the worsening of the conditions of access of the police, AMIS Humanitarian / Human Rights officers, and, to some extent, humanitarian agencies, to IDP camps after the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) (5 May 2006), as non-signatories associated AMIS with an agreement to which they were hostile; and a further deterioration of the situation after the AU decided to expel the non-signatories from the CFC in August. Similarly, participants described how the more the PSC signaled its willingness to allow for a UN transition, the more uncooperative the GoS became, with a detrimental impact on the mission’s day-to-day life (political signals coming from some Western capitals did not make matters easier). Finally, they stressed repeatedly the misunderstandings that arose out of the fact that AMIS was originally deployed as an observer mission, as this is all that was acceptable to the GoS. However, it went on to carry out PSO tasks as of October 2004, armed with a much larger military contingent and a new police force endowed with intrusive powers, without the basic “contract” being renegotiated. This explains much of the obstruction of the GoS. The main lesson to learn here is that a disconnect between the political process and the peace operation is not sustainable, since, at best, it wastes opportunities for synergies between the political effort and the deployment, and at worst, it undermines the role of the peacekeepers and puts their physical security in danger.

18. The Special Representative of the Chairman of the Commission had overall responsibility for the mission; however, his role in the Abuja mediations/negotiations was rather limited. That role was played by a Special Envoy and the AU Mediation Team, but also largely discharged at times by individual AU member states/leaders, and at times (although much more briefly) by partners. The Mediation Team itself lacked preparedness and cohesion. Given the political complexity of the Abuja negotiations, the SRCC could not possibly have led them and run the mission simultaneously. In that light, one may have to review the definition of the SRCC’s role as currently envisaged in the Draft Policy Framework for the Civilian Dimension of the ASF. At present it would seem to put an unbearable burden on the shoulders of the SRCC in situations with the complexity of Darfur by entrusting him/her with the responsibility for both the mission and the political negotiation. Should the mission and the political

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The Benefits of a Well-Functioning Integrated Structure at Field Level

- Ensures the concurrence of efforts of all components of the mission toward a single goal
- Facilitates decision-making on the allocation of resources across the different components of the mission (in particular rare resources like mobility assets) and their shifting in response to gradual or sudden changes on the ground
- Provides a locus for resolving conflicting interpretations of events on the ground, ensuring that a single, unified message is relayed to the strategic level
- Encourages synergies between the police and military effort and facilitate military support to the police (protection) when this is needed (particularly in crisis situations), as well as make it possible, as necessary, for one component to compensate the operational limits of the other

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6 The document reads, “The Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission (SRCC) has the overall responsibility for the
Different Models of Command and Control (C2) in PSOs

**United Nations**

C2 arrangements for UN missions are idiosyncratic and have been built up in the course of the rather organic development of UN peacekeeping over the years. Only recently have more systematic efforts been made to improve UN missions’ C2. In practice, the absence of an immediately available capacity at the operational and tactical levels of missions causes a blurring of the distinction between them, to the detriment of effective C2. This can be compounded if strategic guidance is unclear or weak, a problem that tends to result in the concentration of control at the operational level under the direction of the Special Representative of the Secretary General, who is also the Head of Mission (HoM). Clear guidance has been issued in the past few years (most recently in December 2005) to ensure the cohesion of the mission under the authority of the HoM, and in the revised Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP) endorsed by the Secretary General in June 2006.

UN member states in the form of national representations to New York have little involvement in the planning of UN missions, although the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) has made an effort over the past few years to involve presumed Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) at an early stage. Many Western nations consider C2 arrangements for UN missions unsatisfactory, partly explaining their reluctance to contribute to such missions. The establishment of a Strategic Cell within DPKO in the context of the reinforced UN operation in Lebanon over the Summer of 2006 is a novel development partly aimed at mitigating the lack of C2 at the strategic level.

**European Union**

The EU has put in place *sui generis* arrangements for the C2 of missions, reflecting its aims, resources, and what the consensus of the member states can bear. The EU has a fairly strong structure for strategic level decision-making: at the top, the Council of Ministers approves Crisis Managements Concepts and CONOPs, and formally appoints the HQ and Operations Commander (no mission has been comprehensive enough at this stage to require the appointment of a political Head of Mission). The Political and Security Committee (PSC) exercises the strategic control and political guidance on a daily basis. The PSC receives advice from the EU Military Committee (EUMC) for the military component of operations (itself advised by the Military Staff (EUMS)), and the Civilian Committee (CIVCOM) for the civilian component (including police). Both the EUMC and the CIVCOM are composed of representatives of all member states, facilitating close political follow-up of missions at the strategic level.

Unlike NATO and the UN, the EU does not have a standing command or planning structure. The EU tailors its chain of command to the requirements of the mission, using either an arrangement with NATO (a complex formula called “Berlin Plus”) or one of the five declared national Operations HQs that can be multi-nationalized for operations. The latter for EUFOR DR Congo (election support to the UN), where the HQ is provided by Germany and the mission co-led by France and Germany. A new CivMil Cell will facilitate coordination of strategic planning for integrated (civil-military) crisis response. It will have at its disposal a small Operations Centre facility that can be rapidly augmented with 90 trained staff, should EU member states decide that this could help plan and run a particular operation.

**NATO**

NATO has a strong structure for strategic level decision-making in the form of the North Atlantic Council (NAC), which receives advice for military operations from the Military Committee (MC). The MC is composed of representatives of all member states; on the strategic level, this ensures the close follow-up during missions with respect to the military while the NAC maintains political oversight. The NAC-approved direction and guidance for a mission is then forwarded to Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) which is NATO’s strategic command. SHAPE, along with one of the three operational level Joint (Forces) Commands, carries out the planning and execution of the mission. NATO nations provide the actual forces for the mission. These forces are subdivided into component commands (Land, Air and Maritime) operating most often under a lead nation at the tactical level.

There are similarities between the NATO and the AU-envisioned structures. For example, the AU PSC exercises a similar role to the NAC’s and NATO’s MC serves a similar function to the AU’s MSC. In addition, like the NATO Joint Commands, the RECs or lead nations are expected to carry out the operational level planning and execution of missions in some scenarios. However, the description above makes it clear that NATO is tooled for the strategic and operational planning and C2 of military, rather than multidimensional missions. For its part, the AU lacks a SHAPE equivalent, i.e., the structure to turn a political requirement into an operational plan at the strategic level.

**African Experience So Far and Future Concepts**

African multilateral operations have been carried out in a variety of formats, but none of them had clearly predetermined SOPs for strategic planning and operational conduct. ECOMOG operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 1990s were actually “coalitions of the willing” under ECOWAS auspices and Nigerian leadership. As an organization, ECOWAS had neither an undisputed legitimacy among its members, nor the planning capacity to conduct the missions. There was no political Head of Mission in either Liberia or Sierra Leone. In those conditions, the forces obeyed more directly instructions from their national capitals, than either the Force Commander himself or a central ECOWAS political/military strategic guidance. From this perspective, the 2003 ECOWAS deployment in Côte d’Ivoire represented clear progress as it directly derived from the organization’s engagement in the mediation of the conflict. The first AU multilateral operation, AMIB, in Burundi (2003), was largely conducted in a lead nation format, whereby South Africa led both the military planning and operational conduct of the mission, while political direction from the AU was conveyed by an SRCC. In neither of those deployments was the financial burden clearly apportioned, with the result that those countries that carried the bulk of the operations also bore a large part of the costs, the remainder being covered by external partners.

The ASF Policy Framework is largely based on the premise that the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) will provide the planning and operational HQs of ASF operations, with the PLANELM in Addis acting as the center of gravity for strategic planning and the Peace and Security Council (PSC) giving strategic guidance. It also foresees the use of the “lead nation” option for Scenario 6 (intervention) of ASF operations. However, at this point, whether in REC-led missions or lead nation arrangements, the ASF Doctrine does not yet clearly distinguish responsibilities between the strategic and operational levels in political or military terms. In addition, ASF documents are short of specifics on financing arrangements in either case. It has to be remembered that EU and NATO operations are largely financed under the “costs lie where they fall” rule, whereby each country covers the costs of its own deployment.
management remain distinct, on the other hand, this puts the onus on the AU Secretariat to ensure a seamless flow of information and communication between the direction of the mission (DITF and SRCC) and its other components constituting the mediation team. This is likely to require work at several levels:

a) The constitution of a strategic level management capacity, endowed with the necessary expertise, know-how, and the leadership ability and authority to direct complex missions. The AU PSOD should constitute the core of this capacity, in addition to its planning function;

b) AU Secretariat bodies should be reinforced and structured to assist the AU leadership (President of the Commission, Special Representatives, Mediators) in conflict mediation/negotiations in order both to be less dependent on member states in such endeavors and to provide them with the coordinated staff support and expertise they need as they take the lead;7

c) Cohesive strategic direction requires that procedures to organize the division of labor and communication flows must be put in place between the AU PSOD and the mediation team to allow seamless communication and coordination every time there is a parallel PSO and political effort;

d) The assumption of the Draft Policy Framework for the Civilian Dimension of the ASF should be reviewed in order to re-dimension the responsibility of the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission (SRCC) in peace processes accompanying ASF missions.

19. The second set of weaknesses is of a more operational nature, partly linked to the staffing of the DITF and partly to the lack of clarity of the rules (SOPs) spelling out the respective roles of the DITF and the Mission and Forward HQs in the field. This is largely due to the pressure under which the mission had to be deployed with no time to define arrangements, and the fact that the DITF was only formed some seven months into the mission. Consequences have been multi-faceted: First, military commanders, who had been deployed earlier, have set their own patterns of C2 at the field level and resisted receiving direction from a higher authority. Commanders found it particularly difficult to respond to guidance communicated from civilians and/or more junior officials coming from the strategic level. Second, ad hoc decisions were made on both sides with insufficient consultations, for example the DITF issued guidance for the drafting of logistics contracts without sufficiently taking into account the need for protection of the field; conversely, military and police commanders made up procedures that did not necessarily correspond to the integration sought by the DITF. In regard to staffing, one major gap has been the absence of a DITF’s own Chief of Staff (CoS) who could translate political requirements into operational objectives. The dual-hatted Head of the UN Assistance Cell has done an outstanding job but cannot have the same leeway as an AU-nominated CoS. The AU should recruit an individual of equivalent stature to whom knowledge could be transferred to establish a home grown capacity over the long term.

20. The need for clear “rules of the road” at the operational and tactical level is well articulated in ASF Workshop documents. However, it is less clear that the same applies to the strategic level and its relationship to the operational level. The experience of AMIS leads to these recommendations:

a) The ASF Doctrine be clarified as regards the AU chain of command, and further work be done

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7 Close working relations should be established with the UN Secretariat’s new Mediation Support Unit whose task, precisely, is to become a repository of best practice in matters of mediation and negotiations.

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implied responsibility for the AU’s role in the peace process, as well as responsibility for the overall management and integration of the PSO” (para. 31).
on the development of the operational level of command as well as its relationship with the strategic level via clear SOPs;

b) Particular efforts be made in training all components of the mission in strategic and operational level SOPs so that all understand and accept agreed lines of C2. The difficult cultural adjustment this represents for military commanders should be recognized and given particular attention in training programs;

c) In addition, the AU should groom a few individuals of equivalent stature to the current DITF acting Chief of Staff to play that role in future ASF missions.

21. Another key problem resides in the lack of consultative bodies to advise the AU at the strategic level. The Military Staff Committee (MSC), the only advisory body legally provided by the Durban Protocol, is not competent to guide DITF work and PSC decisions beyond the military realm. Several seminar participants stressed that it was no longer acceptable for decisions on AMIS police deployments to be made on the basis of advice from the MSC, as was the case, for example, in April 2005, when the PSC decided that police should be deployed not only in zones under GoS control, but also under rebel control. In addition, even existing bodies do not have the necessary strength. At present, less than half of AU member states have military advisers in Addis, with only a handful of those fully active, meaning that, in practice, the DITF draws its advice from no more than two or three countries among the 15 constituting the PSC at a particular time. Police advisory capacity is even more insignificant, and capacity to advise on more specific areas such as rule of law, DDR, and SSR, which are key in conflict and post-conflict management, is even more wanting. National capitals have to face the need for remedial action urgently—a major task which will require political will, resources, and a major undertaking in training. The problem, therefore, requires remedial action at two levels:

a) **AU institutional reform**: the AU will need to revisit the structures endorsed in 2002 to ensure that the PSC can receive guidance from bodies endowed with expertise encompassing all key components of future missions;

b) **Member state representations in Addis**: as PSO are rapidly becoming a permanent feature of the AU’s agenda, member states will have to review the size, composition, and working methods of their representations in Addis to ensure that the AU Secretariat has at hand a solid body of expertise on which it can rely for the planning and conduct of missions, whether the expertise is available on site or can be rapidly obtained from national capitals.

### Managing Relations with Third Parties

22. Just like any PSO, AMIS has to manage its relations with a large group of partners, including the GoS and the various factions in conflict, humanitarian agencies of the UN family and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The requirement would not disappear, and may even increase, if the AU were to provide one component within a broader mission led, for example, by the UN. In addition, by contrast with PSOs that are self-sustaining, just like AMIS, in the short run all ASF missions will bear the burden of handling a broad range of Western partners that are supporting it financially and technically. Any African PSO will also most likely be in a particular relationship with the UN, which acts both as a provider of assistance and a possible successor. Let us examine these categories of actors in turn.

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8 Protocol establishing the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) with the Peace and Security Council (PSC) at its apex and the support of the Panel of the Wise, the Military Staff Committee (MSC), and the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS).
Host Country and Local Actors

23. The GoS has been a particularly difficult counterpart for the AU and the mission. This was confirmed by the personal experience of many at the seminar. This experience points, first, to the necessity of an engaged strategic and operational level leadership, with sufficient manpower and authority, able to take on the national authorities whenever necessary (see above para. 17-18).

24. Second, a strong civilian component of the mission at field level is also essential in establishing the necessary contacts to engage relays of the central government in the field (regional or local authorities, etc.). In this respect, the disregard of Darfur’s administrative jurisdictions in the structuring of AMIS did the mission a disservice; and it was especially a hindrance for the CIVPOL component. Again, a proper pre-deployment assessment would have identified the importance of those jurisdictions and a solid political component would have advised on the management of relations with the local authorities. Further, a more energetic civilian presence, via more and better trained CIMIC (Civil-Military Cooperation), Human Rights, and Humanitarian Officers and Public Information Officers would have helped “sell the mission” to the locals—including explaining changes in its roles at key junctures—and avoided the obstruction and even outright hostility experienced by its members as rumors were being spread that AMIS was a coercive force acting in the name of an evil power. Similarly, a stronger civilian or CIMC presence would have enabled the mission to establish links with the many tribes controlling different parts of Darfur (one participant counted 116). This would have helped build confidence with those actors, and therefore facilitated the implementation of the mandate.

a) Future ASF missions must make provision for a sustained liaison capacity with the national government and the main factions in theaters of deployment. This implies that such missions will require a substantive Political Affairs section, with the Head of Political Affairs working very closely with the SRCC and his/her senior management team at mission HQ level;

b) An energetic and sustained public information campaign is a must in any PSO and must be part of the ASF set of tools.

What Should Be the Aims of a PSO Public Information Campaign?

- Convey to the local population the aims, limitations, and format of the mission so as to dampen expressions of unjustified enthusiasm as well as hostility
- Explain changes in the mandate and tools of the mission in reaction to changing circumstances in the local or general political environment
- Communicate the aims of the operation to all components and members of the mission, ensuring that the entire staff conveys a unified message to the local and national actors

Humanitarian Actors

25. It is important to distinguish between two types of humanitarian actors: First, UN agencies and associates, coordinated by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in the field of humanitarian relief and by other major UN agencies (UNICEF, WHO, UNDP, etc.) in other fields under the umbrella of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), and second, independent NGOs, which can be foreign or national. UN and large humanitarian agencies consider themselves bound by a number of principles governing their relations with military components of missions, including the so-called “Oslo Guidelines” and OCHA Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support UN Humanitarian Activities (see Annex II). In addition, they have a long practice of working side by side with military, police, and political missions, and well-established processes to manage their relations with such actors. NGOs, on the other hand, come in all shapes and forms. Local NGOs—and sometimes foreign ones—can have a political agenda hidden behind a humanitarian cause. Besides, they do not necessarily understand the role and constraints of a foreign police or military deployment, and their attitude will go from trying to exploit their presence (for example, for escorts) to shunning any contact, the same organization sometimes alternating between the two modes depending on temporary aims.

26. Evidence shows that managing contacts with NGOs has been a new and particularly trying experience for many AMIS peacekeepers, especially the
military, but others as well, and that the mission as a whole has been poorly prepared for this task. This was indicated, for example, by the MAPEX of August 2005, which demonstrated that CIMIC was poorly understood by mission commanders. In the event, AMIS has few CIMIC officers; among those few, a still smaller number have been trained in CIMIC duties, whereas among the few officers who have been trained, many do not work in the CIMIC area. In addition, there has been a certain degree of overlap between the roles of CIMIC and Humanitarian and Human Rights Officers, which has made it difficult for target groups to understand their respective roles. The confusion has been compounded by the decision to entrust the same individuals with humanitarian and human rights tasks, which are two fundamentally different disciplines and require different expertise and mandates.

27. The confusion of roles and lack of experience has led to an overload of senior commanders in the field, who became the obvious recipients of multiple requests that should have been directed to the appropriate components of the mission. It has also meant that AMIS has deprived itself of access to a wealth of detailed information in the hands of NGOs and other civil society actors. Beyond the role of particular local civilian actors, many observers have noted a lack of understanding of the role of the major UN agencies and of International Humanitarian Law on the part of AMIS staff. This is entirely understandable, as this is new territory for the AU, but since most future ASF operations are likely to intervene in environments marked by a strong presence of humanitarian agencies and NGOs, it is worth putting in place structures and processes to increase mutual understanding and manage relations.

28. Several steps could help enhance the capacity of ASF missions to manage their relations with humanitarian agencies, NGOs and other civil society actors:

a) The provision for, and training of, a much larger number of CIMIC officers, whose primary task would be to interface with the military component of the mission and civilian agencies, whether these are host government agencies, or local NGOs, or humanitarian agencies;

b) The provision for, and training of, a larger number of Humanitarian Officers (in particular for missions such as AMIS with a strong humanitarian assistance mandate) whose primary task would be to interface with the mission as a whole and humanitarian agencies;

c) The provision for, and training of Human Rights Officers as needed, depending on a division of labor agreed upon with the UN; in any event, a distinction between the Human Rights and the Humanitarian function is essential;

d) Terms of Reference (ToR) for CIMIC, Human Rights and Humanitarian Officers have to be clear for the staff concerned, other components of the mission, as well as the local actors; action to communicate those ToR should be incorporated in the public information campaign recommended above;

e) AU ranking officials and selected personnel should be trained in understanding the basic requirements of International Humanitarian Law, the fundamental principles of humanitarianism—humanity, neutrality, impartiality—as well as the tested techniques for the management of PSO relations with humanitarian actors; competence acquisition in those fields should be included in any future Senior Mission Leaders’ training.

Western Partners

29. Partners have played a key support role in AMIS, technically and financially. This was amply recognized at the seminar, where one of the participants half-jokingly remarked that “at times, donors appear more anxious than African leaders to get into Darfur.” The downside of this extensive engagement by partners, however, is that it has created a lasting dependence, making the prospect of African “ownership” of African operations ever more remote. Partners have political agendas and domestic and financial constraints that cannot but influence their support of the mission. Several senior African representatives at the seminar were clear that this situation was unacceptable in the long run, arguing that “you don’t go to war on somebody else’s money.”

30. Negative consequences of a heavy reliance on partners, coupled with the weaknesses of the AU, include the following:

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10 This applies only at the local level, however. At higher levels, it should be the task of Political Affairs officers to engage with host government authorities, because such engagement will inevitably be highly politicized and should be beyond the purview of CIMIC officers who are per definition military personnel.

11 See further para. 55.
• Partners occupying key long-term positions in the mission that should be filled by African staff; as the case when sensitive posts such as intelligence, logistics, procurement, communications at the DITF level or in the area of air mobility are occupied by a civilian foreign contractor;

• Conversely, advisory positions remaining unfilled as partners experience force generation problems (in October 2006, only 60% of EU partners’ military positions were filled, and 50% of police positions);

• Financial or in-kind support not being available when the AU expects it, as domestic politics or bureaucratic red tape in donor countries and organizations lead to delays in disbursements or equipment being delivered piecemeal;

• Poor timing of training, as trainers are only available at specific dates and for a specific duration and developments in the field respond to different dynamics (e.g., delay in the delivery of the Canadian APCs, resulting in their being used not by the drivers trained for that purpose, but by untrained ones); or due to insufficient coordination among partners (ideally, the staff training provided by NATO in Summer 2005 should have come prior to the MAPEX);

• Decisions being made in order to respond to a political priority of a donor—being seen as providing help—rather than to the logic of the mission, e.g., the deployment of a JLOC should have logically followed, rather than preceded the creation of a JOC (although both were recommended by assessment missions);

• Models of equipment provided by partners proving inadequate to the conditions in which the AU operates or its resource flows, compounded by a lack of know-how and discipline of the peacekeepers (for example, the use of the INMARSAT system or the Thuraya mobile phones donated by partners made sense as an emergency solution, but led to cost overruns as they were used with little restraint; likewise the fuel consumption of the helicopters and APCs corresponded neither to the fuel management capacity of AMIS, nor to its transportation capacity);

• Occasional duplications and overlaps in assistance, and provision of conflicting advice, although the coordination mechanisms created at the strategic level (Liaison Group (LG) and Partners’ Technical Support Group (PTSG)) have proven effective and should be recorded as a positive lesson of AMIS.

31. There are also sometimes negative political consequences of an important partners’ presence in the field in the sense that this presence makes the mission vulnerable to political signals coming from the national capitals of partners or the headquarters of their organizations. For example, the GoS became much more obstructive around March-April 2006 as strong pronouncements came from the Bush Administration, NATO HQs, and the UN Secretary General himself advocating a transition to the UN and a greater NATO involvement in support of AMIS. Understandably, political pressure is a necessary corollary of many PSOs, but its use must reflect an understanding of consequences:

Partners have a responsibility to anticipate the consequences of their political discourse on ASF missions.

32. Over time, the AU should seek to reduce its technical and financial dependence on partners, even though full autonomy of AU operations is still distant. This means the following:

a) Increasing Africa’s own financial efforts;

b) Increasing African peacekeepers’ capacity in technical areas (contracting, communications, medical, aviation, fuel management, strategic airlift, etc.) in which African expertise is weak, leading to poor use of assistance and/or forcing over-reliance on external partners;
c) Increasing the ability of African staff to become “intelligent users” of partners’ support in terms of contracting, and contract and expert supervision.

33. Further measures could be taken in order to improve the quality of partner support and its coordination:

a) Early involvement of partners in the planning of support for future ASF deployments so as to improve response, as recommended above (para. 9); this early involvement would also allow partners to identify AU limitations in a timely fashion and facilitate their awareness of sensitive areas of cooperation;

b) Cultural awareness training of partners selected to work with the AU who do not otherwise have work experience in Africa;

c) Discipline and political will from the partners to effectively use the coordination structures put in place, such as the PTSG in the case of AMIS;

d) Clear agreements between the AU and partners on the limitations and responsibilities of each party for the provision of financial and expert support;

e) Further partner work to harmonize reporting requirements on expenditures so as to lighten the burden on the AU—while there is also a continuing requirement for better financial accountability and transparency by the AU;

f) Further efforts in the context of the G8 “clearing house” to harmonize partners’ assistance in long-term capacity-building (see further recommendations on logistics at para. 41);

g) Better coordination among partners to fill gaps in advisory positions that have been promised to the AU when one of the partners fails to deliver on its commitment;

h) Particular attention should be given to the coordination of EU and UN assistance efforts as [or “since”] the EU is the single main provider of financial support, and the UN the key technical standard setter for AU operations. The practice of joint assessment missions, as conducted in March and December 2005, should be carried forward to minimize risks of mismatch between resource allocation and technical advice.

The United Nations

34. As a partner, the UN is in a category of its own. To a limited extent, it provides similar “services” to AMIS as other partners, for example via logistical support and technical advice and, in those areas, its contribution has to be coordinated with that of others. But the UN is also special because it sets standards, provides frameworks, and appears as a possible “exit strategy” for AU PSOs, as repeatedly stressed by the ASF Policy Framework. Actually, the role of the UN in support to AU PSOs is closely related to the AU’s level of ambitions and the division of labor between the two organizations. This will be discussed further below. At this point, it is useful to identify the components of the UN that come into inter-action with the AU in PSOs (leaving aside the UN as a political actor, an important theme which was not addressed at the seminar).

35. At the top of the list is the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) as, to a large extent, the benchmark for AU PSO is UN peace operations (rather than operations by NATO or the EU for example). The UN is therefore regularly called to advise on standards, logistics, equipment, structures, etc. In principle, there is nothing wrong with this, as it can facilitate an eventual transition to a UN mission, but there are a few risks involved. One is that the AU may be tempted to emulate higher UN standards which it cannot reach at this point because of a lack of resources and know-how; another that AU expectations may be too high in comparison with DPKO’s capacity to deliver on assistance (although this is being addressed by the formation of a DPKO AU Peace Support Team); and yet another that the AU may be drawn to think in terms of extremely complex mission models which it could not support. This is an issue that deserves attention, as UN-AU cooperation in PSOs develops.

36. The UN also appears, as indicated earlier, in the form of the major humanitarian and development agencies, i.e., OCHA, UNHCR, UNDP, WHO, WPF, etc. Here, liaison and awareness-raising programs of AU peacekeepers are of the essence to facilitate mutual understanding. The AU should not seek to duplicate the work of those organizations. However, as recommended below (para. 55), the AU must think through what capacities it needs to interface with them effectively, including at the strategic level, and ensure that they are factored in the planning of its operations.

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12 UN DPKO assistance to the AU must also be seen in the context of the 2004 UN Secretary General Report Enhancement of African Peacekeeping Capacity, DPKO’s Peacekeeping 2010 Agenda, and the commitment to a ten year capacity-building plan for Africa endorsed by the World Summit in September 2005.
Third, there is the UN as the Department of Safety and Security (DSS). In principle, there is no reason why the DSS should be involved in AU missions, lest the AU requests its assistance. Darfur therefore seems to be the exception rather than the rule, given the presence of the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) in the south of the country. AMIS experience with the DSS, however, leaves something to be desired, as the Department seems to have made decisions on security affecting the mission’s capacity to operate (e.g., declaring the closure of some routes) without even informing its leadership. Should the AU decide in the future to avail itself of the services of the DSS, this will require much better liaison and coordination.

Fourth, there is the UN as a human rights actor. The matter is important in a situation such as Darfur in which the fear of massive human rights violations has been one of the key motivations for intervention in the first place. However, it appears that the work of UN human rights officers (sent by UNMIS) and initiatives from Geneva-based UN human rights bodies have been poorly coordinated with AMIS: at times AMIS Human Rights and Humanitarian Officers and the CFC have found themselves investigating the same human rights violations as UN staff. This should not be a surprise since, as discussed earlier, the Human Rights and Humanitarian Officers had an imprecise mandate and neither they or the CFC had particular expertise in conducting human rights investigations, which require a high degree of specialization. A prudent approach would recommend that

a) For the purpose of PSOs, the AU should develop a competence mainly to interact in the field of human rights with the major UN human rights bodies as well as human rights NGOs, without undertaking major direct human rights work;

b) Any AU work in the field of human rights in PSOs (education, investigation of violations, etc.) should be coordinated with UN human rights bodies. This requires both a discussion on the general principles of the division of labor and coordination, and specific arrangements governing each mission.

Fifth, the UN appears as the Country Team (CT), i.e., the body of UN agencies that have a presence in the field much before the deployment of the peace operation, and possess a wealth of detailed knowledge on the country. The CT can be particularly helpful to the AU in the planning phase, feeding information into the assessment that must inform the plans.

The AU (PSOD) should seek ways to systematically engage UN Country Teams in assessment missions underpinning the planning of its PSOs.

Logistics

40. The element of logistics is the backbone of PSOs. However, it has been one of the major weaknesses of AMIS. A list of the problems experienced includes:

- The lack of a pre-deployment logistics plan as of the deployment of AMIS II (October 2004) including basic provision of shelter, food supply, medical assistance, communications and mobility equipment for the troops, as well as maintenance services; insufficient steps taken subsequently to resolve some of the fundamental problems; as a result, the availability of basic support in some of those areas has been and remains deficient;
- The lack of an initial police logistics concept, and arrangements for the sharing of mission logistics between the police and the military, which rendered the police hostage to ad hoc decisions by the Force Commander to share or not to share resources depending on the military’s own needs and availability of equipment; the JLOC concept emerged too late to provide a solution and its implementation has been delayed;
- Lack of provision of key mobility assets, e.g., helicopters, and ineffective (including wasteful) use of those valuable assets;
- Negative impact on intra-mission communications as the lack of regular fuel provisioning meant Groups and Sectors remained incommunicado for hours at a time;
- The failure of some troop contributing countries (TCCs) to supply their soldiers with basic equipment at the outset of the mission. This was compounded by the lack of clarity on the Contingent Owned Equipment (COE) reimbursement rates, so that TCCs were reluctant to dedicate major equipments to the mission, not knowing whether they would “get their money back”;
- A lack of AU staff capacity and experience in managing logistics in key areas such as contract letting and monitoring, fuel provision and storage, maintenance, etc.
- The absence of pre-arranged service contracts, leading to long delays in identifying contractors and reaching agreement for the actual provision of services;
• Delays in the provision of key logistics equipment due to a combination of red tape in the providing country and obstruction by the GoS (cf. impounding of communication equipment from The Netherlands; delay in authorizing the import of the APCs offered by Canada);
• Delays in troop rotations, as TCCs were dependent on the availability of strategic transport provided by Western countries (although, overall, the coordination of strategic transport worked well, despite the initial EU-NATO competition);
• Insufficient consultation of field staff on their logistics needs by the DITF as it was negotiating contracts with service providers, with sometimes negative consequences on the security of the personnel in the field;
• Inadequacy of some of the services provided by some private contractors directly remunerated by donors, on which the AU had no leverage.

As a result, military and police were unable to fulfill their mandates: the Protection Force could not protect, the police could not provide security, investigate or mentor, and neither could they react to crises with sufficient speed. The powerlessness experienced by the mission was well-reflected by many former AMIS staff during the seminar.

41. It is a positive sign that the ASF development plan includes further work on logistics in the form of proposals for a study into the logistics depot concept and another into police logistics. This, however, will not exhaust the requirement to upgrade the logistics capacity of the AU (and the RECs) to carry out PSOs. Improvement will require parallel, and to some extent coordinated, action from the AU member states, the AU Secretariat, and the partners:

a) If AU member states intend to attain a degree of autonomy in PSOs, as the ASF Framework and the Roadmap suggest, they will have to consent to a level of financial effort to provide their troops (and police) with minimal equipment and logistic support, and the capacity to maintain them. No “African ownership” will be possible without a degree of self-sustainment;

b) It is essential that any future ASF logistics work (depots study, police study, implementation of the Logistics Workshop outcome, etc.) be guided by the philosophy of integrated logistics support. Therefore, experts competent in the assessment of the logistics needs of the police and civilian parts of AU mission must be involved in this work, which cannot be left only to military specialists, even though they have the most extensive expertise;\(^\text{13}\)

c) Provision for a Joint Logistics Operations Centre (JLOC) should be considered in the planning of every single AU mission in the future and the JLOC should be established at the outset of each mission;

d) Service contracts with key providers must be put in place by the AU Secretariat (PSOD) in order to minimize delays in the provision of services in actual situations;\(^\text{14}\)

e) Troops welfare must not be forgotten as this is important in keeping soldiers in high morale and in preventing misbehavior (e.g., sexual exploitation and abuse) that brings a bad name to missions and forces extremely time-consuming damage control and remedial actions;

f) In further lessons-learned work on AMIS, partners’ logistic support needs to be examined in detail with consideration of four areas:

i) Level: What was the degree of support provided in each key logistics area? Are there areas in which this support could relatively quickly be replaced by AU self-sufficiency? What steps would this require from the AU and the partners? Are there areas in which partners’ support, on the contrary, should be increased because the AMIS experience has demonstrated that the AU could not possibly be self-sufficient in the near future, although the missing assets are key to the success of the mission?

ii) Predictability: How can the reliability of logistics assistance be improved? Apart from the European Peace Facility for Africa, which seems on a sure footing at least until 2010 (albeit with a funding gap to meet needs in 2007), this is a difficult issue, as it is largely dependent on domestic politics in donor countries (negotiations between government and parliament, or across ministries), and the promises of elected governments can only hold, at best, until the next elections. Lasting commitment can only result from the patient lobbying of groups convinced in the value of supporting African efforts. African partners must keep this in mind in their outreach to European and North American constituencies;

iii) Coordination: Structures such as the PTSG

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\(^\text{13}\) The DPKO model of integrated support to UN missions may be a useful source of inspiration.

\(^\text{14}\) Assistance could be sought from the UN and other partners who have extensive experience in such contracts.
are best suited for operational assistance, and partners must make effective use of it. For the longer term, coordination efforts should be pursued through the G8+++ “clearing house” (also including such partners as the UN and the European Commission). The compatibility of equipment provided by partners requires particular attention both in direct operational assistance and long term capacity building;

iv) Nature: What is the best form in which to deliver logistics assistance: provision of direct physical capacity? Support through third party contractors (e.g., PAE, Skylink, Crown Agents)? Or provision of non-earmarked funds for the AU to acquire the necessary goods and services? It is possible that a mix of all those options may be advisable, taking into account the nature of the goods/services, the financial management capacity of the AU Secretariat, and donor demands for accountability. What is important is that the AU and RECs know how to harness these different tools and which is best for what purpose and scenario.

**Communications and Information Systems**

42. The availability of good communications and information systems (CIS) has a fundamental impact on the capability of the mission. AMIS CIS have been unreliable and extremely slow. Sectors have been largely isolated from each other, hampering an effective management of the situation in border areas; not all police sectors have had access to a 24h operation room; merger of information coming from the police and the MILOBS has been partial; and procedures for the transmission of information have been patchy. Finally, both physical CIS capacity and know-how have not permitted staff to gather and analyze information in order to produce intelligence and transmit it to decision-makers in real time. CIS problems have been compounded by delays in the delivery of promised communication equipment due to a combination of Dutch domestic politics (The Netherlands have been the main providers of CIS assistance to AMIS) and GoS obstruction.

43. ASF work has rightly identified CIS as a key component of the ASF and proposed that Phase II include a CIS study covering the detailed technical and process requirements, as well as funding requirements for equipment, personnel and maintenance. For this work to be comprehensive, including in the field of intelligence:

a) It would be advisable that a study be undertaken to examine how the Continental Early Warning Systems (CEWS) and its RECs counterparts (MARAC for ECCAS, CEWARN for IGAD, ECOWARN for ECOWAS, REWS for SADC) could be factored into ASF CIS development work, including their potential to contribute to an ASF intelligence capacity;

b) In addition, a study should be considered into the value of establishing an Intelligence Cell at the strategic level under the auspices of the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa (CISSA) to support the planning and conduct of ASF missions. The temporary support to AMIS provided by the Canadian Intelligence Cell in the DITF should be examined for possible lessons learned;

c) Further work is needed to define intelligence requirements and processes to generate and manage intelligence at the operational level; the UN Joint Mission Analysis Cell (JMAC) concept should be examined for possible import of lessons into the development of AU multidimensional missions.

**Mission Staffing and Training**

44. Many issues related to the staffing of PSOs, both at field and strategic levels, have already been addressed or can be directly deducted from the above, and therefore are only summarized here. They include the need to

a) Fully man the PSOD to its agreed establishment so that it can engage in planning and generally drive the planning and management of ASF missions;

b) Select field personnel in key domains of expertise (communications, logistics management, intelligence, etc.) early so that positions do not remain durably held by partners, whose agenda may or may not align with that of the AU;

c) Conduct generic mission management training for potential senior mission leadership to build a base of expertise;

d) Choose mission leaders early so that they can participate in planning, and undergo joint training prior to their deployment;

e) Seriously address the police requirement in peace operations, both in numbers and quality (i.e., individual specialists, formed units, etc.);

15 The development of those systems is in train, with important donor funding (EU for the CEWS and MARAC, US for ECOWAS, etc.)
f) Develop the ASF CIMIC function and expertise;

g) Define clear terms of reference for Humanitarian and Human Rights Officers, differentiate their roles more distinctly from each other and from that of CIMIC Officers, and develop a pool of such officers, as recommended by the Workshop on the Civilian Dimension of the ASF.  

45. However, a number of other important staffing issues have to be considered by the AU and its member states if they want to ensure the success of future PSOs.

Job Definitions, Ranks and Subordination

46. The lack of job definitions and guidance on position ranking created serious personnel management problems for AMIS. Ranking problems arose in particular for the police because, in the absence of firm guidance, national establishments tended to send officers of a higher rank than required (to gain influence, or simply because senior officers have more clout with their hierarchies to obtain posts abroad). This detracted from commanding officers’ main tasks, as they had to spend much time and energy shuffling individuals around to avoid tensions. Lesser ranking problems affected the military but such problems have arisen in the past in the context of ECOWAS missions as officers of a nominally lower rank—generally coming from a small country with few ranking officers—were put in command of officers with higher ranks. Respect for the ranks in-mission, however, should not be confused with C2 relationships between the strategic and the operational/tactical levels of the mission, whereby senior commanders in the field recognize that more junior officers at strategic HQs may speak on behalf of that HQ. AMIS experienced repeated difficulties on that front. Other problems arose from technical shortcomings, e.g., as already reported, MILOBs were pulled out in numbers to man the Field HQ whereas they had no particular training to do this. There was also a significant lack of specialists in less prestigious but important areas fundamental to operations. This cannot but affect the AU’s capacity to run effective PSOs. Remedial action must be fourfold:

a) The AU PSOD must develop precise job descriptions and accompanying personal profiles for all key positions in PSOs;

b) Member states’ military and police establishments must abide strictly by those descriptions in selecting personnel and shun the temptation to exercise pressure on commanders for them to bypass the rules;

c) Training at all levels, but in particular of senior military commanders, must be clear about the chain of command of ASF missions;

d) As a possible complementary measure, AU member states may want to develop an equivalence table among military ranks across Africa so as to have an undisputed basis on which to organize military hierarchies in the field.

Senior Leadership

47. In addition to earlier recommendations on integrated leadership training, the following should be considered:

a) Mission leaders must be appointed and deployed prior to the appointment and deployment of subordinate officers and staff. Otherwise, they will encounter problems in asserting their authority when they arrive to the mission;

b) Situations should be avoided in which the HoM/SRCC is of the same nationality as the Force Commander. Overlaps in the nationality of their deputies should also be paid attention to. While it is unavoidable that the mission be driven to some extent by personnel from lead nations

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17 Having guidance in the first place should greatly help mission leaders to resist pressure.
(this also happens in NATO and at the EU), the danger of importing domestic alliances or rivalries into the mission should be avoided;

c) Member states should give those police and military officers who have served in the field with distinction the opportunity to build on their skills through appropriate training for future missions;

d) The AU, possibly with the aid of partners, should build a database of African military, police and civilian personnel with particular skills or leadership capacity, including both individuals who have served in UN and African missions, in order to identify quickly needed personnel in future ASF operations.

**Police Component**

48. Particular attention is required on the police side of PSOs. This regards not only the numbers and specialties of police officers but other aspects as well:

- **a) Ranking:** The PSOD should issue clear guidelines as regards the structure of the police force, specifying in particular whether ASF deployments should be ranking or non-ranking missions. The matter created much contention within AMIS, which was forcefully reflected at the seminar;

- **b) Arming:** Similarly the PSOD should issue clear guidelines on the carrying of armament by ASF police (some national contingents of AMIS police were armed, others not);

- **c) Composition:** Serious efforts must be made by member states to recruit and train female police. This is essential if CIVPOL is to be able to fulfill its mandate in societies where traditions uphold a strong male/female role distinction.

**Specialist Domains of Expertise**

49. A key weakness demonstrated by AMIS has been its lack of administrative and financial management capacity. This has resulted in delays in donors’ disbursements, delays and uncertainties as regards TCC reimbursements, delays in third party contracting, and an overall lack of leverage of the mission on donors and contractors as the AU did not have the expertise to put forward counter-proposals. Administering a PSO is a heavy task, for which the AU Secretariat’s departments of administration and accounting are not equipped. It requires special skills and such capacity should therefore be hosted by the PSOD.\(^1\)

- **a) Reinforcement of the PSOD should include the creation of a solid financial and administrative capacity, including the expertise to manage contracts with third parties and interface on assistance with partners;**

- **b) Such capacity should be properly relayed in the field by adequate staffing at Mission HQ level.**

50. PSOs include a whole range of functions that do not belong to normal military and police roles, such as ceasefire implementation, negotiation, mentoring, monitoring, disarmament, etc. Besides, even functions that should normally belong to the expertise of military establishments become more complex in PSOs, and are in any case in short supply in many African countries. In addition to earlier recommendations, this suggests that

- **a) Training in all functions specific to PSOs, such as ceasefire implementation, negotiation, mentoring, monitoring, disarmament, security sector reform, etc. should be introduced in African national police and military curricula, and continue to be developed by the various regional PSO training centers;**

- **b) AU member states may want to select niche areas of expertise in PSOs in which they may specialize, as a way to rationalize capabilities and resources;**

- **c) Given the high degree of expertise needed in**
some functions, the PSOD may want to introduce Standard Assessment Tests not only for members of the police, but also for military and civilians in key specialist areas;

d) The AU and its member states should take advantage of the critical mass of African expertise developed in AMIS to help build capacity in specialized areas as well as in strategic planning and guidance. The experience accumulated by DITF staff should be retained in the form of their incorporation into the PSOD once AMIS is terminated.

Civilian and Expert Hiring

51. Hiring procedures for civilians in PSOs cannot follow the regular AU hiring process, which is much too time-consuming. This was a clear conclusion of the Workshop on the Civilian Dimension of the ASF. The Workshop rightly recommends that the PSOD consider establishing a Rapid Deployment System, not only for civilians, but also for core military and police functions in ASF PSOs, drawing on the DPKO model; it also recommends the establishment of a civilian standby roster.19

The recommendations of the Workshop on the Civilian Dimension of the ASF aimed at facilitating the rapid hiring and deployment of civilians for ASF missions should be followed through. Priority should be given in that context to core components including administrative capacity, political affairs, public information, and humanitarian liaison.

Language

52. The language issue is an important one, and it has two components, one related to communication within the mission, and one to communication with external (local) actors. AMIS has encountered difficulties on both fronts. Within the mission, problems have arisen especially within the police component—this was amply reflected at the seminar—as Francophone officers had difficulty finding their place in a majority English-speaking environment, and they felt their personal skills were not being recognized. Vis-à-vis external actors, the difficulty resided in the lack of qualified interpreters in sufficiently large number to allow for communication with the locals, although a budget for them existed. However, this communica-

tion is essential to ensure that the mandate of the mission is well-understood; it is particularly important for police work (for investigation purposes, but also if, like in AMIS, the CIVPOL component has important training and mentoring tasks of the local police); and it is also vital for Humanitarian Officers and for CIMIC whose role it is to liaise with local actors and NGOs. In addition, without the right language capability, the mission deprives itself of a key information gathering tool. Action will be required at different levels to remedy language gaps in African PSOs:

a) Any AU PSO must have an official language in which guidance and orders are passed, instructions described, information communicated (whether for the purpose of incident analysis or air traffic control), and reports written;

b) Although the official language of AU missions will vary according to the area of deployment, French-speaking African countries will have to make an effort to train their senior officers to master English if they hope to hold commanding positions in future missions. This is important for police officers who serve individually and for senior military officers, less so for members of the contingent and formed police units, should they be deployed;

c) Any future PSO plan must encompass provisions for language assistants or interpreters; this requires not only a budget but a process to identify and recruit the right individuals.

AU Multidimensional Missions: What Level of Ambitions?

53. The 2003 ASF Policy Framework sets the AU’s level of ambitions in PSOs and, to some extent, the way to achieve them. However, against the background of the AMIS experience, a number of elements of the Framework stand out. First, the six scenarios considered, overall, reflect the real world situations the AU and the sub-regions are likely to encounter, with the caveat that the “low level spoilers” envisaged in scenario 5 (multidimensional PSO) may rapidly become “high level spoilers,” necessitating more forceful action of the type envisaged in scenario 6 (intervention). Second, with AMIS, the AU has undertaken a “Scenario 5 +” type of mission, for which it did not anticipate to be ready before 2010. No other component of the international community, either unilaterally or multilaterally, was willing to

intervene to stop the bloodshed in Darfur, and it is all to the AU’s credit that the mission was undertaken at all. However, AMIS has experienced many operational shortcomings, as analyzed above, and its effectiveness has been limited. The experience of AMIS suggests the following considerations:

a) To an extent, the Policy Framework underestimates the requirement for an AU capacity for planning and conduct at the strategic level, assuming that rapid reinforcement and extensive assistance from the UN in the deployment of a strategic HQ will be forthcoming—this may or may not be the case;

b) Strategic level pol/mil interactions, involving relations among various Departments and Divisions of the AU Commission as well as between the Commission and member states, receive little attention;

c) There is very little in the Framework on operational command and control, which is assumed to be handled by the RECs, and the distinction of functions between the strategic and operational level of C2; operational C2 is also under-developed at this point in the ASF Doctrine;

d) Even though the Framework envisages a civilian and police capacity, it gives little sense of the way this capacity could or should be integrated in the planning and conduct of operations—largely reflecting the military origin of the document;

e) The Framework is premised on extremely high levels of assistance from the UN in terms of staffing and technical advice—under the assumption that ASF missions will normally transition to UN operations. Although the UN has provided significant assistance in the case of AMIS, extensive and long term resource allocation on the part of the UN for operational support to African missions cannot be taken for granted;

f) The Framework is further premised on the RECs playing an important part in African operations. While this may at times be the case, AMIS demonstrates that, for political reasons, the AU will also want to undertake major missions directly. In addition, RECs are progressing at a very different pace in tooling themselves for ASF deployments, which may make the assumptions of the Framework applicable in some regions only in the foreseeable future;

g) There is no indication in the Policy Framework of how ASF missions would interface with other actors, in particular local populations and humanitarian agencies, which will co-deploy large contingents with any ASF mission.

54. Phase I of the ASF development work has helped address some of those issues. For Phase II to be successful, however, it seems that an additional number of steps will have to be considered by the AU and its member states. These can be broken down into five components:

**Strategic Level Ambitions and AU-UN Synergies**

55. As highlighted earlier, the UN is a multidimensional and multifaceted body. At this point, however, two strategic factors seem most relevant in view of the ASF Policy Framework and the AMIS experience. First, taking into account resource availability and depth of practice, the AU (and the RECs) cannot and should not aim to duplicate functions that are better performed by other organizations that have greater capacity and experience. This applies in particular to a whole range of functions adjacent to, or deriving from PSOs, e.g., humanitarian assistance, security sector reform (SSR), demobilization, disarmament and reintegration (DDR), comprehensive rule of law reform, and the gamut of post-conflict economic recovery activities led by the World Bank and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). In those areas, what the AU needs is capacity to give guidance and liaise, not to implement. The matter, importantly, is relevant both to the ASF and the AU Framework for Post-Conflict Development (PCRD), a document which spells out in general terms the AU’s level of ambition in post-conflict countries.

Further work is needed in the context of ASF and PCRD development—which have to be considered side-by-side in this context—to define precisely the AU’s level of ambitions in complex PSOs, taking into account the existing functional competencies of the UN, its agencies, and associated bodies (World Bank, IMF). In many PSOs and post-conflict areas, the AU should seek to acquire a capacity to provide strategic guidance, liaise, and interact, not to implement. The 10 year Action Plan for African capacity building endorsed by the 2005 World Summit could be fleshed out to serve as a framework for this effort.

56. The second element is related to the assumption of extensive UN assistance to AU operations. The proposal that the UN should be able to provide financial assistance to regional organizations for peace operations, as well as put at their disposal its Strategic Deployment Stocks (SDS) was made by the High Level Panel on UN reform in 2004.²⁰ However, it
The assumptions on UN assistance underpinning the ASF Policy Framework should be checked to examine their sustainability. Should they prove unsustainable, AU Member States will have to examine two alternative courses of action: a) foresee an increased African contribution and a reduced UN participation in ASF operations; or b) engage with the UN Secretariat and major contributors to the UN peacekeeping budget to obtain a change in financial regulations that would permit major direct assistance (via staff or logistics) to African (AU or REC) operations.

Operational Level Ambitions and Standards

57. Levels of ambitions also have to be defined at the operational / technical level. The UN practice and current efforts to plan and manage integrated missions can be a useful source of inspiration for the AU, e.g., as regards planning methodology, documentation, coordination between police and military forces, joint assessments, validation, etc. However, UN processes are probably too complex—also because they seek to coordinate a larger number of actors—to be copied by the AU. Similarly, there is a danger that, guided by eager leaders and keen partners accustomed to high standards of performance and enabling requirements, the AU may be driven to adopt processes that are excessively complex and equipments that are too delicate, complicated and expensive to maintain.

a) The AU and its partners, including both the UN and Western governments and organizations, have a shared responsibility to ensure that the development of the ASF be guided by sustainability concerns;

b) In matters of integration, the AU’s immediate level of ambition should be that of “minimally multidimensional missions” incorporating a military and police component, with other civilian elements being limited to the core functions of administrative capacity, political affairs, public information and humanitarian liaison.

Mobilizing the AU Commission as a Whole

58. At this stage, the development of the ASF remains largely a preserve of the PSOD and to some extent of the Defense and Security Division, with very limited “buy-in” from the other parts of the Commission. Regrettably, the potential staff growth of the PSOD is creating internal tensions within the institution. The problem needs to be addressed both at the political level by the member states and in administrative terms. First, member states have to recognize that without sufficient and efficient staff at the PSOD, there will be no effective ASF. Second, ASF interventions will be most successful and have longer term stabilizing effect if the efforts of the PSOD are coordinated with, and sustained by, first of all, the other Divisions in the Peace and Security Department, but also those of other AU Commission Departments, including Political Affairs; Social Affairs; Programming, Budgeting, Finance and Accounting; Administration and Human Resources Development; and Economic Affairs.

a) AU member states have to insist that the AU Commission overcomes its reluctance to recruit staff for the PSOD: without staff at the PSOD, there will be no effective ASF;

b) The leadership of the Commission should work with relevant Department Heads to establish appropriate linkages between the PSOD and the Crisis Management Division on the one hand, and other components of the AU Secretariat on the other to define their role in PSOs, especially the Political Department (advice on long term consequences for political stability / sequencing of PSO with institution-building activities);
Social Affairs and the Economic Affairs Departments (reconstruction); the Programming, Budgeting, Finance and Accounting, as well as Administration and Human Resources Development Departments (support).

Increasing AU-RECs Synergies

59. The regional economic communities (RECs) have been closely involved in the ASF Workshops. However, the Workshop process being a mainly technical endeavor, and one largely weighted in favor of the military component of PSOs, it appears that the exposure of RECs civilian actors as well as their political leadership, to ASF development work has been limited. RECs representatives present at the seminar even suggested that in many ways, international partners appeared to be better informed than most African military, police and foreign affairs establishments on ASF developments. Overall, it appears that AU/REC relations have been addressed only at a generic level\(^{21}\) and as a largely legal issue in the ASF documentation work (ASF Workshop on Legal Aspects), rather than at a conceptual level incorporating the political and operational dimension of PSOs. However, important questions lie behind AU/RECs cooperation in PSOs: under what conditions would a REC agree to transfer command and control over its regional brigade to the AU? What kind of liaison / consultation / coordination would have to be put in place between the AU PSC and its counterparts at, say, ECOWAS, SADC or ECCAS prior, during, and after the end of the mission? What would be the political, operational, and financial implications of a REC serving as planning and operational HQ for an AU-mandated mission? The possibility that different types of arrangements may have to be considered with different RECs, although not ideal, should not be ruled out, as whatever is decided must respond to the reality of diverging degrees of RECs cohesion and capacity.

a) All RECs should establish a liaison office in Addis Ababa in order to engage in regular consultations with the PSOD; RECs offices in Addis should be staffed with a range of expertise reflecting the functional scope of the cooperation in PSOs envisaged between each REC and the AU;

b) Pol/mil discussions between the AU and the RECs should be undertaken with a view to clarifying division of roles and responsibilities for the planning and conduct of ASF missions; the distribution of roles and responsibilities may vary from one region to the next.

The Need for High Level Engagement of Member States

60. The ASF is a key component of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), and has to be seen as one among a set of instruments including the Peace and Security Council, the Panel of the Wise, the Continental Early Warning System, and the Special Fund, the efforts of which have to be made complementary to peace and security in Africa. As such, the ASF is also a highly political endeavor. However, as discussed earlier, it appears that ASF development work has been mainly militarily-driven and has only marginally involved the political establishments of national capitals so far. As with key decisions on finance, as well as relationships with external actors (including the UN) and the RECS, the distribution of roles within the AU Commission need to be made in the next few years. And high-level national capital engagement will be necessary in this regard.

a) AU member states committed to the ASF, with the support of committed partners, should convince the AU to launch an information strategy targeting African national political, diplomatic, police and military establishments on the development of the ASF;

b) National capitals of AU member states have to engage in ASF work at the highest political level as often as required. Political, institutional and financial obstacles to the standing of the ASF will not be overcome if they are left only to the functional experts and/or the military to solve.
Annex I

AMIS Chronology

8 April 2004: the Sudanese parties (Government of Sudan, Sudanese Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) sign a Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement (HCFA) and a Protocol on the Establishment of Humanitarian Assistance in Darfur under the auspices of President Idriss Deby of Chad and the Chairperson of the AU Commission. Under the HCFA, the parties agree, among others, to

- Cease hostilities and proclaim a ceasefire
- Establish a Ceasefire Commission (CFC) reporting to a Joint Commission (JC)
- Facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance

28 May 2004: the Sudanese parties sign an Agreement on the Modalities for the Establishment of the CFC and the Deployment of Military Observers in the Darfur Region. The agreement includes modalities for the deployment of 60 African Military Observers (MILOBs) and a 300 Protection Force, as well as observers from the Sudanese parties

June 2004: AMIS I becomes operational with the establishment of an embryonic HQ in El Fashir, the deployment of the CFC and the first group of MILOBs

27 June 2004: the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) requests the Chairperson of the Commission to submit a comprehensive plan on how best to enhance the effectiveness of AMIS

20 Oct 2004: the PSC approves AMIS II. The plans provides for the transformation of the nature, scope and composition of AMIS:

- An increase in size to 3,320 personnel, including 2,341 military personnel, among whom 450 MILOBs, and a new CIVPOL component of up to 815 personnel
- The establishment of a civilian component
- The nomination of a Special Representative of the Chairperson of the Commission (SRCC), to “ensure the overall direction and coordination of the activities of the Mission” and “maintain close contact with the Sudanese parties, as well as the UN and all other concerned actors”

The PSC also authorizes AMIS to perform the following mandate:

- monitor and observe compliance with the HCFA and all future agreements
- assist in confidence building
- contribute to a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian relief and the return of IDPs and refugees to their homes
- contribute to the improvement of the security situation in Darfur within the following constraint: “[AMIS is] to protect civilians who it encounters under imminent threat and in the immediate vicinity, within resources and capability, it being understood that the protection of the civilian population is the responsibility of the Government of the Sudan”

January 2005: the DITF is established with the aim of supporting AMIS with “strategic planning and support,” scheduling deployment and coordinating with international partners

10–22 March 2005: Joint Assessment Mission, including the participation of some AU partners (e.g., UN, EU, US). The Mission concludes that AMIS should be strengthened initially in two phases:

- to end May 2005, AMIS II should reach full operational effectiveness within its existing authorized strength of 3,320. Achieving this aim requires:
  - full deployment of military, police and other civilian personnel
  - filling the gaps in logistics and administrative support
  - enhancing structures for organization, management, command and control of the Mission, including the creation of a Joint Logistics Operation Centre (JLOC) and a Joint Operations Centre (JOC)
- subsequently, AMIS II should be expanded to almost double the size of its military personnel and double the size of its CIVPOL contingent

28 April 2005: the PSC endorses most of the recommendations of the Joint Assessment Mission and congruent recommendations of the Military Staff Committee held on 25 April 2005. It decides to

- increase the strength of AMIS to 6,171 military personnel, up to 1,560 CIVPOL and an appropriate civilian component
• request the Commission to review AMIS CIVPOL CONOPs to enable it to perform its tasks in areas where there is no GoS police presence

**Summer 2005:** partners commit and deploy significant extensive financial, logistical and technical assistance to AMIS

**20 Oct 2005:** the PSC extends the mandate of AMIS for 3 months (to 20 January 2006), pending a review of all aspects of the situation in Darfur and AMIS operations (i.e., a possible transition to a UN operation)

**10–20 December 2005:** Joint Assessment Mission, including the participation of some AU partners (e.g., UN, EU, US). Recommendations include:

• the upgrading of the JLOC
• a reiteration of an earlier recommendation that a JOC be created at Forward HQ level to coordinate operations of all components of the Mission
• a reorganization of the Force HQ to place all components, including the CFC, under the Command and Control of the DHoM

**10 March 2006:** the PSC extends the mandate of AMIS until 30 September 2006 and conditions the transition to a UN operation upon:

• the acceptance of the Government of Sudan (GoS)
• a successful outcome of the Abuja Peace Talks and a significant improvement in the security and humanitarian situation on the ground
• the maintenance, as much as possible, of the African character of the mission

**5 May 2006:** signature of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA)

**15 May 2006:** the PSC

• endorses the DPA
• urges those groups that have not signed it to do so by 31st May
• states that the DPA paves the way for the transition from AMIS to a UN operation after 30 September
• requires the Chairperson of the AU Commission to submit detailed proposals for

**16 May 2006:** UN Security Council Resolution 1679 provides for a transition from AMIS to a UN mission

**9–22 June 2006:** UN/AU joint technical assessment mission to Sudan and Chad

**13 June 2006:** launch of the restructured CFC in El Fashir, and 23 June 2006, launch of the restructured JC (Addis), taking into account the DPA

**23 June 2006:** the Military Staff Committee approves a new CONOPS calling for a shift of AMIS from an observer mission to a more robust peacekeeping operation, requiring a restructuring of the force, a strengthening of its command and control, and attendant communication and information systems, and an increase in size of both its military and police contingents

**27 June 2006:** the PSC

• recognizes those groups that have not signed the DPA, but have signed the Declaration of Commitment (DoC) on 8 June [i.e., Abdul Wahid SLM and Khalil’s JEM] and urges them to work towards the effective implementation of the DPA; it requests the AU Commission to develop practical modalities for their effective involvement
• takes note of the new AMIS CONOPS and “decides to consider it at the appropriate time, in the light of any decision on a transition to the UN and the availability of logistical and financial support”
• approves the additional tasks proposed under the CONOPS “including the protection of civilians within existing strength and capacity”

**20 September 2006:** the PSC (Heads of state and Government)

• extends the mandate of AMIS until 31 December 2006
• reiterates its commitment to work for a transition to a UN mission
• requests the Commission “to take all the necessary measures to enhance AMIS on the basis of the CONOPS” approved by the Military Staff Committee on 23rd June, conditional upon UN and other partners’ assistance
30 November 2006: the PSC (Heads of state and government)

- endorses a three-phase UN support package to AMIS leading to a hybrid operation
- extends the mandate of AMIS until 30 June 2007.

Annex II

Humanitarian Agencies and Principles

- The Geneva Conventions are the bedrock of International Humanitarian Law, available at www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/gen evaconventions
- The Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) is the primary mechanism for inter-agency coordination of humanitarian assistance. The IASC is chaired by the UN Office of Humanitarian Affairs; full members are the major UN agencies (UNICEF, UNDP, etc.), while standing invitees include organizations such as the World Bank and major NGO coordinations, available at www.humanitarianinfo.org/iasc/
- A number of Guidelines relevant to the relationship between the military component in PSOs and humanitarian agencies have been issued under the auspices of IASC and OCHA:

Annex III

Training Opportunities in Humanitarian Principles and Civil-Military Coordination

Humanitarian Principles

- The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) provides both standard training programs and training upon request, available at www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/iwpList2/I nfo_resources:Events?OpenDocument#%3C!--%20d%20--%3ETraining%20courses

Civil-Military Coordination

- UN OCHA (Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs) offers training programs in civil-military coordination from the perspective of the major UN humanitarian agencies, available at ochaoonline.un.org/webpage.asp?Page=1004
- Among African institutions, South-Africa based ACCORD (African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes) offers training programs in civil-military coordination as well as a range of civilian PSO specialties; both the Nairobi-based Peace Support Training Centre (PSTC) and the Accra-based KAIPTC offer CIMIC training based on a common African approach developed in partnership with ACCORD.
- Information on further courses can be obtained from the African Peace Support Trainers Association, available at www.apsta-africa.org/information.
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