EU-UN Partnership in Crisis Management: Developments and Prospects

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The views expressed in this report are the author’s own.

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Executive Summary

- The EU and the UN have taken many practical steps in recent years to formalize their relationship. As part of this process, the EU has also achieved increasing political influence within the UN, although progress on this front has been limited in the Security Council.

- Over the past year, the EU has set capacity-development for cooperation in crisis management as a priority in its relations with the UN. This was formalized in a Joint Declaration on EU-UN cooperation in crisis management signed on September 24th, 2003, in New York.

- The EU has maintained that the development of its capacities is taking place fully within the UN framework, and thus serves to strengthen that framework. Nonetheless, voices from within the UN have raised concerns about whether the development of EU capacity would distract the EU from its commitments to the UN. These concerns are related to the conditions that the EU has set for its involvement in UN operations and crisis management.

- Both organizations have slowly come to acknowledge the advantages to be gained from strengthening their partnership. The EU can provide the UN the military capabilities that it does not have (e.g., in early entry). The UN can provide the EU with the legality and the political legitimacy for its operations. Recent operations provide a host of “subcontracting” models that could be used for deploying EU military assets under a UN mandate.

- 2003 was a watershed year for EU-UN relations, with political and institutional cooperation being transformed into higher degrees of operational and technical cooperation. EU-UN partnership was progressively operationalized through informal contacts between secretariats and through cooperation in the field in launching the EU Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia-Herzegovina (January 2003) and Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (June 2003).

- Transitions between UN and EU operational phases in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in the Democratic Republic of the Congo proved to be successful. These transitions also provided lessons for cooperation between the two organizations at the headquarters level and on the ground. It was found that effective partnership first depends on the political will of the member states of both organizations and on a good relationship at the working level, rather than on strict procedures, binding agreements, and strong institutionalization.

- A number of key areas should receive attention in order to enhance EU-UN cooperation in crisis management. These include procedures for exchanging sensitive information, reporting to various secretariats, joint decision-making, and compilation of lessons learned. In addition to focusing on how transitions from one organization to another should be carried out, the EU and UN should think more deeply about how transitions from organizations to local control should be carried out.
Introduction

This report summarizes findings from a one-year International Peace Academy (IPA) project on relations between the United Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU) in the area of crisis management. This issue falls under the broader category of relations between the UN and regional organizations, whose role has become increasingly common in UN peace operations. Addressing EU-UN relations is particularly relevant now as the EU is currently developing new civil and military capabilities to address crises. This report draws from both primary and secondary sources, my national experience, and a series of interviews with UN and EU officials in New York (at the UN Secretariat, EU General Secretariat Liaison Office to the United Nations, and the Delegation of the European Commission to the United Nations), in Brussels (at the General Secretariat of Council of the European Union, European Commission, European Parliament, and United Nations House) in December 2002, and in the field in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, the Former Republic of Macedonia, and Afghanistan in April 2003.

This report begins by outlining the practical steps taken in recent years at the political and institutional level to develop the relationship between the EU and the UN. These developments are discussed in relation to the increasingly prominent role that the EU has begun to play within the UN. Attention is given to specific efforts made to strengthen capacities for EU-UN cooperation in crisis management. The next section discusses developments and prospects for cooperation at the operational level. Key concerns relating to operational cooperation are discussed—in particular, concerns over the EU’s commitment to the UN. Scenarios are outlined that may serve as models in the context of the increasing UN practice of “sub-contracting” operations involving the use of force. This general discussion of cooperation at the operational level is followed by an examination of EU-UN cooperation in two recent operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

A key finding of this report is that the first steps in EU-UN cooperation have been quite successful. EU-UN relations are in fact evolving within an emerging decision-making architecture, in which no single state or institution, its members, or its secretariat has a monopoly in dealing with matters of international peace and security. Within this context, the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) has opened new possibilities for interaction between the UN and regional organizations. Indeed, “what makes the EU a potentially significant contributor to international security is the ability to combine civilian and military resources to manage violent conflicts. The EU presents itself as able to combine traditional ‘hard’ military power with nontraditional ‘soft’ power.”

Developing the EU-UN Relationship

Both the EU and UN have had to meet explicit and implicit prerequisites before partnership between the organizations could be realized. These prerequisites include the alignment of legal foundations and operational structures. The EU has had to go much further, as a nascent organization, to prime itself for partnership. Until the beginning of 2003, EU-UN

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1 One of the conclusions drawn at an IPA Conference on “Cooperation in Peace Operation in Europe” was that “forum shopping will occur and may not be a bad thing”. In The UN, the EU, NATO and Other Regional Actors: Partners in Peace? , IPA, 11-12 October 2002, p. 1. In relation to that opinion, at the end of the 1990s, NATO’s Summit in Washington decided that NATO would have no geographical limits (New Strategic Concept, April 1999).


3 The steps taken at the French and British summit in Saint-Malo in December 1998, in order to further develop a European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), can be seen as the starting point of the EU’s role as strategic actor in security affairs. The EU has had to define its role according to its means and, importantly, within the context of transatlantic relations. For more information on developments in ESDP, refer to Maartje Rutten (ed.), From St Malo to Nice – European Defence: Core Documents, Chaillot Paper # 47, Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, May 2001; Maartje Rutten (ed.), From Nice to Laeken – European Defence: Core Documents, Chaillot Paper # 51, Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, April 2002; Jean-Yves Haine (ed.), From Laeken to Copenhagen – European
relations were mostly symbolic, based on exchanges of information and high-level contacts. However, 2003 was something of a watershed year. The EU took over the UN police mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina as the first step toward assuming increasing operational responsibility, while relieving the UN, in the Balkans. Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) was launched as the first EU out-of-area military deployment under a UN mandate. These developments are discussed in more detail below, showing that contacts between the organizations have become increasingly operational and technical. The following section outlines how this has come about.

Building the Partnership

The establishment of various points of contact has prepared the ground for better understanding between both organizations. Significant initiatives to cultivate such contacts were launched during the Swedish EU Presidency (January-June 2001). Two key goals were pronounced during this time: (1) to develop “mutually reinforcing approaches to conflict prevention” and (2) to ensure “that the EU’s evolving military and civilian capacities would provide real added value for UN crisis management”.

The decisions of the June 2001 European Summit of Göteborg slowly initiated institutional contacts and working relationships between the two Secretariats. High-level meetings between the UN Secretary-General and the EU High Representative had already begun to take place regularly since their October 2000 meeting in Brussels. Since then, Kofi Annan and Javier Solana have remained in constant contact and have established an informal working relationship. In June 2001, the EU General Affairs Council agreed on "a platform for intensified cooperation" involving four levels:

- “EU Ministerial meetings, where appropriate in Troika format, with the UN Secretary-General”;
- “Meetings and contacts between the EU High Representative and European Commission External Relations Commissioner with the UN Secretary-General and UN Deputy Secretary-General”;
- “Political and Security Committee meetings, where appropriate in Troika format, with the UN Deputy Secretary-General and Under Secretaries-General; and other levels and formats as appropriate”;
- “Contacts of the Council Secretariat and the Commission services with the UN Secretariat at the appropriate levels”.

These decisions initiated regular contacts between the two secretariats at both the official level and the working level. A mission of the EU General Secretariat first met with UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) officials in May 2001. Since April 2002, the UN Deputy Secretary-General has headed a meeting each spring in Brussels. The EU Military Staff and the Directorate IX (DGE-IX) on civilian aspects of crisis management has identified UNDPKO as its UN partner, and the EU Policy Unit has identified the Office of the Assistant Secretary-General for Europe in UNDPA as its counterpart. Relationships between the organizations’ situations centers have slowly come to take

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At the European Summit of Laeken, “the Union has begun to cooperate more fully with the United Nations in crisis management and conflict prevention concerning the themes and in the specific areas endorsed by the Gothenburg European Council. Regular contacts at different levels with the representatives of the United Nations have made it possible to keep up the necessary links on the main subjects of common interest. Those contacts have also led to examination, on the basis of the principles and procedures established, of how the development of European capabilities in the ESDP could contribute to United Nations efforts in peacekeeping operations”. Presidency Report on European Security and Defense policy, 22 December 2001, paragraph 22.

In October 2000, the Troïka first met with the UN Secretary-General who suggested creating working groups on various themes. The EU Political and Security Committee found this measure premature, as well as the opening of discussions on peacekeeping.


The first (April 2002) meeting was a joint mission with the UN Department of Political Affairs (UNDPA), UNDPKO, UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), and the UN Development Programme (UNDP).
place⁹, and contacts were established between the EU Police Unit and the UN Police Division, especially during the transition from the UN Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina (UNMIBH) to the EU Police Mission (EUPM) (discussed further below).

As of January 2003, task forces have been established to coordinate interaction in both secretariats—in particular between UNDPKO and the EU’s DGE-IX. Within the EU, each department working on UN matters meets to coordinate their actions, lists all the actions already undertaken, and identifies matters on which both organizations should cooperate (e.g. training and pre-deployment).¹⁰ UN Military Adviser General Patrick Cammaert has commented on the case of UNDPKO, stating, “the ad hoc coordination group on UNDPKO-EU relations ... provides a forum for the exchange of information on DPKO-EU relations, and an ideal vehicle for the crafting of UNDPKO’s overall strategy vis-à-vis the EU. ... It will greatly facilitate both our external and internal communications, and will assist the process of developing a systematized, comprehensive and integrated strategy to inform our interactions with the EU, and potentially other regional organizations”.¹¹ The task forces have also led to the establishment of a “steering committee” between the two organizations meeting twice a year in New York and in Brussels.

The EU and the UN have also chosen to strengthen their respective liaison offices. The European Commission had established an information office in New York in 1964, and it officially became a Delegation to the UN with observer status in 1974.¹² The General Secretariat of the Council of the EU had established a liaison office in 1992 after the Maastricht Treaty to assist the presidency and to build up archives.¹³ The roles of the offices were heightened following the Amsterdam Treaty (1997), particularly in relation to the coordinating provisions of Article 19 (discussed below) and the creation of the post of High Representative.¹⁴ In Brussels, the UN has a “UN House” comprising several funds, programs, and agencies of the UN system. It is currently led by a Representative of the UN Secretary-General nominated from UNDP.¹⁵ However, this office is not a liaison office as such, and the Representative has no formal authority to coordinate the UN’s work with the EU. Its value is simply to allow for constant and more coherent dialogue.

The Growing Political Influence of the EU at the UN

Official declarations by EU member states have consistently placed the development of a European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) within the broad framework of the United Nations. The European Summit of

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⁹ The NATO Liaison officer to the UN recently took the initiative of convening at NATO headquarters a meeting of the major situation centers (UN Secretariat, UNICEF, World Food Program, OSCE, SHAPE, EU, and UK Joint Analysis Center). The aim of this meeting was an introduction to one another, and an exchange of views.

¹⁰ For example, the task force of the EU General Secretariat comprises the DGE IX, the DGE VIII, the Military Staff, the DGE IV dealing UN matters, and the Legal Department.


¹² The EC has a right of speech on all questions related to the EU’s “Pillar 1” (dealing with, inter alia, the European Monetary Union, environment, research, education, and training). It is party to over 50 UN multilateral agreements and conventions as the only non-State participant. It has also delegations that are accredited to international organizations in Geneva, Paris, Nairobi, Rome and Vienna. The role of the Delegation is “to reinforce the coordination of common EU policy and approaches in the UN, including helping draft EU statements and the adoption of EU positions on draft resolutions and other texts”. European Union @ United Nations, http://www.europa-eu-un.org/article.asp?id=458&lg=5

¹³ This Liaison Office was established without any formal decision or precise mandate. Before 1992, EU officials were paying visits to New York to follow negotiations or to help the Presidency during the sessions of the General Assembly. The General Secretariat has also one in Geneva. It also has the project of having a representation bureau in Vienna or some representatives in the office of the EC in Vienna.

¹⁴ The EU General Secretariat has since needed to be informed on the work of the Security Council, and this has become the main task of the liaison office. Other functions have been to serve as an embassy when the High Representative is in New York, as a venue for press conferences of the rotating EU Presidency, and since January 2001, as a location for weekly information meetings.

¹⁵ Until September 2002, it was led by the Head of the UN Information Centre.
Helsinki in 1999 recognized "the primary responsibility of the UN Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security". Declarations following the June 2001 European Summit of Göteborg defined a path for a stronger cooperation between the two organizations. Finally, the European Security Strategy of December 2003 recognized that "the fundamental framework for international relations is the United Nations Charter", and further considered that "strengthening the United Nations, equipping it to fulfill its responsibilities and to act effectively, is a European priority". Under these terms, the UN serves as a legality and legitimacy provider for the EU when it operates outside Europe.

Nonetheless, the EU also serves as an influence multiplier for European States within the UN. EU member states have taken steps toward strengthening their collective influence within the UN. These steps can be understood in terms of the implementation of Article 19 of the Treaty on the European Union. A challenge in this regard has been within the Security Council, where decisions are usually taken based on national capacity and interests. Article 19 refers not only to the UN, but also to coordination of EU member states policies in all international organizations in which EU member states participate. Speaking generally, implementation of Article 19 amounts to increasing the influence of the EU as a strategic actor on the international stage.

EU influence in the UN has emerged slowly. EU member states continue to align themselves in the UN with the broader regional group “WEOG” –Western European and Other States. But the EU has occasionally functioned as a group of states taking decisions in common, mainly in the General Assembly and its subsidiary organs. The EU Presidency has addressed these organs on behalf of all EU member states, and has associated with its statements Central and Eastern States, EU candidates, and European Economic agreement member states, if they want to join the statement in question. A few issues have proven to be divisive—in particular, the Middle East and human rights issues.

The EU Presidency typically intervenes in Security Council meetings on topics where a EU common position already exists, such as on Kosovo, Bosnia, Afghanistan, and Africa (the conflict in the Great Lakes region in particular). However, coordination does not run in the Security Council as smoothly as it does in the General Assembly. (See Annex 4, Tables 1a and 1b below.) In January 2001, weekly information meetings at the level of heads of mission were established in order to update the EU member states that were non-members of the Security Council. Initially, these meetings were on issues that had already been handled by the Security Council. Over time, ad hoc debriefings came to take place as necessary, and weekly meetings at the level of Security Council coordinators began to

16 The provisions of Article 19 of the consolidated Treaty on European Union (which includes the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty amendments) are the following: "1./ Member States shall coordinate their action in international organizations and at international conferences. They shall uphold the common positions in such fora. In international organizations and at international conferences where not all the Member States participate, those which do take part shall uphold the common positions. 2./ Without prejudice to paragraph 1 and Article 14(3), Member States represented in international organizations or international conferences where not all the Member States participate shall keep the latter informed of any matter of common interest. Member States which are also members of the United Nations Security Council will concert and keep the other Member States fully informed. Member States which are permanent members of the Security Council will, in the execution of their functions, ensure the defense of the positions and the interests of the Union, without prejudice to their responsibilities under the provisions of the United Nations Charter."

17 The WEOG is the most heteroclite UN regional group at the General Assembly, gathering the “rest of the world”: the North-American countries (Canada, United States), Oceania (Australia, New-Zealand), and all the Western European countries (Turkey included).


19 These statements are the result of a consensus achieved through continuous exchange of cables and information between capitals. These diplomatic cables are named COREU ("CORrespondance Européenne"), and they are prepared by the “CONUN group” within the General Secretariat. One of the CONUN’s roles is to strengthen the coordination between EU member states on important issues, to have a reflection on institutional mechanisms, to improve the implementation of Article 19 TUE provisions, and to follow UN issues within the Secretariat.
go into more detail. The EU coordinating meetings have thus evolved from verbatim transmission of Security Council statements to more active exchanges of views. The members of the Security Council now explain their positions, expose their intentions, and present draft proposals. During the Iraqi crisis between September 2002 and March 2003, these information meetings were taking place sometimes every day. EU member states were informed on the evolution of the negotiations between the Permanent Five Security Council members. France and the United Kingdom used these meetings to gain support for their respective positions.

But as important as they may be, these meetings do not really constitute an implementation of Article 19. Some steps toward a more coordinated approach were initiated when Spain and Germany began their two-year memberships to the Security Council in January 2003. Germany and Spain had announced in the fall of 2002 that they might offer (during their term on the Security Council) a seat to the EU presidency within their respective delegation, in order to facilitate information sharing on the work of the Council and to shape the EU position within the Council. A similar idea had been put forward in 2000 by Italy, which had always had a pro-active policy in the issue of the reform of the Security Council and on pushing for a rotating EU seat. France and the UK, however, rejected these initiatives. The (at the time 15) EU member states did take some concrete coordinated actions. As an example, the four European members of the Security Council introduced together, the draft of the renewal of SC Resolution 1390 on sanctions against the Al-Qaida network. But the Iraq crisis split the four European members of the Council and disrupted the continuation of such working procedures.

Thus the provisions of Article 19 have been left half-implemented. It seems the Permanent members of the Security Council do not actually want to be seen as carriers of EU positions. They want to retain their full national and sovereign prerogatives in an organ that only knows states. France and the UK may fear that stronger EU coordination would favor those who desire a permanent seat for the EU in the Security Council. Arguments have been made suggesting that the creation of an EU seat in the Security Council would be an incentive for a common foreign policy, and that a true Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is not compatible with the special status of France and the UK. Others argue that an EU permanent seat would be logical, since the EU should reflect its common foreign policy also in the Security Council. Such a seat would also end the over-representation of Europe in an enlarged Security Council on which France, the UK, and Germany would potentially have permanent seats, and on which Europe may have about five non-permanent seats. But in reality, such ideas are non-starters for France and the UK. They argue that CFSP does not mean a “unique” foreign policy for Europe.20

**Strengthening Capacities for Cooperation in Crisis Management**

The EU General Affairs Council (GAC) conclusions of July 21st, 2003 made crisis management a priority in the EU’s relations with the UN.21 The operations in the Balkans and the DRC were the backdrop to this initiative. The GAC statement from the meeting called on “the Presidency, assisted by the Council Secretariat and in full association with the Commission, to take forward the necessary preparatory work to develop modalities for practical co-operation with respect to the relevant options listed above, in close consultation with the UN and in view of a possible agreement between the EU and the UN on crisis management within the ESDP”. The European Commission presented on September 10th, 2003, a new strategy for EU-UN relations calling for “improving the EU coordinating mechanisms in Brussels, New York and Vienna, establishing direct EC representation in fora that deal with issues of Community competence, and establishing early contacts/co-operation between EU

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20 Some additional alternatives have been proposed, such as the “regionalization of the Security Council membership” and “the creation of regional committees for a decentralized crisis management”. See Serge Sur, Relations internationales, (Paris: Monchrestien, 1995), p. 497. Such proposals are far-reaching, however, because few regional organizations are as well structured as the EU.

services and those of UN agencies, including hands-on co-operation in the field”.22 A Joint Declaration on EU-UN cooperation covering both civilian and military aspects of crisis management was then signed on September 24th, 2003, in New York.23 Through the Declaration, the European Council “reaffirmed the European Union’s commitment to help achieve United Nations objectives in crisis management”.24

Building on the success of Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (discussed below) and in order to contribute to the implementation of the Joint Declaration, France and the United Kingdom proposed in November 2003 “a new initiative for the EU to focus on the development of its rapid reaction capabilities to enhance its ability to help the UN in short-term crisis management situations”.25 In December 2003, the EU Council welcomed this proposal and developed the concept of “coherent, credible battle-groups” of 1,500 men to be deployed at short notice and on a short-term basis.26

From Political to Operational Cooperation

The issue still remains whether the political and institutional structures that have been put into place in recent years will ensure the commitment of the EU member states to the UN. The UN has consistently placed important demands on the EU to contribute at the operational level, particularly in peacekeeping. Officials within the UN have feared that ESDP would distract EU member states from contributing to UN peacekeeping. This fear is understandable, considering the dualism in the way that the EU relates to the UN.

The EU officially recognizes the primary responsibility of the UN Security Council in dealing with international crises, but it has laid down its own principles and prerequisites for helping the UN and for intervening in crises.

UN Demands versus EU Conditions

After initial worries on whether ESDP would distract potential European contributors to UN peacekeeping27, it seems that UN officials have slowly come to realize that the EU could become a reliable burden-sharing partner in peacekeeping. Such partnership is particularly valuable in areas where the UN is the weakest: rapid deployment to non-permissive environments and in-theater preparation for sustained deployments.

The UN Secretariat also had to be reassured that ESDP would not produce a situation in which “rich peacekeeping” would be reserved for Europe and its immediate periphery, while the UN would be left with “poor peacekeeping” for Africa. This fear is related to the criticism that “Western countries” on the Security Council regularly call for involvement in crises, but do not often provide troops; and when they do provide troops, they are only for short-term operations. Officials in the UN have expressed concerns about the low participation of EU member states to UN peacekeeping. Indeed, the contribution of EU member states, in April 2004, amounted to 10.7% of the total personnel deployed in UN operations.28 Responding to this complaint, European member states have argued that they contribute in other ways, with about 25,900 soldiers in the NATO-led forces in the Balkans (KFOR and SFOR), and 6,500 soldiers in the NATO-led force in Afghanistan (ISAF).29 Furthermore, the EU countries’

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22 European Union @ United Nations EU-UN – “Commission calls for the EU to renew its commitment to the UN system and multilateralism”, EC03-247EN, European Commission, 10/9/2003.

23 These statements are included as Annexes 1 and 2 at the end of this report.

24 General Affairs and External Relations Conclusions, 2527th Council meeting, Brussels, 19 September 2003.


26 This concept is proposed to be fully operational by 2007.

27 In July 2001, Austria and Ireland made statements saying that their commitment to ESDP could hamper them in contributing to UN peacekeeping. The Austrians withdrew their personnel from UNFICYP.

28 For details, see Annex 4, Table 2 at the end of this report. In April 2004, the major contributors to UN peacekeeping operations are Pakistan (7,680), Bangladesh (6,362), Nigeria (3,398), India (2,930), and Ghana (2,790).

29 These numbers were acquired on the basis of interviews. These are estimates of the global figures; the exact figures are classi-
share in the UN peacekeeping budget is 39% (i.e. 1,052
billion USD), and 36.8% in the UN regular budget.\textsuperscript{30}

In the face of UN demands and expectations, the EU
has elaborated principles and prerequisites for partici-
pating in crisis management and for putting its civilian
and military instruments that at the disposal of other
organizations. The basic principles for intervention and
cooperation have been developed in successive EU
summits (in particular at the Göteborg summit), and
include the following:

- The EU will retain through the PSC the political
  control and strategic direction of any of its
  operations;
- This cooperation will take place on a case-by-case
  basis;
- There would be no automatic involvement;
- The EU does not constitute a pool of forces but can
  only intervene by conducting specific missions or
  operations, and there would be no earmarked
  forces to any stand-by arrangements.\textsuperscript{31}

The EU has also said that it would intervene under a
UN mandate and according to current international
law, in which the UN Security Council is the only
body that can provide legal authorization of the use
of force (referencing Article 53 of Chapter VIII of the
UN Charter). As set out in the Göteborg summit
statement, “the development of ESDP strengthens
the Union’s capacity to contribute to international peace
and security in accordance with the principles of the
UN Charter. The European Union recognizes the
United Nations Security Council’s primary responsi-
bility for the maintenance of international peace and
security”.

These principles limit the options for the types of EU-
UN cooperation in robust peace operations. The EU
could participate in a UN-led operation. However, since
the Srebrenica episode in Bosnia and its political
aftermath, EU member states are very reluctant to
participate to any significant degree in UN-led
peacekeeping. The EU’s progressive involvement in
crisis management and closer cooperation with the UN
on the ground could reverse this disinclination, but
that is not likely in the short run. Alternatively, the EU
could offer to contribute to an operation based on the
“sub-contracting” model, “by which the UN creates an
operation, but subcontracts its implementation to the
EU. In such a scenario, there is no formal link between
the two institutions and the autonomy of decision of
the EU is preserved”.\textsuperscript{32}

These principles also put limits on the degree of
cooperation between the EU and the UN in robust
peace operations. The sub-contracting model does not
allow any control on the conduct of the operation by
the UN. This appears to be a response to the belief that
the UN Secretariat does not have adequate administra-
tive means and personnel to lead multinational forces.
In practice, the UN has sought to overcome this
problem through the use of small teams of military
advisers linked to its political mission. Such is the case
in Afghanistan within UNAMA. A UN military team
provides information on the security situation by
liaising with ISAF, but does not follow the daily activi-
ties of ISAF—something to which the troop-
contributing countries would be very reluctant to
agree.

**Scenarios for EU-UN Cooperation in Peace
Operations**

The EU has granted itself the options to intervene
without a UN mandate in Europe and only with a UN
mandate elsewhere.\textsuperscript{33} Such intervention may be
conducted alone or with “third countries”, regional

\textsuperscript{30} For details, see Annex 4, Table 3.

\textsuperscript{31} Presidency report to the Göteborg European Council on European Security and Defense Policy, 11 June 2001, Brussels.

\textsuperscript{32} Thierry Tardy, “EU-UN Relations in Peace Operations”, 3 July 2003, IPA Vienna Seminar. Also see Annex 4, Table 4 at the end of this report.

\textsuperscript{33} On the question of the UN mandate, see Thierry Tardy, “EU-UN Relations in Peace Operations”, 3 July 2003, IPA Vienna Seminar.
organizations, or the United Nations itself. Such interventions can involve various mixes of military and civilian elements in activities ranging from peacekeeping to logistical support to training. In all these scenarios, the principles indicated above apply, with the EU being autonomous in its decisions.

The EU makes a distinction between military and civilian crisis management. Its principles for intervention are more flexible for the latter. At the Göteborg summit, a range of options was sketched out for operations conducted in civilian crisis management:

- “EU Member States can contribute nationally to an operation led by international organizations, without any EU co-ordination.”
- “EU Member States can contribute nationally to such an operation, but following EU consultations aimed at e.g. identifying opportunities to pool resources.”
- “A coordinated EU contribution could be provided to an operation led by an international organization.”
- “The EU could provide and lead a whole component (e.g. police) in an operation under the overall lead of an international organization. A model could be a Kosovo type situation, with a pillar structure between different organizations and under the leadership of one of them.”
- “The EU could lead an operation, but with some components provided by international organizations with particular expertise and experience in relevant fields.”
- “The EU could lead an autonomous operation.”

Cooperation between the EU and the UN in a robust peace operation could follow the models suggested in the seven scenarios below:

(1) An EU operation mandated by the UN Security Council conducted with or without NATO’s assets (“SFOR model”).

This scenario does not require much cooperation between the EU and the UN at the operational level. Rather, cooperation takes place at the political level to coordinate decisions, including the necessary UN Security Council resolution and the European Council Joint Action. This scenario poses two key issues: (i) for the UN, there is the issue of control of a UN-mandated, but EU-conducted operation, and (ii) for both the UN and the EU, there is the issue of settling on acceptable practices for reporting to the Security Council. In relation to the first issue, the UN Secretariat does not have any regularized structures in place to follow such operations.

(2) An EU-led operation in charge of the security presence, with the UN in charge of the civilian presence (“KFOR model”).

This scenario differs slightly from the previous one. In this case, cooperation between the EU and the UN would take place through the presence of liaison officers that help coordinate the action on the ground, inform decisions and actions of both headquarters, and ease the potential tensions between the organizations. This scenario, however, means a lack of integration between the military and the civilian chain of command. Thus, effective coordination is contingent on the will and efforts of each head of operation.

(3) An EU-led operation, authorized by the UN Security Council, followed by a UN peacekeeping operation (“Interfet model”).

This scenario provides a remedy for the UN’s problems in rapid deployment to a non-permissive environment and helps the UN to prepare for its own longer-term mission. Cooperation between the EU and the UN would take place in the transition period between the two operations. This model implies that the EU keeps an element of a continuous presence (a “Core Group”) on the ground, even after the end of the mandate of its operation. The EU could (as Australia agreed to do in the case of East Timor) leave some soldiers on the ground and transfer them to the UN as “blue helmets”. This would provide the advantage of a continuous presence, and would give the follow-on UN operation the benefit of the robust position already taken by the

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EU operation. Thus the deterrence effect from the EU operation would continue into the UN mission. This scenario is the preferred one for the UN.\(^5\)

(4) The EU could contribute the headquarters of a UN peacekeeping operation as the SHIRBRIG did for the UN Mission in Ethiopia-Eritrea (“UNMEE model”).

This scenario poses the problem of EU control of its components within a UN-led operation. To counter that problem, the EU could send deployable headquarters as an entity or operation separate from the UN mission.\(^6\) Such an operation would be equivalent to implementing the “Interfet model”.

(5) The EU Political and Security Committee could play the role of a “clearing house” for UN peacekeeping operations by establishing a rotation of national contributions.

This scenario is the least likely to happen in the near future. It does not offer much added value to the current system of national contributions. It might delay the process of force generation.

(6) The EU could help the UN in provision of logistics and training.

EU-UN cooperation could take place on very practical and long-term projects, including training, equipment provision, and logistics support to contingents in the global South. Such assistance could involve appointments of specialized experts in peacekeeping operations and financial contributions to trust funds. The EU could launch a similar program as the French “Renforcement des capacités africaines de maintien de la paix” (RECAMP) for providing logistics and support to African security forces. In other words, RECAMP could be “Europeanized.”\(^7\)

(7) The EU could provide to the UN specific capabilities in the preparation of operations.

EU-UN cooperation can also be developed on norms, concepts and procedures, rules of engagement, lessons learned, training criteria, legal aspects, and exchange of liaison officers. The EU could help the UN in making its standards and procedures operable, compatible with those of the Europeans. The EU and the UN could establish common criteria for selecting equipment and develop common training modules for peacekeeping, crisis management, and policing. These types of cooperation may only evolve slowly, as the EU and the UN do not have equivalent capabilities. Nonetheless, the EU is planning for UN participation as it conducts exercises. Both organizations have also conducted joint evaluation missions in the Congo and in Burundi.

In military aspects, cooperation between the UN and the EU poses the problem of exchanging confidential information. The UN does not have a system for secured information while the EU has recently signed an information security agreement with NATO. Deeper relations are blocked by problems related to the security and confidentiality of information. Pending a solution on that matter, the EU could, if it came to regularly intervene under UN mandates, coordinate such matters through a liaison officer within the Liaison Office of the EU General Secretariat, or preferably within UNDPKO, as NATO has done.\(^8\) Such an officer could facilitate the exchange of information on on-going operations and planning.

Sub-contracting also raises the issue of reporting on UN-mandated EU operations to the UN Security Council.

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36 The EU could, for example, send elements from the “small EU cell” that has been planned to be established at SHAPE. France, Germany and the United Kingdom have supported this plan “to improve the preparation of EU operations having recourse to NATO assets and capabilities under Berlin plus arrangements”. “NATO/EU Consultation, planning and operations”, Presidency Note, 11 December 2003.
37 France is currently helping the EU to take on the RECAMP concept, but so far this has been proceeding slowly.
38 NATO created a post for a liaison officer to the UN (office located within the UN Situation Center) in 1994. This post was initially temporary, with a liaison officer coming from NATO every two weeks; then it became semi-permanent in 2000 when the Danish government sent an officer from NATO headquarters for 7 months, and finally became almost permanent in 2001 when Italy accepted to send an officer for 3 years. NATO is still trying to find ways to fund this post on a permanent basis.
Council. In the case of the EU’s Operation Artemis, the EU resolved this issue by sending EU High Representative Javier Solana to present the report to the Security Council on the operation, and organized on that occasion a public debate within the Council. This mechanism is a more substantive one than what has been used for SFOR, KFOR and ISAF, for which 3-page reports are sent to the Council every three months. The practice of sending the High Representative to report could serve as a precedent for relations between the UN and regional organizations and/or groups of States conducting such multinational operations. Such practices have not been firmly established yet, and have been conceived on a case-by-case basis as crises emerge.

EU-UN Cooperation in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Democratic Republic of the Congo

In 2003, ESDP went from theory to practice, when two civilian operations were launched in the Balkans (the EU Police Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Operation “Proxima” in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM)), and two military missions were launched, one in the Balkans (Operation “Concordia” in the FYROM) and one in Central Africa (Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo). Each operation tested the operationality of EU capabilities on the ground in various tasks and missions: a police training mission, a military protection mission, and a robust intervention in a non-permissive environment. Concordia was launched with NATO assets and Artemis was launched autonomously. ESDP has thus avoided suffering from “WEUization” a risk that existed before the Berlin Plus agreement between the EU and NATO.

Most of these operations were also test cases for cooperation between the EU and the UN as well as other international organizations—Office of the High Representative (OHR), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and NATO—in the cases of Bosnia and Kosovo. In each case, a pragmatic approach and informal contacts were important. The EU is learning about details as it deploys operations, and the UN is learning about potential benefits from relations with the EU.

In Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH), the task of taking over of the International Police Task Force (IPTF) by the EUPM involved a smooth transition between the two missions. The transition involved four key elements. First, a European, the Danish Commissioner Sven-Christian Frederiksen was sequentially appointed as the head of IPTF, then as the head of the EU Planning Mission in BiH (August-December 2002) and, finally, as the head of the EU Police Mission. Second, the High Representative in BiH was also named Special Representative of the EU (EUSR). Third, the EU sent a planning mission nine months prior to the handover from the UN. Fourth, a small UN liaison office (11 staff members) remained from January to June 30, 2003 in the EUPM headquarters in order to provide assistance to EUPM, to complete the transfer of database, and to liaise with the locals.

A number of lessons were drawn from the transition, including the importance of attention to co-localization, transfer of logistics, having a same head of mission in the period of transition, and the transfer of personnel. Since then, the EU Special Representative has sent reports to the UN Security Council every six months. For the sake of coordination, the EUPM has sent liaison officers to the various organizations present in BiH (NATO, OSCE, EU Monitoring Mission, OHR, and the International Tribunal). The EUPM is a

39 Intervening at the request of the Italian representative to the UN on behalf of the EU Presidency, Javier Solana addressed the UN Security Council on July 18th, 2003.

40 “WEUization” of ESDP would have meant the existence of structures for conducting peace operations but a lack of political will to use these structures, as the WEU had experienced. See Annex 3, Table 3 at the end of this report for details on the “Berlin Plus” agreement.

41 On 28 February 2002, the Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) accepted the offer made by the EU. On 4 March 2002, the authorities of Bosnia-Herzegovina invited the EU to assume responsibility for the follow-on to the UN police mission. The UN Security Council Resolution 1396 welcomed the PIC decision on 5 March 2002. The EU Police Mission was created by the Council Joint action 2002/210/CFSP of 11 March 2002. EUPM is composed of about 484 international policemen, 66 civilian experts, and about 337 local staff. Its headquarters are in Sarajevo, but it is also present in about 47 co-locations at the State, Entity and Cantonal/Public Security Centre levels. The EUPM reports through the EU Special Representative to the High Representative in Brussels.
new mission built on the successes and achievements of IPTF, which have included homogenization of law in internal affairs, implementation of a ranking system, implementation of internal control and public oversight, and implementation of laws establishing cooperation between Bosnian law enforcement agencies. EUPM’s mission is to help BiH authorities develop local police forces that meet the highest European and international standards, and to ensure that sustainable institutional structures are in place by the end of its mandate on 31 December 2005. The EUPM acts through monitoring, mentoring, and inspecting BiH police managerial and operational capacities. The EUPM has no executive powers, but is able to remove from office non-compliant officers, whose performance and behavior does not fit the agreed standards, through a recommendation by the Police Commissioner to the High Representative.

In the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the EU responded very quickly to the call of the UN Secretary-General when the crisis in Ituri erupted in May 2003. During a visit by EU High Representative Solana to New York, UN Secretary-General Annan asked if the EU would be willing to help the UN on that front by sending a military force. Then, Annan also asked the French President Jacques Chirac if France would be willing to lead such an intervention. Finally Annan’s deputy, Ms. Louise Fréchette, passed the demand on to the EU-PSC while in Brussels. On May 16, 2003, France officially informed the UN that it would take the lead in sending a multinational force to Ituri, and then drafted the corresponding resolution authorizing the operation. “Operation Artemis” was created by the EU Council Joint Action 2003/423/CFSP of 5 June 2003, and was launched by the EU Council Decision 2003/432/CFSP of 12 June 2003. The EU decision came a week after the authorization of the UN Security Council resolution 1484 (30 May 2003) calling for the deployment, under Chapter VII and “until 1 September 2003, an Interim Emergency Multinational Force in Bunia in close coordination with MONUC”.42 Twelve EU member states contributed to Artemis, with France as the “framework nation”—thus providing the Operational Headquarters43.

“Operation Artemis” is an important development for several reasons. It is the first autonomous EU-led operation (that is without recourse to NATO assets), the first EU operation serving as a rapid reaction force, the first EU military operation to have taken place outside Europe, and the first military operation where EU-UN cooperation was applied. This operation included elements of the “KFOR model” and the “Interfet model”: there had been a period of transition, however in the case of Artemis no EU military personnel remained in the DRC after the end of the mandate.

Cooperation between the EU and the UN worked through simple and transparent procedures. Continuous relations, formal and informal, were maintained at all levels during the entire deployment of Operation Artemis. A transition period was organized between August 15 and September 1 for the handover to the UN’s “Ituri Task Force”—part of MONUC. The transition was also arranged by the EU Operational Headquarters in close coordination with UNDPKO, MONUC, and the Bangladeshi Authorities (Bangladesh being the first deployed component of the Ituri Task Force). The transition included the following: common patrols, liaison officers of MONUC attending field headquarters briefings, the Operation Commander’s visit to New York, a mission of the operational headquarters sent to Bangladesh, logistics support given by Artemis to MONUC, a planning program established for the different stages of the hand-over, both military staff co-located in Bunia, and progressive hand-over of points of control. This transition was facilitated by the fact that a French officer was the MONUC representative in the Ituri sector.

42 This resolution was voted-on before the European Council’s decision and does not mention the organization conducting this Interim Emergency Multinational Force, only the member states contributing to this force. These steps could be reversed in order in future cases, so that the Security Council could expressly authorize the EU.

43 The operational headquarters (OHQ) were located in Paris and included officers from several participating countries as well as officials from the General Secretariat of the EU Council. The Force Headquarters (FHQ) was located in Entebbe (Uganda) with an advanced position in Bunia (DRC). Major General Bruno Neveux was appointed EU Operation Commander (OpCdr). Brigadier General Jean-Paul Thonier was appointed EU Force Commander (Fcdr). The EU’s Military Committee (EUMC) monitored the proper execution of the military operation conducted under the responsibility of the Operation Commander.
However, there seems to have been little cooperation at the political level between the Special Representative of the EU and his UN counterpart, and even with the field headquarters. Nevertheless, “Operation Artemis” alleviated the fears of the UN Secretariat regarding the EU’s willingness to get involved in crisis management and to help the UN where there is a need. The EU is now examining, in cooperation with MONUC, the possibility of creating an integrated police force in Kinshasa to ensure the security of the transitional institutions.

With the EUPM and “Artemis”, EU-UN cooperation became successfully operational. The EU and the UN have common objectives in pursuing international stability, and have realized that they are complementary. For the UN, the EU has now become an important actor and partner in crisis management, even if it has established its own conditions for intervention. Indeed, the EU can bring to the UN crucial financial and military capabilities. In military aspects of crisis management, the UN needs the EU more than the EU needs the UN. The EU can help the UN in areas where it lacks the means to intervene, such as rapid deployment. The EU is also learning from its experiences in transitions with the UN that peace stabilization is a long-term process that requires planning, coordination at all levels (between field headquarters and secretariats), exchange of information, reporting, joint decision-making, and compilation of lessons learned.

**The Possible Future of the EU-UN Partnership**

Both organizations have acknowledged recent achievements in a “Joint Declaration on UN-EU Coordination in Crisis Management.” By this declaration, both organizations “agree to establish a joint consultative mechanism at the working level to examine ways and means to enhance mutual co-ordination and compatibility” in planning, training, communication, and best practices. According to the EU General Affairs Council of September 29, 2003, this “declaration provides a framework for the development of practical initiatives to facilitate interchange between the two organizations through the establishment of information and consultation mechanisms.” This non-binding declaration softly formalizes the steps taken by both organizations since 2000-2001 and deals with the basic requirements needed for cooperation when a crisis arises. With this step, as limited as it is, the EU is providing a model for subcontracting operations by the UN. Key elements in the model include the timing of the political decision, the reporting to the Security Council, periods of transition, and the flow of information. Future cooperation will tell if the EU can be seen as a collective body supporting the principles of the UN Charter. Resolving the issue of how to sustain support and capabilities is likely to make the difference on that matter. The sense of a need to further institutionalize this partnership could arise and actually hamper its further strengthening. In particular, it would make cooperation more rigid and diminish potential for innovative demarches or initiatives. This partnership has been based from the beginning on flexibility for the EU and its member states and on their commitment to support the role of the UN in resolving crises.

Beyond the Joint Declaration and the initial successful partnership, what could be the future challenges for EU-UN cooperation and future concrete cases where such cooperation could apply? The EU is planning to take over SFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina at the end of 2004. This operation will constitute for the EU a greater challenge in military aspects of crisis management than “Concordia”, and will involve EU-NATO cooperation (under the terms of the Berlin Plus agreement) rather than EU-UN cooperation. The operation would be authorized by the UN Security Council under the terms of Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Another possible EU operation in Moldova along with the OSCE would not involve EU-UN cooperation other than the necessary political process of the UN Security Council. The case of Kosovo and a possible handover from UNMIK to an “EU-MIK” could be the next challenge for EU-UN partnership. In November 2002, the then-UN Special Representative in Kosovo, Michael Steiner, considered that the next stage of the international

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44 This declaration was previously meant to be an agreement “establishing a framework for cooperation in the field of crisis management”. But the reluctance from EU member states to institutionalize such cooperation made it a simple declaration.

45 General Affairs and External Relations Conclusions, 2527th Council meeting, Brussels, 19 September 2003.
engagement in Kosovo should be taken over by the EU from the UN, as “the focus of [this] stage will be to draw Kosovo closer to the EU”, instead of creating an enclave.\textsuperscript{46} To prepare that process, Michael Steiner envisaged an “EU-MIK” taking over the UNMIK and embodying “the EU’s pre-accession strategy in Kosovo”. These ideas have not yet led to any serious discussions in New York and Brussels. In Africa, the EU could get involved in the early deployment of an operation in Sudan if a peace agreement is ever reached.

Most probably, the EU missed, by lack of interest, the opportunity to create a comprehensive mission in Afghanistan. EU member states were, for a long time, contributing up to 90\% to the “International Security and Assistance Force” (ISAF) without the EU flag in place and without ESDP invoked.\textsuperscript{47} Nevertheless, besides the new role of NATO in Afghanistan,\textsuperscript{48} the EU could envisage the creation of different missions to help the UN, as the EU is perceived by the local authorities and population as a neutral power.\textsuperscript{49} For example, the EU could send monitors to supervise and verify the disarmament process and to supervise the general elections in September 2004. Additionally, the EU could gather in a single civilian mission the national contributions of Italy in rule of law, Germany in police matters, and the UK in drug trafficking.\textsuperscript{50} What is at stake is to prove to the Afghan people that the action of the international community is not connected to the US policy, and that it is supporting dynamics owned by the Afghan people.

Conclusion

Through the existing operations and future ones, the EU is showing that it is a global actor that has an interest in stabilizing all crisis zones. The EU is present in all the regions of the world, and in all major crisis situations with representation bureaux of the European Commission or the European Commission Humanitarian Office (ECHO) and through its network of special representatives. The General Secretariat of the Council of the EU has six special representatives.\textsuperscript{51} The EC has 130 offices around the world, which perform similar (and somewhat duplicating?) functions as the UN resident bureaux. The EU also has several programs for developing state capacities and for peacebuilding.

But through these various actions, operations, and programs, the EU only lightly touches upon the complexity and difficulty of crisis management. It would need to streamline its actions, chain of command, and mechanisms if it wants to do better than the UN in large-scale crisis management. Moreover, the EU still has to fully implement its concept of global crisis management. That is the next challenge for ESDP.\textsuperscript{52} The comparative advantage of

\textsuperscript{46} Michael Steiner, “Three Times for Kosovo”, 12 November 2002, Humboldt University in Berlin.

\textsuperscript{47} ISAF is reporting to the Security Council every month. It meets with UNAMA once a week and there is a Joint Coordination Board meeting once a month (meeting chaired by the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the Force Commander of ISAF). ISAF has two (non permanent) liaison officers to UNAMA.

\textsuperscript{48} NATO took over ISAF on 11 August 2003 (at its command level only). The North Atlantic Council (NAC) took the decision on April 16th, 2003. NATO is responsible for the planning and command of the peacekeeping force. NATO’s regional headquarters Northern Europe (AFNORTH) runs the operation. NAC is from now on providing the political direction of ISAF (it was previously directed by from the capitals of the commanding nations). See http://www.nato.int/issues/afghanistan/index.htm. It seems that NATO wants to increase the information given to UNDPKO and UNAMA. NATO is also expanding the ISAF by supporting “Provincial Reconstruction Teams” dispatched in the main Afghan cities. That expansion was authorized upon by the UN Security Council resolution 1510 (13 October 2003).

\textsuperscript{49} Interviews conducted in Afghanistan suggested that the EU is seen as a rather neutral power and some of its member states (France and Germany in particular) have a positive reputation among the Afghan population.

\textsuperscript{50} Japan and UNAMA have the lead in demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration. France and the United States have the lead in the creation of an Afghan National Army.

\textsuperscript{51} The EU High Representative or the EU Presidency can also have special envoys for a limited period of time.

\textsuperscript{52} “The challenge now is to bring together the different instruments and capabilities: European assistance programs, military and civilian capabilities from member states and other instruments such as the European Development Fund. ... Our objective should be
the EU crisis management’s toolbox is indeed its comprehensiveness, having at its disposal civilian and military tools, thus being able to enforce peace, maintain peace, maintain law and order, and build peace. In this tremendous task, the different organizations involved can only succeed by cooperating with one another in a well-coordinated way. The utility of this coordination has to be acknowledged by both organizations and by their member states. This coordination often depends on people that get along and know each other.

Another problem also arises in parallel to the development of such cooperation: the issue of exit strategy. How to end crises and withdraw constitutes a challenge for the international community. In Bosnia-Herzegovina for example, the international community is only beginning, after about a decade of presence, to hand over to the locals. What are the incentives to be given to the local population so that international organizations slowly and safely withdraw? What are the criteria to see if a crisis is ended, to see if the country is “normalized”?

The EU and the UN are also complementary at the political level. The EU is committed to multilateralism, and is respectful of the UN Charter principles. It needs to become a stronger group within the UN, and in particular within the UN Security Council or in preparation of the Council’s meetings. The UN needs the EU for managing crisis, but also for managing American power.

**Recommendations**

A number of recommendations can be offered for improving EU crisis management capacities in cooperation with the UN:

- Increasing the means given to the General Secretariat of the European Council in order to properly fund its operations and the work of its special representatives.
- The EC representation bureau and the General Secretariat EU liaison office in New York should be located in the same building. The EC Representation Bureaux and the EUSR Offices should be merged in all regions.
- There is a need to expand the UN presence in Brussels in order to facilitate the coordination between the two organizations.
- For the first time, during the French presidency (January 2000), EU High Representative Javier Solana intervened in the Security Council. This practice could be developed when the EU conducts UN-mandated operations in order to increase the visibility of the EU.
- Additional strategic partnerships should be created in the following areas: exchange of information, setting of priorities, exit and entry strategies, exchange of personnel on the ground, preparation of hand over of some operations, evaluation assessments on a list of countries in situation crisis, and common definition for crisis management and conflict prevention.
- There is a need to formalize participation in staff training exercises: “regularized participation would help to harmonize institutional approaches to future crisis management activities, especially in terms of operational aspects of mission management.”
- Operational procedures of both organizations should become interoperable or compatible. The EU could thus bring the UN towards higher standards in the preparation and the conduct of operations.
- Exchange of liaison officers when operations are to create synergy through a more coherent and comprehensive approach. Diplomatic efforts, development, trade and environmental policies should follow the same agenda. In a crisis there is no substitute for unity of command.” Javier Solana, “A Secure Europe in a Better World”, draft of a EU strategic concept presented at the European Summit of Salonika, June 2003.

occurring. The EU could have sent a liaison officer to UNDPKO during its operation “Artemis”. Instead, it is the French military adviser that serves as a liaison officer between UNDPKO and the Operation Headquarters in Paris. The EU should send, from the operational headquarters level, a liaison officer to UNDPKO.

- When the EU intervenes outside the UN framework or outside a UN operation, it could develop the concept of the EU Monitoring Mission, which means to create a corps of military and political observers providing independent information in all the crisis situations in which it is involved.

- The establishment within the Police Unit of the General Secretariat of the EU of a specialized unit working on organized crime that would have strong link with the third EU “pillar” (Justice and Home Affairs).
Joint Declaration on UN-EU Cooperation in Crisis Management

New York, September 24th, 2003

The Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Presidency of the Council of the European Union welcome the existing co-operation between the United Nations and the European Union in the area of civilian and military crisis management, in particular in the Balkans and in Africa. In order to deepen this co-operation and provide it with reliable and sustainable mechanisms, the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Presidency of the Council of the European Union have agreed to the following joint Declaration:

1. The United Nations and the European Union are united by the premise that the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security rests with the United Nations Security Council, in accordance with the United Nations Charter. Within this framework, the European Union reasserts its commitment to contribute to the objectives of the United Nations in crisis management.

2. The United Nations and the European Union recognize that the past year saw great progress in tangible co-operation between them in crisis management areas, specifically the hand-over of responsibilities from the United Nations International Police Task Force to the European Union Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina; the rapid deployment at the request of the Security Council, of the European Union Military Operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Artemis); and the active consideration by the European Union of ways to assist in the establishment of an Integrated Police Unit in Kinshasa to provide security to the transitional government and institutions.

3. Further practical steps should be taken to build on the momentum of the positive co-operation between the United Nations and the European Union. To this end, the United Nations and the European Union agree to establish a joint consultative mechanism at the working level to examine ways and means to enhance mutual co-ordination and compatibility in the following areas:

- **Planning:** including reciprocal assistance in assessment missions and greater contact and co-operation between mission planning units, specifically with regard to logistical resource allocation and inventory as well as interoperability of equipment.

- **Training:** the establishment of joint training standards, procedures and planning for military and civilian personnel; the synchronization of pre-deployment training for civilian police, military liaison officers and military observers; and the institutionalization of training seminars, conferences and exercises.

- **Communication:** greater co-operation between situation centers; exchange of liaison officers whenever required (military, civilian police, situation center, political/headquarters officials); establishment of desk-to-desk dialogue through the respective liaison offices in New York and Brussels.

- **Best Practices:** regularized and systematic exchange of lessons learned and best practices information, including sharing of information on mission hand-over and procurement.

Signed for the United Nations:  
Kofi A. Annan, Secretary-General

Signed for the European Union:  
Silvio Berlusconi, Presidency of the Council of the European Union
Annex 2

EU-UN - Commission calls for the EU to renew its commitment to the UN system and multilateralism

Brussels, September 10th, 2003

The Commission has today presented a new strategy for EU-UN relations. The paper puts forward practical ways in which, by working through the UN system, the EU can strengthen its position as a central pillar of the multilateral system. Commissioner for External Relations Chris Patten commented: “The EU’s commitment to a multilateral foreign policy needs to be better reflected in our approach to international institutions, starting with the UN. As the largest financial contributor to the UN, the EU needs to find concrete ways of strengthening our political influence in the UN system. We want to discuss these ideas with the Council and Parliament and hope that they will make a useful contribution to the debate in advance of next week’s UN General Assembly in New York.”

The Communication puts forward a series of concrete ways of improving the way the EU engages with the UN system:

- improving the EU coordinating mechanisms in Brussels, New York and Vienna,
- establishing direct EC representation in fora that deal with issues of Community competence,
- establishing early contacts/co-operation between EU services and those of UN agencies, including hands-on co-operation in the field.

The EC budget provides some 300m per year for UN agencies – e.g. for development (UNDP) and humanitarian (WFP) assistance. When combined with national contributions from Member States, the EU is the largest contributor to UN operations. The European Union’s significant weight, which is bound to increase with enlargement, gives the EU the opportunity, as well as the responsibility, to make proactive suggestions in the UN reform debate. The Communication builds on the extensive EU-UN co-operation that has developed in recent years across a wide range of policy areas. High-level political dialogue now involves regular meetings between the UN Secretariat and the Council, Commission and High Representative for CFSP. In addition, the EU and the UN already work together on development and humanitarian aid. This cooperation should expand to other areas. For instance, recent EU peacekeeping and policing operations in the Western Balkans, and now in the Democratic Republic of Congo, have shown the EU’s potential for backing up UN mandates with the EU’s considerable resources. The point of departure of this Communication is the European Union’s attachment to multilateral solutions – on issues as varied as international security and climate change – as a fundamental principle of its external relations. At the same time, it notes that the EU’s ability to influence multilateral debates has at times lagged behind its economic and combined political clout. The Communication sets out three ways in which the EU could contribute more effectively to the work of the UN:

- By taking the lead in the negotiation and implementation of key UN targets and instruments. The Communication argues that the EU can and should act as a ‘front-runner’ in developing and in implementing UN targets. In this context, the EU should apply the proactive approach it has shown on issues such as the Kyoto Protocol, the International Criminal Court or Financing for Development, much more widely in areas such as counter-terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, or human rights. It also commits the Commission to looking at how the implementation of multilateral targets can be integrated more systematically into the EU’s external assistance programs.
• By moving towards a more systematic policy of partnership with the UN in the field. The Communication takes stock of recent moves by the Commission to develop more stable, long-term funding relationships and strengthen policy dialogue with selected UN development and humanitarian aid agencies. It calls for a strengthened partnership with the UN in areas like human rights and conflict prevention, where concrete cooperation between the EU and the UN has yet to be developed more extensively, as well as in the field of crisis management, where the Italian Presidency has already initiated work towards reaching a framework agreement with the UN. The Communication calls in particular for regular upstream concertation on the EC’s and UN’s respective country-level assessments and programming, for action to make training standards compatible, and for regular joint training activities and exchanges of personnel.

• By giving itself the means to become a dynamic, flexible and coherent force in policy debates in the UN. The Communication notes that the EU has emerged in a short period of time as a visible presence at the UN, capable of arriving at common, coordinated positions in most UN policy forums (such as the General Assembly or many specialized agencies). However, it points to the factors which still prevent the EU from ‘punching at its weight’ in the UN, such as the persistence of occasional split votes by EU Member States in key UN bodies or the lack of effective EU coordination in certain multilateral forums which are crucial to the EU’s sustainable development agenda. The Communication sets out concrete proposals for addressing these issues – such as giving relevant Council groups in Brussels a strong role in determining EU policy in the main UN bodies; moving towards a flexible, mandate-based approach for the EU’s participation in UN negotiations; or extending EU coordination to all parts of the UN system.

In this context, the Communication also covers some sensitive issues surrounding CFSP and the Security Council on which the Commission role is limited. However, the Communication suggests more can be done to improve the coherence of the EU foreign policy within the limits or Article 19 of the Treaty, which contains significant obligations for Member States to consult each other and to defend agreed EU positions on issues that are discussed in the Security Council. The Communication addresses this issue in the light of the Convention, aiming at a stepped up presentation of common EU positions in all UN bodies, including the Security Council, including:

• a reinforced role for the future Foreign Minister in bringing Member States’ positions together to avoid split votes on Security Council resolutions;
• a clearer arrangement regarding the presentation of agreed EU positions in the Security Council;
• a more proactive consultation/concertation among Member States with a view to maximizing the degree of consensus on matters discussed in Security Council.

The Commission will now look to the Council and the Parliament for a wide-ranging debate on taking forward the concrete proposals contained in the Communication, many of which will require a concerted effort by the main EU institutions involved in external relations.
Annex 3

Tables and Charts on European Security and Defense Policy

Table 1 – Structures Dealing With Crisis Management in the European Union
Table 2 – EU Decision-Making and Conduct of an Operation in Crisis Management

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DECISION</th>
<th>CONDUCT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>European Council General Affairs Council</td>
<td>National and/or Multinational Headquarters</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Military Staff  
- Early-warning  
- Contingency Planning  
-- Strategic Planning | EU Operation Commander |
| PSC  
Military Committee | EU Force Commander |
| OR | National / Multinational Forces |
| NATO | DSACEUR (CJPS-SHAPE) |

CJTF HQ / GFIM |
Table 3 – “Berlin Plus” Arrangements

NATO stands ready to define and adopt the necessary arrangements for ready access by the European Union to the collective assets and capabilities of the Alliance, for operations in which the Alliance as a whole is not engaged militarily as an Alliance. The Council in Permanent Session will approve these arrangements, which will respect the requirements of NATO operations and the coherence of its command structure, and should address:

- Assured EU access to NATO planning capabilities able to contribute to military planning for EU-led operations;
- The presumption of availability to the EU of pre-identified NATO capabilities and common assets for use in EU-led operations;
- Identification of a range of European command options for EU-led operations, further developing the role of DSACEUR in order for him to assume fully and effectively his European responsibilities;
- The further adaptation of NATO’s defence planning system to incorporate more comprehensively the availability of forces for EU-led operations.

The whole “Berlin Plus” package also includes an agreement on security of information.

---

Table 4 – Current EU Special Representatives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of Appointment</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Mandate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7 July 2003</td>
<td>South Caucasus</td>
<td>Heikki Talvitie (Finland)</td>
<td>To assist the countries of the South Caucasus in carrying out political and economic reforms, preventing and assisting in the resolution of conflicts, promoting the return of refugees and internally displaced persons, engaging constructively with key national actors neighboring the region, supporting the intra-regional cooperation and ensuring coordination, consistency and effectiveness of the EU’s action in this region.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 July 2003</td>
<td>EU Special Representative for the Middle East peace process</td>
<td>Marc Otte (Belgium)</td>
<td>To contribute towards peace that includes a two-State solution with Israel and a democratic, viable, peaceful and sovereign Palestinian States living side-by-side within secure and recognized borders enjoying normal relations with their neighbors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 September 2002</td>
<td>The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM)</td>
<td>Alexis Brouhns (Belgium)</td>
<td>To establish and maintain close contact with the government of FYROM, and with the parties involved in the political process, and to offer the EU's advice and facilitation in the political process.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 June 2002</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>Francesc Vendrell (Spain)</td>
<td>To contribute, through close liaison with and support for the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, to achieving the implementation of the Union’s policy in Afghanistan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 March 2002</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>Lord Ashdown (United Kingdom)</td>
<td>To maintain an overview of the whole range of activities in the field of the Rule of Law, and in that context provide advice to the Secretary-General/High Representative (SG/HR) and the Commission as necessary.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 December 2001</td>
<td>The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe</td>
<td>Ehrard Busek (Austria)</td>
<td>To carry out the tasks defined in the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe. To help the countries concerned develop a joint strategy for ensuring the stability and growth of the region.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 March 1996</td>
<td>EU Special Envoy for the African Great Lakes Region</td>
<td>Aldo Ayello (Italy)</td>
<td>To work closely with the UN and the African Union, and with the prominent African figures who are assisting the international community's efforts. To maintain constant contact with the Governments of the countries in the region.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 4

Tables and Charts on EU-UN Cooperation

Table 1a – EU Statements at the UN Security Council
(Between the Portuguese and the Greek Presidencies, January 2000–July 2003)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Timor</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq/Kuwait</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace and Security</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorism</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other matters</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1b – Number of statements made on behalf of the EU within the UN organs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EU Presidency</th>
<th>Number of statements made on behalf of the EU within the UN General Assembly</th>
<th>Number of statements made on behalf of the EU in the UN Security Council</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EU Presidency of Portugal (January 1st – June 30th, 2000)</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Presidency of France (July 1st – December 31st, 2000)</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Presidency of Sweden (January 1st – June 30th, 2001)</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Presidency of Belgium (July 1st – December 31st, 2001)</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Presidency of Spain (January 1st – June 30th, 2002)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Presidency of Denmark (July 1st – December 31st, 2002)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Presidency of Greece (January 1st – June 30th 2003)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 2 – Contributions of EU Member States to UN Peacekeeping (April 2004)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>25 EU Member States</th>
<th>Police</th>
<th>Military Observers</th>
<th>Troops</th>
<th>Total per Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>377</td>
<td>424</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>394</td>
<td>509</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>440</td>
<td>485</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>592</td>
<td>742</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>519</td>
<td>558</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>499</td>
<td>503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>321</td>
<td>397</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>403</td>
<td>550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>916</td>
<td>327</td>
<td>3,986</td>
<td>5,229</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CIVPOL</th>
<th>UNMO</th>
<th>TROOP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td>4,764</td>
<td>1,949</td>
<td>46,706</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grand Total in PKO</strong></td>
<td>53,419</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: DPKO, Monthly Summary of Contributions,  
Table 3 – EU Financial Contribution to UN Budgets

* European Union includes 15 member states
** Acceding Countries includes the 10 nations that joined the EU in 2004

Table 4 – Scenarios for EU-UN Cooperation in Peace Operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION</th>
<th>MANDATE</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Subcontracting</td>
<td>No Subcontracting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-Led Operation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With NATO Assets</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Concordia)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU civilian contribution</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to a UN operation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(one EU pillar)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Followed or not by a UN Peacekeeping Operation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UN Operation in Which The EU Participates</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>With NATO Assets</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Artemis)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Without NATO Assets</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Concordia)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU contingent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>within a UN operation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU provides the command of the operation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5 – Operation Artemis Chain of Decision and Command