The Infrastructure of Peace in Africa
Assessing the Peacebuilding Capacity of African Institutions

A Report submitted by the Africa Program of the International Peace Academy to the Ford Foundation

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This report was put together by Dr. Monica Kathina Juma, a former Associate at the Africa Program of the International Peace Academy (IPA), who coordinated the project, and wrote the introduction and conclusion, as well as sections on the security dynamics of the Horn of Africa, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and organizations in Kenya and Tanzania. She was ably assisted by Ms. Aida Mengistu, Program Officer with IPA’s Africa Program, who conducted research in Ethiopia and was particularly meticulous in the logistics of contracting and coordinating the research team, and in editing and commenting on field reports as well as the main report.

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It would have been impossible to collect the amount of material we did within the period of our fieldwork without the cooperation of organizations in the eighteen countries covered, for which we remain deeply indebted. We look forward to continued partnership with each of these organizations.

In putting this report together, Dr. Monica Juma worked with an extraordinary team of colleagues at the International Peace Academy. Dr. Adekeye Adebajo supervised the project and edited the draft report. Dr. Neclâ Tschirgi, Vice President of IPA, Ambassador John Hirsch, Senior Fellow, and Mr. Cyrus Samii, Publications Coordinator and Program Assistant, reviewed the report, in whole or in part, while Dr. Neclâ Tschirgi contributed to the introduction and conclusion. All these people helped to enhance the quality, purpose and richness of this report. Last but not least, we thank the Ford Foundation for proposing and funding this project. We hope that this report will contribute to the Foundation’s new special initiative on Africa designed to strengthen the capacity of African organizations to manage conflicts.
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Foreword

It is with great pleasure that we publish this report, commissioned and funded by the Ford Foundation.

We were drawn to the possibility of evaluating the strengths and limitations (both inherent and imposed by outside actors, not least funders) of civil society actors in Africa. As the report details, civil society organizations in Africa as elsewhere take a variety of forms, and we have attempted, in considering them, to avoid undue generalizations. This report by no means surveys more than a sampling of such organizations, merely aiming to cover enough of them to serve as a basis for the analytical sections of the document.

IPA is particularly proud that all authors of the report are African, drawn from each of the continent's main regions. We are very grateful to Dr. Monica Kathina Juma for coordinating the report and drafting much of its analytical thrust. As always, I am personally grateful to Dr. Adekeye Adebajo, the Director of IPA’s Africa program, for overseeing this demanding project.

Our conclusions make clear that while civil society actors in Africa as elsewhere must remain responsible for their own successes and failures, there is much that donors need to do better to ensure a greater ratio of successful projects and programs. In particular, donors need to be more results than process oriented and need to stick with grantees long enough to allow these organizations to master both their local and international administrative, legal and financial requirements. As an NGO of 32 years standing, IPA can attest that this is no small task even in New York and even after all these years. The challenges on the ground in Africa are much greater and deserve a more consistently supportive rather than often reflexively critical, approach by funders and other partners. The Ford Foundation has generated a fine track record in supporting its African grantees. Others can learn much from its example.

Since the inception of its Africa program in the early 1990s, under my distinguished predecessor Olara Otunnu, one of the two goals of IPA’s Africa Program has been to support civil society actors in Africa in promoting peace and security on the continent. (The other has aimed to strengthen, wherever possible, the capacity of African regional and sub-regional organizations to address constructively Africa’s security challenges.)

Preparation of this report has confirmed us in our conviction, first articulated by Olara and the then-Director of our Africa Program, Margaret Vogt, that civil society organizations hold out a great deal of hope for Africa. We trust readers will share our admiration for the achievements of this vital sector of Africa’s polity and for the courage of the individuals involved in tackling ambitious objectives in often very adverse and frequently dangerous circumstances.

David M. Malone
President, International Peace Academy
Executive Summary

In October 2000, the Ford Foundation requested the International Peace Academy’s (IPA) Africa Program to generate a database of institutions managing conflicts and crises in Africa. After consultations, the scope of this project was expanded to comprise an assessment of capacity, and determination of the potential of institutions to respond to crises and conflicts in Africa. This report is the outcome of that exercise and hopes to guide and facilitate the design of the Ford Foundation’s funding strategy for peacebuilding in sub-Saharan Africa. However, it is hoped that this report will also serve to stimulate further discussion by the Ford Foundation and IPA staff, with the involvement of other relevant donors, about the challenges and opportunities for supporting peace and development in Africa. To that end, this report landscapes the condition of capacity in Africa, provides a diagnostic overview of institutional layout at the regional, national and local levels and proposes areas of intervention that can bolster and improve performance. It must be noted from the start that this report claims to be neither exhaustive nor comprehensive. Many important organizations engaged in useful peacebuilding work in Africa have not been included in this report due to logistical and time constraints. The organizations included in the report are merely illustrative of some of the peacebuilding work being conducted in Africa, and are mainly concentrated in conflict areas.

I. Methodology

Eleven researchers, five based at IPA and six working in Africa, were involved in generating background papers and carrying out interviews with staff of seven subregional organizations, seventy-eight semiformal organizations and ten community-based organizations (CBOs), drawn from eighteen countries in sub-Saharan Africa. The survey covered three main areas. First, it contextualized the assessment of institutional capacity, the nature and dynamics of conflicts, including their causes and characteristics, in four subregions: West, Southern, Central and East Africa. Second, the survey highlighted the regional characteristics of conflicts, discussing peculiar features that shape security systems in each subregion. Third, the survey assessed the peacebuilding capacity and potential of institutional actors at the regional, national and community levels.

This report is divided into six parts. Part one outlines the background, rationale and methodology as well as the structure of the report. Part two provides an overview of the conflict systems in Africa and analyzes factors that define the security architecture in each subregion. Part three addresses the capacities—strengths, weaknesses and potential—of intergovernmental actors to respond to conflicts and crises in Africa. Part four focuses on semiformal actors in Africa and assesses their performance in each subregion. Part five provides broad observations of the characteristics of Community-Based Organizations from a select number of umbrella bodies. Finally, part six provides a conclusion and general observations crucial for informing the process of designing a funding strategy for peacebuilding in sub-Saharan Africa. This section also offers recommendations on the priority areas to which the Ford Foundation and other donors should consider investing their efforts and resources in their current and future engagements.

II. Summary of Findings

A. Nature and Dynamics of Conflicts

Since the end of the Cold War, Africa has been embroiled in a plethora of intra- and interstate conflicts. Most of these conflicts have a transnational character and generate consequences that have implications for regions beyond those in which they occur. Among the major causes of these conflicts are: the weak democratization process; deep-seated environmental problems; competition for resources; breakdown in the rule of law; and proliferation of private armies, militias, and the attendant problem of illicit trade in, and use of, illegal arms. In addition, the nature and dynamics of conflicts are shaped by the interplay of features peculiar to each subregion.

In West Africa, four issues stand out: the Charles Taylor factor; the Franco-Nigerian rivalry; the link between the exploitation of natural resources and war; and the
proliferation of small arms and light weapons. Southern Africa’s security architecture is defined to a large extent by the legacy of apartheid and the fear of South Africa’s economic and political dominance in the post-apartheid era, as well as by the fragility of democratization throughout the subregion. In Central Africa, three broad factors define conflicts and responses to them: ethnicity and governance; the scramble for resources in DR-Congo; and the prevalent, sometimes conflicting interests of regional and international actors. Finally, in the Horn of Africa, the nature and dynamics of conflicts are determined by the legacy of superpower rivalry and the weakening, sometimes fragmentation of the state; proliferation of small arms and light weapons; and (involuntary) human migration. Any interplay of these factors generates a wide range of consequences, including population displacement within and beyond borders, fragmentation of societal structures, militarization of the civilian population and generalized insecurity.

While the number of interstate conflicts in Africa has reduced significantly, intrastate conflicts have increased exponentially. Further, most of these conflicts spill over borders through networks and alliances of rebels and other actors. This regional (and sometimes extraregional) character of conflicts poses peculiar challenges for African institutions seeking to address them. Efforts at resolving conflicts are limited by their scale and complexity, a perennial shortage of resources, and the debilitating internal political weaknesses within most African states. In responding to the different manifestations of such conflicts, African institutions have developed varied tools and approaches.

B. The Institutional Infrastructure

Regional and Subregional Organizations

Regional and subregional organizations are retooling themselves in two ways: revising their mandates from being purely “developmentalist” to encompass conflict management and where applicable, revamping their fledgling regional security mechanisms. Evolving under circumstances of insecurity, the response of these organizations to crises and conflicts is developing in an ad hoc manner.

While all intergovernmental organizations are in need of substantive institutional building in terms of their human and technical capacities, each is responding to particular challenges within its subregion and emphasizing different aspects of peacebuilding. Intervention, therefore, needs to be designed specifically to suit each subregion and institution. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) is keen to develop a role in coordinating the early warning systems and security mechanisms of subregional organizations rather than undertaking large-scale peacekeeping missions. From the peacekeeping experiences in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is developing a capacity for peacekeeping and enforcement. In Southern Africa, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) is struggling to operationalize its Organ on Politics, Defense and Security, even as the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) attempts to complement the work of SADC and other regional actors in conflict management. In the Horn of Africa, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) favors nonmilitary options to deal with conflicts and is working with civil society partnerships in developing a Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN). The smaller East African Community (EAC) is moving toward developing a conflict prevention model and greater security co-operation. These differences have implications for the types of capacities that require strengthening in each organization.

Regional and subregional actors in Africa play critical roles in sponsoring discussions, engaging in diplomacy and intervening militarily in conflicts. These organizations are driven, in their interventions, by an internal logic of common interest in economic development, and peace and security. They tend to have more at stake in conflicts within their regions than do external actors. Unlike foreign actors, they enjoy the advantage of having deep knowledge of their region. But some of these regional interventions have also been controversial, as local actors have been accused by their neighbors of pursuing parochial political and economic agendas rather than regional stability. Nigeria and South Africa have also been accused of nursing hegemonic ambitions to dominate their subregions.
Semiformal Organizations

In responding to conflicts that manifest themselves differently across regions, semiformal organizations have developed varying institutional forms. These range from research and analysis institutions, to facilitative bodies, to operational actors and networks. Operating in political environments that may be friendly, indifferent, or hostile, they are often forced to navigate through the dangers of co-optation, harassment, or lack of a policy framework to guide their operations. In their work, these actors constantly seek to cultivate and operate within the principles of impartiality, neutrality, independence, objectivity, and relevance to the needs on the ground.

Among the distinctive characteristics of these actors is their ability to network upwards (with international governmental and nongovernmental actors), downwards (with national and local actors), and horizontally (with each other). Increasingly, semiformal organizations are becoming the intermediaries between donors, international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and governments, on the one hand, and local actors on the other, in terms of disbursing funds, and building or bolstering the capacities of smaller, usually community-based organizations (CBOs).

Community-Based Organizations

Community-based organizations operate at the frontline of conflict areas and, despite their chronic shortage of resources and skilled manpower, confront conflicts directly. Their agenda is localized and pursued in a reactive and ad hoc manner. Institutionally, CBOs are fragile, often lacking clear operational structures. They are often weak and prone to political manipulation. CBOs depend largely on volunteers and draw heavily on traditional mechanisms for conflict resolution and peacebuilding, which are crucial for the development of early warning and conflict prevention mechanisms.

C. Modalities of Current Support for Peacebuilding

Responding to crises and conflicts has taken on an added urgency and is increasingly conceived as part of a larger peacebuilding agenda across Africa. Within this context, there are several important developments that merit special attention in any discussion on supporting peacebuilding efforts in Africa.

Donor Roles and Funding Patterns

Peacebuilding is a new funding area for most donors. Nonetheless, convinced that conflicts impact negatively on all other program activities, there is a general move by donors toward designing funding strategies for peacebuilding. For instance, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) is funding an institutional strengthening initiative, code-named Clinton-GHAI, in the Greater Horn of Africa. Since 1998, the Dutch government has been supporting an initiative that seeks to build the capacity of organizations dealing with the Sudan conflict; the European Union and other donors have supported the ECOWAS security mechanism; the German Technical Cooperation Body, GTZ (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit) has also launched a small Conflict Management Initiative in Africa. Since the Ford Foundation already supports a range of programs that are directly affected by conflicts across Africa, this report recommends the designing of a comprehensive Ford Foundation strategy for peacebuilding.

There is a reluctance on the part of donors to fund core activities, such as administrative overheads, which presents a critical challenge for peacebuilding organizations in this new area. Organizations, particularly semiformal and CBOs, have been forced to draw running costs from project funds, reducing the amount of resources available for program activities. Inability to secure core activities inhibits the growth of professionalism, leads to high turnover of staff, and a personnel retention problem, as trained and experienced staff leave to join the increasing number of better-paying international NGOs. This situation can also lead to a heavy dependence on consultants who, while increasing technical expertise, are expensive and reduce the possibilities of organizations developing local capacity. A combination of these conditions affects program continuity and reduces institutional capacity.
To reduce intense competition for resources and the effects of heavy dependence on single foreign donors, semiformal actors in Africa are seeking independence through various means, such as diversifying funding sources, creating endowment funds and cultivating support from the private sector.

Nature of Ongoing Capacity Building

On the whole, there is an impressive human resource capacity in most of the countries surveyed. Most top and mid-level officers in these organizations are well qualified and have the requisite skills to deal with conflicts. However, their ability to operate optimally is limited by a number of factors. Remuneration packages are generally low and not reflective of qualifications, while most organizations lack support structures, including technical capacity, to facilitate the optimal utilization of available human resources. This deficiency is partly overcome by a heavy dependence on key persons who act as catalysts for organizations. Without institutionalized governance structures, organizations are prone to transitional problems after such people leave.

There is a prevalence of workshops and conferences as the preferred model for capacity building. While these meetings can and do contribute to networking, their value in addressing institutional shortcomings is limited. Usually, they are one-off interventions, run largely by outside experts and have no follow-up mechanisms.

Networking as a Preferred Operational Model

Consortiums and networks could have greater potential to undertake peacebuilding. They have the weight of numbers, provide a resource pool for members, enhance the capacity of weaker/smaller actors, improve the quality of training, encourage complementary action and, in volatile political situations, act as watchdogs for weaker network members. Networking is more prevalent among semiformal institutions and glaringly absent between intergovernmental organizations and individual civic actors. This reduces the opportunities for complementary action between governmental and nongovernmental actors.

However, networking generates challenges relating to coordination, duplication of activities, and competition for scarce resources in the face of divergent agendas, overlapping mandates, mandate gaps, and interference by agency head offices, all of which can limit collaboration. To promote networking and increase its value would require making provisions for effective coordination in each situation.

III. Recommendations

The recommendations of this report are grouped under four broad categories: institutional capacity building, networking, dissemination and utilization, and creating an enabling environment.

Institutional Capacity Building

Actors that are fully institutionalized tend to perform better than weaker ones in peacebuilding activities. Such actors are strong, have clearly articulated visions and mandates, can raise funds, are better governed, and have credibility and capacity in terms of structures to implement, execute, and monitor their program activities. Therefore, investment in organizational development is a crucial step in bolstering the capacity of actors involved in peacebuilding.

An institutional building program can take one or a number of forms depending, on the needs of an organization:

- Make institutional strengthening grants to networks or individual organizations to help them clarify the relationships between their mandate and vision, and their resources, including human and technical capabilities. These grants will establish structures of governance, implementation and monitoring for their program activities.

- Fund core positions within organizations for periods of three months to two years in order to stabilize and enable the organizations to concentrate on peacebuilding activities. The Commonwealth expert secondment model could inform such an intervention.
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• Allow for matching of funds from two or more of the divisions of a donor or between donors. Such a model could reflect the interrelatedness of issues on the ground and secure program activities for the longer term.

• Fund the creation and management of a pool of experts composed mainly of Africans to undertake capacity building for African institutions. Such a pool could focus on the specific deficiencies within organizations and address these through short visits and expert placement schemes. Among the critical skills cited are grant making and proposal writing, as well as communication, particularly in information technology. Such a pool could draw on the enlarging African diaspora, many of whose members are keen to make a positive contribution to the rebirth of the continent.

• Fund activities that support peacebuilding, particularly research, documentation, publication and dissemination of information.

Facilitate Networking

Facilitate consultative meetings between civil society and subregional organizations; between semiformal organizations and CBOs; and among semiformal actors within and across subregions. This would encourage cross-fertilization of ideas, drawing on lessons and good practices within the continent.

Dissemination and Utilization

Share this report with interested donors, including bilateral and multilateral actors involved in peacebuilding.

Support a consultative meeting between donors to enable them to share lessons and experiences on funding peacebuilding activities in Africa.

Initiate a dialogue between some of the organizations evaluated in this report and donors supporting peacebuilding activities in Africa.

An Enabling Environment

The strengthening of institutions in Africa and the investment of resources in them can only be effective if a conducive enabling environment exists. The Ford Foundation can contribute to this process by supporting interaction between states, subregional organizations and nonstate actors and by funding consultative meetings that help forge partnerships and break the barrier of distrust between state and nonstate sectors. The OAU-civil society conference held in Addis Ababa in June 2001, funded by Ford Foundation, was applauded for facilitating a dialogue that could help bridge the gap of mutual suspicion between governments and civil society actors on the continent. Support for such initiatives at the subregional level is highly recommended.
Part One: Introduction

1.1 Background and Rationale

The escalation of conflicts in Africa in the 1990s has led to the expansion of actors involved in peacemaking, but has also overwhelmed the capacity of these actors to manage conflicts. From Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea in West Africa, to Somalia, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Sudan in the Horn of Africa, to Burundi, Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in the Great Lakes region, to Angola and Lesotho in Southern Africa, civil wars and interstate conflicts persist. These conflicts involve multiple actors and are often deeply entrenched, complex, and protracted. Whether intrastate or interstate, conflicts occur within complex regional dynamics and security systems, creating transnational linkages in one or several regions and making them more difficult to resolve.

Often underpinned by economic agendas, these conflicts have seen the militarization of the civilian space, recruitment of children, subversion of human rights and humanitarian law and massive displacements of people. These wars and their attendant humanitarian consequences pose a major threat to peace and security in Africa. While institutions devoted to the search for peace and security are being established in all of Africa’s subregions, their capacity, including knowledge, skills, level of technology, finance and trained manpower, is often very weak. Not surprisingly, many Africans continue to urge donors and the international community to enhance the capacity of African institutions to deal with these challenges. So far, efforts at building local capacity have been criticized for being ineffectual. Often such efforts are inappropriate, inadequate, and usually ad hoc, rarely meeting the needs on the ground.

A logical step toward designing an effective intervention strategy to resolve the dilemma posed by inadequate capacity in Africa is to assess the institutions and organizations that exist on the ground. This requires an analysis of existing capacities, an identification of gaps and an appraisal of the potential of African organizations to address crises and conflicts in the future. Such an assessment is the overriding concern of this report, which evaluates the strengths, weaknesses and potential of intergovernmental and nongovernmental regional, national, and community-based organizations in Africa to respond to conflicts. It also offers recommendations to facilitate the design of a funding strategy by the Ford Foundation and other donors in support of peacebuilding activities in sub-Saharan Africa.

1.2 Methodology

This project was undertaken by eleven researchers, six of whom were based in Africa. The researchers assessed the capacity of seven intergovernmental organizations, seventy-eight semiformal organizations and ten community-based organizations. These were drawn from eighteen countries in sub-Saharan Africa, namely Liberia, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Angola, Mozambique, South Africa, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, Somalia, Sudan, Ethiopia, and Djibouti. In evaluating the capacity of each organization, the research team examined their mandate, resource capacity, program implementation, potential to respond to future crises, and relationship to other players including governments, international organizations, donors, and the media. In order to refine the

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2 Conceptualization borrowed from Barnett Rubin’s discussion on Regional Conflict Formation; see IPA/Permanent Mission of Colombia to the UN report on “Regional Approaches to Conflict Management in Africa,” 8 August 2001.
3 See for example, Mats Berdal and David Malone (eds.), Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, and Ottawa: International Development Research Center, 2000).
4 See for example, Eric Berman and Katie Sams, Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and Culpabilities (UN Institute for Disarmament Research, Geneva, Switzerland, and Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, South Africa, 2000).
5 See Appendix I for a matrix of organizations surveyed.
project and its scope, three consultative sessions were held in New York involving IPA Africa Program staff and Ford Foundation officers.\(^6\)

Following this brief introduction, the second section of this report focuses on the dynamics of conflicts and contextualizes the assessment of institutional capacity. IPA commissioned four background papers covering West Africa, Southern Africa, Central Africa and the Horn of Africa. Each of these papers outlines the causes and dynamics of conflicts; their regional interconnectedness; the role of domestic, regional and extra-regional actors in fueling or managing conflicts; and regional capacities that exist to deal with conflicts. In addition, these conflicts highlight idiosyncrasies that shape the security architecture of each African subregion.

Parts three through five of this survey focus on organizations responding to conflicts and crises. These institutions are grouped into three categories. The first category consists of the seven regional and subregional intergovernmental institutions addressing various aspects of conflict management in Africa. These include the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and the East African Community (EAC).

The second category of organizations surveyed comprises an array of civil society organizations, referred to in this report as semiformal organizations. This conceptualization is adopted to reflect the fact that these organizations are becoming more formal and are sometimes affiliated to the state and sometimes independent of it. These actors are diverse in their history, size, resource base, capacity to develop and implement programs, profile and scope of operation. They consist of actors previously confined to development activities, which now include conflict-related activities, organizations established to deal exclusively with conflicts, research and training institutes, policy think-tanks, human rights, pro-democracy and governance organizations, and institutions engaged in emergency relief activities. For comparative purposes, this survey has tried to focus on institutions that articulate a clear vision, have organizational coherence, and have a minimum level of capacity to undertake basic programming tasks that seek to shape policy and practice in the areas of conflict management and peacebuilding.

Finally, the third category of actors in this report comprises community-based organizations (CBOs) involved in activities and projects that promote peacebuilding, conflict management, resolution, and/or prevention at the community (rather than state) level. It should be stressed that CBOs work with local communities in more challenging rural environments and, in spite of a chronic shortage of resources and skilled manpower, are directly confronting the problems of conflict.

Fieldwork for this report was conducted between April and August 2001. After identifying at least five organizations in each country, researchers carried out extensive interviews with key individuals and players within these organizations. In their work, the researchers employed a structured questionnaire, made observations, and consulted the publications of these organizations to gain insights into their inner workings. The survey could have benefited from deeper engagement with more civil society organizations, especially among community-based organizations, but limited time and resources rendered this impossible. Most CBOs are located deep in rural areas that were difficult to access. The report has attempted to overcome this shortcoming by undertaking an in-depth analysis of some large networks that draw their membership from local CBOs. The cross-section of organizations surveyed in this report not only focuses on players in the area of conflict management in Africa, but also provides findings with wider application between Africa’s subregions.

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\(^6\) These meetings were held in November 2000, March 2001 and August 2001.
The format of the report adheres faithfully to the outline provided by the initial project proposal: assessing the capacity and potential of African institutions to respond effectively to conflicts and crises as a way of guiding donor intervention strategies by the Ford Foundation and other donors. The report has five additional parts. Part two provides an overview of conflict systems in Africa, particularly their causes, nature, and dynamics, and offers a context for assessing the capacity of various African institutions to respond meaningfully to conflicts. Parts three through five assess the capacity of institutions to deal effectively with crises and conflicts in Africa: part three examines the conflict management capacity of regional and subregional intergovernmental organizations; part four focuses on the peacebuilding experiences and potential of semiformal organizations (Appendix 1 contains a more detailed description of these organizations); while part five assesses the conflict management potential of community-based organizations. Finally, part six provides general observations, draws lessons from the analyses across the eighteen countries surveyed, and makes recommendations about how to strengthen the capacity of organizations and actors in the field of conflict management, resolution, and prevention in Africa.
Part Two: The Nature and Dynamics of Conflict in Africa

The end of the Cold War ushered in a new international spirit of cooperation that raised hopes for peace and security in Africa. Countries previously embroiled in conflict, such as Namibia, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and South Africa adopted more democratic systems of government. However, any illusions of a post–Cold War peace dividend were shattered as conflicts erupted in virtually all of Africa’s subregions: Lesotho, Angola, and Zimbabwe in Southern Africa; Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau in West Africa; Eritrea, Ethiopia, Sudan, and Somalia in the Horn of Africa; Chad, the Central African Republic, Congo-Brazzaville, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Rwanda, and Burundi in Central Africa and the Great Lakes region. While Africa’s democratization struggles in the early 1990s sought to restore values of democracy and human rights, in countries like Benin, Niger, Nigeria, Cameroon, and Congo-Brazzaville, resistance to the process by ruling political and military elites led to “communal” violence in countries like Togo and Kenya. Political exclusion and inequalities in access to economic and social opportunities have combined with issues of identity and citizenship to result in genocide in Rwanda, mass murder in Burundi, and civil wars in Liberia, Somalia, and Central African Republic.

The crises and conflicts in Africa are accentuated by deep-rooted environmental problems related to access to, and use of land resources, and competition for natural resources such as minerals and timber. As unemployed, disaffected “lumpen” youths in many of Africa’s rural areas have been recruited into rebel movements, law and order has broken down, resulting in the proliferation of private armies, militias, and the illicit trade in arms and drugs in states like Liberia, Sierra Leone, (Northern) Uganda, Sudan, and Somalia.

In addition to these intrastate conflicts, Eritrea and Ethiopia waged a more old-fashioned interstate conflict between 1998 and 2000. While some states like Nigeria, South Africa, Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, Zambia, and Kenya have taken a leading role in regional peacemaking efforts, such initiatives have often been frustrated by the scale and complexity of conflicts, lack of resources, the parochial agendas of local actors, and weak subregional mechanisms for managing conflicts. Apart from these general characteristics, each subregion exposes particular trends that have shaped the dynamics of conflicts in its own locality. Understanding these dynamics is critical to any effective intervention strategy.

Before assessing the nature and dynamics of African conflicts, it is worth briefly defining the term “peacebuilding”. In this report, peacebuilding is conceived as encompassing “all actions undertaken in a conflict continuum to consolidate peace and prevent recurrence of armed confrontation.” Such activities may involve “the creation or strengthening of national institutions, monitoring elections, promoting human rights, providing reintegration and rehabilitation programs and creating conditions for resumed development.” Peacebuilding aims to build on, add to or reorient peacemaking activities in ways designed to reduce the risk of the resumption of conflict and to contribute to creating conditions conducive to reconciliation, reconstruction and recovery. Based on this conceptualization, peacebuilding involves long-term investment and requires a conscious link between conflict resolution, rehabilitation, reconstruction and development.

2.1 West Africa

West Africa is one of Africa’s most politically volatile regions. Thirty-five out of seventy-two successful coups in Africa between 1960 and 1990 occurred in this subregion. The fact that the fifteen states that make up the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) are among the poorest countries in

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8 These include Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Niger, Nigeria, Mali, Togo, Senegal and Sierra Leone.
the world adds a complex economic dimension to the subregion’s political and security crises. In the 1990s, conflicts proliferated in the ECOWAS subregion. While Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea Bissau were embroiled in protracted civil strife, Senegal confronted a separatist war in Casamance. Liberia and Guinea have been locked in intermittent cross-border raids and counter-raids in a three-way conflict also involving rebels in Sierra Leone. In Nigeria and Côte d’Ivoire internal communal violence has occurred during and after multiparty elections. Conflict in West Africa takes on a subregional dimension, as civil strife in one country tends to spill over into neighboring states. This is fueled by a complex interplay of personality factors, a quest for regional hegemony by Nigeria and France, competition for natural resources, and the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in West Africa.

The Taylor Factor

The destabilization of the West African subregion owes much to one individual: Liberian president and former warlord Charles Taylor. Taylor announced his arrival on the West African scene during the Liberian civil war that began in December 1989 and (temporarily) ended in 1997 with his presidential victory. During the civil war and its immediate aftermath, Charles Taylor and his guerrilla outfit, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), turned Liberia into a breeding ground for rebels and militias. With Taylor’s dramatic election victory and rise to power in July 1997, Liberia has continued to support several dissident movements from neighboring states. In Sierra Leone, Taylor has supported the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), an organization with which the NPFL received military training in Libya in the late 1980s. A recent UN report has revealed “unequivocal and overwhelming evidence that Liberia has been actively supporting the RUF at all levels, in providing training, weapons and related material, logistical support, staging ground for attacks and providing a safe haven for retreat and recuperation.”

RUF leader Foday Sankoh, who fought alongside Taylor’s NPFL during the Liberian civil war, launched his bid for power in Sierra Leone in March 1991, when, backed by fighters from Liberia and Burkina Faso, he struck Bomaru in eastern Sierra Leone. Fueling the Taylor-Sankoh military alliance is the illicit trade in Sierra Leonean diamonds. Guinea has also accused Taylor of sponsoring rebel incursions into its territory. From the September 1999 raid on Macenta, a Guinean border town, rebels opposed to the government in Guinea have stepped up their armed forays. Taylor, in turn, charges that Guinea has been supporting militias opposed to his government in Liberia called Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD). How to contain Taylor’s destabilization activities in West Africa remains one of the major dilemmas confronting peacemaking efforts in this subregion.

The Franco-Nigerian Rivalry

Another factor that shapes the security architecture in West Africa is a drawn-out rivalry between France and Nigeria. French dominance in West Africa rested on its strong political, cultural, and economic ties with its former colonies and injection of military and economic resources into its former colonies in the postcolonial era. France maintained permanent military bases in Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire to ensure the security of client regimes in Africa. Between 1960 and 1990, France obstructed Nigeria’s hegemonic ambitions in West Africa. France, along with Côte d’Ivoire and Gabon, provided arms to Biafra during the Nigerian

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10 This view is widely held by many observers of the ongoing conflicts in the subregion.


civil war (1967–1970) in a bid to reduce the potential of a strong and united rival.13 At the height of this rivalry, Nigeria pushed strongly for the creation of ECOWAS by 1975. Regarding the establishment of a Nigerian-led subregional organization as an attempt to undercut its influence, France had earlier encouraged Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal, Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania and Niger to create the exclusively francophone Communauté Économique de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (CEAO) in 1973.14

In the post–Cold War era, this relationship changed dramatically as France reduced its high-profile military involvement in West Africa and improved bilateral relations with Nigeria. Addressing French diplomats in 1997, President Jacques Chirac urged them to abstain from “all interference of whatever nature, political, military or other” in Africa, adding, “France would not accept it herself.”15 More than anything else, France's refusal to intervene in Côte d'Ivoire in the wake of a military coup that toppled the friendly regime of Henri Konan Bedie in December 1999 dramatized this policy shift. In place of supporting client regimes, France has since extended commercial ties with Africa beyond its former colonies, becoming the second largest foreign investor in Nigeria after Britain. Francophone African states have also sought economic and political ties beyond France.16 On the military front, in 1997, France launched its initiative, Renforcement des Capacités Africaines de Maintien de la Paix (RECAMP), to strengthen African peacekeeping capacity. Paris has since invited non-francophone states to participate in this program. France’s courting of key anglophone countries like Nigeria and South Africa17 needs to be understood in the context of the loss of its sphere of influence in states like Rwanda and Zaire.18 This followed France’s arming of Rwandese genocidaires and prolonged support for the autocratic Mobutu Sese Seko in Zaire. In February 1990, Nigeria’s head of state, General Ibrahim Babangida, visited France. A decade later, Nigerian president Olusegun Obasanjo paid another visit to Paris. In return, French president Jacques Chirac visited Nigeria and publicly acknowledged Nigeria’s leadership role in Africa.

Meanwhile, Nigeria has increased its role in security operations in West Africa. It led military interventions to restore order in Liberia in 1990 and in Sierra Leone in 1997, both within the framework of the Economic Community of West African States Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). In December 1999, Nigeria played a key role in establishing the ECOMOG security mechanism to institutionalize conflict management in West Africa (see part three). The declining military role of external actors in post–Cold War Africa and the increased role of African actors in managing their own conflicts has facilitated Nigeria’s peace and security initiatives in West Africa. This suggests that efforts to bolster West Africa’s security infrastructure will have to take into account Nigeria’s hegemonic ambitions, despite its own enormous political, economic, and social problems, which could yet hamper the fulfillment of such ambitions.

Exploitation of Natural Resources and Conflicts

A third factor that shapes the security landscape in West Africa is conflict over the control of mineral resources, which fuels war and undermines peace processes as illustrated by the examples of Sierra Leone and Liberia. Grievances relating to diamond-mining in Sierra Leone date back to the colonial era. Using local chiefs, British-administered diamond-rich regions in the country gave small diamond concessions to private

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companies and workers instead of salaries\textsuperscript{19}, creating groups and individuals who fell outside the government’s control.\textsuperscript{20} Corruption, inadequate tax collection measures and tax evasion enabled individuals and private groups to use their private economic power to exert control and to challenge the state. In the 1990s, protagonists in the Sierra Leonan conflict battled for control over diamond mines and the international trade in diamonds. Some shadowy entrepreneurs, bent on controlling the diamond industry, have supported warlords, particularly RUF rebels who in turn have used the income from diamonds to finance and prolong Sierra Leone’s civil war.

Similarly, the conflict in Liberia seemed to benefit a small circle of warlords heading factions such as the NPFL, the Liberia Peace Council (LPC), and the United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia (ULIMO), which controlled vast territories rich in natural resources. These groups exploited ethnicity and military power to dominate a lucrative export trade in diamonds, timber, iron ore, and gold in collaboration with US, European, and Asian commercial firms.\textsuperscript{21} When Liberian ports were closed following UN and ECOWAS embargoes in 1992, Ivorian and French firms established direct trade links with the NPFL in Liberia and the RUF in Sierra Leone.\textsuperscript{22} One of the main objectives of Guinean rebel forces fighting the regime of Lansana Conte could be to gain access to Guinea’s mineral reserves of diamonds, bauxite, and gold. In a country where smuggling of mineral resources is undoubtedly a growing problem, powerful business interests lie in wait, ready to exploit the economic gains that are to be derived from a protracted conflict. Thus, political and economic strategies are linked in ways that enable corrupt groups to prolong and benefit from conflicts in West Africa. Any credible search for peace in this subregion will have to deal squarely with the link between resources and war.

Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons

A fourth factor that complicates security in West Africa is the widespread availability of small arms and light weapons (SALWs), which often intensify conflicts. While SALWs were a feature of the Cold War era, distributed both legally and illegally as part of superpower geopolitics, their acquisition and use vastly increased in the 1990s. An estimated 7 million weapons currently circulate in West Africa, escalating and prolonging conflicts, making them more deadly and entrenched. The ensuing culture of violence and lawlessness that is spawned by the use of these weapons hinders economic, political and social development and frustrates efforts to reconstruct societies afflicted by conflicts.\textsuperscript{23} One study on the civil war in Sierra Leone estimates that women and children account for over 80 percent of firearm-related fatalities.\textsuperscript{24}

Furthermore, for every one casualty resulting from the use of these firearms, five people are displaced. Those involved in small arms trade are often militias supported by or against the state, criminal gangs, vigilantes, and ordinary civilians who are apprehensive about the increasing inability of the state to provide them with security. Aside from gaining access to arms, children and youths in West Africa have also been recruited into fighting units. Government and rebel movements have increased their military stockpiles, recruited mercenaries or “private security companies” and created their own militias to confront their rivals.

\textsuperscript{19} An example is the Selection Trust (SLST) company, a DeBeers subsidiary that was granted a monopoly over the diamond industry in Kono, Sierra Leone, in 1934.

\textsuperscript{20} John Hirsch, Sierra Leone: Diamonds and the Struggle for Democracy (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner, 2001).


\textsuperscript{22} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{23} For information on the impact of small arms and light weapons, visit the UN Development Program’s Emergency Response Division website: http://www.undp.org/erd/small_arms.htm.

gain state power, and control and extract natural resources. Realizing the harmful effects of SALWs, West Africa led the rest of the continent in initiating efforts at large-scale disarmament. The most significant of these efforts was the Mali Flame of Peace, which led to the ECOWAS Moratorium on the Export, Import and Manufacture of Small Arms and Light Weapons of October 1998. However, this declaration of intent is yet to be translated into concrete action on the ground.

2.2 Southern Africa

Southern Africa’s political and security situation remains precarious seven years after the end of apartheid in South Africa. In addition to the twenty-five year civil war in Angola which has recently ended with the killing of UNITA leader, Jonas Savimbi, by government forces in February 2002, sporadic instability in Zimbabwe and Lesotho, the ongoing war in the Democratic Republic of Congo, which pits at least seven African armies and their internal allies against each other, HIV/AIDS has emerged as a security threat throughout the region. Moreover the region is threatened by the prospect of water conflicts in the future, an unfolding land crisis in the region beyond the current one in Zimbabwe, transnational organized crime and the proliferation of small arms.

While more Southern African states are formal democracies, they face challenges that threaten to reverse the gains made in the past few years. Since the historic democratic elections in South Africa in 1994, the subregion has been able to turn a weak defense alliance against apartheid, the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), into a regional security and development bloc, renamed the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in 1992. SADC seeks to achieve development and economic integration; promote common political values, systems and institutions; and strengthen the long-standing historical, cultural and social affinities and links among the peoples of the subregion. However, the development of this vision is shaped by the fear of most SADC countries of South Africa’s dominance, in view of the historical legacy of apartheid and the lingering memory of its destabilization policies in the region.

The Legacy of Apartheid

Any understanding of security in Southern Africa must necessarily start with the legacy of apartheid and the recognition of the near total dominance of South Africa in the subregion. Established specifically to counter economic and political dominance by apartheid South Africa, SADC’s creation in 1992 signaled a shift from defense against apartheid to regional cooperation. However, the specter of the South African economic and military giant continues to affect security dynamics within SADC. Tensions between South Africa and its neighbors revolve around market liberalization—the degree to which Pretoria is willing to drop trade barriers with other subregional states—but more critically around democracy and peacebuilding. South Africa seeks to promote democracy in SADC but is vulnerable to charges of interference when it does so. Having played an aggressive, destabilizing military role in its subregion particularly in the 1980s under the apartheid regime, South Africa is open to charges of bullying when it intervenes in regional disputes, and to complaints of indifference when it does not.

There is also a naïve tendency on the part of many analysts to overstate South Africa’s leverage. In this view, South Africa is economically more powerful than its weaker neighbors and should be able to translate this power into political clout and leadership. While South Africa’s dominance has engendered fear, distrust and jealousy among other SADC member states, it remains a giant with serious limitations. Its government presides over a deeply divided society with acute poverty levels, making processes of domestic political

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26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
and economic transformation difficult. Although it is an emerging market and undisputed regional power, South Africa is still largely inexperienced in regional diplomacy and has a relatively weak administrative capacity.

Fragile Democratization

While many SADC states have conducted multiparty elections, pressure for greater freedom often jostles with ominous signs of growing autocracy and deep political divisions. Elections are often highly contested, and the credibility of electoral outcomes has often been questioned by opposition parties and external monitors. In some cases, this contestation is a continuation of the Cold War-era conflicts between groups such as the MPLA and UNITA in Angola and to a lesser extent Frelimo and Renamo in Mozambique. Namibia and South Africa are haunted by a legacy of racial division and the reality that major opposition parties are associated with racial minorities, notably white minorities. In other SADC countries, ruling elites have simply grafted themselves onto multiparty systems that they use to consolidate their monopoly on power, creating what Richard Joseph has called “virtual democracies.”

However, the problem of democratization in SADC goes beyond its governing elites. With the inherent weaknesses of opposition parties who often lack access to state patronage and the media, the playing field is rarely far from level. Often restricted to urban elites, opposition parties lack a social base. There is also a continuation of the culture of fear and silence, which dominated the predemocratization era. In Zambia and Zimbabwe, for example, the media, which has often been an effective source of opposition, is under constant harassment. In other cases, as in Zimbabwe, the judiciary has sought to play a countervailing role to a powerful executive, supplanting to some extent the parliamentary opposition. But recently, the executive appears to have brought the judiciary under its influence by appointing judges it considers more malleable.

Botswana’s democracy remains a rarity within the SADC region, having survived for more than three decades. However, it has yet to survive the test of the defeat of the governing party at the polls. This leaves Mauritius as the only established, consolidated democracy in Southern Africa. While its 1998 elections were marked by accusations that the Labor Party, which won a 41.5 percent plurality, had used state funds for electoral purposes, party competition remains vigorous and electoral politics are marked both by alternations of power, as governing parties are defeated at the polls, and by the building of coalitions between different parties to achieve a ruling majority.

But despite these encouraging examples, the hegemonic “party-state” appears to be the major political trend in Southern Africa. SADC’s stated commitment to democratization is uneven, as was the case with the admission of the DRC into the club. The absence of democracy and consequent tensions in the DRC and Swaziland and continuing instability in Zimbabwe and Lesotho, illustrate the degree to which formal democratization in the SADC subregion remains fragile. The weakness of party systems and continued conflicts are symptomatic of a deeper problem: formal democracy is yet to translate into popular participation and good governance. So far, many rulers practice “façades” of democracy, denying their populations civil liberties and democratic freedoms.

2.3 Central Africa

The dynamics of conflict in the Great Lakes region—Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda and Eastern Congo—have, over the last seven years, been painstakingly

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documented in a number of studies. These conflicts are complex and involve a multiplicity of interlocking regional and international forces that mitigate or fuel conflicts, thus complicating peacemaking efforts. The war in Burundi and tensions in Rwanda continue in spite of several peacemaking efforts and the temporary truce under UN supervision in the DRC. In this subregion, the epicenter of conflict is constantly shifting from one country to another. In 1993 it was Burundi, where more than 200,000 people have since died; in 1994 it moved to Rwanda, where a genocide left an estimated one million dead; in 1996, it moved to Burundi and the DRC, where an estimated 2.5 million people have reportedly died since August 1998. The war in the DRC has spawned more than 600,000 refugees and two million internally displaced persons.

Insecurity in Congo-Brazzaville also continues to affect security in the DRC. In October 1997, rebel forces loyal to the former Congolese leader General Denis Sassou-Nguesso seized control of Brazzaville, effectively ending a four-month revolt against the elected government of Pascal Lissouba. Sassou-Nguesso, who had ruled the country between 1979 and 1992, became its new leader. France and Angola had reportedly supported Nguesso’s power grab by providing him with military and logistical assistance. The war in Congo-Brazzaville left an estimated 10,000 people dead, and spawned 40,000 refugees and 500,000 internally displaced persons. Renewed violence erupted in October 1998 in the Pool region around Brazzaville, involving various militias (notably Sassou-Nguesso’s “Ninjas” and his military rival Kolélas’ “Cobras”), resulting in another 1,000 deaths. The ripples of the DRC conflict have reverberated throughout Central Africa. As the civil war in Angola escalated, the government recalled thousands of troops previously fighting in the Congo. In Zimbabwe, the political and economic costs of military involvement (estimated at U.S.$1 million a day) aroused a violent antiwar movement by a broad section of civil society (trade unions, human rights organizations and religious groups). In Congo-Brazzaville, the pro-UNITA rebel forces (pro-Lissouba and pro-Koléla militias) stepped up the war against the Nguesso regime, so that by December 1998 over 25,000 people had died in Brazzaville alone, while about 500,000 were displaced within the country.

SADC’s ability to provide a framework for addressing these conflicts has been constrained by differences between Zimbabwe and South Africa on the DRC. Military clashes between Uganda and Rwanda in the DRC have not only damaged their alliance, but also threaten to spark off a wider arms race and greater regional instability. The security dynamics in Central Africa have to be understood within the context of four main factors: ethnicity and political governance; the economic factors fueling conflicts; the geopolitical interests of various actors; and the regional responses to the conflicts.

Ethnicity and Political Governance

As elsewhere in Africa, bad governance and ethnic politics have accentuated conflicts in Central Africa. In Rwanda and Burundi, conflict revolves around the


33 Rather than the generally accepted estimate of 800,000 deaths (or 850,000 according to Gerard Prunier, “Burundi: Descent into Chaos or Manageable Crisis?” Writenet Country Papers, 1995, pp. 261–265), we have retained the figure of 1 million deaths given by Philippe Gaillard, chief delegate, International Committee of the Red Cross, Rwanda, 1993–1994, confirmed by Charles Petrie, deputy coordinator of the UN Rwanda Emergency Office. See also Linda Melvern, A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda’s Genocide (London: Zed Books, 2000), pp. 222–223.

34 Angola was concerned about the alleged support Lissouba was giving to the rebel UNITA movement.
ethnic differences between the Tutsi and Hutu, which translates into the politics of inclusion and exclusion. Apart from promoting unequal access to opportunities, ethnicity in the two countries has enabled ethnic minorities to control the state and its resources. In Rwanda, the failure of the Hutu government to accommodate members of the Tutsi ethnic group resulted in the genocide of 1994. In Burundi, the fear of Hutu dominance—interpreted as Tutsi exclusion and possible annihilation—has often stalled the implementation of peace accords. To remain in power, regimes rely on violence to regulate internal political and other differences and to erect structures that exclude and marginalize sections of society. In Zaire, Mobutu Sese Seko failed to resolve the crisis of citizenship relating to Congolese of Rwandese descent (Banyamulenge), giving rise to a rebellion that swept Laurent Kabila to power in 1997. In turn, Kabila failed to address the same question, triggering the rebellion in Eastern Congo, which many observers believe contributed to his assassination in January 2001.

Democracy has historically been under siege in this subregion. As the cases of Prince Louis Rwagasore and Melchior Ndadaye in Burundi and Patrice Lumumba and Laurent Kabila in Congo clearly illustrate, democratically elected leaders have been assassinated or forcefully removed from power by the military. The Congolese state has been unable to exert authority throughout the entire country largely because of its sheer size (2.3 million square kilometers). Consequently, the concentration of state power in Kinshasa has reduced the authority of the state in the outlying provinces and administrative regions and eroded its legitimacy. This is especially true in Eastern Congo, which has cultural and historical ties with Rwanda and Burundi. In contrast to the DRC, the small size of Rwanda and Burundi has ensured an excessive presence of the state and its capacity to suppress its opponents. The narrow economic base of both countries, a fact tied to their geographical size and landlocked status, has sharpened political and ethnic cleavages. Competition for land, resources and government control of the major cash crops has constantly fueled rural population disaffection, a situation accentuated by the introduction of Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) in the 1980s. Attempts at restoring peace to Central Africa will have to address the question of democratization and governance. The assassination of Laurent Kabila and his replacement as Congolese head of state by his son, Joseph Kabila, in January 2001 has been viewed by many as the removal of a major stumbling block to the implementation of the Lusaka accord of 1999. However, peacemakers must keep in mind that there remain

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factions in the Congo conflict who view the implementation of the accord as threatening their own short-term interests. The failure to secure a peace agreement following marathon negotiations between the DRC’s factions in South Africa’s Sun City in March 2002, underlined this point.

The Scramble for Resources in DR-Congo

A second feature defining conflicts in Central Africa is the myriad interests tied to the DRC’s huge natural resources that has earned it the French characterization of scandale géologique. These include minerals like diamonds, gold, silver, iron, zinc, copper, cobalt, columbite-tantalite, cadmium, manganese, bauxite, uranium, radium and timber. These vast resources have become even more valuable in the context of the current world financial crisis. Eastern Congo is home to some of the richest columbite-tantalite (coltan) deposits in the world, a mineral whose price skyrocketed to U.S.$200 a pound at the end of 2000.

As in West Africa, natural resources in Central Africa are instrumental to the war economy. Since the colonial era, both state and private actors have competed for access to the Congo’s mineral wealth. Internally, both the government and rebel movements use income from the sale of gold, diamonds, timber and coffee to acquire weapons, recruit troops, gain military support and finance their war efforts. Regional states involved in the Congo war are extracting resources found in areas under their control. For example, in the first quarter of 2000, Uganda and Rwanda became leading exporters of diamond and copper, despite not producing these resources domestically. A Swiss government secret report revealed that over the last three years, the sales of world coltan reached a total of U.S.$90 million, a small portion of which was retained by the Rwandese military and other foreign intermediaries. In seeking to restore peace to Central Africa and particularly to the DRC, the issue of access to and exploitation of mineral resources to fund and promote conflicts will have to be addressed.

Geopolitical Interests

One of the hallmarks of the conflict in the DRC is its regional character. In addition to the 55,000-strong Forces Armées Congolaises (FAC), 62,000 foreign troops from six African countries (Rwanda: 20,000; Burundi: 15,000; Zimbabwe: 11,000; Uganda: 10,000; Angola: 4,000; and Namibia: 2,000) have been involved in this conflict. This war is between two regional alliances: the “Great Lakes” alliance consisting of Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi is pitted against the alliance of Angola, Zimbabwe, and Namibia. Rwanda claims that it has intervened in the Congo to confront the military threat posed by the Hutu-dominated Interahamwe militia, which fled into exile in Eastern Congo after the 1994 genocide. The evolving détente in the Congo in 2001 sent a wave of Rwandese Interahamwe militiamen fleeing back to Rwanda, accompanied by Mai Mai fighters from the Congo. Like Rwanda, Uganda argues that its presence in the Congo is motivated by its security interests, particularly the threat posed by United Democratic Front (UDF) fighters who operate out of Eastern Congo. Rwanda and Uganda have since fallen out and their troops clashed militarily several times in the Congolese town of Kisangani between 1999 and 2001.

Citing similar security interests as Uganda and Rwanda, Angola explained its involvement in the war as part of its strategy to deny Jonas Savimbi’s UNITA military bases in the DRC. Angola, Burundi, Uganda, and Rwanda complain that their national security was compromised by the inability of the government in Kinshasa to secure its borders. More importantly, the involvement of these countries is linked organically to the rebel groups in the DRC. The Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo (MLC), led by Jean-Pierre Bemba and based in the Équateur province, was supported by Uganda; the Congolese Rally for Democracy.

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Part Two: The Nature and Dynamics of Conflict in Africa

(Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie/RCD) has been supported by Rwanda and Uganda at various times. The RCD split into two factions in March 1999: the RCD-Kisangani (or ML) faction, led by Wamba dia Wamba, and the RCD-Goma, based in Eastern Congo, supported by Rwanda, and led by Jean-Pierre Ondekanke. A Congolese Liberation Front (Front Congolais de Libération/FCL) unifying the MLC and RCD-Goma factions (excluding the RCD-Kisangani) has recently been created. Uganda is reportedly now backing a splinter group called the RCD-ML. Thus, strong regional security interests and ambitions often pursued through local rebel movements and regional militia groups have regionalized the civil conflict in the DRC.

Closely tied to the multiplication of rebel groups in Central Africa is the flow of small and light arms in this subregion from diverse sources such as South Africa, France, Eastern Europe, China, North Korea and the United States. Besides the weak regulations of the international arms trade and the unwillingness of arms-trading nations to enforce certification regulations stringently, the mushrooming of “private” militias has made it difficult to control and regulate the proliferation and use of arms in Central Africa. Another important issue in Central Africa’s wars is the child soldier (kadogo) phenomenon. In Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and the DRC, children compose a large percentage of rebel armies and militia groups, generating a whole range of concerns related to protection, demobilization, rehabilitation and retraining, that need to be part of any successful peacebuilding strategy.

Beyond Central Africa, the interests of external powers such as France, Belgium, and the United States are critical in shaping the dynamics of conflicts in Central Africa. France was a patron of several regimes like Zaire and Rwanda in the region until the mid-1990s. Its responsibility in the Rwanda genocide of 1994 has been firmly established. France supplied arms to, and trained, the Rwandese army during the 1990-1994 civil war. It was also instrumental in Operation Touquoise, which provided safe passage for government soldiers and Interahamwe militia to flee to Goma, Bukavu and Uvira in the DRC. France propped up the Mobutu regime until it fell in 1997, even after former Mobutu backers such as the United States and Belgium had cut off support. More broadly, the international community has been widely criticized for its failure to prevent or meaningfully address the genocide in 1994 as well as the escalation of conflict in Burundi. France, Belgium, and the United States warmed up to Joseph Kabila’s government, and Washington provided $10 million in humanitarian aid to Congo. In 2000, the UN authorized a 5,537-strong peacekeeping force to the DRC (later reduced to 3,000), signaling a willingness to engage in limited peacekeeping. However, such a force is unlikely to have the capacity to restore order to an entity the size of Western Europe.

Regional Responses to Conflicts

The Great Lakes region does not have an established institutionalized framework for dealing with security

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44 Ibid.
The Infrastructure of Peace in Africa

Amidst these institutional weaknesses and personality clashes, regional efforts at trying to resolve the DRC conflict have been largely ad hoc. While agreements have been brokered, namely the Arusha Peace Accord for Rwanda in 1993, the Lusaka Accord for the DRC in 1999 and the Peace and Reconciliation Accord for Burundi in 1999, these agreements have not resolved any of the three conflicts. Thus, in spite of the 1993 Arusha accord, Rwanda descended into genocide in 1994. In Burundi, sanctions imposed by regional states between 1996 and 1999 entrenched a small political, business and military elite, and resulted in a hardening of positions and the stalling of the implementation of the peace accord. Likewise, the implementation of the Lusaka accord of 1999 remains stalled.

The Lusaka Agreement of 1999 proposed both military and political measures to bring peace to the Congo. In particular, the accord entrusted the task of policing the disengagement of forces to the warring parties. This is to be done under the auspices of a Joint Military Commission (JMC), composed of two representatives from each party and a neutral OAU-appointed chairman reporting to a Political Committee consisting of the Foreign and Defense ministers of the warring parties. Lusaka also called for a National Dialogue that would set the stage for a new political dispensation in the Congo. A preparatory meeting held in Botswana between 22 and 23 August 2001 agreed that the Inter-Congolese Dialogue would begin on 15 October 2001 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. This meeting brought together, for the first time, all Congolese political and armed factions. Although the dialogue was convened as scheduled, it was adjourned following disputes over procedures and representation. In a dramatic reversal of the late Laurent Kabila's demand for the unconditional withdrawal of all foreign troops from the Congo and refusal to recognize the rebels as equal negotiating parties, his son, Joseph, agreed to participate in the inter-Congolese peace dialogue before the withdrawal of foreign troops from the Congo. As earlier noted, this protracted meeting took place in South Africa in May 2002, but failed to secure an agreement on power-sharing among all the DRC's factions. Central Africa's major security challenge remains the implementation of the Lusaka accord. Without peace in the DRC, there can be no peace in the region.

2.4 The Horn of Africa

In defining the security dynamics of the Horn of Africa, a subregion comprising Djibouti, Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, and Somalia, John Haberson observed: “this region is in the process of redefining the fundamentals that relate to the social contract and who should govern. The region reveals an overlap of differing, sometimes conflicting governance systems, reinforcing the interdependence of the security system as well as posing critical challenges to regional peace.” Apart from being embroiled themselves in intra- and interstate conflicts, the majority of countries on the Horn of Africa lack substantive capacity to deal with many of the long-standing conflicts in the subregion.

52 Discussions at the meeting on “State Formation and Political Identities in the Horn of Africa” on 6 April 2001.
Part Two: The Nature and Dynamics of Conflict in Africa

Compared to Central or West Africa, the Horn of Africa has meager natural resources, though Sudan is increasingly becoming a major oil producer in Africa. Lying on the southern part of the Sahara and dependent largely on rain-fed agriculture, the subregion is under constant threat of famine and drought. Thus, conflict over access to limited natural resources—water, land and pasture—has been part of the history of the Horn.\(^{53}\) The context of conflict changed dramatically under colonialism.\(^{54}\) Ethnic communities were either arbitrarily split or lumped together with other disparate groups in new states with little regard to their wishes;\(^{55}\) often resulting in states with little sense of national identity or unity.\(^{56}\) To consolidate national unity, governments resorted to strategies of centralizing political and economic power and suppressing pluralism. In the Horn, as elsewhere in Africa, the centralized state disrupted and marginalized outlying areas. In the marginal parts of Uganda, Kenya, Somalia, or Ethiopia, people either view the state as an alien entity or refer to it in the past tense. Nonetheless, the nature and dynamics of conflicts in this subregion have changed significantly since the end of the Cold War. This change revolves around three main factors: the legacy of the superpower rivalry; the proliferation of small arms and light weapons; and the forced migration of populations.

The Legacy of the Superpower Rivalry

The Horn of Africa was an arena of superpower rivalry that buttressed tyranny and dictatorships. Both the United States and the Soviet Union armed client regimes in this area without regard to their despotic tendencies. Conversely, governments in the Horn switched masters at will, leading to arms race, the presence of Cuban troops in Ethiopia and of a U.S. base and British troops in Kenya, and a proliferation of armed conflicts in places like Sudan, Somalia and Ethiopia. The end of the Cold War consequently had serious security implications for the Horn of Africa. Having depended on the support of the superpowers to stay in power, subregional leaders like Somalia's Siad Barre and Ethiopia's Mengistu Haile Mariam faced internal challenges and regime collapse with the end of the Cold War. Moreover, as many donor governments used aid to pressure recipient states to democratize, others redirected their aid to states deemed to have achieved some economic or political success, like South Africa, Botswana, and Ghana. As UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan noted: “Without external economic and political support, few African regimes could sustain the economic lifestyles to which they had become accustomed, or maintain the permanent hold on political power which they had come to expect.”\(^{57}\)

Prolonged economic crises eroded the resource base of many governments in East Africa and diminished the ability of several regimes to maintain an administrative presence in much of their territories.\(^{58}\) Dictatorships such as those of Barre in Somalia and Mengistu in Ethiopia collapsed in the early 1990s, precipitating civil wars and in Somalia, withering away the state. From 1991, internal tensions rocked Kenya under the

\(^{53}\) Katsuyoshi Fukui and John Markakis (eds.), Ethnicity and Conflict in the Horn of Africa (London: James Currey, 1994).

\(^{54}\) Although Ethiopia was not colonized, it nevertheless experienced similar symptoms, as did other African countries, and embraced a Eurocentric way of organizing its state and society. Emperor Haile Selassie consulted with Europeans on how to “modernize” the Ethiopian society and economy. This led to the neglect of traditional ways and systems. The Marxist-Leninist ideology introduced by the Mengistu Haile-Selassie government was not better: it introduced a central state with a foreign agenda, borrowed from outside. This system became autocratic, suffocated traditional systems and transformed Ethiopia into a fertile ground for Cold War superpower rivalry. As in other African countries, after the Cold War, Ethiopian was in need of reconstruction but without a strong central state.

\(^{55}\) Sudan is the epitome of this tragedy, characterized by the longest ongoing civil war in Africa.

\(^{56}\) This was the fate that befell the Somali people, who found themselves dispersed in three countries: Kenya, Djibouti and Ethiopia. This phenomenon formed the basis of Somali nationalism and irrendentist movements, which pervades the entire Horn of Africa.


\(^{58}\) For instance, many analysts believe that the Ethiopian famine of 1974 was the main factor in the overthrow of Emperor Haile Selassie's government and the ensuing violence.
autocratic leadership of Daniel Arap Moi. The ray of hope that accompanied the settlement of the Eritrean question following a successful independence referendum in 1993 quickly dimmed as an interstate war broke out between Ethiopia and Eritrea five years later which lasted for two years. In the Sudan, divisions within militias in the South, the reimposition of Sharia law by Khartoum in 1998 and the simmering conflict over recently discovered oil resources have intensified the civil war between the predominantly Muslim North and the largely Christian and animist South.

Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons

The second main feature in the process of state collapse and the withdrawal of the superpowers from Africa has been the militarization of populations, accompanied by the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. From Northern Uganda and Southern Sudan to Ethiopia, militias and rebel movements fighting central governments are often as well equipped as the state. Even Kenya, which is widely perceived to be a strong state, has been affected by this phenomenon. In response, governments in the Horn of Africa have been acquiring more arms, ostensibly to deal with security threats. Rather than ensuring security and generating peace, this arms buildup has instead accelerated the proliferation of arms and increased tensions and conflicts. The ability of states to subdue or hold militias accountable for arms proliferation has greatly diminished. The flow of arms and proliferation of militias have important implications for interstate relations on the Horn of Africa. As Somalia continues to be a conduit for arms, the historically close military ties between Kenya and Ethiopia are under increasing threat. The presence of the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) in northern Kenya and southern Ethiopia has also adversely affected this defense axis. While militias continue to accumulate arms, the ability of subregional states to expand their arsenals is sometimes curtailed by international pressure to reduce military expenditures. In contrast, insurgents are able to replenish their arms with resources from looted food aid and external remittances from ethnic diasporas.

Prolonged insurgency on the Horn of Africa has inevitably multiplied the number of people skilled in the use of firearms, destabilized societies, led to the breakdown of the rule of law, disrupted lives and escalated violence and insecurity in urban and rural areas. Rural violence takes the form of banditry and cattle rustling in the Rift Valley province of Kenya and the Karamojong region in Uganda. In sedentary communities, insurgent activities affect agriculture, the mainstay of most economies in the region. In Northern Uganda, insurgency has rendered production difficult. These developments have resulted in the steady fragmentation of the institutional basis of state power in many parts of the Horn of Africa.

Forced Displacement

The Horn of Africa has generated more than a quarter of Africa's six million registered refugees. In addition to refugees, all countries in the Horn of Africa have a large number of internally displaced persons. Sudan alone has generated four million internally displaced persons, the largest in the world. Although accurate

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59 This situation is explained in terms of the breakdown of state mechanisms in Somalia, but also in terms of the inability of the government in Kenya to control arm flows. Interview with Professor John J. Okumu, a scholar of governance issues and security in Kenya, 11 September 2000.

60 By 1988, the Ethiopian government was spending 50 percent of its revenue and 15 percent of its GDP for military purposes. See Christopher Clapham, "The Political Economy of Conflict in the Horn of Africa," Survival 32, no. 5, September/October 1990, p. 410–411. In the same vein, one of most difficult areas in Uganda’s relations with external donors is its military expenditure. Since 1997, the World Bank and IMF have consistently argued that Uganda's military expenditure is disproportionate to its resources and affects allocation to other sectors.

61 Principally this takes the form of relief aid, which is increasingly being linked to war economies.

62 Remittances come from an increasing number of exiles from conflict-affected states. In addition to remittances, exiles are regularly taxed by “their” governments. An Eritrean who lives and works in Washington, D.C., noted in April 2000, that when the war broke out between Eritrea and Ethiopia, Eritreans met and collected some U.S.$5 million to support the war effort.

63 In addition, there is a substantial number of unregistered refugees who fall outside this number.
figures are difficult to obtain, the generalized violence within these countries has led to large-scale militarization of civilian populations. Indeed the fast-growing proliferation of small arms and light weapons is linked directly to this movement within and across borders.

A large proportion of the populations of IGAD states are nomadic pastoralists who constantly migrate across national borders. Environmental pressure has intensified competition for access to limited natural resources such as common pasture and watering points among these communities. Over time, conflicts over these resources have generated cycles of violence as communities that suffer attack, regroup, and carry out retaliation against their aggressors. To minimize casualties in what has become part of their coping strategies, communities engage in large-scale migration and evacuation operations when tensions between various groups begin to escalate. Such migration often involves crossing international borders, and has sometimes sparked off interstate tensions.

For example, the spread of Somali populations across the Horn of Africa has provided sanctuaries to same clans across borders beyond the reach of the jurisprudence of national governments. The case of the Oromo Liberation Movement (OLM), which is supported by communities in both northern Kenya and Ethiopia is another case in point. These linkages are critical to understanding the generalized violence and culture of impunity that characterize this subregion. Having assessed the nature and dynamics of conflicts in four African regions, we will now analyze the peacebuilding capacity of regional and subregional organizations in Africa.
Part Three: Assessing the Peacebuilding Capacity of Regional and Subregional Organizations in Africa

During the 1990s, Africa’s regional and subregional organizations were forced to create security mechanisms in a bid to manage local conflicts. Their efforts took on particular urgency following the growing lack of interest by external actors, particularly by the powerful members of the UN Security Council, to contribute to peacekeeping missions in Africa after the debacles in Somalia (1993) and Rwanda (1994). While regional cooperation is not new in Africa, as exemplified by the Organization of African Unity, which was created in 1963, its focus is shifting in the post-Cold War era from politics and economics to security. Most regional intergovernmental organizations in Africa were established to address economic and social issues. Many of these organizations have, however, revised their mandates to incorporate one of the most pervasive challenges facing Africa: conflict management. This trend became prevalent in the 1990s as regional and subregional organizations embarked on expanding and restructuring their capacity, membership and mandate to accommodate new functions in the field of conflict management, resolution and prevention.

This section assesses the performance of seven of Africa’s intergovernmental organizations, namely the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the East African Community (EAC). These institutions have all sought to play a role in preventing conflicts, and sometimes in making, keeping, and enforcing peace. Their operations carry a certain amount of political weight and legitimacy, critical in managing or resolving conflicts. Unlike external actors, these organizations are made up of countries from the same subregion that share much in common, in terms of development, economic needs, peace and security, they, therefore, tend to have more at stake in managing conflicts. Regional political institutions also enjoy the advantage of having deep knowledge of their region, a useful attribute when managing conflicts of a regional character.

But regional and subregional mechanisms have also revealed political divisions, and there have been accusations that subregional actors have used these mechanisms to launch military interventions in pursuit of their parochial national interests. These mechanisms are being established on an ad hoc basis and reveal profound institutional weaknesses. Reflecting this reality, subregional organizations have different structures and stress different issues in line with the specific security needs of each subregion. In view of their unique experiences and regional differences, it would be erroneous to presume that there is a single model or linear pattern of institutional development that each African regional and subregional organization should follow. These security mechanisms are in their formative stages and still need to develop a wide range of capacities to deal with the ever changing dynamics of conflicts and crises in their respective subregions. All of Africa’s subregional organizations lack the financial, logistical and military resources to undertake effective military interventions. In West and Southern Africa, where potential hegemons like Nigeria and South Africa might have compensated for these constraints, military interventions by these two states have been questioned and their leadership claims challenged by other states in their subregions. Further, both Nigeria and South Africa must themselves tackle serious domestic socioeconomic problems. We next turn to the peacebuilding role of the OAU and subregional organizations in Africa.

3.1 The Organization of African Unity (OAU)

In a 1990 Declaration, the OAU Heads of State and Government recognized that the prevalence of conflicts in Africa was seriously impeding their collective and individual efforts to deal with the continent’s economic problems. Consequently, they resolved to work together toward the peaceful and rapid resolution of conflicts. During the OAU summit held in Cairo in
1993, African leaders established a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (MCPMR). In doing so, they recognized that the presence of peace and stability is a necessary precondition for social and economic development.

From the outset, the issue of peacekeeping, upon which the Mechanism was predicated, was controversial. It was widely felt within the OAU political leadership that peace and security were the preserve of the United Nations, which is mandated to keep peace globally and possesses more resources than the OAU. The OAU narrowly defined its objective as that of primarily anticipating and preventing conflicts; it left large-scale peacekeeping to the UN and Africa’s subregional organizations. Specifically, the continental body identified three aims: first, to anticipate and prevent situations of potential conflict from developing into full-blown wars; second, to undertake peacemaking and peacebuilding efforts if full-blown conflicts should arise; and third, to carry out peacemaking and peacebuilding activities in postconflict situations. While this initiative thrust the OAU into the center of conflict management efforts in Africa, the reality is that the pan-African organization has yet to become a principal player in peace processes in Africa.

The OAU Mechanism has yet to overcome several financial, organizational and mandate-related limitations that have dogged its operation since its inception. A Peace Fund was created to serve as a financial reserve for its peacemaking efforts, raising hopes that the OAU Mechanism would overcome the financial woes that had plagued the organization in the first three decades of its existence. Between 1996 and 2001, the Peace Fund was able to mobilize an average of U.S.$1 million per annum from African and external sources. However, three factors have hampered the effectiveness of the Mechanism. First, the conflict management needs of the continent by far outweigh the resources of the OAU Peace Fund. Second, the failure of member states to meet their financial obligations to the OAU has adversely affected the work of the Mechanism. Third, there is a growing realization that if the OAU Mechanism is to be successful, the Peace Fund must be revamped and financed on a regular basis.

The OAU Conflict Management Center has three units: the Early Warning Systems Unit, Regional Desk Officers, and the Field Operations Unit, manned by four professional staff and seventeen consultants. While this staff is expected to undertake political analysis, monitor developments across the continent and write reports drawing lessons from different subregions, they are not required to have specific training in conflict management and resolution. Their qualifications range from international relations, social work and political economy, to psychology and urban planning. Staff at the OAU Center acquire specialized skills through attending different training programs, conferences and workshops. However, this staff is overstretched due to two factors. First, the Center lacks a strategy for optimal utilization of available human resources; and second, the Center has been experiencing a steady reduction of staff as part of the OAU’s ongoing restructuring program. Although the UN Development Program (UNDP) had been contracted to help build its capacity, the Center remains heavily reliant on consultants.

The operational arm of the OAU Conflict Management Center is its Early Warning System, which has a research database that is supposed to contain basic information on the history, politics, society, economics and potential sources of conflicts of every country in Africa. Because this information is neither up-to-date nor complete, it is not always useful for making speedy decisions. The Center also lacks sufficient computers, trained personnel and experts to collect and analyze early warning information. Compared to similar systems that the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) has developed, the OAU’s Early Warning System remains underdeveloped. Its situation room, where most data is collected, relies heavily on Western media sources such as CNN, Reuters, and the

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BBC. Yet, it is clear that these sources are not always up-to-date, credible, or insightful on African conflicts in Africa. While the OAU does organize workshops on the role of the media in conflict management, it has yet to embrace African media as a valuable tool in its early warning mechanism.

Despite these deficiencies, the OAU has the potential to coordinate the evolving early warning systems in Africa’s various subregions. It can act as an information bank with subregional desks or other alternative systems where information about the activities of each subregion and its organizations can be coordinated. This would facilitate information exchange, and could potentially enhance intervention strategies and result in early warning innovations within Africa. The UNDP’s capacity-building project with the OAU Conflict Management Center has identified three urgent needs for its Early Warning System. The first is an information system capable of analyzing conflict indicators on a continuous basis. To enhance this system, the OAU could set up regional desks linking its work with those of subregional organizations and civil society actors. Second, the OAU Center needs personnel with sufficient skills and experience to analyze information and data collected. The Center, at the end of 2001, had two information analysts, both of whom were consultants. But the OAU estimates that it requires seven information analysts in addition to two research analysts and two computer analysts. The need to hire and retain permanent staff is crucial to the center’s effectiveness. So far, the Center does not have a single permanent member of staff. One option for remedying this shortcoming could be to create tenured rather than contractual positions to insulate staff from political manipulation.

The third pressing need of the OAU Center involves advocacy and reaching out to civil society, universities, subregional organizations and governments. The idea would involve the organization setting up a local network linking all its offices, embassies and member states, so that they too could share information easily. After this goal has been achieved, the OAU could link up with subregional institutions and use their information sources as part of its own Early Warning System. The OAU could then develop links with African civil society actors in order to benefit from their information sources.

Another constraint to the OAU’s conflict management work is poor communication and publicity. Telephone lines frequently do not work and internet access is very limited. There has not been much publicity about the OAU’s conflict management efforts because the organization lacks the means to publicize its work effectively. Interviewees at the OAU Secretariat in Addis Ababa also noted that there is little cooperation within OAU departments and between its different divisions. The OAU could potentially serve as a focal point for putting pressure on African states and the international community to give more weight to conflict management efforts on the continent. The OAU office in New York could potentially serve as a link between the organization, the UN, and international organizations working in the field of conflict management. The OAU could also organize a website to popularize its activities and to overcome the difficulty of publicizing its work, especially the activities of its Conflict Management Mechanism.

But despite these problems, the OAU Mechanism is not without achievements. Since its creation in 1993, the Mechanism has been able to intervene in matters that previously would have been considered as purely “internal.” In its work, the OAU Conflict Management Center has used a range of preventive tools including applying political pressure, issuing regular statements, endorsing sanctions against military regimes and undertaking direct mediation between parties. To its credit, the OAU has dispatched special envoys to areas recently ravaged by conflict, such as Burundi and Comoros, while its former Secretary-General, Salim Ahmed Salim, worked with his UN counterpart, Kofi Annan, to mediate the Eritrea/Ethiopia and DRC conflicts. The OAU has also deployed fact-finding missions to Rwanda and the DRC and observer missions to Rwanda, Burundi, and Comoros.66 Most of these missions have had mixed results. While the observer missions were inadequate for the tasks...
required, they nonetheless enabled the OAU to begin establishing a credible presence in the area of conflict management in Africa. Furthermore, the OAU set up an International Panel of Eminent Personalities to investigate the events surrounding the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, which published a detailed report that offered lessons for avoiding the failures of Rwanda in the future.67

However, key provisions of the OAU Charter continue to hamper its actions. Specifically, some member states continue to view sovereignty as sacrosanct, placing severe constraints on the OAU’s scope of action and room for maneuver. If the OAU Mechanism is to become effective, it must urgently address this issue. Furthermore, owing to its limited capacity to mount full-scale peacekeeping operations, the OAU should seriously consider participating in UN peacekeeping activities. One proposal that has often been made to the OAU is that it should take up the responsibility of coordinating and supporting African participation in UN peacekeeping initiatives.68 Such responsibility could entail creating and maintaining a roster of African troops available for UN peacekeeping operations in Africa and organizing regular meetings of African Chiefs of Staff to improve the coordination of UN peacekeeping operations in Africa.

The OAU could also coordinate the development of common standards of operations among African armies, facilitate the joint training of African forces for peacekeeping, and develop a common pool of logistical, communication and transportation equipment to be used in peacekeeping operations in Africa.69 To enhance its capacity to defuse and resolve conflicts, the OAU needs to explore ways of working with other conflict management institutions within and beyond Africa. Some peacekeeping cooperation currently exists between the OAU, the UN and Africa’s subregional organizations. The OAU and UN worked together in Rwanda following the Arusha accord in 1993. In the DRC, the OAU deployed observers throughout the country, even in areas where the UN was reluctant to deploy.

The joint deployment of UN and OAU peacekeepers in the Ethiopia/Eritrea mission could provide a model of successful cooperation between these two organizations. In 2001, the UN and OAU jointly deployed peacekeepers who have been cooperating in monitoring the cease-fire between Ethiopia and Eritrea. The UN deployed a mission of 4,200 soldiers, while the OAU sent a contingent of eleven soldiers. To ensure coherence of action between the OAU and the UN, coordination meetings are held weekly in Addis Ababa and Asmara. In Asmara, these meetings are conducted within the framework of the Commission for the Coordination of UN Peacekeeping, a focal point created to deal with all matters related to the peace agreement.70 A critical lesson of this mission is the importance of establishing a clear division of labor between the UN, the OAU and Africa’s subregional organizations.71

On 9 July 2001, the OAU took the decision to transform itself into a continental African Union (AU), following the signing and ratification by fifty Heads of State and Government, of the constitutive act of the Africa Union in Lusaka, Zambia.72 However, it remains to be seen whether the AU will build on the capacity of its

71 See ibid.
72 The process did not actively involve regional organizations and African civil society actors, reminiscent of the OAU’s old habit of excluding nonstate actors from its deliberations.
Involved in the Liberian Civil War

African Parliament and provides for an Economic and Cultural Commission. Revitalizing the OAU/AU will require political will and commitment to address conflicts in Africa. A strong institutional structure and more financial and logistical resources will also be needed to facilitate decisionmaking.

3.2 The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)

Conceived as an organization for promoting economic development, ECOWAS was untested in the 1970s when West Africa experienced relative calm akin to a Pax West Africana. Guinea-Bissau’s war of liberation ended in 1974, while brief border clashes between Burkina Faso and Mali in 1975 and 1985 were managed through local mediation efforts. However, insecurity began to loom large with the outbreak of the Liberian civil war in December 1989. In July 1990, invoking the Protocol on Mutual Assistance on Defense (1981), Liberian autocrat Samuel Doe requested ECOWAS to send a peacekeeping force to Liberia to end a civil war that had led to mass killings and massive refugee flows. ECOMOG’s intervention would profoundly change the security landscape in West Africa.

ECOMOG in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau

Liberia and Sierra Leone both endured almost a decade of civil wars that resulted in over 250,000 deaths and over 1 million refugees. Liberia’s civil war lasted from December 1989 to early 1997 and was mainly fought by eight factions. The Sierra Leone war lasted from March 1991 until a cease-fire in July 1999, and was fought between successive civilian and military governments in Freetown, in alliance with civil defense groups including local hunters, the Kamajors, against the RUF. It took eighteen peace agreements (fourteen in Liberia and four in Sierra Leone) to end—at least temporarily—both conflicts. ECOMOG’s involvement in Sierra Leone’s civil war was inextricably linked to its eight-year peacekeeping effort in Liberia’s civil war.

In March 1991, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) invaded Sierra Leone with the assistance of Charles Taylor’s National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL). Several hundred Nigerian, Ghanaian, and Guinean troops were sent to Sierra Leone to defend the government. A second ECOMOG mission was established in Sierra Leone after Nigerian leader, General Sani Abacha, diverted peacekeepers from the successful Liberia mission to Sierra Leone in an attempt to crush a military coup by the Sierra Leonean army in

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74 Ibid., p. 33.


Freetown in May 1997. They were later joined by contingents from Ghana, Guinea and Mali. The military junta invited the RUF to join its administration. Nigerian troops reversed the coup in February 1998 and restored President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah to power. However, the unsuccessful but devastating rebel invasion of Freetown in January 1999 showed that ECOMOG has been unable to eliminate the RUF as a military threat. In both cases, an ill-equipped and poorly funded ECOMOG has been unable to defeat the rebels in guerrilla warfare or prevent violations including rapes, killings, kidnappings and disarming of UN peacekeepers.

ECOMOG launched a third intervention into Guinea-Bissau between December 1998 and June 1999 to end the civil conflict between President João Vieira, backed by Senegalese and Guinean military forces, and his former army chief, General Ansumane Mane. The ECOMOG intervention involving troops from Benin, Gambia, Niger, and Togo, and funded entirely by the French government, failed to achieve its peacekeeping objectives and had to be withdrawn prematurely. The difficulties of peacemaking in Guinea-Bissau can be explained by three main factors. First, Guinea-Bissau's two main protagonists, Vieira and Mane, were unwilling to settle their differences through peaceful means and sought to manipulate the support of external forces. Second, Senegal and Guinea were compromised as neutral peacekeepers and had to be replaced by troops from other West African states with no prior involvement in the fighting. But the size of ECOMOG's contingent—712 men—was insufficient to protect the capital from attack and to disarm the combatants, a situation exacerbated by its logistical weaknesses. Finally, though external actors like the UN, the World Bank, the EU and several bilateral donors supported some peacebuilding efforts in Guinea-Bissau, continuing instability in the country has made donors reluctant to deliver on most of the pledges made at a conference in Geneva in May 1999.

The ECOWAS Security Mechanism

The ECOWAS Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security was adopted at the ECOWAS summit in Lomé in December 1999. The Mechanism expanded two previous subregional security initiatives: a Protocol on Non-Aggression signed in 1978, and a Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance on Defense (MAD) in 1981. The first Protocol called on members to resolve their conflicts peacefully through ECOWAS. The second promised mutual assistance for externally instigated or sponsored aggression and called for the creation of an Allied Armed Force of the Community, consisting of standby forces from ECOWAS states. The Mechanism of 1999 was also shaped by ECOMOG’s experiences in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau. This Mechanism evolved out of the activities of ECOWAS’ Standing Mediation Committee (SMC) established in 1990 following the outbreak of the civil war in Liberia.

The ECOWAS Mechanism of 1999 comprises six distinct bodies, designed to help contain and defuse impending conflicts. The first is the Mediation and Security Council, the main decisionmaking body on all matters concerning conflict prevention, peacekeeping, security and other areas of operation. It is made up of ten members who are elected to two-year terms. The second important body of the new Mechanism is the Defense and Security Commission, which examines all technical and administrative issues and assesses logistical requirements for peacekeeping operations. The Commission consists of military technocrats and advises the Mediation and Security Council on mandates, terms of reference and the appointment of Force Commanders for military missions. One pressing need of the ECOWAS Secretariat is to appoint more staff to oversee its Mechanism. Until recently, this responsibility fell largely on three overworked Legal Affairs officers. General Cheikh Diarra was appointed Deputy Executive Secretary for Political Affairs,

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Defense and Security in early 2001 and is in the process of increasing his staff.

The third body of the Mechanism is the Council of Elders, a group of eminent persons mandated to use their good offices in the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts. The Council of Elders is to consist of eminent persons from Africa and outside the continent, including women, traditional, religious, and political leaders appointed on an ad hoc basis. Seventeen of its thirty-two members met for the first time in Niamey, Niger, from 2 to 4 July 2001. The fourth body of the mechanism is the Executive Secretariat and particularly the Executive Secretary, who coordinates the activities of the various bodies of the Mechanism and the implementation of its decisions. The fifth body of the new Mechanism is the Executive Secretariat on impending signs of conflict. Finally, ECOMOG, a body that will consist of standby forces from member states, is to be the peacekeeping and monitoring arm of the Mechanism. ECOWAS’ new Mechanism also calls for improved cooperation among its members in the areas of early warning, conflict prevention, peacekeeping operations, cross-border crime, and the trafficking of small arms and narcotics. Many of these ideas were based on ECOMOG’s experiences in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau.

Since it has already undertaken three military missions, it is important to discuss ECOMOG’s military arm in more detail. The ECOWAS Mechanism calls for the establishment of a brigade-size standby force, consisting of specially trained and equipped units of national armies, ready for deployment at short notice. The force’s main tasks involve observation and monitoring, peacekeeping, humanitarian intervention, enforcement of sanctions and embargoes, preventive deployment, peacebuilding operations, disarmament and demobilization, and policing activities including anti-smuggling and anti-criminal activities. These were many of the tasks that ECOMOG performed in Liberia and Sierra Leone. The proposed subregional force is expected to embark on periodic training exercises to enhance the cohesion of the troops and the compatibility of equipment. It will undertake exchange programs in West African military training institutions, as well as external training involving the UN and OAU. Four thousand troops from Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Niger, Togo and Ghana took part in war games in the Burkinabé town of Kompienga and northern Togo in May 1998, with Nigeria involved in the military planning for these exercises.

The ECOMOG force is mandated to intervene in four cases: first, a situation of internal armed conflict within a member state; second, conflicts between two or more member states; third, internal conflicts that threaten to trigger a humanitarian disaster or pose a serious threat to subregional peace and security, and situations that result from the overthrow or threat to a democratically elected government; and fourth any other situation that the council deems “appropriate”. While the first two scenarios were included in the ECOWAS Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance on Defense of 1981, the third scenario was a conscious effort to provide legal cover for future interventions, again, based on the Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau experiences. In Liberia and Guinea-Bissau, ECOMOG intervened by arguing that the situation posed a humanitarian disaster and a threat to subregional peace and security. In Sierra Leone, ECOMOG restored a democratically elected government to power after its overthrow by soldiers. The interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone were controversial and questioned on legal grounds, even by some ECOWAS members.

The ECOMOG interventions in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau exposed the logistical weaknesses of West Africa’s armies. For the foreseeable future, such logistical support will have to come from external donors until the subregion develops its own capabilities. The issue of financing is particularly important to the building of ECOMOG’s standby force. The ECOWAS security mechanism foresees troop-contributing countries bearing financial costs for the first three months of military operations, before ECOWAS takes over the costs. The initial agreement for the ECOMOG mission in Liberia was for each contingent to fund its own troops for the first month of the mission, after which time the full ECOWAS would assume responsibility for ECOMOG. But Nigeria ended up footing about
90 percent of the costs (over U.S.$1.2 billion) while francophone countries opposed to ECOMOG were unwilling to contribute to a mission they did not support. France entirely financed the ECOMOG mission to Guinea-Bissau. Under the ECOWAS security mechanism, a Special Peace Fund is to be established to raise revenue. Funding will be raised from member states, corporate bodies, the UN, multinational organizations, the OAU and the rest of the international community.

The three ECOMOG missions demonstrated the importance of securing financial support before embarking on an intervention. Such costs can prove a disincentive to future interventions in a subregion saddled with a crippling debt burden. OAU peacekeepers from Tanzania and Uganda withdrew from ECOMOG’s mission in Liberia in 1995 in large part because their financial and logistical needs were not being met. Other ECOWAS states, like Togo, declined to contribute troops to ECOMOG due to the costs of maintaining peacekeepers in Liberia. The Nigerian-led OAU intervention force in Chad between 1979 and 1981 was forced to withdraw largely because it lacked the funding and logistical support to sustain it. All these experiences underscore the significance of financial and logistical support for future subregional efforts at conflict management.

The ECOWAS security mechanism has so far received funding from the AU and several donor governments. The OAU gave ECOWAS $300,000 for its deployments in Sierra Leone and Liberia. The European Union (EU) (2 million euros), the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) ($250,000) and the governments of the United Kingdom, Japan (U.S.$100,000) and Germany have also made contributions in support of the ECOWAS security mechanism. Canada has contributed $300,000 for the establishment of an ECOWAS Child Protection Unit. The government of the Netherlands has also expressed an interest in funding the mechanism.

Beside ECOWAS, the Mano River Union (MRU), comprised of Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone also works to resolve conflict in the region, through the Joint Security Committee (JSC), which was created at the Summit of MRU Head of State in Conakry in April 2000. The JSC Committee was born out of the need to address the deteriorating security situation along the borders of the three MRU states. The JSC consists of a Technical Committee and a Border Security, and Confidence-Building Unit, with a mandate to address and monitor joint security and border issues. One of the first tasks undertaken by the JSC was to investigate the persistent cross-border incursions between Guinea and Liberia. However, since the conclusion of this investigation, the MRU states have not been able to implement the recommendations made by the JSC, as the security situation along the borders between Liberia and Guinea has deteriorated and tensions between the two countries have increased.

A further factor complicating the resolution of the Liberia/Guinea conflict is the fact that members of the JSC are parties to the dispute. More fundamentally, political differences among ECOWAS member states, relating to disagreements over conflict management strategies, continue to test the capacity and resolve of ECOWAS to address conflicts in the subregion. ECOWAS leaders have often not spoken in unison on these issues. Although ECOWAS appeared at first to support a plan by the international community to impose sanctions on Liberia in 2001 in order to deter its support for Sierra Leonean RUF rebels, it later called for a two-month moratorium before such sanctions could be imposed. Following the imposition of sanctions on Liberia by the UN Security Council in May 2001, some ECOWAS leaders have publicly questioned the wisdom of punishing Charles Taylor.

Among these recommendations are: the end to the endemic problems of dissidents, armed groups and other paramilitary forces involved in the destabilization of states in the subregion; the implementation of the deployment of Joint Border Security and Confidence Building Units along the common borders of Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea; the facilitation of the repatriation of refugees to their respective countries of origin; the reestablishment of the free movement of goods and people; and the creation of an effective program on information education and communication on the culture of peace and the objectives of subregional integration. See the Mano River Union, Press Release, Mano River Union Joint Security Committee Meeting, 23 August 2001, http://www.sierra-leone.org/mru082301.html.
while seeking his cooperation for the disarmament of RUF rebels in Sierra Leone. We next turn to the role of SADC in managing regional conflicts.

3.3 The Southern African Development Community (SADC)

An understanding of the role of the Southern African Development Community in responding to conflicts and crises is impossible without recognizing a key feature of security in this subregion: the overwhelming military and financial preponderance of South Africa. SADC’s predecessor, the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), was established in 1980 specifically to counter the economic, military and political dominance of South Africa. While its creation symbolically signaled a shift from defense against apartheid to regional cooperation, the specter of South African economic and military power continues to affect the dynamics within SADC.

SADC set itself an ambitious regional development agenda: working toward creating a free trade area; establishing frameworks to ensure macroeconomic stability; facilitating financial and capital markets; encouraging public-private partnerships (PPPs); and building regional infrastructure. Thus far, this commitment has remained largely rhetorical. While some progress has been made on bilateral (and in rare cases multilateral) cooperation on specific issues (such as aspects of cross-border policing), progress toward regional integration remains minimal.

The entire SADC Secretariat currently stands at only fifty persons—this includes professional and support staff. SADC is therefore clearly both understaffed and overstretched. Only about five officers are directly involved in SADC’s security work. The organization envisaged that, after the completion of an ongoing restructuring process, its staff would be increased to two hundred people. But this is more a medium- to long-term goal. In the short term, SADC is aiming to increase its staff to sixty people. On the issue of funding, SADC member states, through the SADC Fund and other regional funds, are responsible for the operational costs of its Secretariat. As with other regional organizations in Africa, however, SADC members do not always pay their dues on time or in full, and eighty percent of SADC funding comes from external donors, largely from the European Union (EU).

The SADC Organ on Politics, Defense and Security

Since its creation in 1996, the SADC Organ on Politics, Defense and Security (OPDS) has not achieved much in terms of promoting collective security in the region. Its strategic vision on how to address the insecurity facing southern Africa is still undefined, and it has been wrecked by divisions among its members. The organ remains captive to the political rivalry between South Africa and Zimbabwe, countries which represented the two opposing conceptions of the functioning of the organ. Zimbabwe felt that incorporating security within the SADC Secretariat in Botswana, rather than leaving it as a specialized task for the chair in Harare, would divert the organization’s attention from its main objective of economic development and integration. In contrast, South Africa argued that the organ should be placed within the structure of the SADC and run by the SADC chair.

These differences have paralyzed the operation of the OPDS. At the SADC summit in August 1997, President Nelson Mandela of South Africa, then acting Chairman of the organization, threatened to resign from the SADC Chairmanship if the OPDS was not brought under the central SADC Chair. This dispute between Mandela and Zimbabwe’s President Robert Mugabe, who had held the chair of the SADC Organ since its creation, led the SADC summit to suspend the organ. SADC leaders then appointed a committee composed of a “troika” of Malawi, Mozambique and Namibia to...

80 Department of Foreign Affairs, South Africa, Draft discussion document on a framework for co-operation with the countries in the southern African region (Pretoria, 1997).
identify a suitable solution to this problem. The SADC Treaty provides little direction in resolving this problem since it does not contain any details about the nature and functioning of a security organ. Since 1997 SADC has struggled to find a solution to this impasse. Two main proposals emerged: first, to transform the organ into separate committees and work on an ad hoc basis to integrate the organ into the SADC framework under a deputy chairperson from one of the troika countries; and second, to operate the organ on the basis of specific protocols signed by member states. The SADC summit held in 2001 finally rotated the chairmanship of the organ from Zimbabwe to Mozambique.

With the paralysis of the organ, SADC’s Interstate Defense and Security Committee (IDSC), established in the mid-1980s, often coordinated SADC’s security efforts. SADC leaders proposed the establishment of a brigade-level standby force to which member states would contribute with units and Headquarters staff to intervene in regional conflicts. But progress on this issue has remained stalled. SADC states did, however, undertake joint military exercises called “Operation Blue Crane,” funded by EU states. SADC has also undertaken police operations involving Mozambique, South Africa, and Zambia.

The SADC organ needs to be operationalized and strengthened if the organization is to play an effective role in conflict management. Dealing with security requires addressing three main issues. First, a common vision of security must be nurtured and strengthened within SADC. This can be facilitated through the signing of defense and non-aggression pacts, promoting the protection of human rights, having a moratorium to limit arms smuggling, and creating pacts for environmental protection and the protection of vulnerable groups during conflicts. Second, the region needs to embark on institutional development at both national and subregional levels to implement and monitor the various accords established by SADC. Finally, SADC must set priorities, establish a program of action in security matters, and draw up a calendar to be ratified by national governments.82

South Africa: The Giant on the Limpopo

South Africa has the largest, most diversified and advanced economy in the region with a GDP three times that of Nigeria and Egypt.83 It possesses a modern financial and industrial sector with excellent infrastructure and accounts for some eighty percent of the region’s economic output.84 Trade flows between it and the rest of Southern Africa are disproportionately in Pretoria’s favor at a ratio of four to one. South Africa possesses the fourth largest electricity utility in the world, ESKOM, and accounts for sixty percent of Africa’s electricity generation. Its military is larger and better equipped than that of any of its neighbors, although military sophistication should not be confused with military readiness, as South Africa’s intervention in Lesotho in 1998 clearly demonstrated.

The Southern African Customs Union (SACU), which supplies some of its members with almost fifty percent of their government’s revenues, will be undermined by the newly negotiated Free Trade Pact between South Africa and the EU. Notably, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland will lose 3.5 billion Rand a year.85 The South Africa/EU pact could also have a fundamental bearing on SADC, forcing states to make substantial adjustments to cope with the new trade regime. Some analysts argue that the likely negative economic spin-offs of the agreement for Southern Africa may make it more difficult to negotiate equitable SACU and SADC economic relations.86 This situation has generated tension between South Africa and its neighbors, most of whose economies depend overwhelmingly on Pretoria. SADC states are vulner-

82 Ibid.
84 Ibid.
able to the penetration of South African capital, particularly since its democratic transition between 1990 and 1994.

This economic dominance tends to undermine a spirit of subregional cooperation within SADC, with other states expressing skepticism about Pretoria’s professions of not wanting to bully or dominate its neighbors. In the case of relations between South Africa and Zimbabwe, SADC’s second largest economy, tensions emanating from the failure of Nelson Mandela’s government between 1994 and 1999 to renew an existing bilateral preferential trade agreement contributed to an atmosphere of tension that spilled over into disputes over the chairmanship of SADC. It remains to be seen if the SADC Trade Protocol, establishing an asymmetrical Free Trade Area within the region, can help reverse the economic imbalances feeding such tensions.

The resulting tensions between South Africa and its neighbors have complicated the attempt by this subregion to cooperate in managing and resolving conflicts that have affected its member states in places like Angola, DRC and Lesotho. SADC continues to confront problems in its efforts at extending democracy, maintaining peace, and strengthening weak states. In recent times, attempts to address these challenges have tended to highlight divisions and rivalries among SADC members. South Africa has also experienced challenges from regional rivals like Zimbabwe and Angola.

SADC: A House Balkanized?

Southern Africa is a deeply divided subregion, a situation that threatens stability in the SADC subregion. These tensions and threats have forced SADC to prioritize political cooperation and conflict resolution over economic integration. The most striking example is the war in the DRC, following its admission to SADC in 1997, which has polarized SADC. Although SADC states remain theoretically committed to cooperation, their solidarity and cohesion is frayed and may be beyond repair, at least in the short term. The conflict in the DRC has split SADC into at least three groupings.

The first group consists of countries seen as the proponents of democracy in SADC: South Africa, Botswana, and Mozambique. Apart from their democratic credentials, these states are bound by close economic relationships. While this group of states has as its objective the promotion of democracy, respect for human rights and the political settlement of disputes, their pursuit of these goals is inhibited by fear of domination by South Africa and the failure to build an effective regional coalition. These states declined to support military engagement in the Congo, arguing that only an inclusive political settlement could resolve the conflict, a theme often repeated by Pretoria in its response to African conflicts. However, South Africa and Botswana intervened militarily in Lesotho in 1998, reviving, despite Botswana’s participation in the exercise, fears of South Africa’s “giantism” and accusations of “double standards” from rival SADC camps, given Pretoria’s refusal to intervene militarily in Congo.

The second group of countries consists of Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Angola—states that intervened militarily in the DRC to prevent the toppling of Laurent Kabila by Ugandan- and Rwandan-backed rebels in 1998. These three countries seem to be united by what they perceive to be the continuation of South Africa’s apartheid policies. This is illustrated by Zimbabwe’s claim that after ten years of fighting in Mozambique alongside Frelimo against the apartheid regime, South Africa is reaping the benefits of peace by securing large investments in that country. Mugabe has also attempted to maintain his subregional influence, which he felt was threatened by the emergence of a black-led government in South Africa in 1994. Even after the assassination of Laurent Kabila in 2001, Mugabe embraced Joseph Kabila and continued to exercise significant influence in the DRC.

As further evidence of the balance-of-power politics that continues to play itself out in the southern and central African subregions, Angola has a strong

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security interest in opposing South Africa’s foreign policy. Despite the strong ties between the African National Congress (ANC) and Angola’s ruling MPLA, built up during the years of struggle against apartheid, bilateral relations between Pretoria and Luanda since South Africa’s 1994 elections have been less cordial than expected. The Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA) saw the continuation of the supply of arms from South Africa to territory held by União Nacional pela Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) as a betrayal, and this has been a source of tension between the two governments. Contrary to the widespread belief that Angola’s concern in the DRC related exclusively to its security, there are clear indications that economic interests are high on the agenda: Angola, whose troops occupy the oil towns on the DRC’s coast, has formed a joint oil-exploration company with the Kinshasa government called Sonangol-Congo. Namibia’s involvement in the DRC war is based on its close security and political relationship with Angola and Zimbabwe forged during the struggle for independence in all three countries.

The third group of states in SADC comprises “neutral” SADC members: Zambia, Tanzania, Mauritius, Seychelles, Lesotho, Swaziland, and Malawi. Mauritius and Seychelles do not feel the direct impact of the conflicts in the subregion. Malawi, Lesotho, and Swaziland are too small militarily, financially, and in terms of human resources to be able to play an influential “balance-of-power” role in SADC. Zambia and Tanzania share borders with the DRC and are directly affected by the conflicts. Though Zambia was reported to have provided free passage to pro-Kabila rebels, enabling them to attack areas in southern Congo during the first rebellion that ousted Mobutu in 1997, Lusaka has since refused to take sides in the conflict. Former Zambian leader Frederick Chiluba emerged as a key mediator in the conflict. Three reasons best explain this situation. First, Chiluba was constrained from supporting Kabila, as his domestic political opponents could have linked such support to his perceived Congolese origins. Second, the Chiluba government was keen to maintain Zambia’s international prestige built up during Kenneth Kaunda’s twenty-seven-year leadership. Third, Chiluba recognized that the DRC war would be long, costly and unsustainable. With Angolan president Eduardo Dos Santos accusing Zambia of aiding late UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi in Angola’s civil conflict, the relationship between Luanda and Lusaka was another weak link in SADC’s security chain.

The interventions by SADC states in the DRC and Lesotho and their nonintervention in Angola have revealed fundamental differences of perception and conduct in the security arena within SADC. Interveners in Congo and Lesotho have claimed that their interventions were legitimized by SADC. But in both cases, there were disputes over SADC legitimization of the interventions. The two military interventions highlight SADC’s weakness as a guarantor of peace and security in the subregion. For many observers, this confirms the fear that SADC’s Organ on Politics, Defense and Security can be used as a political tool by subregional leaders to pursue their own narrowly defined interests.

Several SADC states portrayed the Angolan conflict as a clash between “good” and “evil,” between an elected MPLA government committed to peace and UNITA, a recalcitrant guerrilla movement. In reality, the conflict was one between two elites, one of which (the MPLA) has a near monopoly on oil, while the other (UNITA) had a seemingly unlimited supply of diamonds. The epicenter of this conflict repeatedly spilled over Angola’s borders. SADC’s inability to contain or resolve the conflict until Savimbi’s death in February 2002 had threatened subregional stability.

Challenges for Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding

Conflict over water resources in Southern Africa remains a potential source of future conflicts because water is in short supply even as the subregion is experiencing increasing population growth. Already Namibia and Botswana are engaged in serious disputes over shared water sources. South Africa uses some eighty percent of water consumed in Southern Africa.

88 Sunday Independent, 20 September 1999.
Pretoria also shares many rivers with neighboring countries, thereby increasing the potential for future conflicts. A further source of conflict—over gemstones—might emerge in SADC. Diamonds cross the Angola-Zambia border with impunity and are, for some informal dealers, a key source of income. Here, and perhaps in other areas of economic activity, efforts at more effective control could lead to conflicts between states and could also involve diamond traders.

The security environment in Southern Africa remains fluid, and the DRC conflict remains the greatest challenges confronting SADC and its embryonic security architecture. Joseph Kabila’s succession to the leadership of the Kinshasa government following his father’s assassination in January 2001 has presented the greatest challenge to the subregion. Although withdrawals of foreign troops from areas in the DRC have begun and UN peacekeepers have been deployed, there remains uncertainty about the commitment of the government in Kinshasa and other parties to implement the Lusaka accord of 1999. Without the backing of Angolan, Zimbabwean and Namibian troops the balance of military power in Congo would shift to the Rwandan-backed faction of the RCD and to the Ugandan-backed faction of Jean Pierre Bemba’s Congolese Liberation Front (FCL). The UN report detailing the plundering of the DRC’s resources by Rwanda and Uganda, and Ugandan leader Yoweri Museveni’s threat to opt out of the Lusaka peace process, further complicated the peace process in the DRC. The FCL appears to have strengthened its position with its reported pact with the Mai Mai aimed at policing and pacifying the DRC’s northeastern border with Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi.

Ironically, the improving prospects for peace in the Congo are not a guarantee of regional stability. This is particularly true in the case of the Congo’s neighbors, Rwanda and Burundi. If peace breaks out in the Congo, rebels from both countries fighting in the DRC are likely to take their wars back home so that “any Congolese deal could spell trouble for Congo’s smaller neighbors.” This carries the unsettling possibility of destabilizing both countries and leading to a regional conflagration. This situation would seem to require a need to link the Lusaka peace process to that of the Central Africa and Great Lakes regions.

An accelerated peace process in the DRC should enable Zimbabwe to undertake an honorable exit from a commitment that has exacerbated that country’s economic decline. But it is not clear whether bringing the troops back home would contribute to or detract from Zimbabwe’s internal tensions. The genuine land issue in Zimbabwe has been manipulated by the ruling ZANU-PF as a way of remaining in power at all costs. It does appear though that SADC is gradually disengaging from Mugabe’s leadership by its decision in 2001 to rotate the chairmanship of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defense and Security and to replace Zimbabwe with Mozambique. Continuing instability in Zimbabwe following controversial elections in March 2002, which saw Mugabe retain power, are a continuing source of concern.

### 3.4 The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS)

Recognizing the need to cooperate to solve common problems within a wider subregional grouping, the member states of the Central African Customs and Economic Union created in 1981, and of the defunct Economic Community of the Great Lakes States (CEPGL), combined to establish the Economic Community of Central African States in 1983. Conceived as a tool to pursue economic development, promote regional cooperation and establish a Central African Common Market, ECCAS brought together eleven countries: Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Brazzaville, Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon,
Rwanda, and São Tomé and Principe. In an attempt to address the perennial conflicts in Central Africa, ECCAS leaders decided to create an Early Warning Mechanism in 1996. At a meeting in Libreville in 1997, called to discuss the political crisis in what was then Zaire, ECCAS leaders proposed the idea of an interstate security cooperation mechanism for the prevention and management of conflicts in the subregion. The aim of the mechanism was to establish a legal and institutional framework to promote and strengthen peace and security in central Africa. Thereafter the Conseil de Paix et de Sécurité de l’Afrique Centrale (COPAX) was established under the auspices of the UN standing committee for Security Questions in Central Africa. COPAX had a dual mandate: to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts in Central Africa; to undertake any necessary action to deal effectively with political conflicts; and to promote, preserve and consolidate peace and security in the subregion.

Over the years, however, technical problems associated with creating ECCAS’s structures, coupled with the pursuit of narrow national interests, have blocked the effective operation of the security mechanism. ECCAS members, for instance, do not agree on the relationship between ECCAS, COPAX and its Early Warning Mechanism. Some states argue that since ECCAS is a weak organization, the security mechanism should be an independent body, while others advocate that the mechanism work within existing institutions. This suggests a general lack of political will among countries in a region afflicted by conflicts. The political and security environment in Central Africa has made it difficult for ECCAS to become institutionalized as a regional organization. States in the subregion have responded to this failure by seeking membership in alternative subregional organizations. For instance, the DRC is a member of SADC, while Burundi and Rwanda have applied to join the East African Community. Any revitalization of ECCAS would have to resolve how to deal successfully with multiple memberships of regional organizations, a phenomenon that is not peculiar to this subregion.

### 3.5 The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)

Established in 1994, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa was the successor organization to the Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern Africa. COMESA is currently Africa’s largest intergovernmental organization, with twenty members: Angola, Burundi, Comoros, DRC, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. COMESA seeks to create a fully integrated and competitive region where goods, services, capital and people move freely. But the organization has increasingly acknowledged the importance of peace and security as critical components in regional integration. COMESA is currently developing a peace and security policy to enhance its overall objectives. At its fourth summit in August 1999, COMESA decided to deal with the many devastating conflicts among its member states without compromising its agenda of economic development and subregional integration or duplicating the work of other organizations.

The COMESA summit in 2000 linked the issue of sustainable development to peace and security. This meeting discussed the resources needed to address the causes of conflicts, and sought to draw lessons from other subregional organizations in Africa engaged in various aspects of conflict management. Before designing their strategy, COMESA leaders requested its secretariat to develop a coordination mechanism with the OAU and Africa’s subregional organizations and to recommend a division of labor and responsibilities between different subregional institutions in order to

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95 Tanzania withdrew from COMESA in 2000, citing various reasons including the challenge of meeting its financial obligations to multiple organizations with similar objectives.
avoid duplication of tasks. COMESA leaders insisted during its 2000 summit that other stakeholders, including NGOs, civil society, the business community, and parliamentarians, be involved in the development of a viable security policy in East and Southern Africa. This initiative led to the first COMESA Workshop on “The Role of the Private Sector, the NGOs and the Civil Society in the Promotion of Peace and Security in the COMESA Subregion.” Recommendations from this workshop form an integral part of the COMESA policy on peace and security.

In order to execute its policy, COMESA developed a three-tier structure consisting firstly of the Bureau, made up of Heads of State and Government, as the supreme policy organ responsible for peace and security issues. The second body, the Bureau of Ministers of Foreign Affairs on Peace and Security, meets once a year to consider ways of promoting peace and security in the COMESA region. Under the rules and procedure of the Authority, the Bureau of Ministers is to carry out the function of conflict prevention and resolution. It performs these tasks taking into account the need to consult the Central Organ of the OAU/AU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution and other African subregional organizations. COMESA’s Council of Ministers is its second highest policy organ and makes policy decisions on its programs and activities, including monitoring and reviewing its financial and administrative management. The third body, the Committee of Officials on Peace and Security, comprising high-level officials of regional Ministries of Foreign Affairs, meets regularly to ensure the effective discharge of COMESA’s security responsibilities.

The COMESA secretariat initiates actions, convenes meetings and utilizes information from nongovernmental sources in its security work. The secretariat undertakes research and studies as a basis for implementing the decisions adopted by its policy organs. COMESA’s Secretary-General, assisted by two Assistant Secretaries-General, directs its security operations. The Office of the Secretary-General includes the Legal and Institutional Affairs Division, a Strategic Planning and Research Section, a Public Relations Unit, and an Audit Section. A consultant has been hired to undertake the COMESA Peace and Security Study with the assistance of a legal adviser. As the policy on peace and security is fairly new and still awaiting further input from other actors such as parliamentarians, there is no staff in the COMESA secretariat responsible solely for peace and security issues. A major challenge for COMESA is to begin to operationalize its peace and security policy. It will need urgently to increase its staff to achieve this goal. The organization’s security mechanism is still very much a work in progress.

3.6 The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)

The Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Desertification (IGADD), comprising Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda, was established in 1986. Eritrea joined after its independence in 1993. Initially IGADD was established to act as an early warning mechanism for alerting the international community of impending humanitarian emergencies and to coordinate resources in responding to crises on the Horn of Africa. Cooperation was thus confined to issues of drought, desertification and food security. IGADD avoided addressing issues related to military security, then conceived as a prerogative of individual states and, therefore, as falling outside the arena of collective action. However, as insecurity continued to curtail economic, social and political developments, IGADD member states started to confront these problems collectively. Out of these efforts emerged a decision to begin to transform the security architecture in the subregion. In March 1996, subregional leaders signed an agreement transforming IGADD into the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). The organization’s mandate was expanded to include conflict management, prevention and resolution.

97 This study was supported by funds from USAID/REDSO/ESA, the EU, JICA, GTZ and UNHCR.
99 Security cooperation remained at a bilateral level with signing of military alliances and pacts. However, these arrangements remained fluid and often were violated.
Under the new agreement, IGAD prioritized the pursuit of peace and security, and had as its principal aim the maintenance of peace, security and stability on the Horn of Africa. Specifically, the agreement provided for: the creation of a subregional mechanism for the prevention, management and resolution of inter- and intrastate conflicts through dialogue; and collective action to preserve peace, security and stability, defined as an essential prerequisite for economic development and social progress. The agreement proposed dealing with conflicts by eliminating threats to security; called for the establishment of a mechanism for consultation and cooperation for the pacific settlement of disputes; and agreed to deal with disputes among member states within the subregion before referring them to other regional or international organizations. Demonstrating unprecedented political commitment, IGAD states pledged themselves to resolving outstanding security problems and conflicts, and to preserving subregional stability.

In seeking security and peace, IGAD pursued a dual-track approach. To deal with conflicts likely to polarize the organization, IGAD often creates semiautonomous ad hoc mechanisms, outside of its Secretariat, which are then mandated to deal with a particular issue. The secretariat on the Sudan Peace Process, based in Nairobi, is one such mechanism. The process that led to the restoration of a transitional government in Somalia in 1999 was another such mechanism. IGAD’s second peacemaking track revolves around its secretariat in Djibouti, which addresses issues on which its members have forged a consensus, such as the establishment of a Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) (discussed below), a campaign against small arms, and a diverse range of humanitarian issues.

The Sudan Peace Process

In 1993, IGAD leaders established a Standing Committee of Foreign Ministers of Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda to draw up an agenda and program of work for a negotiated peace settlement in Sudan. The following year, Kenya was mandated to chair this committee and led the drafting of the Declaration of Principles (DOP), adopted by the parties as a basis for negotiations. However, the effective working of this committee was stalled by disputes over the question of the separation of state and religion and the right to self-determination of the South. This stalemate continued until 1997 when IGAD convened an extraordinary summit to revive the peace process. This meeting led to several positive developments, four of which are particularly significant. First, the IGAD Partners Forum (IPF), composed of Norway, the United States, Canada and the EU, agreed to fund the peace process. Second, the parties to the conflict committed themselves to the self-determination of the South within an (unspecified) interim period, supervised by international observers. Third, both sides agreed to facilitate the free and unimpeded flow of humanitarian assistance to areas affected by famine. Fourth, it was agreed that the boundaries of southern Sudan would be set at those existing on 1 January 1956. However, the parties in Sudan disagreed over the interpretation of the Declaration of Principles, stalling the implementation of the peace accord.

To ensure continued engagement with the parties to the conflict, IGAD leaders established a secretariat for the Sudan peace process, otherwise referred to as the Nairobi secretariat, in 1999. Seeking to engage at both political and technical levels, the secretariat created two committees: a political committee that seeks to reach a political settlement, and a transitional committee to deal with interim arrangements prior to the exercise of self-determination by southern Sudan.

In spite of these initial steps, the ability of the Nairobi Secretariat to resolve the Sudan conflict is limited by several constraints. Among the greatest challenges is the lack of expertise within the committees to interpret the technical details of areas of agreement and points of difference in the Declaration of Principles. Particularly problematic are issues related to the relationship between the state and religion; the delineation of borders; self-administration; and the sharing of wealth and power. For instance, in the first meeting that explored the question of wealth-sharing, agreement was
reached about an equitable distribution of resources between North and South Sudan. However, this plan was never fully elaborated and led to two contradictory interpretations by both sides. The position of the Sudan Peoples Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M) is that there should be a halt to the drilling of oil. The government of Sudan, which refuses to cease oil drilling, prefers to share the proceeds from oil exploration with the SPLA, an offer the latter rejects. Any further negotiations will require assisting the parties to reach a common interpretation and understanding of this issue.

The Nairobi secretariat receives limited support from Djibouti and relies on third-party support, in particular the IGAD Partners Forum. However, resources have been insufficient, averaging $1 million between 1999 and 2000. This lack of funding has greatly limited the secretariat’s activities. Although the IGAD Partners Forum reiterated its support for the Sudan peace process in June 2000 (Oslo) and March 2001 (Rome), it failed until April 2002 to provide substantial funds to the process. Responding to this constraint, IGAD leaders have agreed to allow the secretariat to undertake its own fundraising.

In addition to being cash-strapped, the Nairobi secretariat has to contend with an inflexible structure in using its available funds. IPF funds are earmarked for costs related to facilitating meetings and cannot be used for any activities. These funds cannot pay for resource persons, consultations, and gathering of information, all necessary for IGAD’s preparatory work. Nor can such funds be used for diplomacy or for negotiations before and after meetings. This type of funding limits the operations of the secretariat which, owing to its limited capacity, must depend on contracted resource persons. Furthermore, this situation denies the secretariat the flexibility it needs to take advantage of opportunities in the Sudan peace process. The short-term disbursement of funds, in periods of between three to six months, further accentuates the effects of limited resources.

Institutionally, the Nairobi secretariat lacks structures to support negotiations. It comprises three core staff: the special envoy and two rapporteurs. While IGAD ambassadors in Nairobi and advisers from the countries designated to guide the peace process also support the core staff, their input is small. Further, coordination is poor between the IGAD secretariat in Djibouti, and the Nairobi secretariat. IGAD procedures require that the Special Envoy report to IGAD Foreign Affairs ministers, who then report to the IGAD Council and Summit, leaving the secretariat out of the chain of command. The disbursement of funds for the Nairobi Secretariat also comes through Djibouti, creating major tensions between the two institutions.

The secretariat needs to have funds for core expenditure, in particular to pay the salaries of its main staff. In June 2001, staff had not received salaries for five months and their morale was very low. Resources are also required to enable the Special Envoy to travel and mobilize support for the peace process. Currently, the Secretariat is in need of experts to advise on borders, on models of governance such as federalism or confederalism, and on the sharing of resources. Such a pool of experts would make it possible for the secretariat to put together a variety of consultants who can, at short notice, undertake studies and in-depth analyses of issues.

Seeking Peace and Reconciliation in Somalia

Following the failed international effort to restore peace to Somalia in the early 1990s, responsibility for ending the Somali civil war increasingly came to rest on subregional actors. Compared to the Sudan peace process, the Somali process was fluid and less structured. However, this process did reveal the potential of state and civil society actors playing complementary peacebuilding roles. Between 1991 and 1998, a dozen failed attempts were made to restore peace to Somalia. Finally, in October 1998, in cooperation with the IGAD Forum Partners Liaison Group, IGAD member states created a Standing Committee on the Somali peace process, chaired by Ethiopia. Based on the format of the Sudan peace process, this committee was mandated to organize a peace process in Somalia by providing a consultative forum for negotiations aimed at reconciliation and restoration of a government in Somalia.

The ensuing process involved initial consultations among state and intergovernmental actors, namely IGAD, the Arab League, the OAU and the UN, as well as a broad spectrum of Somalis including clan leaders, Muslim clerics, warlords and members of civil society. From March through to May 2000, a series of consultations with Somali intellectuals, professionals, former politicians and representatives from the business community was organized in Djibouti by IGAD. The last of these meetings involved 200 Somali traditional leaders and 100 women delegates. The Somali National Peace Conference took place on 4 June 2000, in Arta, Djibouti. This meeting identified arms control, disarmament of militias, restoration of looted property, and determining the status of Mogadishu as priority issues. Special committees were created to address each issue. By the time the national peace conference ended on 13 August 2000, a Transitional National Assembly (TNA), composed of 245 members, had been established. A week later, members of the TNA elected Mr. Abdul-Kassim Salat Hassan as president of Somalia. After his inauguration in Djibouti, Salat moved his government to Mogadishu. Shortly thereafter, a new legislative assembly and a cabinet were formally established. The government continues to face serious difficulties, including the challenging of its authority by warlords controlling different areas in Mogadishu and the nonparticipation of representatives from Somaliland and Puntland. Despite these problems, Somalia was readmitted to IGAD during its November 2000 summit.

The IGAD Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN)

The IGAD secretariat’s work in the peace and security field is located in two divisions, namely the Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (CPMR) division and the Humanitarian Affairs division. Four critical projects have emerged within the CPMR since 1996. The first, focusing on the strengthening of capacity within the IGAD secretariat and of key actors within member states, is funded by the EU and the government of Sweden. The second project deals with demobilization and post-conflict reconstruction, including the control of illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons. Conducted in partnership with Saferworld, this activity is funded by the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID) to the tune of 300,000 pounds sterling. The third project seeks to promote a culture of peace and tolerance on the Horn of Africa. The fourth, and by far the most developed project, is the development of IGAD’s Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism, which requires closer scrutiny. Keen to address crises before they erupt into full-blown conflicts, IGAD Heads of State mandated the secretariat in Djibouti to establish a Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism in 1998. Following this...
decision, the secretariat contracted the Forum on Early Warning and Early Response (FEWER)\(^{109}\) as its partner in March 2000 to establish the mechanism. This process led to three CEWARN workshops. The first, held in July 2000, drew participants from a wide range of state and nonstate actors and discussed conceptual issues related to developing the early warning system. A decision was reached to contract consultants from all IGAD states to reflect on the recommendations from the workshop. The consultants were mandated to: identify national systems of early warning and conflict management; assess their strengths and weaknesses; and examine the possibility of linking such systems to similar mechanisms at the subregional, regional, and international levels.

The findings from the country-based studies were discussed at the second CEWARN workshop held in September 2000. Among the significant outputs of this meeting was the identification of four entry focus areas for IGAD’s early warning work: pastoral communities and cattle rustling; small arms and environmental security; peace processes; and civil society. The meeting agreed to locate national early warning systems in each country’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. An examination of the agreement establishing IGAD revealed two principal problems: first, the treaty does not link CEWARN to other regional and early warning systems; and second, there is no clear decision making process within both the IGAD secretariat and the CEWARN mechanism itself. The September 2000 meeting recommended engaging a team of legal experts to examine and draw lessons from other early warning mechanisms, and to inform IGAD governments about the legal and institutional issues related to the establishment of CEWARN. The meeting also recommended the drafting of a Declaration of General Principles on the establishment of CEWARN and a protocol on early warning.

The third IGAD workshop on this issue was held in October 2000 and discussed both the Draft Declaration of Principles as well as the Draft Protocol on CEWARN. The meeting established a Bureau\(^{110}\) to facilitate the adoption of the CEWARN program and a Draft Declaration and Protocol on CEWARN. The proposed CEWARN protocol was discussed by IGAD’s Council of Ministers and signed at its summit in January 2002. Still in its infancy, the IGAD early warning system faces two critical challenges: shaky political will and lack of technical capacity. Given that a CEWARN system will be based on the availability of information, some of which is sensitive, there is no provision for dealing with a state that is unwilling to facilitate the collection of relevant information. The chances of the mechanism succeeding depend almost entirely on the political cooperation of member states. Aside from the issue of political cooperation, IGAD’s early warning system also lacks much of the infrastructural support and technical capacity needed to collect and analyze relevant information and disseminate such information to its members. The CEWARN process has been funded by the U.S. and German governments to the amount of $700,000.

### 3.7 The East African Community (EAC)

In November 1999, the Heads of State of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania signed the treaty that reestablished the East African Community, which entered into force in July 2000. The three East African countries have a long history of regional cooperation dating back to the colonial period. Most significant among these organizations was the East African Community, which collapsed in 1977.\(^{111}\) The new treaty of 2000 was driven largely by the economic imperative to “improve the standard of living of the population by facilitating an adequate and economically, socially and ecologi-

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109 This is a consortium of NGOs, research centers and international agencies that work in the conflict prevention field. FEWER has as its objectives the facilitation of institutional frameworks to enhance cooperation and synergy among the providers and users of country- and region-specific early warning information and analyses, as well as the development of regional capacities for contributing to early warning and early intervention strategies.

110 Mr. Alier Deng Ruai of Sudan and Mr. Teumezghi of Eritrea were unanimously elected to the positions of chairperson and rapporteur, respectively.

cally sustainable development process... that allows an optimal utilization of the available resources.” But the EAC also recognized that security and political stability are a prerequisite for sustainable development. Cooperation was partly conceived by EAC leaders as a strategy for conflict prevention. In their view, regional integration is a vehicle for regional peace. The ultimate aim of EAC cooperation is the establishment of a political federation to ensure “a peaceful neighborhood.” Underpinning the EAC treaty is the notion that economic prosperity and regional integration will have the multiplier effect of reducing the possibility of conflict and enhancing security. Hence, a number of provisions in the treaty cast the EAC as an instrument of regional peace and security.

Security Cooperation in the EAC

A Memorandum of Understanding on Common Defense and Security issues was drafted by EAC leaders in April 1998. At the time, it was thought that this memorandum could develop into a military pact. However, citing constraints relating to command structures and procedural irregularities, the Heads of State suggested that defense matters were best left for the last phase of cooperation. Nonetheless the EAC secretariat in Arusha, Tanzania has engaged in a range of confidence-building measures in the security sectors of its three members. While the Heads of State were reluctant to undertake common defense initiatives, they allowed the creation of a Defense Liaison unit within the secretariat, manned by three military defense attachés from each country. In 2000, EAC leaders signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Interstate Security, calling for the establishment of border committees between countries that experience cross-border clashes. EAC leaders have also called for harmonizing policies on the treatment of refugees.

The EAC secretariat has facilitated regular visits by military personnel and has undertaken joint military training and exercises between its members. Together, these activities have introduced minimal elements of common procedure among armies with different histories. For instance, a series of joint natural fires training sessions organized in 1999, 2000 and 2001 enhanced the sharing of experiences and generated case studies to guide responses to disasters and to improve civil-military relations. The Defense College in Karen, Kenya, which trains senior officers from a number of countries in East, Central and Southern Africa, has introduced peacekeeping into its curriculum. For students from EAC countries, such training is useful for common operations and creates the possibility of the subregion contributing a regional force for future peacekeeping operations.

Operationalizing a Preventive Model

The EAC secretariat is confining itself to facilitating meetings, selecting experts, and hosting deliberations between technical personnel from the three EAC countries on issues of mutual security concern. This method has two major advantages: first, it does not overwork the lean secretariat allowing to develop, design and implement its programs; second, it ensures that ownership of the process remains with partner states. Networking between the EAC and other subregional organizations in Africa has been limited and has so far been confined largely to economic matters.

In conflict-related issues, the EAC is attempting to learn from more experienced organizations such as ECOWAS and SADC. In March 2001, EAC officials visited Abuja to consult with their ECOWAS counterparts. The EAC secretariat has had more frequent exchanges of views with IGAD on a range of common security issues. The two organizations have produced a draft joint protocol on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW).

112 Interview with Francis Muthaura in August 2000.
114 The Kenya-Uganda border clashes involving the Pokot, Sebei, Turkana and Karamanjong communities have created generalized insecurity.
115 For instance, interaction with SADC aims to draw lessons from the Southern African Customs Union for the EAC. The EAC is also looking to Caribbean countries as a model to creating an African bloc consisting of COMESA, SADC and IGAD. There are also plans to send a team to francophone West Africa to study the CFA Franc monetary zone.
The EAC’s emphasis on conflict prevention means that it can concentrate on a diplomatic approach to conflicts and avoid becoming embroiled in military conflicts. This is as much out of choice as necessity: the EAC, in any case, lacks the mechanism for dealing with armed conflicts. The organization, however, provides an opportunity for NGOs to seek observer status in order to enhance their participation in its work. The challenge for the EAC’s preventive model of conflict management is how to change negative state attitudes toward NGOs, some of which have the potential to complement government efforts in the area of conflict prevention. This task will require establishing a division of labor between the EAC secretariat, partner states and other actors. The EAC treaty provides for partnerships with civil society and observer status for NGOs interested in working with the secretariat. The EAC could also establish an NGO liaison office to mediate the relationship between governments and civil society. Currently, the EAC public relations office is expected to coordinate NGO-related activities. But this office is clearly too overburdened to perform this task effectively. There is also limited networking between the EAC’s information unit and the defense liaison unit. Furthermore, there is an urgent need to strengthen the EAC’s outreach program, possibly through the hiring of an information officer who focuses solely on NGO activities, collects information on conflict management, and disseminates such information to member states and officials.

Having assessed the seven main regional and subregional organizations engaged in conflict management in Africa, we will now turn our attention to assessing the security capacity of semiformal organizations in Africa.

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116 To qualify for observer status, NGOs have to be operating regionally, have three years experience and be registered in at least two of the three East African countries.

Part Four: Assessing the Peacebuilding Capacity of Semiformal Organizations in Africa

This section examines the institutional capacity of seventy-eight semiformal organizations dealing specifically or in part with conflict management and peacebuilding in West, Southern, Central, and the Horn of Africa. In evaluating these organizations, this section adheres, as much as possible, to the following criteria: the relationship between the vision and mission of organizations and their actual performance; the extent to which the structure of organizations support their stated objectives and activities; and the correlation between the perception of each organization’s needs and reality. More detailed information about these organizations could be found in Appendix 1.

The discussion is split into four sections corresponding to each subregion. The size, scope, and mandate of semiformal organizations among the four subregions vary greatly. Thus, while the researchers have attempted to capture and present these organizations within a certain framework, there are variances in the number of organizations covered in each subregion, and in the form of analysis used to highlight their activities, strategies and institutional challenges.

4.1 Semiformal Organizations in West Africa

This section on West Africa covers semiformal organizations in what has come to be called the Mano River Union (MRU) countries (Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone) and Nigeria. We examined fourteen semiformal organizations in the Mano River Union countries, four in Guinea, four in Liberia, and five in Sierra Leone, in addition to one subregional network. In the MRU countries, the relationship between organizations and their governments varies from state to state. One interviewee observed that civil society is “vibrant in Sierra Leone, cohesive in Liberia, and almost inseparable from government in Guinea.” 118 In spite of the challenges such relations present, these organizations are seeking to cultivate and operate within the principles of impartiality, neutrality, independence and objectivity. In Nigeria, we examined five organizations. These organizations are primarily engaged in policy research and consultancy, providing the intellectual infrastructure for West Africa and to a lesser extent for other conflict spots in Africa.

These institutions, as elsewhere in Africa, are confronted with major obstacles. The survey assessed organizational activities, capacities and challenges. In general, we observed that the size, scale, and complexity of conflicts, the small core staff of these institutions, and their reliance on largely unremunerated volunteers as well as their high turnover rate of staff, all severely constrain institutional capacity. Poor communication resulting from the dilapidated road networks, telephones and other services makes it difficult for these organizations to reach and serve a widely dispersed population. These organizations are engaged in too many activities and fail to specialize, thus accentuating their endemic financial problems.

a) Institutional Challenges for West Africa’s Semiformal Organizations

The organizations covered in West Africa share several institutional challenges in implementing their conflict management activities. These organizations are building cohesive partnerships across borders and sectors of civil society. Several of them have broadened their mandates in order to address the dynamics of conflicts in West Africa, requiring a strengthening of their institutional resource base. An example of this trend is the work of the Interfaith Council of Liberia (IFCL) which is increasingly involved in promoting dialogue, facilitating meetings among regional Heads of State, and searching for a peaceful resolution to the ongoing conflicts in the Mano River basin. However, despite some innovative conflict management activities in the subregion, most organizations continue to struggle with the need for more autonomy, resources for bolstering communication and in-house technology, and staff capacity-building.

118 Interview with David Kiazolu, Inter-Faith Council of Liberia.
Civil society actors, particularly in Guinea, continue to operate while linked to the state. While such actors may be able to utilize their access to government to engage the state in conflict resolution, their limited ability to operate outside of sanctioned areas hinders their ability to advance the democratic and good governance agenda. Another challenge of state-civil society relations is the ambivalence of governments toward externally-funded NGOs and civil society organizations. Organizations such as Connect Synergy in Nigeria, have had difficulties working with the OAU and ECOWAS, partly because of government distrust of non-state actors. To some extent, as a response to these challenges, several organizations have opted to create broad horizontal linkages across various civil society sectors. The National Committee for Action and Reflection for Peace in the MRU States (CORAPEM) membership has expanded to include about fifty national civil society groups. This coping strategy helps to increase the capacity for actors to address broader, perhaps more contentious issues from within coalitions.

Among the organizations surveyed in West Africa, Nigeria’s semiformal organizations represent the country’s tremendous potential for policy formation. These organizations however, despite their impressive objectives and potential, face obstacles to producing and disseminating policy relevant research successfully. The Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA) has about 13 Research fellows and a hugely disproportionate administrative support staff estimated at about 150, including drivers, secretaries and guards. While the research staff has acquired new computers and now receives their salaries on time, NIIA still has to overcome financial and technological problems, including better access to the World Wide Web. Most staff at NIIA lack access to adequate research facilities. The institute’s library, despite being one of the best in the country in its field, does not meet the research needs of its staff and more books and academic journals are needed. In addition, NIIA staff need opportunities for further training in conflict management, resolution and prevention.

The Nigeria-based African Center for Development and Strategic Studies (ACDEESS) is a multidisciplinary center comprising about fifty scholars conducting research on diverse policy issues affecting the African continent. Notably, ACDEESS is headed by Nigeria’s prominent political scientist and former Executive Secretary of the UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), Adebayo Adebajo. Presently, Professor Adebayo Adebajo works on policy and practical issues relating to conflict prevention. In particular, this research focuses on security and development issues in Africa. Recent publications include country studies on Nigeria and South Africa. ACDEESS’ research capacity, political clout, and international connections are impressive. However, its far-reaching research agenda requires enormous resources to conduct, publicize, and subsequently, affect policy. ACDEESS is further constrained in its ability to influence policymakers by its remote location in the southwestern town of Ijebu-Ode. Additionally, concerns exist about ACDEESS’ institutionalization once Professor Adebayo Adebajo retires.

The Lagos-based African Strategic and Peace Research Group (AFSTRAG), established in 1992, is a research NGO concerned with strategic and human security problems in Africa. The scope of AFSTRAG’s research is wide-ranging, including disarmament, defense studies, demilitarization, conflict studies, gender issues, governance, security, development and cross-border crime. AFSTRAG, in conjunction with a forum of twenty-six West African NGOs, has embarked on a project aimed at assisting ECOWAS to develop an early warning system. Related to this, AFSTRAG has plans to coordinate the activities of civil society groups to participate in the four observation zones of ECOWAS’ early warning system (see part three). It plans to use satellite networks for this work, after establishing two coordinating offices in Freetown and Dakar. AFSTRAG is also working with ECOWAS and the Accord de Non-Aggression et d’Assistance en Matière de Défense (ANAD) to develop a common security mechanism system. In April 2000, AFSTRAG met with staff of the ANAD secretariat to

119 The forum is a West African Network for Peacebuilding which met in Abuja from 24 to 27 March 2001.
120 These zones are Banjul, Cotonou, Monrovia and Ouagadougou.
discuss plans to integrate ANAD into ECOWAS’ security mechanism. Within this framework, AFSTRAG aims to provide the ECOWAS Mediation and Security Council with policy options for managing subregional conflicts.

4.2 Semiformal Organizations in Southern Africa

Semiformal organizations in Southern Africa share one critical feature: a majority of them work very closely with different departments and agencies of governments. In some cases, particularly in South Africa, the government is their sole client. This feature emanates from the specific history of these countries. In South Africa as in Mozambique, the current government is made up of individuals coming from the civic sector who fought for political independence. The gap in the capacity and potential of various national actors is another critical feature. In South Africa and Namibia, and to a lesser extent in Zimbabwe, this has taken a racial form, while in Angola and Mozambique it has taken the form of foreign versus local actors. As South Africa and Mozambique entered their democratic transitions, most of the organizations in these countries moved to embrace broader approaches to conflict resolution beyond the race question (South Africa) or the conflict management issue (Mozambique). Southern Africa is also characterized by a visible effort by national organizations to create subregional networks and to adopt a more subregional approach in their outlook, often attempting to reach out and work with subregional organizations, in this case SADC, and related institutions in addressing conflict-related issues.

a) Institutional Challenges for Southern African Semiformal Organizations

In terms of capacity, Southern Africa’s semiformal institutions have multiple needs. The funding sources for most of these organizations are limited. One dilemma is an over-dependence on government sources for funding. A limited source of funding in South Africa coincides with difficulty in retaining trained staff, particularly black research talent. Generally, organizations are struggling to maintain diversified staff (the leadership of many of the best-endowed organizations are non-blacks) and they have also struggled to establish a diversified funding base. Several organizations in South Africa, the most developed and best-endowed conflict management NGO sector in Africa, have, however begun to develop alternative sources of funding.

A secondary, but equally important problem in Southern Africa is related to retaining qualified trained staff. In part, because of limited resources, organizations have not been able to secure and retain staff at all levels. This applies to research, programmatic and administrative staff. In addition, many organizations share a common trait of having a dominant executive or senior staff, which is problematic in terms of long-term sustainability of programmatic goals and recruiting new indigenous or black talent.

Diversifying Funding, Building Capacity

The Africa Institute of South Africa’s (AISA) dependence on government funding has implications both for its independence and its relations with government. AISA is closely associated with the government, which gives it an annual grant of some 3.5 million Rand (U.S.$500,000). The critical dilemma is how to find a proper balance between proximity to the government and independence from it. One way of getting this balance right is for AISA to diversify its funding base, but recent attempts to do so have not been very successful. Second, while AISA has, probably more than any other think-tank in South Africa, recruited black staff to reflect more adequately the demographics of the country, it has found it difficult to retain such trained staff because of its inability to pay them salaries commensurate with government or private-sector levels.

Most peacebuilding NGOs in South Africa depend largely on program funding. Over the past three years the full-time staff of the Center for Conflict Resolution (CCR) in Cape Town, has grown from about twenty-four to thirty, and it is estimated that it will reach thirty-nine by the end of 2001. CCR’s annual budget has more than doubled since 1994: from approximately 6.5 million Rand to nearly 15 million Rand in 2001. However, 90 percent of the funding is for core activi-
ties for conflict management, resolution and peacebuilding activities. A three-year grant provided by the Hewlett Foundation for “core” administrative costs is vital to ensuring sustained growth.

The **Center for Conflict Resolution (CCR)**, while extraordinarily active has some problems that may weaken its capacity. Possible “burnout” of staff members and attracting core funding for administration are the two main internal obstacles identified by CCR staff. CCR’s leadership, like several other organizations in South Africa, is seen as white-dominated. Outside South Africa, political volatility has sometimes impacted on planned activities, and some projects have had to be abandoned. This was the case with a project in Zimbabwe in 2001.

In terms of funding, the Durban-based **African Center for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)** is the first conflict resolution NGO in South Africa to have received an endowment grant from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), valued at $5 million. Accord’s funding base is also secured through core and program funding from the Ford Foundation, the Swedish International Development Authority (SIDA), CIDA (Canada), the Swiss Development Agency and The UK Department for International Development (DFID). One of ACCORD’s major constraints is too heavy reliance on its leadership and lack of mid-level capacity.

**ACCORD** needs adequate training capacity, which is still lacking internally, so that the organization can rely less on its senior leadership. There are serious capacity constraints at the middle management level. This impacts negatively on the organization’s ability to conduct effective training and carries with it the potential for difficulties related to leadership transition. Furthermore, as with many South African NGOs, the racial dimension is relevant, as there is a view that more could be done to build desperately needed black capacity.

The South Africa-based **Quaker Peace Center (QPC)** receives international funding from international organizations as well as governments, but has also been able to attract a great deal of its funds from local corporate-sector entities. One of the main reasons why QPC has been able to diversify its funding base is because it typically does not ask for large sums of money. Currently QPC allocates fifty percent of its funding to salaries and overheads, forty percent to programs and ten percent to administration. Local donors include the City of Cape Town, the Department of Health, the Department of Social Service, the Independent Electoral Commission, the Provincial Administration of the Western Cape, and the Western Cape Education Department.

Some alternative funding strategies may negatively impact retention of fulltime staff. The Cape town-based Mediation and Transformation Practice (MTP) outsources work to consultants on a standby basis. Its budget was 560,000 Rands in 2001. MTP covers its overhead through contracting out its services to paying clients. MTP currently spends ninety percent of its funds on conflict resolution and only ten percent on administration. Less than thirty percent of funds are from donors and seventy percent is self-generated mainly through government contracts. A serious drawback for MTP is that it relies too heavily on consultancies to be able to pay its staff. MTP argues that its flexibility allows its employees to offer service in communities free of charge, thereby strengthening relationships with local communities.

Finally, the South Africa-based **Institute for Security Studies (ISS)**, enjoys diversified financial support from bilateral government donors, and is also trying to diversify its staff. ISS works through and with national, subregional, and regional organizations, most notably the OAU in its conflict management work, and has published widely on African security issues. ISS programs are undertaken by a team of about twenty-five researchers. Some of these researchers have recently left ISS to form SAFER Africa.

**Negotiating funding in a fluid environment**

Like all Southern Africa-based NGOs, the concerns of the Zimbabwe-based **Southern African Regional Institute for Policy Studies (SARIPS)** include its dependence on external funding. Even though the organization is well endowed compared to other
organizations in the subregion, its fear is that due to recent instability in Zimbabwe its funding could be badly affected. SARIPS is therefore considering establishing an endowment that might secure its financial future. Some of its chief obstacles include donor conditionality and maintaining an autonomous agenda. SARIPS's major short-term needs are to strengthen subregional ties, to consolidate networks, and to gain overall control over its agenda. Furthermore, the organization is concerned about its high rate of staff turnover. SARIPS believes that it cannot compete with the lures of the private sector, though it pays its staff international salaries.

Until 2001, the government of Denmark had been the main funder of the Zimbabwe-based Regional Peacekeeping Training Center (RPTC) since established in 1996. Through Danish International Development Assistance (DANIDA) was provided 46.1 million Danish Kroners, as well as technical assistance in the form of a senior military peacekeeping adviser. Clearly RPTC was heavily dependent on DANIDA funding. Due to the termination of Danish funding in 2001, the future of RPTC will require financial contributions from other external donors and SADC member states. There is also a need for secondment of officials from SADC states to work at the Center. However, it is likely that problems will be experienced in this regard, as some states will find it difficult to provide the funds to support their officials unless donors supplement such assistance. The main obstacles facing RPTC include the uncertainty and fragility of the subregional security environment, the vulnerability of many of SADC’s member states, and the poor economic situation in Southern Africa. Officials at RPTC say that a key challenge is to consolidate South African support for its activities and mission because of its status and role in the region. This, they believe, will go a long way in debunking the idea that RPTC is a Zimbabwe-dominated organization.

Often lauded internationally as a peacebuilding success, Mozambique is one of the few countries in Africa that enjoys substantial international support. However, most of its peacebuilding NGOs are not rooted in the communities for which they profess to work. Institutionally, most local institutions are weak, depending on a few committed individuals to operate. They lack comprehensive skills to help them define their goals and strategies. Assistance provided to the nascent conflict management organizations in Mozambique should not only be in funds but should also be centered in knowledge and exchange of experience between actors in Southern Africa and beyond. A major obstacle facing these organizations is the lack of capacity to develop internal mechanisms to engage in conflict resolution as well as the lack of qualified personnel. To overcome these problems, some organizations, such as the Movement for Peace and Citizenship (MPPC), have adopted informal structures that would provide them flexibility and the benefit of tapping into the capabilities of their members without compromising their mandates and objectives.

In both Angola and Mozambique, semiformal organizations are heavily dependent on donors for funding and program implementation. This raises a series of problems of financial sustainability and the challenge of how to become self-financing. Related to this problem is the issue of a crisis of identity faced by these actors: the question is whether these organizations can develop their own identity and vision, and be accountable to their own members while remaining dependent on foreign donor funding. Unlike other African countries, the participation of Mozambican and Angolan NGOs in international fora organized by the UN and the OAU is very limited. These actors could benefit immensely from interacting with actors from other parts of the continent.

4.3 Semiformal Organizations in Central Africa

Eighteen organizations were examined in Rwanda, the Eastern and Western parts of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Congo-Brazzaville. Three reasons necessitated the treatment of eastern and western Congo separately. First, in terms of administrative authority, eastern Congo is largely under rebel administrations that are backed by Rwanda and Uganda, while the West is under the Kinshasa-based
government of Joseph Kabila. Second, eastern Congo is more closely linked socially, economically and infrastructurally, with Uganda and Rwanda than with Kinshasa. Third, civil society organizations operating in the western and eastern parts of the DRC often demonstrate a marked difference in orientation. In spite of these differences, a common feature of this subregion is networking among organizations within and beyond administrative boundaries. This subregion has three distinct types of semiformal organizations: networks and umbrella bodies; nationally-based actors; and intermediate organizations. Suffice to say that, in spite of their differences in size, capacity and scope of operation, these organizations are largely intertwined, their relationship is becoming increasingly symbiotic, and their capacities mutually reinforcing.

a) Institutional Challenges for Central Africa’s Semiformal Organizations

National and intermediate semiformal actors in the Great Lakes region appear to be increasingly innovative in undertaking their peacebuilding work, despite the high degree of insecurity, human rights abuses, and violence in this area. For instance, these actors have devised means of circumventing scrutiny by governments and rebel authorities by setting up liaison offices outside their countries, which enables them to highlight and disseminate sensitive issues that they would otherwise be unable to disseminate domestically. *Association Africaine de Défense de Droit de l’Homme (ASADHO)*, for instance, has opened liaison offices in Washington and Geneva to facilitate its dissemination of sensitive reports on the state of human rights in the DRC. *Heritiers de la Justice* has built an extensive network of like-minded organizations which lobby and sensitize the international community whenever the authorities harass the network’s staff.

According to the views expressed by peacebuilding NGOs in the Great Lakes during interviews, donors need to strengthen the capacity of nationally-based actors to be able to engage with governments on issues such as accountability, transparency and broader questions of governance. This is important because if the groups concentrate only on peacemaking, the benefits of their work can potentially be destroyed overnight by the unchecked violation of rights perpetrated by authorities or groups associated with them. Donors should also consider providing more platforms for the discussion of subregional questions by nonstate actors and enabling them to conceive and implement peace activities. Subregional discussions on peace and conflict resolution need to be supported as a way of holding governments accountable and opening up space for political participation. In this case, support for nationally based actors to participate meaningfully in the Inter-Congolese Dialogue would be key to unlocking the stalemate in the DRC. A number of actors, such as *Conseil National des ONG de Development du Congo (CNONGD)* in the DRC, have generated sufficient confidence among their local communities and have been invited to provide arbitration between various warring communities. Such actors need support in the form of training for their staff to improve their skills in mediation, arbitration, and conciliation. Donors should also consider providing logistical support to dynamic civil society organizations (CSOs) to lobby governments. CSOs should also be assisted in sustaining negotiations between warring communities.

Most actors in the Great Lakes region have carefully cultivated networks at national, subregional, and international levels, an effort that has enhanced their profile and made their work more effective. Actors are collaborating at the local, national and subregional levels in a host of activities aimed at supporting peacebuilding efforts. For example, NGOs in Burundi, the DRC, Rwanda and Congo-Brazzaville collaborate and exchange information and expertise on conflict prevention and management through training, observance of human rights violations and monitoring, poverty eradication and gender development. Nonetheless, networks, national and intermediate actors alike, have enormous institutional weaknesses. Most of these organizations became involved in peacebuilding partly by chance, and partly out of necessity. Their programs are implemented in an ad hoc and reactive manner, rather than systematically and proactively. They lack capacity for strategic planning, budgeting, monitoring and conflict analysis. Program activities are rarely tied to broad objectives or desired

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outputs. Planning is based on project cycles rather than on methodical and systematic long-term institutional planning, which is needed for coherent delivery and realization of desired outputs. Part of the problem is an over dependence of these NGOs on donors for their operations.

According to many of those interviewed for this survey, donors need to commit funds for capacity building in areas of strategic planning, budgeting, project management, report writing, fundraising, advocacy, conflict analysis, and general expert training in conflict resolution techniques. Of particular urgency, donors should invest in equipment such as computers to increase technological capacity. So far, no donors have committed any substantial funds to institutional capacity building to these organizations. Relations with the media are for the most part cordial, though public-owned media largely give wider coverage to semiformal organizations tied to governments. Private media are often more willing to provide voice and audience to other actors.

4.4 Semiformal Organizations in the Horn of Africa

This section examines a wide range of semiformal organizations in Uganda, Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, Sudan, and Somalia. A number of pressing issues dominate the Horn of Africa, where inter and intra-state conflicts continue to present challenges for sustainable peacebuilding. As discussed in part two of this report, security dynamics in the Horn have been influenced by prolonged insurgencies, resulting in, or exacerbated by, large refugee flows, state capacity crises, and political conflicts. This section highlights some of the strategies employed by civil society organizations in addressing these issues.

Similar to their sister organizations in West, Southern and Central Africa, organizations in the Horn of Africa engage in conflict management and peacebuilding work through training and research, advocacy and collaborative networks. However, an examination of the organizations covered in this survey highlights important distinctions.

First, organizations in the horn of Africa have different relationships with their governments: in Uganda, civil society organizations that have been engaged in rehabilitation and reconstruction continue to view government as a partner in conflict transformation; Kenya’s well-established, semiformal organizations have interfaced with the government in addressing the country’s political conflicts and tensions; and two Ethiopian policy focused institutions are working to promote dialogue between civil society and the government and to train and improve the capacity of public officials to foster bilateral and multilateral dialogue on peace, security, democracy and economic development. Second, there is a great need to support Sudanese and Somali semiformal organizations, which due to insecurity continuing in their countries, require external support and are often based outside their countries. This survey discusses three Sudanese semiformal actors, two based in Nairobi, and one based in, and operating out of, Khartoum. Related to this, NGOs in this subregion often work well beyond national borders: the Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation in Tanzania, along with other actors in Kenya and Uganda have actively worked on the Great Lakes crisis, particularly the conflict in the DRC. Finally, throughout the Horn of Africa, organizations are strongly in favor of employing African conflict management traditions, a trend also evident in other subregions.

a) Institutional Challenges for Semiformal organizations in the Horn of Africa

Institutions in the Horn of Africa are encountering a range of challenges related to institutional planning for long-term programmatic objectives, human capacity, resource mobilization, and outreach and dissemination of their material. These challenges are reminiscent of the issues limiting the potential of semiformal organizations throughout Africa. The final section that follows summarizes some of the institutional challenges facing semiformal organizations in the Horn of Africa.

Funding strategies and their relevance to sustainability

Fundraising presents a critical challenge for Sudanese Women Voice for Peace (SWVP). In October 2001, while awaiting news on a three-year grant proposal, the organization only had about $60,000 to cover the
next six months. Donor interest, grant requirements
and reporting mechanisms generate significant
difficulties. Among SWVP’S donors are P a x i
Christi/Cordaid (Netherlands) and NORVIB (Oxfam
Netherlands), which support community voices and
poverty eradication, and Life and Peace Institute and
UNIFEM, which fund programs for building networks.

Some organizations rely on a more ad hoc funding
strategy. In Uganda, the Center for Conflict
Resolution’s (CECORE) founder raised the organiza-
tion’s start-up costs, establishing a pattern of resource
mobilization outside of traditional donor circles. Thus,
CECORE’s funding is ad hoc, but the organization relies
on a number of donors, which allows it to diversify its
dependence. So far, CECORE seems to be receiving
more funding than most of the other organizations in
this area. A deeper institutional analysis is necessary to
establish whether it is able to translate this funding
into sustainable and effective programs.

New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC) organized a
series of peace campaigns (a Dinka-Nuer reconciliation
meeting; an Eastern Nile meeting of six warring
groups; a conference between chiefs at Uulu; and a
stakeholder meeting in Kisumu, Kenya). In spite of the
potential of this project to lead to a multiplication of
peace initiatives at the community level, NSCC has no
budget line and depends on opportunistic funding. The
organization seeks funding for each individual activity.
For instance, the cost of the Kisumu meeting was
estimated at 350,000 Kenyan shillings. Most funding
comes from church partners that have a long relation-
ship with Southern Sudan, in particular Norwegian
Church Aid, World Council of Churches (WCC) and
churches in Europe. NSCC also receives funding from
government agencies like USAID, which channels its
resources through U.S.-based church-related NGOs
such as the Catholic Relief Services (CRS). The
availability of consistent funding for these activities
would go a long way in sustaining what is becoming a
community-grown peace initiative. Lack of dependable
funding means that activities are project-based and
NSCC depends on contracted personnel to execute its
activities.

The Ethiopian International Institute for Peace and
Development (EIIPD) is well funded by, among others,
the government of Norway, the European Union and
the Ethiopian Government Trust Fund. Between 1997
and 1999, its annual budget averaged $1 million. Lack
of avenues for advertising and disseminating its work
greatly impedes the impact of EIIPD. The organization
also requires skilled personnel to manage its resource
center and financial resources and to facilitate the
processing, production and acquisition of materials.

Kenya’s African Peace Forum (APFO) has secured a
total of $250,000 for a period of two years, in the form
of an institution strengthening grant for developing
human resources, securing equipment and/or training.
Through this initiative, three workshops took place in
2001 on information sharing, strategic planning and
resource mobilization/fundraising. The potential value
of such a network was demonstrated in 1998 during an
APFO-facilitated Inter-Congolese Dialogue in eastern
Congo. At this meeting, a warning was sounded about
the second war in the DRC. This information was
passed on to the UN information network, IRIN.

APFO confronts critical capacity gaps. It is conducting
limited research, does not publish much, has poor
documentation, and lacks Internet access and a strong
outreach program. APFO has faced difficulties
fundraising for its activities. Dependence on donors
inhibits any prospects for self-sufficiency. Most of
APFO’s funds are project specific and disbursement is
often tailored to donor demand. According to APFO
members interviewed, donors need to support the main
program areas, namely the Sudan peace process and
the Great Lakes Early Warning Network (GLEWLN)
initiative.

With funding from German churches and the World
Council of Churches, the Kenya-based All Africa
Conference of Churches (AACC) has developed a
peace-training manual to guide youth meetings and
workshops. Centered on local peace projects in 35
countries, and dealing with 172 churches, the youth
program promotes inclusiveness and is an interfaith
initiative. The Canadian government is the main funder
of this program. The project had an annual budget of
$200,000 for 2001. The AACC plans to expand
lobbying for the inclusion of peace education in
schools, develop resource mobilization to support local
initiatives for peace, and develop a capacity to analyze

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the impact of its programs. A second area identified for expansion is publishing and dissemination of information. The AACC information desk currently assists in the publication of the TamTam News and some youth magazines, but their circulation is limited. The youth program is run by three officers, an executive secretary, administrative assistance and an intern. It is currently in dire need of expansion. A shortage of manpower is responsible for the lack of evaluation of the youth program.

Filling Critical Human Capacity and Planning Gaps

Several organizations in the Horn of Africa have identified their critical gaps in institutional planning, implementation and human capacity. Key elements for improvement include peacebuilding training and management training for staff as well as support for core technology and program staff. Many of these gaps will require additional funding for core capacity-building. For example, the Nairobi Peace Initiative-Africa (NPI-Africa) is a small organization that has found itself overstretched. In an attempt to address this problem, it has engaged a full-time program adviser, in charge of research and documentation. The adviser is facilitating the production of discussion papers and monographs in an effort to contribute to discussions on issues of conflict and peacebuilding.

Gaps in human capacity include lack of training in peacebuilding and conflict management as well as minimal preparation for human resource management. The Kenya-based All Africa Conference of Churches (AACC) noted that church leaders, who comprise its core actors, are trained in theology and divinity and not in management. AACC workers require training in specific aspects of management. Additionally, as part of its long-term strategy for enhancing its peacebuilding activities, the organization needs to find ways of harnessing traditional methods of conflict resolution and peacebuilding. AACC is also seeking funding for the support of its work in reconciliation using African traditional methods. According to several interviewees, many donors are skeptical of this concept of “African traditional methods” and unwilling to support it.

The Tanzania-based Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation has struggled with its own transition following Julius Nyerere’s death in 1999. From a powerful organization enjoying a high status, one interviewee described the foundation as “lacking both a messenger and a message.” In this view, after Nyerere, the Foundation lost much of the initiative in the Burundi peace process and has no capacity to reclaim its central role, particularly now that most of the preparation on implementing the peace accord in Burundi is being undertaken outside the country (Nelson Mandela and a team of South African lawyers have led this process). Institutionally, the Foundation needs to create structures to facilitate the transition from the Burundi process to the smaller programs it has proposed.

The appointment of the long-serving OAU Secretary-General, Salim Ahmed Salim, as the chairman of the Foundation in 2001, provides an opportunity for the revival of the Foundation. Donors could facilitate this revival by encouraging the establishment of an accountable monitoring system. They can also support institution building to ensure continuity. In an attempt to build this capacity, members of the organization have visited the Ford Foundation’s offices in New York and Nairobi, and proposed three specific ways in which the Ford Foundation could strengthen the Nyerere Foundation. First, by funding the position of a program officer to help the Foundation develop a strategy for action. In particular, the Nyerere Foundation is keen to develop the capacity to design grant proposals that enable it to raise core funds. Second, by funding a technical person to help in archiving the material in its possession. Third, by contributing to the establishment of an endowment fund. Such a fund would sustain four professional staff, support staff and administrative costs, and assist in the development of project guidelines.

The Tanzania-based African Dialogue Center (ADC) is working on establishing a website to stimulate debate, complement its conferences, provide a resource database and minimize duplication of efforts among African civil society organizations. The organization depends on consultants with high-level expertise on
short-term contracts. It is fully funded by the Ford Foundation and has an annual budget of $300,000. A major challenge confronting ADC is sustainability. As with other actors, it is yet to succeed in building up sufficient African interest, and to support programs within the civil society sector. Collaboration with the local government has seen the Resident Commander (RC) donate a piece of land (three acres) for ADC to construct its offices and an institute that can help it generate capital. The idea is to convert the ADC into the equivalent of the U.S.-based Council on Foreign Relations. ADC is also exploring the possibility of establishing an endowment fund as a means of ensuring its financial survival.

While the New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC) staff based in Nairobi are well trained, most peace “mobilizers” at the field level have not received training in peacebuilding. As its programs expand, the need for some standardized training will be vital in bolstering the capacity of trainers. The NSCC has forged partnerships with donors and more experienced semiformal organizations including People for Peace (PPA), the National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK) and Catholic Churches in Kenya and Southern Sudan. Finally, NSCC urgently needs a documenter, a fundraiser and staff to help the organization develop structures for dealing with its expanding programs.

The Kenya-based Sudanese Women Voice for Peace (SWVP) has a small staff with three full-time officers and one expert dealing with financial accounting matters. Other than being overstretched, most of the staff lacks critical skills required for peacebuilding, such as negotiation and mediation. As a step toward further institutional development, SWVP has restructured its administrative system. However, to run its programs optimally, it would still require a full-time program administrator who will concentrate on managing part-time consultants who are considered essential for activity implementation. The organization also needs to build a capacity to develop a database. SWVP was forced, due to shortages of funds, to suspend the publication of New Voice and Images (its newsletter and magazine), but there is a strong desire to revive both publications. SWVP networks with women and NGOs operating in Southern Sudan; the New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC), which provides the framework for its program implementation; and the Network of Sudanese Women NGOs dealing with human rights issues. From its base in Nairobi, SWVP has been able to tap into a large group of NGOs, which helped build its capacity and assisted the organization in undertaking its training activities in Southern Sudan. NGOs which were vital to these important efforts include PFP, NPI-Africa, and APFO.

Having assessed the institutional capacity of semiformal organizations in West, Southern, Central and the Horn of Africa, we now turn our attention to assessing the peacebuilding capacity of community-based organizations in Africa.
Part Five: Assessing the Peacebuilding Capacity of Community-Based Organizations (CBOs) in Africa

A majority of community-based organizations in Africa work in peri-urban areas or rural environments and may be hosted by, or affiliated to, national or subregional organizations or networks. Their agenda is localized, and usually pursued in a reactive and ad hoc manner. They depend heavily on volunteers and professionals drawn from members of the communities that they serve. In this survey we focused on ten examples of CBOs that draw their members from local communities. These organizations are located in the following subregions: two in Southern Africa, six in Central Africa and two in the Horn of Africa.

5.1 Institutional Challenges in Southern Africa

The two organizations assessed in Southern Africa were from Zambia: the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP) and the Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS). Catholic church structures, in particular the dioceses, parishes and the small Christian communities, form the core of both JRS’s and CCJP’s programs. They provide the entry points and the framework for implementing activities at the community level. These institutions share an affinity with other faith-based organizations in Africa: they have a level of moral authority, which may be leveraged at the local as well as national level.

JRS’s full-time staff comprises five project directors, eight policy program officers, fifty teachers and twenty community workers. Most of these workers are based in the refugee camps and communities along Zambia’s border areas, particularly the teachers and community workers. JRS has the problem of high staff turnover because it employs expatriates who stay for short periods because of low pay and family commitments in their home countries. There is currently an effort to employ Zambian staff and refugees to run these programs. This will hopefully increase staff retention and build project management capacities.

CCJP’s advocacy work appears to complement JRS’s capacity-building and training work. CCJP is limited in the level of skills it is able to transmit, and once a crisis in a community erupts into violence, CCJP does not have the skills or procedures for dealing with it. Further, members are committed to their full-time jobs or simply cannot afford to devote much time to the organization’s work. CCJP members are advised to refer such cases to other institutions such as the police, or village headmen or chiefs. Only 20–30 (out of 3,000) members have undergone formal training in conflict management. All were trained at Mindolo Ecumenical Foundation. There is also a high turnover of members who leave the institution to work for other organizations that offer a small allowance for voluntary work. With high poverty levels in Zambia, a number of members are undernourished, unwell and/or victims of HIV/AIDS. The CCJP national office is currently undergoing an organizational development program facilitated by the Institute for Democracy in South Africa. The program seeks to provide training workshops, tutoring and exposure to core staff with the objective of building and strengthening their ability to respond, in an effective way, to social, economic and political problems.

5.2 Institutional Challenges in Central Africa

Central Africa has a large numbers of CBOs, attributable in part to the current state of insecurity in the region. Aware of the inability of government and other structures to provide services, communities have mobilized to provide safety nets for their members. Like the semiformal organizations in this subregion, CBOs have tended toward operating within larger networks. The observations presented in this section are drawn from the examination of six networks of CBOs. Three of these, Association for the Promotion of Women Like the Sunrise (SERUKA), Solitaire Benirugwiro (Those Who Have Solidarity), and Save Our Souls and Rescue the Vulnerable (S.O.S. RAMIRA), are based in Rwanda. Three others, namely Agir en Faveur des Droits de l’Homme (AFDHO), Organization des Volontaires pour l’Autopromotion Durable (OVAD) and Initiatives et Actions Pour le Développement Locale (IADL), are based in the DRC, while the Association Pan-Africaine Thomas Sankara (APTS) is based in Congo-Brazzaville.
These CBOs need to be assisted to procure capital equipment such as computers, fax machines, copiers and office furniture. Since they often operate in tough rural terrain, donors should consider assisting their mobility within their target communities by providing motorcycles and bicycles. These organizations also need help in paying volunteers allowances so that they can be engaged for longer periods of time. Finally, CBOs in Central Africa need to be assisted in developing skills on proposal writing, report writing, fundraising and documentation.

5.3 Institutional Challenges in The Horn of Africa

The survey focused on two CBOs in the Horn of Africa: the Acholi Religious Leaders Initiative for Peace (ARLIP), a local initiative for peacebuilding in northern Uganda, and Peace and Development Network (Peace Net), a national network of CBOs in Kenya dealing with issues of peacebuilding, conflict resolution and development.

The greatest challenge to ARLIP’s work lies in the scale and complexity of the conflict in northern Uganda. While ARLIP’s structures have grown remarkably, the dynamics of a conflict that is at once local, national, and international poses great challenges to this fledgling organization. Having emerged out of necessity, ARLIP now depends on the goodwill of clerics guided by religious convictions rather than expertise in conflict management. Funding for organizational development and institutional strengthening is necessary if ARLIP is to meet its growing role and to build a competent, transparent and professional organization to oversee work already in progress. Second, the multiplication of donors has the potential of overwhelming the initiative and/or inhibiting it from growing naturally. Compounding its practical difficulties, every donor has been interested in some, but not all, aspects of its program. For instance, the Belgian government has funded the revival of Acholi traditional leaders through assistance for the appointment of Chiefs, while the Mennonite Central Committee (MCC) funds training, travel and a permanent member of staff. ARLIP faces the challenge of managing and coordinating its varying interests and programs. In dealing with the challenge of depending on Western donors, an issue of major concern across the continent, ARLIP has sought support from the private sector in Uganda, and from Acholis in the diaspora.

Since its creation, Peace Net has undergone a metamorphosis. In 1997, the NGO Peace Net organized a retreat after which the Secretariat was mandated to generate programs and to raise funds. Consultations with several donors led to the first substantive contract, amounting to $25,000 in 1997. In 2001, USAID awarded Peace Net a two-year contract worth $75,000. However, USAID claims that Peace Net lacks an identity of its own because it operates within the framework of the national NGO Council, established by the Kenyan government to regulate the activities of all NGOs. According to Peace Net, it is this structure that gives it flexibility to deal with a whole range of actors beyond the narrow definition that would characterize a registered NGO. A further challenge to this sector of peacebuilding is the possibility of the Kenyan government co-opting civil society initiatives. But, while several former government figures have played prominent roles in donor-led CSO initiatives, Peace Net also needs to build a capacity to protect its members from government harassment at the local level.

While a lot has been achieved by Peace Net in terms of creating local peacebuilding structures, most zonal peace committees remain fragile and in need of strengthening. In particular, the ability to share information, exchange experiences and facilitate meetings between the various actors at the local level as well as with national actors, is very weak. The scope of Peace Net is vast and difficult to sustain for a five-person staff, only two of whom are directly engaged in

123 Mr. Sam Korna, the current head of the Oxfam project responsible for peace work, came from the Office of the Kenyan President. The OCHA-led national steering committee on disaster response is led by government figures. Major Cheruyoit, from the Office of the Kenyan President, who is heading this structure, held the same position during the UNDP-led intervention, which led to the destruction of local capacity in the relief sector, in the 1990s.

Part Five: Assessing the Peacebuilding Capacity of Community-Based Organizations (CBOs) in Africa
program activities. The other glaring capacity deficiency for Peace Net is in the area of research and documentation. Due to limited resources and in order to benefit from complementarity, Peace Net networks with a range of international, national and local organizations. However, the value of networking, particularly among members of the network, would be increased markedly by the development of a website on which members can post information on various issues of concern, including their program activities.

Having briefly assessed ten community-based organizations in three African subregions, we will continue this survey with a summary of the Key issues and some recommendations for donors on how to strengthen the peacebuilding capacity of African organizations.
Part Six: Summary and Recommendations

This report has assessed the capacity of African institutions to respond to conflicts and crises. Focusing on three categories of actors, namely regional and subregional intergovernmental actors, semiformal organizations, and community-based organizations, this report has determined existing capacities, identified gaps and anticipated the potential of various organizations and actors in Africa to address crises and conflicts in the future. This survey was undertaken through an assessment of the strengths, weaknesses and potential of seven intergovernmental actors, seventy-eight semiformal civil society actors, and ten community-based organizations. These cases were drawn from eighteen countries in sub-Saharan Africa, namely Liberia, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Angola, Mozambique, South Africa, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, Somalia, Sudan, Ethiopia, and Djibouti. In evaluating the capacity of each of these organizations, this report has assessed their mandate, resource capacity, program implementation, potential to respond to future crises, and relationship with other players including the government, international organizations, donors and the media.

6.1 Summary of Findings

From the 1990s Africa has witnessed an escalation of civil wars and interstate conflicts that continue to undermine peace and security: Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea in West Africa; Somalia, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Sudan in the Horn of Africa; Burundi, Rwanda, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in the Great Lakes region; Angola and Lesotho in Southern Africa. These conflicts involve multiple actors and are deeply entrenched, complex, and intractable. Often underpinned by economic agendas, they have led to the militarization of the civilian space, recruitment of children, subversion of human rights and humanitarian law and massive displacements of large numbers of people. In an attempt to address the insecurity and humanitarian crises brought about by these conflicts, there has been a multiplication of institutions devoted to the search for peace and security throughout the continent. However, the capacity of such actors is often very weak. So far, efforts at building local capacity have often been inappropriate, inadequate and ad hoc; and rarely met the needs on the ground. Desiring an effective intervention strategy to resolve this problem requires assessing the institutions and organizations that exist on the ground.

a) Nature and Dynamics of Conflicts

An effective funding strategy needs to be informed and shaped by an understanding of the nature and dynamics of conflicts. Given the scale of conflicts and their complexity, efforts must focus at the local, national and regional levels. Donors need to make a strategic decision about whether to design country-specific programs, regional programs or complementary programs targeted at both levels. Clearly, given the transnational character and regional consequences of conflicts, there are advantages to focusing on the regional level. Several ongoing donor-sponsored initiatives that could provide useful lessons include the ECOWAS security mechanism and the civil society-led IGAD early warning system. In addition to this regional focus, the complexity and protracted nature of conflicts requires substantial investment of resources. While there is a growing realization that sustainable peace is a prerequisite to the successful pursuit of most activities, this is not reflected in the scale of funding made available to peacebuilding actors. For instance a majority of semiformal organizations in Africa operate on annual budgets of less than $20,000. If breaking the cycle of conflict requires a focus on reconstruction, governance and the rule of law, women’s issues, socioeconomic rights, among others, then donors need to invest beyond the short-term activities that include provision of emergency relief, facilitation of negotiations, and training for peace workers. Clearly, intervention in issues of citizenship and political participation, access and use of resources, public management and accountability, human rights protection, and the rule of law needs to be part of the long-term strategy for peacebuilding in Africa.
b) Institutional Infrastructure

Defining Response to Conflicts as Peacebuilding

Many African actors conceive responses to conflicts and crises as a peacebuilding process, distinguishable from activities targeting conflict prevention, management, and/or resolution. Aware of this reality, this report encompasses an array of activities directed at consolidating peaceful coexistence within societies. This conceptualization envisions peacebuilding as the employment of measures that consolidate peaceful relations and societal institutions in order to help create an environment that deters the emergence or escalation of tensions that can lead to violent conflicts. Such a conception enables a wide array of actors to deal with conflict management and to incorporate peace activities into their work. Without exception, all actors surveyed in this report see sustainable peace as a prerequisite for political, social, and economic development. There should therefore be a conscious effort to link issues of democratization, human rights, governance, the rule of law, tolerance, and development to peacebuilding. Most actors interviewed for the survey have also stressed that peace is essential to the success of their programs. For instance, all regional and subregional organizations stressed the existence of peace as essential to attaining sustainable development and regional integration. Semiformal organizations have made connections between respect for human rights, good governance, the rule of law and sustainable peace. In the same vein, a link has been made between levels of poverty and violence, as illustrated by the debate on the role of greed and grievance in fueling civil wars. Thus, while the core programs for the majority of organizations in this report were not initially concerned with peacebuilding or conflict management, these grew from being appendages of larger programs to becoming integral parts of their work.

This interrelatedness of issues is reinforced in the report of Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary-General, Causes of Conflict and Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa (1998). In this report, peacebuilding is conceived as encompassing “all actions undertaken in a conflict continuum to consolidate peace and prevent recurrence of armed confrontation.” Such activities may involve “the creation or strengthening of national institutions, monitoring elections, promoting human rights, providing reintegration and rehabilitation programs and creating conditions for resumed development.” Peacebuilding aims to build on, add to or reorient peacemaking activities in ways designed to reduce the risk of the resumption of conflict and to contribute to creating conditions conducive to reconciliation, reconstruction and recovery. Based on this conceptualization, peacebuilding involves long-term investment and requires a conscious link between conflict resolution, rehabilitation, reconstruction and development. More importantly, donors have to decide whether to invest in the entire process, which means buying into a broad array of activities that have a bearing on peacebuilding, or whether to target particular activities in the process, for instance, those that address particular stages of the conflict cycle.

Evolving a Peacebuilding Capacity

More than two-thirds of organizations in this survey were learning on the job. They were created to address issues rather than conflict, and very few were, from the beginning, devoted to peacebuilding or conflict management. Regional and subregional organizations were, at their formation, informed by development, interpreted as economic growth and integration. Their venture into conflict resolution and peacebuilding has been plagued by many challenges. Current conflicts, which are at once internal while spilling across borders, pose peculiar challenges for these actors. The main protagonists of these wars are often alliances of rebels operating across national borders. Further, the democratization process has transformed the political terrain in Africa by stirring up forces of ethnicity, regionalism and religious fundamentalism, all of which threaten state cohesion. More than ever before, the state has become hostage to local affinities, and its capacity to hold the mantle for peace has been considerably reduced. Clearly, state structures have a limited capacity for dealing with the current conflicts in Africa. An effective peacebuilding strategy needs to recognize and respond to this weakness, in terms of complementing national
programs with strengthened regional response mechanisms. Like their state counterparts, these conflicts generate critical challenges for semiformal and community-based organizations, most of which were created to address the development needs of their target populations. Nearly all these organizations are ill prepared to deal with the entire conflict cycle. Most of them ventured into conflict-related issues in an attempt to stabilize their development programs. However, as conflicts become ever more intractable, their capacity continues to be strained. Against the background of shrinking resources, the operation of these actors has been plagued by duplication of activities, and increased competition for performance space and resources in this fast-expanding peacebuilding “industry.”

**Regional and Subregional Organizations**

Conceiving conflicts within a regional framework, regional and subregional organizations are retooling themselves in two ways: revising their mandates from being purely “developmentalist” to encompass conflict management; and in some cases, revamping their fledgling regional security mechanisms. Evolving under circumstances of insecurity, their response to crises and conflicts is developing in an ad hoc manner.

While all of Africa’s intergovernmental organizations are in need of substantive institutional building in terms of their human and technical capacities, each is responding to particular challenges within its subregion and emphasizing different aspects of peacebuilding. Interventions, therefore, need to be designed specifically to suit each subregion and institution. The OAU is keen to develop a role in coordinating the early warning systems and security mechanisms of subregional organizations rather than undertaking large-scale peacekeeping missions. From the peacekeeping experiences in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau, ECOWAS is developing a capacity for peacekeeping and enforcement. In Southern Africa, SADC is struggling to operationalize its Organ on Politics, Defense and Security, even as COMESA attempts to complement the work of SADC and other regional actors in conflict management. In the Horn of Africa, IGAD favors nonmilitary options to deal with conflicts and is working with civil society partnerships as well as developing a Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN). The smaller EAC is moving toward developing a conflict prevention model. These various approaches have implications for the types of capacities that require strengthening in each organization.

Regional and subregional actors play critical roles in sponsoring discussions, engaging in diplomacy and intervening militarily in conflicts. These organizations are driven, in their interventions, by an internal logic of common interest in economic development, peace and security, and tend to have more at stake in conflicts within their regions than external actors. Unlike foreign actors, they enjoy the advantage of having deep knowledge of their region. But some of these regional interventions have also been controversial, when local actors are accused of pursuing parochial political and economic agendas rather than regional stability. Nigeria and South Africa have also been accused of pursuing parochial political and economic agendas rather than regional stability. Nigeria and South Africa have also been accused of nursing hegemonic ambitions to dominate their subregions. Uganda, Rwanda, Liberia, and Burkina Faso have been accused of pursuing parochial economic agendas from regional conflicts.

**Semiformal Organizations**

In responding to conflicts that manifest themselves differently across regions, semiformal organizations have developed varying institutional forms. These include research and analysis institutions, to facilitative bodies, to operational actors and networks. Operating in political environments that range from being friendly, to being indifferent, to being hostile, NGOs are often forced to navigate through the dangers of co-optation, harassment or lack of a policy framework to guide their operations. In their work, these actors constantly seek to cultivate and operate within the principles of impartiality, neutrality, independence, objectivity and relevance to the needs on the ground.

Among the distinctive characteristic of these actors is their ability to network upwards (with international governmental and nongovernmental actors), downwards (with national and local actors) and
horizontally (with each other). Increasingly, semiformal organizations are becoming the intermediaries between donors, international NGOs and governments, on the one hand, and local actors on the other, in terms of disbursing funds, and building or bolstering the capacities of smaller, usually community-based organizations.

Community-Based Organizations

CBOs operate at the frontline of conflict areas and, despite their chronic shortage of resources and skilled manpower, confront conflicts directly. Their agenda is localized and pursued in a reactive and ad hoc manner. Institutionally, CBOs are fragile, often lacking clear operational structures. They are often weak and prone to political manipulation. CBOs depend largely on volunteers and draw heavily on traditional mechanisms for conflict resolution and peacebuilding, which are crucial for the development of any early warning and conflict prevention mechanisms.

c) Modalities of Current Support for Peacebuilding

Peacebuilding as a New Funding Area

Apart from church-based donors like the Mennonite Central Committee (MCC) and the World Council of Churches (WCC), which have long-standing relations with their sister organizations in Africa, peacebuilding is a new funding area for many other donors. Nonetheless, as conflicts continue adversely to affect development activities, there is increasing interest in designing frameworks of involvement in peacebuilding. For instance, USAID is currently designing a strategy for conflict prevention, resolution and management in Eastern and Central Africa. The Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) has launched a small “conflict management initiative” known as COMANI. In some cases, donors such as the Department for International Development (DFID-UK) and the Danish Church Aid are focusing on preventive work. The extent to which these strategies complement and inform each other will determine the degree of the effectiveness of donor interventions.

Influence of the Development Arena in Funding Peacebuilding

At the moment, funding for peacebuilding in Africa is informed largely by practice in other sectors, particularly the development arena. For instance, donors are applying monitoring systems designed for other forms of assistance to peacebuilding activities. Given that enduring peace can only be measured in the long term, evaluation based on quantifiable indicators is likely to yield tentative, inconclusive judgments on the effectiveness of such programs. The unpredictable nature of conflicts and their dynamics call for donors to design monitoring mechanisms that allow flexibility while at the same time ensuring performance. In some cases, desire for results has led to donors imposing unrealistic pressure on actors to produce results. For instance, IGAD’s Sudan Peace secretariat has been under immense pressure to deliver a peace agreement even in the face of enormous political, logistical, human and technical obstacles.

Reluctance to Fund Core Areas

While there is consensus that peacebuilding is a new area that necessitates capacity building, donors are often unwilling to provide core funding, crucial for facilitating organizational development. For instance, less than five percent of organizations dealt with in this survey had secured funds for overhead costs, including salaries. Even then, this was for periods of less than two years. A majority of actors drew salaries from project funds. Other than reducing the money available for program activities, inability to secure core funding inhibits professionalism and leads to a high turnover and retention problem, as trained and experienced staff leave to join the enlarging number of foreign NGOs that offer better remuneration packages. A combination of these factors has left many organizations understaffed and overstretched. This situation also affects program continuity and reduces institutional capacity. Lack of in-house expertise has led to heavy dependence on consultants, especially by a majority of policy think-tanks. While this can provide more expertise, it is costly and affects the ability of organizations to create internal capacity.
Dependency on Foreign Donors

On the whole, dependence on foreign donors is heavy and manifests in donor preferences often overshadowing organizational mandates and objectives. More than half of the actors in this survey indicated uneasiness with the manner in which donors influence programs. For instance, there is a tendency to draw up grant proposals in line with the interest of donors rather than the needs on the ground. When such interests shift, as they often do, this leads to difficulties in sustaining programs. Across the continent, actors, particularly semiformal ones, are attempting to attain financial independence. Most are seeking to reduce the influence of dominant donors by diversifying their sources of funds, or by seeking long-term donor commitments. In a few cases, actors are attempting to create endowment funds. One such organization, the Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation in Tanzania has made some progress in this regard. Many other NGOs are becoming involved in activities that can generate income, including selling their programs, while some NGOs are reaching out to other sectors for support. An example of this is the Quaker Peace Center (QPC) in South Africa, which receives fifty percent of its budget from private contributions. The Sudan-based Mutanuak covers some of its operational costs from membership subscriptions. Akina Mama Wa Africa (AMWA) in Uganda and the African Dialogue Center (APC) in Tanzania are exploring ways of tapping the support of the private sector for their peacebuilding work. The latter has moved a step further in engaging entrepreneurs to participate in examining issues of corruption within the corporate sector.

Changing Donor Requirements

Changing grant-making requirements often make it difficult for actors to engage in successful proposal writing. Complicated, time-consuming and heavy reporting procedures have translated into proposal writing becoming a continuous activity throughout the year. To deal with an increasingly competitive environment, against the background of diminishing resources, most executives spend much of their time on public relations and fundraising activities. This robs program activities of the services of their most qualified personnel.

Human Resource Capacity Building

On the whole, there is an impressive human resource capacity in the four subregions in which this survey was conducted. The vast majority of senior staff and program officers in these organizations are well qualified. There is also marked enthusiasm to address conflict issues as indicated by the innovations of many organizations even in the face of limited resources. However, three factors inhibit the full realization of the potential of this human capacity. First, remuneration packages are generally low and not reflective of qualifications. Second, most organizations have no support structures for this human capacity. Glaringly absent are internal monitoring mechanisms. With the exception of the Kenya-based NSCC, which initiated monitoring meetings to review the growing peace movement in Southern Sudan, few organizations had comprehensive internal monitoring systems. Third, a majority of the organizations surveyed suffer from limited technological capacity. In particular, the ability to communicate is crucial if semiformal organizations and CBOs are to realize their potential as providers of information essential for early warning to actors that may not enjoy similar access to communities.

Support Activities

Although all actors agree that research, analysis and documentation are vital for supporting peacebuilding work, such activities are in short supply. A number of organizations have stopped the production and distribution of their newsletters and magazines. Except for a few organizations, most lack support for their research, analysis and documentation capacities. This situation is often blamed on the unwillingness of donors to fund support activities.

Workshops and Conferences

There is a prevalence of workshops and conferences as the model for capacity building. While these meetings often contribute to networking, their value in addressing institutional shortcomings is limited. Such
events are often expensive to organize (in terms of time and money), are usually short one-off events that deal with a disparate range of subjects, often without the benefit of accumulated knowledge, and there is often no means to ensure sustained follow-up of these activities. Capacity building requires large infusions of funds. However, experience on the ground suggests that there is no relationship between funds available to an organization and its performance. Thus, though necessary, money is hardly sufficient for creating capacity. What seems critical in building capacity is the absorptive capacity of an organization to handle large amounts of money without being overwhelmed.

**Networks as a Preferred Peacebuilding Model**

On the whole, it would appear that consortiums and networks often have greater potential for peacebuilding than organizations acting alone. Such networks have the weight of numbers, provide a resource pool for members, enhance the capacity of weaker/smaller actors, improve the quality of training, encourage complementary action and, in volatile political situations, provide protection for members who are in danger of government harassment. The network model of intervention is fast growing, particularly among semiformal organizations and CBOs. This model prevails in Central Africa, parts of West Africa, particularly among the Mano River countries, and is rapidly catching on in Southern and East Africa. There is also an increasing desire to network at the local, national, regional, and international levels. Through networking, efforts are made to adapt lessons from elsewhere, broaden and expose African perspectives on peacebuilding and expand the repertoire of conflict transformation techniques. This has perhaps developed furthest in Uganda, where actors have fused foreign and local approaches, creating hybrid models for reconciliation and peacebuilding at the local level. In South Africa, ACCORD and ISS have developed a model for conflict management with continent-wide application. Elsewhere in West and East Africa, there are attempts to produce manuals to guide peace work. One important question, however, is whether documentation of local initiatives will adversely affect the flexibility that enables peace workers to adapt new techniques to new circumstances.

**Limited Networking Among Intergovernmental Actors**

Although the benefits of networking seem self-evident, there is minimal networking among subregional actors. This is in spite of states having multiple memberships in various intergovernmental organizations. This is attributed to a lack of human and financial resources to facilitate cross-fertilization. Yet all organizations surveyed indicated a greater desire to share information on peace and security issues. Access to, an understanding of, and support for the OAU mechanism for conflict prevention, management and resolution, and mechanisms being developed by ECOWAS, SADC, IGAD, EAC, ECCAS, and COMESA, are all crucial to strengthening regional mechanisms.

**CBOs as the Weakest Link**

Compared to the OAU and subregional organizations, networking was more practiced and had greater positive results among semiformal and community-based actors. However, CBOs form the weakest link in the chain of institutions dealing with peacebuilding in Africa. They are often severely limited in their capacities and rely more on the support of semiformal institutions for their institutional capacity and program activities. CBOs, though, tend to be more cohesive, an attribute inspired by a sense of shared community values. Nonetheless, the practice of conflict management tends to be deeply rooted among CBOs, as each community already possesses its own rich experience and local conflict management mechanisms. Because local communities are often the theaters of conflict, the involvement of CBOs in conflict management is crucial. More could be done to augment the capacities of CBOs, starting with the most rudimentary of their needs: providing office space from which they can run their activities—a capacity that most CBOs lack.

**Gap Between Civic Actors and Intergovernmental Actors**

Critically absent in peacebuilding in Africa is networking between intergovernmental organiza-
tions and civic actors. Bridging this gap is critical to enhancing partnerships for peace, as illustrated by the Djibouti-led Somali reconciliation and peace process. Although this process has failed so far to bring peace to Somalia, it highlighted the potential of involving both political and civic actors in the search for peace. Most civil society actors felt that governments are still uncomfortable with their role and remain reluctant to give them access to their decisionmaking processes. Civil society actors in West and East Africa are, however, playing a role in developing the early warning systems of ECOWAS and IGAD respectively.

6.2 Recommendations

a) An Enabling Political Environment

Owing to the complex and intricate nature of conflicts in Africa, it is clear that peacebuilding requires political commitment and a willingness on the part of states to create an enabling environment within which other actors can pursue peace. In spite of the difficulties facing African governments, they remain critical entry points for addressing conflicts and crises on the continent. Compared to other actors, governments often have more capacity, especially as far as security is concerned. They can thus support or subvert peacebuilding work. The role of governments assumes greater significance given the regional nature of conflicts. Thus, encouraging states to support regional initiatives is critical. At the same time, holding governments accountable for ensuring good governance is a necessary step to opening up political space for other non-state actors. The role of governments in facilitating an enabling environment raises the question of how to help create the right partnerships between states and NGOs. Supporting interaction between states, subregional organizations and non-state actors, in the form of consultative meetings, would go some way in initiating dialogue between these three sectors and forging partnerships among them. The OAU–Civil Society conference in Addis Ababa in June 2001, funded by the Ford Foundation, has been applauded as an activity that could help bridge the gap of mutual suspicion between governments and civil society.

b) Institutional Capacity Building

Organizational Development

In all of the regions surveyed, there is a need to facilitate the clarification of organizational vision, mandate, and objectives and to link these to available human and technical resources, create structures that can carry out stated objectives, and help actors establish monitoring and evaluation capacities. This can be done through institutional strengthening grants.

More specifically, organizations at each level seem to have their particular needs. At the subregional level, organizations are at different levels of development and emphasize different aspects of peacebuilding in accordance with their mandates and the needs on the ground. The need to strengthen the capacity of the conflict management center at the OAU to enable it to coordinate the activities of subregional organizations in the security field is paramount. In all cases, the development of effective early warning and response mechanisms is critical in supporting peacebuilding activities in Africa.

CBOs: Institutionalization Versus Program Flexibility

At the community level, institutionalization may threaten the flexibility of CBOs to respond to needs on the ground. The dilemma that this raises is whether institutionalization can occur without creating inflexibility. One way of catering for the varied needs of CBOs is to have a focal point to facilitate their activities and to link them to donors and key decision makers. These functions can be located within the focal point in the country or regional office of the Ford Foundation, which is accessible to CBOs and able to make decisions that can facilitate their activities. The MCC-ARLIP model in Uganda is a good one which could be adapted elsewhere.

Support for Existing Program Activities

The Ford Foundation could provide core funding for the most effective of these organizations, which would release program money for the implementation of
activities on the ground. Such support could take any of the following three forms: (i) provide core funding for administrative costs, which would stabilize staff and key programs; (ii) match funds with another division (for instance, grants related to human rights monitoring could be matched with grants from the division on security and/or development, or by funds from another donor); (iii) support secondment positions within organizations, especially technical positions such as in grant making. Funding core areas would release qualified personnel to concentrate on program implementation.

**Fund Support Activities**

There is a critical need to facilitate support activities, the most critical of which is research. This is especially important in view of the state of academia in Africa today. For a long time, centers of excellence were located within academic institutions. However, the current degeneration and political interference in these institutions necessitates looking beyond them. Semi-formal actors, who are increasingly becoming interlocutors between society and the state, and between the state and the wider international community, are in need of strengthening to perform these tasks. Supporting the creation and consolidation of documentation, analysis and dissemination of information is critical to supporting peacebuilding in Africa. The creation of a research fund and would go a long way in supporting activities relating to generating reliable and qualitative information.

**Creating a Pool of Expertise**

The Ford Foundation can help put together or contract a capable organization to create a pool of expertise that can be called upon to offer services to any of the organizations surveyed, on the basis of carefully defined criteria related to need and potential. This can be organized in the form of visitorship programs of between three months to two years. Such a program would benefit from experts in the large and expanding Africa diaspora, many of whose members are keen to contribute to Africa’s recovery. Experts in this pool would include program analysts and people skilled in negotiation, arbitration, human rights monitoring, information technology and grant generation. Such experts would work with organizations in Africa to help them build their capacity. The Commonwealth model, which involves sending experts, upon request, to organizations for periods of up to two years, is one that can be adapted to enhance the peacebuilding capacity of African organizations.

c) Dissemination and Utilization Component

**A Concert of Donors**

The scale of intervention this report envisages goes well beyond the capacity of any single donor. These recommendations would require a group of donors to implement. These strategies could be undertaken in concert with other donors. It is proposed that this report be shared with as many interested donors as possible, including bilateral and multilateral donors. The information and recommendations within this report can then benefit other donors working in this area. For instance, a number of bilateral and multilateral donors, including the World Bank, UNDP, DFID, among others, have formed a consortium to examine ways of dealing with the reconstruction of the Great Lakes region.

**African Institutions**

Another potential audience for this report is African governments, which are critical stakeholders in the search for peace on the continent but also key actors in facilitating an enabling environment for the activities of other actors. In addition, this report should also be shared with regional and subregional organizations, semiformal actors and CBOs in Africa, particularly those surveyed in this report. This survey can provide a basis for reflecting on their capacities and may provide opportunities for their improvement. It should also be made available to scholars in this area, particularly to help advance peace studies in Africa.

**Dissemination Strategy**

For wider dissemination, this report should be distributed in both print and electronic form. It could also be
presented to other targeted audiences in the form of briefing papers.

**A Concluding Note**

This project generated enormous enthusiasm across sub-Saharan Africa, particularly because the Ford Foundation has built impressive credibility in Africa as a donor involved in capacity building in various fields and at different levels. The general feeling is that a comprehensive Ford Foundation strategy would lead other donors toward a more systematic approach to supporting peacebuilding in Africa. Compared to bilateral or multilateral agencies, which are constrained by governmental procedures, the Ford Foundation enjoys the flexibility that can enable it to blaze this trail in both conceptual and practical terms. The hope is that Ford’s special initiative for Africa will be able to derive some useful insights from this report in developing its own strategies for building and strengthening the capacity of African organizations to bring peace to a troubled continent.
Appendix I
The Infrastructure of Africa: Strategies and Activities of Semi-Formal and Community-Based Organizations

This section is a companion to Part Four of the report and covers the strategies and activities of 78 semi-formal and community-based organizations in Africa.

Appendix I: Section I
Semiformal organizations

a) Semiformal organizations in West Africa: Strategies and Activities

The role of religious leaders and women’s groups in West Africa

Semi-formal actors in West Africa are building their activities within and across core constituencies. In the Mano River Union countries, religious leaders and women’s groups engaged in peacebuilding have institutionalized their activities by forming structures to address specific conflict needs. In part, because these organizations relate directly to local constituencies, they enjoy a tremendous amount of moral authority and capacity to frame the needs of populations for conflict resolution, peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction.

Religious Leadership

The Interfaith Council of Liberia (IFCL), the Catholic Justice and Peace Commission (JPC), and the Inter-Religious Council of Sierra Leone (IRCSL) have engaged in conflict management in their respective countries and may constitute an untapped subregional civil society network for peacebuilding.

In Liberia, the IFCL, created to mediate between the warring parties in the Liberian civil war in 1990, drafted what became the first ECOWAS peace plan while the JPC has built up a wealth of experience in providing human rights education and monitoring, and in peacebuilding and relief activities. The IFCL employs church-based structures and Islamic centers to facilitate conflict resolution and to empower local communities through training in conflict management skills. The IFCL has cultivated wide appeal and extensive networks in communities across Liberia, as well as carried out peace education and provided trauma counseling for victims of conflict. Focusing on human rights advocacy, the JPC office in Gbarnga spearheads conflict management and peace education programs and trains youths in producing drama with peace messages for live street performances and radio production. Its programs extend to Nimba county and, until 2001, Lofa county, where its program offices were closed due to fighting between government forces and rebels of the group Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD). Located strategically in rural Liberia and working mainly with rural communities, the Gbarnga Diocese office has played a useful role in conflict management and peace education in Liberia.

The IRCSL is regarded as a highly impartial, neutral and independent mediator in Sierra Leone. Seeking primarily to promote peace and national reconciliation, it represents the initiative of the Muslim and Christian religious communities to end the civil war. It has facilitated dialogue between the government and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), was actively involved in peace talks in Lomé in 1999, and has programs on human rights, democratization, disarmament, and reintegration, especially of child soldiers and children affected by war. IRCSL is also promoting the use of traditional conflict management techniques.

Women’s Networks

An interesting development in civil society across the continent, is the phenomenon of women’s groups organizing around peace. In West Africa, the Mano River Women’s Peace Network (MRWPN) a subregional civil society organization, grew out of a strategy meeting of civil society women in MRU.
countries held in Abuja, Nigeria, in May 2000. The **Liberia Women Initiative (LWI)** was established at the height of the Liberian civil war in 1994, primarily to promote women’s participation in the Liberian peace process and to address the welfare of women and children during the conflict. Both organizations are building networks; MRWPN at the subregional level and LWI at the local level.

**Liberia Women Initiative’s (LWI) conflict management** and peacebuilding programs are executed under its “Bridges to Peace” project and operate within ten communities in Monrovia, and the counties of Sinoe, Maryland, Nimba, Grand Gedeh and lower Lofa. The project trains local leaders, drawn from community-based organizations (CBOs), in conflict management and peacebuilding skills. In turn, the trainees impart these skills and sensitize their communities. The LWI encourages and facilitates the creation and growth of CBOs.

Launched in Monrovia in 2001, MRWPN has attempted to facilitate a meeting of Heads of State of the MRU countries and to seek ways of resolving the ongoing conflicts in the subregion. Other objectives of the Network include: ensuring effective participation of women from Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone in the Mano River Union and ECOWAS peace processes; and devising better strategies in prevention, reconciliation, and reconstruction efforts; promoting democratization. Clearly the MRWPN has the potential to become an influential player in conflict management and resolution in the MRU.

**Peacebuilding through peace education**

Activities that facilitate coexistence and peacebuilding in West Africa are critical for reducing conflict and tension. Many of the organizations surveyed employed strategies for nurturing good governance and democratization through peace education. Broadly, these strategies leverage conflict management training in order to sensitize populations and to empower local actors toward effective conflict resolution. Organizations in the MRU are expanding their efforts across borders, particularly on the Sierra Leone and Guinea border, in order to address the flow of refugees across borders. These organizations are also focused on democratization and good governance, largely in an advocacy capacity as well as by forging strong networks and partnerships.

The Freetown-based **Campaign for Good Governance (CGG)** was established in July 1996 to promote democracy, empower civil society, redress gender imbalances, and promote human rights in Sierra Leone. The CGG’s approach to conflict management has been through peace education, organizing training workshops and symposia for various sectors of civil society, and sensitizing and creating public awareness. Its main strategy is maintaining and exploring the use of informal contacts through visits between parties in conflict.

In Liberia, the **Center for Democratic Empowerment (CEDE)** is developing a trainer’s guide for practitioners to standardize and offer a unified approach to conflict management. Besides building partnerships and facilitating consultations among civil society groups in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, CEDE has formed a common front for peace in the Mano River basin. CEDE is currently operating out of Côte d’Ivoire due to attacks on its staff by Liberian security agents.

Two organizations with sophisticated peace training methodologies in Sierra Leone are the **Network Movement for Justice and Development (NMJD) and Conciliation Resources/Sierra Leone (CRSL)**. NMJD started as a development NGO based in Kenema district, before turning to peace education and conflict management and moving its headquarters to Freetown following the outbreak of the civil war in 1991. In facilitating peacebuilding, the NMJD uses “external animators”—field monitors who provide skills training to improve the knowledge base of community representatives to enable them to act as peace monitors. The NMJD coordinates its activities through Task Force Units and emphasizes a multidimensional approach to conflict management, incorporating peace education, trauma-healing and development education. The CRSL is an arm of an international NGO, the London-based Conciliation Resources, but it relies on local staff and addresses local concerns. The organization’s activities

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124 On this and other organizations in Liberia, see Augustine Toure, Peacebuilding and National Reconciliation in Liberia, (New York: International Peace Academy, April 2002).
are concentrated in the communities most severely affected by Sierra Leone's civil war. A CRSL Program Officer and core training staff provide training in conflict management and peace education for peace monitors drawn from within local communities. The peace monitors then use their newly acquired skills to mediate in local conflicts and undertake peace education.

Both of these organizations —NMJD and CRSL— have had an impact on peace processes beyond their training programs. NMJD held a consultation on diamonds and the Sierra Leone war. It also launched the campaign for “Just Mining” to create public awareness and to influence policy reform in the mining sector particularly highlighting the role of diamonds in fueling the civil war. These efforts were reportedly important in the adoption of a resolution 1306 by the UN Security Council in July 2000, which prohibited the export of uncertified diamonds from Sierra Leone. The CRSL has embarked on research, investigation and analysis of conflicts. It has sought to create linkages between communities and donors; mobilize resources; and provide training to assist community development.

As conflicts in West Africa continue, and the flow of refugees increases, particularly in the MRU, efforts to address refugee issues are of growing importance. Since 1996, ABC Development (ABC), a Sierra Leone-based organization, has recently been working with refugee communities on the Guinean side of the border. ABC programs aim to prepare host communities to receive and assist refugees and to facilitate peaceful coexistence between the host population and refugees. It runs a literacy and conflict resolution center at one of its main sites in Forecariah, which hosts the largest refugee community in Guinea. This center provides trauma-counseling services for refugees, empowers both refugees and the host community with conflict management skills, and encourages confidence-building through workshops between refugees and host communities. Such meetings are key in the sensitization and the dissemination of information.

State, society and partnerships

Several Guinean civil society organizations engaged in peacebuilding and conflict management, are directly linked with government. This is a reflection of Guinea’s strong nationalist fervor, inherited from its first president Sékou Touré. A prominent Guinean organization, the Lansana Conté Foundation (named after Guinea’s current head of state) is concerned with promoting peace in the MRU states, particularly by fostering harmony among Guinea’s diverse ethnic groups. The foundation is a private initiative with links to Guinean leader, Lansana Conté. This is in line with a pattern of society-state relations in Guinea, where the distinction between civil society and the government is sometimes blurred, and where an organization’s survival is almost impossible without the government’s blessing. This has direct implications for the sustainability of civil society in Guinea, perhaps requiring investment from donors in order to strengthen the capacity for independent NGOs.

However, despite the interdependence of the state and civil society in Guinea, several organizations are forging effective horizontal partnerships across civil society. The National Committee for Action and Reflection for Peace in the MRU States (CORAPEM) emerged out of a series of roundtable discussions initiated by the Lansana Conté Foundation for Peace in March 2001 and attended by forty-six civil society groups. CORAPEM’s membership has expanded to include about fifty civil society groups, many of which are leading institutions in conflict management and peacebuilding in Guinea. Its immediate task is to forge effective partnerships among civil society groups to promote peace in the MRU. CORAPEM seeks to achieve this through its two commissions: the Commission on Sensitization and Information, and the Commission on Negotiation and Mediation and the Settlement of Conflict.

The Organization for the Defense of Human Rights (OGDH) in Guinea has also built useful partnerships with communities across the country, and established networks with a host of international organizations dealing with conflict management. The OGDH basically documents human rights violations and conducts training for civil society groups in human rights education and monitoring. Conflict management and peace education also form part of its core activities.

This pattern of coalition-building extends into other MRU states. In Sierra Leone, the Civil Society
Movement (CSM) established in December 1998, is a consortium of over a dozen organizations. The CSM emerged after January 1999 when it mobilized civil society and public opinion against the RUF invasion of Freetown. In May 2000, in conjunction with members of the Sierra Leone Parliament, CSM organized a public demonstration to protest the slow pace of disarmament. Following the protest, RUF leader Foday Sankoh was arrested and charged along with other key RUF lieutenants for the deaths of some nineteen protesters. From a pressure group, the CSM developed into a full-fledged organization with defined structures and a mission to promote peace and national reconciliation. The CSM’s organizational outreach is spreading throughout Sierra Leone and its activities are carried out mainly among local communities. The organization’s main innovation is its experiment with indigenous practices of conflict management, which it intends to build upon and use as a set of core tools for its peace work.

Nigeria’s Policy-Making Peace Infrastructure

The survey covered five organizations in Nigeria, focusing on policy and research. These organizations serve as a focal point for developing relevant conflict management policy for West Africa and beyond. They are situated in a unique position, often linked to the Nigerian government or spearheaded by high-profile individuals with a subregional or regional perspective.

The African Center for Development and Strategic Studies (ACDESS) is a multidisciplinary center comprising about fifty scholars conducting research on diverse policy issues affecting the African continent. The organization is headed by a prominent scholar and former Executive Secretary of the UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), Professor Adebayo Adedeji. ACDESS is currently involved in research on policy and practical issues relating to conflict prevention. This research focuses on security and development issues in Africa and studies on these issues as well as special country studies on Nigeria and South Africa have been published.

The Lagos-based African Strategic and Peace Research Group (AFSTRAG), established in 1992, is a research NGO concerned with strategic and human security problems in Africa. The scope of AFSTRAG’s research is wide-ranging, including disarmament, defense studies, demilitarization, conflict studies, gender issues, governance, security, development, and cross-border crime. AFSTRAG, in conjunction with a forum of twenty-six West African NGOs, has embarked on a project aimed at assisting ECOWAS to develop an early warning system. Related to this, AFSTRAG has plans to coordinate the activities of civil society groups to participate in the four observation zones of ECOWAS’ early warning system (see Part Three). It plans to use satellite networks for this work, after establishing two coordinating offices in Freetown and Dakar. AFSTRAG is also working with ECOWAS and the Accord de Non-Aggression et d’Assistance en Matière de Défense (ANAD) to develop a common security mechanism system. In April 2000, AFSTRAG met with staff of the ANAD secretariat to discuss plans to integrate ANAD into ECOWAS’ security mechanism. Within this framework, AFSTRAG aims to provide the ECOWAS Mediation and Security Council with policy options for managing subregional conflicts. To facilitate these activities, AFSTRAG is planning to establish an office in Abuja, with three staff, to ensure closer proximity to the ECOWAS Secretariat.

The Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA) is one of the oldest institutions on the continent. Established in 1963, it was designed to serve as a foreign policy think-tank and was modeled on Britain’s Royal Institute of International Affairs and America’s Council on Foreign Relations. One of the Institute’s key mandates is to educate the Nigerian public on foreign policy issues. In 2001, NIIA conducted some training...
programs for members of Nigeria’s National Assembly on governance and foreign policy issues, which were funded by Germany’s Friedrich Ebert Foundation. NIIA has also organized practical workshops on boundary disputes between Nigeria and its neighbors Chad and Niger. NIIA has organized lectures, conferences and roundtables on security and other issues.

Formally known as the Sani Abacha Foundation for Peace, the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution (IPCR) was founded in June 1999. Funded fully by Nigeria’s Ministry of Integration and Cooperation, and housed within the Office of the President, the IPCR has a mandate to monitor conflict situations in Africa (Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Democratic Republic of Congo and Uganda) and to generate policy prescriptions for managing them. It has four departments, which focus on: international negotiation; security; democracy and development; and policy analysis. IPCR pursues its goals through a series of seminars held on such topics as the African Union, ethnicity and globalization, and Practical Solutions for Conflict Resolution in Africa. It organized one event with Human Rights Africa in September 2000. The participants at these events include scholars, government officials, diplomats, the press and members of the general public. Since its inception, the institute has held about ten seminars.

Connect Synergy (CS) a Nigerian organization that focuses exclusively on conflict management, is involved in research and training. CS’s unique contribution to peacebuilding is that it seeks to strengthen and promote the use of traditional networks of conflict prevention, management and to create a standardized tool kit to be used by mediators across the region. To that end, CS organizes workshops and seminars on conflict management at the community level, conducts research and publishes its work. In its work at the community level which includes in Nigeria’s oil-producing Niger Delta, CS has forged a partnership with the West African Network for Peacebuilding, one of the most dynamic subregional networks of organizations dealing with issues of conflict management. Out of this partnership has emerged a project to produce a manual incorporating traditional knowledge about conflict management for community-based practitioners. The pilot survey for this project seeks to investigate the informal mechanisms used by communities in reconciliation and plans to involve about one hundred Nigerian traditional leaders. The organization also hopes to create a database on conflict areas and tension spots and to undertake training. As part of its partnership with Nigerian government institutions including the Ministry of Justice, Connect Synergy has created a mediation center that it hopes will eventually be used to document traditional understandings of conflicts and their management.

b) Semiformal organizations in Southern Africa: Activities and Strategies

South Africa’s Policy-Making Infrastructure

Three South African organizations that engage in policy research and training on issues related to conflict resolution, are the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), the African Institute of South Africa (AISA) and the Center for Conflict Resolution (CCR). These agencies are all high-profile, have broad mandates, usually beyond South Africa, and network with a large number of international donors, perhaps reflecting the hope and generally favorable attitude associated with South Africa internationally.

It should be noted that these organizations share the research and policy terrain with other institutions in Southern Africa, namely Zimbabwean organizations such as the Center for Defense Studies (CDS), the Southern African Regional Institute for Policy Studies (SARIPS), and Botswana’s African Renaissance Institute (ARI). These institutions are part of broader subregional partnerships.

The AISA focuses primarily on political, socioeconomic, international and development research in Africa. AISA’s mission commits it to knowledge production, education, training and the promotion of awareness of Africa, for Africans and the international community. Its method for achieving this is through policy analysis, collection, processing, interpretation, and dissemination of information. AISA’s clients include the government of South Africa; foreign...
missions; the academic and research community; NGOs and civil society; the business community; schools; and subregional organizations such as SADC. AISA depends on its research fellows, currently about sixty-five in number, to undertake its research activities in the areas of African studies, political parties, party systems and governance in Africa; the African renaissance, regional peace and security, globalization, regional integration, and South Africa’s foreign policy in Africa. AISA has an invaluable reference library holding more than sixty thousand volumes. It has managed to recruit new black staff and is led by a black director.

The Institute for Security Studies (ISS) is an established regional think-tank with offices in Pretoria, Cape Town and Maputo. Among its major achievements is its subregional capacity-building work on civil-military relations in the Southern African region and its work with South Africa’s Department of Defense, parliamentarians and academia within SADC. ISS has also worked closely with the OAU and has been able to publish books and reports based on seminars involving a wide range of actors from across the continent.

The Center for Conflict Resolution (CCR) was created in the 1980s and started off as the Center for Inter-Group Studies. Its activities in post-apartheid South Africa have grown to include training, mediation, facilitation and public consultation, and research policy advocacy. Its beneficiaries include Southern African governments and research and scholarly constituencies. It has worked with the Western Cape Education Department, the Western Cape Correctional Services and the South African Police Services in the Western Cape. At the national level, CCR has worked with the Department of Defense, the Department of Foreign Affairs, the Department of Intelligence and the Ministry of Water Affairs and Forestry.

Enhancing dialogue through research in Southern Africa

To augment ongoing research, Southern African organizations, often working in relation to a network affiliation, employ a policy dialogue strategy in order to influence government and military actors. One of the more prominent institutions engaged in this type of work is the Southern African Regional Institute for Policy Studies (SARIPS), based in Zimbabwe. SARIPS is the research and training arm of the Southern African Political Economy Series (SAPES) Trust, whose principal mandate is to nurture and promote indigenous capacity in the social sciences and the enhancement of the policymaking capacity of African states. SARIPS’ goal is to promote and deepen the exchange of ideas between practitioners and scholars through discourse and building capacity for advocacy activities in Southern Africa. The policy dialogue strategy is aimed at facilitating intellectual discourse by organizing meetings, seminars, conferences and workshops for exchanging ideas and experience and influencing the policy framework in Southern Africa. The dialogue activities provide an essential forum for SARIPS’ research and training programs and brings together network members from academia, practitioners, civic and private organizations involved in policy formulation, implementation and evaluation. Papers and proceedings from the dialogue sessions are published as monographs, occasional papers, articles and chapters in books that are used as reference material for training, research and further dialogue activities.

National and Subregional Efforts

National

The South African organization, Mediation and Transformation Practice (MTP), established in 1998, considers itself to be an African-oriented conflict resolution and facilitation unit, embracing the values of democracy, constructive conflict resolution and development of people and society. The MTP considers itself to be a community-based organization and works mostly with various government departments, local governmental agencies, local organizations such as the Quaker Peace Center (QPC), and South African universities. MTP has a number of partnerships in North America, largely due to cooperation with the Ploughshares Conflict Transformation Institute in Canada.

The Quaker Peace Center (QPC) is a small South
African NGO working locally in the Western Cape region and focusing on local modules of conflict management, peace education, community development and youth issues. However, QPC sometimes extends these modules to the national and subregional levels by working with other provinces in South Africa and other communities in Southern Africa. At the national level, QPC has participated in the South African Defense Review, where it lobbied and advocated for a reduction in military spending. Through its Youth Program, QPC has been involved with the National Youth Commission and the South African Youth Clubs Association. QPC also works closely with the South African National NGO Coalition (SANGOCO), a coalition of South African NGOs that work in a range of areas such as poverty, anti-racism, gender and employment. Regionally, QPC has worked in Burundi and plans in the near future to work in Angola. The organization claims to have increased cooperation in the area of conflict management with similar institutions at the subregional level and has committed itself to work with Quakers in Africa to develop peace initiatives on the continent.

Subregional

The African Center for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) is one of the largest and fastest-growing NGOs in South Africa dealing with a range of conflict-related issues. ACCORD has developed a peace model recognized by the United Nations as viable for Africa. This model focuses based on three key areas: intervention, training, and research. ACCORD’s current programs focus on conflict analysis and research; public-sector conflict management training; track-two diplomacy initiatives in Africa; peacekeeping training programs in all SADC countries; training for women in the Great Lakes region and the Horn of Africa; a preventive action program in SADC; and a program on constitutional development in Africa.

Established with assistance from the U.S.-based National Endowment for Democracy (NED), ACCORD has undertaken significant activities to transform the public sector into a dynamic, needs-based and proactive instrument. ACCORD also runs the Public Sector Conflict Management Program (PSCMP), which seeks to promote good governance in Africa through increasing the capacity to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts within the public sector.

The South Africa-based Institute for Security Studies (ISS) works through and with national, subregional, and regional organizations, most notably the OAU, in engaging debates within Africa. The scope of ISS’s programs is large and varied. It has nine major project areas, notably organized crime and corruption in SADC, African peace missions, AIDS as a regional security challenge, children in conflict, crime and justice in South Africa, African security analysis, security-sector transformation in SADC, crime information capacity building in Mozambique, and small arms management in Africa. On the international front, ISS has cooperation agreements with the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington D.C., the UN Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Cooperating Organization, and Saferworld. ISS programs are undertaken by a team of about twenty-five researchers. Some of these researchers have recently left ISS to form SAFER Africa

Created in 2001, the South African Conflict Prevention Network (SACPN) is a loose civic network that seeks to share information and expertise as a way of developing a common understanding and subregional identity with regard to conflict prevention and peacebuilding. It emerged from the activities of the Citizens Security Council (KATU), a network of Finnish NGOs that seeks to create a broad civic basis for preventing the outbreak and escalation of violent conflicts. Coordinated from Zambia, SACPN’s members are drawn from Angola, Bostwana, Lesotho, Namibia, Malawi, Mozambique, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. SACPN’s structure involves a Regional Steering Group, consisting of one representative from each member country, as well as National Conflict Prevention Networks or Reference Groups. The Steering Group is conceived as a planning and organizing unit for the activities of the network.

The Center for Defense and Security Management (CDSM), a South Africa-based organization aims to enhance effective democratic management of military
and security forces in South and Southern Africa by coordinating regional network institutions sharing the same vision of peace and regional security. The Southern African Defense and Security Management Network comprises the Center for Defense Studies at the University of Zimbabwe in Harare, the Center for Foreign Relations in Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, the Institute Sonadade e Administração at Eduardo Mondlane University in Mozambique, the Department of Political and Administrative Studies at the University of Namibia, and the Department of Politics and Administration at the University of Botswana. All the members of this network provide training and education for defense management and planning civil-military relations, peacebuilding, as well as management of peace missions, good governance, and transparency. The subregional inclusivity of CDSM is a factor that greatly enhances its legitimacy and credibility.

Building capacity for conflict management in Southern Africa and beyond

Several organizations work simultaneously in producing policy relevant research, advocacy and capacity building. While space does not allow for a comprehensive report of the full range of these activities, it is worth noting that these various endeavors positively affect capacity for conflict management in Southern Africa and beyond. Activities target governmental, civil society and local constituencies. They range from dissemination of peace and democratization curricula to broad consultations at the subregional level. For example, in 1994, ACCORD hosted the first seminar on election violence in the run-up to South Africa’s democratic elections and brought civil society leaders together in war-torn Somalia. It also developed a conflict studies curriculum for undergraduates at the University of the Western Cape and the University of Durban, Westville, as well as producing a training manual on conflict resolution for paralegals in South Africa.

In Botswana, the African Renaissance Institute (ARI) aims to serve as a vehicle for Africa’s researchers and development workers to marshal and deploy a critical mass of able people dedicated to Africa’s political and economic recovery. ARI is a product of two years of consultations and organizational work with African governments and civil society organizations to promote the effective mobilization and networking of Africa’s human resources and intellectual wealth. ARI seeks to bolster the capacities of Africans to resolve their own problems in the areas of poverty and deprivation; technological backwardness; financial and economic dependence; private-sector enterprise development; and youth and women. To undertake the research required in these sectors, ARI has established a council of African consultants and development workers. The organization works with African governments, African development institutions and the private sector. ARI is currently building a database of important African development endeavors, and establishing systems for monitoring individual national economies and providing advance warnings to governments and international financial institutions about the economic crises facing African states.

Tomorrow’s Peacekeepers Today: Training in Conflict Management

Southern Africa’s semiformal organizations share a common agenda for ‘homegrown’ solutions to African conflicts. The SADC Regional Peacekeeping Training Center (RPTC) in Zimbabwe and ACCORD in South Africa have engaged in full-fledged peacekeeping and electoral monitoring training. The Zambian NGO, Mindolo Ecumenical Foundation (MEF) runs a peacebuilding and conflict transformation module and the Center for Conflict Resolution (CCR) in South Africa has trained police forces in Malawi.

The overall aim of the SADC Regional Peacekeeping Training Center (RPTC) in Zimbabwe is capacity building, specifically by supporting subregional cooperation in peace and security in Southern Africa and by building SADC’s capacity in conflict prevention, conflict management and peace support operations. RPTC seeks to achieve these objectives through training peacekeeping practitioners; facilitating the participation of all SADC countries in peace support operations; and assisting SADC in planning peacekeeping ventures. The RPTC is widely perceived among stakeholders in Southern Africa as having great potential to build capacity for conflict management and peacekeeping. So far it has assisted SADC’s
Interstate Defense and Security Committee (ISDSC) to promote cohesive subregional security policies. Zimbabwe, the host country of RPTC, is responsible for the implementation of RPTC's programs through the Zimbabwean Ministry of Defense. The rights and obligations of the host country as well as the lines of communications between RPTC and SADC have, however, not always been clear. The termination of RPTC's funding by the Danish government in 2001, following instability in Zimbabwe, has put the future of the organization in question.

In 1995, ACCORD helped train South African election monitors and also trained South African Foreign Affairs cadets, establishing a peacekeeping training program for them. ACCORD's first seminar on SADC Peacekeeping in Africa was hosted in 1995. By 1996, ACCORD’s training had expanded to Zambia, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Mauritius, Swaziland, Sudan, Ethiopia, Burundi and Mozambique. It is hard to gauge how effective and successful these programs have been and they have yet been thoroughly evaluated. Support from both the UN and the OAU has legitimize ACCORD’s involvement beyond South Africa.

The Zambia-based Mindolo Ecumenical Foundation's (MEF) peacebuilding and conflict transformation courses target peace workers at the national, community and family levels. In addition, the Foundation offers a university certificate program on peacebuilding and conflict resolution. With support from the Eastern Mennonite University in the United States, MEF is restructuring itself into the Africa Peace Institute (API). API seeks to combine the theory and practice of conflict management within the African continent as a means of creating a critical mass of actors that can help manage conflicts across the continent. The organization draws an average of thirty participants annually from across Africa. In addition to its full-time staff are six part-time lecturers, all of whom are holders of at least a master's degree in conflict resolution. Several of these lecturers have been part of teams involved in negotiations in the DRC Lusaka Accords of 1999.

The South Africa-based Center for Conflict Resolution (CCR) has helped train police forces in Namibia and Zimbabwe and worked with Swaziland's Regional Security and Human Rights committees; ruling and opposition parties in Malawi; the Lesotho government and its interim political authority and security services; the SADC secretariat and the OAU.

**Formalizing informal institutions in Angola and Mozambique**

In Angola, twenty-seven years of war, social upheaval, and a persistent climate of fear and suspicion have limited the development of substantial local capacity to deal with conflicts. However, political openings, in particular the approval of a new constitution safeguarding democratic liberties, encouraged the growth of civil society. A number of NGOs, initially concerned with humanitarian and development projects, have expanded programs into civic education and human rights activities. However, lack of institutional capacity to enable organizations to map out strategies and programs of action, combined with a volatile political environment, have constrained the effectiveness of these actors. Of all countries in this survey, Angola has the least number of semiformal organizations. Instead, there are movements and working groups that are advocating for sustainable peace and collaborating in organizing activities such as conferences, workshops, and talk shows to raise popular awareness about the issues. These groups had urged for a peaceful solution to the Angolan conflict and put pressure on the government and UNITA to resume negotiations before the death of Jonas Savimbi in February 2002. However, these networks are fragile and informal, with little or no chance of long-term survival in Angola's uncertain political environment. A critical challenge facing them is how to create solid and sustainable structures and organizations.

The church has attempted to mediate between government forces and UNITA rebels in Angola. However, its capacity is limited because it has to wait to be invited by the parties to the conflict before it can mediate. This means it often fails to maintain momentum. Apart from the church, there are a number of foreign NGOs, previously confined to development and humanitarian activities, which have incorporated peace initiatives into their agendas. Key among these are Accao para o
Desenvolvimento Rural e Ambiente (ADRA), Forum das ONGs Angolanas (FONGA), Grupo Angolano para a Promocaov da Paz (GAP), Grupo Angolano sobre Reflexao para a Paz (GARP), Center for Common Ground (CCG) and Development Workshop. While these actors have the capacity to engage in conflict management, they often lack the legitimacy. According to most Angolans, the peace process should be owned and managed by local actors. Therefore, the potential of these organizations to support and strengthen local groups needs to be explored. The dominance of international NGOs raises the question of the relationship between international and local capacity and by extension the more fundamental issue of the extent to which such organizations are building the capacity of local actors. A particular challenge facing civil society in Angola is the politicization of the civil society sector. In many cases, political leaders are also part of the civic movement. In other cases, personnel in the civil society sector have worked for the government in the past or continue to do so. While this overlap in roles can create avenues for policy influence and advocacy, it presents peculiar challenges related to maintaining neutrality, harmony and unity, as in the case of Guinea in West Africa. Such a situation also carries the potential of creating conflicts of interest.

In Mozambique, conflict management organizations are, with the exception of the Christian Council of Mozambique, a recent development. They have emerged in an attempt to engage in the reconstruction of Mozambique after the civil war of 1975-1991 as well as to address the violence related to the elections of 1999. Central to the Mozambique peace movement is the question of how to support sustainable peace. Semiformal organizations in Mozambique focus on a variety of issues. For instance, the Christian Council of Mozambique (CCM) engages in peacebuilding work. It has been promoting dialogue between the ruling Frelimo and the opposition Renamo party. Campanha Terra addresses issues of land use as a way of preventing land-related conflicts. It does this by using both informal and formal mechanisms to address grievances as they arise. The Institute for Democracy (IPADE), the Eduardo Mondlane Foundation, the Center for Studies and Development, and the Movement for Peace and Citizenship (MPPC) deal with issues related to citizenship, political participation, civic education, safeguarding democracy, and constitutional rights during political transition. The Organization for Community Conflict Resolution (OREC) and Ethics (ETICA) try to promote integrity in public life and also to curb increasing governmental corruption.

Activities of networks and umbrella organizations go beyond national boundaries. Most of these actors are ecumenical organizations such as the All Africa Conference of Churches (AACC), the Fellowship of Christian Councils and Churches in the Great Lakes and Horn of Africa (FECCCLAHA), the Central Africa Confederation of Churches and NGOs (CONGAC), and the African Network of Ecumenical Organizations (ANEN). Also falling under this category are women’s organizations. These include the Eastern Africa Subregional Support Initiative for the Advancement of Women (EASSIAW), Women Involved in Law and Development in Africa (WILDAF), Women as Partners for Peace in Africa (WOPPA) and the Ligue de Défense des Droits de la Personne dans la Région des Grands Lacs (LDGL). Ecumenical organizations often have greater leverage and impact on conflict resolution and peacebuilding activities than smaller NGOs. They enjoy the goodwill of governmental authorities, who are often afraid of the power churches have over their followers. In addition, these organizations define themselves as apolitical, which casts them as neutral brokers, and increases their legitimacy among all actors.

Networking and consorting have become the preferred modes of operation in Central Africa. This enhances program effectiveness and outreach, and cushions actors from persecution by government authorities. While these networks are large, cover huge geographical scope and have improved the performance of civil society organizations (CSOs), they are relatively fluid and still in a formative stage. These networks face three major constraints. First, they lack proper coordination.
and have failed to initiate activities to promote and strengthen coalitions of CSOs in peacebuilding; they are also weakened by redundancy and competition among affiliated organizations. Second, while these groups operate within the same conflict system, each country has a different social, political and economic reality, presenting different challenges for peacebuilding. Language is one such challenge. A member of the Great Lakes network, Conseil Nationale des ONG et Développement (CNONGD) from a Francophone country pointed to difficulties in exchanging information with counterparts in Rwanda. Increasingly, Rwanda is adopting English and Kiswahili as its official languages, while French is still the language used by most NGOs in Burundi and the DRC.

The third constraint facing civil society networks in Central Africa is the fact that the Kinshasa government is uncomfortable with Congolese civil society groups collaborating or networking with Rwandan and Ugandan organizations since the governments of these countries are supporting Congolese rebels. Within the DRC, a number of nongovernmental organizations expressed a desire to network in order to complement and strengthen their activities in conflict prevention, resolution and management. However, the coordination of organizations is hampered by the continued division of the country into zones under different administrations. Each of these different administrations have put in place stringent requirements for organizations operating in their areas; CSOs are thus unable to operate to their fullest capacities by involving local communities in their activities.

Nationally Based Civil Society Organizations

The second category of semiformal organizations in Central Africa consists of nationally-based actors. Operating in most parts of the country in which they are based, these groups often collaborate with subregional and local organizations. In Rwanda, Programme d’Observatoire des Elections au Rwanda (POER), IBUKA, Collectif des Ligues et Associations de Defense des Droits de l’Homme au Rwanda (CLADHO), Commission Justice et Paix and Pro-Femmes were some of the national organizations engaged in peacebuilding work. In DRC, some of the national organizations included Conseil Nationale des ONG de Développement (CNONGD), Association Africaine de Défense de Droit de L’Homme (ASADHO) and Commission Justice et Paix. It is important to note that besides the conflict in the DRC, the huge size of the country makes it extremely difficult for organizations, including those with sufficient capacity, to operate nationally. In Congo-Brazzaville two national organizations, Observatoire Congolais des Droits de l’Homme (OCDH) and Association Congolaise pour la Nonviolence (APN), are working in the area of peacebuilding.

While nationally based semiformal organizations are involved in monitoring and challenging human rights violations perpetrated by the state and its agents, they continue to face intimidation and harassment while their workers face occasional arrest and torture. Although rare, peace workers have been killed by people suspected to be acting on behalf of the authorities. And yet in this difficult environment, most actors have devised ways of working with the authorities to help stem violence and wanton abuses of human rights. A number of civil society actors in Central Africa have developed strategies for working with local authorities on sensitive issues, and have achieved some results. These include actors such as Heritiers de la Justice and Commission Justice et Paix in South Kivu, ASADHO and CNONGD in the DRC, OCDH in Congo-Brazzaville and CLADHO in Rwanda.

Some nationally based semiformal actors are producing useful and informative publications and periodicals. These include Heritiers de la Justice, Groupe Jeremie, CNONGD, Commission Justice et Paix, Pro-Femmes, CLADHO and POER. Their publications have played an important role in sensitizing people about human rights and how defending such rights can serve as a basis for peacebuilding.

Intermediate Organizations

The third category of peacebuilding organizations in Central Africa operates at an intermediate level: below national organizations, but above community actors. Some of these intermediate actors have greater human and material resource capacity than most of the
national organizations, and their work is confined to a few local areas or urban centers. But these organizations do not deal with issues broad enough to be considered national. Many of them employ professional staff but usually fewer than national organizations. They also experience more problems with staff retention than national organizations. Though intermediate organizations were often able to develop and implement programs by themselves, they also participate in a number of programs under the umbrella of some national organizations or a consortium. The capacity gap between national organizations and intermediate organizations is often narrowed after a few years of collaboration so that a number of intermediate organizations graduated to become national organizations themselves. In cases where national organizations designed the programs and only invited intermediate organizations to be involved in implementation, the capacity gap between the two remained. In Rwanda some of the intermediate organizations were Rwandaise pour la Promotion et la Défense des Droits de l’Homme (LIPRODHOR), Kanyarwanda, and the Rwanda Association of Female Entrepreneurs (AFR). In the DRC, some of the intermediate organizations include Groupe Jeremie and Initiative de Paix de Femme en Afrique (IPFAMA-Papa Africa Peace Initiative). In Congo-Brazzaville an example of an intermediate organization is the FONDATION NIOSI.

Intermediate semiformal actors in the Great Lakes region have faced the challenge of cyclical and frequent outbreaks of violence at the subregional and local levels. Most of them lack sufficient capacity to anticipate outbreaks of conflict or to alert actors within and outside the subregion of growing tensions. Where such capacity exists, it is limited and often has fragile structures that are unable to communicate and disseminate information effectively. These organizations would benefit from assistance to facilitate information gathering and dissemination, through provision of telephone, fax and access to the Internet and other institutional building efforts.

d) Semiformal organizations in the Horn of Africa: Activities and Strategies

Kenya’s semiformal actors: Peacebuilding across the subregion

Kenya has a large number of semiformal organizations. This survey focuses on five semiformal actors, based primarily in Nairobi, but with program areas in other countries. Most of these organizations have been in existence for more than a decade. They act as brokers between warring parties; support peace initiatives; and, more significantly, help build the capacity of community-based organizations. Their capacity to manage conflicts is being strengthened through increasingly close links and collaboration with each other. In addition, all these organizations have developed programs to deal with the political conflicts and tensions that occurred in parts of Kenya in the 1990s. However, the inability of these organizations to secure core funding, the reluctance of donors to fund support activities such as research, and the increasing competition for shrinking resources, has limited the performance of these organizations.

Since its creation in the 1990s, the African Peace Forum (APFO) has become a principal player in the area of peacebuilding and conflict management in the Horn of Africa. APFO has three main program areas: the conflict in Sudan; disarmament in Somalia; and developing a civil society-led early warning network for the Great Lakes region (GLEWN). More recently APFO launched a series of policy fora on issues of relevance to Kenya. Organized monthly, these policy fora aim to support peace and good governance and draw participants from a cross section of national actors in Kenya. The first policy forum discussed the ongoing constitutional review process in Kenya. Another, requested by the police department, assessed the relationship between the police, the media and civil society. The forum also focused on electoral violence, and was co-hosted with the Kenyan Human Rights Commission. APFO, which has nine professional staff,
has raised awareness about the complexity of the Sudanese conflict, Africa's longest civil war, leading to the creation of more than ten organizations dealing with the Sudan peace process. APFO has variously encouraged the parties in the Sudanese war, including the government, the SPLA and other rebel factions, to engage in negotiations.

APFO's training activities have led to capacity creation and enhancement programs for actors operating in the Sudan, including the Sudanese Women Voice for Peace (SWVP) and the Sudanese Women Association in Nairobi (SWAN). From encouraging locals to participate in de-mining activities in SPLA areas in southern Sudan, a local NGO emerged: Operation Save Innocent Lives (OSIL). In collaboration with the New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC), OSIL encouraged the creation of a coalition of churches to address the Sudan conflict. From this ecumenical coalition emerged the Fellowship of Christian Councils and Churches in the Great Lakes and Horn of Africa (FECLAH). FECLAH is now extending its work to Somalia and incorporating Islamic imams to expand its ecumenical character.

With regard to Somalia, the APFO program started during the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) (1993-1995) to address disarmament and demobilization issues. With the support of the International Resource Group and in collaboration with the Bonn International Center for Conversion, APFO organized a series of dialogues between experts and actors in the region on disarmament and demobilization issues. Out of these consultations the organization was able to initiate a dialogue on Small Arms and Light Weapons with governments in the Horn of Africa. APFO folded up its Somali program due to lack of personnel, but the Nairobi-based Life and Peace Institute continues to train actors on disarmament issues in Somalia. These initiatives influenced the process that led to the declaration on small arms in Nairobi 2000. APFO has secured funding from the US-based Hewlett Foundation to organize an annual conference, over the next three years, on security issues in the Horn of Africa.

APFO's third program area is the Great Lakes region and involves periodic situation analyses and tracking events related to small arms and light weapons. Since 1998, the organization has supported a network of civil society groups involved in issues of peace and human security drawn from the DRC, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi and Kenya. Out of this collaboration emerged the idea of establishing a civil society Great Lakes Early Warning Network (GLEWN) to increase the understanding of the coping mechanisms of local communities; identify civil society groups operating in the region; and improve regional coalition building. Launched in 1999, this civil society-led initiative brings together members with diverse knowledge, expertise and experience. The network aims to maximize efficiency and effectiveness. To do this, APFO is trying to facilitate the growth and stability of at least one NGO in each country to act as the national focal point for early warning in the region. APFO also confirms to be involved in IGAD’s current efforts to create an early warning system.

People for Peace in Africa (PPA), the oldest peace organization in Kenya, is organized around two desks: a gender desk, with two full-time staff and five associates, and a legal desk with two full-time staff and four associates. PPA also relies on a resource base of some fifty professionals and clinical staff to support its work. Besides peacebuilding, PPA also deals with human rights advocacy and lobbies key individuals and officials on policy matters. The organization’s work has centered on three conflict areas. First, it focuses on conflicts within Kenya, where it targets ordinary people as agents of conflict transformation and employs “African traditional approaches” to reconciliation and peace. Second, it seeks to strengthen civil

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129 The International Resource Group comprised Canada, the United States, Germany, Sweden, Denmark, Austria, the UN and some African individuals, including General Emmanuel Erskine, Bethwel Kiplagat and Josephine Odera, who was the regional coordinator of the group.

130 The Nairobi Declaration on Small Arms was signed on 15 March, 2000 by the fifteen member states of the Horn and Great Lakes regions.
society in the “emerging nations” of southern Sudan, Uganda, Mozambique and Somaliland. The latest in such activities was a workshop held in 2000 in Tigoni, Kenya, where it focused on practitioners from “emerging societies”. The third level of intervention centers on the media. PPA has trained fifty Kenyan journalists to report on conflicts and peace efforts and has assisted twenty-two refugee journalists from Ethiopia with trauma counseling.

The Nairobi Peace Initiative–Africa (NPI-Africa) was first conceived as the Nairobi Peace Group in 1984, and operated under the registration of the Mennonite Board in East Africa for its first seventeen years. In 2001, NPI-Africa was registered as an independent Charitable Trust “for the promotion of peaceful societies in Africa through peace education, conflict resolution and peacebuilding.” NPI-Africa has developed capacity in peacebuilding, strategy development, impact assessment, and evaluation. Like AACC, NIP-Africa recognizes the need to explore the world of African spirituality and peace traditions and to integrate them into peacebuilding. The conflicts in the Horn of Africa during the 1990s challenged the organization to look more deeply into African religious cultural resources for the resolution of the continent’s conflicts. NPC has discovered the existence of a broad range of “historic peace traditions” among various communities across the African continent. The organization aims to serve as a facilitator in the peaceful transformation of violent and destructive conflicts. It has developed an internship program and now hosts three young people for a period of between three to six months.

Kenya’s semiformal actors: Continental Efforts

The All Africa Conference of Churches (AACC) is a continent-wide peace organization, the largest umbrella body in this survey. AACC has an expansive membership that provides it with a dependable network. It works principally with national councils of churches such as the National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK). In all, it has one hundred and sixty-four member churches and claims to reach some eighty million people within Africa. It also collaborates with regional bodies and AACC networks outside Africa. Such networking has facilitated the resettlement of thousands of African refugees abroad, and mobilized international opinion on issues related to immigration. AACC also relies on a network of sister institutions such as the World Council of Churches to reach out to governments. As church structures, these institutions are uniquely placed to deal with conflicts because they are perceived as independent and most importantly neutral.

The AACC attempts to develop a culture of peace by linking peace to development. It has three programs: a youth program, a women’s program and an international affairs program. Of these three, the youth program is the most developed. The AACC established a youth desk to facilitate networking and participation of youths in the search for peace through dialogue and peer education. The international affairs program, the oldest of the AACC programs on peacebuilding, relies on church leaders. It is the program that the AACC used to facilitate the peace process in Sierra Leone and the DRC. AACC has amassed a wealth of experience since the 1970s. Long before the IGAD process began, the AACC played a pivotal role in bringing the Sudanese rebels and the government in Khartoum to Addis Ababa to negotiate a cease-fire in 1972. The AACC has not only used the media as an instrument of peace, but worked with the media in cases it has identified like Rwanda and Nigeria where the press has been used by various parties to fuel conflicts. The AACC has a media program aimed at establishing an early warning system. The program seeks to produce regular publications to warn communities and local leaders of likely conflicts. In August 2001, the AACC held a workshop...
that brought together media editors, police chiefs, peace workers and experts to discuss the role of the media in conflicts. The workshop, which was funded by the AACC, the Catholic Church, NCA and USAID, addressed various issues related to conflict, paying particular attention to small arms and light weapons. AACC plans to extend its work with the media to West Africa and to use peace workers to advise journalists on how to cultivate peace. The AACC has forged links with nonstate actors and maintains a critical distance from governments. This has enabled it to act as a critic when necessary and to support regimes when it felt it right to do so.

The Kenya-based ABANTU for Development is the only organization in this report that is concerned solely with conflict and gender. The organization seeks to influence institutions to be gender-sensitive in the articulation and implementation of their programs. ABANTU’s programs center on gender and conflict; gender and peace; gender and information; communication and technology; and gender and poverty. In its gender and conflict program, ABANTU runs a standard training module on conflict management within institutions. The quality of training attracts high-level officers from both the public and the private sector. Usually the training takes five days and covers a range of issues including understanding conflicts, explaining the characteristics of conflicts, and assessing conflict management tools.

ABANTU also undertakes activities to create awareness on issues related to conflicts. One such meeting was a policy seminar on the gender implications of peacekeeping and reconstruction in Africa held in 2000. The meeting challenged the prevailing thinking on peacekeeping and reconstruction and emphasized the need to involve civilian gender officers in monitoring human rights and civil administrations. Another public policy forum, attended by more than 150 people, discussed the vital role of women’s organizations in peacebuilding and conflict transformation. The forum launched a special issue of gender matters on peacekeeping and peacebuilding, funded by UNIFEM, and identified ways of strengthening women’s leadership roles in peacebuilding and conflict transformation. This meeting also developed a framework for making peacekeeping and reconstruction more gender-sensitive.

ABANTU has sought to work with African regional and subregional organizations in assisting them to develop tools for integrating a gender perspective into their work. The first organization to benefit from this program was IGAD. After consultations, the IGAD Gender Desk asked ABANTU for help in catalyzing women’s participation in the Sudan peace process. A team from ABANTU went to Djibouti, the location of IGAD’s secretariat, to brainstorm ahead of the IGAD-sponsored women’s meeting held in Khartoum in October 2001. ABANTU depends on its experienced associates to carry out its research and training activities. A majority of these resource persons are local, which ensures local ownership and relevance.

ABANTU’s Nairobi office is one of its three regional offices in Africa. The other two are based in Nigeria and South Africa. ABANTU’s UK office acts as an interlocutor between its African offices, as well as with donors and other international organizations, including the United Nations. The organization’s Nairobi office has also established extensive networks at the international level with the UN’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations, UNHCR, UNIFEM, UNESCO, OCHA, and UNICEF, and at the regional level with political and civil society actors such as the OAU, SADC, ECOWAS, ACCORD, ISS, and CECORE. At the national level, ABANTU networks with actors such as the Justice and Peace Commission, Peace Net, and Nairobi Peace Initiative–Africa.

**Sudan: Peacebuilding from Afar**

The Sudanese organizations covered in this report undertake activities at the community level. However, due to insecurity, most are based outside the country. This survey discusses three semiformal actors, two based in Nairobi, and one based in and operating out of Khartoum.

In December 1997, the embassies of the Netherlands in Khartoum and Nairobi launched an initiative to facilitate the participation of women in peace processes, particularly in the Sudan peace process. At the first
workshop of this initiative in the Sudan, the Dutch government sponsored the creation of five blocs of actors, representing the various interests in the conflict: the national committee representing the government; the national Democratic Alliance, made up of opposition political parties such as the UMMA Party; the Nuba Mountain Women group; the Southern Women group; and the Civil Network for Peace. Located in Khartoum, the Civil Society Network for Peace (Mutanuak Group) is composed of fifty national NGOs, community-based organizations (CBOs), academic institutions, research centers and individual activists working on peace issues. Their initiative aims at imparting skills to boost their lobbying activities and to engage in institution building. The network began with $5,000 seed money from the Dutch Embassy in Khartoum.134 To support its operational and communication costs, its members pay a monthly subscription fee of $10 each. The second phase of the initiative was discussed in February 2001 and about $12,000 was promised by the Dutch government to cover different types of activities such as training and symposia. This network seeks to address conflicts across the whole area of Sudan. Currently, it is collaborating with the Sudanese Environment Association to organize a national forum to deal with the issue of natural resources.

This network is keen to learn from previously failed peace agreements, but lacks resources to collect, analyze and document information. There has been an attempt to supplement Dutch funding with that of other donors such as the EU, UNDP, and Oxfam UK. To achieve this, the Mutanuak Group is organizing weekly meetings for its members to discuss proposal writing. While the network would like to be all-inclusive, it has no contact with groups in the Nuba Mountains and Southern Sudan. A proposal to find ways of forging strategic links with these blocs failed to gather adequate support. Due to power struggles within these groups and their fear of a loss of identity or loss of access to international events and training. Any engagement with the North is feared as a threat to the focus on the war in the South.

A second cluster of actors supported by the Dutch Embassy comprises four blocs of actors based in Kenya in Nairobi. These include organizations such as the Sudanese Women Voice for Peace (SWVP), and the Sudanese Women Association in Nairobi (SWAN). Activities in this cluster are slow. Tensions and rivalry between these two women’s groups have denied them the benefit of synergy and collaboration. Stringent donor requirements have also led to a loss of momentum. The gap between the first meeting held in January 2000 and the next meeting was nearly a year, making it difficult to follow events on the war front. While the idea of having blocs has been in existence for the last four years, there has not been any evaluation of the validity, necessity, and the nature of the idea. Further, the need to build institutional capacity and to lobby for inclusion in ongoing peace processes is crucial in view of the large numbers of actors involved in this network. The Mutanuak Group is also keen to build a capacity that can help it collect, document and store information on peace initiatives in the Sudan.

The most daunting challenge facing this initiative, and similar initiatives in Khartoum, is the negative attitude toward the participation of women in the peace process. Peacemaking and waging war are perceived to be the domain of men. There is, therefore, skepticism and a lack of support for initiatives taken by women. The patriarchal system of the society in Khartoum has presented peculiar challenges. IGAD mechanisms and structures are also typically male-dominated.

The Sudanese Women Voice for Peace (SWVP), created in 1994, to support peace work at the local level, has evolved from an informal organization to a full-fledged registered institution. Its broad objective is to support the peace process in Sudan by facilitating women’s participation in, and maintaining the momentum of, the peace process. Specifically, the organization seeks to promote dialogue between communities, identify and strengthen communities’ coping mechanisms during periods of conflict, and support and encourage the use of traditional methods

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134 This initiative is an offshoot of the 1999 Hague Peace Conference, which brought together a range of initiatives, citizens and organizations, to develop substantive global strategies for the reduction of conflicts and the peaceful settlement of disputes. For details of the conference, see http://www.worldfederalistscanada.org//hague.html.
of peacebuilding. SWVP uses workshops to target critical actors such as political leaders and women representatives from southern Sudan. In addition, SWVP encourages women to form peace committees and peace demonstration centers (PDCs) in each region after these training workshops. So far, it has helped to create six PDCs that focus on strengthening the capacity of local communities to make peace, promote income-generating activities, and offer trauma counseling to victims of war. Each PDC has five trainers (peacebuilders), whose role is to sensitize and educate local communities on issues of leadership, human rights, peace education, conflict resolution, communication, and trauma counseling. These are supported in their work by eight part-time trainers. As part of its training, SWVP runs a counseling program that uses drama as its mode of delivery.

The programs of the New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC) are organized around six desks, the peace desk being the main focus of this survey. Created in 1989, the peace desk was initially meant to cater for the relief needs of war victims in rebel-controlled areas, then excluded from government assistance. This mandate evolved over time following the realization that relief alone was inadequate in a war situation. In particular, the split within SPLA/M, between Riak Machar and John Garang, forced NSCC to focus more attention on peacebuilding. Aided by the National Council of Churches of Kenya, NSCC tried in vain to reconcile these rebel leaders. It then decided to target leadership at the community level. In 1997, it organized a meeting in Yei, southern Sudan, between SPLA/M and the church, out of which emerged an understanding to work together in promoting peace. In the following year, with facilitation from People for Peace, NSCC organized a series of peace campaigns, starting with chiefs from warring groups. This initiative led to the Dinka-Nuer reconciliation meeting during which the two communities signed a declaration of peace in February 1999. The success of this initiative is attributed to the use of traditional methods of conflict resolution and the participation of local communities in the peace process. In 2000, following the same format, NSCC shifted attention to the Eastern Nile and brought together representatives from six warring groups. Again another declaration for peace was signed, helping to restore calm to the area. In November 2000, a conference between chiefs was held at Uulu to assess the progress that had been made. A second meeting was held in June 2001 in Kisumu, Kenya.

Rebels who, based on their dependence on local populations to wage war in southern Sudan, are wary of the increasing power of the church as a counterforce to them, threaten the potential of NSCC’s work. Rebels are also wary of the possible multiplier effect of a growing peace movement. Besides, these meetings encourage discussions on issues of human rights abuses and good governance, invariably criticizing the rebel movements. SPLA/M has responded by trying to deter people from attending such meetings. For instance, SPLA leader John Garang attempted to stop people from attending a Sudan peace meeting organized in Kisumu in June 2001.

Somalia: The Demand for Conflict Management

The Life and Peace Institute (LPI-Nairobi) is a peculiar type of semiformal organization. It is an ecumenical research institute comprising Christian churches and a branch of the Life and Peace Institute in Uppsala, Sweden, and it operates in local communities in East Africa. LPI-Nairobi was established to respond to various conflicts in the Horn of Africa on the premise that many responses to conflicts lack an understanding of their root causes. Traditional approaches seemed ad hoc and lacking in an understanding of the core issues. Many Western organizations operating in the region, such as Norwegian Peoples Aid, asked churches to help in research aimed at arriving at a holistic understanding of the conflicts in the region. Thus, LPI was established as a peace research institution to generate information on the nature of conflicts. Its mandate is to partner with existing church organizations and to facilitate their work in conflict management.

135 The coordinator of this training program is based in Lokichoggio, on the border between Kenya and Sudan.
136 The other desks include the evaluation desk, education desk, medical desk, women’s desk and accounts desk.
In 1992, the Swedish government was asked by the UN through Mohamed Sahnoun, then the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General in Somalia, to assist in peacebuilding efforts in Somalia. Sahnoun’s approach was to begin at the grassroots level, building peace from the bottom rather than from the top. The Swedish government, through LPI, started to support grassroots peace initiatives that targeted community leaders. From Somalia, this project expanded to include Ethiopia, Eritrea and Sudan.

After working in Somalia for nearly a decade, LPI has been looking for a suitable partner in Somalia to take over its local training. To date the organization worked with over twenty-five Somalis on the ground, whom it has encouraged to form a local organization called the Forum for Peace and Governance (FORPAG). If this initiative succeeds, LPI is seeking to withdraw from Somalia and leave peacebuilding to local actors. LPI also works with youth, women’s groups, and church leaders in undertaking civic education, peacebuilding, discussing the link between resources and conflicts, the impact of small arms and light weapons on peace, human rights, democracy and the rule of law, and the role of gender in development. LPI has also trained civil servants in IGAD countries, in partnership with the IGAD secretariat’s Political and Humanitarian Affairs division.

Uganda’s Semiformal Actors and Conflict Transformation

Civil society organizations in Uganda actively began to participate in conflict management after 1986, when Yoweri Museveni took power and invited them to take part in the rehabilitation and reconstruction of the country. Before then, state repression and civil war in the 1971–1986 period had virtually destroyed all such institutions. Following the presidential invitation of 1986, local actors mushroomed and foreign NGOs thronged the country. Insecurity in parts of Uganda has intensified in recent years. Such insecurity is linked to conflicts in southern Sudan and the DRC, complicating the involvement of NGOs in peace work.

Uganda’s semiformal organizations defined their work in terms of conflict transformation, arguing that their work not only seeks to eradicate conflicts, but also to cultivate a culture of tolerance and peaceful coexistence. This concept also serves a distinct strategic purpose: to describe peace work in a context where the state is functional and able to manage peace processes and forge links with key decision-makers and members of the diplomatic corps, enabling them to bring the human rights agenda and peacebuilding into decision-making circles. In turn, the government is increasingly relying on the representatives of CSOs for information about popular reactions to government policies. CSOs have also trained civil servants in conflict management techniques.

First, there are a range of actors dealing with a variety of human rights and governance-related issues. These include the Foundation for Human Rights Initiative (FHRI) and the Uganda Human Rights Commission (UHRC). In monitoring, documenting, and carrying out advocacy work on human rights, these organizations situate the problem of conflict within the context of the good governance debate. More recently, they are focusing attention on the rights of displaced populations in conflict zones, especially in the North. Further, these NGOs seek to hold the government accountable for human rights violations associated with its suppression of insurgency in many parts of the country. The contention gaining ground among such groups is that displacement leads to discrimination. According to them, internally displaced populations are turned into second-class citizens and left “faceless” under the limited legal structures existing within camps. Under these circumstances, women and children become particularly vulnerable to abuse. The rising incidence of HIV/AIDS and other sexually transmitted diseases has engendered family violence and separation. In the camps, people are targets of attacks from rebels, Local Defense Units (LDUs) and Home Guards who perpetuate human rights violations.

The second category of Ugandan NGOs working in peacebuilding comprises actors involved in the humanitarian arena. Actors in this area are overwhelmingly international (foreign) and include Italy’s Association of Volunteers in International Service (AVSI) (which has operated in Kitgum district for nearly two decades), World Vision in (Gulu), Oxfam–UK and Ireland in Arua, Uganda Red Cross Societies and the
German Development Service (DED) in Koboko-West Nile. Relief actors increased from about five NGOs (mainly international) in 1996 to more than sixty by the end of 2000. The focus of these organizations has shifted from meeting immediate survival needs (food, water, shelter, and immunization) to care and maintenance (including provision of agricultural implements, psychosocial support, education, training and income generation). Peace, reconciliation and healing have become the main concerns of intervention programs.

The third set of actors in Uganda consists of agencies that focus on conflict management and peacebuilding. The leading organization among these is the Center for Conflict Resolution (CECORE). Based in Kampala, CECORE seeks to promote a culture of peace and tolerance at the national level. CECORE has two program areas. The first targets the media and seeks to use it to promote a culture of peace by training journalists on how to report on conflicts and to influence policy decisions. The second area involves organizing training workshops that target peace workers or the staff of organizations dealing with conflict transformation and peacebuilding. To facilitate its work and increase the multiplier effect of its training, CECORE produced three resource handbooks in 2000.37 Besides publishing these documents, CECORE supports organizations working at the community-based level through staff training. The strongest of such links is with the Acholi Religious Leaders Initiative for Peace (ARLIP). CECORE also trains local peace workers among communities affected by conflict. It has built an impressive national, subregional, and international network.

Ethiopia: Enhancing Government’s Capacity for Conflict Management

This section focuses on two peacebuilding organizations in Ethiopia: the Ethiopian International Institute for Peace and Development (EIIPD) and the Development Policy Management Forum (DPMF).

EIIPD seeks to train and improve the capacity of public officials to articulate Ethiopia’s policy concerns and to foster bilateral and multilateral dialogue on issues of peace, security, democracy and economic development. Consequently, its Foreign Service Training program trains ambassadors, officers in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and new diplomats in negotiation, mediation and conflict management skills. So far, 690 people, drawn from twenty-four ministries and other organizations, have passed through this program. Further, EIIPD has organized conferences on various issues including the Ethiopian-Eritrea war of 1998-2000, water resource management, and humanitarian affairs. Aside from organizing sessions where experts are invited to give lectures, EIIPD also holds short and intensive classes based on case studies and simulation exercises in public and project management. It also publishes trainees’ handbooks, reports, books on civic education, human rights, democratization and regional conflicts, and has a documentation center on the Horn of Africa region.

Because of EIIPD’s cordial relations with the government, it has a great impact on policy, especially in the ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defense, Ecology and Economic Planning. EIIPD has a good working relationship with the media, through which it publicizes its activities, disseminates information and educates the public. It works closely with multilateral agencies based in Addis Ababa, such as the European Union (EU), the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), and the OAU, as well as research institutions in other parts of Africa. EIIPD has an impressive human resource capacity, including thirty-four staff, thirteen of whom are professionals. It also relies on a pool of expert resource persons, including policymakers and practitioners, university professors, and consultants.

37 This information was compiled from a workshop on the role of the media in peacebuilding, the first handbook discusses ways in which the media can contribute to peacebuilding. The handbook highlights and warns against the pitfalls of “news” reporting and urges responsible, balanced reporting. The second resource handbook, which is the first of its kind in Uganda and perhaps the subregion, seeks to promote the use of traditional methods to resolve conflicts. Drawing from the material culture of the Pokot and Turkana (Kenya), the Acholi and Karamajong (Uganda), the Agacaca conflict resolution system (Rwanda) and the Wamakua, Wamwera, Wamakonde and Wayao (Tanzania), the book documents traditional methods of conflict resolution, reconciliation and healing processes. The third handbook documents the experiences and best practices of peacebuilders in Eastern Uganda. The book is a tool kit for peace workers in the area.
The Development Policy Management Forum (DPMF) was founded in 1995 to promote dialogue between civil society and the government on issues related to governance and democracy. Hosted by the UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), the organization aims to provide open and democratic fora to discuss policy and to promote dialogue among civil servants, politicians and civil society groups. DPMF also organizes capacity-building workshops and an annual scientific conference. The organization promotes dialogue aimed at facilitating post-conflict reconstruction and is currently conducting fifteen research projects. These projects focus on the role of external forces in fueling conflict and the role of African governments in managing them.

DPMF espouses traditional mechanisms of conflict management as alternative methods of resolving conflicts at the community level. It strongly believes in the capacity and effectiveness of local initiatives. Although the organization collaborates with a number of international and regional organizations, some of its members are skeptical about the utility of collaborating with the UN, the OAU, subregional organizations, or even, governments on matters of conflict. Such members view UN policies as too narrow, the OAU as too bureaucratic and ineffective, and subregional organizations as only marginally effective. These members instead advocate for increased collaboration with local institutions. The Netherlands Directorate General for International Cooperation (DGIS), SIDA, the Ford Foundation, UNDP, the International Development Research Center (IDRC), GTZ and UNESCO are some of DPMF’s donors. It is currently engaged in negotiations with such international donors as the Netherlands Organization for International Cooperation in Higher Education (NUFFIC), the Finish Development Agency (FINIDA), the Norwegian Agency for Development Aid (NORAD), DANIDA and the Rockefeller Foundation to support the expansion of its programs. The organization relies heavily on consultants to carry out its work.

Tanzania: Facilitating Peace at Home and in the Subregion

This section examines two Tanzania-based organizations, the Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation, a peacebuilding think-tank and post-conflict reconstruction facilitator, and the African Development Center, which focuses on development of subregional policies on peace, security and stability. Both of these organizations employ strategies based on a more subregional rationale, similar to ABANTU in Kenya and CECORE in Uganda.

In 1996, former Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere, founded the Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation (MNF) as a think-tank to facilitate and participate in peacebuilding, including postconflict reconstruction. This vision informed the role of the Foundation as a custodian of the Burundi peace process (1996-2000). The Nyerere Foundation provided an administrative and legal structure and served as the official custodian of resources for the Burundi peace negotiations. The Foundation also established links with state and non-state actors at all levels. In its work on the Burundi peace process, the foundation had a facilitator and a support team. This core team was in turn supported by a group of international experts organized into five committees in the areas of: nature of the conflict; democracy and good governance; peace and security; economic development; and implementation of the peace agreement. The Burundi negotiations were driven by the philosophy that neighbors know each other better and can solve their problems in an “African” way. Special envoys from the United States, Canada, Germany, United Kingdom, European Union and Scandinavian countries represented the interests of the international community in the peace process. Nyerere reported to regional governments, the OAU and the UN.

Nelson Mandela, who now heads the Burundi peace process, has inherited this peace mechanism. The DRC

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138 The conference in the year 2000 centered on the Progress of Democracy and good governance.
139 The Foundation is currently seeking assistance to preserve its enormous collection of primary material from the Arusha peace process as well as those on Front Line States and the struggle against apartheid. The government of Sweden has indicated interest in archiving personal materials. The University of Connecticut has also shown an interest in the materials on the liberation movements in Mozambique and Angola, as well as the Front Line States.
is experimenting with a similar model. Sir Ketumile Masire, former president of Botswana and Facilitator of the DRC Peace Process, visited the Foundation to learn from its mediation experience. Following the signing of a peace accord in August 2000, the Nyerere Foundation folded up its Burundi program in May 2001. Only a two-person implementation and monitoring team has been left to work with President Mandela, who has mainly been assisted by a team of South Africans.

Recently, the Nyerere Foundation has facilitated interparty negotiations to address tensions between the ruling party, Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM), and the Civic United Front (CUF) in Zanzibar following disputed elections in October 2000. In its intervention in Zanzibar, the Nyerere Foundation has isolated two groups of issues. The first group involves issues related to election violence between the mainland and the islands resulting from disputes over the last election and strong feelings of marginalization of the islands by the Union, expressed by many Zanzibaris. The second of issues group involves a variety of issues, including corruption, “tribalism,” poverty and disparity in the education process, that have a high potential of igniting tension and conflict. So far, the Nyerere Foundation has not been able to play a substantive role in efforts to resolve the conflict in Zanzibar, largely because of wranglings within its own leadership.  

The Nyerere Foundation plans to undertake a training program involving civil society groups and legislators in Burundi and a dialogue with government officials, political parties and the judiciary on issues of equity and access to education. The Nyerere Foundation has plans for a comparative study on mediation and transition to civil administration, which would draw lessons from other areas in which such developments succeeded. The organization is also planning a conference to examine the comparative experiences of mediators with lessons drawn from Africa and the Balkans. Currently, the Foundation is collecting and documenting information on the Burundi peace process with the aim of presenting the conclusions to a regional summit of Heads of State and soliciting their input.

Undoubtedly, the Nyerere Foundation, now under the chairmanship of former OAU Secretary-General, Salim Ahmed Salim, continues to enjoy a privileged position and support from the government of Tanzania, largely due to Nyerere’s legacy. Whether it can harness this goodwill to promote regional peace and security remains to be seen.

The African Dialogue Center (ADC) is located in Arusha, close to the Secretariat of the East African Community. ADC has played a central role in the development of subregional policies on peace, security and stability. It pursues two broad objectives. First, it assesses regional conflicts in the Great Lakes region, taking into account the conditions necessary to create an enabling environment to resolve them. ADC gathers and analyzes this information and shares it with policymakers and international actors. Second, ADC seeks to bring African institutions together to share different perspectives on managing conflicts. Since 1998, the organization has been involved in activities leading to the first OAU-civil society conference in June 2001. This project has attempted to reduce the seeming hostility and mutual suspicion between African governments and civil society. More than 200 NGOs and 35 government representatives attended the 2001 meeting. The conference reinforced the importance of flexibility and versatility within NGOs, particularly the recognition that issues of good governance and the rule of law form the basis for conflict prevention, management and resolution.

In order to facilitate drawing lessons from past experiences, ADC convened a meeting of all the key decisionmakers in the Tanzanian ministries of Foreign Affairs, Economic Planning, the Attorney General’s Chamber, and the Office of the President. This meeting sought to highlight the pitfalls and explore ways of creating built-in mechanisms for maintaining regional cooperation. From these meetings and wider consulta-

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140 This dispute involved a clash between the Executive Director and the Trustees, with the Trustees accusing the Executive Director of seeking to control the Foundation. Worse still, the CCM is beginning to show signs of impatience with the Foundation, especially with regard to the issue of Zanzibar.
tions, ADC proposed three memoranda of understanding on foreign policy, good governance, and common security. Although these memoranda have not yet been drafted, there is a desire within the EAC secretariat to draw up a protocol on common foreign policy, defense, and security. ADC is also engaging other sectors of society. The organization has engaged corporate actors in exploring their potential contribution to regional development and stability, especially with regard to the issue of corruption.

Appendix I: Section II: Community-Based Organizations

We conclude this Appendix by assessing the strategies and activities of community-based organizations on Southern, Central and Eastern Africa.

a) Strategies and Activities in Southern Africa

Established in 1986, the Zambia-based Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP) instructs its members on issues of social justice. Informed by a Christian philosophy, the CCJP emphasizes preventive action before tensions erupt into open conflicts. It operates through Justice and Peace structures created at the national, local, and community levels. CCJP assists the people working on these structures by providing, at the local level, analyses of events and instruction on how to advocate and lobby for local action. All CCJP members work on a voluntary basis except for a few staff employed at the National Secretariat.

The Zambia-based Jesuit Refugee Services (JRS) has exhibited strength in building the capacities of local communities hosting refugees, as well as ensuring refugee protection. In preparation for refugee influxes, the JRS offers Refugee Emergency Response Training to local communities and parishes along Zambia's borders. This training provides information and skills on the rights, responsibilities and needs of refugees, and the ways in which border communities can organize effectively to cater for the immediate needs of refugees. Further, the JRS helps local communities and refugees contact and engage with relief institutions such as UNHCR and the World Food Program. JRS conducts peace education and pastoral counselling for refugees in camps, which are replicated in urban centers to assist refugees in coexisting peacefully with their hosts.

JRS also runs a Refugees Prison project. The general idea is to try to improve the structural conditions/laws for refugees in Zambia. At the moment, Zambian law seeks to ensure that all refugees remain in refugee camps and that only few refugees enter urban centers. This has resulted in many refugees in urban centers being hunted down by immigration authorities and put in prison to await verification on their refugee status or to await relocation to a designated refugee camp. With the large number of refugees in Zambia, this situation is resulting in much tension among refugees, between refugees and Zambians in urban centers and between immigration officials and refugees. On a number of occasions, JRS has come under attack from immigration officials in search of “illegal” immigrants.

CCJP’s advocacy work appears to complement Jesuit Refugee Services’ capacity-building and training work. CCJP is limited in the level of skills it is able to transmit, and once a crisis in a community erupts into violence, CCJP does not have skills or procedures for dealing with it. Further, members are committed to their full-time jobs or simply cannot afford to spend a lot of time on the organization’s work. CCJP members are advised to refer many cases to other institutions such as the police, or village headmen or chiefs. Only twenty to thirty (out of three thousand) members have undergone formal training in conflict management. All were trained at Mindolo Ecumenical Foundation. There is also a high turnover of members who leave the institution to work for other organizations that offer a small allowance for voluntary work. With high poverty levels in Zambia, a number of members are undernourished, unwell and/or victims of HIV/AIDS. The CCJP national office is currently undergoing an organizational development program facilitated by the Institute for Democracy in South Africa. The program seeks to provide training workshops, tutoring, and exposure to core staff with the objective of building and strengthening their ability to respond effectively to social, economic, and political problems.
b) Strategies and Activities in Central Africa

Central Africa’s CBO’s operate on a very localized level. They are usually based in the peri-urban areas or rural environments. Some are also hosted by intermediate or national organization to which they are affiliated. CBOs in Central Africa usually address very localized issues and often do not employ permanent professional staff. Rather, volunteers often use their spare time to run the organizations. Many CSOs in Central Africa, for example the Organization des Volontaires pour l’Autopromotion Durable (OVAD); Agir en Faveur des Droits de l’Homme (AFDHO); Association Pan-Africaine Thomas Sankara (APTS); and Association for the Promotion of Women Like the Sunrise (SERUKA), have been able to engage actively in peacebuilding despite meager resources and poor facilities.

c) Strategies and Activities in the Horn of Africa

For most of the 1990s, Northern Uganda was a zone closed to many organizations, with a small number of international NGOs concentrated in refugee hosting areas. The absence of humanitarian actors left local communities to deal with the insurgency in this area without much external assistance. Out of a series of attempts at reconciliation emerged the Acholi Religious Leaders Initiative for Peace (ARLIP), an interfaith collaborative framework that seeks to promote dialogue between the government and rebels of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). This initiative seeks to enhance local capacity through partnerships between local and international actors. The core actors of ARLIP are Christian and Islamic religious leaders based in northern Uganda. These actors have moral authority, status, and the extensive organizational anchor of churches, parishes and mosques—perhaps the only institutions that have been able to survive the war in the North.

ARLIP’s peacebuilding strategy has involved building governmental, local and international support for forgiveness and reconciliation. In March 1998, the task force met and presented Ugandan president Yoweri Museveni with a memorandum: A Call for Peace and an End to Bloodshed in Acholi Land. Presidential reassurance bolstered the position of ARLIP in the eyes of local government actors, in particular the Local Councils and military authorities, who became enthusiastic partners in the search for peace as well as donors such as the UNDP, which, as part of its bilateral arrangement, started funding ARLIP to run workshops, hold meetings and make contacts with LRA rebels and their allies. ARLIP has also established contacts with Acholis in the diaspora, and sent a delegation to attend their annual meeting in London to urge their support for the peace initiative. In a visit to the United States in 1999, ARLIP leaders met with government officials, members of Congress and the UN to discuss issues related to the release of abducted children; strengthening the amnesty law; dialogue and reconciliation between Sudan and Uganda; and international support for resettlement and reconstruction efforts. At the subregional level, ARLIP leaders have engaged with religious leaders from southern Sudan in an attempt to share experiences, promote dialogue and explore opportunities for building partnerships across the Sudan-Uganda border. These activities have been critical in bolstering confidence within the government and helped bring about the Amnesty Act of November 1999.141

ARLIP has emerged as the legitimate mouthpiece for the Acholi community, a mediator between the government and rebels and a trusted buffer between, on the one hand, the rebels and the government, and on the other hand, children who have fled abduction and forcible conscription. With support from the Mennonite Central Committee (MCC), ARLIP had trained sixty Voluntary Peace Animators (VPA) by 2000. The MCC also funds one program officer position within ARLIP and pays for ad hoc activities such as the national, regional and international travel of peace workers. The flexibility of this funding allows ARLIP to seize opportunities as they arise and to accommodate unanticipated events without the constraint of laborious grant making and accounting procedures. Another useful supporter of ARLIP’s work is the South Africa-based African Center for Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), which, with

141 The Amnesty Act replaced the decision to use military force in dealing with the LRA, with a blanket amnesty, deemed as the only means of delivering reconciliation, healing and sustainable peace.
assistance from Christian Aid, has collaborated with
ARLIP to organize a forum on Peace Research and
Reconciliation Agenda. This forum brings together
religious leaders from conflict-ridden regions in
Karamoja, Teso, Lango and West Nile to share experi-
ences with those of Acholiland. Under this program,
ARLIP clerics recently visited southern Sudan in an
effort to network with their counterparts.

Kenya's Peace and Development Network (Peace Net)
belongs to a category of organizations running
outreach programs in partnership with community-
based organizations across Kenya. It has its genesis in
the tensions and ethnic clashes that occurred in Kenya
in the early 1990s, and have now become a recurrent
feature of the country's politics. Primarily, Peace Net is
engaged in organizing community-based solutions to
inter- and intra-communal violence and security. Its
primary objective is to create a critical mass of peace
workers. Peace Net's activities involve the rehabilita-
tion of local structures weakened or destroyed by the
UNDP-led intervention between 1993 and 1995. In
addition, the organization seeks to defuse tension in
areas where communal violence has erupted. These
activities are undertaken through a program on
capacity building, in which Peace Net selects and trains
local focal points such as community workers, individ-
uals, or smaller organizations to become peace
workers. Peace Net has carried out work in nine
operational areas throughout the country: Far East,
North Eastern (Garissa, Ijara, Mandera), Nairobi, Coast,
North Rift Valley, South Rift Valley, Nyanza, Western,
and Central Kenya. It has trained over five hundred
community workers in conflict transformation.

These community-based processes have generated their
own momentum and led to replication at higher
administrative levels such as districts and provinces.
For instance, Peace Net's first engagement with
communities from Garissa district led to the formation
of the Garissa Peace Committee, which was replicated
in the newly created Ijara district and later in Mandera
district. In May 2001, Peace Net organized a meeting,
attended by fifty-six of its members, to review its
programs. This meeting identified the phenomenon of
election-related violence as a priority issue in view of
the upcoming elections in Kenya scheduled for
December 2002.

142 In an effort to lead the intervention to rehabilitate Kenyans displaced in the aftermath of the “land clashes” of the early 1990s,
UNDP, through its Office of Projects (UNOPS), created the Displaced Persons Program. However, instead of working and collaborating
with local actors, this program established parallel structures, intensified competition and undermined local capacity. For a com-
prehensive analysis of the project, see CRS, Evaluating the Performance of the estern Province Coordination Committee, Commissioned
by UNDP–Kenya to CRS, Moi University, 1995; and Human Rights Watch/Africa, Failing the Internally Displaced: The UNDP Displaced
Persons Program in Kenya (HRW, 1997).

143 At the end of this meeting, participants delivered a statement in which they appealed to leaders to “rethink the dangers inherent
in a divisive political culture and called upon them to move towards governance based on the intrinsically African values of
Appendix II
List of Acronyms

AACC  All Africa Conference of Churches
ACCORD African Center for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes
ACDESS African Center for Development and Strategic Studies
ACRI African Conflict Response Initiative
ADC African Dialogue Center
ADRA Accão para o Desenvolvimento Rural e Ambiente
AFDHO Agir en Faveur des Droits de l’Homme
AFR Association of Female Entrepreneurs
AFSTRAG African Strategic and Peace Research Group
AISA African Institute of South Africa
ANAD Accord de Non-Agression et d’Assistance en Matière de Défense
ANC African National Congress
ANEN African Network of Ecumenical Organizations
APFO African Peace Forum
API Africa Peace Institute
APN Association Congolaise pour la Nonviolence
APTS Association Pan-Africaine Thomas Sankara
ARI African Renaissance Institute
ARLIP Acholi Religious Leaders Initiative for Peace
ASADHO Association Africaine de Défense de Droit de l’Homme
ATM African Traditional Methods
AU African Union
BCP Basutoland Congress Party
BNP Basotho National Party
CAR Central African Republic
CBO Community-based organization
CCG Center for Common Ground
CCJP Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace
CCM Chama cha Mapinduzi
CCM Christian Council of Mozambique
CCR Center for Conflict Resolution
CDD Center for Democracy and Development
CDS Center for Defense Studies
CDSM Center for Defense and Security Management
CEAO Communauté Économique de l’Afrique de l’Ouest
CECORE Center for Conflict Resolution
CEDE Center for Democratic Empowerment
CEPGL Communauté Économique des Pays des Grand Lacs
CEWARN Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism
CGG Campaign for Good Governance
CIDA Canadian International Development Agency
CLADHO Commission Justice et Paix et Pro-Femmes
CNDD-FDD Conseil Nationale pour la Défense de la Démocratie
CNONGD Conseil Nationale des Organizations Non-Gouvernementales de Développement
COD Christian Organization for Development
COMESA Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CONGAC Central Africa Confederation of Churches and NGOs
COPAX Conseil de Paix et de Securité de l’Afrique Centrale
CORAPEM National Committee for Action and Reflection for Peace in the MRU States
CPMR Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution
CRS Catholic Relief Services
CRSL Conciliation Resources/Sierra Leone
CS Connect Synergy
CSM Civil Society Movement
CSO Civil Society Organization
CUF Civic United Front
DANIDA Danish International Development Assistance
DED German Development Service
DFID-UK Department for International Development–United Kingdom
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DGIS</td>
<td>Netherlands Directorate General for International Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOP</td>
<td>Declaration of Principles</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPMF</td>
<td>Development Policy Management Forum</td>
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<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>EAC</td>
<td>East African Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>EASSIAW</td>
<td>Eastern Africa Subregional Support Initiative for the Advancement of Women</td>
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<td>ECA</td>
<td>Economic Commission for Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECCAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of Central African States</td>
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<td>ECOMOG</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States Cease-fire Monitoring Group</td>
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<td>ECOWAS</td>
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<td>EIIPD</td>
<td>Ethiopian International Institute for Peace and Development</td>
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<td>ESA</td>
<td>Europe-South Africa Business and Finance Forum</td>
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<td>ETICA</td>
<td>The Ethics</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>Early Warning System</td>
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<td>FAC</td>
<td>Forces Armées Congolaises</td>
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<td>FCL</td>
<td>Front Congolais de Libération (Congoles Liberation Front)</td>
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<td>FECCAHA</td>
<td>Fellowship of Christian Councils and Churches in the Great Lakes and Horn of Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>FECCCLAHAF</td>
<td>Fellowship of Christian Councils and Churches in the Great Lakes and Horn of Africa</td>
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<td>FHRI</td>
<td>Foundation for Human Rights Initiative</td>
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<td>FINDA</td>
<td>Finish Development Agency</td>
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<td>FONGA</td>
<td>Forum das ONGs Angolanas</td>
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<td>FORPAG</td>
<td>Forum for Peace and Governance</td>
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<td>Frelimo</td>
<td>Frente de Libertacão de Moçambique</td>
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<td>FROLINA</td>
<td>Front pour la Libération Nationale</td>
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<td>GAP</td>
<td>Grupo Angolano para a Promocão da Paz</td>
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<td>GARP</td>
<td>Grupo Angolano sobre Reflexao para a Paz</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>GHA</td>
<td>Greater Horn of Africa</td>
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<td>GHAHAI</td>
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<td>GLEWN</td>
<td>Great Lakes Early Warning Network</td>
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<td>GLR</td>
<td>Great Lakes Region</td>
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<td>GTZ</td>
<td>Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (German Technical Cooperation)</td>
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<td>IADL</td>
<td>Initiatives et Actions Pour le Développement Locale</td>
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<tr>
<td>IBUKA</td>
<td>Collectif des Ligues et Associations de la Défense des Droits de l’Homme au Rwanda</td>
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<td>ICD</td>
<td>Inter-Congolese Dialogue</td>
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<td>ICG</td>
<td>International Crisis Group</td>
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<td>IDASA</td>
<td>Institute for Democratic Alternatives for South Africa</td>
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<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person</td>
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<td>IDSC</td>
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<td>IJ R</td>
<td>Institute for Justice and Reconciliation</td>
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<tr>
<td>IEC</td>
<td>Independent Electoral Commission</td>
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<td>Interfaith Council of Liberia</td>
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<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Authority on Development</td>
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<td>IGADD</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Desertiﬁcation</td>
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<td>IJ</td>
<td>Institute for Justice and Reconciliation</td>
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<td>Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
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<td>Kenya African National Union</td>
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<td>KATU</td>
<td>Citizens Security Council</td>
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<td>LDGL</td>
<td>Ligue de Défense des Droits de la Personne dans la Région des Grands Lacs</td>
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<td>LDU</td>
<td>Local Defense Unit</td>
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<td>Life and Peace Institute</td>
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<td>Lord’s Resistance Army</td>
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<td>Mindolo Ecumenical Foundation</td>
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<td>Marematlou Freedom Party</td>
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<td>Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo</td>
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<td>Mano River Women’s Peace Network</td>
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<td>MTP</td>
<td>Mediation and Transformation Practice</td>
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<td>Nairobi Peace Initiative–Africa</td>
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<td>Netherlands Organization for International Cooperation in Higher Education</td>
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<td>Organization of African Unity</td>
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<td>OLME</td>
<td>Organization of African Unity</td>
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<td>PDA</td>
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<td>PPA</td>
<td>People for Peace in Africa</td>
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<td>PPP</td>
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<td>PSCM</td>
<td>Public Sector Conflict Management Program</td>
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<td>PDC</td>
<td>Peace Demonstration Center</td>
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<td>POER</td>
<td>Programme d’Observatoire des Élections au Rwanda</td>
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<td>QPC</td>
<td>Quaker Peace Center</td>
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<td>RC</td>
<td>Resident Commander</td>
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<td>RCD</td>
<td>Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (Congolaise Rally for Democracy)</td>
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<td>RECAM</td>
<td>Renforcement des Capacités</td>
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<td>REDSO</td>
<td>Regional Economic Development Services Office for East and Southern Africa</td>
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<td>RENAMO</td>
<td>Resistência Nacional de Moçambique</td>
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<td>RPTC</td>
<td>Regional Peacekeeping Training Center</td>
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<td>RUF</td>
<td>Revolutionary United Front</td>
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<td>SA</td>
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<td>SAB</td>
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<td>SACPN</td>
<td>Southern African Conflict Prevention Network</td>
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<tr>
<td>SACU</td>
<td>Southern African Customs Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
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<td>SADCC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Coordination Conference</td>
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<td>SALWS</td>
<td>Small Arms and Light Weapons</td>
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<td>SANGOCO</td>
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<td>SAP</td>
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<td>SAPES</td>
<td>Southern African Political Economy Series</td>
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<td>SARIPS</td>
<td>Southern African Regional Institute for Policy Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>SERUKA</td>
<td>Association for the Promotion of Women Like the Sunrise</td>
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<td>SIDA</td>
<td>Swedish International Development Authority</td>
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<td>SLST</td>
<td>Selection Trust</td>
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<td>SMC</td>
<td>Standing Mediation Committee</td>
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<td>S.O.S. RAMIRA</td>
<td>Save Our Souls and Rescue the Vulnerable</td>
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<td>SPLA</td>
<td>Sudan Peoples Liberation Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPLA/M</td>
<td>Sudan Peoples Liberation Army/Movement</td>
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<td>SWAN</td>
<td>Sudanese Women Association in Nairobi</td>
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<tr>
<td>SWVP</td>
<td>Sudanese Women Voice for Peace</td>
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<td>TNA</td>
<td>Transitional National Assembly</td>
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<td>UDF</td>
<td>United Democratic Front</td>
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<td>United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia</td>
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<td>UN Development Program</td>
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<td>UN Development Fund for Women</td>
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<td>UNITA</td>
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<td>UNMEE</td>
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<td>UN Peacekeeping Training Assistance Teams</td>
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<td>World Council of Churches</td>
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<td>ZANU-PF</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front</td>
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