INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE TO COUNTRIES EMERGING FROM CONFLICT: A Review of Fifteen Years of Interventions and the Future of Peacebuilding

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Acknowledgements
Preface

Much has been written in the last few years on post-conflict peacebuilding. If even a small portion of that knowledge were translated into practice, some of the serial failures of international assistance to countries emerging from conflict might have been avoided. Instead, there are multiple layers of disconnect between the growing body of knowledge on post-conflict peacebuilding, hortatory commitments by policy makers to more effective peacebuilding, and international engagement on the ground. The chasm between knowledge, policy and practice is no longer sustainable. Too much is at stake for countries emerging from conflict to continue serving as laboratories for ongoing experimentation by the international community through trial and error. Similarly, given the range of global challenges in the early decades of the twenty-first century, there is no justification for not improving international policy and practice after more than fifteen years of experimentation. The establishment of the Peacebuilding Commission, the Peacebuilding Support Office and the designated Peacebuilding Fund at the United Nations at the end of 2005 provides an important opportunity to draw the appropriate lessons from international efforts to date, and to design the next generation of peacebuilding policies and practices.

This important study by Alberto Cutillo could not have come at a better time. Although the study was conceived well before the creation of the Peacebuilding Commission, Cutillo was ideally placed to follow the excruciating debates and political maneuvering in the lead-up to the establishment of the Peacebuilding Commission during his sabbatical leave in New York City in 2004–2005. As a result, in undertaking his far-reaching review of the main features and trends in international assistance to countries emerging from conflict over the last fifteen years, Alberto Cutillo was particularly attentive to the promises as well as the limitations of the proposed changes at the United Nations in light of past policy and practice.

His paper carefully traces the evolution of international peacebuilding and identifies its persistent weaknesses. In spite of the considerable efforts and resources invested in years of practice, he notes that peacebuilding activities throughout the 1990s were undertaken by a multitude of actors in absence of an overall political strategy or a commonly agreed doctrine that could be translated into meaningful guidelines on the ground. He further argues that the United Nations system and donor agencies have thus far failed to address three key gaps: political leadership, strategic coordination, and a comprehensive financial mechanism.

On the surface, the creation of the Peacebuilding Commission, as well as the accompanying Support Office and Peacebuilding Fund, seems to address these important gaps. However, a close reading of Cutillo’s paper raises serious questions about the adequacy of these important, but ultimately very limited, innovations in overcoming the range of shortcomings identified in the paper. There is little evidence that the lessons of fifteen years of policy and practice are in fact being learned.

If the chasm between knowledge, policy and practice noted above is to be redressed, Alberto Cutillo’s paper should be required reading for the Peacebuilding Commission as well as other international actors committed to assisting countries emerging from conflict. IPA’s Security-Development Nexus Program is happy to bring Cutillo’s important study to the attention of policy makers, practitioners and academics as we collectively strive to improve international support for peacebuilding.

Necla Tschirgi
Director
Security-Development Nexus Program
Executive Summary

The end of the Cold War and the spirit of cooperation which prevailed in the early 1990s within the Security Council provided the international community with a historic opportunity to address the number of violent conflicts—and particularly internal conflicts—which had been steadily increasing since the end of World War II.

The United Nations (UN) found itself at the heart of an extremely challenging process of developing new tools to respond to crises. In the early 1990s, separate but related developments led to the establishment within the UN system of new structures and mechanisms in the area of conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance to victims of conflict. At the same time, the concept of peacebuilding emerged as the combination of efforts by various actors to help war-torn societies avoid a relapse into conflict and to establish the conditions for sustainable peace. Peacebuilding has, therefore, been identified as the overall framework in which external assistance to post-conflict countries should be included, encompassing peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and development cooperation.

While statistical evidence suggests that the international community has achieved some progress in curbing the number of ongoing conflicts, it is generally recognized that peacebuilding, as the overall strategy to help countries with the transition from war to lasting peace, has fallen short.

Despite the considerable efforts and resources invested in fifteen years of practice, and during as many international peace operations coordinated by the UN, peacebuilding “has not yet developed the depth of experience, specialization and mission clarity that exists in the areas of peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance,” or, to put it more bluntly, “the picture of international peacebuilding strategies pursued throughout the 1990s is one of ad hoc, piecemeal, and fragmented responses by a multitude of actors without an overall political framework or an institutional base....While humanitarian and peacekeeping efforts had institutional homes, peacebuilding was (and still remains) an institutional orphan...[that] found temporary and tenuous shelter under the roof of development agencies.”

A lively debate on ways and means to improve peacebuilding has been going on for several years within many different fora, including the UN Security Council, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), the Group of Eight (G8) nations, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and the European Union (EU), as well as among academics and practitioners. The debate peaked with the presentation, in December 2004, of the report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. The Panel put forward several proposals on peacebuilding that formed the basis for decisions taken at the UN World Summit in September 2005. In the meantime, several donor governments have been reshaping their approach to post-conflict assistance in the last few years.

This paper reviews the debate and how it has translated into operational developments in the field, focusing on the main problems and gaps that have emerged so far. The final sections focus on the decisions endorsed by the World Summit and their likely impact on the ground.

The paper starts with an introduction to the concept of peacebuilding and how it has emerged in the last decade of the twentieth century. The next three chapters examine in sequence three fundamental

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questions: who should assume political leadership; who should be in charge of the coordination of different actors; and which financing mechanisms should be adopted for peacebuilding.

Chapter 1 reviews the way in which peacebuilding activities are integrated into UN peacekeeping missions, comparing theory with the reality on the ground, in particular through a discussion of the ongoing UN Mission in Burundi. The discussion focuses on two substantial problems: the ambiguity of most missions' mandates in terms of their peacebuilding responsibilities, and the inconsistency between the missions' tasks and budgets. After briefly reviewing peacebuilding initiatives outside peacekeeping missions, this chapter deals with the issue of the political responsibility of peacebuilding operations, mainly within the relevant organs of the UN.

As a classical cross-cutting subject, peacebuilding does not fit within the exclusive jurisdiction of a single body, although the prominent role of the Security Council can hardly be questioned. Cooperation between the Council, the General Assembly and ECOSOC could provide a practical solution and is strongly advocated—at least in principle—by member states. However, as documented, cooperation has not worked effectively so far. The final part of this chapter briefly reviews two additional, related issues: the longstanding debate over the role of internal actors in post-conflict reconstruction—where again a wide gap remains between rhetorical pledges in support of local “ownership” and the persistent tendency of external actors to impose their own agendas, priorities and timing—and the complex issue of accountability in post-conflict situations.

Chapter 2 focuses on the multiple challenges to be faced in coordinating the many actors involved in peacebuilding efforts. To a large extent, problems in this area reflect a parallel lack of clarity on the issue of political leadership. Competition within the UN Secretariat and among UN agencies, funds, and programs has survived all repeated attempts to establish strategic coordination mechanisms, including recommendations in the Brahimi report. Also, the important roles played by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) may complicate the task of coordination even further, since both their mandates and financial mechanisms differ significantly at times from those of the UN. A similar problem occurs with bilateral donors, who, in addition, tend to ignore agreed guidelines—such as those approved in the OECD/DAC framework—and seem only open to ad hoc coordination mechanisms. Coordination on the ground shows signs of improvement, particularly in the presence of a Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), in his/her double capacity of head of the UN peace mission and coordinator of the entire UN family in the country. However, incomprehension and overlapping between the peace mission and the UN Country Team often reduce the SRSG’s effectiveness.

Chapter 3 discusses the consequences of the lack of a comprehensive financial mechanism for dealing with post-conflict assistance. The complex mix of funding sources currently available is examined in detail, preceded by a review of the myth and reality of the inadequacy of current financial support. This chapter also describes financial assistance provided by the Bretton Woods institutions, and looks at the related questions of debt relief and clearance of arrears for countries emerging from conflict. The final paragraph is devoted to a discussion of recent experience with multi-donor, multi-purpose trust funds jointly managed by the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Bank, which offer new perspectives for establishing a common framework for all donors, one in which local authorities can gradually assume growing responsibilities.

Chapter 4 reviews institutional transformations introduced in recent years in post-conflict assistance.
It focuses first on two major donor countries, the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US); then on two regional organizations, the EU and the African Union (AU); and finally on recent decisions to establish a Peacebuilding Commission, a Peacebuilding Support Office and a standing Peacebuilding Fund within the UN system. Those measures may bring a small revolution in current peacebuilding activities, although it remains to be seen to what extent they effectively address the three gaps discussed throughout the paper: political leadership, strategic coordination, and a comprehensive financial mechanism. In any event, the adoption of these measures, combined with other innovations described in the paper, may in the end lay the foundation for a global mechanism to approach coherently the challenges of post-conflict assistance.
Introduction: From Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding

“Peace-building is a complex business. It draws in many actors: not just the operations mandated by the Security Council, but also the vital work of the United Nations agencies, funds and programme, of regional organizations, and of our non-governmental organizations partners. And its goal is to build durable peace in societies shattered by war. That is ambitious, indeed.”

United Nations peacekeeping initially developed during the Cold War era as a means to resolve conflicts between states by deploying unarmed or lightly armed military personnel from a number of countries, under UN command, between the armed forces of the former warring parties.

The end of the Cold War precipitated a dramatic shift in UN and multilateral peacekeeping. In a new spirit of cooperation, the Security Council established larger and more complex UN peacekeeping missions, often to help implement comprehensive peace agreements between protagonists in intra-state conflicts. Furthermore, peacekeeping came to involve more and more non-military elements to ensure sustainability. The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) was created in 1992 to support this increased demand for complex peacekeeping.

The establishment of DPKO is just one in a series of major developments which made the year 1992 a turning point in the history of peacekeeping. In January of the same year, a meeting of heads of state and government was held in the Security Council for the first time to discuss how the UN could strengthen its work on international peace and security. As a result, the Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, was asked to examine and present recommendations on how the UN could, in line with the UN Charter, enhance its capacity for conflict management. The resulting report, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping (1992), introduced the term “post-conflict peacebuilding,” as post-conflict action “to identify and support structures which tend to strengthen and solidify peace to avoid a relapse into conflict.” It complemented the three terms the UN had been using previously: preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, and peacekeeping.

While the term peacebuilding was new, the concept of external assistance for post-war rebuilding had clear antecedents in the reconstruction of Western Europe and Japan after World War II. “What was new in Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s formulation, and what caught the world’s attention, was a realization that the end of the Cold War opened new possibilities for international action….The promise of the new peacebuilding agenda was that the international community would intervene collectively—as a “third party”—to help resolve violent conflicts and civil wars, and that external actors would actively support the process of rebuilding in the affected countries without the shadow of Cold War politics….The impetus for peacebuilding came from multiple sources, but found its strongest expression at the United Nations. Throughout the 1990s, the UN provided both the rationale and the operational principles for post-conflict peacebuilding.”

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3 The mandates of these and other past and current UN missions are available at http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/index.asp.


An Agenda for Peace identified the main components of peacebuilding:

“Peacemaking and peace-keeping operations, to be truly successful, must come to include comprehensive efforts to identify and support structures which will tend to consolidate peace and advance a sense of confidence and well-being among people. Through agreements ending civil strife, these may include disarming the previously warring parties and the restoration of order, the custody and possible destruction of weapons, repatriating refugees, advisory and training support for security personnel, monitoring elections, advancing efforts to protect human rights, reforming or strengthening governmental institutions and promoting formal and informal processes of political participation.”

These principles were first translated into practice in the “new” peacekeeping operations conducted in the first half of the 1990s, some of which proved rather effective in restoring peace. More generally, a range of data shows that the number of armed conflicts, which had been steadily increasing since the end of World War II, started to decline in the early '90s, and that this trend is continuing—although at a slower pace—in the twenty-first century, as shown in Table 1.

The data also show that the number of international crises, victims of conflicts, refugees, and actual and attempted military coups have all been declining since the early 1990s, and some authors give the main credit for these positive trends to “the dramatic UN-led post-Cold War upsurge in peacekeeping, peacebuilding and conflict prevention.”

It is undeniable, however, that while some UN peace operations proved to be rather successful (as in El Salvador and Mozambique, for example), other missions failed and remain associated to some degree with particularly tragic events—like the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM), linked with the ferocious civil war, UNPROFOR (the UN Protection Force) and the massacre of civilians in the former Yugoslavia, and the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) and the genocide in Rwanda.

These failures led to a period of criticism and rethinking of UN peacekeeping, which culminated in 2000 with the so-called “Brahimi report,” prepared by a panel of international experts led by former Algerian foreign minister Lakhdar Brahimi. The panel was asked by the Secretary-General to examine UN peace operations and identify where and when UN peacekeeping could be most effective and how it

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could be improved, also taking account of the growing demands for UN intervention, both in size and scope, as peacekeeping operations expanded to include rule of law, civil administration, economic development, and human rights (at that time, the UN was setting up an interim administration in East Timor and was responsible for the transitional administration mission in Kosovo).

The report set the minimum requirements for a successful UN peacekeeping mission, including a clear and specific mandate, consent to the operation by the parties in conflict, and adequate resources. The United Nations and member states have pursued its implementation by launching a number of initiatives to improve UN peacekeeping, and for its part, the Security Council has made a considerable effort to get clear and realistic mandates for the new missions.

At the same time, the report endorsed the already prevailing trend which called for “integrated missions,” combining from the outset military action with humanitarian and development assistance, as opposed to “traditional” peacekeeping missions, where the military component was largely dominant. As a result, today, peacekeeping and peacebuilding appear interrelated more than ever. However, while the progress of recent years in the “techniques” of peacekeeping (particularly through the strengthening of DPKO) and in the coordination of humanitarian assistance is generally recognized, the record of peacebuilding remains mixed.

A parallel debate on how to improve international assistance to countries emerging from conflicts started in the 1990s among donor governments, development and humanitarian agencies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and researchers, whose number has grown exponentially in the last ten years, producing an impressive, although rarely coordinated, literature. Experience on the ground has also produced a huge catalog of lessons learned. This experience was effectively conceptualized in the 1997 OECD/DAC Guidelines on Conflict, Peace and Development Cooperation, which gained broad consensus as comprehensive and analytical guidance for development assistance to countries in different phases of conflict. The guidelines underline the need “for greater coherence and transparency in conflict prevention initiatives and responses to conflict and complex emergencies by the international community.”

More specifically, on post-conflict reconstruction, the guidelines identify priority areas of support, such as: restoring internal security and the rule of law (with a particular emphasis on training police, lawyers and judges); legitimizing state institutions; fostering the re-emergence of civil society; improving food security and social services; and building administrative capacity. The reintegration of uprooted populations, the demobilization and social reintegration of former combatants, and the clearing of land mines were subsequently discussed as operational priorities in supporting post-conflict recovery. In 2001, the OECD/DAC released a supplement to the guidelines, Helping Prevent Violent Conflict, which further consolidated the theoretical background for external assistance to countries in conflict or at risk to enter into violence.

However, it is widely recognized that the guidelines—as is the case with similar documents approved in other fora—have made little impact on the ground, where they are often ignored or neglected, even by representatives of the donor governments who elaborated and endorsed them. The main problems with peacebuilding appear to be not the lack of a theoretical basis and lessons learned, but rather the failure to turn these into a commonly agreed doctrine, and the resulting gap between meaningful but rather

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abstract guidelines and their application on the ground.

Examining and comparing external interventions in several contexts in recent years, scholars and practitioners have formulated frustrating questions: “Why is it that after more than ten years of practice, the international peacebuilding project is still experimental, amorphous and tenuous in nature? And how can the knowledge and experience gained to date be better put to use to achieve more effective peacebuilding outcomes?”

The question is not academic in nature, since available data show that the successes of recent years in reducing the number of violent conflicts are undermined by the high percentage of countries that relapse into violence shortly after a peace settlement. This negative feature has been acknowledged by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, and provides the rationale for his proposal to world leaders to create a dedicated institutional mechanism to improve the records of peacebuilding.

In the following chapters we will endeavor to shed light on the mixed results of peacebuilding, in particular addressing three fundamental questions which have so far received inconsistent or inadequate answers: Who should have political leadership and accountability in peacebuilding? Who should be in charge of the coordination of different actors? Which financing mechanisms should be adopted for peacebuilding? Answering these questions is a prerequisite for more effective assistance to countries emerging from conflict.

Chapter 1: Who Is in Charge?

“Yet at this very point there is a gaping hole in the United Nations institutional machinery: no part of the United Nations system effectively addresses the challenge of helping countries with the transition from war to lasting peace.”

1) Peacebuilding within UN-mandated Peacekeeping Missions: Theory.

The transition from conflict to peace is not a linear process and it is often difficult or even impossible to determine when it starts and when it ends. Security Council approval of a peacekeeping mission may often mark a turning point, ideally paving the way for a successful post-conflict transition and ultimately bringing stability and recovery.

As a first result, the establishment of a UN peacekeeping mission activates several mechanisms which put the UN at the center of the efforts made by the international community to preserve peace and help improve security. The deployment of the military is often seen as an element of stability and a means to attract international attention. Keeping the Security Council periodically updated on the
situation on the ground, the Secretary-General and his Special Representative maintain the necessary political attention on the part of the international community. They also get the financial support needed to fund peacekeeping activities, as well as a limited number of related programs, through the assessed budget approved for each UN peacekeeping mission.

While it would be impossible to define once and for all a rigorous framework for the mandate and the operational structure of a UN peacekeeping mission, recently DPKO has been developing the concept of a template applicable to the average15 mission whose mandate usually includes the following responsibilities:

a) monitoring of the ceasefire and support for its implementation;
b) assistance in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants;
c) protection of UN personnel, institutions and civilians;
d) support for humanitarian and human rights assistance;
e) support for law and order;
f) support for security reform;
g) support for the implementation of the peace process;
h) support for elections and/or referendum; and
i) public information.

Some of these activities are key elements of post-conflict peacebuilding, but the UN has established—at least in principle—a clear distinction between its roles in peacekeeping and in peacebuilding:

“Most of the activities that together constitute peace-building fall within the mandate of various programmes, funds, offices and agencies of the United Nations system with responsibilities in the economic, social, humanitarian and human rights fields. In a country ruined by war, resumption of such activities may initially have to be entrusted to, or at least coordinated by, a multifunctional peace-keeping operation, but as the operation succeeds in restoring normal conditions, the programmes, funds, offices and agencies can re-establish themselves and gradually take over responsibilities from the peacekeepers.”16

According to this approach, what clearly separates the civilian aspects of peacekeeping from peacebuilding is not the nature of their respective activities, but rather their timing and implementing agents. A natural, although delicate, transition from the former to the latter is envisaged:

“The timing and modalities of the departure of the peace keeping operation and the transfer of its peace building functions to others must therefore be carefully managed in the fullest possible consultation with the Government concerned.”17

In revisiting UN peace operations, the Brahimi report took note of the growing interrelation between the two phases of a mission: “Since the end of the cold war, United Nations peacekeeping has often combined with peace-building in complex peace operations deployed into settings of intra-State conflict,”18 but kept UN peacekeepers separate from UN peacebuilders. “When complex peace operations do go into the field, it is the task of the operation's peacekeepers to maintain a secure local environment for peace-building, and the peacebuilders' task to

15 “Average” can be interpreted as a mandate which falls neither into the category of “traditional” missions, tasked exclusively with the monitoring of the ceasefire, nor into that of “transitional administration” missions, where the UN temporarily assumes full executive, legislative and judicial power.
17 Ibid., para. 52.
18 Brahimi report, para. 18.
support the political, social and economic changes that create a secure environment that is self-sustaining. Only such an environment offers a ready exit to peacekeeping forces, unless the international community is willing to tolerate recurrence of conflict when such forces depart. History has taught that peacekeepers and peacebuilders are inseparable partners in complex operations: while the peacebuilders may not be able to function without the peacekeepers’ support, the peacekeepers have no exit without the peacebuilders’ work.”

However the report seems to acknowledge that the straightforward sequence—peacekeeping first, peacebuilding second—described in former documents is true only in part and that the two components do coexist, mutually reinforcing each other. Peacekeeping is equated in this context to restoring security; once this goal achieved, the peacekeepers can leave and the ongoing “peacebuilders’ work” will provide them with an ideal exit strategy.

This vision of the nexus between peacekeeping and peacebuilding has since been widely endorsed. The Security Council, for instance, in a Presidential Statement on February 2001, “recognizes the need for an early involvement on the ground of peace-building actors and on an orderly assumption of their responsibilities.”

2) A Case Study on Peacebuilding: the UN Mission in Burundi.

In order to understand how these principles apply in practice and consider the impact of UN peacekeeping missions from a peacebuilding perspective, it is useful to examine with some degree of detail one of those missions, starting from its mandate. We will consider Resolution 1545 (2004), establishing the UN Operation in Burundi (ONUB), an interesting example in many respects. How far does it go in taking into account the post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction needs of that country?

Resolution 1545 was passed on 21 May 2004, almost four years after the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi had been signed (28 August 2000). In the intervening periods, the agreement repeatedly threatened to collapse, a number of stakeholders refusing to adhere to it, while the situation on the ground was marked by widespread violence and breaches of the ceasefire agreement. The Security Council finally decided to set up ONUB only after the considerable efforts of others, mostly at the regional and sub-regional level, had brought some positive results, including the deployment of the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) by the African Union. At the time of Resolution 1545’s approval, the security situation in large areas of the country had improved and only one armed group remained outside the Arusha process. In fact, it was on the request of the Burundian government and the AU that AMIB be transformed into a UN peacekeeping operation that Resolution 1545 was adopted, “in order to support and help to implement the efforts undertaken by Burundians to restore lasting peace and bring about national reconciliation, as provided under the Arusha Agreement.”

19 Ibid., para. 28. The report (para. 13) provides a detailed interpretation of the term peacebuilding: “Peace-building ...as used in the present report, defines activities undertaken on the far side of conflict to reassemble the foundations of peace and provide the tools for building on those foundations something that is more than just the absence of war. This, peace-building includes but is not limited to reintegrating former combatants into civilian society, strengthening the rule of law (for example, through training and restructuring of local police, and judicial and penal reform); improving respect for human rights through the monitoring, education and investigation of past and existing abuses; providing technical assistance for democratic development (including electoral assistance and support for free media); and promoting conflict resolution and reconciliation techniques.”


Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, the Security Council:

“Authorize[d] ONUB to use all necessary means ... to ensure the respect of ceasefire agreements...; to carry out the disarmament and demobilization portions of the national programme of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of combatants;...to contribute to the creation of the necessary security conditions for the provision of humanitarian assistance, and facilitate the voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced persons; to contribute to the successful completion of the electoral process stipulated in the Arusha Agreement, by ensuring a secure environment for free, transparent and peaceful elections to take place,...and to coordinate and conduct, as appropriate, mine action activities in support of its mandate.”

In addition to these primary tasks, ONUB was charged with “provid[ing] advice and assistance ... to the transitional Government and authorities to contribute to their efforts” in a series of activities, including:

“to carry out institutional reforms as well as the constitution of the integrated national defence and internal security forces and, in particular, the training and monitoring of the police, while ensuring that they are democratic and fully respect human rights and fundamental freedoms; to proceed with electoral activities; to complete implementation of the reform of the judiciary and correction system; to ensure, in close liaison with the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the promotion and protection of human rights, with particular attention to women, children and vulnerable persons, and investigate human rights violations to put an end to impunity.”

A third set of tasks for ONUB is outlined in the Resolution:

“ONUB shall cooperate with the Government and authorities of Burundi, as well as their international partners, to ensure the coherence of their work, in assistance to the Government and authorities of Burundi in: extending State authority and utilities throughout the territory, including civilian police and judicial institutions; carrying out the national programme of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of combatants and members of their families....”

Finally, the Security Council “request[ed] the Secretary-General, through his Special Representative for Burundi”—who, incidentally, was not only the head of ONUB, but also the chairperson of the Implementation Monitoring Committee for the Arusha Agreement—to “conduct all the activities of the United Nations system in Burundi and to facilitate the coordination with other national, regional and international actors, in particular the African Union, of activities in support of the transition process.”

Most of the operational priorities generally identified in the context of post-conflict assistance are mentioned in the relevant paragraphs of Resolution 1545. However, only a few of them fall entirely within the mandate of ONUB, namely disarmament and demobilization (not reintegration) of former

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22 Ibid., para. 5.
23 Ibid., para. 6.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid., para. 7.
26 Ibid., para. 8.
27 The UN interagency working group on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration is currently refining a precise definition of these three words, with a view to standardizing them across the UN system. Reinsertion, at times added to form DDRR programs, is now understood within the working group (but not necessarily in other contexts) as a component of demobilization, rather than an element of
combatants, and coordination and conduction of mine action activities, but only “in support to its mandate.”

The other, broader, responsibilities are to be exercised either in support of the transitional authorities (institutional reforms, constitution and training of security forces and police, elections, and judiciary and correction system reform), or in partnership with other external actors, such as the High Commissioner for Human Rights (promotion and protection of human rights, as well as investigation of their violations), or both (“ONUB shall cooperate with the Government and authorities of Burundi, as well as their international partners, to ensure the coherence of their work, in assistance to the Government and authorities of Burundi”).

As for the last provisions, contained in paragraph 8, while the request that the Special Representative coordinate with non-UN international actors does not seem to raise particular problems, the assumption that she should “conduct” all UN activities in the country does not accurately reflect the level of independence enjoyed by UN agencies, programs and funds vis-à-vis the Secretariat (and therefore the Special Representative of the Secretary-General). More recently, different formulations have been used,28 which seem to acknowledge, at least in part, existing limitations in the prerogatives of the SRSG.29

Two other UN documents are relevant in this discussion: ONUB’s budget, as approved by the General Assembly, and the last available (the fifth) report of Secretary-General on the UN Operation in Burundi. The Budget.

The budget proposal for the first year of ONUB’s activities (1 July 2004 through 31 June 2005) was presented by the Secretary-General for the General Assembly’s approval in August 2004.30

The document, in response to a recent general request by the General Assembly, presents the proposed budget in the so-called “results-based” budgeting format. It is structured along the different components of the mission, as outlined in its mandate, defined in paragraphs 5 to 7 of Resolution 1545. For each of the five components—political process, security sector reform, security environment, human rights and humanitarian assistance, and support—the budget identifies one or more expected accomplishments and related indicators of achievement. For instance, under the political process component, there are three expected accomplishments: progress towards a comprehensive and all-inclusive peace in Burundi; free, transparent and peaceful elections in Burundi; and progress towards the extension of state administration. The indicators of achievement include the appointment of governors in all provinces; the adoption of land reform legislation; and the appointment of provincial judicial officials. Finally, outputs are listed for each of the expected accomplishments, some of them quantifiable, ranging from regular meetings with the transitional government, donors, and civic leaders to discuss specific issues, to reporting activities; and from technical assistance for training programs for the Burundi National Police, to monitoring and providing security for the process of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration.

reintegration. The point is of some relevance, since currently the common interpretation within the General Assembly (and mainly its Fifth Committee, responsible for budgetary and administrative matters) is that the budget of peacekeeping missions can only cover expenditures related to disarmament and demobilization, not reintegration. For current definitions, see UN Doc. A/C.5/59/31 of 24 May 2005.

See, for instance, the mandate of the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), UN Doc. S/Res/1590, para. 3: “Requests the Secretary-General, through his Special Representative for Sudan, to coordinate all the activities of the United Nations system in Sudan.”

See below, chapter 2.

See UN Doc. A/59/300. The proposal incorporates and supersedes a temporary budget proposal, presented in May 2004, for the period from 1 July to 31 December 2004 (see UN Doc. A/58/802).
The second part of the budget proposal quantifies the financial requirements. Out of a total budget of US$333,174,000, almost $200 million went to personnel costs, including those of the military, the civilian police and civilian personnel. Operational costs covered the remainder of the budget, most of them falling under categories such as facilities and infrastructure ($66,348,800), communication ($18,973,400), ground transportation ($16,623,500), air transportation ($13,730,400), etc.

Except for the allocation of $1 million for quick-impact projects, there is no quantification of the amount of money which will directly benefit the Burundian authorities and people, although references to activities in areas such as technical assistance or monitoring seem to imply a form of tangible support. It can also be argued that the simple presence of so many foreigners, all of them with relatively high standards of living, brings an additional demand for goods and services which indirectly boosts the local economy. For the purposes of this chapter, however, what is relevant is the relative lack of funding for the different peacebuilding tasks of the mission, as opposed to the clear (and relatively large) provisions for the strictly peacekeeping elements.

Developments on the Ground.

The latest available report of Secretary-General on the UN Operation in Burundi describes the evolution of the situation on the ground and the activities carried out by ONUB up to mid-September 2005. On the first point, the report relates very significant and positive developments:

“During the reporting period, there were further significant developments in the peace and reconciliation process, including the successful conduct of elections, the conclusion of the transitional process, and the installation of a democratically elected Government. At the same time, progress continued in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants and increasing numbers of refugees returned from neighbouring countries.”

Between June and August, communal, parliamentary and presidential elections were successfully completed as scheduled and “on 26 August, the inauguration of Mr. Nkurunziza, who is the first democratically elected President in over a decade, marked the formal conclusion of the transitional process in Burundi.”

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31 Following the recommendation of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ), the General Assembly has approved a slightly reduced budget of US$329,714,400.
32 According to Resolution 1545, the highest levels of authorized strength are a 5,450-person military contingent, 200 military observers, and 120 civilian police. There is no indication on the number of the civilian staff; the budget proposal refers to a total of 998 staff, of whom 423 would be local, 403 international, and 172 United Nations volunteers.
33 There is a rich literature on the political economy (and its contradictory effects) of international assistance in post-conflict countries. For some references, see Simon Chesterman You, the People, the United Nations, Transitional Administration, and State-Building (Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 184.
34 The budget proposal for ONUB in 2005-2006 has been presented in March 2005, and has been approved in June. Its overall figure of US $ 296 million represents a 10% decline compared to the preceding year. This is due to a 50% reduction in operational costs (since most of the equipment had been purchased in the first year of operations), partially offset by an increase in personnel expenditures, reflecting mainly a lower vacancy rate. The budget for quick-impact projects has remained stable at US $ 1 million.
35 UN Doc. S/2005/586. “Special report of the Secretary-General on the UN Operation in Burundi.” Since this report focuses in particular on the conclusion of the transitional process and on the proposed international arrangements to support the newly elected Government of Burundi, we will also refer to the former report, UN Doc. S/2005/328, “Fourth report of Secretary-General on the UN Operation in Burundi,” which relates development up to May 2005.
36 Special report of the Secretary-General on the UN Operation in Burundi, par.2
37 Ibid., para. 8.
As a consequence, the Implementation Monitoring Committee held its final meeting on 8-9 August, and on that occasion:

“The Committee issued a statement drawing the attention of the new Government and the international community to several outstanding provisions of the Arusha Agreement and called on the Government to complete their implementation expeditiously. The provisions were a conclusion of the repatriation of refugees and the rehabilitation of civilians affected by conflict; release of political prisoners; reconstruction and economic and social development; reform of the defence and security sectors; reform of the justice system; and bringing an end to impunity.”

In fact, while the overall security situation improved, allowing humanitarian agencies to operate throughout the country, clashes continued sporadically and banditry and looting persisted. In addition, the continuing military confrontations between the National Defence Force and the rebel group FNL (Rwasa) “have had severe consequences for the civilian population in Bujumbura and Bubanza provinces. There have been many reported incidents of human rights violations by FNL, including targeted executions of civilians, abductions, extortion and looting. Populations have been displaced by the violence.”

The electoral period has also been marked by disturbing episodes:

“In the city of Bujumbura and Bujumbura Rural, ONUB has documented an increase in summary executions, reportedly by National Defence Force soldiers of suspected FNL supporters. During the electoral period, the National Defence Force carried out mass arbitrary arrests of suspected FNL supporters, including widespread cordon-and-search operations. Several deaths resulting from torture and ill-treatment were reported; however, most detainees were released after questioning. During the communal elections, National Defence Force personnel were implicated in several fatal shooting incidents in communities in Bujumbura Rural and Bubanza.”

Overall, however, the Secretary-General describes the conduct of elections, the inauguration of a democratically elected president and the conclusion of the transitional process as “truly historical milestones for Burundi.” He cautions, nonetheless, that “despite the progress achieved in consolidating peace, significant challenges remain. Reconstruction, development, job creation, the rehabilitation of the nation’s health and education sectors, the promotion of reconciliation and putting an end to impunity, as well as the conclusion of the security sector and judicial reform programmes and ensuring sound governance, are some of the key areas that will require sustained and enhanced international engagement and donor support.”

Consequently, the report anticipates two important decisions. In the first place, the Secretary-General seems reluctant to reduce the military component of ONUB:

“Given the history of fragility marking post-electoral periods in Burundi, I do not at this stage anticipate recommending an immediate reduction in the Mission’s military strength, while the civilian component of ONUB will obviously undergo the necessary adjustments.”

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38 Ibid., para. 15.
39 Ibid., para. 24.
40 Ibid., para. 26.
41 Ibid., para. 44.
42 Ibid., para. 46.
43 Ibid., para. 49.
The second proposal is an interesting anticipation of what may develop into a routine exit strategy for UN peace missions—the proposed creation, in consultation with members of the Regional Initiative, the African Union, and donor representatives, of an international support mechanism.

"While consultations on modalities are continuing, the proposed mechanism should support the reform processes currently under way, including those relating to the security sector, the judiciary and land ownership. It should also address civilian disarmament issues and the management of large-scale refugee returns; ensure coordination among donors for reconstruction and development funding; support national efforts to consolidate peace through reconciliation; and assure the people of Burundi of the international community's commitment to ensuring democratic, transparent and accountable governance.

It is also proposed that my Special Representative for Burundi would chair the mechanism, which would be supported by a small secretariat drawn from existing ONUB resources. The mechanism would include representatives of the Regional Initiative, the international donor community, the African Union and the United Nations and would convene monthly and hold joint meetings regularly with the Government of Burundi. Technical subcommittees reporting to the Chairperson would be established as required to address specific thematic issues."44

The proposed mechanism appears to be an anticipation of the country-specific configuration of the peacebuilding commission, which we will discuss in chapter 4.

As for the activities of ONUB, the five successive reports detail a wide range of operations. After a rather slow take-off during the first six months of operations,45 ONUB has been engaged in areas of direct support to the political process, particularly in preparing and holding elections,46 in security sector and police reform,47 and in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants.48 Reference is also made to activities in the areas of human rights and rule of law,49 gender mainstreaming50 and the establishment of a bilingual radio broadcast with coverage of over 95% of the country as the public information component of ONUB.51

What is striking, however, are the repeated references, in reporting on most of these sectors, to the need to secure donors' financial and political support. For instance, concerning security sector reform, the fourth report notes:

"While important steps are being taken, progress on this front will require further technical and financial assistance from international partners. ONUB, in consultation with the Transitional Government and donors, is developing a security sector reform strategy that will outline modalities for the integration of the National Defence Force and the police force, including timelines, the size of each force, and actions required of both the Government and the international partners. Pending finalization of this strategy, ONUB

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44 Ibid., para. 41-42.
46 Special report of the Secretary-General on the UN Operation in Burundi, paras. 3-10.
47 Ibid., paras. 16-17, and 21-23.
48 Ibid., paras. 18-20.
49 “Fourth report of the Secretary-General on the UN Operation in Burundi,” paras. 33-39.
50 Ibid., para. 40.
51 Ibid., para 51. Interestingly, Res. 1545, para. 14, explicitly requests ONUB to put in place an effective public information capacity, including by radio broadcasts.
continues to coordinate closely with the Government and international partners, in order to ensure that the necessary resources are available for this crucial process."

Similarly, commenting on the successful electoral process, the special report acknowledges donor contribution outside the mission's budget:

"Altogether, donors provided $22 million for the elections through a trust fund managed by the United Nations Development Programme. This financing, combined with in-kind donations and the extensive support provided by ONUB, was vital in ensuring the successful holding of the elections."

Another interesting remark, which highlights the problem of uneven availability of resources for different—but, strictly, related—activities, emerges from the report on the issue of DDR:

"The rapid pace of the demobilization process has strained the capacity of the executive secretariat of the National Commission for Demobilization, Reinsertion and Reintegration to implement a nationwide process of reintegration. Personnel from ONUB and the World Bank's multi-country demobilization and reintegration Programme (MDRP) have continued to work closely with the executive secretariat to minimize delays and it is expected that most reintegration activities will have commenced by September."

In conclusion, while ONUB’s achievements are generally seen as a success story for the UN, from a peacebuilding perspective, it is necessary to acknowledge the wide gap which exists between the language of Resolution 1545 and the reality on the ground. The mission's mandate is drafted in order to include an exhaustive “checklist” of all the commonly agreed components of a coherent peacebuilding strategy, but at the same time it does not provide the mission with the authority and the resources needed. The budget of the mission and the report of the Secretary-General confirm this disconnect. ONUB is undoubtedly playing a catalytic and advocacy role, but it lacks the mandate and the means to assume overall responsibility for the different components of the peacebuilding strategy. In turn, Burundian authorities are supposed to drive the strategy, but clearly need external support, both in financial and operational terms, to do so. Voluntary financial contributions by donors, including the World Bank, remain entirely out of the formal framework in which ONUB and local actors operate, but are a critical component for the success (or the failure) of the entire process.

An analysis of other, recent UN peacekeeping missions mandaté show a similar pattern, with a combination of “limited” tasks assigned specifically to the mission (and supported by an assessed budget) and broader functions, to be exerted “in support” of local authorities and “in coordination” with other international entities.

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52 Ibid., para. 22.
53 “Special report of the Secretary-General on the UN Operation in Burundi,” para. II.
54 Ibid., par. 19.
55 Success or failure of a UN mission depends largely on a number of external factors, including the attitude of neighboring countries, support or, at least, benevolent indifference of the major players, etc. Also, the relative size and equipment of the military and civilian components of the mission are main determinants, together with financial support for peacebuilding activities. ONUB has enjoyed overall positive external conditions; however the successful completion of the transitional period, with only a limited delay respect its original timetable, was not an obvious outcome. Also, the conduct of operations, including in the delicate sphere of behavior of its staff, has contributed, so far, to the definition of ONUB as a “success story.”
56 See, for instance, Security Council Resolution 1270 (1999), establishing the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), and subsequent amendments to its mandate contained in Resolutions 1289 (2000) and 1346 (2001), Resolution 1509 (2003), establishing the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and Resolution 1528 (2004), establishing the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI).
57 UN missions have received at least twice a much broader mandate: UNMIK (Kosovo; 1999-ongoing) and UNTAET (East Timor; 1999-
3) Other Forms of International Intervention in Post-Conflict Situations.

The decision to set up a UN peacekeeping operation does not necessarily reflect objective parameters. It may come too early, at a time when there is no real peace to keep, or it may come long after the cessation of widespread violence—and it may not even come at all. This happens, for instance, when divergent views prevent the Security Council from reaching the necessary agreement, but also, in the case of civil wars, when the local government does not request (or even openly objects to) the active involvement of the UN.58

Military action can also take place outside the framework of UN peacekeeping. Authors tend to distinguish between a “multinational force” in the case of missions authorized by the Security Council but not led by the UN, and a “coalition of the willing” for multi-state operations not authorized by the Security Council.59 In former category, while some such missions are regarded as successful,60 their mandate has usually been limited to specific and short-term goals, which at best can be regarded as establishing the pre-conditions for a subsequent peacebuilding intervention. The latter group includes the NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) operation in Yugoslavia in 1999 and the US-led operations in Afghanistan and in Iraq.

None of these operations fall within the definition of peacekeeping because they were enforcement missions aimed at defeating a warring party. However, all of them have been subsequently sanctioned, in different ways, by the Security Council, and UN missions have later been authorized to lead international assistance to the countries or regions where operations by a “coalition of the willing” took place—such as UNMIK in Kosovo—or to assist the transitional authorities that resulted from the operations—as with UNAMA and UNAMI in Afghanistan and Iraq, respectively. Given the atypical nature of those missions, however, we will not examine them in this paper.

Apart from military interventions, a full range of different forms of concerted assistance may replace or complement a UN mission. They include humanitarian appeals (in particular those coordinated by the UN through the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance, OCHA); international (donor) conferences, where individual donors and/or international institutions play a leading advocacy and coordination role; or other forms of ad hoc “coalitions of the willing.” Another option, relatively little known, is that of the UN Peace-building Offices, three of which are currently operational: BONUCA in Central African Republic, UNOGBIS in Guinea-Bissau, and UNTOP in Tajikistan.

In chapter 2 we will take a closer look at these other forms of interventions and at the potentialities and challenges they pose, particularly in terms of coordi-
nation. None of them, however, offers an adequate answer to the question discussed in this chapter: who is in charge? They all provide relatively loose frameworks for cooperation among different actors (governments, international institutions, local partners), which typically lack the accountability mechanisms of peacekeeping operations in which the Security Council assumes the leading role.

In the second part of this chapter we will therefore discuss the issues of leadership and accountability in UN peace operations, beginning with the question of the Security Council’s legitimacy as the political body ultimately responsible for post-conflict peacebuilding, and then considering the possible role of other UN bodies, a matter that has been repeatedly raised over the last decade.

4) Who Is in Charge?

There is no doubt about the Security Council’s primary competence, under the UN Charter, in dealing with questions related to the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security. At the same time there is wide recognition, including on the part of the Council, that “the quest for peace requires a comprehensive, concerted and determined approach that addresses the root causes of conflicts, including their economic and social dimensions.”61 It is therefore no surprise if the Security Council, in the above-mentioned Presidential Statement,

“underlines that successful peace-building is predicated on an effective and unambiguous division of labour, based on comparative advantage of different implementing bodies, between all the international partners, including the United Nation system, the international financial institutions, regional and subregional organizations, non-govern-

mental organizations and the wider international community. In this regard, the Council strongly encourages all those actors to enhance their cooperation in areas such as the early identification of situations where peace-building is required; the definition of objectives and priority areas of peace-building; the development of an integrated operational response through mutual consultation; joint monitoring of peace-building activities; and establishing repertoires of best practices and lessons learned in the area of peace-building.”62

More interestingly, in the same document, the Council also recognizes that a joint effort is needed not only at the operational level, but also at the political level.

“To enhance further the effectiveness of the United Nations in addressing conflicts at all stages, from prevention to settlement to post-conflict peace-building, the Security Council reiterates its willingness to consider ways to improve its cooperation with other United Nations bodies and organs directly concerned by peace-building, in particular the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council which have a primary role in this field... the Council expresses its determination, where appropriate, to consult at various stages of any peacekeeping operation that includes peace-building elements and in particular when the operation is being established, with the State concerned and with relevant actors who are primarily responsible for coordinating and implementing aspects of peace-building activities, such as the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council, the United Nations funds and programmes, the international financial institutions, regional organizations and major donor countries.”63

In other words, the Council states that preventive

62 Ibid.
63 Ibid. Emphasis added.
measures and post-conflict peacebuilding fall off its responsibilities. This is probably the main explanation—besides the ambiguous language of its Resolutions—of the Security Council’s inadequacy in mandating missions with effective capabilities in those areas, and is also the rationale for the creation of a new organ of the UN, the Peacebuilding Commission, which we will examine in chapter 4.

Before the establishment of the Peacebuilding Commission, several proposals attempted to bridge this gap. First, the two other main intergovernmental bodies of the UN have tried to assert their roles in this area. In 2002, ECOSOC adopted a resolution\(^{64}\) that offered the legal basis for the creation, at the request of any African country emerging from conflict, of an ad hoc advisory group to:

“examine the humanitarian and economic needs of the country concerned; review relevant programmes of support and prepare recommendations for a long-term programme of support, based on its development priorities, through the integration of relief, rehabilitation, reconstruction and development into a comprehensive approach to peace and stability; and provide advice on how to ensure that the assistance of the international community in supporting the country concerned is adequate, coherent, well-coordinated and effective and promotes synergy.”\(^{65}\)

Two ad hoc groups have been created so far within this legal framework, one on Guinea-Bissau (2002) and one on Burundi (2003); a third group was created in 2004 on Haiti, within a different legal framework, but with a similar mandate.\(^{66}\) The evaluation so far appears rather mixed. The groups have undoubtedly played an advocacy role for greater attention, in general, to the involved countries, and for long-term international support, more specifically, mainly through group members’ visits to the countries and their meetings with high-level officials of a number of international institutions. However, the groups have not produced significant practical recommendations on the nature of current coordination mechanisms or international support. While the groups have consistently advocated for stronger coordination among relevant bodies of the UN system, their dialogue with the Security Council does not appear to have produced significant results.\(^{67}\) The mandate for the groups has been extended until the substantive session of ECOSOC in July 2006, when a decision on possible further extensions or terminations is expected.

As for the General Assembly, back in 1965 it established the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, mandated to conduct a comprehensive review of all issues related to peacekeeping. The Committee reports to the General Assembly through the Special Political and Decolonization (Fourth) Committee. In recent years, the Committee has started focusing also on the issue of peacebuilding in the context of peacekeeping operations. The last report of the Special Committee,\(^{68}\) for instance,

“recognizes the need for the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to plan for peacekeeping missions in such a manner as to facilitate to the extent possible an effective approach to peacebuilding and long-term prevention of recurrence of armed conflict by the international community...Underlining the need for clear and well-defined mandates and exit strategies for complex

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\(^{64}\) UN Doc. E/2002/L.12.

\(^{65}\) Ibid., para. 3.


\(^{67}\) Both Guinea-Bissau and Burundi were on the agenda of the Security Council at the time of the creation of the ad hoc groups, but there was not a UN Peacekeeping Mission in either of them. This has subsequently changed in June 2004 with the creation of ONUB. This development has not translated into a stronger interaction between the two UN bodies.

\(^{68}\) UN Doc. A/59/19 of March 2005.
peacekeeping operations, the Special Committee ... calls for the inclusion, as appropriate, of peacebuilding elements in complex mandates to generate enabling conditions to prevent the recurrence of armed conflict.”

Specific recommendations can be found in the report on the issues of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, rule of law, and quick-impact projects.

The Special Committee offers to a wider membership than that of the Security Council the opportunity to debate all issues related to peacekeeping. However, it does not examine individual missions and its comments and recommendations are of a thematic nature. Also, while its recommendations are addressed to all relevant actors (governments, international institutions, UN agencies and bodies, etc.), the General Assembly simply “welcomes” the Committee’s reports without taking any follow-up action, and only the UN Secretariat has the duty to report back on the implementation of the recommendations specifically addressed to it. The Security Council, which is also the recipient of some suggestions and recommendations, generally does not react to the report, despite the possible contradiction of its stated “willingness to consider ways to improve its cooperation with other United Nations bodies and organs,” and its determination, where appropriate, to consult with them.

Evidence of some dissatisfaction with the level of cooperation between the main UN bodies on the issue of post-conflict assistance has also emerged on the occasion of the Security Council’s debate on “civilian aspects of conflict management and peacebuilding.” While the short Presidential Statement only notes that “continued internal coordination in this field among all relevant United Nations organs and agencies should also be strengthened,” the interventions delivered by some of the foreign ministers go further. Making express reference to article 65 of the Charter, the Brazilian minister called for stronger cooperation between the Security Council and ECOSOC:

“Let us not forget that the Economic and Social Council, and not the Security Council, is the Charter organ with responsibility for matters relating to social development. And of what do we speak when we talk of efforts to build lasting peace or of reconstruction if not of social and economic development?...I think it is part of the work of Security Council to promote the work of the Economic and Social Council in fulfilling its tasks, so as to ease the work of the Security Council and prevent it from interfering in its own work.”

The Pakistani minister of state expanded the scope of cooperation also to the General Assembly:

“The multidimensional tasks in the post-conflict phase are not primarily the domain of the Security Council. Many lie within the purview of the General Assembly and the Economic and Social

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69 Ibid., para. 87 and 88.
70 Ibid., para. 95-103.
71 The Committee has currently 115 members.
72 See above, note 51.
73 The debate took place on 22 September 2004. The majority of the Security Council members were represented by their respective ministers for foreign affairs. For its report, see UN Doc. S/PV.5041.
74 See UN Doc. S/PRST/2004/33. Presidential Statements are approved by consensus by all Council members.
75 “The Economic and Social Council may furnish information to the Security Council and shall assist the Security Council upon its request.”
76 UN Doc. S/PV.5041.
Council...Pakistan's proposal for establishing ad hoc composite committees of the Security Council, the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council deserves careful consideration in this context.”

Other participants in the debate expressed similar views without expanding on the subject of greater cooperation between the Security Council and other UN organs; none of the five permanent members touched upon it.

In chapter 4 we will examine more closely the current prospects for stronger coordination among UN organs, in the light of the recent decision to establish a Peacebuilding Commission. Echoes of the Security Council debate can be found in the discussion held within the General Assembly following the 2005 World Summit, which led to the approval, on 20 December 2005, of a resolution which defines the modalities of the Peacebuilding Commission. At this stage, we can only refer to the quotation at the beginning of this chapter and conclude that, at least until this new body begins its work, nobody is in charge of addressing “the challenge of helping countries with the transition from war to lasting peace.”

5) The Role of Internal Actors.

The ultimate goal of post-conflict peacebuilding is to rebuild a devastated, divided society. While external assistance may be indispensable to achieving this objective, sustainable peacebuilding requires internal actors to take lead of the process; the international community should, therefore, focus on real and effective national “ownership” of post-conflict reconstruction. This principle has been endorsed by external actors and is reaffirmed in the OECD/DAC Guidelines on Helping Prevent Violent Conflicts, as well as in other documents. In practice, however, the principle is weakly applied.

Several reasons concur to explain the separation between principle and practice, which occurs even with the best intentions on the part of external actors. In general terms, there is a tension between the desire to show rapid, concrete “peace dividends” in order to strengthen popular support for peace, and the lengthy process of achieving national ownership. Rather than waiting for local officials to be adequately trained and capable of actively taking part in preparatory activities such as needs assessments, external actors tend to exclude them, at least in substance. Similarly, instead of financing local agencies directly for the implementation of programs, donors rely on their own agencies or on international organizations, NGOs and “experts,” whose standards and expertise are normally higher and more in line with donors’ expectations. This applies especially to the international financial institutions, which tend to impose strict conditions for access to their funds, but is also reflected in the tendency of donor governments and UN agencies to impose their own rules and procedures.

On the other hand, in the aftermath of a conflict it may be difficult to know who are the most credible, representative and legitimate internal actors. “Prior to democratic elections, competing claims to represen-
tation and legitimacy are not easily resolved. Public authorities may be non-existent, weak or lack legitimacy; corruption and crime may be rampant, and prominent internal actors may be “spoilers”, warlords or people responsible for atrocities.”\textsuperscript{81} While reinforcing local institutions at the national and regional level and strengthening civil society should be among the main priorities of peacebuilding, often donors see these as long term goals, and pay them little attention (and funding) in the short term. As a consequence, the capacity of internal actors at all levels to effectively assume a leading role in the design and execution of post-conflict programs usually remains weak for several years.

In chapter 4 we will discuss how these problems may be addressed; it is important to note at this stage that they represent one of the most significant challenges we face in peacebuilding: “Difficulties in achieving the delicate balance between genuine national ownership and effective partnership between internal and external actors continue to plague recovery efforts and the long-term sustainability of peacebuilding processes.”\textsuperscript{82}

6) Who Is Accountable to Whom?

The concept of accountability in a post-conflict framework entails several different meanings and sometimes appears extremely complex and elusive. It may be useful to consider, in the first place, legal accountability.

The existence of legal mechanisms to ascertain the truth and to prosecute persons accused of criminal behaviors both during the conflict and in its immediate aftermath is a crucial component of post-conflict reconciliation. International conventions, when applicable to the concerned country, cover the most serious crimes (crimes against humanity, war crimes, etc); a peace agreement may or may not include clauses on transitional justice, truth and conciliation committees, special tribunals, amnesty laws, and such. International actors, however, are to a large extent immune from this kind of jurisdiction. This appears particularly significant in situations where the UN or other external entities enjoy very broad powers, such as in the transitional administration of territories (as in the recent cases of Kosovo and East Timor), where they exert, de jure or de facto, legislative, judicial and administrative power. In similar circumstances, the risks of abusing their powers and violating the rights of the population are very high; nonetheless, no effective accountability mechanism has been put in place to address potential abuses. In some instances, an ombudsperson institution has been established (for example, in Kosovo and East Timor), but it lacks effective powers other than the ability to make recommendations to the UN mission, even regarding abuses committed by the same. Their reports have been at times extremely critical of the UN missions' lack of respect for human rights and, more generally, of the missions' legal and democratic principles.\textsuperscript{83}

The proposal\textsuperscript{84} made by the UN Secretary-General to create an ombudsperson in all peacekeeping missions to deal with complaints from civilians about the behavior of peacekeepers has not been implemented so far, and repeated abuses (especially sexual exploitation) are now considered almost inevitable in all peacekeeping missions. Even when evidence is

\textsuperscript{81} Conference document presented at the Peacebuilding Forum Conference.
\textsuperscript{82} \textit{Ibid}.
\textsuperscript{83} The Ombudsperson Institution in Kosovo, in its second annual report 2001-2002 stated that “UNMIK [UN Mission in Kosovo] is not structured according to democratic principles, does not function in accordance with the rule of law, and does not respect important international human rights norms. The people of Kosovo are therefore deprived of protection of their basic rights and freedoms three years after the end of the conflict by the very entity set up to guarantee them.” Quoted in Chesterman, \textit{You, the People}.
\textsuperscript{84} See the Report of the Secretary-General on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflicts, UN Doc S/1999/957, recommendation 31.
gathered against members of UN peace missions, the
decision to prosecute them rests with the authorities
of their own country, while the UN can only issue
administrative sanctions.

Given the more limited scope of authority of an
ordinary UN peace mission (compared to a transi-
tional administration), the absence of accountability
mechanisms for illegal or criminal behavior on the
part of its members may seem to be a relatively minor
drawback. However, the simple prospect of impunity
for abuses committed by the very persons deployed to
assist countries emerging from conflict has a very
disturbing moral impact.

The second aspect is that of political accountability of
UN peace operations. Since they normally derive their
legal authority from Security Council’s resolutions, UN
peace missions are accountable to the Council, through
the Secretary-General, who is usually required to
present reports on each mission at regular intervals
(typically every three months). In substance, the debate
within the Security Council takes place almost
exclusively on the basis of the reports of the Secretary-
General, which are “generally taken at face value.”

As for the activities of individual UN and other
development agencies operating in a post-conflict
country, they are normally reported to agencies’
headquarters and subsequently to their governing
bodies. Also, the only reports discussed are usually
those made by the same staff on the ground, with
little if any possibility for members of the board to
independently assess their activity.

In practice, while external actors stress the
importance of upholding the principles of
transparency and accountability on the part of

authorities of beneficiary countries as a crucial
component of good governance, they appear
reluctant to adopt substantial measures to enhance
their own accountability.

Another element sometimes raised is that of making
external actors accountable to the beneficiaries of
their activity, although at present “there are no
dedicated mechanisms for promoting the transparency
of external actors vis-à-vis elected representatives in
the post-conflict countries they assist.”

The feasibility and desirability of such mechanisms is
still a matter of debate, and it is difficult to establish
their legal basis. However, as noted by Simon
Chesterman (in reference to situations of transitional
administrations, though the point applies more
generally to all peacekeeping and peacebuilding
operations):

“Creating mechanisms by which the international
presence may be held accountable can both
encourage the emergence of an indigenous human
rights and rule of law culture as well as improve the
day-to-day governance of the territory. The failure to
do so...will lead to frustration and suspicion on the
part of local actors.”

Chapter 2: The Challenge of Coordination

“We need to make sure that our efforts are well
integrated, since the various elements of peace-
building are interdependent, and failure in one sector
can mean failure in the rest.”

1) Coordination within the UN Secretariat.

Coordination on peacebuilding issues within the UN
system is currently based on the concept of the

85 Chesterman, You, the People.
86 Conference document presented at the Peacebuilding Forum conference.
87 Chesterman, You, the People.
“integrated mission,” experimentally applied in Kosovo after the NATO bombing in the spring of 1999, in response to the peculiarity of “a hybrid mission consisting of a NATO security presence and a UN-led civilian operation with substantial components tasked to the UNHCR, the OSCE, and the EU.”

This concept is regarded as effective, if not a strategic tool, at least to “coordinate technical policy differences between the implementing organizations,” and has been subsequently applied elsewhere. Its main objective is to ensure that humanitarian and development elements are incorporated into each UN mission from the outset, including the early stages of its planning. Despite some resistance from the humanitarian community, which tends to reject the integrated approach out of concern for blurring humanitarian concerns and compromising the humanitarian space, integrated missions have become, at least on paper, the overarching principle for complex UN peacekeeping operations.

This principle has been reinforced by the strong call in the Brahimi report in favor of the concept of “integrated mission planning and support,” and its proposal to establish Integrated Mission Task Forces (IMTF) within the Secretariat to sustain this approach systematically and consistently.

However, five years later, there is no common agreement on the definition of the integrated mission, and discussion continues on whether the integration implies the merging of all UN entities involved into a single structure, or simply the adoption of common procedures.

Implementation of the Brahimi report with respect to the integrated planning has therefore proceeded so far with mixed results, as acknowledged by the Secretary-General in a recent report: “Full implementation of the IMTF concept as intended in the Brahimi report ... remains a work in progress.” In practice, IMTF have been established on only a limited number of missions and they performed below expectations. While DPKO has made significant progress in developing its own planning capacities within the limits of its mandate, the broader Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP), involving all relevant UN entities, still looks experimental:

“The Department of Peacekeeping Operations is refining and discussing with United Nations partners an integrated mission planning process, which could serve as a basis for a common, system-wide approach to integrated mission planning, applicable to any stage of United Nations engagement. A handbook of guidelines and a training course are currently under development, in consultation with partners, to facilitate the application of the process.”

It is not surprising, therefore, that the deceptively simple question of who within the UN system is responsible for coordination on peacebuilding issues has not yet received a simple and unambiguous answer. The creation of a Peacebuilding Support Office, decided at the September 2005 UN World
Summit, will likely reshape the current division of work within the UN Secretariat. However, given the limited size and scope of that office (which we will discuss in chapter 4) and its institutional location, it is unclear how current attributes of existing departments will be affected. It is therefore useful to discuss them briefly at this stage, and in chapter 4 take a look at how they might be revised once the new Peacebuilding Support Office becomes operational.

The Department for Political Affairs (DPA) of the UN Secretariat, according to its organizational chart, is “the focal point within the United Nations for post-conflict peace-building.” More specifically—since the term “focal point” is a rather generic one—the same document mentions, among the core functions of the four regional divisions of DPA, the responsibility of “advising the Secretary-General in giving overall political direction to post-conflict peace-building efforts and, to that end, providing guidance to United Nations programmes, funds and agencies.”

It is worth noticing that the Brahimi report supported an enhanced role for DPA as the focal point within the UN for peacebuilding activities, including through the creation of a “pilot Peace-building Unit,” a proposal which was subsequently dismissed. The Brahimi report also stressed the institutional role of the head of DPA in the area of peacebuilding in his/her capacity as convener of the Executive Committee on Peace and Security (ECPS), one of the committees created in 1997 to facilitate complementarities and coherence within the UN system in its core areas. “The Panel therefore believes that the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, in his/her capacity as convener of ECPS, should serve as the focal point for peace-building.” There is very little evidence that ECPS is currently playing such a role, although given the confidential nature of ECPS’s meetings, it is difficult to have a complete perception of its activities from the outside.

DPA may also play a role in devising country-specific peacebuilding strategies through the above-mentioned Integrated Mission Planning Process, for which DPA normally bears responsibility in its first phase (pre-planning), when the decision whether to set the Integrated Mission Task Force is made. As we have seen, however, this process remains experimental at present.

Another channel for DPA to provide direction for the UN system’s peacebuilding activities is through its oversight of a significant number of missions on the ground. They included, at the end of 2005, several small political offices established mainly in support of preventive and peacemaking (good offices) functions, and one larger post-conflict mission mandated by the Security Council, namely the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), which is both politically relevant and administratively complex, with a total staff of 225 internationals (plus four military advisors) and 345 local civilians.

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97 Brahimi report, para. 243.
98 ECPS is defined on DPA website at www.un.org/Depts/dpa as “the highest policy development and management instrument within the UN secretariat on critical cross-cutting issues of peace and security.” Its current membership is rather wide. Full members: the Under-Secretary-General (USG) and Assistant-Secretary-Generals (ASGs) for Political Affairs; Special Advisor on Africa; USG and ASG for Peacekeeping Operations; USG for Disarmament Affairs; USG for Legal Affairs; USG for Humanitarian Affairs; SRSG for Children & Armed Conflict; Administrator and Assistant Administrator of UNDP; High Commissioner for Human Rights; High Commissioner for Refugees; Executive Director of UNICEF; Vice-President for External Affairs of the World Bank; UN Security Coordinator; Observers: Executive Director of Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention; Executive Director of WFP; ASG for Economic and Social Affairs; Head of Department of Public Information; Office of the Deputy-Secretary-General; Office of the Spokesman of the Secretary-General.
99 Brahimi report, para. 44
100 UNAMA (UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan) and UNOTIL (UN Office in Timor-Leste), although political missions, are directed and supported by DPKO.
DPA is also in charge of three Peacebuilding Support Offices (PBSOs), operating either in countries where a peacekeeping mission has just ended (such as in Tajikistan and in the Central African Republic), or where such an operation has not been launched (as in Guinea Bissau). In Liberia, the PBSO was operational from 1998-2003, between two peacekeeping missions, the 1993-1997 UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) and the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), established in September 2003.

A review of PBSOs conducted in 2001 by DPA and UNDP found that, with one exception, they had not been successful and suffered some intrinsic problems of coordination with the local UN Country Team. Since then, alternative models for integrating a political presence into country teams in selected countries have been explored, and we will revert to them when discussing coordination on the ground later in this chapter.

Finally, DPA has a specific mandate for UN electoral operations, which it carries out through its Electoral Affairs Division (EAD). The holding of elections is often a crucial component of a UN peace operation, since it can mark a turning point in the process of reconciliation and political reconstruction of a country. DPA exerts an important coordination function in this area, where several other actors—both local and external—are typically involved.

The Department for Peacekeeping Operation “is responsible for planning, managing, deploying, supporting and, on behalf of the Secretary-General, providing executive direction to all UN peacekeeping operations.” As we have seen in chapter 1, important peacebuilding components are regularly included in those operations, particularly in the areas of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants (DDR), mine action, and civilian police. Within DPKO there are dedicated units for some of those activities, like the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS), which is “the focal point within the UN system for all mine-related activities and is responsible for UN mine action activities in support of peacekeeping operations and urgent humanitarian needs. It ensures an effective, proactive and coordinated UN response to landmine contaminations.”

This constitutes a remarkable challenge, since the number of entities involved in mine action is very large. To fulfill this role, UNMAS relies on two separate mechanisms, the Inter-Agency Coordination Group on Mine Action, which brings together thirteen partners within the UN family, and the Steering Committee on Mine Action, which includes organizations outside the UN.

The role of civilian police in providing security in post-war settings is essential and has to be considered in the broader picture of rule of law reform, including judicial and corrections components also. International police officers are required not only to monitor and advise their local counterparts, but to “focus primarily on the reform and restructuring of local police forces” while in the meantime, at least in some missions, they are tasked with executive law enforcement authority on the ground. A dedicated division within DPKO was created in October 2000 to oversee this sector. The Civilian Police Division “coordinates the recruitment and deployment of civilian police officers and is responsible for ensuring that candidates for peacekeeping operations meet...”

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103 Ibid.
104 Brahimi report, par. 119.
105 At the end of November 2005 6,963 international civilian police officers were employed in thirteen UN peacekeeping operations; of them, 5,017 operate in the three biggest police missions, namely in Kosovo, Haiti and Liberia, where they are responsible for law enforcement.
certain minimum UN standards."\(^{106}\)

For its part, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) coordinates UN humanitarian efforts in all countries affected by natural or man-made disasters, including during and after a conflict. On the ground, OCHA has an extended presence in almost forty countries, considerably larger than that of any other Secretariat department. OCHA’s offices on the ground support the humanitarian and resident coordinators of the UN in coordinating humanitarian assistance in the country.

OCHA has also the responsibility—both on the ground and at headquarters—to coordinate the preparation, launching and subsequent implementation of the Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP), an instrument created in 1992 in order to improve the system-wide response to countries affected by complex humanitarian emergencies, many of them falling into the definition of post-conflict countries.

While Consolidated Appeals (CA) are primarily meant to secure humanitarian assistance, they often include a certain number of projects which are not strictly life-saving, but rather aim at creating a link between those activities and development programs, which are usually regarded as still premature at that stage. In situations where the CA is the only concerted assistance effort of the international community, the inclusion of reconstruction projects in the appeals has been regarded as the best opportunity to get support for peacebuilding activities, although, in general, those proposals have received limited funding.

CAs have been often criticized as lacking an overall strategy and being a mere collage of programs planned and executed by individual agencies. While this was probably the case in the past, in recent years the CAP has generally made progress in bringing the agencies together early in the process of planning. This implies, at a minimum, that they all share a common view of the situation in the country; at best, they develop common needs-assessments and medium-term strategies that offer a reasonable guarantee for avoiding gaps and duplications. The role of OCHA in coordinating the planning process and bringing additional coherence to the agencies’ activity is increasingly recognized. This may also apply to the peacebuilding components of CAPs, although OCHA does not have a specific mandate in this area.

More generally, since humanitarian assistance is badly needed in most post-conflict situations, this implies that OCHA is a major partner, at least in the early stages, in coordinating agencies’ responses—even, to a certain extent, beyond the UN system. In fact, the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, who heads OCHA, is not only the convener of the Executive Committee for Humanitarian Affairs (ECHA),\(^{107}\) the equivalent of ECPS for humanitarian assistance, but also chairs the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), another coordinating body which stretches beyond the UN family.\(^{108}\)

Finally, within the UN Secretariat the Department for Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) is trying to define its own role in post-conflict reconstruction, particularly linking peacebuilding with economic development and addressing long-term structural causes of conflict.

2) Coordination among UN Agencies.

Fragmentation of responsibilities in the area of post-conflict reconstruction is not limited within the UN...
Secretariat, but extends also to UN agencies, funds and programs, although a prominent role in the area of post-conflict reconstruction is played by the UN Development Programme (UNDP) on the basis of both its mandate as the UN global development network, and its extended presence in most of the developing countries, including those emerging from conflict.

In line with the traditional dichotomy between the “political” role of the UN Secretariat and the “operational” role of UN agencies, UNDP is often regarded as the “counterpart” of DPA as far as conflict prevention and peacebuilding are concerned. Overcoming this not just theoretical divide, the Brahimi report called for a combined effort from DPA and UNDP “to jointly strengthen United Nations capacity in this area, because effective peace-building is, in effect, a hybrid of political and development activities targeted at the sources of conflict,” pointing out, however, that “a distinction should be made between strategy formulation and the implementation of such strategies, based upon a rational division of labour among ECPS members. In the Brahimi Panel’s view, UNDP has untapped potential in this area, and UNDP, in cooperation with other UN agencies, funds and programmes and the World Bank, are best placed to take the lead in implementing peace-building activities.”

In fact, UNDP has significantly strengthened its capacity and devoted a growing share of resources to conflict prevention and peacebuilding. This has been achieved mainly through the establishment of the Emergency Response Division in 1996—which eventually became the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery in November 2001—and the Thematic Trust Fund for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, which we will discuss in the next chapter. UNDP has also been active in promoting partnerships with other UN entities to cover all areas, essentially, of post-conflict recovery, and also in clarifying divisions of labor and avoiding gaps and duplication. “These efforts have focused on issues such as rule of law (e.g., with DPKO and OHCHR), DDR (e.g., with DPKO, UNICEF and UNIFEM), conflict prevention (DPA and other members of the UN Framework Team), IDPs and refugees (e.g., OCHA ... UNHCR, UNICEF, ILO and the World Bank), and Area-based Development (World Bank).”

The question of the division of labor is critical, because apart from UNDP, several other agencies have a mandate in one or more sectors of post-conflict-related activities. As mentioned above in the UNDP document, examples range from UNHCR, which is in charge of facilitating refugees’ return—an element often critical in post-conflict situations and whose ramifications touch upon many other sectors—to UNICEF (the UN Children’s Fund), whose responsibility for youths is also a cross-cutting issue.

The combined presence of a number of UN bodies is not unusual in itself; what makes coordination in the post-conflict context particularly complex is the coexistence of political, military, humanitarian, and development actors and mechanisms. Just as an example, while for humanitarian purposes the main coordination bodies are the IASC and the ECHA, for development activities it is the UN Development Group (UNDG), chaired by UNDP. Symmetrically,

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109 According to Call, “The Problem of Peacebuilding,” “A separate conceptual debate emerged, largely between DPA and UNDP, over whether peacebuilding was fundamentally “political” or “developmental” in nature. This fruitless and distracting dispute impeded operational advances in planning and coordination for several years.”
110 Brahimi report, para. 44.
111 Ibid., para. 46.
113 UNDG members are: UNDP, UNICEF, UNFPA, WFP, UNIFEM, UNOPS, UNAIDS, UN Habitat, ODA, WHO, DESA, OHCHR, IFAD, UNCTAD, UNESCO, FAO, UNIDO, ILO, UNDPI, UN Regional Commissions, OHRLLS, SRSGC, UN, UNHCR. The World Bank, UNFIP and OCHA have observer status.
while the CAP is the main document prepared by the UN system to define assistance needs and funding requests in humanitarian situations, in “ordinary” development situations the system produces other documents, such as the Common Country Assessment (CCA) and the UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF). Parallel coordination mechanisms operate on the ground.

There have been several attempts to effectively reconcile the two separate realities of humanitarian and development assistance in post-conflict situations; of recent attempts, the most articulated is the work of an ad hoc UNDG/ECHA working group, which published its report on “transition issues”\textsuperscript{114} in February 2004. Recommendations stemming from the report are currently under implementation and we will revert to some of them in chapter 4.

3) Coordination with the Bretton Woods Institutions.\textsuperscript{115}

As the world’s largest development institution, the World Bank is obviously regarded as a major player in post-conflict peacebuilding. However, while physical reconstruction has been at the core of the Bank’s mandate since its inception,\textsuperscript{116} for several decades it has been reluctant to engage in post-conflict scenarios—although it maintained limited lending activity in support of post-conflict countries—given the “political” nature of such an engagement, which long viewed as precluded by the Bank’s Articles of Agreement.

A change in this attitude started in the mid-nineties, under growing pressure for Bank’s assistance in an increasing number of civil wars. The turning point is often identified with the World Bank president’s announcement in September 1995,\textsuperscript{117} that “rebuilding war-torn societies would again become one of the Bank’s development priorities.”\textsuperscript{118} This is now usually described as “putting the ‘R’ back in the IBRD [International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Bank’s original name],” with reference to its mandate to assist the reconstruction and development of member countries. For decades, the actual focus of the Bank had been almost exclusively on the ‘D’.

During the last decade, the World Bank has significantly developed its policy in the area of post-conflict. In 1997, the Board approved a framework paper on engagement in countries emerging from civil conflicts. The paper acknowledged, among other things, that the scope for reconstruction needed to be expanded from simply rebuilding infrastructure to the creation of the “enabling conditions for a functioning peacetime society,” and identified five stages for its engagement. Particularly relevant is the second stage, which identifies the Transitional Support Strategy (TSS) as the entry point for the Bank in a country as soon as it

\textsuperscript{114} One of the conclusions of the report is the need for a common definition of transition from conflict to peace. The proposed solutions reads as follows: “For the UN, transition refers to the period in a crisis when external assistance is most crucial in supporting or underpinning still fragile cease-fires or peace processes by helping to create the conditions for political stability, security, justice and social equity.” For a comparison with the term “post-conflict peacebuilding”, see above, note 14 in chapter 1.

\textsuperscript{115} This section, as well as sections 3.3 and 3.4, is based on several documents of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, as well as on conversations with their staff. It also draws significantly upon two articles: Susan L. Woodward, “Economic Priorities for Successful Peace Implementation,” in Ending Civil Wars; and James K. Boyce, “The International Financial Institutions: Postconflict Reconstruction and Peacebuilding Capacities,” paper written for the Center of International Cooperation, New York University, on behalf of the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Denmark.

\textsuperscript{116} The first loan provided by the World Bank was in support of post-World War II reconstruction in France.

\textsuperscript{117} In 1994, the Bank had been encouraged by the US government to get involved in two post-conflict situations, Bosnia and Palestine (see below, section 3.3).

becomes clear that there are opportunities for its useful intervention.

In the same year, the Post-Conflict Unit (PCU) was created as an internal focal point for post-conflict related activities, as well as a training and capacity-building provider within the Bank. It was also tasked with the management of a newly created Post-Conflict Fund (see below, section 3.3).

In 1998, the Bank published a report on its experience with post-conflict reconstruction. While reviewing past operations, the report proposed new approaches and activities, particularly in breaking with the traditional World Bank position which ruled out any involvement in “political” matters. The Board reaffirmed that “peacemaking and peacekeeping fall under the mandate of the UN and are not responsibilities of the Bank,” but it acknowledged the need for revisiting the approach towards countries emerging from conflicts, which until then had been based on the same model adopted for countries affected by natural disasters.

The following year, the Bank took a series of measures to increase internal awareness on issues related to post-conflict countries. The PCU started preparing quarterly monitoring reports on countries and regions affected by conflicts, subsequently reviewed by a Post-Conflict Management Steering Group. Country desks were tasked with conducting country portfolio performance reviews for post-conflict countries more often than for other countries. The Operations Evaluation Department (OED) was asked to develop guidelines for evaluation criteria with greater sensitivity to the political and economic environment in post-conflict countries.

In January 2001, the Bank adopted a new operational policy, entitled “Development, Cooperation and Conflict” (O.P. 2.30), with the aim of responding more rapidly and flexibly to conflicts and mandating the integration of sensitivity to conflict in Bank assistance (this concept has been subsequently developed into the Conflict Analysis Framework). In addition to a significant prevention component, the new policy addressed both countries affected by conflict, and those emerging from conflict. For the latter, O.P. 2.30 clarified the concept of TSS as a “short to medium-term plan for Bank involvement in the country.” This first step for a program of assistance in the aftermath of a conflict had to be “closely aligned with the objectives and sequencing of priorities of peace accords and rehabilitation plans agreed to by parties to the conflict.”

The document makes a reference to financial assistance, stating that “to help a country emerging from conflict meet its transitional financial needs in a timely manner, the Bank may provide exceptional financial assistance, subject to approval by the Board. Any such assistance must be consistent with the Bank’s financial policies and its preferred creditor status, and it should be consistent with the principles of burden sharing.”

The development of those tools has been mainly assigned to the CPU (renamed in 2001 the Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit, or PCRU). Since its inception, it has produced a considerable number of studies and has played a significant advocacy role, both within the Bank and in its relationship with partners. Its limited size, however, as well as its location within the Social Development Department may have limited its operational impact. For instance, the Conflict Analysis Framework has not been systematically adopted by desk offices; similarly, the incorporation of conflict-sensitivity within PRSPs is still at the stage of a pilot program for a few selected countries.

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119 Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) were introduced by the World Bank in 2001. They are defined on the Bank’s website as “a country’s macroeconomic, structural and social policies and programs to promote growth and reduce poverty, as well as associated external financing needs. PRSPs are prepared by governments through a participatory process involving civil society and development partners,
Another policy development partially related to conflict situations took place in July 2002, when the LICUS (Low Income Countries Under Stress) initiative was set up to support countries with very weak policies and institutions. The decision to include a specific country in the LICUS category is made by the Bank on the basis of an indicator of economic policy quality, the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA); countries scoring 3.0 or less are defined as LICUS.

The rationale for LICUS policy is to address specific issues arising in countries where, given extremely weak government capacity, the usual development policies—including the adoption of PRSP—have failed. As a consequence, donors, including the World Bank, have disengaged from most of those countries, making things even worse. Therefore, LICUS strategy seeks innovative ways for a re-engagement in those countries.

All LICUS are viewed by the Bank as conflict-prone, though they are not necessarily conflict-affected; the two categories, therefore, only partly coincide. It is interesting to note that while the decision to create a LICUS task force was motivated by purely economic concerns, the LICUS Unit was established in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 9/11, and its mandate was, to a certain extent, revised in order to pay greater attention to security considerations also. Weak countries receiving very low levels of development assistance are in fact regarded as potential sources of transnational threats, including terrorism and illicit trafficking.

More recently, the publication of Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy, a policy research report, has greatly influenced the current thinking of the Bank and its staff in the entire area of conflict and development. The notion of a conflict trap—echoing the poverty trap—implies that once a country stumbles into civil war, it tends to remain captured in a perverse mechanism which facilitates the self-sustaining of conflicts and their resurgence even after a peace agreement is reached. External intervention is then needed to break the cycle and create the conditions for all parties to the conflict to actively support the peace process.

Unlike the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund is not a development agency. Its primary role in post-conflict situations is therefore not to provide direct financial support to the reconstruction, but rather to assist countries in restoring stability and to lay the basis for sustainable growth.

An area in which the IMF has developed considerable experience over the years is that of technical assistance to post-conflict countries in monetary, financial and fiscal issues. In the first two sub-areas, the IMF describes the goal of technical assistance as the development or reconstruction of monetary and financial systems to support economic recovery and growth, ranging from determining the

including the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). PRSPs have gained increasing support as the standard national development strategy that countries are encouraged to prepare in order to articulate their overall development strategy. Symmetrically, donors and development agencies are encouraged to base their overall support to poor countries on PRSPs.

CPIA is based on four economic policy areas: macroeconomic, structural, social, and public sector management. The maximum score, indicating the best policies, is 5. The average score for post-conflict countries in the first decade after peace is 2.29, while in the five years prior to conflict it is 2.56. Other low-income countries score, on average, 2.75. See Paul Collier et al., Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy (Washington, D.C.: World Bank and Oxford University Press, 2003): 21-22.

Breaking the Conflict Trap was jointly published by the World Bank and Oxford University Press in 2003. It was prepared under the supervision of Nicholas Stern, chief economist and senior vice-president of the Bank, and written by a team led by Paul Collier. Other works of Paul Collier, often co-written with other researchers at the Bank, have also exerted significant influence among scholars and practitioners.

Two recent documents (December 2004) review these activities: “MFD Technical Assistance to Recent Post-Conflict Countries” and “Rebuilding Fiscal Institutions in Post-Conflict Countries.”
appropriate currency and exchange rate arrangements to the restoration of financial intermediation and other basic banking services.

As for fiscal assistance, the IMF identifies a three-step process which includes the creation of a legal framework for fiscal management, the strengthening of the fiscal authority, and the design of appropriate revenue and expenditure policies. The ultimate aim is “to make fiscal policy and fiscal management effective and transparent.” The IMF sees the early rebuilding of revenue administration and systems as a matter of priority because they constitute necessary pre-conditions for the state to generate internal resources through taxation in order to finance the reconstruction of the economy and to ensure the delivery of essential services.

More generally, the IMF and the World Bank play a critical role in shaping the macroeconomic framework of countries emerging from conflict. While other donors (bilateral and multilateral) also may be active in this crucial area, the influence exerted by the international financial institutions (IFIs) is largely regarded as predominant. Not only do they offer assistance of high technical quality, but they also rely on their decisive influence in providing economic assistance and debt relief to the country to make their voice heard. In addition, the Fund has de facto been entrusted by the international community with the task of evaluating the macroeconomic situation of member countries. This position, combined with the widespread tendency of all lending institutions to adjust their behavior toward a country to the stance adopted by the IMF, has forged its extremely influential role, which makes many countries in need of financial assistance obviously willing to adhere to its recommendations.

The coordination and division of labor between the IFIs and UN agencies (mainly between the World Bank and UNDP) is not always smooth. At times, competition for donors’ funds has prevailed over comparative advantages and competences. Occasionally, donors have pushed the Bank to take the lead in sectors such as DDR or the administration of trust funds, to the detriment of other agencies that were possibly better positioned, particularly in terms of having a longer experience in the country. One of the disadvantages of the Bank in post-conflict situations is that, unlike the UN, it normally withdraws completely during war and is rather slow in resuming its presence.123 On the other hand, the Bank is regarded at times as more suitable than UNDP for overall coordination tasks, since, unlike UNDP, it does not engage in direct implementation of programs and therefore is not in a potential conflict of interest position. Joint administration has been adopted on some occasions as a compromise solution, although this creates administrative problems since internal procedures are quite different, particularly in terms of management fees.

Coordination between IFIs and other external actors also remains critical in light of differences in reciprocal perspectives. The monetary and fiscal policies usually advocated by the IMF to achieve macroeconomic stability (which refers mainly to the stabilization of prices and the exchange rate) have been criticized primarily on two grounds: they could harm efforts to sustain the economy and reduce poverty, particularly in the short term; and they are not necessarily conducive to political stabilization. We will revert to these issues in chapter 4; what is worth addressing at this stage is that the mandates, and therefore the agendas, of the IFIs (especially of the IMF) may significantly differ from those of other external actors, at least on some issues.

123 In this respect, regional development banks also are often better placed than the World Bank to assist countries immediately after, and even during, conflict. The main stakeholders of regional development banks have a greater interest than the World Bank’s major members in development occurring in their own regions, and therefore often exert maximum pressure to make sure that regional financial institutions assist. A discussion of the role of regional development banks in post-conflict assistance is beyond the purpose of this paper, but it is important to keep in mind their presence and potential to be among the major providers of assistance to countries emerging from conflict.
In operational terms, while the Bank and the Fund have developed a number of partnerships, primarily with the UN system, and have joined some of the existing coordination mechanisms and technical groups, there is a widespread feeling among practitioners that the IFIs have yet to be strongly involved in the overall efforts to coordinate international assistance to conflict-afflicted countries. However, as we will discuss in section 4.3, coordination on the ground between the World Bank and members of the UN Development Group (and notably UNDP) has made encouraging progress in the last few years.

4) Donor Coordination.

In addition to programs managed by international aid and development agencies, a significant share of external assistance to post-conflict countries comes directly from bilateral donors, whose integration into the coordination mechanisms as a result, is regarded as essential. Donors have discussed the challenge of such coordination in different fora, and particularly at the OECD/DAC, whose Guidelines on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation on the Threshold of the 21st Century touch upon most of the relevant issues.

“There is broad agreement on the purposes of aid coordination: resources should be delivered as efficiently and effectively as local conditions allow; the contributions of the many donors involved should be complementary and allocated in line with indigenous priorities and policies. Furthermore, external assistance must be managed so as to ease the burdens on partner countries and not add their own co-ordination problems.”

The guidelines identify five elements on which aid coordination should be developed:

"a) a common strategic framework for assistance; b) timely access to resources allowing for flexible implementation; c) leadership among international actors; d) mechanisms for field-level consultation and sharing of information; and e) the availability of resources specifically earmarked for co-ordination purposes."

On the first point, the Guidelines provide further elements to develop the concept of a common strategic framework for assistance:

“Donors should attempt to formulate and agree on a common integrated strategic framework addressing the contents and priorities of the programme as well as the policy and operational roles of different actors according to their comparative advantages. This situation-specific and time-specific strategy will implicitly define the respective mandates of different actors. Therefore it should be agreed upon at headquarters-level as the strategic approach forming the basis of the dialogue with local counterparts at the field level.

Based on a shared analysis of the most pressing needs for political, economic, administrative or social rehabilitation, this strategic framework can provide a guide for prioritising resource allocation across sectors and geographical areas, determining the division of labour among actors, and defining common approaches towards key policy issues. By definition, it is not a list of projects but rather a dynamic instrument mapping out the transition from relief to longer-term recovery assistance.”

This concept of a strategic framework for assistance has received general endorsement, but its systematic elaboration has not been undertaken yet at the intergovernmental level. Rather, the UN Secretariat
has taken the initiative in this area, leading to the concept of the integrated mission, described above. However, this process is limited to UN entities and does not involve governments.

Donor governments have, so far, focused on ad hoc measures which respond to the main principles of the OECD/DAC concept of a strategic framework for assistance, such as the “group of friends,” in which the countries primarily involved meet periodically to review the evolving situation. Since these groups mainly operate at the country level, we will discuss them in the next section of this chapter.

Another ad hoc form of coordination among donors (both governments and agencies) is based on international donor conferences. Similar meetings have been held for almost all countries emerging from conflict in the last fifteen years, either by the initiative of international agencies such as UNDP and the World Bank, or under the auspices of one or more donor governments, or a combination of them. Typically a first conference takes place shortly after the signing of a peace agreement and its primary goal is to raise the visibility of peace dividends, since all gathered donors publicly announce their pledges of aid in support of the economic recovery of the interested country. Follow-up meetings can take place more or less regularly in the following years.

Pledging conferences present several advantages for all parties involved. The recipient country and the implementing agencies receive political and media attention, which is crucial in mobilizing financial resources, and they often can rely on competition among donors, which may translate into an escalation of pledges. In turn, the donor community enjoys collective recognition of its role, as well as the opportunity to define and review the comprehensive framework of action.

However, there are also significant shortcomings, although the quality of each conference may be significantly different. In general terms, the reconstruction programs introduced at the conference was prepared more on the basis of the donors’ likely expectations and priorities than on a comprehensive needs assessment coupled with clear prioritization. Another recurrent problem is the alleged gap between pledges and real commitment, together with late disbursement of funds. Combined, these two elements are seen as undermining the credibility of the donor community and responsible for generating feelings of frustration within the recipient countries and implementing agencies. In turn, donors often blame inefficiency, corruption, and other “absorption capacity” problems on the part of the local government (and sometimes also of the agencies) to justify their performance.

Scholars and practitioners have repeatedly presented proposals for improving and standardizing pledging conferences; donor countries, however, have not promoted a concerted effort in this respect, thus far.

Coordination efforts among donors are also taking place in a number of informal networks, often coordinated by NGOs or academic institutions. While certainly useful opportunities for an exchange of views, these efforts seem to duplicate similar but formal fora, such as the OECD/DAC Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation (CPDC). In addition, they all share the problem of the relative marginalization of peacebuilding efforts within national institutions in donor countries, including development agencies.

129 On pledging conferences, see Patrick, “The Donor Community.”
130 For a critical review of those issues, see further, section 3.1. For a detailed discussion on this point in general terms and with reference to six specific situations, see Forman and Patrick, eds., Good Intentions, in particular the introduction.
131 See, for instance, Patrick, “The Donor Community,” p. 41.
“Confined largely to small, designated units and an equally small cadre of dedicated staff, peacebuilding basically remained outside the mainstream of the operations of development agencies. Despite repeated commitments to “mainstreaming” peacebuilding, development agencies found it difficult to integrate peacebuilding into their core mandates. While many agencies gained a better understanding of the challenges of post-conflict peacebuilding, their capacity to translate those into their operations were severely constrained by institutional politics, human resource shortages, and competing priorities. Inconsistent policy directions at the governmental level also constrained the role of post-conflict peacebuilding units.”

In chapter 4 we will examine recent developments in this area, often driven by the “stabilization agenda” imposed in many countries by the post 9/11 anti-terrorist strategy. However, at least until very recently, it seems fair to say that national efforts to articulate consistent policies in post-conflict peacebuilding and subsequently improve internal coordination in order to translate them into action have lagged well behind similar efforts made by UN agencies and the IFIs.

5) Coordination on the Ground.

The complexity of coordinating different peacebuilding initiatives on the ground can be seen, to a large extent, as a reflection of the scattered responsibilities at headquarters described above, as well as of the still uncertain profile of the integrated mission.

Typically, in a post-conflict context, the UN is present with several humanitarian and development agencies, forming the so-called UN Country Team (UNCT), under the overall coordination of a Resident Coordinator. When a peacekeeping operation is established, its leader—the Special Representative of the Secretary-General—also takes overall guidance of the UNCT, generally assisted by a deputy in charge of humanitarian and development issues. The effective “unification” of the UNCT with the peace mission is probably one of the most challenging tasks for the SRSG, as noted in the already mentioned independent study on integrated missions:

“Newly arrived political and civil affairs officers are perceived to act as if they are experts, with scant regard for the expertise of those already in place. In most cases, the UNCT feels that it is not involved in the planning of the new mission to the degree they would like...From the perspective of the (DPKO) mission, key personnel claim that the Country Teams are unwilling to adapt to the new realities. The perceived “old-timers” do not recognise the extent to which the “political wind” has changed due to a peace agreement, a transitional government and a Security Council mandate. These are typically situations in which the bulk of the UN efforts move from being “impartial” (to the warring factions) to “partial”, in that the UN subsequently supports a specific transitional process.”

The loose nature of the UN coordination—which, for instance, does not include the possibility of reallocating budget resources among UN agencies, nor the right to define priorities within each UN entity’s programs—is another limitation to the effective creation of a unified team. The proliferation of

132 Tschirgi, Post-Conflict Peacebuilding Revisited.

133 Probably the most relevant finding of one of the recent studies in this area, the Utstein Evaluation Study of Peacebuilding, carried on jointly by Germany, the Netherlands, Norway and the UK, is that none of those countries “has what any of the research team was prepared to characterize without reservations as a policy on peacebuilding”. See Joint Utstein Study of Peacebuilding, quoted in Tschirgi, Post-Conflict Peacebuilding Revisited.


135 As we have discussed in section 1.1., the evolving discussion on the meaning and implications of the concept of “integrated mission” may (or may not) end up providing the SRSG with stronger powers vis-à-vis the different members of the UN Country Team.
other actors, in particular international NGOs, experienced in recent years is another element which tends to weaken the effectiveness of coordination.

Despite these and other limitations, the SRSG can play a decisive role in post-conflict situations, not only in terms of his/her responsibility for carrying out the mandate approved by the Security Council, but, more broadly, in shaping the overall international assistance to the affected country and, ultimately, in determining the success or failure of the transition from war to peace.

The SRSG faces multiple challenges. In the first place, he/she is responsible for all elements of the peace mission. This requires the capacity of “harmonizing different mission cultures and components (e.g., military, police, civil affairs, electoral, human rights, administration) into a well-functioning team.”136 One aspect of this task is the need to overcome institutional rivalries between old and new members of the team.

As part of the UN system, the SRSG must also maintain constant, effective relations with the Secretariat in New York—mainly, but not exclusively, with DPKO, the day-to-day interface of the mission. Another important area for coordination is with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. As we have seen in this chapter, division of labor presents some critical areas. In addition, since the IFIs are normally not represented in a country in the immediate aftermath of a conflict, it may be difficult for the SRSG to establish effective channels for coordination on the ground. Recent developments, however, that we will discuss in more detail in section 4.3, show significant improvements in early coordination for needs assessment, which lays the ground for a more integrated approach between the UN and the IFIs.

The network of relations outside the UN system is even more important for the SRSG to successfully accomplish his/her mission: “to ensure that the mandate and resources are indeed in accordance with the needs on the ground, the SRSGs (through the Secretary-General and the Secretariat) need to work closely with the Council to keep it thoroughly briefed, to offer a clear analysis of each situation, and to provide cogently argued recommendations when Council action is required.”137

Through the local embassies, the SRSG must keep regular and positive relations with not only Security Council member countries, but also with other interested countries and regional organizations; this is especially needed to generate political and financial support for the mission. Establishing a “group of friends” on the ground, sometimes mirroring similar informal associations in New York, has often proved to be an effective tool for SRSGs in order to directly involve all relevant external partners and, in turn, obtain greater authority vis-à-vis local actors. As one former SRSG said, “It was because people were aware that I had the total support of the international community that they accepted my authority. If you think you have power because you represent the United Nations Secretariat, you’ll find that this is not sufficient.”138 This represents a significant advantage for SRSGs as compared to UN Resident Coordinators.

And, most importantly, the SRSG needs to establish strong working relations with the local governments both at the central and regional level, as well as with all former conflicting parties and their “sponsors.” He/she must also build an effective relationship with

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137 Ibid.
138 Interview with Samuel Nana-Sinkham, quoted in Peck, “Special Representatives of the Secretary-General.”
members of civil society and the local population, and with local and international NGOs.

Given the complexity of the role and the significant influence that SRSGs exert on the outcome of the UN mission and of the overall peacebuilding effort, selecting them is a very sensitive issue, the importance of which has been acknowledged on several occasions, including by the Brahimi Panel. Experience so far shows that, on average, the SRSG as an institution has proven its effectiveness, while SRSGs as individuals have performed rather well. Nevertheless, the current selection procedure, which leaves full discretion and responsibility to the Secretary-General to appoint the SRSG following consultations with the parties, is in debate. Furthermore, a recurrent request is the one to provide SRSGs with a higher level of autonomy as well as authority, at least over the broader UN family; even more important, SRSGs need a certain degree of flexibility in terms of resource allocations. The now-customary practice of leaving a fraction of one percent of UN missions’ budgets unallocated for funding quick-impact projects at the discretion of the SRSG represents a first—though limited—step in this direction. In the meantime, the SRSG’s ability to attract voluntary contributions from donors remains critical in order to pursue strategic activities outside the assessed budget.139

Chapter 3: Who’s Paying the Bill?

“We need more resources, and we need to get those resources more quickly.”

“We should certainly treat the costs of civilian crisis management as a normal component of a peace mission.”

“We can, of course, respond by increasing funding. In comparison to the $4 billion budget for peacekeeping operations for 2004, financing for certain actions - for example the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants and the establishment of joint tribunals - is quite pathetic."

“We need better financing for the civilian part of the peace-support operations...especially in the vital first year after the end of a conflict...we therefore need to find better ways to mobilize long-term support for post-conflict countries in transition. I hope that the High-level Panel will propose some options for doing so.”140

1) One Goal, Many Tools, Much Confusion.

The international community has yet to create a financing mechanism specifically tailored for post-conflict assistance. In chapter 4, we will examine current proposals and recent examples which may eventually lead to such a mechanism, and we will specifically discuss the role of the Standing Fund for Peacebuilding, established at the September 2005 UN Summit (but not yet operational). In the present chapter we will instead attempt to discuss in a comprehensive way the existing, separated and normally uncoordinated funding arrangements. As we have seen in chapter 1, they result from a combination of two well established models, namely, development assistance and emergency humanitarian aid, combined, when relevant, with a third one, peacekeeping operations. In recent years, a new model, transitional assistance, has made its debut, although it still needs to develop into a well established system.

Despite their redundancy, current funding instruments—as the quotations at the top of this page clearly attest—are largely perceived as inadequate in at least four different respects: the overall level of resources; the timing of their disbursement; the distribution of resources among the different

139 On the assessed budget of UN missions, see above, chapter 1.
components of peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities; and the “quality” of aid.

Unkept Promises?

One of the major shortcomings in global efforts to assist societies recovering from violent crisis is, allegedly, the lack of sufficient funding. This view is a leitmotif in documents and declarations coming from the most disparate sources: the UN, recipient countries, NGOs, practitioners and scholars. Even donor countries’ officials tend to accept the blame for their insufficient generosity in support of post-conflict countries, and for not keeping promises made.

This assumption may well be true—both with respect to individual situations and in general terms—but attempts to “scientifically” demonstrate it are lacking. Setting the question would require, as a starting point, two elements: agreement on the exact amount of resources needed to cover post-conflict requirements, and reliable accounting of all contributions recorded against requirements. Unfortunately, adequate figures are rarely available on either side of the equation.

Until recently, needs assessments were conducted independently by different agencies in their respective sectors, using different criteria and standards. Once assembled in an overarching “map” of global needs, they present gaps and duplications.141

Furthermore, since post-conflict needs assessments typically refer to medium-term programs (covering, in general, three to five years), and given the unpredictable evolution of the situation during this time span, estimates are regularly revised and projects are cancelled or added, making it almost impossible to keep track of outstanding needs in a meaningful way. Recording, on the other hand, the precise amount of financial support that donors make available may prove to be an equally complex enterprise. Despite growing pressure (and general agreement in principle) in support of contributing funds through a single channel (such as a multi-donor trust fund), donors continue to fund bilateral programs also, which do not necessarily fit into the overall strategy. Also, other multilateral frameworks continue to run parallel to the main post-conflict reconstruction framework, such as humanitarian Consolidated Appeals, not to mention the annual budget of the UN peacekeeping mission, which can also include peacebuilding components, as we have seen in chapter 1.

Other forms of assistance that are not easy to factor into the overall reconstruction framework (and usually are not included) range from debt cancellation to clearance of arrears with the IFIs. In some instances, their amount is even higher than the level of all other resources made available for post-conflict reconstruction.

Another source of uncertainty originates from the behavior of local governments. Some of them—especially exporters of oil or other natural resources—not only take active part in the designing of post-conflict reconstruction strategies, but also agree to take responsibility for a significant share of the costs identified in those frameworks.142 Unfortunately, just like external donors, they sometimes fail to keep their engagements, or divert their resources towards activities not included in the agreed strategy.

As a result of those and other obstacles, it is generally impossible to answer the question of the presumed gap between needs and resources, simply because we lack accurate and reliable figures for comparison.

141 Recent examples of joint needs assessments (as, for instance, in Sudan, led by UNDP and the World Bank) represent a crucial step in the establishment of a common framework for all partners. We will examine it more closely in chapter 4.

142 As an example, the Framework for Sustained Peace, Development and Poverty Eradication in Sudan anticipates funding needs for the period 2005-07 of US$7.9 billion, of which domestic financing is expected to provide US$3 billion.
In the absence of comprehensive figures, evaluations of the level of external assistance tend to be based on a more limited framework, usually comparing the amounts appealed for in donor or pledging conferences and the funds eventually received in response.

As discussed in chapter 2, a gap between pledges and real commitments appears to be a typical and much decried feature of those conferences. However, where accurate research has been conducted on this issue, the results are mixed and in some instances, they show that the financial support made available by donors has been substantially in line with requests and expectations. In addition, donors often claim that they deliberately suspend payments once they realize that their monies are not being properly spent because of one of several problems, such as local authorities’ lack of capacity, delays in the submission of projects, poor security conditions, etc.

Overall, it seems fair to conclude that the issue of systematic under-funding of post-conflict activities requires, at the present stage, further analysis.

Untimely Contributions?

Another recurrent criticism is based on the timing of contributions. Donors, even when they honor their commitments, are accused of disbursing their money at the wrong time. In fact, this criticism has been presented in two different and somewhat conflicting versions.

According to one school of thought, consolidation of peace requires the distribution of early “peace dividends,” tangible signs to all parties that the benefits of making peace outweigh its costs. Therefore international aid should come as soon as possible once a peace agreement has been signed.

There are, however, some practical obstacles to the provision of an immediate response beyond emergency assistance. To mention just one of them, such a response should be based on a comprehensive and meaningful recovery strategy and this strategy, in turn, can only be elaborated after the completion of needs assessments. Both processes, as we have seen, cannot be conducted by a single aid agency, and should instead extensively involve local actors and government, former rebels, and representatives of civil society (elders, women, former combatants, the displaced, etc.). Still, the pressure to “deliver” quickly remains strong.

On the other hand, according to some studies, external assistance flows would tend to concentrate in the short period of time immediately following the peace agreements, and would later quickly phase down. This pattern is often explained as a consequence of the influence of media attention: when a country is in the spotlight—which typically happens in the immediate aftermath of a “historic” agreement—donors compete to display their commitment, but once the country no longer has media coverage, donor interest falls and resources are diverted to other, more publicized crises.

This behavior is criticized since it generates an excess of resources at a time when local capacity is too weak to make good use of them, while providing insufficient support later, once institutions have been strengthened and are able to properly spend the money.

While it is possible for both criticisms to be correct, as they may refer to different situations, the fact that they coexist seems indicative of the relative lack of reliable and comparable data on which different analyses are based.

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143 See, for instance, Forman and Patrick, eds., Good Intentions, where the conclusion on the six case studies considered is that “the donor community appears to have disbursed approximately two-thirds of its aid pledges...moreover, some research teams express confidence that outstanding commitments will eventually be fulfilled,” p. 30.
Uneven Distribution.

Within a global peacebuilding strategy, each component should ideally receive adequate funding at the appropriate time. However, since they have varying degrees of interest and attractiveness to donors, in a funding mechanism where donors can “pick and choose” what to fund, this almost never happens. Experience in post-conflict and humanitarian situations clearly shows a pattern of systematic under-funding (and, more rarely, also over-funding) for certain activities, sectors and countries.

The most effective way to counter this trend is to disallow earmarking of contributions. This is the case with peacekeeping missions, for example, whose budgets, once approved by the General Assembly, are funded through assessed contributions of all member states. Members cannot select activities to be funded through their share: money’s fungibility fully applies in this context.

A similar result may be attained through a multi-donor trust fund, where donors are free to decide if and how much to contribute but are not allowed to earmark their funds toward specific activities—although in practice there is usually a certain level of flexibility, which means that donors can choose the sector they fund, for instance. In section 3.6 we will examine this issue more in-depth.

Another type of unevenness exists “between” crisis. This problem is well known in humanitarian situations, where “forgotten” crises stand in stark contrast with “CNN” crises, of which a recent example is the Indian Ocean tsunami. Undeniably, some internal conflicts receive very little political attention, at times because of a lack of interest on the part of major international actors, but also as a result of efforts by the local government to keep the issue out of the agenda of the UN or any other multilateral forum. Consequently, when those conflicts end the international response takes a very low profile. This is certainly one of the most serious weaknesses of the current system of conflict management, from prevention to assistance. However, it is more of a political than economic nature, and as such, exceeds the objects of the current chapter. In discussing proposals to strengthen the overall response to conflict, in the next chapter, we will consider the potential contribution of the Peacebuilding Commission to addressing this shortcoming.

Do No Harm.

Increasing attention is being paid to the quality of aid in conflict-related situations. The literature is rich with examples of assistance programs which, instead of fostering peace and reconciliation, have exacerbated existing tensions. The question is clearly recognized by the OECD:

“All aid becomes part of the political dynamic and produces political results. The first principle for aid policy makers is to do no harm and to guard against unwittingly aggravating existing or potential conflicts.”

Despite growing attention to this issue, there is no systematic evaluation of the impact of aid on the peace process. As noted by James K. Boyce:

“This is not only a question of how much aid is delivered, but also of (1) what types of aid are given? (2) to whom? and (3) with what conditions attached?”

Those questions are relevant in all development programs, but they acquire a special importance in conflict situations, where tensions exist not only over

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144 OECD/DAC Guidelines on Conflict, Peace and Development.
145 Forman and Patrick, eds., Good Intentions, p. 369.
“ordinary” dilemmas (such as between short- and long-term goals), but also between strictly economic conditions and purposes and peacebuilding objectives. The question of aid conditionality, in particular, appears to be crucial, but has received only sporadic attention so far. We will examine this issue more closely in chapter 4.

In summing up, while there is consensus on the unsatisfactory status of current funding rules and procedures governing international assistance to post-conflict peacebuilding, the very absence of such a “regime”—to use the expression employed by Forman and Patrick—makes it extremely difficult to answer apparently simple questions on the amount of aid, its timeliness and its distribution, not to mention its quality and consequences. Evidence suggests, however, that the ad hoc nature of most arrangements for post-conflict assistance, the co-existence of separate funding channels, and the gaps and overlapping of efforts made by individual actors seriously undermine aid effectiveness and frustrate the expectations of recipient countries.

2) Support from the UN.

Most of the financial assistance to post-conflict countries—like, in general, aid to developing nations—comes from donor governments, either directly as bilateral aid, or through international organizations, such as the United Nations and the international financial institutions. The level of financial autonomy enjoyed by the IFIs, and specifically by the World Bank, however, is generally much higher than that of the UN, since resources for development assistance of the World Bank come through periodical replenishments of the International Development Association (IDA) and subsequent disbursements are allocated by the Bank’s Board, without consultation with donor governments. Most of the budget of UN agencies, instead, is funded through voluntary contributions against specific programs, with only a limited share coming as un-earmarked contributions that can be allocated at the discretion of the agencies.

As a consequence, UN agencies are constantly struggling with the dilemma between starting projects only after they have secured the resources necessary to carry them on (which constrains their capacity to respond in a timely manner), and launching them without any guarantee that they will be able to secure the funding (which risks undermining their credibility).

This constraint is of special concern in post-conflict situations, where UNDP and other UN agencies are increasingly required to work in close cooperation within the context of integrated missions, but continue to rely on separate and largely unpredictable sources of funding.

To try to address this serious concern, ad hoc measures have been adopted so far in individual countries—as, for instance, multi-donor trust funds in Afghanistan, Iraq and in other countries, which we will discuss in section 3.6. At the same time, some UN entities have developed their own mechanisms to try to secure more predictable support for post-conflict activities. The most significant example in this respect is offered by UNDP’s Thematic Trust Fund.
for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (TTF CPR).

Established in March 2000, the TTF CPR aims at strengthening UNDP’s role in crisis prevention and recovery. It has been conceived as an additional source of contributions, which does not replace other traditional channels. It is managed directly by the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery,149 without the intermediation—as for other trust funds—of a TTF Management Committee. Programs supported by the fund are approved on a fast-track basis by BCPR.

The fund covers seven service lines—conflict prevention and peace-building; transition recovery; security sector reform and transitional justice; small arms reduction, disarmament and demobilization of ex-combatants; mine action; natural disaster reduction; and special initiatives for countries in transition—which correspond to most of the crucial areas in peacebuilding. Donors may contribute resources for the overall theme or specific service lines, regions, or countries, or any combination thereof, although the ability for UNDP to respond quickly to emerging needs and opportunities relies on the availability of unrestricted funds that have not been earmarked for a particular use.

Since its inception, TTF CPR has received more than US$300 million. After a relatively slow start in 2000-2001, when only a small number of donors financed it, the fund peaked in 2002, when UNDP established, through TTF CPR, the Afghan Interim Authority Fund (AIAF) as a special funding window in support of the Afghan Interim Authority set up in the aftermath of the regime change in that country. TTF CPR has continued increasing its funding basis since then, allowing UNDP to expand BCPR, which now has almost 100 staff based in New York, Geneva and several regional offices.

The overall favorable response to the creation of TTF CPR may be seen as an indication that donors support the concept of a global financial mechanism devoted to post-conflict situations, although, so far, contributions earmarked to specific countries or services have remained significant.

3) Support from the World Bank.

The range of operational tools at the disposal of the Bank to support post-conflict countries is very broad, and given the significant financial means at its disposal, the Bank is potentially one of the main (if not the first) partners for those countries. In the Africa region alone, for instance, seventy-four projects amounting to approximately US$3.4 billion were under implementation in conflict-affected countries.150

While most of its grants and loans to countries emerging from conflict come from IDA151 and are not specifically meant for post-conflict countries, the Bank established the Post-Conflict Fund (PCF) in 1997 to enhance its ability to support countries in transition from conflict to peace when normal instruments and budget provisions cannot apply.

The PCF was initially financed entirely by the Bank (with money drawn from the Development Grant Facility) and has subsequently been opened to voluntary contributions from donors. As of August 2004, the Bank had approved 136 PCF grants totaling US$66.7 million, of which donors financed slightly less than 10%. Approval or rejection of grant proposals is made by the PCF Committee, comprising representatives of several departments of the Bank, as well as PCRU, which manages the fund.

Grants go to a wide range of partners (United Nations

149 See above, chapter 1, paragraph 2.
151 The International Development Association (IDA), established in 1960, is the part of the World Bank Group that provides long-term interest-free loans (credits) and grants to the poorest of the developing countries.
agencies, transitional authorities, governments, non-governmental organizations, and other civil society institutions) to support a broad spectrum of activities pertaining to conflict and its aftermath. Typically, PCF grants finance preparatory activities, analytical work, and pilot projects, and, in general, programs designed to encourage cooperation and dialogue among the different actors involved in reconstruction.

While PCF is certainly an interesting facility, one which allows the World Bank to assist post-conflict countries before its usual instruments are available, and seeks to explore original initiatives to consolidate peace, the limited amount of the grants (ranging from US$25,000 to a ceiling of US$2 million) and, globally, of the PCF restricts its “potential to respond to the varied post-conflict recovery challenges.” PCF is therefore not a substitute for larger disbursements under different Bank facilities, but rather a complement to them, and is sometimes used to create the pre-conditions required by the World Bank's regulations for larger grant financing. Several observers, from within the Bank and without, advocate for a significant scaling-up of PCF and the size of its grants (up to at least US$10 million), given its flexibility and its broad scope.

In 2004, the Board of Governors approved the transfer of US$25 million from surplus to establish the LICUS Implementation Trust Fund. “The trust fund—according to the Bank—is designed to support LICUS with the most severe conflict and institutional problems to implement the reforms necessary for re-engagement with the international community and to address urgent social needs through a coordinated multi-donor approach. The LICUS Trust Fund should primarily finance integrated programs outlined in a country re-engagement note rather than discrete activities.”

While separate from PCF, the two facilities are designed to work together and have the same operational procedures, and the LICUS trust fund is managed by an expanded PCF committee. In principle, post-conflict countries in arrears that are not entitled to any other form of assistance from the Bank and meet LICUS trust fund criteria, are eligible for grants under this facility. Haiti, Liberia, Sudan, Somalia and Comoros are recipient countries thus far, totaling over $19 million.

Another activity which has become an accepted and common practice for the Bank over the last decade is the administration of Multi-donor Trust Funds (MDTF) in support of post-conflict or newly created authorities, which started in 1994 with the Holst Peace Fund for the West Bank and Gaza.

Usually MDTF cover a broad range of activities, including a significant share of recurring costs of the government budget, but occasionally they may be used to fund only specific activities, such as the MDTF for the Greater Great Lakes Region for demobilization and reintegration of former combatants. While they rely mostly on donors' voluntary contributions, the Bank can decide to use its own money also to create leverage and bridge funding gaps.

Since MDTF are not an exclusive feature of the Bank, and are probably one of the most effective financial instruments in support of peacebuilding programs, we will consider it more extensively in section 6 of this chapter.

4) Support from the International Monetary Fund.

The International Monetary Fund is normally able to provide financial assistance to post-conflict countries only at a relatively late stage. This because its financial facilities are designed to work with countries whose institutional capacity is strong enough to

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152 Michailof, Kostner and Devictor, Post-Conflict Recovery in Africa.
153 See above, section 1.3.
engage in a dialogue with the Fund and then stay on the track of reforms that typically are imposed as a pre-condition for assistance. In addition, internal regulations prevent the IMF from lending money to countries in arrears with the institution (and, in practice, also those in arrears with the World Bank). The concurrence of those conditions rarely applies to countries in the aftermath of a conflict.

In order to provide financial assistance to post-conflict countries at an early stage, the Fund decided in 1995 to extend to those countries its emergency assistance, originally designed only for countries afflicted by natural disasters. Emergency Post-Conflict Assistance (EPCA) is now “intended as a bridge to a comprehensive economic program supported by a Fund arrangement, during which implementation capacity is built up by the country.”

EPCA is “limited to circumstances where a member with an urgent balance of payments need is unable to develop and implement a comprehensive economic program because its capacity has been damaged by a conflict, but where sufficient capacity for planning and policy implementation nevertheless exists.”

EPCA consists of loans from the General Resources Account (GRA), which are on non-concessional terms. However, donor contributions—when available—are used to subsidize the interest rate of loans to 0.5% per year. The loans have to be repaid within three to five years. They do not require adherence to performance criteria and are normally quick-disbursing. They are limited to a ceiling of 25% of the member’s quota in IMF, with exceptions allowing disbursement up to 50%.

Since 1995, twelve post-conflict countries have received emergency assistance loans on nineteen occasions, for a total amount of approximately US$800 million. EPCA is seen as a first step in IMF re-engagement with countries which are not ready for a PRGF arrangement. And in fact, most of the countries which received EPCA prior to 2004 subsequently moved to more articulated Fund arrangements. However, while the initial expectation was that countries would require one year before making such a move, experience has shown that they may need longer. As a result, the policy was recently revised to allow for a second EPCA loan after a year or more, thus providing a longer “transition” with a higher share of quota.

A recurrent criticism of EPCA is that much of the money received under this facility has been used to settle past debts instead of being devoted to reconstruction programs. In essence, emergency assistance has turned into a form of debt rescheduling with little or no connection to post-conflict needs. The Fund’s reply to similar observations is two-fold: first, it is the choice of recipient countries to use EPCA for this purpose, since the Fund does not attach any conditionality to the destination of EPCA; and second, since money is fungible, there is little point in tracking the destination of EPCA.

5) Debt Relief and Clearance of Arrears.

One of the main obstacles on the road to economic recovery that countries emerging from conflict often face is the unsustainable level of their international debt.
debt, sometimes coupled with arrears to one or more of the IFIs. Since the financial policy of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund—often applied by other creditors—does not allow them to extend new loans to countries in arrears, early access to debt relief and the availability of new loans are, consequently, essential components of most of the economic strategies of transition to sustainable development.

To try to address this issue, IDA was authorized in 1999 to provide limited grants to post-conflict countries in arrears in order to support early recovery efforts in the context of an agreed economic recovery program and a concerted international assistance effort. Such grants can be used only as a last resort, when other sources are inadequate or inappropriate. This possibility has been reaffirmed and expanded in the subsequent IDA-13 and, more recently, IDA-14 agreements. However, meeting the requirements set by the Bank has proven extremely difficult for most post-conflict countries, as the Bank itself has recognized; in Africa, only the Democratic Republic of Congo received a grant in 2001, for US$50 million.

The Bank has been considering for several years now how to enable early and systematic IDA grants in post-conflict situations, which are critical for supporting capacity-building and restoration of governance, as well as for implementing urgent measures to re-launch the economy. Despite the relevance of this issue, however, little progress has been achieved so far.

It is worth noting in this context that the Bank has extended case-by-case grants to post-conflict countries from IBRD net income or surplus. However, the criteria for these interventions are not clearly defined; in most cases, the political profile seems to have played a decisive role. Beneficiaries include the Palestinian Territories, Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor, but in Africa, only Rwanda in 1994 received a $20 million grant.

As for the IMF, its Board has so far come to the somewhat contradictory conclusion that its current policies are sufficiently flexible for assisting post-conflict countries, although it has recognized that in some areas they could be enhanced. This applies both to the criteria and timetable for HIPC-eligibility,161 and to the issue of clearance of arrears. To ensure a coordinated response to the latter, in 2001 it was decided, jointly with the World Bank, to prepare an arrears clearance plan in each interested country, in consultation with all its major creditors, once the country had satisfied certain criteria. However, it does not appear that this idea has been realized so far.

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158 The expression “odious debts” is sometimes used to describe large external debts contracted by dictatorial regimes, largely to the exclusive benefit of the ruling family, clan or party, in order to finance, inter alia, the oppression of internal dissent. Recent events in Iraq—where the former regime had accumulated a huge debt—have re-launched the debate on the most appropriate means to handle such a hard and deeply unfair legacy. The political and legal implications of possible measures in this regard go far beyond the scope of this paper. For some proposals and additional references on this issue, see Boyce, “The International Financial Institutions,” p. 16.

159 “The use of such early recovery grants is restricted to situations where all creditors allow arrears accumulation, and where the country has made convincing steps towards social and economic recovery. These requirements may be too burdensome for countries where state institutions are not functioning. This type of IDA grant would therefore not be appropriate to finance the initial stage of engagement in the most severely devastated countries. Thus, the Bank is not now well positioned to provide adequate support to post-conflict countries arrears that must quickly take advantage of windows of opportunity to start and then consolidate economic and social recovery.” International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, Assistance to Post-Conflict Countries and the HIPC Framework. Paper prepared jointly by the staffs of the World Bank's Resource Mobilization Department, and the IMF's Policy Development and Review and Treasurer's Departments (Washington: April 2001).

160 The criteria for receiving grants in IDA14 are based only on debt vulnerability. Highly vulnerable countries will be eligible to receive 100% IDA grants, the less severe 50%. It remains to be seen to what extent post-conflict countries will benefit from these new provisions.

161 The HIPC framework is the overall multilateral debt reduction effort for the alleviation of debt burden for the most Heavily Indebted Poor Countries.
6) Multi-Donor Trust Funds\textsuperscript{162}

The practice of setting up trust funds (TF) in support of development programs is today an important and well-established funding mechanism, which has proven its great versatility over the past forty years in adapting to extremely different purposes and situations. Many development agencies and organizations, most notably UNDP, have developed considerable technical expertise in this area, but the World Bank has established its position as the biggest administrator of TF\textsuperscript{163}.

Multi-donor trust funds (MDTF) in support of post-conflict or newly created authorities have become an accepted and common practice over the last decade, starting in 1994 with the Holst Fund for the West Bank and Gaza, which the Bank agreed to manage after some initial hesitation. As mentioned before, this event is regarded as one of the very first steps made by the World Bank toward a systematic involvement in post-conflict countries.

Some experts regard MDTF as one of the most effective financial instruments in support of peacebuilding programs, and undoubtedly they present significant advantages in comparison with most of the currently available alternatives.

Ideally, an MDTF is established in close and logical connection with a comprehensive needs assessment, with the extensive involvement of donors, aid agencies and local authorities. This allows a well-defined shared understanding of the most pressing needs and of the channels for addressing them. It also avoids (or at least reduces) fragmentation of funding vehicles, especially between the financing of recurrent costs and investments.

The second requirement is a strong linkage between the MDTF and a recipient country's budget, which secures a coherent interaction between external aid and national fiscal and development policies. It also helps strike a balance between immediate reconstruction priorities and long-term institutional development.

One of the merits of an MDTF is that it makes it possible to fund activities that are not generally attractive to donors. An MDTF has to be designed in a way which makes "it possible for them to claim that their assistance goes for the purpose of which their constituencies can approve—while precluding strict earmarking."\textsuperscript{164}

The management of an MDTF also provides an excellent opportunity for close interaction between the local government, major donors, and aid agencies. Normally, a steering committee is formed, comprising major donors and aid agencies. It meets regularly and interacts with the recipient country's authorities, usually through their aid management agency (AMA).\textsuperscript{165} To run the daily activities of the MDTF, an administrator is named; currently the World Bank manages several MDTFs in post-conflict countries (including Afghanistan, Iraq, Rwanda, and Timor-Leste), often jointly with UNDP or other entities.

Specific project proposals are, at least in principle, advanced (or, at a minimum, cleared) by the government itself and presented to the MDTF administrator for approval and eventual funding. The proposals can go through the AMA, or come directly from the

\textsuperscript{162} This section draws significantly upon a paper authored by Salvatore Schiavo-Campo, Financing and Aid Management Arrangements in Post-Conflict Situations. CPR Working Papers, World Bank, June 2003. It is also based on conversations with staff of the World Bank.

\textsuperscript{163} At the end of fiscal year 2004 (June 30), the World Bank Group was managing 903 trust funds and programs for a global value of US$8.6 billion.

\textsuperscript{164} Salvatore Schiavo-Campo, Financing and Aid Management Arrangements in Post-Conflict Situations.

\textsuperscript{165} An AMA is necessary whenever the formal government structures do not yet exist or do not have the capacity to implement reconstruction; its establishment is often supported by donors looking for a transparent and efficient financial management of aid.
government ministry of finance (or planning), depending on the specific mandate assigned to the AMA. It is desirable, in any case, to have close day-to-day cooperation between the AMA and the MDTF administrator—and ideally to have a common set of preparation and appraisal procedures applying to all projects, whether aid-financed or domestically-financed. The award of contracts is then made by the MDTF administrator for MDTF-financed projects (preferably in consultation with the AMA) and by the AMA for domestically-financed projects.

In chapter 4 we will return to the subject of MDTF to discuss the role they can play in the framework of a global funding mechanism for peacebuilding.

Chapter 4: Lessons Learned & the Way Forward

“At any event, the art of state-building will be a key component of national power, as important as the ability to deploy traditional military force to the maintenance of world order.”

1) How Donors Have Evolved.

As briefly discussed in chapter 2, until recently, national efforts in donor countries to articulate consistent policies in post-conflict peacebuilding, including through better internal coordination, and to translate those policies into action have lagged behind progress achieved in these areas by some UN agencies and the IFIs.

Most of the debate in the second half of the last decade has been confined to relatively marginal sectors of ministries of foreign affairs and development agencies, often driven by the same limited number of officials who drove the work of the OECD/DAC Informal Task Force on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation, which produced, two years after the task force’s establishment in 1995, the above-mentioned Guidelines on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation.

As a consequence, most of the institutional innovations introduced in several donor countries at that time—such as the Office of Transition Initiative created by the US Agency for International Development (USAID) in 1994, the Peacebuilding Unit at the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), and the Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Department (CHAD) at the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID)—achieved only a limited mainstreaming of peacebuilding principles and practices into policies and operations of their respective organizations.

One of the consequences of this “marginalization” of peacebuilding efforts within donor agencies—as the Peacebuilding Forum held in October 2004 widely acknowledged—is that even the most prominent policies in post-conflict assistance, the DAC guidelines, are largely ignored on the ground, not only by local authorities, NGOs, and international organizations, but even by donor agencies’ representatives.

There are indications, however, of a renewed interest in post-conflict assistance on the part of donor governments in the last few years. This has been spurred in part by several studies that have highlighted the global costs and risks of civil wars, establishing direct connections between them and terrorism, drug production and trafficking, organized crime, and even the AIDS pandemic. Successfully

167 For a broader discussion of those and other institutional innovations, see Tschirgi, Post-Conflict Peacebuilding Revisited.
168 The final document of the Forum urges donor governments to make the internal dissemination of the Guidelines a priority for DAC donors and suggests that: “DAC peer reviews should deepen their attention to peacebuilding performance.” One of the recommendations of the Forum (n. 8) is also concerned with better use and dissemination of the Guidelines, and supports developing user-friendly documents to this effect.
169 See, as an example, Collier et al., Breaking the Conflict Trap.
ending civil wars and creating the basis for sustainable peace are therefore again among the development priorities of some governments, and new institutional adjustments are taking place.

Some experts have expressed concern for this new impetus, since it no longer appears to be driven by humanitarian goals, but rather by the “stabilization agenda” imposed in many countries by the post-9/11 anti-terrorist strategy. However, this renewed interest has also generated the momentum needed to revitalize efforts to strengthen the UN’s role in coordinating international peacebuilding activities, as well as to improve the operational tools at its disposal.

In this chapter we will first review institutional innovations in two donor governments, and then, before turning to recent decisions for an enhanced role of the UN, we will also briefly discuss developments within two regional organizations.

The United Kingdom.

The UK has shown constant attention to conflict prevention and peacebuilding during the last decade. Following the establishment of CHAD within DFID, mentioned above, 2001 saw renewed efforts to improve the coordination of different national agencies active in those areas. Key to this effort was the creation of two Conflict Prevention Pools (CPP), bringing together the staff and resources of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and DFID. One pool is intended for sub-Saharan Africa (the Africa Pool, chaired by the Secretary of State for International Development), while the other covers the rest of the world (the Global Pool, chaired by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs). Their annual budgets for 2004/05 are, respectively, £60 million and £74 million (these figures relate only to program costs, and exclude administration).

The Global Pool is currently articulated in fourteen “strategies,” eleven geographical and three functional (United Nations, small arms and light weapons, and security sector reform). Some of them are focused on conflict prevention; others cover mostly conflict resolution and peacebuilding operations. The focus of the Africa Pool is on strengthening African capacities in all areas of conflict management, from prevention to reconstruction. Four geographic areas are defined for planning and operational purposes (West Africa, eastern Africa and the Horn, central and Great Lakes, and southern Africa).

The main idea behind the CPP concept is to develop teamwork across the three departments (FCO, MoD and DFID), from policy formulation to program delivery, with the aim of realizing a more strategic and cost effective approach to conflict reduction. An external evaluation of the CPP conducted in 2004 concluded that the Pools had achieved positive results in respect to major benchmarks: preventing new conflicts and containing existing ones, enhancing international partnerships, and improving inter-departmental cooperation. On this last point, the evaluation reported that “the expanded availability of pooled funds has acted as an incentive for cooperation.”

The evaluation found no evidence, however, that better conflict prevention had reduced peacekeeping expenditures, and made several recommendations aimed at achieving the full potential of the Pools. It concluded that the progress achieved so far was significant enough to justify their continuation. At the same time, another complementary process has been launched, focused exclusively on post-conflict.

In September 2004, the British government set up a Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit (PCRU) to lead its

work in post-conflict stabilization. The statement to Parliament made on that occasion by the Secretary of State for International Development is extremely clear on the rationale for and the purpose of the PCRU:

“\[I\] wish to inform Parliament of the Government’s intention to improve the United Kingdom’s capacity to deal with immediate post conflict stabilisation, including by integrating civilian and military policy, planning and operations. In recent years, the United Kingdom, with the international community, has been increasingly involved in helping countries to stabilise after conflict. We need to deal better with conflict and instability, learn lessons and improve our capability to respond. Within this broader context, there is particular scope to improve the way in which we deal with immediate post conflict situations, especially those which include military and civilian components. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Ministry of Defence and Department for International Development are working closely to develop the capabilities that are needed. The Foreign Secretary will chair a new Cabinet Sub-Committee on Post Conflict Reconstruction. My Right Honourable friends and I expect to be in a position formally to establish an inter-departmental Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit later this year to lead this work. It will have a policy and operational role. In Spring 2005 we anticipate being able to inform Parliament about its initial capabilities.\]”

The decision came one year after the establishment of a joint working group of the three relevant departments (which, incidentally, are the same responsible for the CPP) and was guided, in terms of policy, by two objectives: to improve the link between military and civilian planning in post-conflict operations, and to engage the wider international community in an effort of coordination. The experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, where the British military had to perform civilian roles also, led to the creation of the joint working group and suggested the idea of the early inclusion of civilians within the military in each operation to cover the gap before purely civilian organizations arrive:

“We have long recognised that military force alone cannot achieve long term security. Particularly when our own armed forces are engaged, we aim to have the civilian capability to work alongside them to make effective arrangements for immediate post conflict stabilisation. The Government is interested in drawing on a wide spectrum of experience as to how this can best be done.”

The focus of PCRU is therefore on the short term—broadly identified as the six months after the signing of the peace agreement—with the aim of devising an early stabilization process which takes into account its consequences for future development. Operationally, PCRU takes responsibility both for development of policies and best practices, and for identifying, training and deploying qualified civilian personnel. This is to be achieved primarily through the creation of a 350-person roster managed by PCRU.

The Unit is located within DFID and is currently chaired by a person from MoD. Its staff should peak at forty in 2006, of whom only a small group will be employed in policy development, while the bulk of the staff will have operational roles, mainly in the management of the roster. It reports to the level of directors of the three departments, and has limited spending authority, mostly for the training and deployment of roster experts.

The United States.

As mentioned before, the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTT) was created within USAID as part of

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171 Written statement to Parliament on 16 September 2004 of the Secretary of State for International Development.
172 Consultation on United Kingdom strategy and practice and establishment of a Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit. PCRU, Autumn 2004.
its humanitarian bureau in 1994 to provide fast, flexible, short-term assistance to countries in transition from war to peace. Since 2001, OTI has been funded by a separate “Transition Initiatives” budget account with special authority allowing immediate spending, with a total annual budget of approximately US$50 million in 2003. Its programs are generally focused on the short- to medium-term (usually two to three years), with the aim of filling the gap between humanitarian assistance and development. Once the transition is considered completed, OTI leaves the country, handing over its pending activities to USAID missions or other partners. In 2004, OTI was active in eleven countries.

Ten years after OTI’s inception, the Department of State (DOS) has established its own office to deal with failing or failed states, the Office for the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). Unlike OTI, however, S/CRS is not meant to be operational; rather, it has been established to “lead, coordinate, and institutionalize U.S. Government civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations, and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife so they can reach a sustainable path toward peace, democracy and a market economy.” To stress its interagency nature, S/CRS’s staff comes from several branches of the administration, including the DOS, USAID, the military, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Treasury.

The main assumptions behind the creation of S/CRS are two: failed and failing states provide breeding grounds for terrorism, crime, trafficking, humanitarian catastrophes and other threats to US interests; and successful stabilization and reconstruction are essential to an achievable and sustainable exit strategy for military and peacekeeping forces. In operational terms, based on the trend of the last fifteen years,173 the main objective is to develop the capacity to manage two or three concurrent stabilization and reconstruction operations at any given time.

Five core functions are identified, from monitoring states of greatest risk and importance, and planning interventions to prevent crises when possible or to intervene in their aftermath, to preparing skills and resources, and mobilizing and deploying them. Coordination with international partners and learning lessons are also included within the main functions of the office.

A new planning framework for reconstruction and stabilization operations has been developed, which should guide the planning process behind each intervention. It aims at using all existing capabilities to address and subsequently achieve objectives in a strategic framework, encompassing the entire spectrum of bilateral relations with interested countries. To simplify and standardize the process, a template is under development; it identifies for each mission the overarching policy goal and its sub-goals, and associates them with the major mission elements and essential tasks. For each task, coordination mechanisms and resources needed—and eventual gaps—are identified.

Particular attention is being devoted to the development of the essential task list as the exhaustive inventory of crucial capabilities required in all post-conflict situations. The list is meant as a “living document” which should serve as a planning tool. It identifies174 five technical areas at the heart of stabilization and reconstruction: security; governance and participation; humanitarian assistance and social

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173 In its presentation brochure, S/CRS refers to “seven major post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization operations” in which “the U.S. has been involved” (Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Liberia, Afghanistan and Iraq) and nine in which the US “has devoted significant capabilities and resources” (Cambodia, Mozambique, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Colombia and East Timor).

174 The Essential Tasks document is based on the “Joint CSIS/AUSA Post-Conflict Reconstruction Task Framework,” expanded and updated by S/CRS staff.
well-being; economic stabilization and infrastructure; and justice and reconciliation. A sixth area, namely, management, is currently under development. For each area, several more specific sub-areas are listed, each of them further broken down into individual activities. For each activity, essential tasks are defined and articulated in three sequential conceptual phases: Initial Response (short-term), Transformation (mid-term) and Fostering Sustainability (long-term).

The conceptual framework developed by S/CRS appears very broad and strategically oriented. It is too early, however, to say whether it will succeed in effectively improving the global response of the US to post-conflict situations. Coordination with other departments, and especially with the military, is certainly a crucial element in this process. Budget resources are another; for the fiscal year 2006 the budget request amounts to $100 million. It would allow the office to expand its staff up to fifty-four people and to develop its training and deployment modules in particular, which constitute another essential piece of the overall strategy. The medium-term objective is to create an active response corps of State Department officers, which would deploy as first responders, possibly in conjunction with the military or multilateral peacekeepers. Active corps staff after completing the service, would be part of a standby corps, subject to recall for future missions. To promote the importance of getting civilian teams on the ground in the shortest possible time, S/CRS stresses not only the possibility of saving lives and time, but also the opportunity to reduce costs as a consequence of earlier termination of military operations.

Another important element of the strategy is cooperation with partners outside the US administration, including other donors, the UN and other international organizations, as well as the authorities and civil societies of concerned countries. We will examine this aspect more closely in section 5.3.

2) The Role of Regional Organizations.

The role of regional organizations in peacekeeping (as well as peace enforcement) operations has been extremely relevant in the last fifteen years. From NATO to ECOWAS (the Economic Community of West African States), regional organizations have often either assumed the lead in peace missions, or supported UN-led operations. In general terms, the collaboration between the UN and regional organizations in peacekeeping missions has evolved in a pragmatic and complex way, with the support of the vast majority of member states, who agree that the fast-growing demand for complex peacekeeping operations cannot be met exclusively by the UN.

As far as peacebuilding operations are concerned, cooperation has started later and has been more limited. Some organizations have recently developed specific competences in well-defined areas of peacebuilding, such as NATO in security and military

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175 For instance, within the Governance area, the following sub-areas have been identified: National Constituting Processes; Transitional Governance; Executive Authority; Legislative Strengthening; Local Governance; Transparency and Anti-Corruption.
176 For instance, the sub-area Legislative Strengthening is divided into: Mandate; Citizen Access; Staffing and Training; Resources and Facilities.
177 For instance, to perform the activity “Citizen Access,” the following essential task is identified as Initial Response: “Identify legal, institutional, and political obstacles affecting citizen in put to legislative process.”
178 Until now, S/CRS has not had an autonomous budget.
179 In the context of this chapter, “regional organizations” refers to a vast array of organizations whose membership, unlike the UN’s, is not universal, but substantially limited to specific regions or sub-regions. Its meaning is therefore broader than the one referred to in chapter 8 of the UN Charter.
180 For a discussion on this subject, see S. Forman and A. Grene, “Collaborating with Regional Organizations,” in Malone, ed., The UN Security Council.
training, and the OSCE in elections, democratic institutions capacity-building, rule of law, and police reform. We will however limit our attention to two organizations which are in the process of developing a broad peacebuilding capacity, namely the European Union and the African Union.

The European Union.

In the jargon of the EU, “civilian crisis management” encompasses a vast range of non-military activities in support of post-conflict countries. This concept has been developed in the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), which, in turn, is a component of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).181

Since the establishment of ESDP, the EU has launched several peace operations,182 involving military, police and civilian components. A crucial element for those operations has been the decision made by the European Council to establish military and civilian rapid reaction forces.

The European Council has identified four priority areas for the civilian rapid reaction capacity: police, rule of law, civilian administration, and civil protection, and has set quantitative goals,183 all of them already largely met. EU members have recently agreed to develop a Civilian Headline Goal, to be reached by 2008, to further refine and build up the civilian capabilities of the EU.

Another significant development was achieved in October 2004, with the decision by five EU members184 to set up a European Gendarmerie Force (EGF) as a police force with military status available for rapid deployment. EGF should become operational by the end of 2005 and is primarily meant as a means for maintaining public order and security during or immediately after a military operation, in situations—especially those characterized by a rather hostile environment—where the local police are not adequately prepared for similar tasks and before an external civil police mission can intervene.

Although the institutional machinery set up to manage the civilian rapid reaction capacities appears rather complicated, it is undeniable that the EU has succeeded in a relatively short period of time in developing a new and important tool for crisis management, which has already proven its effectiveness on the ground, both inside and outside Europe.

Still, several aspects need to be improved:185 the capacity to deploy multifunctional civilian crisis

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181 The Common Foreign and Security Policy and the European Security and Defence Policy have an intergovernmental character, and are under the so-called second pillar of the European institutional architecture. They are not Community matters, under the so-called first pillar in which common institutions, such as the Commission, the Council and the European Parliament, govern matters on the basis of a partial devolution of competences from the members states to the Community. In the intergovernmental second pillar, decisions are taken at the unanimity of collective bodies. The Council of the EU, composed of ministers of member states, is the decisionmaking body under the general political direction of the European Council, which is composed of heads of state and government. The Council decides the conduct of military and civilian crisis management operations and adopts the planning documents. The political control and strategic direction of operations are exercised, under the authority of the Council, by the Political and Security Committee (PSC), a permanent body composed of ambassadors of member states that sits in Brussels.

182 The first two ESDP crisis management operations were EUPM, a police operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina launched at the beginning of 2003 to replace a similar previous operation conducted by the United Nations, and Operation CONCORDIA, launched a few months later in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, as the first military operation of the EU, in replacement of a NATO operation. Outside the Balkans, other operations include the rule of law operation in Georgia, and Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

183 For the police, the goal is 5,000 policemen, of whom 1,000 should be deployable within thirty days; for the rule of law, 300 experts (prosecutors, judges and jailers) deployable within thirty days; for the civilian administration, a pool of experts (local administration, custom service, civil registration, etc.) rapidly deployable; for civil protection, two to three assessment teams of experts, to be dispatched within a few hours, and intervention teams of up to 2,000 persons, available for quick deployment.

184 France, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. EGF headquarters is located in Vicenza, Italy.

185 See the Ministerial Declaration of the Civilian Capabilities Commitment Conference held in Brussels on 22 November 2004.
management resources in an integrated format; the development of appropriate planning and support capabilities within the Council Secretariat; the allocation of adequate resources; and the ability to deploy more quickly.

The issue of coordination with other international organizations is of primary importance. EU officials have reiterated on several occasions that both the military and the civilian crisis management capabilities of the European Union, while primarily developed in order to give the EU the capacity for autonomous action, can be used also in missions conducted by other agencies, and mainly the UN.

This has not entirely reassured UN officials, who have noticed that the participation of EU member countries' contingents in UN-led peacekeeping operations has declined over the years. The development of capacities at the EU level is seen as happening, at least potentially, to the detriment of the participation of individual member states in UN-led operations, given the limited human resources available in most countries.

Recent developments send mixed signals concerning the future of EU-UN cooperation. At the political level, a Joint Declaration on EU-UN Co-operation in Crisis Management was signed in September 2003 by the President of the European Council and the UN Secretary-General. The declaration, which covers four areas of cooperation, namely planning, training, communication and best practice, is currently under implementation, although progress has been rather slow so far. At the operational level, the first two EU missions (EUPM and Artemis) have both been launched in close coordination with the UN, however, civilian cooperation on the ground in current operations remains limited, with the notable exception of the police sector.

The African Union.

Since its inception, the AU has devoted special attention to the issues of conflict prevention, management and resolution within the continent, and is currently engaged on several fronts, both in mediations, good offices, and other measures to prevent the outbreak of conflicts, and in peacekeeping missions. Typically, those missions are deployed at times when the UN is not ready to make a similar decision, and the AU’s deployment has sometimes proved crucial in improving the security situation enough to persuade the Security Council to review its former decision and eventually approve a UN peace operation to take over from the AU.

At the first Assembly of the AU, held in Durban on 9 July 2002, the Protocol establishing an African Peace and Security Commission was signed. It has proved a key instrument in the area of conflict management. Article 14 of the Protocol defines the role of the Peace and Security Commission in assisting member countries in peacebuilding during and after a conflict. More specifically, according to paragraph 1:

“In post-conflict situations, the Peace and Security Council shall assist in the restoration of the rule of law, establishment and development of democratic institutions and the preparation, organization and supervision of elections in the concerned Member State.”

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186 The police mission in Bosnia was an handover from the UN, while Operation Artemis came at the request of the Security Council to cover a three-month gap in the military deployment of MONUC.

187 For a review of EU-UN cooperation in crisis management, see Peter Viggo Mortensen, “The Emerging EU Civilian Crisis Management Capacity - A Real ‘added value’ for the UN?” Paper written for the Center for International Cooperation, New York University, on behalf of the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Denmark.

188 The Peace and Security Commission is the successor of a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, created by the AU predecessor, the Organization for African Unity (OAU), in 1993.
Paragraph 3 contains more detailed provisions:

“To assist Member States that have been adversely affected by violent conflicts, the Peace and Security Council shall undertake the following activities:

a. consolidation of the peace agreements that have been negotiated;

b. establishment of conditions of political, social and economic reconstruction of the society and Government institutions;

c. implementation of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes, including those for child soldiers;

d. resettlement and reintegration of refugees and internally displaced persons;

e. assistance to vulnerable persons, including children, the elderly, women and other traumatized groups in the society.”

As in other areas, the limited availability of financial resources is a major concern for the AU. The Protocol, for instance, does not provide indications about the financing sources of the peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities. It does, however, offer a useful framework for external donors to support them—financially and logistically—without their direct involvement on the ground. This has already happened for peacekeeping operations in several occasions, most recently with the AU mission in the Sudanese region of Darfur.

The enhancement of African peacekeeping capabilities is currently strongly encouraged at the UN. The UN Secretariat is providing technical assistance and capacity-building (mostly by DPKO) to the AU, and the Secretary-General’s proposal to make a small core planning and advisory capacity available to the African Union through the secondment of UN staff is currently under discussion.189

Several bilateral donors as well as the European Union are also extending capacity-building and training programs to the AU in the area of conflict management, including peacebuilding. In this respect, the Peace Facility for Africa,190 developed by the EU in 2004, is probably the most prominent example of cooperation between regional organizations in the area of conflict management.

3) Evolution on the Ground.

In chapter 2 we discussed the little progress made in the area of integrated mission planning since the presentation of the Brahimi report, as well as the persistent lack of a strategic approach in setting up UN peace missions. Despite these shortcomings, some encouraging progress in better coordinating the different main actors is being made in several current operations.

In general terms, all recent improvements seem to be based on the same premise: the realization that the only way to maximize results in post-conflict situations is through better coordination and an improved working relationship among all relevant partners. In the absence of an overarching model and doctrine, progress is achieved piece by piece, in a pragmatic way, under the joint pressure of donor and recipient governments.

Much of the recent progress seems to be linked to a more convinced cooperation among UN agencies and departments forming the UN Development Group

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189 See the last report of the General Assembly’s Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, doc A/59/19, paragraph 120: “This core capacity could consist of representatives from the political, administrative, logistics and military and civilian police units in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and its field missions. They could be temporarily attached to the African Union headquarters on the basis of memorandum of understanding and for an agreed period, depending on the needs of the Department and field operations.”

190 The Facility is a commitment of Euro 250 million, to support African-led peace support operations and to enhance the institutional capacities of the African Union and sub-regional organizations in peacekeeping and conflict prevention.
(UNDG), and the World Bank. This has resulted in the development of innovative tools and reference documents, such as the Practical Guide to Multilateral Needs Assessments in Post-Conflict Situations. As we have seen in chapter 3, the fact that, until recently, each agency used to rely on its own appraisal of needs in post-conflict societies has been one of the most serious obstacles to a concerted strategy for peacebuilding. The definition of Post-Conflict Needs Assessment (PCNA) provided in the Guide is that of:

"A complex analytical process led by the national authorities and supported by the international community and carried out by multilateral agencies on their behalf, with the closest possible collaboration of national stakeholders and civil society. The needs assessment aims to overcome consequences of conflict or war, prevent renewed outbreak and shape the short-term and potentially mid-term recovery priorities as well as articulate their financial implications on the basis of an overall long-term vision or goal."192

While stating that the process is “led by national authorities,” the guide makes a distinction between situations where national capacities are strong and those where they are weak. In the former context:

“National authorities have the capacity to fully engage in the PCNA. Together with a relatively stable security situation, this allows for a complex and participatory approach including extensive in-country data collection and consultation processes. As national contributions and ownership are likely to be high, planning can be oriented beyond the short-term (0-18 months) to include medium term (18-36 months) recovery and development needs.”193

While in the latter case,

“it may be more realistic to conduct a preliminary PCNA with a short-term focus (up to 18 months), which will be repeated after about 18-24 months under leadership of the new transitional government and with stronger civil society involvement. Such a “light” PCNA would involve a smaller team and concentrate on key areas required for stabilizing the country. Proposals should be robust enough to be feasible under difficult security conditions and conflict scenarios. In contrast to the humanitarian CAP, however, a light PCNA also focuses on developmental approaches including a conflict analysis. Inevitably, quality standards for a preliminary PCNA may be lower.”194

Even when the quality of the assessment is far from perfect, its greatest value lies in its joint nature, which allows national authorities and other local actors to actively cooperate with the international community.

The other main feature of a joint PCNA, as defined in the Guide, is its link with a subsequent recovery strategy and its financial implications. The following step is the joint definition of a common framework for development, which covers both short- and medium-term goals. This has been recently developed in the form of a Transitional Results Matrix (TRM), which is defined as:

“a planning, coordination, and management tool that national stakeholders and donors can use to better prioritize actions necessary to achieve a successful transition in fragile states. The TRM helps launch a poverty reduction strategy (PRS) approach in these

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191 The Guide, published in August 2004, is a joint effort of UNDP-BCPR, WB-CPR and UNDG, and was prepared by staff of the German Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ), with the support of the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ). The Guide has a host of forty-five annexes, which address the main subjects in detail and provide concrete examples.
193 Ibid.
194 Ibid.
environments, either by acting as an early framework to lay the groundwork for a PRS or, later, as a way to operationalize poverty reduction strategies in low capacity countries.\textsuperscript{195}

The TRM has been developed by UNDG (with the extensive involvement of UNDP) and the World Bank, in cooperation with the authorities of five countries where it has been applied so far (Timor-Leste, Haiti, Liberia, Sudan and the Central African Republic) and with other financial institutions and donors. It is mainly, but not exclusively, meant for post-conflict countries.\textsuperscript{196} Like the PCNA, the TRM is regarded as a nationally-owned document, developed with technical and process support from development partners.

The TRM, as presented in the Operational Note, is premised on a well-focused criticism of peacebuilding experiences of the last fifteen years:

"Political and post-conflict transition plans in the past have suffered from:

a lack of an overarching nationally-driven plan to which all donors agree, resulting in fragmentation, gaps or duplication in aid-financed programs; inadequate links between priorities in the political and security arena and priorities in the economic and social arena; overloading new governments with too many simultaneous decisions; loss of momentum after the key transition event (peace agreement, international donors conference); unrealistic expectations on the part of the population (breadth and speed of restoration of service delivery, individual perceptions of the “peace dividend” to be delivered), national leadership themselves (technical and managerial demands of managing reform or reconstruction, ease or speed of governing compared to leading a resistance, personal or political “pay-back”), and donors (speed of disbursement; how quickly and how deeply reforms can be implemented or state functions can be restored).\textsuperscript{197}

To try to address these problems, TRM is meant to provide:

“focused support to nascent national leadership to place key actions, outputs, and results for political, security, economic, and social priorities in a simple calendar framework; clarify and manage expectations (population, leadership, donors) by increasing realism on timing and forcing prioritization; identify in advance periods of overload and sectoral linkages; highlight and address actions lagging behind (e.g., voter registration before elections); provide a basis for dialogue with donors on resource mobilization and allocation among sectors.”\textsuperscript{198}

Whenever local conditions do not allow the preparation of a regular PRSP, a TRM can replace a full Poverty Reduction Strategy. It operates as a national development framework, in which donors and local authorities can define respective responsibilities and commitments. At the same time, the TRM can enhance transparency, giving civil society an opportunity both to provide input to and more closely scrutinize national reconstruction activities. On the other hand, according to the Operational Note, TRMs have already proved their usefulness in assisting low-capacity government in assuming greater control:

“National government leaders who have used the Transitional Results Matrix report that it has helped [195] UNDG and World Bank, An Operational Note on Transitional Results Matrices, January 2005.
[196] The Operational Note describes four of the five countries where the Transitional Results Matrix tool has been piloted to date as “emerging from armed conflict,” while the fifth (the Central African Republic) is defined as “a transition to democracy after a coup.”
[197] UNDG and World Bank, An Operational Note on Transitional Results Matrices.
[198] Ibid.
them approach the daunting challenges of mobilizing political will, managing expectations, and structuring dialogue with donors on the mobilization of technical expertise and financial assistance.\textsuperscript{199}

Obviously, Transitional Results Matrices are only a tool, and their adoption is not sufficient to guarantee success; in particular, their translation into reality relies on adequate financing. The Operational Note indicates in this respect three main mechanisms: the national budget; bilateral donor commitments; and pledges at formal donor meetings. A fourth possibility would be to link the TRM with a multi-donor trust fund (MDTF).

MDTFs,\textsuperscript{200} Post-Conflict Needs Assessments and Transitional Results Matrices basically pursue the same overarching goal, which is that of creating a global framework for reconstruction in which donors, development agencies and local actors all interact and assume clear responsibilities.\textsuperscript{201} They also share the “cluster” approach, under which leadership and coordination tasks are endorsed to different entities according to their respective mandates and capabilities. The appraisal of essential requirements, the identification of appropriate frameworks and timeframes for meeting them, and the establishment of a system responsible both for project approval and financing constitute sequential and strictly related elements in this process. For this reason, a combination of the three tools we have described, ideally with the same actors, seems to offer an excellent opportunity for a global, coherent peacebuilding strategy. Incidentally, the combined use of TRM and MDTF could represent an effective substitute for donor conditionality. As briefly mentioned in chapter 3, the economic conditionality imposed by some donors and IFIs has often proved to be counterproductive in weak countries, including those emerging from conflict. As noted by several authors,\textsuperscript{202} weak countries are likely to fail to enact institutional and economic reforms; therefore exercising conditionality on them means cutting them from external aid or jeopardizing their long-term perspectives. Replacing conditionality with an agreed framework of measurable targets may prove an effective way to defuse tension between short- and long-term goals and between strictly macroeconomic conditions and peacebuilding objectives.

“The TRM is based on the idea that clear expectations are more effective in these circumstances than specific legal conditionality. Rather than treating each action as a condition, periodic reviews of the TRM and progress towards its planned outputs allow donors to clarify with national authorities their expectations on satisfactory progress being made against the broad program of key results, and to reinforce the link with donor agencies’ ability to justify further funding to donor domestic constituencies. Through frequent dialogue, donors and government discuss progress against the TRM targets, and revise those targets where appropriate: government should be clear that, while all concerned will understand if some specific actions lag, failure to make progress across the program as a whole will risk future financial support.”\textsuperscript{203}

The availability of a Multi-donor Trust Fund would

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{199} Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{200} See above, section 3.6.
  \item \textsuperscript{201} Not coincidentally, the post-conflict countries where TRM has been applied so far (Timor-Leste, Haiti, Liberia, and Sudan) are all countries where PCNA also had been previously implemented, and two of them (Timor-Leste and Sudan) rely on MDTF for funding and coordination.
  \item \textsuperscript{202} See for instance the discussion on the failure of conditionality in promoting institutional and economic reform in poorly performing countries in Francis Fukuyama, State-Building.
  \item \textsuperscript{203} UNDG and World Bank. An Operational Note on Transitional Results Matrices.
\end{itemize}
complement this approach, allowing a flexible allocation of resources to try to address delays in specific sectors or to reach revised targets.

4) How the UN May Evolve.

The Peacebuilding Commission.

Despite the growing role of regional actors, IFIs, bilateral donors, and an increasing number of intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, the centrality of the UN system in peacbuilding strategies and action has not been challenged in the last fifteen years. However, as we have seen above, fundamental questions about the ultimate responsibility for both policy and coordination within the UN system have not been answered.

This double gap has severely undermined the effectiveness of peacbuilding. Experience accumulated in more than a decade of interventions in over twenty countries, combined with very extensive and often excellent research—both within academia and development agencies, most notably the World Bank—has provided a number of widely shared principles and practical suggestions concerning the mechanisms and the instruments the international community should develop to improve peacbuilding activities. Those principles and suggestions offer a continuous source of inspiration for organizations involved in peacbuilding, and have contributed to a widespread reshaping of those organizations, as we have seen in chapter 3 (for UN agencies and the IFIs), and in the first part of this chapter (for donors and some regional organizations). But, despite repeated analytical efforts at the inter-agency level, such as the report of the ECHA/UNDG Working Group on transition issues we referred to in chapter 2, they have not yet been institutionalized at the very heart of the peacbuilding machinery. Both the main intergovernmental organs of the UN and the Secretariat’s departments involved in peacbuilding have achieved little progress other than repeated rhetorical pledges in joining their forces and creating effective mechanisms for political guidance, joint planning and operational coordination.

As a result, there is no evidence that today’s peacbuilding operations produce, on average, better results than they used to ten or fifteen years ago; rather we look today at operations in the early 1990s—such as those in Mozambique and El Salvador—as more successful than many later operations.

This kind of comparison has little, if any, scientific value, for at least three reasons: each situation is different; the final outcome of a peace mission depends on many more factors (both at the local and the global levels) than just its design and the performance of its main actors; and last, but not least, as repeatedly stated, final responsibility lies with the people and institutions concerned—in other words, sustainable peace can not be imposed from the outside. Nevertheless, the fact that the number of conflicts worldwide, after a sharp decline between 1992 and 1995, have since remained almost stable (see Table 2), and that a high percentage of countries relapse into violence shortly after a peace settlement, are indicators that we cannot simply dismiss. Projections made by the World Bank show a disturbing trend, with the number of countries in conflict or in its immediate aftermath declining only marginally over the next fifty years.

204 See above, section 1.4.
205 See above, sections 2.1 and 2.2.
206 UN agencies, funds and programs have taken significant steps in recent years to improve their own operational responses to post-conflict peacbuilding, as we have seen in section 3.2, where we have described with some level of detail the role played by UNDP through its Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR). The point we are making in this chapter is that similar improvements within individual agencies have not translated into a system-wide re-organization and have left the UN Secretariat largely unaffected.
207 See Breaking the Conflict Trap, pages 94-110.
This trend, however, is based on a number of assumptions—not on laws of physics—which can be reversed. A serious reform of current UN mechanisms in the area of peacebuilding, combined with the already mentioned transformation in individual agencies and governments, could contribute significantly to such a change. In this respect, the decisions made at the UN World Summit in September 2005 offer a very promising opportunity.

While several other references in the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document have a direct or indirect impact on post-conflict countries, we will focus on its chapter devoted to peacebuilding (paragraphs 97-105). World leaders have endorsed a set of decisions which significantly draw upon the relevant section in UN Secretary-General’s report In Larger Freedom, released in March 2005. The Secretary-General’s proposals were, in turn, largely based on the report produced by the sixteen-member High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change.

The Summit has decided on the creation of three new bodies: an intergovernmental body, the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC); supported by a dedicated unit within the UN Secretariat, the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO); and a standing Peacebuilding Fund (PBF), the third pillar in this new architecture, and a financial one. These new institutions are designed to address the current situation in which “no part of the United Nations system effectively addresses the challenge of helping countries with the transition from war to lasting peace,” as discussed in chapter 1.

Although paragraph 97 of the Outcome Document states that the members of the United Nations “decide to establish a Peacebuilding Commission,” the document leaves many outstanding issues, requiring further action on the part of some UN organs in order to make the Commission operational. Shortly after the Summit, the President of the General Assembly launched a process of informal consultations on the text of a resolution to “operationalize” the Peacebuilding Commission. On 20 December 2005, the General Assembly (GA) and the Security Council (SC) passed two identical resolutions, which largely drew upon the text of the relevant paragraphs of the Outcome Document and integrated it with some

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208 The authors of Breaking the Conflict Trap suggest that halving the incidence of civil war by 2015 could be adopted as an additional benchmark to the Millennium Development Goals.
209 UN document A/Res/60/1.
210 In particular paragraphs 114-119, but also 137, 178, and 189. One month after the publication of In Larger Freedom, in April 2005, the Secretary-General circulated an explanatory note to his proposals concerning the issue of peacebuilding. In this context, and unless otherwise specified, we will refer to both In Larger Freedom and to the explanatory note as the Secretary-General’s Report, without further specification.
211 UN document A/59/565 (see, in particular, paragraphs 224-230 and 261-269), presented in December 2004.
212 In paragraph 105, the Outcome Document stipulates that “The Peacebuilding Commission should begin its work no later than 31 December 2005.”
213 See UN documents A/60/L.40 (temporary number) and S/Res/1645, respectively.
crucial provisions, which pave the way for the convening of the first meeting of the Commission in early 2006.

As for the Peacebuilding Support Office and Fund, paragraphs 104 and 103, respectively, request the Secretary-General to proceed to their establishment, very briefly outlining their mandate and modalities. Subsequent GA and SC resolutions have slightly expanded the text.214

The Peacebuilding Commission is defined as an “intergovernmental advisory body,” whose main purposes are:

“(a) To bring together all relevant actors to marshal resources and to advise on and propose integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery;

(b) To focus attention on the reconstruction and institution-building efforts necessary for recovery from conflict and to support the development of integrated strategies in order to lay the foundation for sustainable development;

(c) To provide recommendations and information to improve the coordination of all relevant actors within and outside the United Nations, to develop best practices, to help to ensure predictable financing for early recovery activities and to extend the period of attention given by the international community to post-conflict recovery.”215

The PBC should meet in different formats. An organizational committee of thirty-one people will be comprised of seven members each of the Security Council,216 the Economic and Social Council, and the General Assembly, the five top providers of assessed contributions to the UN and voluntary contributions to UN funds, programs and agencies (including the Peacebuilding Fund) “selected by and among the ten top providers,” and the five top providers of military personnel and civilian police to UN missions, selected according to the same rule. The organizational committee will be responsible for developing procedures and organizational matters of the PBC.

Larger groups will take part in the country-specific meetings of the PBC. These groups will include, in addition to the members of the organizational committee:

“(a) The country under consideration;

(b) Countries in the region engaged in the post-conflict process and other countries that are involved in relief efforts and/or political dialogue, as well as relevant regional and subregional organizations;

(c) The major financial, troop and civilian police contributors involved in the recovery effort;

(d) The senior United Nations representative in the field and other relevant United Nations representatives;

(e) Such regional and international financial institutions as may be relevant.”218

214 “Reaffirms its request to the Secretary-General to establish, within the Secretariat, from within existing resources, a small peacebuilding support office staffed by qualified experts to assist and support the Commission, and recognizes in that regard that such support could include gathering and analysing information relating to the availability of financial resources, relevant United Nations in-country planning activities, progress towards meeting short and medium-term recovery goals and best practices with respect to cross-cutting peacebuilding issues;

Also reaffirms its request to the Secretary-General to establish a multi-year standing peacebuilding fund for post-conflict peacebuilding, funded by voluntary contributions and taking due account of existing instruments, with the objective of ensuring the immediate release of resources needed to launch peacebuilding activities and the availability of appropriate financing for recovery.” Ibid., Operational Paragraphs (OP) 23 and 24.

215 Ibid., OP 2.

216 Security Council Resolution 1646, approved also on December 20 2005, specifies that the five permanent members of the Council “shall be members of the Organizational Committee of the Peacebuilding Commission and that, in addition, the Council shall select annually two of its elected members to participate in the Organizational Committee.”

217 UN doc. A/60/l.40, OP 4.

218 Ibid., OP 7.
Additional provisions concerning the membership stipulate that: “a representative of the Secretary-General shall be invited to participate in all meetings of the Commission,”219 and “Representatives from the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and other institutional donors shall be invited to participate in all meetings of the Peacebuilding Commission in a manner suitable to their governing arrangements.”220

The process of establishing the PBC’s agenda, obviously a crucial component of its work, is governed by a rather cumbersome mechanism. The Commission, in fact, cannot autonomously decide which countries will be selected for country-specific configurations. The organizational committee “taking in due consideration to maintaining a balance in addressing situation in countries in different regions,”221 shall establish its own agenda “based on the following:

(a) Requests for advice from the Security Council;
(b) Requests for advice from the Economic and Social Council or the General Assembly with the consent of a concerned Member State in exceptional circumstances on the verge of lapsing or relapsing into conflict and with which the Security Council is not seized in accordance with Article 12 of the Charter;
(c) Requests for advice from Member States in exceptional circumstances on the verge of lapsing or relapsing into conflict and which are not on the agenda of the Security Council;
(d) Requests for advice from the Secretary-General.”222

As for the conclusion of country-specific discussions, operational paragraph 22 “recommends that the Commission terminate its consideration of a country-specific situation when foundations for sustainable peace and development are established or upon the request by national authorities of the country under consideration.”223

An interesting and innovative approach has been adopted concerning the institutional location of the PBC and the related question of its reporting lines. The High-level Panel had advised the establishment of the commission as a subsidiary organ of the Security Council (although one to be established by the Council after consultation with ECOSOC). The proposal raised concerns among many UN members, mostly from the developing world, who advocated strongly in favor of the subordination of the PBC to the General Assembly or ECOSOC also.224 The report of the Secretary-General approached this delicate issue from the perspective of the reporting lines of the PBC, suggesting that “the Peacebuilding Commission would best combine efficiency with legitimacy if it were to advise the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council in sequence, depending on the state of recovery. Simultaneity should be avoided because it will create duplication and confusion....If the proposal for sequential reporting is agreed, these two bodies would have to work together to identify the modalities for transition between the two.”

The Summit Outcome Document remained silent on the “location” of the PBC, leaving the final word to the subsequent GA and SC resolutions, which have made the PBC the first UN organ to be established as a “joint” subsidiary organ of the two bodies. As for the reporting lines, the resolutions determined that: “The
Peacebuilding Commission shall make the outcome of its discussions and recommendations publicly available as United Nations documents to all relevant bodies and actors, including the international financial institutions, and that “the peacebuilding Commission shall submit an annual report to the General Assembly and that the Assembly shall hold an annual debate to review the report.” However, an echo of the sequential reporting suggested by the Secretary-General is detectable in paragraphs 16 and 17 of the resolutions passed by the GA and the SC, which underline that:

“In post-conflict situations on the agenda of the Security Council with which it is actively seized, in particular when there is a United Nations-mandated peacekeeping mission on the ground or under way and given the primary responsibility of the Council for the maintenance of international peace and security in accordance with the Charter, the main purpose of the Commission will be to provide advice to the Council at its request,” while “the advice of the Commission to provide sustained attention as countries move from transitional recovery towards development will be of particular relevance to the Economic and Social Council, bearing in mind its role as a principal body for coordination, policy review, policy dialogue and recommendations on issues of economic and social development.”

As mentioned above, the resolutions contain only a short reference to the Peacebuilding Support Office, which the Secretary-General is asked to establish within the UN Secretariat. More details on its nature, size and structure are presented in the budget proposal submitted by the Secretary-General, which clarifies that it “would be located within the Executive Office of the Secretary-General and would be reporting to the Secretary-General through the Deputy Secretary-General.” The budget proposal spells out six core functions of the PBSO and describes its overall structure and composition with considerable details. Three of the core functions are conceived as activities in support of the Peacebuilding Commission, although it is not anticipated that the PBSO will work as the organizational secretariat of the PBC. Another function is to represent the Secretary-General at meetings of the PBC and at external meetings concerning the PBSO itself, and also to liaise, on his behalf, with the administrator of the PBF. The two remaining core functions are to provide “high-quality inputs to the planning process for peacebuilding activities” and to “conduct best practice analysis and develop policy guidance as appropriate.” Those activities seem to partially overlap with functions presently attributed to other departments within the Secretariat, and we will return to them in the next paragraph.

While the budget proposal offers a rather articulated vision of the role that the Secretary-General envisages for the PBSO, it is to be noted that the General Assembly rejected this proposal, asking the Secretary-General to operate the support office “within existing resources,” as stipulated in the Outcome Document. Because the discussion on this proposal was held within the Fifth Committee of the GA, it has touched exclusively upon its budgetary and administrative implications, without entering into its political substance. The Secretary-General is invited to present a new proposal sometimes in 2006, leaving a significant degree of uncertainty over the ability of

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225 UN document A/60/61, OP 13.
226 Ibid., OP 15. In the subsequent Resolution 1646, the Security Council stipulated that such a report “shall also be submitted to the Secretary-General for an annual debate.”
227 Ibid., OP 16.
228 Ibid., OP 17.
229 UN document A/60/537, paras. 40-43.
the PBSO to operate, at least over the next months.\textsuperscript{230}

As for the Peacebuilding Fund, no further indication is provided in official UN documents, except for the above-mentioned indirect reference contained in the budget proposal for the PBSO. A short concept note circulated by the UN Secretariat during the month of December 2005 offers an interesting suggestion of the way the Secretary-General may intend to proceed in setting up the PBF.

The paper first recalls that the fund will

"support critical peacebuilding initiatives which directly contribute towards post conflict stabilization and strengthen the capacity of Government or transitional authorities to assume early ownership of the recovery process. The PBF will address critical funding gaps during the early stages of the recovery process and priority consideration will be given during the initial 12 month period, broadly defined as the stage between the conclusion of a peace agreement and when normal funding mechanisms come into play."\textsuperscript{231}

It then enters into the mechanisms for activating the fund and approving grants, stating that proposals for funding "will originate from field operations and will be based on discussions between the national authorities and the UN." Disbursement decisions will be made by the Secretary-General, who "will be guided by the broad parameters spelled out by the PBC with respect to the strategic options available."

Three different entities are envisaged for the functioning and the oversight of the fund: a “Project Review Board will be constituted to examine submission to the PBF and ensure their compatibility with stated disbursement criteria”; a five-member Special Advisory Group will be appointed by the Secretary General “to provide him with strategic observations on the use of the PBF”, and will produce “an annual report on the impact of the PBF, for review by the PBC”; “a separate partner organization will be nominated to provide the fiduciary management of the PBF,” whose design will “meet the highest standards of accountability and...take account of best practices with Multi-Donor Trust Funds.”

The Note does not provide any figure on the expected volume of the fund, but makes it clear that it will be “a comparatively modest fund relative to all financing for peacebuilding related activities,” and that “priority should be given to countries under consideration by the PBC.” Finally, the Note reiterates that the PBF will be supported by voluntary financial contributions and “will need to be replenished at regular intervals.”

Beyond the Peacebuilding Commission

To what extent does the set of decisions on peacebuilding made at the 2005 UN World Summit and in the subsequent GA and SC resolutions address the three basic questions related to peacebuilding that we have assumed as the basis for this paper—who is in charge, who coordinates, and who pays?

At first glance, the three new institutions may seem

\textsuperscript{230} The budget proposal anticipated for the PSO a staff of twenty-one, headed at the level of Assistant Secretary-General, with a total budget for the biennium 2006-07 of slightly over US$4 million. In the view of Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ, whose advice has been fully endorsed by the Fifth Committee), "while the Secretary-General is within his right to inform the Assembly that he believes that additional resources are necessary, it is incumbent upon him to fully justify that position, with a full analysis of the possibilities for absorption and redeployment. In this regard, the Committee has been informed that, in view of the novel functions of the envisaged support office, it is not possible to utilize existing Secretariat capabilities to staff it. The Committee is not convinced by this explanation and points out that there is no evidence of a sufficient attempt to redeploy resources or otherwise accommodate this activity from within existing resources... In the opinion of the Committee, the Secretary-General should therefore be requested to revisit the matter and to submit a proposal that would be consistent with the intent of the Assembly." See UN document A/60/7/Add.25.

\textsuperscript{231} UN Secretariat, Concept Note on the Peacebuilding Fund. Undated (but circulated in December 2005). Following quotations in this section are extracted from this document.
to provide exactly for the instruments needed to fill the triple gap: the Peacebuilding Commission would pull together and organize the political determination of the international community to assist post-conflict countries, the Peacebuilding Support Office would offer the institutional place for UN entities and other actors to define their respective roles and responsibilities, and the Standing Peacebuilding Fund would provide the money needed to finance crucial activities.

A closer examination of the PBC, PBSO and PBF, however, leads to somewhat different conclusions.

A new intergovernmental body is, in principle, the right instrument to address the political gap. However, the advisory nature of the PBC—coupled with the stipulation that it “shall act in all matters on the basis of consensus of its members”seems at odds with the very concept of a body assuming the final responsibility for peacebuilding. Incidentally, this was not the advice of the High-level Panel. Its report did not explicitly describe the nature of the PBC; the Panel did, however, suggest that it should be established by the Security Council “under Article 29 of the Charter of the United Nations” as a Council subsidiary organ. In this capacity, the PBC could have approved (if necessary, by a majority vote) binding texts, to be eventually endorsed by the Security Council in the form of resolutions.

As currently conceived, the PBC is more a political forum “to address the special needs of countries emerging from conflict towards recovery, reintegration and reconstruction and to assist them in laying the foundation for sustainable development,” rather than a decision-making body, and since it is not independent, it will have to rely on cooperation among the main UN organs to function.

The debate during the Summit and subsequently in the consultations which preceded the approval of the twin resolutions showed a considerable amount of “competition” among the main UN organs, and notably between the Security Council (or rather, its permanent members) and the General Assembly (or at least, the majority of its members, and notably the non-aligned movement).

One specific point on which effective cooperation among the main organs of the UN (including ECOSOC) will be essential for the PBC to have a meaningful role is the complex, and potentially conflictive, mechanism for setting its agenda. Because, in practice, most of the possible candidates for establishing country-specific commissions are likely to be on the Security Council agenda (whether or not they will also be the object of a UN-mandated peacekeeping mission), the SC, and specifically its permanent members, hold de facto veto power on the agenda. They need to use it with the greatest caution, if they are to dispel suspicions about their willingness to allow the PBC to operate effectively, which emerged during the negotiations and are largely reflected in a number of declarations made by countries immediately after the adoption of the resolution.233 It is therefore imperative for the PBC, as soon as its members are elected and deliberations begin, to devote special attention to defusing potential controversies on the role of the main UN bodies in defining (and limiting) its work.

As for the Peacebuilding Support Office, the main impression emerging from its budget proposal is that it is not meant as the UN entity responsible for coordination of peacebuilding efforts, but rather as an additional member of the UN system dealing with

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232 UN document A/60/1.40, OP 18.
233 See press release GA/10439, dated 20 December 2005. Among others, the declaration by the Egyptian representative expresses reservations and disappointment for the “central and authoritative role of the Security Council in addressing post-conflict peacebuilding vis-à-vis the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council” and raises the suspicion that the resolutions intend to reshape the roles and mandates of the principle organs of the UN, in a manner which would provide the Security Council with “absolute powers.”
some aspects of peacebuilding. As we have seen, apart from acting as a sort of substantive secretariat for the PBC, the PBSO will provide inputs to the planning process and conduct best practice analysis and policy guidance, activities currently entrusted to DPA and, to a certain extent, to DPKO. What appears to be missing is the concept of a “strategic secretariat” for overall peacebuilding strategies, one which “brings together the various strands of the UN system at Headquarters” active in that area.

While it remains to be seen whether those functions will be revised, following the rejection of the budget proposal, it should be noted that the same document does not clarify which, if any, of the significant peacebuilding functions currently attributed to the Department for Political Affairs (described in chapter 2) will be taken over by the PBSO, including the responsibility for political missions in post-conflict countries (such as UNAMI) and the existing three Peacebuilding Offices. The envisaged size of PBSO (twenty-one posts, including sixteen officials and five administrative positions) appears too small to allow the office to undertake any supplementary functions in addition to those spelled out in the budget proposal. Similarly, its role in the Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP), or within the Executive Committee on Peace and Security (ECPS), currently chaired by the head of DPA, remains to be defined.

As for the PBC, for the PBSO, also, much will depend on the effective willingness of its “partners” (mainly within the UN Secretariat) to cooperate in order to make its institutional location outside existing departments an asset rather than a liability. Placing the office under the DPA would have certainly consolidated the primary role of DPA as the focal point for peacebuilding, which now, instead, sounds rather obsolete. This could have caused friction with other departments, however, weary of DPA’s excessive power on this crosscutting issue. What is crucial for the future work of the PBSO is the avoidance of turf battles within the UN Secretariat, which, in turn, requires clear and undisputed guidance to separate the roles of different entities, establish effective coordination mechanisms, and avoid gaps and overlapping of functions. At the present stage, there is little indication about how this may eventually happen.

However, effective interaction between the PBC and the PBSO may favor the emergence of a mechanism for coordinating peacebuilding programs carried on by all different actors. The PBC and PBSO may mutually reinforce each other’s role and provide a model of interaction of particular value in the current phase of significant institutional innovations in several donor countries. The development of new tools and procedures that we have briefly described in the early part of this chapter, mainly conceived without due attention to similar efforts conducted by other donors, risks increasing fragmentation and confusion on the ground without the parallel development of an intergovernmental setting that facilitates exchange of information and coordination. The issue of solid cooperation between the PBC and the PBSO appears to be of the utmost importance, therefore.

As for the funding mechanism, some researchers and practitioners have been calling for the creation of a global financial instrument covering all peacebuilding related activities, more or less along the lines of the Global Environment Facility. The report of the
The UNDG/ECHA working group on transition issues also recommended the UN to “investigate the feasibility and utility” of a “dedicated, multi-year, resource-mobilization mechanism for transition,” while warning that “until such a tool is agreed however, the UN should maintain the existing menu of resource mobilization options—including funding through the regular budget.”

The proposed PBF has the more limited scope of “ensuring the immediate release of resources needed to launch peacebuilding activities and the availability of appropriate financing for recovery.” It certainly does not aim at replacing the current combinations of financial tools described in chapter 3, but rather should help fill some specific gaps between them, and the concept note seems to acknowledge these limitations very clearly.

The note suggests an interesting pattern of co-responsibilities in managing the fund, using its money, and providing auditing and evaluation of its use. While it envisions the overall leadership of the Secretary-General (in making disbursement decisions), and of the UN mission leader in the field (in making funding proposals), the note also highlights the contribution that the PBC could provide in setting broad disbursement criteria. Again, this is a complex mechanism which will create a significant administrative workload, but which also has the potential to enhance cooperation and dialogue between different bodies of the UN system.

The funding issue reminds us that institutional reform within the UN must be seen, in the end, not in isolation, but in the broader framework that we have briefly reviewed in the first part of this chapter, which includes developments in other international institutions, within individual governments, and on the ground, where new operational and coordination tools are being developed. In the final section we will try to understand how all these innovations might combine together to create a global, more coherent mechanism.

5) Toward a Global Mechanism?

As we reach the end of our review of current trends in peacebuilding, some encouraging signals of a more coherent and global approach seem to be emerging. More than twelve years after the first appearance of the term peacebuilding in the Agenda for Peace, eight years after the OECD Guidelines on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation on the Threshold of the 21st Century, and five years after the Brahimi report, it is, however, still too early to conclude that the international community is finally on the right track.

As we have seen, some of the more promising developments are still experimental and it would be premature to conclude that they can make the difference or that they can be replicated in other contexts. In addition, since they have often been introduced from the bottom, based on lessons learned on the ground and collected by professionals and practitioners, they still lack recognition from the top, both by governments and the senior management of agencies and departments.

There are, however, two reasons for being optimistic. First, a similar process is ongoing within several donor governments. In the first paragraph of this chapter we have briefly discussed how two of them are currently progressing, but it is important to keep in mind that a number of other donors are also introducing significant innovations in the way they address post-conflict reconstruction. A host of new tools, departments, and dedicated financial windows are being created; more importantly, a new sensitivity is developing within government agencies on the importance of peacebuilding, and a new generation of experts is taking advantage both of intense experience on the ground and of the rich and stimulating
literature now available on this topic.

Second, the creation of a UN Peacebuilding Commission, Peacebuilding Support Office and Peacebuilding Fund may constitute—one fully operational—the final piece of the puzzle, the one which could finally shed a completely new light on the so far fragmentary picture before our eyes. The institutional machinery that we have described in this chapter, with its complexity and ambiguity, would prove of little use if it were to operate in the void. But since it would be at the heart of a dynamic process of innovation, it could provide a much-needed universal framework. It would offer a transparent forum of discussion where all actors would be encouraged to share their plans and perspectives and coordinate them with other players; where local governments and civil societies could speak and be heard; where emerging best practices, such as Post-Conflict Needs Assessments, Transitional Results Matrices and Multi-donor Trust Funds, could receive endorsement and codification.

On financial issues also, we can expect the positive impact of the Peacebuilding Commission, which could address long disputed questions such as the “boundary” of assessed budgets for peacekeeping missions, thereby providing clearer direction. At the same time, the Standing Peacebuilding Fund could provide critical funding for areas which may not be included in those budgets, such as, for instance, first reintegration of former combatants and the establishment of truth and reconciliation commissions or other forms of accountability mechanisms.

The future of peacebuilding remains uncertain, but the foundations have finally been laid for a more effective and better coordinated collective effort to help countries emerging from conflict to reach sustainable and lasting peace.
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