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Civil Society and the State: Partnership for Peace in the Great Lakes Region

Rapporteur: Dr. Jacqueline Klopp



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About IPA's Africa Program

The civil society task force meeting "Civil Society and the State: Partnership for Peace in the Great Lakes Region," jointly organized by IPA and Africa Peace Forum, Kenya, took place from 21–22 June 2004 in Nairobi, Kenya. The meeting was an important follow-up policy dialogue to the policy seminar, "Peace, Security, and Governance in the Great Lakes Region," which took place in December 2003 in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. In convening this policy dialogue, IPA brought together approximately thirty civil society activists, scholars, and representatives of the Office of the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region. The task force meeting served as a major component of the Africa Program's current three-year project (2003–2006) on strengthening Africa's security mechanisms and actors.

The Africa Program of IPA works with partner institutions:

- To serve as a useful guide to Africa's regional organizations and actors in assessing their strengths and weaknesses in the area of conflict prevention, management, and resolution;
- To identify the key factors required to maximize the potential of Africa's fledgling security mechanisms and to provide tangible support for the efforts of regional organizations at strengthening their political and military institutions;
- To share comparative experiences between, and learn policy lessons from, the African Union, the New Partnership for Africa's Development, and sub-regional organizations, such as the Economic Community of West African States, the Southern African Development Community, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, the East African Community, and the Economic Community of Central African States;
- To encourage the involvement of civil society actors in developing and shaping Africa's regional security mechanisms and to facilitate the development of civil society networking within Africa;
- To serve as a valuable resource for external actors and donors involved in assisting the development of Africa's security mechanisms;
- To create networks of knowledgeable and interested Africans to influence developments on their continent through interaction among themselves; and
- To provide a resource for scholars and students of conflict management in Africa, particularly since there exists a paucity of knowledge on the continent's institutions and actors engaged in the field of conflict management.

About the Africa Peace Forum

The Nairobi-based Africa Peace Forum (APFO) strives to promote peace and human security in eastern Africa through research and analyses on early warning and conflict management strategies and the development of community-based peace initiatives. APFO works closely with governments, inter-governmental and non-governmental entities, and research institutions in Africa and abroad. It is the lead agency in the Forum on Early Warning and Early Response (FEWER) network.

About the Rapporteur

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Executive Summary

The civil society task force meeting “Civil Society and the State: Partnership for Peace in the Great Lakes Region,” jointly organized by the International Peace Academy (IPA) and Africa Peace Forum (Kenya) took place from 21–22 June 2004 in Nairobi, Kenya. The meeting, opened by the foreign minister of Kenya, Honorable Stephen Kalonzo Musyoka, was an important follow-up policy dialogue to the seminar “Peace, Security, and Governance in the Great Lakes Region,” which took place in December 2003 in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. In convening this policy dialogue, IPA brought together approximately thirty civil society activists, scholars, and representatives of the Office of the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General (SRSG) for the Great Lakes Region.

The goals of this policy dialogue were two-fold. First, the task force sought to provide recommendations for increasing the participation and voice of civil society groups within a regional dialogue on peace. Second, participants generated recommendations for the SRSG on organizing an effective, inclusive, and comprehensive *International Conference on the Great Lakes Region* (IC/GLR). As Professor Ibrahim Fall, the SRSG for the Great Lakes Region, emphasized, non-governmental actors will have a key role to play in both formulating concrete proposals for peace and regional stability and in ensuring that the final recommendations emerging from this policy process are implemented. In light of these important roles, this forum gave activists and scholars a chance to critically assess and define their roles relative to the state in the Great Lakes region’s peacebuilding process and to exchange experiences across countries in the region, with the aim of developing denser and more effective regional networks and action. Particular areas of concern included: how to carve out space for an open public dialogue in order to create a constructive state-society partnership in peacebuilding; how to challenge exclusive notions of citizenship that may subsequently legitimize violence; and how to grapple, in concrete ways, with the human costs of violence in the Great

Lakes region, such as the large numbers of refugees and internally displaced people.

The Great Lakes region has shown some hopeful signs of emerging from the conflict that has gripped it continuously since at least 1993. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), peace agreements have brought a transitional government to power. In Burundi, the peace agreement has been accepted by the largest Hutu insurgency, and Rwanda appears to show signs of political normalcy. However, openings for peace and security in the Great Lakes region continue to be fragile; “the first African war” centered on the DRC, which led to an estimated 3.3 million deaths, may not yet be over. Current threats to peace and stability are many. Particularly troubling are the spoilers in the DRC¹ – reflected in the ongoing violence in the eastern DRC, the attempted coups in Kinshasa, the intractability of the *Parti pour la libération du peuple hutu-Forces nationales de libération* (PALIPEHUTU-FNL), and the debate about elections in Burundi, as well as the narrowing of political space and entrenchment of structural violence in Rwanda.

Policy Recommendations and the Way Forward

Recognizing many challenges to the region’s stability, a number of key policy recommendations for consideration within the context of the IC/GLR emerged out of the discussions. Important areas covered by these discussions include: improving the effectiveness of civil society in peacebuilding, promoting public dialogue and inclusive notions of citizenship, involving international and regional actors in peacebuilding, and developing a more comprehensive and regional approach to refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs).

Improving the Effectiveness of Civil Society in Peacebuilding

The potential of civil society actors in peacebuilding needs to be better supported and developed. It was felt that civil society actors are more effective in their peace efforts when they build on pre-existing strengths

¹ The idea of spoilers is more fully explored in Stephen John Stedman, “Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes,” *International Security* 22, no. 2 (Fall 1997): 5–63.

and networks. Most importantly, civil society organizations (CSOs) can increase their credibility as participants in policy dialogues by establishing sets of standards and norms that would govern their engagement in peacebuilding. Participants therefore recommended more coordination of roles within CSOs, to make them more complementary rather than competitive. Better networking around core issues and themes both nationally and in the Great Lakes region would enhance coordination. The IC/GLR has served as a catalyst – with regional preparatory meetings and task force meetings, such as those organized by IPA – to create key opportunities to develop regional networks. This needs to be followed with concrete actions for further developing, maintaining, and fostering these networks. Such networks will be important in holding governments accountable to the *Stability, Security, and Development Pact* to emerge at the end of the IC/GLR.

Participants also urged CSOs to reduce their dependency on states and donors, which currently hamper the autonomy and effectiveness of these organizations. The region needs its own resource-mobilization strategies. Such strategies include bringing in contributions from the private sector, which has a strong interest in peace. CSOs should also be more actively involved in the IC/GLR process as stakeholders. Another possibility raised in the meeting was the formation of a regional fund, perhaps through the African Union (AU), that could be drawn on in times of crisis.

Promoting Public Dialogue and Inclusive Notions of Citizenship

Participants recognized the critical role played by the media and by public discourse, more generally, in interpreting past and present violence. Such interpretations can reinforce negative cycles of violence or play more constructively into reconciliation and peacebuilding. Ways must be found to counter exclusive and state-controlled public dialogues and to insert moderating voices for peace. A regional media

that would transmit a culture of peace and confront facile analyses of conflicts based on primordial hatreds and grievances should be established.

Peacemakers should avoid rewarding violence by including its perpetrators as negotiation partners while excluding those waging peace. Non-violent institutions and CSOs must find a space in discussions and negotiations around peace processes. Including CSOs adds the contextual local knowledge necessary to the peace processes in different parts of the Great Lakes region.

Involving International and Regional Actors in Peacebuilding

All the key actors in the region should be involved in the IC/GLR. Specifically, thought might be given to how actors influential in the region, such as South Africa, the United States, France, and multinational corporations can be more integrally involved in the IC/GLR. Further, given the linkages of the Great Lakes conflict with events in Angola and the Republic of Congo, the IC/GLR should include them as core countries.

All the Great Lakes countries should be encouraged to join regional initiatives – in particular NEPAD (the New Partnership for Africa's Development) and its African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). While many regional initiatives are linked to common economic objectives, more emphasis needs to be on building regional institutions and networks for peacebuilding. More specifically, participants suggested that assistance be provided for the regionalization of civil society through networks that span the core countries of the region. In this regard, the idea arose of a regional and independent human rights commission, which would meet regularly to share information across the region or civil society advisory assemblies at the regional level. In addition, participants suggested the establishment of a regional fund to finance civil society's peacebuilding-related activities. Finally, while Democratic Dialogues for a single country have been

tried with some success, the IC/GLR might help catalyze regional Democratic Dialogues.²

Developing a More Comprehensive and Regional Approach to Refugees and Internally Displaced People

Recognizing that lack of peace and security and bad governance are root causes of forced migration, the complex set of issues centering on refugees and IDPs should not be confined to the IC/GLR theme of “humanitarian and social issues.” Instead, refugee and IDP issues must be seen as a critical part of all the themes of the upcoming Great Lakes conference. One recommendation that emerged was that the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), the AU and all those involved in the IC/GRL should facilitate a stakeholders’ meeting (involving government officials, civil society, and refugee representatives). The aim would be to develop a refugee and IDP policy framework with specific benchmarks and, potentially, standardization.

Some of the issues that need to be on the agenda of both a stakeholders’ meeting and the IC/GLR discussion of refugees and IDPs include:

- Explore the option of developing national institutions such as refugee boards, which involve government, non-governmental organizations, the UNHCR, and refugee representatives;
- Critical scrutiny of the problem of “camps,” which tend to increase insecurity and marginalize refugees;

- Specifically advocate that member countries of the IC/GLR adopt the *Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement* developed by the Secretary-General’s Special Representative on IDPs, with the aim of incorporating them into national legislation;
- Critical examination of the need to formulate an appropriate asylum policy for those in particular danger;
- Effective integration of the local host and refugee and IDP populations within development policy, planning, and practice;
- Avoid “re-circulation” of combatants; find ways to make disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, reintegration, and resettlement programs regional. Such programs should, in addition to combatants, consider combatants’ families – many of whom are IDPs or refugees;
- Incorporate the treatment and the inflow of refugees and IDPs into benchmarks for good governance and as part of the APRM for those countries that have acceded to the mechanism. Other countries not party to the peer review mechanism should be encouraged to join; and
- Members of the IC/GLR should adopt the following as a core principle:

“Member states will respect the 1969 Organization of African Unity’s Refugee Convention and further, act against those who instigate violence that causes forced migration.”

² Democratic Dialogues are a relatively new technique used in conflict resolution where people from a conflict-ridden country and diaspora, from opposing vantage points, are brought together on neutral ground to examine the different scenarios for their country. It is a way to build a core consensus and make people imagine alternatives to violence. For example, the *Nederland Comité Burundi* (NCB) has facilitated such dialogues for Burundi. See *Nederland Comité Burundi, Scenarios pour le Burundi* (Zwolle, The Netherlands: NCB, 2000).

1. Introduction

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The goals of this policy dialogue were two-fold. First, the task force sought to provide recommendations for increasing the participation and voice of civil society groups within a regional dialogue on peace. Second, participants generated recommendations for the SRSG on organizing an effective, inclusive, and comprehensive *International Conference on the Great Lakes Region* (IC/GLR). As the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region (SRSG), Professor Ibrahima Fall, emphasized, non-governmental actors will have a key role to play in both formulating concrete proposals for peace and regional stability and in ensuring that the final recommendations emerging from this policy process are implemented. In light of these important roles, this forum gave activists and scholars a chance to critically assess and define their roles relative to the state in the Great Lakes region’s peacebuilding process and exchange experiences across countries in the region –

with the aim to develop denser and more effective regional networks and action. Key areas of concern included: how to carve out space for an open public dialogue to create a constructive state-society partnership in peacebuilding; how to challenge exclusive notions of citizenship that legitimize violence; and how to grapple in concrete ways with the human costs of violence in the Great Lakes region, such as the large numbers of refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs).

Brief Overview of the Conflict in the Great Lakes Region

The ongoing violence in the Great Lakes region has multiple and complex dynamics. These dynamics have led competing and hostile interests of individuals, groups, and states to produce extreme violence in a struggle for power, resources, and security. Although the conflict has been conditioned by historical factors including colonial legacies, the current cycle of regionalized violence may be said to have begun in the 1993 civil war in Burundi. This violence began when the assassination of Hutu president Melchior Ndadaye triggered massacres of Tutsi, which in turn provoked reprisals by the Tutsi-dominated army. The result was a spurt of violence that would take 300,000 lives, create 600,000 to 800,000 refugees and roughly 500,000 IDPs.⁴ Refugees went to Tanzania, Zaire,⁵ and Rwanda, where they brought tales of terror. This fed into the ongoing process of intense politicization of ethnicity and its transformation into extreme ideologies justifying the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, where at least 800,000 people, both Tutsis and moderate Hutus, were brutally exterminated.⁶ The genocide occurred within the context of the civil war in Rwanda and was instigated by the downing of the plane on 6 April 1994 carrying President

³ IPA, Office of the SRSG for the Great Lakes Region (Kenya), African Dialogue Centre for Conflict Management and Development Issues (Tanzania), Centre for Conflict Resolution (South Africa), Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation (Tanzania), and the UN Sub-regional Centre for Democracy and Human Rights in Central Africa (Cameroon), *Peace, Security, and Governance in the Great Lakes Region*, December 2003, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.

⁴ See US Committee for Refugees, “Burundi: A Patchwork of Displacement,” in Roberta Cohen and Francis Deng, eds., *Forsaken People: Case Studies of the Internally Displaced* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1998); and Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), *A Strategic Conflict Analysis for the Great Lakes Region* (March 2004).

⁵ Zaire is now the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

⁶ See Alison Des Forges, *Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999).

Juvenal Habyarimana of Rwanda. The genocide only ended when the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), consisting of many Tutsi exiles from Uganda and funded in part by the Rwandan diaspora, won the war and took Kigali on 4 July 1994. The gross failure of key international actors, including the United Nations, to prevent the Rwandan genocide has been widely recognized not only as a major tragedy, but also as a factor that has played into perpetuating regional dynamics of violence.⁷

Besides creating enormous upheaval and destruction of human life within the borders of Burundi and Rwanda, this extreme violence had profound regional repercussions. Nearly two million refugees flowed into Tanzania and Zaire. When President Mobutu Sese Sekou agreed to provide space for an estimated 20,000 Hutu soldiers and 50,000 militia members, including those responsible for much of the killing in the genocide, the dynamics of the region became intertwined with the dynamics of genocide in Rwanda. These militias created military bases next to the refugee camps, survived on relief food, and continued to terrorize refugees in camps that they effectively controlled, and staged cross-border raids.⁸ In response, the Rwandan government invaded to create a security zone. The failure to disarm these militants is largely recognized as yet another tragic failure of the international community to curtail perpetrators of violence and halt the spread of violent conflict.⁹

The inflow of over a million Hutu refugees fresh from the genocide in Rwanda into Zaire also had an enormous impact on local populations, economies, and politics in places like the Kivu regions in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The flood of

Rwandan refugees created land pressures and politicized further the problems of extreme poverty, inequalities, and unequal distribution of resources, which make populations more vulnerable to recruitment into violence. Specifically, these pressures generated politically manipulated resentment against all *Banyarwanda*, or people – either Hutu or Tutsi – seen to be of Rwandan origin, regardless of whether or not they were recent arrivals or had been living there before any border between Zaire and Rwanda was ever constructed. Thus, citizenship issues became politicized and to complicate things further, the large numbers of Hutu refugees were liable to recruitment by the *Interhamwe/ex-FAR (Forces Armées Rwandaises)*, reinforcing their numbers. Alarmed by this situation that could lead to a continuation of genocide targeted at the Congolese Tutsi, sometimes known as the *Banyamulenge*, in 1996 Rwanda, Uganda, a faction of the *Banyamulenge* elite, and anti-Mobutu forces led by Laurent Kabila toppled Mobutu.

This alliance that overthrew Mobutu did not last long, especially given the need for Kabila to develop an internal basis of support. He did this in part by turning against the “Rwandans” including the *Banyamulenge*. This triggered the second phase of the war: on August 1998, a joint Rwandan-Ugandan military operation supporting the Goma-based *Rassemblement Congolais pour la démocratie* entered the DRC; Kabila was supported by troops from Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe, and Chad. Libya allegedly provided funding.¹⁰ Eventually, a cease-fire agreement was negotiated at Lusaka. However, implementation of this agreement and others only made progress when Joseph Kabila took over the presidency in the DRC.¹¹

⁷ See IPA, *10 Years After Genocide in Rwanda: Building Consensus for Responsibility to Protect*, New York, March 2004.

⁸ See Alexander Cooley and James Ron, “The NGO Scramble,” *International Security* 27, no. 1 (Summer 2002): 5–39; and Human Rights Watch/Arms Project, *Rearming with Impunity: International Support for the Perpetrators of the Rwandan Genocide* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1995).

⁹ This criticism persists with many arguing that the international community is failing to properly support MONUC (the Mission of the United Nations in the Congo), which still has not disarmed those responsible for the 1994 genocide. See SIDA, *A Strategic Conflict Analysis for the Great Lakes Region*, p. 186.

¹⁰ See International Crisis Group, *Africa’s Seven Nation War*, ICG Democratic Republic of the Congo Report No 4, 21 May 1999 (electronic version).

¹¹ Agreements include: *The Global and Inclusive Agreement on Transition in the DRC* (signed December 2002 in Pretoria), the *Luanda Agreement* (September 2002) between DRC and Uganda, the *Pretoria Agreement* (July 2002) between DRC and Rwanda and the *Sun City Agreement* (April 2002) between DRC and the MLC (*Mouvement de libération Congolaise*).

Currently, the persisting presence of armed groups in eastern DRC constitutes a serious impediment to peace. These groups include: extremist Hutu militias, various local militias backed by Rwanda and Uganda, the SPLA (Sudanese People's Liberation Army), and the Rwandan and Ugandan armies. The high degree of intervention by neighboring countries and other external actors has made this ongoing war extremely complex and difficult to resolve. These negative dynamics are exacerbated by the lack of mediating structures, the use of violence as a form of negotiation, and the enormous wealth of the DRC. This wealth has led to illicit resource exploitation, vested interests in the war economy, and the purchase of armaments by different parties to perpetuate violence.¹² These armaments continue to flow into the region despite a UN embargo.¹³

The Regional Approach: International Conference on the Great Lakes Region

Recognizing the intensification of serious security issues between Rwanda and the DRC in the aftermath of the genocide in 1994, the UN Security Council and the Organization of African Unity proposed an *International Conference on the Great Lakes Region* that would address "Peace, Security, Democracy and Development in the Great Lakes Region, in which all the governments of the region and other parties concerned would participate."¹⁴ The rationale for the conference stems from recognition of three critical dynamics: 1) the war in the DRC had regional dimensions; 2) because the people of the Great Lakes



Honorable Stephen Kalonzo Musyoka, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Republic of Kenya.

region are inextricably linked, instability in one country may quickly engulf the whole region; and 3) durable solutions to conflicts in any one country can only be addressed within a regional framework.¹⁵ The ultimate aim of this conference is to establish a regional framework leading to the implementation of a *Stability, Security and Development Pact* around four thematic clusters: 1) Peace and Security; 2) Democracy and Governance; 3) Economic Development and Regional Integration; and 4) Humanitarian and Social Issues.¹⁶

In 2003, a series of preparatory processes started for the IC/GLR. This involved a number of meetings of national preparatory committees for core countries (Burundi, DRC, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia),¹⁷ regional preparatory committees, and

¹² The UN set up an expert panel to investigate the natural resource exploitation in the DRC. See their final report: UN Security Council, "Letter dated 15 October 2002 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council," (S/2002/1146), 16 October 2002, Annex: "Final Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo."

¹³ UN Security Council, "Letter dated 15 July 2004 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the President of the Security Council," (S/2004/551), 15 July 2004.

¹⁴ Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, (PSC/PR/2.(IV), 6 April 2004 (electronic version), paragraph 3.

¹⁵ UN Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General on preparations for an international conference on the Great Lakes region," (S/2003/1099), 17 November 2003 (electronic version), paragraph 3.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, paragraph 8.

¹⁷ Other countries and external actors that have an interest in the region are also involved.

thematic meetings that involved women, youth, and civil society. Within this process, CSOs are expected to be involved in each national preparatory committee, as well as in the thematic meetings.¹⁸ Hence, developing a concrete, critical, and creative approach to civil society-state partnerships in this process is an important policy task.

Plan of the Report

The overarching theme emerging from the meeting was the need for realistic, creative civil society input into



Professor Ibrahim Fall, Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region.

the regionally-based peace and development processes catalyzed, supported, and sustained by the IC/GLR. In order to make the broad outlines of such civil society input clear, this report first looks at challenges facing the prospects for peace and security, and the implications of these challenges for civil society-state partnerships for peace. Sections two through five of the report follow the four thematic areas of the proposed *Stability, Security and Development Pact*. Section three takes a careful look at how strategic coalitions and

networks, often involving women, can play a key role in peacebuilding and more specifically how such civil society networks might play a role in the IC/GLR. Section four examines the need for the protection of citizenship rights and the fostering of open public dialogue to support forces of reconciliation, and looks at how civil society and the media will be key actors in pushing this agenda. Section five examines critical ways that peacebuilding can be enhanced through mechanisms of regional political and economic integration. Section six takes a multifaceted look at refugees and internally displaced peoples. Finally, the report concludes with concrete policy recommendations. Throughout, the report delineates potential civil society concerns and roles and emphasizes the need for a holistic approach that takes into account the interconnections between the four thematic areas.

2. Challenges and Prospects for Peace and Security in the Great Lakes Region

The Great Lakes region has shown some hopeful signs of emerging from the conflict that has gripped it continuously since at least 1993. In the DRC, peace agreements have brought a transitional government to power. In Burundi, the largest Hutu insurgency has accepted the peace agreement, and Rwanda appears to show signs of political normalcy. However, openings for peace and security in the Great Lakes region continue to be fragile; “the first African war” centered on the DRC, which led to an estimated 3.3 million deaths, may not yet be over.¹⁹ Current threats to peace and stability are many. Particularly troubling are the spoilers²⁰ in the DRC, which are reflected in the ongoing violence in the eastern DRC and the attempted coups in Kinshasa, the intractability of the *Parti pour la libération du peuple hutu-Forces nationales de libération* (PALIPEHUTU-

¹⁸ Professor Ibrahim Fall, UN SRSG, “Civil Society and the State: Partnership for Peace in the Great Lakes Region.” Opening Statement at the task force meeting organized by IPA in Nairobi, Kenya, from 21–22 June 2004.

¹⁹ Batabiha Bushoki Josiah, “The Democratic Republic of the Congo: ‘Wait: The First All African War Is Not Yet Over,’” paper presented at the task force meeting organized by IPA in Nairobi, Kenya, from 21–22 June 2004. For the 3.3 million figure see, International Rescue Committee (IRC), *Mortality in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: Results from a Nationwide Survey* (New York: International Rescue Committee, April 2003).

²⁰ The idea of spoilers is explored extensively in Stephen John Stedman, “Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes,” *International Security* 22, no. 2 (Fall 1997): 5–53.

FNL), and the debate about elections in Burundi, as well as the narrowing of political space and entrenchment of structural violence in Rwanda.

Burundi

After two and a half years of negotiations, a South-African-brokered peace agreement for Burundi was signed on 28 August 2000. The United Nations has taken over from the African Mission in Burundi and is responsible for facilitating the implementation of the agreement between the government and former rebel groups. The largest rebel group, the *Conseil national pour la défense de la démocratie*, which draws support from groups within Tanzania, including refugees,²¹ is also a signatory to this agreement.

Despite this agreement, political tensions persist and the peace is fragile. Per the peace agreement, elections are scheduled for the end of October 2004. However, the government of President Domitien Ndayizeye is seeking to push elections back one year, arguing that this is needed to ensure security at the polls. The opposition demands that the election proceed as was agreed. As the date gets closer for elections, the laws to ensure a free and fair election are not yet in place, and the issue of whether or how Burundi refugees are to vote remains a contentious and difficult one to resolve.²² Debates over ethnic shares of power and resources persist with continuing feelings of marginalization by large sections of the population.

Also worrying is that the PALIPEHUTU-FNL rebel faction led by Agathon Rwasa has not yet joined the negotiations over the transition, posing a major stumbling block to a peaceful transition. The PALIPEHUTU-FNL is linked to Hutu groups in the DRC including the *Interhamwe* and ex-FAR who were

culpable in the 1994 genocide in Rwanda,²³ underscoring that peace in Burundi is linked to regional considerations, including particular events in eastern DRC. The recent massacre in the Gatumba refugee camp near the capital has brought this regional dimension to the fore and also reflects the fragility of the ongoing peace process.²⁴ The PALIPEHUTU-FNL has claimed responsibility for the attack and the government of Burundi has put out an arrest warrant for PALIPEHUTU-FNL leaders, including Rwasa, deepening the likelihood of more violence and making it unlikely that he could be easily incorporated into a transition. Finally, as contention and uncertainty over elections continues and halting steps are made in implementing the peace agreement, violence in the province of rural Bujumbura rages on.²⁵

In this context, civil society in Burundi is badly needed. Yet it is currently playing less of a role than it



From left to right: Mr. Noël Twagiramungu, Utrecht University; Mr. Batabiha Bushoki Josiah, Africa Initiative Program; Mr. Jean-Marie Kavumbagu, *Ligue ITEKA*; Dr. Josephine Odera, Africa Peace Forum; and Honorable Stephen Kalonzo Musyoka, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Republic of Kenya.

²¹ SIDA, *A Strategic Conflict Analysis for the Great Lakes Region*, p. 143.

²² See Jeremy Grace and Jeff Fischer, *Enfranchising Conflict-Forced Migrants: Issues, Standards and Best Practices* (International Organization for Migration, 29 September 2003). In October 2004, the government pushed elections back until April 2005, citing the failure to pass constitutional reform.

²³ SIDA, *A Strategic Conflict Analysis for the Great Lakes Region*, p. 143.

²⁴ See Human Rights Watch, *Burundi: The Gatumba Massacre: War Crimes and Political Agendas* (New York: Human Rights Watch, September 2004).

²⁵ See Human Rights Watch, *Burundi: Suffering in Silence: Civilians in Continuing Combat in Bujumbura Rural* (New York: Human Rights Watch, June 2004).

should, although groups like *Ligue ITEKA* are sensitizing the population through civic education about human rights, the constitution, the need for peace, and a proper electoral code to make transfers of power fair and transparent. Civil society groups would like to see the United Nations assist in setting up a commission to look into the massacres of 1993, and further, as a matter of urgency, have asked the international community to pressure the rebels that do not yet respect the cease-fire to go back to the negotiating table.²⁶ More forceful action is also required by national, regional, and international actors to prevent ongoing civilian deaths in the fighting in rural Bujumbura.²⁷

The Democratic Republic of the Congo

The signing of the *Global and Inclusive Agreement on Transition in the Democratic Republic of the Congo* in Pretoria on 17 December 2002 and the subsequent establishment of the Government of National Unity and Transition are positive steps towards peace and stability. However serious obstacles to an enduring resolution of violent conflict remain. The transitional government has serious internal problems as witnessed by the attempted coup on 11 June 2004. Further, despite UN Security Council Resolution 1493 of 28 July 2003 authorizing an arms embargo, direct and indirect assistance from states in the region and from sources in the DRC continue to be provided to armed groups operating in Ituri, the Kivus, and in other parts of the DRC, fueling a continuation of hostilities.²⁸ In a very real sense then, the war in the DRC, which began in 1998 and has claimed over 3.3 million lives, is not yet over.²⁹ In addition, as a consequence of war and state-collapse, the majority of Congolese people suffer from enormous poverty; some estimates suggest that eighty

percent of the population is living on less than \$0.20 a day and the country as a whole has one of the lowest ranks in the Human Development Index.³⁰

In this difficult context, civil society in the DRC has done a great deal in terms of fostering peace and reconciliation. In places like the Kivus, civil society groups have managed to foster a climate of solidarity across ethnic and political lines. However, they face the basic problem that they need the state as a partner in constructing the rule of law, in preventing the ongoing impunity for crimes, and in promoting reconciliation. Besides the absence of an effective state in the DRC, the current attempts at peacebuilding face the limitations of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, which ended the war but did not go far enough to secure the peace. Equally important, the ongoing involvement of Rwanda and Uganda within Congolese borders must be addressed at the IC/GLR.³¹ Furthermore, civil society in the DRC feels that it is the victim of international apathy and injustice, as it is getting inadequate support and attention, especially if places like the Kivus are compared to Kosovo.³²

Rwanda

Progress has been made since the trauma and upheaval associated with the 1994 genocide. Basic security exists for most Rwandans and the country is moving towards greater regional cooperation through its application for entry into the East African Community (EAC). However, concerns were raised about problems that could ultimately undermine peace and security both internally and regionally. The apparent closure of social and political space for CSOs and a constructive public dialogue are worrying. In particular, concerns were raised about the delivery of justice, reconciliation,

²⁶ Jean-Marie Kavumbagu, "Exchanges and Perspectives for Peace and Security in the Region of Great Lakes: Case of Burundi," paper presented at the task force meeting organized by IPA in Nairobi, Kenya, from 21–22 June 2004.

²⁷ See Human Rights Watch, *Burundi: Suffering in Silence*.

²⁸ UN Security Council, (S/2004/551), paragraph 25.

²⁹ IRC, *Mortality in the Democratic Republic of the Congo*. See also Bushoki, "The Democratic Republic of the Congo."

³⁰ SIDA, *A Strategic Conflict Analysis for the Great Lakes Region*, p. 182; United Nations, *Human Development Report* (New York: United Nations, 2003).

³¹ Bushoki, "The Democratic Republic of the Congo."

³² *Ibid.*

and reparations for victims of the genocide as well as the use of the genocide to silence criticism of the government. At a regional level, Rwanda continues to support militias active in the eastern DRC, fueling violence.³³ The slow pace of demobilization of the *Interhamwe* and ex-FAR militias continues to give the country legitimate security concerns in the DRC. However, the involvement of Rwanda in illegal resource exploitation clouds any justification for continuing intervention in the eastern DRC. Additionally, tensions with Uganda, which began with violent conflicts in Kisangani and Uganda's temporary occupation of Ituri in May 2003, continue and need to be addressed.

While much work remains to be done, civil society actors are hampered in Rwanda by the closure of social and political space for maneuvering. An accumulating body of evidence suggests that most organizations are intimidated into keeping silent in the face of assassinations and disappearances and the government is currently using the genocide, through accusation of "divisionism," to threaten any potential critics.³⁴ This situation creates enormous challenges for CSOs, which wish to foster peacebuilding. Given the centrality of the truth in a healing process, one participant recommended that an international commission of inquiry into the genocide be set up with a role for Rwandan civil society. Further, following the examples of Belgium and Switzerland, more activism is needed against perpetrators of the genocide in countries that host such perpetrators, as well as for a frank discussion of international complicity in the genocide.³⁵ Finally, civil society in Rwanda must continue to pressure the government to facilitate genuine dialogue, both with internal critics and its neighbors, through the IC/GLR. National and regional civil society umbrella organizations have a great role to play in building trust and solidarity among peoples across borders and in bringing pressure to bear on their governments to

negotiate conflict without the use of violence. The IC/GLR, through the participation of civil society groups, must help empower such networks to achieve this goal.

Support of Other Actors in the Region

Finally, a critical factor for all the countries in the Great Lakes region is to deal with legacies of violence in a way that breaks cycles of violence. Here the assistance of the relatively stable countries – such as Kenya, Tanzania, and Zambia – will be critical. In this regard, SRSF Ibrahim Fall recognized the government of Kenya's help to his office and congratulated it on conducting a very inclusive national preparatory meeting. However, even in countries such as Kenya where progress has been made, it was recognized that gains from more open government can be reversed and problems of exclusion and disenfranchisement persist.³⁶ In this context, the role of civil society at both national and regional levels in protecting democratic gains and actively promoting peace and development will be key.

3. The Emerging Role of Civil Society in Peacebuilding

Making and protecting peace have traditionally been considered the preserve of governments. However, in recent times, CSOs have taken a larger role in peacebuilding, complementing and reinforcing state and UN initiatives. This new role demands greater examination and facilitation.

The expansion of civil society's influence in peacebuilding is reflected in a growing number of cases. Civil society actors played a key role in the mediation efforts of the Somalia conflict, participated in negotiating the transitional government in the DRC, and played an important part in reconciliation and

³³ UN Security Council, (S/2004/551).

³⁴ See for example, Dave Hampson, "It's Time to Open Up" (Christian Aid, March 2004) and International Crisis Group, *Rwanda at the End of the Transition: A Necessary Political Liberalisation* (Nairobi/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 4 December 2002).

³⁵ Noël Twagiramungu, "Rwanda: From Genocide to Where?" paper presented at the task force meeting organized by IPA in Nairobi, Kenya, from 21–22 June 2004.

³⁶ Generali Ulimwengu, "Sponsors to Democratic Reform: Disenfranchisement v. Enfranchisement," paper presented at the task force meeting organized by IPA in Nairobi, Kenya, from 21–22 June 2004.

protection of IDPs and refugees in places such as Kenya and the DRC. Women's networks have played a prominent role in mediating resolutions to conflict in Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, and Mozambique. The Mano River Union Women's Network for Peace is a particularly impressive example of civil society's peacebuilding potential. Consisting of women from Sierra Leone, Guinea, and Liberia, the network compiled its own research and used local networks to expose arms trafficking. Equipped with this information, the network played a mediating role among presidents in the region.³⁷ This case demonstrates the key roles played by women in peacebuilding and the need to provide them with more support. One participant suggested such networks of women be given special envoy status by the United Nations.

Participants highlighted the means by which CSOs have worked to develop cultures of peace and to make people less vulnerable to state manipulation. Using existing organizational infrastructure and networks, as well as forming new ones, civil society groups have been able to carve out niches in areas such as advocacy, training, peacebuilding methodologies, and community mobilization for peace. The involvement of civil society in peace, in particular civic education, has fostered curriculum changes in schools and universities, including the proliferation of peace education programs. Equally significant, these actors have engaged in building early-warning institutions and at times, participated in disarmament initiatives.

Civil society action in peacebuilding is more evident at regional levels where there have been opportunities for mobilization across cross-cutting issues. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development and the East African Community frameworks have lent themselves to civil society aggregation around regional issues in advocacy and institution-building. It was felt, however, that there is less focus on other key regional questions such as refugees and human rights advocacy at the regional level. The Refugee Protection Network, currently hosted by the Refugee Law Project in



From left to right: Mr. Arthur Bainomugisha, Advocates Coalition for Development; Mr. Kizito Sabala, Africa Peace Forum; and Ms. Alison Lazarus, Centre for Conflict Resolution.

Kampala, Uganda, is a promising movement in this direction, but requires more support to expand into all countries in the Great Lakes region. Information sharing and networking on a regional level is also critical for organizations involved in disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, reintegration, and resettlement programs. As one participant pointed out, cases exist of demobilized soldiers giving up guns, getting assistance, and then slipping across borders to re-engage with militias. Problems such as these require denser regional networks. Finally, it was noted that civil society exchanges within countries are a good way to build local capacities. The example was given of organizations in post-conflict Uganda that quickly rebuilt capacity with the help of their Kenyan and Tanzanian counterparts.

Despite much potential to constructively engage in peacebuilding, civil society faces many challenges. In a number of cases where governments are either incapable of ensuring peace or are, in fact, part of the problem, many obstacles exist to civil society involvement in peacebuilding, including, most basically, restriction of their activities. Participants also felt that most of these organizations are essentially learning-

³⁷ Alison Lazarus, "Women in Peace and Conflict: Comparative Perspectives," paper presented at the task force meeting organized by IPA in Nairobi, Kenya, from 21-22 June 2004. See also Elisabeth Rehn and Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, *Women, War and Peace: The Independent Experts' Assessment on the Impact of Armed Conflict on Women and Women's Role in Peacebuilding* (New York: UNIFEM, 2002).

on-the-job – improvising resources and skills. For this reason, governments in particular have found it difficult to accept CSOs as serious interlocutors. Although these organizations champion issues that governments are unwilling to raise, most participants agreed that CSOs must articulate their roles more clearly and, in particular, specify the added value they bring to the peacebuilding arena. This last point referred to the persisting problem of the lack of documentation on the roles of civil society actors in peacebuilding. Governments will more likely react with hostility to civil society's engagement in peace when they have no information on its precise roles.

Another problem raised was the fact that many civil society actors depend on various governments for their funding. As a result, donors often set peacebuilding agendas, and do not always reflect local priorities. Moreover, by their unwillingness to engage civil society actors effectively, governments often inadvertently foster such dependency. Some participants also took local actors to task; the lack of local vision or clear agendas could not be simply blamed on donor dependency. Nevertheless, many expressed deep concern over the donor tendency to supplant governments in their efforts to directly reach people in conflicts. While in some cases this is understandable, as a general approach this creates the mentality that local actors cannot solve their own problems and leads in the long-run to a distortion of priorities between local and international actors. Hence, a real need exists for donors to foster local capacity rather than replace it.

To build local capacity and reduce the adverse consequences of dependency, many urged that civil society actors must organize and develop a vision of their aims and a concrete program of action for peace, development, and stability in the region. Another strategy is diversification of funding by appealing to local businesses, which have a clear stake in the ongoing peace process. Currently the dissemination of information on civic engagement for peacebuilding is inadequate. Without this publicity and outreach, it is unlikely that other stakeholders will contribute to

enhancing the capacities of these organizations. By highlighting the role of civil society in the peace process and by more consciously bringing in business as a stakeholder, the IC/GLR could play a key role in facilitating this local capacity-building and resource-mobilization. This will ensure that CSOs play a strong role in monitoring and implementing any *Stability, Security and Development Pact* emerging from the IC/GLR.

4. Conflict, Citizenship, and Public Dialogue

The problematic nature of citizenship in the Great Lakes region was a key theme of discussion. Despite long histories of movement and integration throughout the continent, notions of who is “indigenous” versus who is a “settler” persist and are politicized in ways that strip people of rights and make them vulnerable to violence and displacement. As a number of participants noted, in many ways there is a need to rejuvenate a pan-Africanist ideal that fosters regional and even continental notions of citizenship. This reflects the general need for peacebuilding to involve structured dialogue among major social groups beyond the political elite,³⁸ who often manipulate ethnicity in ways that undermine citizenship rights of targeted populations. In particular, the situation of the *Banyamulenge* in the DRC emerged in discussion as one particularly contentious example of how the politicization of ethnicity can corrode citizenship. One participant suggested that the problems faced by the *Banyamulenge* also point to the limitations of fostering national versus regional civil society, since ethnicities often transcend borders and their politicization creates unique problems that only a civil society that also transcends these borders must address.

While some participants felt it was unsuitable to single out the *Banyamulenge* as an “issue,” the citizenship problems they face came up so frequently in discussion that it seems inappropriate not to openly face this as a burning question. The 1981 citizenship act in Zaire withdrew citizenship rights from the *Banyarwanda*,

³⁸ IPA and WSP International, *Building Effective Partnerships*, New York, 8 June 2004.

creating enormous tensions in the Kivus.³⁹ The past six years of war, with its large influx of refugees, including *génocidaires* with their anti-Tutsi ideologies, deepened hostility against both Tutsi and Hutu *Banyarwanda*. Even the *Banyamulenge* are now often identified as “Rwandan” and hence “outsiders” by other Congolese. This, in turn, stems partly from the participation of some *Banyamulenge* in militias, as well as the resentment against the Rwandan presence in the DRC. Rwanda has justified this presence by citing the need to protect the *Banyamulenge* people. Ironically, anger at the Rwandan interference in the DRC is targeted at the *Banyamulenge*, who as a consequence are as vulnerable as the Rwandan government claims. In the end, the *Banyamulenge* continue to live in precarious conditions and many have been killed very recently.⁴⁰ This is only one example of many of the continuing violent consequences of politicization of ethnicity, which undermines the tenet that all citizens deserve equal protection, rights, and voice. It reflects the urgent need for civil society to push for inclusive citizenship laws in all countries participating in the IC/GLR, as well as for regional civic education, as a counterweight to the politicization of ethnicity by many actors in the region.

CSOs and the media need to combat exclusive notions of citizenship and promote tolerance by prying open space for dialogue and reconciliation. Such work should take place internationally among diaspora networks, regionally, and nationally, including within refugee camps. However, participants recognized that the opportunities for influencing public discourse within countries in the Great Lakes region vary considerably. Some countries are open to civil society input, and others have become increasingly intolerant, exerting a *de facto* monopolization of public discourse.

The use of regional bodies and regional media broadcasts may serve as one way to overcome this obstacle. Still, it was noted that even if control over public discourse results in the denial or negation of ethnicity, this will likely be counterproductive. Drawing on the experience in Mauritius, one participant argued that, somewhat paradoxically, only when ethnicity is protected and safe and not a marker for violence can it move beyond its destructive and polarizing forms. When people do not feel free to express their ethnicity, they are also less likely to develop a wider sense of civic identity.⁴¹

5. Partnerships with Regional and International Actors

Clearly, a long-term resolution of conflict in the Great Lakes region will involve regional solutions. In this regard, participants raised the need to bring Angola and the Republic of Congo into the IC/GLR. Participants also suggested that thought be given to how the IC/GLR process can integrate actors influential in the region, including South Africa, the United States, France, and foreign corporations. Further, greater integration of all the countries in the Great Lakes region into regional initiatives like NEPAD, including the APRM, should be encouraged. Equally important, participants underscored that mechanisms to create viable regional institutions that truly incorporate civil society and democratic principles remain inadequately conceptualized.

As emphasized by Musyoka, the AU, existing regional organizations, and future regional agreements on economic integration may have a key role to play in providing peace and stability.⁴² As with countries

³⁹ Mahmood Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda* (Oxford University Press, 2001), chapter 8.

⁴⁰ Human Rights Watch, *D.R. Congo: War Crimes in Bukavu* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 12 June 2004). See also IRC, *IRC Condemns Massacre of Refugees in Burundi: Responds with Aid for Survivors* (IRC, 17 August 2004), on the killing of Congolese refugees in Gatumba Burundi on 13 August 2004 by the PALIPEHUTU-FNL.

⁴¹ L. Amedee Darga, “Public Discourse on Communal Peace and Conflict,” paper presented at the task force meeting organized by IPA in Nairobi, Kenya, from 21–22 June 2004.

⁴² These regional organizations have major weaknesses that need to be addressed, including the fact that they focus primarily on economic integration issues rather than critical security issues that undermine economic development in the region. See IPA, *Peace, Security and Governance in the Great Lakes Region*.

wishing to enter the European Union, the economic benefits of a regional economic union might provide incentives to stop fighting.⁴³ As one participant put it, “peace dividends must not only be seen in terms of security, but be rapidly felt in terms of economic impact.”⁴⁴ However, the region would have to secure adequate resources not just for peacebuilding, but also for reconstruction. In this regard, governments and CSOs must critically interrogate donor policies, which emphasize restructuring economies around markets, but do not consider how resulting economic inequalities contribute to violent conflicts. Finally, involving all stakeholders within peace processes means that the IC/GLR should also involve multinational corporations, and the private sector more generally.

6. Refugees and Internally Displaced People: The Need for a New Approach

The conflicts in the Great Lakes region have produced enormous numbers of refugees and IDPs. Figures vary, however – according to one recent source, there are approximately four million IDPs within the seven core countries, and over 600,000 refugees.⁴⁵ Participants agreed that this massive flow and dislocation of people should not be merely treated as a “humanitarian and social issue,” but as a symptom of deeper crises of governance, with broader economic, political, and security implications. Participants also generally agreed on the inadequacy of the policy responses to the refugee and IDP crises at national, regional, and international levels.

Current conceptions of displaced people need rethinking. Specifically, participants noted that the view that displaced people are “problems” rather than human beings with skills, ingenuity, and rights needs challenging. Moreover, policies should cease to treat refugees as a homogenous group. While some are peasants, in fact many bring valuable skills to host countries, which could be used and cultivated through access to education and work opportunities. One particularly problematic notion is that refugees constitute a security threat that requires isolation from hosts, containerization in camps, and other forms of control. Poor screening of perpetrators of violence among genuine refugees, and lack of protection and peacebuilding in camps means that in some cases militia members have been able to enter refugee camps and recruit. However, the policy of sequestering people into camps on the premise that all refugees are security threats in fact creates more insecurity for both the refugees themselves and the region. Most critically, camps are insecure places especially for women and children refugees who are left alone at night without adequate protection of the law and sometimes in the presence of perpetrators of crimes.

Studies have also shown that permanent exclusion and containerization in camps or remote settlements and failure to prosecute gross human rights violators living in host countries make it more likely that extremist groups organize among refugee and diaspora populations – perpetuating regional insecurity.⁴⁶ This problem became evident after the extremely problematic experience of Rwandan refugees in United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) camps in Zaire in 1994–1996. These camps effectively were taken over

⁴³ However, the caveat was raised that rewarding violent behavior with a place at the negotiating table and tangible benefits may only encourage the rise of more militias.

⁴⁴ Darga, “Public Discourse on Communal Peace and Conflict.”

⁴⁵ These numbers are only rough estimates derived from: US Committee for Refugees, *World Refugee Survey 2003* (electronic version); and Global IDP Project and the Norwegian Refugee Council, *Internally Displaced People: A Global Survey* (London: Earthscan Publications, 2002).

⁴⁶ Liisa Malkki, *Purity and Exile: Violence, Memory and National Cosmology Among Hutu Refugees in Tanzania* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995). See also Jude Murison, “The Politics of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons,” in *The African Stakes of the Congo War*, John Clark, ed. (New York: Palgrave, 2002). Interestingly, some evidence suggests that diaspora populations, or at least some parts of a diaspora, tend to be more extremist than local populations (See *The Economist*, “A World of Exiles,” 4 January 2003, 41–44).

by Hutu militias responsible for the genocide.⁴⁷ Work also shows that in contrast to refugees that have self-settled in towns, Burundi refugees in Tanzanian camps developed exclusionary “Hutu” identities and aspirations to reclaim their homeland.⁴⁸

It is imperative that the IC/GLR’s *Stability, Security and Development Pact* should include a review of immigration and refugee law at a regional level. As one participant pointed out, until the mid-1980s, host countries, like Tanzania and Kenya, had draconian refugee laws, but in practice had an open and generous attitude to the displaced. Since that time, Tanzania instituted less restrictive laws and Kenya abdicated its refugee policy to the UNHCR, but paradoxically, the practice towards refugees has gotten more punitive, in general. Participants thus returned to the theme of citizenship: exclusionary and, in fact, xenophobic immigration laws and punitive refugee laws perpetuate the marginalization of displaced people in the region at the price of both human suffering and continuing destabilizing conflicts.⁴⁹

Participants outlined a number of specific ways to rethink policy within the context of the IC/GLR. First, refugees must be seen as holders of rights and as creative actors who can form solutions to their own problems and contribute to their host country. Second, camp policy needs rethinking. Evidence shows that many camps create more problems than they solve for both refugees and their host communities. Host countries should receive support and incentives for integrating refugees into their societies, as well as for properly dealing with their own IDPs. Third, treatment of refugees and IDPs should be explicitly articulated and formulated as an indicator of good governance. Fourth, participants also felt that governance within refugee populations needs to be taken seriously to improve protection of vulnerable groups. Additionally, refugees must have proper representation, rather than have civil society actors speak for them in such fora as

the IC/GLR. Fifth, to facilitate sharing of information and better coordination among civil society-based refugee and IDP programs in the region, the East African NGO Refugee Protection network needs to be rejuvenated and expanded to cover the entire Great Lakes region – in time to inform and ensure the implementation of the *Stability, Security and Development Pact*.

7. Policy Recommendations and the Way Forward

Recognizing many challenges to the region’s stability, a number of key policy recommendations for consideration within the context of the IC/GLR emerged out of the discussions. Important areas covered by these discussions include: improving the effectiveness of civil society in peacebuilding, promoting public dialogue and inclusive notions of citizenship, involving international and regional actors in peacebuilding, and developing a more comprehensive and regional approach to refugees and IDPs.

Improving the Effectiveness of Civil Society in Peacebuilding

The potential of civil society actors in peacebuilding needs to be better supported and developed. It was felt that civil society actors are more effective in their peace efforts when they build on pre-existing strengths and networks. Most importantly, civil society organizations can increase their credibility as participants in policy dialogues by establishing sets of standards and norms that would govern their engagement in peacebuilding. Participants therefore recommended more coordination of roles within CSOs, to make them more complementary rather than competitive. Better networking around core issues and themes both nationally and in the Great Lakes region would enhance coordination. The IC/GLR has served

⁴⁷ See Sarah Kenyon Lischer, “Collateral Damage: Humanitarian Assistance as a Cause of Conflict,” *International Security* 28, no. 1 (Summer 2003): 79–109.

⁴⁸ Malkki, *Purity and Exile*.

⁴⁹ In this context, some scholars argue that the refusal of Uganda to recognize people of Rwandan origin as citizens, even those born in the country, helped fuel the invasion of Rwanda by the RPF, which in turn helped trigger a series of crises in the region. See Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers*, chapter 6.

as a catalyst – with regional preparatory meetings and task force meetings, such as those organized by IPA – to create key opportunities to develop regional networks. This needs to be followed with concrete actions for further developing, maintaining, and fostering these networks. Such networks will be important in holding governments accountable to the *Stability, Security and Development Pact* to emerge at the end of the IC/GLR.

Participants also urged CSOs to reduce their dependency on states and donors, which currently hamper the autonomy and effectiveness of these organizations. The region needs its own resource-mobilization strategies. Such strategies include bringing in contributions from the private sector, which has a strong interest in peace. CSOs should also be more actively involved in the IC/GLR process as stakeholders. Another possibility raised in the meeting was the formation of a regional fund, perhaps through the AU, that could be drawn on in times of crisis.

Promoting Public Dialogue and Inclusive Notions of Citizenship

Participants recognized the critical role played by the media and by public discourse, more generally, in interpreting past and present violence. Such interpretations can reinforce negative cycles of violence or play more constructively into reconciliation and peacebuilding. Ways must be found to counter exclusive and state-controlled public dialogues and to insert moderating voices for peace. A regional media that would transmit a culture of peace and confront facile analyses of conflicts based on primordial hatreds and grievances should be established.

Peacemakers should avoid rewarding violence by including its perpetrators as negotiation partners while excluding those waging peace. Non-violent institutions and CSOs must find a space in discussions and negotiations around peace processes. Including

CSOs adds the contextual, local knowledge necessary to the peace processes in different parts of the Great Lakes region.

Involving International and Regional Actors in Peacebuilding

All the key actors in the region should be involved in the IC/GLR. Specifically, thought might be given to how actors influential in the region, such as South Africa, the United States, France, and multinational corporations can be more integrally involved in the IC/GLR. Further, given the linkages of the Great Lakes conflict with events in Angola and the Republic of Congo, the IC/GLR should include them as core countries.

All the Great Lakes countries should be encouraged to join regional initiatives – in particular NEPAD and its APRM. While many regional initiatives are linked to common economic objectives, more emphasis needs to be on building regional institutions and networks for peacebuilding. More specifically, participants suggested that assistance be provided for the regionalization of civil society through networks that span the core countries of the region. In this regard, the idea arose of a regional and independent human rights commission, which would meet regularly to share information across the region, or civil society advisory assemblies at the regional level. In addition, participants suggested the establishment of a regional fund to finance civil society's peacebuilding-related activities. Finally, while Democratic Dialogues for a single country have been tried with some success, the IC/GLR might help catalyze regional Democratic Dialogues.⁵⁰

Developing a More Comprehensive and Regional Approach to Refugees and Internally Displaced People

Recognizing that lack of peace and security and bad governance are root causes of forced migration, the complex set of issues centering on refugees and IDPs

⁵⁰ Democratic Dialogues are a relatively new technique used in conflict resolution where people from a conflict-ridden country and diaspora, from opposing vantage points, are brought together on neutral ground to examine the different scenarios for their country. It is a way to build a core consensus and make people imagine alternatives to violence. For example, the *Nederland Comité Burundi* (NCB) has facilitated such dialogues for Burundi. See *Nederland Comité Burundi, Scenarios pour le Burundi* (Zwolle, The Netherlands: NCB, 2000).

should not be confined to the IC/GLR theme of “humanitarian and social issues.” Instead refugees and IDPs issues must be seen as a critical part of all the themes of the upcoming Great Lakes conference. One recommendation that emerged was that the UNHCR, the AU, and all those involved in the IC/GRL should facilitate a stakeholders’ meeting (involving government officials, civil society, and refugee representatives). The aim would be to develop a refugee and IDP policy framework with specific benchmarks and, potentially, standardization.

Some of the issues that need to be on the agenda of both a stakeholders’ meeting and the IC/GLR discussion of refugees and IDPs include:

- Explore the option of developing national institutions such as refugee boards, which involve government, non-governmental organizations, UNHCR, and refugee representatives;
- Critical scrutiny of the problem of “camps,” which tend to increase insecurity and marginalize refugees;
- Specifically advocate that member countries of the IC/GLR adopt the *Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement* developed by the Secretary-General’s

Special Representative on IDPs, with the aim of incorporating them into national legislation;

- Critical examination of the need to formulate an appropriate asylum policy for those in particular danger;
- Effective integration of the local host and refugee and IDP populations within development policy, planning, and practice;
- Avoid “re-circulation” of combatants; find ways to make disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, reintegration, and resettlement programs regional. Such programs should, in addition to combatants, consider combatants’ families – many of whom are IDPs or refugees;
- Incorporate the treatment and the inflow of refugees and IDPs into benchmarks for good governance and as part of the APRM for those countries that have acceded to the mechanism. Other countries not party to the peer review mechanism should be encouraged to join; and
- Members of the IC/GLR should adopt the following as a core principle:
 “Member states will respect the 1969 Organization of African Unity’s Refugee Convention and further act against those who instigate violence that causes forced migration.”



Participants at the task force meeting organized by IPA in Nairobi, Kenya, from 21-22 June 2004.

ANNEX I: Opening Statement

“Civil Society and the State: Partnership for Peace in the Great Lakes Region”

Professor Ibrahima Fall, Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General
for the Great Lakes Region

This task force meeting organized by the International Peace Academy in partnership with the Africa Peace Forum comes at a welcome time, as a follow-up to the policy seminar on “Peace, Security and Governance in the Great Lakes,” held in Dar es Salaam in December 2003 and jointly organized by IPA and the Office of the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General.

It comes at a time when the Great Lakes region (GLR) is slowly emerging politically from years of crises, yet at a time also where the transition process in Burundi and the DRC still remains fragile, as could be witnessed with the lingering instability in Eastern DRC and the attempted coups in Kinshasa on the one hand, the debate about the timing of the elections, and the continued rebellion of FNL in Burundi on the other hand.

It is in such a time that there is need for thorough reflection on ways and means, on policies and strategies to help the national, regional and international efforts to boost the political transition processes in the region and work towards lasting good-neighborly relations between the core countries of the region, through an integrated, regional approach that promotes peace, stability and development. This is the objective of the *International Conference for the Great Lakes Region* (IC/GLR), which I am tasked to undertake.

IPA, through its Africa Program leadership, should be lauded for having made the effort to translate the inputs of this series of reflection seminars on the crisis in the Great Lakes region into a clear identification of the root causes of conflict in the region and into concrete proposals as to how to emerge from the cycle of violence that has stifled the region for all too long.

IPA’s Africa Program leadership should be further congratulated for making every effort to ensure that

these intellectual contributions feed into the process of the IC/GLR. Indeed, intellectual political exercises could be sterile if they are not put to the service of a political process and, inversely, political processes are feeble without the nourishment of thorough and comprehensive prior reflection. In other words, thought and action must go hand in hand to make important political initiatives credible and successful. It is with this in mind that we are happy to associate ourselves to this two-day reflection on “Partnership between Civil Society and the State for Peace in the Great Lakes Region.”

The subject of this workshop, in fact, is one of the objectives of the IC/GLR. Since the beginning of the process, the United Nations has understood that it would be a mistake to make this process a purely governmental one. The ambition of this action-oriented conference is to bring an added value to the region, to make sure that the decisions and recommendations of the summits do not fall onto deaf ears and die down by being shelved in a dusty drawer of a paper-swarmed office. Its objective is to bring real change to the lives of the peoples of the GLR, to truly and durably improve the prospects of its citizens. It is therefore essential that the peoples of the region do not feel alienated from the process.

We should no longer have to hear comments such as: “this is yet another airy conference of the United Nations where the leaders will meet, shake hands, sign a non-binding document and go back home to take care of their own business without worrying about us citizens.” If we are to overcome this cynicism, this lack of enthusiasm towards great political gatherings such as these, we have to make the conference a concrete reality for every citizen of the region, from the political leader to the school teacher, from the doctor to the student, from the elderly to the child, from the farmer

to the entrepreneur, a reality for women as much as for men, for the youth as much as for adults. It has to be connected to them.

This is why, on top of the four calabashes of the conference (Peace and Security; Democracy and Good Governance; Economic Development and Regional Integration; Humanitarian and Social Issues), essential social components have been encouraged to organize themselves in order to bring their own input into the IC/GLR.

This is why faith-based organizations, trade unions, parliamentarians, and, on a larger and wider scale, the women, youth and civil society as such (as represented by regional NGOs) have all joined the process. Each one of these groups will have its own regional meeting in the current preparatory process of the IC/GLR, in order to bring to the fore the priorities and recommendations it wishes to be taken into account in the ultimate *Security, Stability and Development Pact* that might be the outcome of the conference process. The regional meeting of faith-based groups has already taken place, as did one for trade unions. They have come out with interesting conclusions and recommendations that my office would be happy to share with you. A meeting of regional parliamentarians, under the aegis of the Amani Forum, will take place in a week's time here in Nairobi, and will also be devoted to the IC/GLR. In the next few weeks, regional meetings for youth (Kampala), women (Kigali) and civil society (Arusha) will also take place. My office has been overwhelmed by the welcome enthusiasm of regional and national NGOs who want to have an active part in the process. This is a healthy situation that underlines that all components of society in the GLR feel a genuine concern about the IC/GLR. They will have the opportunity to participate in it through foras such as the regional meeting of civil society.

This is all part of the attempt to bring on board the most crucial elements of a nation's lifeblood. At the end of the day, it is the women and the youth, it is the farmer and the trader, the teacher and the student who are the first affected by war, instability, poverty and destitution. It will also be them who will be first to feel

the impact of the proposed *Security, Stability and Development Pact* for the region, which is the expected formal outcome package of the conference. If security at the borders and inside each state is improved, access to refugees and IDPs facilitated, if regional communication and the free movement of persons and goods are boosted, if women are given a more participatory role in the decisionmaking process of a country, if a comprehensive regional strategy to combat these weapons of mass destruction that are HIV-AIDS and malaria is adopted, there is no doubt that they – and civil society in general – will feel it first. It is therefore fundamental that civil society be not just downstream of the process but also upstream and be handed the early opportunity to give their recommendations to their respective governments. After all, it is the countries as a whole, not just some of its segments or entities, who own the process.

It is in the same frame of mind that there was insistence that each National Preparatory Committee (NPC) of each core country of the IC/GLR is composed of a mixed body, constituted not just of governmental officials, but also of significant members of civil society and is gender-balanced. So far, some countries have gone further in making sure that this balance is respected, but I am confident that all will respect this important commitment. The inclusion of members of civil society in each NPC is essential in that they enable the national consultations, that have to be undertaken prior to the three regional preparatory committees meetings, to be complete and comprehensive, taking into account every segment of society, in every geographical area of the country, even the most remote, which often are the most vulnerable areas in more ways than one. This will also ensure that governments and CSOs collaborate in continuity and not on an *ad hoc* basis, in tandem and not for cross-purposes.

We nevertheless deemed it important that, in parallel, autonomous regional consultations of civil society, women and youth take place, as I have explained, to allow those parts of society to engage in their own intellectual and political exercise as to what they concretely see and recommend as the substance of the conference and its expected outcomes.

This is another reason why your task force comes at a timely moment, as a prelude to the NGO regional conference, which will be coordinated by the Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation. Your deliberations will provide food for thought for them and bring them significant action-oriented substance that will enrich their debates.

I am confident that this two-day meeting with intellectuals of the caliber of those I see today in front of me, under the very able facilitation of IPA and the Africa Peace Forum, will be successful and provide us with

thought-provoking ideas that will further promote civil society's input to the conference, through a fruitful partnership with government representatives. There is no doubt in my mind that the IC/GLR will only be successful if government and civil society both understand the important role of the other in the process and act as full partners, in a mutual spirit of trust, dialogue and cooperation. This spirit must prevail in every aspect of the conference and is the true token of its success.

Thank you.

ANNEX II: Agenda

Monday, 21 June 2004

- 8:30 am–8:40 am **Welcoming Remarks**
- Dr. Ruth Iyob, Director, Africa Program, International Peace Academy
- 8:40 am–9:00 am **Welcome Address**
- Honorable Stephen Kalonzo Musyoka, Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Republic of Kenya
- 9:00 am–9:15 am **Opening Statement**
- Professor Ibrahima Fall, Special Representative of the United Nations
Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region, Kenya
- 9:15 am–10:45 am **Challenges and Prospects for Peace and Security in the Great Lakes Region**
- Chair:* Dr. Josephine Odera, Africa Peace Forum, Kenya
- Mr. Jean-Marie Kavumbagu, Director, *Ligue ITEKA*, Burundi, “Burundi”
- Dr. Noël Twagiramungu, Utrech University, The Netherlands, “Rwanda”
- Mr. Batabiha Bushoki Josiah, Africa Initiative Program, Kenya,
“The Democratic Republic of the Congo”
- 11:00 am–12:15 am **Right to Public Dialogue: Negotiating Conflict**
- Chair:* Dr. Ruth Iyob, Director, Africa Program, International Peace Academy
- Mr. L. Amedee Darga, Director, StraConsult, Mauritius,
“Public Discourse on Communal Peace and Conflict”
- Mr. Jenerali Ulimwengu, Chairman, Habari Corporation, Tanzania,
“Responses to Democratic Reform: Disenfranchisement v. Enfranchisement”
- Ms. Alison Lazarus, Senior Trainer, Centre for Conflict Resolution,
South Africa, “Women in Peace and in Conflict: Comparative Perspectives”

1:30 pm–3:00 pm **Refugees, Host Communities, and Internally Displaced People in the Great Lakes**

Chair: Ms. Betty Muragori, Director, Sienna Associates Research and Consultancy, Kenya

Dr. Khoti Kamanga, Centre for the Study of Forced Migration, Faculty of Law, University of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, “Transforming Refugees into Citizens: Policies and Modalities”

Dr. Jacqueline Klopp, Columbia University, New York, “Comparative Policies on Refugees: Tanzania, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo”

Mr. Zachary Lomo, Director, Refugee Law Project, Makerere University, Uganda, “Designing Effective Policies for Refugees”

3:00 pm–4:30 pm **Reconfiguring Partnerships for Peacebuilding**

Chair: Dr. Gilbert Khadiagala, Director, African Studies Program, Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, Washington, D.C.

Dr. José Mateus Kathupa, *Universidade Eduardo Mondlane*, Mozambique, “The Mozambican Experience: From Guerrilla Politics to Civil Dialogue?”

Ms. Betty Muragori, Director, Sienna Associates Research and Consultancy, Kenya, “Investing in Civil Dialogues on Communal Peace, Security and Prosperity”

Dr. Abdul-Raheem Tajudeen, President, Pan-African Movement, “Pan-Africanism and Citizenship in the 21st Century”

Tuesday, 22 June 2004

9:00 am–9:10 am **Opening Remarks**

Dr. Ruth Iyob, Director, Africa Program, International Peace Academy

9:10 am–1:00 pm **Break Out Sessions**

Objective: Policy Recommendations to Secure a Lasting Peace in the Region

Group #1 Conflict, Public Discourse, and Citizenship
[Moderator: Mr. L. Amedee Darga]

Group #2 Promoting Autonomous Civil Societies
[Moderator: Ms. Betty Muragori]

Group #3 From Refugees to Citizens?
[Moderator: Mr. Jenerali Ulimwengu]

Group #4 Peacebuilding: New Roles and New Rules
[Moderator: Dr. Jacqueline Klopp]

2:00 pm–3:30 pm

Reports and Recommendations from Group Rapporteurs

Chairs: Dr. Ruth Iyob, Director, Africa Program, International Peace Academy,
and Mr. L. Amedee Darga, Director, StraConsult, Mauritius

3:45 pm–5:30 pm

Policy Recommendations and the Way Forward

ANNEX III: List of Participants

1. **Ms. Hodan Addou**
UN Development Fund for Women
Nairobi, Kenya
2. **Mr. Arthur Bainomugisha**
Advocates Coalition for Development and
Environment
Kampala, Uganda
3. **Mr. Batabiha Bushoki Josiah**
Africa Initiative Program
Nairobi, Kenya
4. **Mr. L. Amedee Darga**
Director
StraConsult
Curepipe, Mauritius
5. **Dr. Khoti Kamanga**
Centre for the Study of Forced Migration
University of Dar es Salaam
Dar es Salaam, Tanzania
6. **Dr. José Mateus Kathupa**
Universidade Eduardo Mondlane
Maputo, Mozambique
7. **Mr. Jean-Marie Kavumbagu**
President, *Ligue ITEKA*
Bujumbura, Burundi
8. **Dr. Gilbert M. Khadiagala**
Director
African Studies Program
Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced
International Studies
The Johns Hopkins University
Washington, D.C.
9. **Dr. Jacqueline Klopp**
Columbia University
New York
10. **Ms. Alison Lazarus**
Centre for Conflict Resolution
Cape Town, South Africa
11. **Mr. Zachary Lomo**
Director
The Refugee Law Project
Makerere University
Kampala, Uganda
12. **Mrs. Brigitte Mutambala Mapendo**
Africa Initiative Program
Bunia, DRC
13. **Ms. Betty Muragori**
Director
Sienna Associates Research and Consultancy
Nairobi, Kenya
14. **Mrs. Annonciate Ndikumasabo**
Observatoire pour l'action gouvernementale
Bujumbura, Burundi
15. **Mr. Sinyigaya Silas**
*Collectif des ligues et associations de défense des
droits de l'homme au Rwanda-CLADHO*
Kigali, Rwanda
16. **Dr. Abdul-Raheem Tajudeen**
General-Secretary
Pan African Movement
Kampala, Uganda
17. **Mr. Noël Twagiramungu**
Utrecht University
Utrecht, The Netherlands
18. **Mr. Jenerali Ulimwengu**
Chairman
Habari Corporation
Dar es Salaam, Tanzania

International Peace Academy

19. **Dr. Ruth Iyob**
Director, Africa Program
20. **Mr. Mashood Issaka**
Program Officer
21. **Ms. Kapinga Y. Ngandu**
Program Assistant

**Office of the Special Representative of the
UN Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region
Nairobi, Kenya**

22. **Professor Ibrahima Fall**
Special Representative
23. **Cheick Lamine Conde**
Political Affairs Officer
24. **Mr. Kassim Diagne**
Political Affairs Officer

25. **Mr. Abdul-Rahman Ghandour**
Special Assistant

26. **Ms. Monique Kande**
Gender Expert

**Africa Peace Forum
Nairobi, Kenya**

27. **Dr. Josephine Odera**
Deputy Director
28. **Mr. Kizito Sabala**
Senior Program Officer
29. **Mr. Alex Nyago**
Program Officer
30. **Mrs. Jebiwot Sumbeiywo**
Program Officer
31. **Mr. Laban Rutto**
Assistant Program Officer

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