A Framework for Lasting Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration of Former Combatants in Crisis Situations

Executive Summary

- The successful disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants are crucial to achieving a lasting peace. While there has been a good deal of international focus of disarmament and demobilization, more analysis and resources are needed in reintegration.

- DDR programs should be part of an overall integrated recovery strategy that encompasses economic development, security sector reform, the integration of refugees and internally displaced persons, and justice and reconciliation. An effective strategy must take the regional dimensions of the conflict into consideration.

- Political will and national buy-in are essential to the success of DDR programs. Ex-combatants must be ready to disarm and return to civilian life and the government and communities must be prepared to accept them. The role of the international community can only be to facilitate this process, for example by encouraging the inclusion of DDR programs in peace agreements, and providing money and support for planning, national awareness raising campaigns, and reinsertion packages for ex-combatants. International actors can also monitor programs to ensure that all ex-combatants are treated equally regardless of former affiliations.

- Strategic planning for DDR can and should start prior to the actual peace agreement in order to establish a division of labor, develop networks and expertise, as well as build confidence and ensure local ownership. A broad-based national commission that ensures the equal treatment of all groups is likely to be the optimal mechanism for planning and implementation.

- For successful implementation of DDR programs, it is crucial to seek a balance between managing the often very high expectations of ex-combatants and addressing resentment of “favoritism” among the rest of the population. Flexible programming and an effective public information campaign are key in achieving this goal.

- Issues that require additional consideration include the ambiguous status of female ex-combatants who have not necessarily carried weapons, the role of dependents, health issues such as the spread of HIV/AIDS, funding processes, and coordination priorities.
Introduction

On 12-13 December 2002, the International Peace Academy, in conjunction with UNDP’s Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, organized a workshop entitled “A Framework for Lasting Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration of Former Combatants in Crisis Situations”. Participants included experts and practitioners from various UN departments and agencies, as well as representatives from the World Bank, the International Organization for Migration (IOM), academics, and NGOs. With a specific focus on the reintegration of former combatants, participants analyzed the cases of Mozambique, Sierra Leone, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, to draw out insights and find common features across the cases. The goal of the workshop was to encourage a more integrated view of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) and address the limits in knowledge and practice in reintegration, as compared to disarmament and demobilization.

Experts increasingly agree that for post-conflict peace-building strategies to have a lasting impact, DDR must be a priority. The June 2001 report of the UN Secretary-General on the prevention of armed conflict, for example, recognized that lasting DDR is a key component in conflict prevention. Disarmament entails the collection of arms and ammunition. Demobilization, a process that separates combatants from military service or armed troops, may include the establishment of camps and receiving areas where former combatants hand in their weapons and in return receive counseling, vocational training or economic assistance. Reintegration programs support the immediate and medium term social and economic inclusion of former combatants into their communities of origin or new communities.

While disarmament and demobilization have been studied extensively and are relatively well understood as military processes (though less examined as social and economic processes), reintegration has received less attention in terms of analysis and resources, from the international community. It is, however, clear that unless former fighters become functioning and productive members of society, long-term peace will not be possible.

There are a number of reasons why reintegration has received comparatively little attention. First, the successful reintegration of former combatants requires a long-term and ongoing commitment. Second, reintegration initiatives do not result in easily quantifiable results – there is no equivalent to stockpiles of weapons that can be locked away or destroyed publicly. Third, while disarmament and demobilization are generally included in peacekeeping mandates and therefore funded through peacekeeping operations, reintegration is often left to a host of actors ranging from UNDP and the World Bank to civil society organizations and international NGOs.

Fourth, and most importantly, the reintegration of former combatants spans both the development and security fields and presents more complex challenges than either disarmament or demobilization. These challenges are multidimensional and encompass the stimulation of viable economic growth and development, the establishment of income-generating projects, the provision of education and training programs, the preparation of host communities for the return of ex-combatants, and the response to the psycho-social impacts of war, including the needs of special groups such as child soldiers and women and girls who have been abused during the war.

Unlike disarmament and demobilization, which can be described as time-bound, reintegration is a process. As such, it necessarily involves many variables that are beyond the control of donors or the international community, including the willingness of ex-combatants to reintegrate and of communities to accept them. Ultimately, ex-combatants must re integrate themselves, and the role of the international community can only be to facilitate this process. To a large extent, the success of a DDR program then depends upon winning the hearts and minds not only of ex-combatants but also of the government and the community at large. Political will is crucial; unless the population and the government are committed to peace and combatants are ready to return to civilian life, DDR programs are unlikely to succeed.

Participants at the workshop agreed that there is no blueprint for DDR. It was clear from examinations of the

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2. Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration or Ex-combatants in a Peacekeeping Environment: Principles and Guidelines, Lessons Learned Unit, United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, December 1999.
different cases that programs and strategies that are successful in one situation might not fit the circumstances or realities of another. Appropriate timing, sequencing, and relevant actors depend on a host of issues and necessarily differ from case to case. The nature of the conflict, its duration, and causes, for example, have implications for the DDR process and influence what type of program will be most suitable. Participants observed that in Mozambique the conflict was closely linked to the Cold War and superpower rivalry. With the end of the Cold War, motivation and support for the conflict disappeared, helping the peace process and making the process of reconciliation and reintegration much easier. In the case of Sierra Leone, the war was largely about access to resources, which has contributed to protracted tensions, lacking simple solutions.

Nevertheless, several common themes emerged throughout the workshop and are discussed here. These range from issues associated with timing, actors, and the need for an integrated strategy, to the challenges of implementation. In addition, many issues were identified as requiring further attention.

**Key Issues and Challenges**

**Timing**

Planning for DDR can and should start well in advance of the actual peace. A DDR program should be part of an integrated national recovery strategy, which in turn should be prepared well in advance of its actual implementation. It was suggested that a pre-peace planning unit be set up for these purposes. In Mozambique, Switzerland supported a Mozambican planning unit for demobilization for two years prior to the peace. When a peace agreement was signed there was a ready pool of people who were familiar with the issues, could speak the language and had developed networks within the country. They were therefore in a position to assist with the implementation of the DDR program. This planning unit was seen as an important factor in the program’s success.

The discussion of DDR prior to the finalization of a peace agreement also means that crucial aspects can be incorporated into the peace agreement, enabling national buy-in limiting the likelihood of unpleasant surprises in the implementation process. Concrete tasks that can be accomplished at this stage include planning the division of labor between the government and external agencies, identifying rebel groups, agreeing which persons are to be considered combatants and eligible for benefits, determining the role of the parties to the agreement in defining and monitoring the DDR program, and estimating the number of fighters and weapons. This last task will be difficult—factions are likely to provide lists of combatants only when there is no strategic advantage for them to keep this information secret. As became apparent from the experience in Mozambique, disclosures at this early planning stage can be very unreliable.

While there was agreement on the need to start the strategic planning for the DDR process before a peace agreement is fully in place, participants at the workshop disagreed as to the possibility of beginning implementation prior to the cessation of hostilities. It may be the case that a DDR program can be initiated prior to the formal end of a conflict, and that it may even enable a swifter resolution. In Congo-Brazzaville a small pilot demobilization program was initiated during a ceasefire. This built confidence and generated the impetus for a larger peace-building process.

However, in many cases it is likely that peace is a necessary condition for DDR. Attempts at demobilizing early in Angola and Sierra Leone, for example, were not successful. One of the problems associated with implementing DDR programs before the peace is the “recycling of combatants”, where armed groups use demobilization camps as recruitment centers. Most participants did agree, however, that child combatants should be disarmed and demobilized as early as possible regardless of the status of the peace process. In addition, the handing over of a weapon must not be a prerequisite for entering a demobilization program since armed groups often use women and children for purposes other than traditional armed combat and these individuals may not own a weapon.

The appropriate sequencing of DDR is also open to debate. Many experts and much of the literature on DDR has argued that DDR is a “continuum” in which reintegration naturally follows disarmament and demobilization. However, as discussion at the workshop evidenced, this notion has increasingly come into question. In some
cases, it may be beneficial to start the reintegration process before the disarmament and demobilization projects are completed. In such instances, a reintegration program can provide a venue for convincing combatants to disarm and demobilize and build confidence in the process. Economic and social benefits associated with participating in reintegration programs can also serve as carrots. However, prioritizing reintegration sequentially will not work in all instances.

**Actors**

Actors involved in DDR programs range from national and local government authorities, communities, UN agencies, the international financial institutions, bilateral donors, and international NGOs to local NGOs, grassroots organizations, and of course combatants, ex-combatants, and their dependents.

The appropriate role of the national government and rebel groups in the planning and implementation of DDR programs is a central issue as national ownership of the process is vital for its success. While this means that the national government must frequently be the principal actor in developing and implementing DDR policies, national ownership should not be equated with government ownership. There is a genuine risk that the government could use this opportunity to consolidate its power to the detriment of civil society and groups that were in armed opposition, thus sowing new seeds of grievance. Corrupt leaders could, for example, use resources allocated to DDR programs to further their own political ambitions (including buying support, rewarding past allegiances, discrediting opposition parties, or favoring particular constituencies such as ethnic or religious groups).

However, the importance of government authority for overall stability cannot be underestimated. Governance programs emphasizing transparency and accountability can help to mitigate the risk of government overreach and corruption. In addition, government control and responsibilities should be defined in the peace agreement, which also needs to provide for the equal treatment of all groups—including ex-combatants—regardless of their pre-peace allegiances. In Mozambique, the peace agreement anticipated this need by creating a committee on reintegration chaired by the UN with both government and Renamo participation. A sense of ownership of the process can prevent ex-combatants from turning into spoilers of the peace. All relevant parties and rebel groups should therefore be included in the larger peace process as early as possible.

There was consensus at the workshop on the need for an equally broad-based commission in planning and overseeing DDR programs. Such bodies are most successful when they are specialized and have a limited mandate and life span. One currently exists in Sierra Leone and, as mentioned above, a similar commission functioned in Mozambique; both were considered to be extremely important in strengthening national unity. A non-inclusive DDR process can reinforce existing inequalities while a well-conceived program can actually go some way to addressing existing social structures and stratifications. Involving ex-combatants in the design of reintegration programs can further strengthen their sense of ownership of the process and enhance the probability of its success. Their involvement can also help to ensure the formulation of feasible and appropriate programs since ex-combatants, as well as other local actors, often have a better understanding of the social issues, networks, and structures that have developed during a conflict.

The identity, or self-conception, of ex-combatants, is also of concern. There is some risk that if ex-combatants are treated as a distinct group, separate from the rest of society, they will continue to identify themselves as such, demanding special benefits and targeted economic opportunities over the long-term. Perhaps more importantly, ex-combatants who perceive of themselves as belonging to a group apart from the rest of society may have trouble reintegrating socially and psychologically. Alternatively, it may simply be the case that most ex-combatants, marked by their war experience, are likely to continue to identify themselves with this experience regardless of the framing of a DDR program.

There is also an ongoing debate as to whether ex-combatants should be prioritized over refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the reintegration process. In cases such as Sierra Leone where ex-combatants have committed atrocities against the civilian population, there is resentment over what is often seen as their “special treatment”. Offering reintegration benefits directly to the communities in which ex-combatants (as well as other displaced populations) are to be reintegrated, rather than to the ex-combatants themselves, might ameliorate this resentment. The alternative pragmatic view, emphasizing stability rather than equality, maintains that since idle ex-combatants
pose a serious threat to peace and security, they must indeed receive special attention. In Sierra Leone for example, dealing with large groups of disaffected and unemployed youth, many of whom are ex-combatants, is an issue of vital importance to the country’s long-term recovery.

**Integrated Strategy**

DDR programs must be part of an integrated national recovery strategy. This strategy should encompass economic development, security sector reform, justice and reconciliation initiatives, and the resettlement and reintegration of ex-combatants, IDPs and refugees. Making DDR part of the overall recovery strategy serves to acknowledge the importance of this task and the fact that many of the challenges to the implementation of DDR programs have ramifications for the broader recovery process. It is also a strategy that can enable ownership by ex-combatants, communities, and the government.

While the success DDR has implications for the security situation within the country, it is ultimately dependent on economic growth and employment creation. Ex-combatants must be able to earn a livelihood through legitimate means. However, high levels of unemployment are common in post conflict societies, which makes demobilization and the lasting reintegration of combatants a tough proposition.

Even though the success of DDR programs is dependent on economic recovery, well-designed reintegration programs can actually contribute, indirectly, to the growth of the economy. Not surprisingly, the chronic lack of infrastructure and extreme underdevelopment that characterize countries emerging from conflict hinders economic recovery. Ex-combatants offer a ready source of labor for infrastructure projects and employing them in this fashion may, when DDR programs are financed by outside donors, lessen the burden on national governments. This can be particularly important, as spending cuts imposed by international financial institutions often make it very difficult for post conflict governments to free up money to generate economic opportunities and run job-creation programs.

DDR programs should also be linked to an overarching security sector reform. Countries emerging from violent conflict generally have oversized armies, the presence of other armed groups, an overabundance of weapons and lack of civilian oversight of the security apparatus. Armed groups, be they part of the national armed forces or rebels, are part of the security sector and have an impact on the general level of security within the country.

As the downsizing of the security apparatus is an important task for post-conflict countries, it is perhaps ironic that the armed forces, police, and prison services offer an important avenue of employment for ex-combatants. Retraining and separating command structures are key to ensuring that the civilian police and prison services as well as a ‘reformed’ military take on new attributes and political culture. In conflict-torn societies these institutions which, along with the government, represent a source of power, are generally controlled by the dominant group be it religious, ethnic or ideological. With civilian oversight and training in human rights, ex-combatants may be well placed to join these institutions as they are not only skilled recruits but can also significantly alter the ethnic, religious, or ideological make-up of such institutions. They may thus indirectly assist national reconciliation by addressing grievances about past imbalances or current discrimination.

In considering the suitability of an ex-combatant for redeployment in the armed forces, or any other area, it is important to take into account not only individual health and educational standards, but also his or her human rights record. Ex-combatants are obviously one of the groups most likely to have committed such abuses. As a consequence, it is important that DDR programs be linked to the overall reconciliation and justice initiatives.

In most conflicts, IDPs and refugees outnumber ex-combatants. All three groups face many of the same challenges in terms of integration. As mentioned previously, offering special treatment to ex-combatants runs the risk of breeding resentment within the community. Integrating DDR programs into an overall recovery strategy that takes into account the needs of all of these groups is therefore an important way to overcome potential pitfalls. It may also be possible to transfer lessons from one area to the other. In other words, experience in the area of reintegrating refugees and IDPs might prove helpful in DDR programs and vice versa.

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Implementation

Although the meeting did not examine implementation in detail, a number of important issues were raised.

Training programs are often held up as a measure of the success of a DDR program. Training is however not a panacea. The level of education among ex-combatants who have spent much of their adolescence and all of their adult life as fighters might be very low, and relatively little knowledge can actually be imparted in the brief period during which training of ex-combatants takes place (typically about six weeks).

Training is generally viewed as a means of increasing an individual’s employment prospects. However, the experience in Mozambique has shown that most ex-combatants failed to find employment in the area in which they were trained. This illustrates the need for training programs that are responsive to the needs of the community and to job opportunities that actually exist or can be generated. The best way of achieving this is to conduct labor market surveys and demographic profiling of ex-combatants. To ensure relevance of reintegration programs, it is also important to involve ex-combatants and the community in their design. That said, if the local economy is weak, ex-combatants will have difficulty finding employment regardless of the appropriateness and/or demand for their skills. Managing the expectations of ex-combatants is thus critical. If ex-combatants who sign up for DDR programs have unrealistic expectations about what they will get out of the program they are liable to become disillusioned with the process and to return to habits and modes of behavior developed during wartime. This is potentially very destabilizing.

Public information campaigns are an invaluable tool for facilitating implementation. These can begin in advance of the actual DDR program and should highlight the benefits that will accrue to ex-combatants and the communities in which they settle. The utility of broad based information campaigns is clearly illustrated by the experience in Mozambique. The DDR program in that country provided that many ex-combatants would be re-deployed in the newly constituted army. There was however, a significant shortfall in the number of recruits. It became apparent that many ex-combatants believed that they would not be paid for their service because soldiers were not paid during the war. A well-conceived public information campaign could have countered these misconceptions.

Flexibility in programming is crucial to the success of DDR initiatives. While it is important to start designing the program before the peace, it is just as important that the program be able to respond to events and conditions as they unfold. Flexibility is not enough however. It is important that there be comprehensive and periodic assessments of the various components of any DDR program. These assessments provide objective criteria for judging whether particular initiatives were successful and for making decisions about how future programming should be adapted. The experience of the World Bank in Sierra Leone is illustrative in this regard. Phase three (of three chronological periods of the program) is generally regarded as being much more effective than either phases one or two. This is a result, at least in part, of the attempt to address issues that were problematic in the earlier phases.

Issues Requiring Further Debate

Several important issues were raised in the meeting that, due to time constraints, could not be examined in great detail. The following discussion aims to highlight issues that require further attention from analysts as well as pose specific questions that should be addressed by policymakers when designing reintegration programs.

Conflict Dynamics

Current work in conflict analysis would suggest that it is crucial for DDR programs to incorporate a ‘conflict system approach’, which recognizes the regional dimensions of conflict. Regional dimensions include not only the shared causes but also the fact that conflict has a tendency to ‘spill in’ and ‘spill out’ of neighboring states. In some cases combatants follow the fighting from country to country, contributing to levels of insecurity. When and if they eventually return to their country of origin, they will once again pose a security threat. Although it might be unrealistic to involve neighboring countries in the design and implementation of DDR programs, it is important to consider the impact of regional conflict on the country in question as well as the impact that the cessation of violence and the development of DDR programs might have on other countries in the sub-region.

Relevant questions might be:
- What is the history of conflict in the region/sub-
region? Is the sub-region currently experiencing instability or in danger or experiencing instability?

- Did neighboring countries benefit from the war? What was the involvement of neighboring countries in the conflict — i.e. were governments supporting any of the parties either directly or indirectly? Did neighboring countries serve as a conduit for arms and/or the illicit flow of resources?

- Were fighters drawn from neighboring countries? Did rebels flee to neighboring countries after the cessation of hostilities?

- How can regional organizations be involved in the DDR process?

Similarly, the type of conflict experienced in the country and the nature of the peace process should also shape the design of reintegration programs. It will for example have an impact on the number of armed groups and the likelihood of spoilers (which increases if they are not included in the peace process). It can also have impacts on the inducements necessary to get combatants to disarm and re integrate. In the case of resource wars, ex-combatants may have been able to earn a great deal through the spoils of war and it will be difficult to convince them to accept a more uncertain, and impoverished, peace-time existence.

Relevant questions might be:

- What was the nature of the conflict - was it a civil war, was it ideological, ethnic, religious, or resource-based?

- What was the duration of the conflict? What types of groups were involved?

- Was the peace agreement externally brokered? Were neighboring countries involved in the peace process? Were all warring factions part of the agreement? Did the agreement contain provisions relating to DDR?

**Neglected Beneficiaries**

In many cases there will be questions about who actually qualifies for DDR programs. While many women do not fit the usual stereotype of a combatant in that they may not have been directly involved in the fighting, they may have served armed groups as cooks, servants, or sexual slaves. Not only will they fail to qualify for programs that require that combatants turn in a gun in return for assistance, but ordinary DDR programs are not well-placed to deal with the special issues—shame, prejudice and unwanted or unplanned pregnancies—that these women face when the war comes to an end.

Dependents of ex-combatants may also be neglected. In some cases, the ex-combatant may have more than one wife, each of whom has a number of children. Reinsertion packages generally provide a flat payment that does not take into account the number of dependents that an ex-combatant is supporting. As a result, ex-combatants may declare only one wife or in some cases, no wife at all. The women and children then lose their primary means of support and are generally not eligible for support in their own right.

Relevant questions might be:

- How is gender incorporated into the national recovery plan and the DDR program?

- Were women involved in the fighting as combatants? Were women involved in the fighting in support roles (i.e. cooks, sexual slaves etc.)? Did women leave their communities or remain in them?

- Are public information campaigns relating to DDR programs targeted at women? Can women ex-combatants seek assistance in a manner that protects their identity and privacy? Is there a network bringing former women combatants together so that they can share their experiences and support each other during the reintegration process?

- Do programs aimed at women make provision for dependents? Do training programs provide for childcare?

- Are there provisions for rape counseling? Are there programs for screening for sexually transmitted diseases? Is there education about the transmission of AIDS to children?

- Does the DDR program make provision for all family members? How are family members defined? Does this definition fit with the traditional concept of ‘family’ in this community? Did ex-combatants start families while away from their communities? Is the...
amount of money received by ex-combatants related to the number of dependents?

- Do members of all the armed groups qualify for DDR programs? Does the DDR program take into account part-time fighters? What proportion of fighters were part-timers? Should this group be entitled to benefits?

**Health Issues**

In many parts of the world there is a high incidence of HIV/AIDS among combatants and they risk spreading it to communities in which they settle or reside on a temporary basis. However, limited time and resources, and the logistical challenges entailed in addressing combatants with HIV/AIDS mean that this issue may receive little or no attention. The DRC is a case in point. The focus in the DRC has been on repatriating ex-combatants as quickly as possible and as a consequence, the issue of HIV/AIDS is not being addressed. Although the immediate impacts of failing to deal with this issue are relatively few, in years to come it will have devastating effects.

While AIDS is perhaps the most high-profile health issue, it is by no means the only one requiring attention. Many ex-combatants suffer from a variety of health complaints – both physical and psychological. This is clearly an area that must be given a higher priority in the planning of DDR programs. This in turn requires increased funding and expert advice.

Relevant questions might be:

- What types of communicable diseases are prevalent among combatants? What are the provisions for testing ex-combatants?

- What are the strategies for health education? How can health education and screening be incorporated into the existing DDR process? What is the prevalence of psycho-social disorders?

- Was rape a method of war?

- Is it possible to identify organizations that might be interested in funding health related aspects of the program? Is there an organization involved in DDR programming that specializes in health issues? If so, can this organization be asked to coordinate the health strategy?

- Should the World Health Organization, other relevant UN agencies and various NGOs focusing on health issues be represented at both the planning stage and implementation stages?

**Funding**

Procuring funding for DDR programs remains a challenge. Donors are diverse and uncoordinated and there are significant disparities and delays between pledges and actual delivery. However, if DDR is to be an integrated process, there cannot be gaps and delays as a result of slow funding. To be effective, funding should be secured well in advance of the peace so that planning can begin and a well-elaborated plan can be built into the peace agreement. The mechanisms for fund disbursement must be flexible while maintaining financial standards. In the early phases of disarmament and demobilization external bodies may be more impartial and agile than the national government.

Donor agencies are understandably reluctant to provide money for programs that are dependent on peace when the prospects of a peace agreement remain slim. Conditions can be placed on funding in order to ensure that money is spent correctly. In addition, including DDR in the peace agreement can itself be a useful tool in helping to securing funding.

Other potential solutions that need further examination include the development of rapid response mechanisms such as the creation of small pools of money for immediate use while longer-term funding is secured. An alternative is that assessed funding could be made available for reintegration programs. This would require that reintegration be included in UN peacekeeping mandates, something that the Secretary-General has urged the Security Council to consider.

Strong bilateral support can be a vital tool for ensuring the availability of funding for DDR programming. In Sierra Leone, much support came from the UK. Obviously, permanent members of the Security Council have a greater capacity to garner support in that body but non-permanent members can still be helpful. These donors can monitor the peace process, and help to keep DDR initiatives focused. They also bring with them a level of credibility and ultimately may be helpful in terms of securing support from other donors. As important as strong bilateral support is, funding may remain problematic and of course there will be many cases where there is
no strong bilateral support. It may sometimes be effective to have the leader of the country personally contact his/her counterpart in donor countries.

Relevant questions might be:

- Is there a former colonial power?
- Is there an existing or obvious bilateral donor?
- Can the leader of the country convince their counterparts in the donor countries to increase their involvement?

Coordination

Coordination remains a thorny issue in DDR, as it is in so many aspects of peace implementation. The plethora of agencies and institutions involved in the various stages of DDR has resulted in both overlaps and gaps in the implementation of programs. Tasks should therefore be allocated according to the comparative advantage of actors in specific circumstances.

Coordination is not only an issue between actors but also between the various stages of DDR programs. In cases where there is a UN peacekeeping mission, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations will generally be responsible for the disarmament and demobilization of ex-combatants. It is less likely that the mandate will include reintegration. Similarly, in the absence of a UN mandate, national military strategies often address disarmament and demobilization but again reintegration is not usually part of this process. In both cases reintegration is left to other actors such as UNDP, the World Bank, the IOM, and NGOs, which makes it difficult to achieve a coordinated and integrated approach.

Relevant questions might be:

- Is there an existing UN mandate or a national military strategy that deals with disarmament and demobilization?
- Which organizations are involved in DDR programming? Do their activities complement each other or overlap? Would monthly meetings among DDR actors be useful?
- Are there gaps in the DDR programming? Are there groups or regions that are being neglected?
- Are there regional mechanisms that deal with DDR? How can the international community best support emerging regional initiatives in this area (this might include the provision of technical support and expertise)?

Conclusion

The workshop provided an opportunity for experts from the field, headquarters, and academia to come together and discuss an issue that is central to post-conflict peacebuilding but historically has not received the attention it deserves. The reintegration of ex-combatants, which is arguably the most difficult component of the process commonly referred to as DDR, also has the most far-reaching impact on the prospects for a sustainable peace. The structure and content of UN peacekeeping mandates has meant that while there might be relative consistency and coherence in disarmament and demobilization programs, reintegration programming has fallen to a range of actors. This lack of continuity in implementation and programming begs the question of whether it is realistic to refer to DDR as a continuum. Greater coordination among the various elements of the DDR process must clearly be a priority.

A positive lesson from the workshop was that while there can be no blueprint for DDR, there are a range of goals on which the various actors agree. These range from the need to include DDR programming in peace agreements and to incorporate DDR into integrated recovery strategies, to the importance of national buy-in from the government, communities, and ex-combatants.

There are a number of issues that require further analysis and debate in order that they might be incorporated into programming. These include the need for strategies that: reflect current thinking on conflict dynamics; respond to the needs of neglected actors such as female ex-combatants, part-time fighters and the dependents of ex-combatants; and address health concerns such as mental health and HIV/AIDS. Unfortunately, funding mechanisms and coordination among actors remain problematic.

Effective DDR is a central element of long-term peacebuilding and conflict prevention, yet the full reintegration of former combatants remains incomplete in many countries emerging from conflict. This workshop sought to draw out these key challenges with an emphasis on the ways in which all actors, but particularly UNDP, might develop more effective programming.
Workshop Agenda

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 12

12:00 - 1:00 Lunch

1:00 - 1:15 Welcome and Introduction

Ms. Julia Taft, United Nations Development Programme
David M. Malone, International Peace Academy

1:15 - 2:15 Discussion of Background Paper

Chair: David M. Malone, International Peace Academy
Speaker: Mr. Kees Kingma, Bonn International Center for Conversion
Discussants: Mr. Robert Scharf, United Nations Development Programme
Mr. Mark Schneider, International Crisis Group

2:15 - 3:30 Case Study: Mozambique

Chair: Dr. Necla Tschirgi, International Peace Academy
Panelists: H.E. Mr. Francisco Madeira, Office of the President of Mozambique
Ms. Sam Barnes, United Nations Development Programme
Ms. Virginia Gamba, SaferAfrica

3:30 - 3:45 Coffee Break

3:45 - 5:00 Case Study: Democratic Republic of the Congo

Chair: Ms. Petra Lantz, United Nations Development Programme
Panelists: Mr. Pierre Bertrand, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
Ms. Margaret Carey, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations
Mr. Jean-Luc Stalon, United Nations Development Programme

6:30 – 8:00 Reception
FRIDAY, DECEMBER 13

8:30 - 9:00 Light Breakfast

9:00 - 10:15 Case Study: Sierra Leone
Chair: Mr. Joel Martins, SaferAfrica
Panelists: Mr. Sean Bradley, World Bank
Mr. Bengt Ljunggren, United Nations Development Programme, Sierra Leone
Mr. Mitonga Zongwe, United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone

10:15 - 10:30 Coffee Break

10:30 - 11:45 Lessons from the Case Studies
Chair: Dr. Chandra Sriram, International Peace Academy
Panelists: Mr. Marco Boasso, International Organization for Migration
Mr. Stelios Comninos, Independent Consultant
Dr. Joanna Spear, King’s College

11:45 - 1:00 Lunch

1:00 - 2:15 Managing DD&R of Ex-Combatants in the Context of Transitional Recovery Programming
Chair: Ms. Sam Barnes, United Nations Development Programme
Panelists: Mr. Patrick Coker, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations
Mr. Ashraf El-Nour, United Nations Development Programme
Mr. Robert Scharf, United Nations Development Programme

2:15 - 3:30 Funding Mechanisms
Chair: Ms. Julia Taft, United Nations Development Programme
Panelists: Dr. Ann Fitzgerald, United Kingdom Department for International Development
Mr. Auke Lootsma, United Nations Development Programme
Dr. Johanna Mendelson-Forman, United Nations Foundation

3:30 - 3:45 Coffee Break

3:45 - 5:00 Conclusions
Chair: Ms. Julia Taft, United Nations Development Programme
Panelists: Ms. Sam Barnes, United Nations Development Programme
Ms. Roxanne Bazergan, King’s College
Dr. Taylor Seybolt, United States Institute of Peace
## List of Participants

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About the program

From Promise to Practice: Strengthening UN Capacities for the Prevention of Violent Conflict

Duration: September 2000 – June 2003

While preventing violent conflict has many advocates at a general level, knowledge about how it is to be done, under what circumstances, when, and by whom, remains significantly underdeveloped. This is partly a problem for analysts, whose techniques for assessing volatile situations and potential remedies need to be sharpened. It is also a significant problem for organizations and institutions, whose practices, cultures, and styles of decision-making, and whose systems of learning and accountability, often inhibit effective responses to the complex environments in which conflict may turn violent.

In 2000-2001, IPA conducted an initial research and policy development project entitled "From Reaction to Prevention: Opportunities for the UN System in the New Millennium." The project aimed to determine the degree of consensus and discord in recent research on conflict trends and causes of conflict and peace, and to use these findings to help shape policy and action on conflict prevention within the UN system. We drew several conclusions from this initial work, including recognition of the urgent need to address the developmental aspects of conflict prevention. In light of this, IPA launched a three-year project entitled "From Promise to Practice: Strengthening UN Capacities for the Prevention of Violent Conflict." The goal is to find opportunities to strengthen the conflict prevention capacity within the UN system. The project devotes considerable attention to structural prevention, emphasizing the role of development and capacity-building.

IPA's research aims to identify the most appropriate tools, actors, and strategies for a range of preventive actions to be undertaken by the United Nations. Case studies of preventive action were commissioned on the following nine countries: Georgia (Javakheti), Burundi, Tanzania (Zanzibar), Fiji, Kenya, East Timor, Colombia, Tajikistan, and Liberia. In order to develop cases that are both rigorous and as policy-relevant as possible, consultations have involved the UN system and its agencies, research institutes, civil society actors, experts, and others, developing guidelines for authors to give priority to the policy insights gained from cases. An edited volume of these cases will be published in 2002. A policy report on lessons from the case studies was disseminated to the UN and the larger policy community in the spring of 2002. The report presents ideas on best practices and policy recommendations for a wide variety of situations and identifies cooperative potential among UN actors, regional and subregional organizations, member states, NGOs, civil society, and the business community in preventing violent conflict.

The prevention project has developed two meetings to examine the role of regional and subregional organizations. A workshop held in April 2002 with the Swedish Institute in Alexandria, Egypt sought to share best practices on conflict prevention and examine collaboration and cooperation between the UN and regional and subregional organizations at a working level to distill practical policy-oriented and operational suggestions. A senior level conference held at Wilton Park, UK, in July 2002 built on insights from the workshop and focus on further steps that can be taken to strengthen the role of regional and subregional organizations in conflict prevention.