IPI Blue Papers

Global Terrorism

Task Forces on
Strengthening Multilateral
Security Capacity

No. 4

2009

INTERNATIONAL PEACE INSTITUTE

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

NOTE

Meetings were held under the Chatham House Rule. Participants were invited in their personal capacity. This report is an IPI product. Its content does not necessarily represent the positions or opinions of individual Task Force participants.

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Foreword

We live in difficult times. Rapid socioeconomic changes, demographic bulges, and intertwined security crises are affecting us all, and most especially the poor. Criminal and violent organizations are gaining control over territory, markets, and populations around the world, complicating peacemaking and generating insecurity. States with ineffective and corrupt institutions prove too weak to deal with interlinked threats ranging from transnational organized crime to infectious disease. Meanwhile, the number of actual and aspirant nuclear-armed countries is growing, as is the likelihood that nonstate actors will acquire weapons of mass destruction through illicit global trade.

Global warming and environmental degradation particularly distress already impoverished regions. Fluctuating food and energy prices put people and governments to the test, while the demand for resources—notably water and energy—increases due to unprecedented development and population growth.

To this already gloomy picture, the year 2008 added tectonic shifts in the economic landscape. A devastating financial crisis is producing dramatic consequences with likely long-term impacts on economic development, aid, and emerging markets alike.

Yet, at a time when common efforts are needed more than ever, division and discord can be spotted in many multilateral institutions, from the United Nations to NATO and the European Union. Peace operations are under serious stress, while political disunity undermines the authority and effectiveness of the Security Council. The optimistic embrace of a "flat" world of responsible sovereign states is challenged by those who push for a return to exclusive state sovereignty and jealously guarded territorial integrity.

However, crises provide unparalleled opportunities for change. These moments are transitory, but they need to be seized upon to

put ideas into action, to strengthen the capacity to meet the challenges we face, which in today's globalizing world means more responsive, effective, and efficient multilateral mechanisms and policies.

In response to these challenges, IPI launched the **Task Forces on Strengthening Multilateral Security Capacity** in 2008. The purpose of these Task Forces was to suggest ideas for action to strengthen the capacity of the United Nations (UN) and its partners to deal effectively with emerging, multifaceted, and global challenges to peace and security. The Task Forces addressed not only the policy steps that are needed, but also the political and institutional strategies required to implement them. This strategic perspective has too often been the missing link in efforts to strengthen the UN system.

Given the links among security, development, and environmental challenges, the initiative opened with a symposium on Development, Resources, and Environment. The symposium provided a larger context for the work of the subsequent Task Forces, which focused on two core dimensions of the security concerns facing the UN and its partners: (1) Transnational Security Challenges and (2) Inter- and Intra-state Armed Conflict (see Annex 3 for details of the process).

The **IPI Blue Papers** are the product of this intense process of consultation, which engaged more than sixty UN member states, half of them at ambassadorial level, and seventy experts in a variety of thematic areas. It included the preparation of more than twenty-five background papers and fourteen multiday meetings. Each Blue Paper includes a section on why action to strengthen capacity in a particular area is needed and a section with ideas for action. The content is based on the Task Force discussions, but does not necessarily represent all the views articulated during the entire process. Although the institutional focus of the Task Forces was primarily the UN, this report aims to assist key stakeholders to prioritize and leverage the comparative advantages of the UN

and other multilateral institutions, including their ability to forge productive and sustainable partnerships with other groups and organizations.

While policy discussions on related topics are taking place in other fora, IPI brings to this initiative nearly forty years of constructive collaboration with the United Nations and its membership, as well as a more long-term strategic perspective than in-house and intergovernmental processes can offer. With these Blue Papers, IPI hopes to continue a process that will produce concrete steps toward stronger multilateral capacity in peace and security.

Despite the difficulties ahead, we believe that tomorrow's world needs more multilateral capacity, not less. It needs a stronger UN, capable of adapting and strengthening its capacity to address the realities of the twenty-first century. It needs a UN able to work with its partners and in particular with member states, which remain the first line of response to many of the threats discussed here.

This is the purpose of the IPI Blue Papers, and I am very pleased to introduce them to you.

Finally, I would like to thank most warmly the co-chairs of the Task Forces, the member-state participants, the experts, and IPI staff, without whose hard work and intellectual contributions the IPI Blue Papers would not have seen the light of day.

Terje Rød-Larsen
President, *International Peace Institute*
January 2009

Acronyms

1267 Committee	Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee
CT	counterterrorism
CTAG	Counter-Terrorism Action Group
CTC	Counter-Terrorism Committee
CTED	Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate
CTITF	Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force
DPA/UNDPA	United Nations Department of Political Affairs
DPKO/UNDPKO	United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DSS/UNDSS	United Nations Department of Safety and Security
EOSG	Executive Office of the Secretary-General
G8	Group of 8
GA/UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INTERPOL	International Criminal Police Organization
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	nongovernmental organization
P5	Permanent 5 members of the Security Council
PBC	Peacebuilding Commission
SG	United Nations Secretary-General
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme

UNDPI/DPI	United Nations Department of Public Information
UNHCR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNHQ	United Nations headquarters
UNICRI	United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute
UNOLA	United Nations Office of Legal Affairs
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
WMD/s	Weapon/s of Mass Destruction

Executive Summary

The increasingly transnational and multifaceted nature of terrorism calls for a strong multilateral response. States have the primary responsibility for protecting their populations from the threats posed by terrorism. At the same time, given the often cross-regional nature of the terrorist threat, mechanisms for effective cooperation are needed at the global and regional levels. To this end, the United Nations (UN), by virtue of its universality and legitimacy, has an important role to play.

Yet, despite the longstanding presence of terrorism as an issue on the UN agenda, the collective response to global terrorism has been stymied by fundamental disagreements among UN member states, including divergent threat perceptions and priorities among the global North and South. In addition, tensions remain between the Security Council and the General Assembly as to the rightful arbiter of multilateral norms and the appropriate forum for discussing counterterrorism (CT).

The UN's efforts have been hampered, moreover, by unwieldy institutional arrangements, inconsistent political support, and a lack of public understanding of what comparative advantages the UN has to offer in countering terrorism. In the absence of a comprehensive set of policies guiding multilateral action to counter terrorism, the UN's response has been largely ad hoc and reactive; responsive rather than preemptive or preventative.

IDEAS FOR ACTION

I. **Strengthen political support for the UN's role in countering terrorism**

- UN member states should develop a cross-regional platform at the UN to engage on a regular basis with the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF), including through support for the implementation of the

UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (GCT Strategy), by, for example, a "Group of Friends" or Contact Group.

- Member states should support assessed budgetary allocations for the UN's counterterrorism work.

- The Executive Office of the Secretary-General and member states should promote greater cooperation among the Security Council, CTITF, and UN human rights mechanisms. The UN human rights and counterterrorism mechanisms should work together to develop human rights best practices. Also, the Council should review the listing/delisting processes of the Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee ("1267 Committee") and direct it to inform member states whose nationals are listed.

II.   Enhance strategic communications

- The Secretary-General should not hesitate to use his bully pulpit to articulate the UN's role and comparative advantages in countering global terrorism. To that end, the CTITF should work closely with the UN Department of Public Information (DPI) to develop a global media campaign to reaffirm the UN's core values of protecting civilians and human rights, and to highlight the impact of terrorist violence on individual victims and communities.

- The Executive Office of the Secretary-General (EOSG) should direct UN agencies and funds, and particularly the constituent members of the CTITF, to support GCT Strategy implementation, at headquarters and in the field.

- The EOSG should designate a single spokesperson to provide a recognized CT focal point to represent the collective efforts of the world body.

- The CTITF and the Security Council's counterterrorism experts should accelerate their efforts to improve their engagement with the private sector and civil society to

further implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions 1267, 1373, and 1540, as well as the GCT Strategy.

III. **Deepen relationships between UN headquarters and national and regional partners**

- The UN should increase its engagement and capacity-building initiatives with regional and subregional organizations. The CTITF and the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate (CTED) should develop regional strategies informed by these relationships. Staff rotations between regional and subregional organizations and the UN would bring much-needed regional expertise into the CTITF.

- CTED's regional expert staff could be relocated within key states or peace operations where member states signal a need for assistance in addressing the terrorist threat.

- Donors providing voluntary contributions to the CTITF should consider funding secondments of officers from the global South to the CTITF, both to promote broader regional representation and to enhance its operational and analytical capacities.

IV. **Streamline and consolidate UN bureaucracy to address counterterrorism**

- The CTITF should be granted the funding and personnel necessary to meet the demands for more pro-active engagement by the UN membership. Additionally, the chair should be invested with the necessary political authority, mandate, and resources to effectively coordinate all the CTITF's constituent bodies and working groups.

- The General Assembly should ensure that the 2010 review of the GCT Strategy assesses the CTITF and its role in supporting the UN's counterterrorism activities and addresses the relevant resource-allocation needs. Member

states should encourage the establishment of a biennial review, based on a series of benchmarks established to assess progress made by the CTITF and its contribution to countering global terrorism.

- In the long run, the UN's leadership and member states should consider consolidating the world body's CT work in a single organization or office. The latter would require both resolving the relationship between CTED and the CTITF, and designating a centralized authority on CT within the UN.

- Building on the recommendations of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, the Security Council should streamline the reporting requirements and its engagement with countries related to the work of the 1267, 1373, and 1540 committees. In addition, the expert staff of those committees should be consolidated.

WHY ACTION IS NEEDED

The Challenge for Multilateral Counterterrorism

1. The increasingly transnational and multifaceted nature of terrorism calls for a strong multilateral response. Like organizations in the commercial world, terrorist groups have benefited from globalization and have been able to decentralize operations, diversify supply and funding mechanisms, and use technologies to connect operatives or "home-grown cells" across the globe. Furthermore, they have expanded their operations to encompass new partnerships, including transnational criminal organizations and armed groups.[1]

2. In its December 2008 report, the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism predicted that a terrorist attack using WMDs was likely before 2013.[2] We have already seen the willingness of terrorists to use chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons in the 1995 sarin attack in Tokyo. This underscores the possibility of damage on a catastrophic scale. Booming population centers, interconnected economic infrastructures, and people and goods continually on the move would be especially vulnerable to such an attack. The rapidity with which such weapons could be deployed is starkly contrasted with the inertia of bureaucracies tasked with a response.

3. Terrorism and other forms of violent extremism also pose a threat to fragile states by destabilizing political systems, creating an inhospitable environment for development, and threatening civil liberties and human rights. Moreover, terrorist groups have exploited vulnerabilities such as porous national borders, weak governance, limited law-enforcement capacities, fragile governments, and local grievances to generate permissive conditions for violent extremism and

militancy to emerge or flourish. As such they challenge not only the authority of the state but its ability to provide the necessary security for achieving progress on development objectives.[3]

4. The diffusion of terrorist threats across borders, via technology like the internet, alongside the potential for catastrophic damage from the use of WMDs, means that political borders offer little security from the effects of a potential terrorist attack.[4] As one member-state representative noted during the IPI Task Force discussions, the collective effort to counter terrorism can only be as strong as the weakest state, as any state might be used either as a target, base of operations, or transit route for terrorists. Consequently, the response must be national, regional, and global in scale.

5. States have the primary responsibility for protecting their populations from the threats posed by terrorism. However, following a broad recognition that no state, or even group of states, can counter terrorism on its own, states' efforts have often been complemented by well-established bilateral and regional cooperation. At the same time, given the often cross-regional nature of the terrorist threat, mechanisms for effective cooperation are needed at the global level. To this end, the United Nations, by virtue of its universality and legitimacy, has an important complementary role to play. Yet, despite the longstanding presence of terrorism as an issue on the UN agenda, the collective response has been stymied by fundamental disagreements among the UN member states on the nature of terrorism and the appropriate response by multilateral organizations. Moreover, the UN's efforts have been hampered by unwieldy institutional arrangements, inconsistent political support, and a lack of public understanding of the UN's role and comparative advantages in countering terrorism.

6. Divergent threat perceptions and priorities among the global North and South have also contributed to fragmentation among the UN membership on this issue. Developing countries have raised concerns regarding the possible diversion of resources toward a security agenda widely perceived as favoring developed states. Moreover, the framing of the challenge by the United States as a "Global War on Terror" led to perceptions among some that this was an initiative more for the consolidation of American hegemony than one of vital consequence to countries where natural disasters, poverty, disease, and political violence are perceived as more pressing human security needs.

7. In addition, tensions remain between the Security Council and the General Assembly as to the rightful arbiter of multilateral norms and the appropriate forum for discussing counterterrorism. As a result, each body has developed its own set of counterterrorism initiatives and sub-bodies.

    a. Following September 11, 2001, the Security Council's Resolution (UNSCR) 1373, calling on all states to deny terrorists shelter and resources, met with widespread support. To monitor and facilitate its implementation, the Council established the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) in 2001 and the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate (CTED) in 2004 to support its work.[5] Moreover, the Group of Eight (G8) Counter-Terrorism Action Group (CTAG) among other donors also provides support to the CTC in order to promote implementation of UNSCR 1373 and coordinate capacity-building assistance to that end.[6]

    b. In an attempt to reassert its role in countering global terrorism, the General Assembly adopted the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (hereafter, "GCT Strategy") in September 2006. Despite the seemingly intractable debates regarding a definition of terrorism, all member

states unequivocally condemned "terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, committed by whomever, wherever and for whatever purposes, as it constitutes one of the most serious threats to international peace and security."[7] This resolution draws on elements from existing counterterrorism-related treaties and agreements to put forward a plan of action in four key areas: addressing "conditions conducive" to the spread of terrorism; preventing and combating terrorism; building state capacity to counter terrorism; and upholding human rights while countering terrorism. Significantly, the GCT Strategy reflects an acknowledgement by governments that effective counterterrorism requires both "hard" and "soft" measures, reflected in its plan of action and the thematic range covered by its working groups.[8]

c. The Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF) was established in 2005 by the Secretary-General to coordinate the efforts of the UN system to address the threat and has been tasked after 2006 with supporting implementation of the GCT Strategy. The CTITF brings together development and educational organizations, such as the UN Development Programme (UNDP), the UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), with technical assistance providers like the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), and key stakeholder departments like the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), the Department of Political Affairs (DPA), the Department of Safety and Security (DSS), and the Office of Legal Affairs (OLA) as well as the UNSC's CT-related bodies. In addition, the group provides multilateral bodies like the World Bank, the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), the International Atomic Energy Agency

(IAEA), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), a vehicle to coordinate with the UN and member states in addressing this global challenge.[9]

8. Although the UN has made positive strides in developing greater coordination in its counterterrorism work and improving cooperation with multilateral partners, some member states and experts remain skeptical. Critics point out that the UN is ill-suited to several of the more operational tasks involved in fighting terrorism, including preempting strikes or developing dedicated intelligence-gathering capacities.[10] Mistrust among states, many of whom have been implicated in acts of terrorism, makes it unlikely that they would entrust the UN—or indeed each other—with sensitive information relating to their security establishments or citizens. As a result, though terrorism has confronted the UN for nearly sixty years, ever since the 1948 assassination of Count Folke Bernadotte, the UN has been unable to act with a unified and purposeful voice.

9. Given the primary role of states in countering terrorism, cooperation among member states has been undertaken mostly via bilateral, or in some cases, "plurilateral" channels. In order to play an effective and complementary role, the UN system will need to address a number of institutional challenges, outlined below.

INSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES

10. In the absence of a comprehensive set of policies guiding multilateral action to counter terrorism, the UN's response has been largely ad hoc and reactive; responsive rather than preemptive. The IPI Task Force discussions suggested three key areas in which the UN faced barriers to more effective action: political support, communication, and organization.

Political Support

11. Support for UN CT activities from states and the global public has been inconsistent and constrained by a limited understanding of the role and functions of the world body and its multilateral partners.

12. The limited membership of the Security Council has narrowed the political support it receives from nonmembers, some of whom believe counterterrorism initiatives to be primarily driven by the permanent five Council members (P5). In addition, the continuing existence of the better-resourced Security Council apparatus in counterterrorism, despite the presence of the CTITF, fuels perceptions that the UN's initiatives to counter terrorism are not in the interests of the broad membership. This is particularly relevant as the General Assembly controls the world body's budget through its Fifth Committee, where political differences are played out over resource allocation. Some member states also expressed resentment regarding the "peer review" mechanism of the Security Council's committees, questioning the qualifications and possible biases of reviewing states.[11]

13. The authority and enforcement capacity of the Security Council have also been challenged by some of its own practices, such as its reluctance to "name and shame" noncompliant states. Analyzing the Counter-Terrorism Committee, C. S. R. Murthy has pointed out that its warm reception from member states is derived to some degree from this restraint. However, he cautions, "The Committee has a dilemma: if it wears the enforcement cap, it will lose whatever little confidence it has among certain governments. On the other hand, the present mode of cooperation is not taking the CTC very far either."[12]

14. Inadequate attention to human rights and due process within the UN's own work risks eroding the organization's credibility and moral authority. For example, the listing and delisting processes of the Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee (the "1267 Committee") have drawn fire for the limited opportunities they provide to listed individuals to challenge the process. Criticisms of these processes have even led to thirty legal challenges to the 1267 Committee's consolidated list and listing process.[13] For example, the European Court of Justice, in the case of *Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission*, concluded that European implementation of the Council's targeted sanctions measures violates due process rights protected by European law.[14] Consequently, since the committee's new guidelines were adopted in winter 2008, a review has been taking place of all names currently on the list.

15. The listing and delisting processes rely heavily on states assisting the individuals in question. However, a number of member states have noted that information regarding the listing of their nationals is not always conveyed to them, limiting their capacity to assist. Many of the names provided by the US and, to a lesser extent, other members of the P5, have been processed through the listing procedure with only limited—if any—UN independent verification of the information against them. This has fueled perceptions of the instrumentalization of the Security Council's counter-terrorism measures by its permanent members.

Communication

16. The leadership at the UN has not clearly articulated the comparative advantages it enjoys and the vital roles it can play in countering terrorism. Its agencies and departments have a longstanding history of addressing challenges in the realms of development, armed conflict, and human

rights, which might be leveraged into initiatives to counter terrorism and other forms of violent extremism.

17. Even its presupposed strength in setting international norms—such as nonviolent conflict resolution, the protection of civilians, and human rights—has been compromised by the very public disagreements among the membership regarding the definition, and consequently, suitable response, to terrorism.

18. Opportunities presented by the tools of transnational media—including satellite communications, cable news, and the internet—have not been harnessed by the UN and its CT actors to create a "counternarrative" to that propagated by militants and terrorist groups. This could showcase the negative impact of terrorism on many of the perpetrators' own communities and those they purport to help.

19. The abundance of CT-related bodies at the UN means there is no single spokesperson to clearly articulate the role of the world body in countering terrorism. As a result, statements are often made by several different actors and it remains unclear who, or which CT organ, represents the entire organization, or indeed the collective efforts of other multilateral bodies.[15]

20. Engagement between the UN and civil society on counterterrorism remains patchy. The review of the GCT Strategy in 2008, and the resultant General Assembly (GA) resolution, encouraged nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and civil society to engage, as appropriate, on how to enhance efforts to implement the GCT Strategy, including through interaction with member states and the UN.[16] However, tensions between many governments and civil society, as well as a lack of clarity on how the UN is aligned with their interests and objectives, limit the scope of engagement.[17] Yet, the expertise and field presence of many NGOs and other

civil society organizations make them important partners as the UN moves toward implementation of the GCT Strategy.

21. Internally, communications among many UN entities remains weak and several states have expressed frustration at the lack of information sharing among the UN's CT entities, as well as between them and the broader membership. Within the Security Council, for example, it took nearly two years for the CTC to begin sharing information with the other two counterterrorism-related committees working pursuant to Security Council resolutions 1267 and 1540.[18]

22. Additionally, priorities expressed by the UN leadership, including the Secretary-General, the Security Council, and the General Assembly, are not always mirrored in the field. For example, though the GCT Strategy calls for a holistic approach to countering terrorism, one in which development and education organs of the UN play a big role, there is little collaboration in the field between the UN's development and CT actors in implementing the Strategy.

Organizational Shortcomings

23. The reactive nature of the UN's counterterrorism work and the absence of a strategic approach have contributed to the proliferation of multilateral actors dealing with counterterrorism in one form or another—seventy within the multilateral system and twenty-three within the UN alone—creating a labyrinth of overlapping mandates and functions among them.[19] The European Union, for example, has its own counterterrorism strategy and action plan, and has accompanied CTED on three missions (Morocco, Albania, and Kenya).[20] The reporting requirements many of these actors impose on member states have led several repre-sentatives to complain of "reporting fatigue" and bureaucratic overstretch in capitals, and the difficulty of communicating with so many varied focal points regarding CT issues.

24. In 2005, then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan encouraged "the Security Council to consider ways to strengthen its monitoring and enforcement role in counter-terrorism, including by consolidating State reporting requirements, taking into account and respecting the different mandates of its counter-terrorism subsidiary bodies."[21] Despite this, member states remain obligated to engage with each committee separately, via reports as well as dialogue, while information sharing among them remains limited.

25. Additionally, the presence of bureaucratic "silos" at the United Nations has led to the separation of activities on security, human rights, development, and humanitarian assistance, among other issues. As a result, the UN has struggled to address multifaceted transnational security challenges that cut across these seemingly arbitrary divisions.[22] The growing recognition of linkages between terrorist and extremist groups as well as organized criminal networks and illicit trafficking in weapons and narcotics further highlights the anachronistic nature of such compartmentalization.[23] This prevents the vital interdepartmental cooperation and collaboration necessary for a comprehensive and strategic approach to contemporary global terrorism.

26. The CTITF was established to help overcome some of these challenges; however it has been constrained by a lack of sufficient personnel and resources in its secretariat to meet the demands of member states. Moreover, the CTITF is largely dependent on voluntary contributions rather than the regular assessed budget of the UN. This has limited the CTITF's ability to develop long-term work plans. And it has fed perceptions among some member states that the CTITF's initiatives and its working groups are primarily "donor driven," rather than focusing on the implementation of the GCT Strategy in the interest of the broader membership.

27. The proliferation of bodies both within the UN and the multilateral system more widely has resulted in a lack of clarity about their relationship to one another, their comparative advantages, and, consequently, their leadership. For example, it remains unclear how the GCT Strategy interfaces with the work of the Security Council, or how CTED relates to the CTITF, in particular because CTED's Executive Director will hold a higher rank than the incoming full-time Chair of the CTITF.

28. There is little sustained coordination or engagement between UN headquarters in New York (UNHQ) and partners in the field, such as national counterterrorism practitioners or regional and subregional organizations. And there is a corresponding lack of field presence among the UN's CT staff, resulting in analytical and operational limitations. Thus the "New York process" is seen as distant from challenges on the ground and focused on political posturing rather than supporting functional counterterrorism efforts. Moreover, the UN has not been able to draw on the expertise and contextual knowledge of these actors to devise a strategic approach to countering terrorism together.

WHAT SHOULD BE DONE

Ideas for Action

I. STRENGTHEN POLITICAL SUPPORT FOR THE UN'S ROLE IN COUNTERING TERRORISM

29. **Form a cross-regional group or a contact group:** Member states should form a cross-regional group to support the implementation of the GCT Strategy: one permutation of this could be in the form of a **group of friends**—of the GCT Strategy or the CTITF—that ensures representation from all the UN's regional groups. Although member states are informally working with the CTITF's working groups to promote specific elements of their work, a group of friends could engage more robustly with the Secretary-General and his Executive Office to offer policy support to the UN's CT activities, and provide a core group of interested states to implement the GCT Strategy;

30. Alternatively, the member states could convene a **contact group** to support the GCT Strategy's implementation through resource allocation, and political, analytical, or operational support to UN CT bodies and states requesting assistance. A model for this, which brings together not only member states but also relevant multilateral bodies, is the Contact Group on Piracy Off the Coast of Somalia, which includes representatives from Australia, China, Denmark, Djibouti, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, India, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Republic of Korea, the Netherlands, Oman, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Somalia TFG, Spain, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, and Yemen, as well as the African Union, the European Union, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the UN Secretariat, and the International Maritime Organization.[24]

31. **Support budgetary allocations:** Member states should support budgetary allocations for the UN's counterterrorism

work in the General Assembly's Fifth Committee. In parti-cular, allowing the CTITF to be funded from the regular budget would increase predictability in developing its workplan and reduce its dependency on voluntary contributions or staff secondments, largely from developed countries, which give rise to perceptions that all its activities are "donor driven" by Northern states.

32. **Ensure a more robust human-rights approach:** The UN Security Council should ensure a more robust human-rights approach within its own counterterrorism activities. To that end, the Security Council ought to promote greater cooperation among the Security Council, CTITF, and UN human rights mechanisms, in particular the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Fundamental Freedoms and Human Rights While Countering Terrorism. The UN human rights and counterterrorism apparatuses should work together to develop human rights best practices in the context of implementing the UN counterterrorism mandates. In addition, efforts should be increased to review the listing/delisting processes of the Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee, not only those individuals and entities currently listed. Furthermore, the Security Council should direct the 1267 Committee to inform member states whose nationals are listed.

33. **Promote greater dialogue** among CTITF members, Security Council members, terrorism and country experts, the broader UN membership, regional organizations, and civil society: The CTITF, or independent research institutions in partnership with the UN, should host a series of thematic discussions, based on the reports relating to counterterrorism by its constituent members and the best practices emerging from them.

34. **Promote medium- to long-term research** by a consortium of independent think tanks, universities, and other research

institutions. Research should focus on the ability of the multilateral system to address the security challenges posed by terrorist nonstate actors and to support fragile states in developing the resilience necessary to resolve them peacefully. The findings from such an initiative should inform the development of counterterrorism and counterradicalization policies that are closely aligned with national security and development priorities of member states.

II. ENHANCE STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS

35. **Use the "bully pulpit":** The Secretary-General should not hesitate to use his bully pulpit to clearly articulate the UN's role and comparative advantages. To that end, the CTITF could work closely with the UN Department of Public Information (UNDPI) and develop a global media campaign to reaffirm the UN's core values in protecting civilians and human rights, and highlighting the impact of terrorist violence on victims and communities. Such a campaign could do the following:

- Increase awareness and visibility of the GCT Strategy among member states and civil society groups. At present, familiarity with the GCT Strategy in many states extends no further than officials of foreign ministries and their UN desks;

- Highlight the tools available within the UN system to assist states and civil society in addressing each of the pillars in the GCT Strategy;[25]

- Generate an information kit or reference guide that can be used by member states to distribute among government personnel, counterterrorism practitioners, and domestic media outlets in order to promote the GCT Strategy and familiarize them with the UN tools for counterterrorism;

- Finally, such a campaign could also highlight the ways in which organizations like the World Bank, the G8's Counter-Terrorism Action Group, INTERPOL, the IAEA, and the IMF, work together with the UN. Though some information is available via the CTITF website, it is often generic in nature and does not describe in detail their cooperative efforts.

36. **Promote system-wide consistency in implementing the GCT Strategy:** The UN leadership should promote a holistic and consistent approach to implement the GCT Strategy within the UN system. To do so the EOSG should clearly direct all UN agencies and funds, and constituent members of the CTITF, to support GCT Strategy implementation, at headquarters and in the field.

37. **Designate a single UN spokesperson:** The EOSG should designate a single spokesperson to provide a recognizable focal point representing the collective efforts of the world body within, and outside, the organization. Such a spokesperson could also serve as a clearinghouse for public information regarding the UN's CT work.

38. **Strengthen engagement with civil society and the private sector:** The CTITF and the Security Council's counterterrorism experts should continue to strengthen their engagement with civil society and the private sector to further the implementation of UNSCRs 1267, 1373, and 1540, and the GCT Strategy. This might be achieved through a series of workshops, hosted by the UN or partner organizations, to bring private sector representatives and civil society organizations together with the UN's CT bodies and explore ways in which they could contribute to implementing the four pillars of the GCT Strategy.

III. DEEPEN RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN UN HEADQUARTERS AND NATIONAL AND REGIONAL PARTNERS

39. **Develop regional strategies with regional and subregional organizations:** The UN should increase its engagement with regional and subregional organizations, and the CTITF and CTED should develop regional strategies informed by these relationships.[26] The CTITF or CTED should host a series of meetings, in association with regional and subregional organizations, to strengthen multilateral partnerships with regional stakeholders and to facilitate the exchange of lessons learned and best practices on countering terrorism. Such meetings could also be used to promote functional cooperation among regional counterterrorism practitioners and provide opportunities for the UN system to contribute to building national and regional CT capacity.

40. **Institute staff exchanges between UN and regional organizations:** Partnerships between the UN system and regional/subregional organizations should be strengthened through staff exchanges or rotations. This could take place in two different ways. UN staff may be seconded to regional or subregional organizations at their request, or that of member states, for three- to six-month periods, in order to promote a stronger partnership and support regional implementation of the GCT Strategy. Alternatively, regional organizations could second staff to work with the CTITF, thereby contributing resources and regional expertise to inform a more strategic approach to promoting and implementing the GCT Strategy and UN CT initiatives.

41. **Relocate expert CTED staff to key states or peace operations:** Council decisions could be shaped by direct information from the field and this could also help develop and sustain partnerships with national and regional practitioners. CTED regional experts should be relocated to the places

where member states signal the most need for assistance in addressing the terrorist threat.

42. **Fund secondments from the global South to the CTITF:** Donors providing voluntary contributions to the CTITF should consider funding secondments of officers from the global South to the CTITF, to promote broader regional representation and enhance its operational and analytical capacities.

IV. STREAMLINE AND CONSOLIDATE UN BUREAUCRACY TO ADDRESS COUNTER-TERRORISM

43. **Continue to streamline and consolidate the UN counter-terrorism architecture:** In the short term, the institution-alization of the CTITF within DPA, as put forward in a CTITF briefing of member states on March 3, 2009, provides a foundation for this. Member states joined the Secretary-General, during the 2008 review, in asserting that GCT Strategy implementation remains the primary responsibility of states. However, demands made on the CTITF for increased information, engagement, and activity to support states in implementing the GCT Strategy are not matched by the resources it has been allocated. Consequent-ly, it is important that the CTITF be granted the necessary funding and personnel to meet the demands for more proactive engagement by the UN membership. Additionally, it will be important for the Chair to be invested with the necessary rank, political authority, and mandate to effect-ively coordinate all the CTITF's constituent bodies and working groups.

44. The allocation of three professionals and one administrative assistant to the CTITF, as announced in March 2009, is a step in the right direction. However, it would be useful if the CTITF could also develop in-house expertise in areas

covered by the GCT Strategy to increase the effectiveness of its staff liaising with specialized agencies and organizations. Furthermore, it would mean that member states could have a designated point-person on specific subjects, streamlining the communications process.

45. Broadly speaking, the thematic areas covered by the GCT Strategy may be broken down as development, preventing and combating terrorism—and ensuring the necessary state capacity to do so—and human rights. Consequently, each area should be covered by a CTITF staff member; a development officer should be made responsible for liaising with UNDP, UNICEF, and UNESCO, for example. Should member states or partners require information about development-related CT work then, there would be an obvious focal point within the CTITF. The CTITF could consider allowing the informal participation, or attendance, of other CT multilateral or regional bodies, such as the European Union's, at CTITF meetings with "observer" status. This could help promote more regular information sharing among multilateral bodies engaged in counterterrorism and help avoid duplication in their programs.

46. **Hold biennial reviews and assess the CTITF in the 2010 review of the GCT Strategy:** The General Assembly should ensure that the 2010 review of the GCT Strategy will assess the CTITF and its role in supporting the UN's counterterrorism activities and address the relevant resource-allocation needs. Member states should encourage a biennial review, based on a series of benchmarks established to assess progress made by the CTITF and its contribution to countering global terrorism. In setting these, member states should consider assessing the added value of the body, whether it fulfills its stated aim of becoming a "one stop shop" and thereby lessen the burden on member states by creating a single focal point for them to engage with

the UN on CT issues. Additionally, states should assess whether having the CTITF promotes greater cooperation and coordination among its constituent members, and to what extent it is able to effectively contribute to states' efforts to counter terrorism.

47. **Consider the long-term centralization of UN counter-terrorism work in a single office:** In the long run, the member states will need to decide whether the current arrangement sufficiently meets their needs and consider a bolder means of streamlining the world body's CT work in a truly centralized organization or office. This requires resolving the relationship between CTED and the CTITF, and nominating one as the centralized authority on CT within the UN. Several models for this have been already put forward. One would take CTED out of the Security Council and make it an independent office within the UN Secretariat, with its Executive Director serving as Chair of the Task Force.[27] Others include adapting the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) model—with its diverse membership, flexible committees, and supporting office and fund—for counterterrorism.[28] Some have advocated an independent counterterrorism organization designed around a treaty or as a UN program.[29] Additionally, a recent report recommended a UN High Commissioner for Counterterrorism Capacity Building, with a High Commissioner modeled on that for refugees (the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR]). Those on the Commission's board would have to prove compliance with existing UN counter-terrorism treaties.[30]

48. **Streamline reporting requirements and consolidate expert staff:** Following the recommendations made within the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, the Security Council should streamline the reporting requirements and engagement with countries related to the work of the 1267, 1373, and 1540

committees and consider consolidating their expert staff.[31] The expert groups of these committees might be merged under a single chair, with three vice chairs each focusing on UNSCRs 1267, 1373, and 1540 respectively, to reduce member states' reporting burdens. Since Security Council members constitute all three committees, member states might submit a single detailed report regarding their efforts to implement the three resolutions, with subsections addressing each resolution as necessary. Should the Council wish to take the bolder step of consolidating its three counterterrorism-related committees, it could adopt a similar structure with a single chair and vice chairs for each resolution.[32]

Conclusion

49. The rapidly evolving nature of global terrorism, including its transnational scope, links to organized crime, the possible use of WMDs, and the flow of small arms and light weapons, makes the need for international cooperation on this issue particularly urgent. The potential impact of terrorism on the socioeconomic stability of developing—and developed— states, as well as its potential to destabilize fragile political systems and jeopardize delicate diplomatic relationships, make it a critical issue for the UN and its partners.

50. Among the most recurrent themes in the IPI Task Force discussions was the need to streamline and better resource UN bodies engaged in countering global terrorism. However, a key element of achieving this will be a decision by the member states and the UN leadership regarding how they wish to address the threat at the global level and how much they want to spend in doing so.

51. The obstacles facing the CTITF in effectively coordinating UN agencies and in engaging frequently with member states, the limits of CTED's ability to gain field-level knowledge and

develop networks on the ground, the emphasis on process over substance due to an inability to regularly convene expert practitioners: each of these challenges requires the allocation of resources in order to be overcome. This is not to say that additional funds will be necessary; resources may be reallocated from within the UN system to support its CT activities. Their success or failure will depend on the UN Secretariat and its ability to make the case for a more coordinated, consolidated, and streamlined CT architecture.

52. However, the quality and efficacy of the UN's initiatives to counter terrorism will depend primarily on member states and their willingness to strengthen multilateral capacity to address the terrorist threat. During the review of the GCT Strategy, the member states reaffirmed their primary responsibility for its implementation. Consequently, the future role of the UN in countering global terrorism will depend on its members' weighing the cost of inaction against the costs and benefits of empowering the United Nations and the multilateral system to maintain international peace and security in the face of transnational security challenges like global terrorism.

Endnotes

1. See, for example, the *IPI Blue Paper* in this series on transnational organized crime. International Peace Institute, "Transnational Organized Crime," *IPI Blue Paper* no. 2, Task Forces on Strengthening Multilateral Security Capacity, New York, 2009.

2. Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism, *World at Risk: The Report of the Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism* (New York: Vintage, 2008).

3. Eric Rosand, Naureen Chowdhury Fink, and Jason Ipe, "Countering Terrorism in South Asia: Strengthening Multilateral Engagement," (New York: International Peace Institute, May 2009).

4. Tim Stevens and Peter Neumann, "Countering Online Radicalisation: A Strategy for Action," (London: International Center for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, January 2009).

5. Among the Security Council's other counterterrorism-related committees is Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee, established pursuant to UNSCR 1267 (the "1267 Committee"), imposing sanctions and financial penalties on al-Qaida or Taliban members and supporters, as designated on the Committee's Consolidated List. Additionally, the 1540 Committee, established to support UNSCR 1540, obliges states to refrain from supporting nonstate actors in developing, acquiring, manufacturing, possessing, transporting, transferring, or using nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their delivery systems.

6. For a full description of CTAG's proposed functions, visit www.g8.fr/evian/english/navigation/2003_g8_summit/summit_documents/building_international_political_will_and_capacity_to_combat_terrorism_-_a_g8_action_plan.html .

7. United Nations, "Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy," September 2006, available at www.un.org/terrorism .

8. The current working groups of the CTITF are as follows: Integrated Assistance for Countering Terrorism (I-ACT) (formerly known as the Working Group on Integrated Implementation); Preventing and Resolving Conflicts; Supporting and Highlighting Victims of Terrorism; Preventing and Responding to WMD Attacks; Tackling the Financing of Terrorism; Countering the Use of the Internet for Terrorist Purposes; and Protecting Human Rights while Countering Terrorism. The Working Group on Radicalization and Violent Extremism that Leads to Terrorism has been transformed into a UNICRI (United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute) Center on Policies to Counter the Appeal of Terrorism. Further information is available at http://un.org/terrorism/cttaskforce.shtml .

9. Each of these organizations has a representative who participates in meetings of CTITF members.

10. Edward C. Luck, "The Uninvited Challenge: Terrorism Targets the United Nations," in *Multilateralism Under Challenge: Power, International Order, and Structural Change*, edited by Edward Newman and Ramesh Thakur (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2005), pp. 5-20.

11. The Security Council's committees are constituted by its member states: five permanent members and ten elected ones. Reviews of CTED's reports and the CTC's work are therefore conducted by Security Council member states, which has given rise to wariness and suspicion among some nonmembers.

12. C. S. R. Murthy, "The Counter-Terrorism Committee: An Institutional Analysis," FES Briefing Paper no. 15 (New York: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, September 2007).

13. Security Council Report, "Monthly Forecast May 2009," New York, April 30, 2009, pp. 17-19.

14. "The EU imposed sanctions on Qadi, a Saudi businessman, and al-Barakaat, a money remitter in Sweden, when they appeared on the UN Security Council's Al-Qaida/Taliban list in October 2001. Although countries must implement Security Council sanctions, they can choose how to do so. EU member states adopted a regulation that automatically applied sanctions to any individual or entity mentioned by the UN. The sanctions include an assets freeze and severe travel restrictions. The ECJ [European Court

of Justice] overturned a lower court ruling that suggested EU member states had little choice but to handle UN designations in this pro forma manner. The ECJ decided that despite their obligations under the UN Charter, EU members could not adopt a regulation that infringed rights integral to EU law. What most concerned the court was that the listed parties were not informed of their wrongdoing and had no opportunity to put their case before an independent review body." Richard Barrett, "Al Qaeda and the Taliban Sanctions Threatened," Policy Watch no. 1409 (Washington, DC: Washington Institute, October 2008).

15. The potential for UN leadership to raise awareness and catalyze activity was demonstrated at a September 2008 Symposium on Victims of Terrorism convened by the Secretary-General in New York. It brought together victims, experts, and member states in a first discussion to raise awareness of the issue and bring together key actors to exchange ideas on boosting state capacity to support victims of terrorism. A report summarizing the recommendations of participants was published in March 2009.

16. United Nations General Assembly, Letter from General Assembly President to Member States Dated August 18, 2008, available at www.un.org/ga/president/62/letters/CTS180808.pdf .

17. Eric Rosand, Alistair Millar, and Jason Ipe, "Civil Society and the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy: Opportunities and Challenges," (New York: Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation, September 2008).

18. Murthy, "The Counter-Terrorism Committee."

19. See Annex 1 of this paper for background non-paper.

20. The EU Strategy also has four pillars (prevent, protect, pursue, and respond), and requires member states to submit reports outlining measures undertaken to implement the strategy. Further information is available at http://register.consilium. europa.eu/pdf/en/05/st14/st14469-re04.en05.pdf .

21. United Nations, *2005 World Summit Outcome*, UN Doc. A/ RES/60/1, October 24, 2005, para. 90.

22. James Cockayne and Christoph Mikulaschek, "Transnational Security Challenges and the UN: Overcoming Sovereign Walls

and Institutional Silos," (New York: International Peace Academy, February 2008).

23. See, for example, Library of Congress, "A Global Overview of Narcotics-Funded Terrorist and Extremist Groups," (Washington, DC, 2002).

24. Recently, an "International Process on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation," led by Switzerland, Austria, Japan, Norway, Costa Rica, and Slovakia, in cooperation with the CTITF, UNODC, and CTED, established an ad hoc platform under UN auspices that allows for, inter alia, the CTITF to engage with member-state experts on discrete topics. See Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation, "International Process on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation: A Compilation of Key Documents," (New York: CGCTC, September 2008). Such initiatives could lay the groundwork for a group of friends or contact group.

25. The four pillars are (1) addressing conditions conducive to terrorism; (2) preventing and combating terrorism; (3) building state capacity to counter terrorism; and (4) defending human rights while countering terrorism.

26. See, for example, the recommendations in Rosand, Fink, and Ipe, "Countering Terrorism in South Asia," pp. 25-27.

27. These recommendations were supported by a large group of member states participating in the Swiss-led International Process on Global Counter-Terrorism Cooperation, a series of workshops bringing together experts, diplomats, UN offices, and NGOs. See CGCTC, "International Process on Global Counter-Terrorism Cooperation."

28. Murthy, "The UN Counter Terrorism Committee," p. 12.

29. Alistair Millar and Eric Rosand, *Allied Against Terrorism: What's Needed to Strengthen Worldwide Commitment* (New York: Century Foundation, 2006), p. 55.

30. See, for example, Managing Global Insecurity, "A Plan for Action: A New Era of International Cooperation for a Changed World: 2009, 2010, and Beyond," September 2008, available at www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/reports/2008/11_action_plan_mgi/11_action_plan_mgi.pdf , p. 29; and Eric Rosand, "From

Adoption to Action: The UN's Role in Implementing its Global Counterterrorism Strategy," Policy Brief (New York: CGCTC, April 2009).

31. United Nations, *2005 World Summit Outcome*, UN Doc. A/RES/60/1, October 24, 2005, p. 23.

32. Millar and Rosand, *Allied Against Terrorism*, p. 39.

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Annex 1: Background Non-paper

1. **What are the current policy and institutional shortcomings in multilateral security capacity for global terrorism?**

    - The generally ad hoc and reactive approach, which has led to the involvement of some seventy multilateral bodies (twenty-three in the UN alone), with often overlapping mandates, insufficient information sharing and other coordination and cooperation among them.

        - For example, the proliferation of Security Council counterterrorism-related resolutions and subsidiary bodies, often hastily adopted and established in response to specific crises, has produced turf battles between and among committees and expert groups, duplication of work, and multiple and sometimes confusing reporting requirements for states. Many states have also highlighted "reporting fatigue" resulting from burdensome reporting requirements to multiple bodies on the same or similar subjects.

    - Lack of an effective intergovernmental mechanism to help coordinate the activities of these bodies, identify counterterrorism capacity gaps and priorities, work with donors to fill the gaps, maximize use of limited resources, engage with national counterterrorism practitioners (as opposed to diplomats), and allow for the participation of a broad range of states and other key stakeholders.

    - The central role the Security Council has played has limited the effectiveness of the multilateral response. Suffers from a perceived lack of legitimacy and the sense that it is closely connected with the US-led "Global War on Terror." This has led to continuing tensions between the Council and the General Assembly, although adoption of UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy has the potential to ameliorate the situation.

    - Heavy emphasis on paper and process (to the detriment of developing the necessary analytical capacity to assess implementation and results), with limited ability to engage

strategically and effectively with, and deliver technical assistance to, local stakeholders. The lack of a meaningful presence in the field impedes the UN's ability to work more closely with states, and regional and subregional bodies, and thus to understand local needs, interests, and perspectives.

- Over-emphasis on law enforcement and other security-related activities and programs and difficulties in operationalizing a holistic approach to addressing terrorism, which is now reflected in UN strategy.

- Difficulties in keeping up with the evolving nature of the threat.

- Uneven capacity (and political interest) of regional and subregional bodies, with institutional capacity often the weakest in regions and subregions where the terrorist threat and national capacity needs are the greatest.

- Difficulties in operationalizing the "human-rights-based approach" to countering terrorism that underpins the UN strategy, partly as a result of insufficient cooperation and information sharing between the primary UN counterterrorism actors and UN human rights machinery, as well as lack of resources and political will.

- Tendency of the "leading" global counterterrorism players to marginalize the role of the UN and some other multilateral institutions in this area and to favor bilateral channels for counterterrorism cooperation. As a result, the UN tends to play a limited role in regions where there is significant and effective bilateral counterterrorism engagement.

- Lack of clearly identified leader within the UN.

- Lack of a common definition of "terrorism."

2. **Why have previous attempts to address these shortcomings failed?**

- Few such attempts, although former Secretary-General Kofi Annan's report In Larger Freedom and the 2005 World Summit Outcome document did try to address some of the shortcomings.

- The adoption of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy

presents an opportunity to address some of the institutional shortcomings at the global, regional, and subregional levels. Its inclusion of not only security-related issues, but also ones related to conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism, such as poverty and lack of good governance, give it broader appeal than the Security Council counterterrorism program.

- For example, the proliferation of Security Council counterterrorism-related resolutions and subsidiary bodies, often hastily adopted and established in response to specific crises, has produced turf battles between and among committees and expert groups, duplication of work, and multiple and sometimes confusing reporting requirements for states. Many states have also highlighted "reporting fatigue" resulting from burdensome reporting requirements to multiple bodies on the same or similar subjects.

- The main strategy recommendation regarding organizational architecture focuses on the UN Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF). Its limited composition and mandate and resource limitations present challenges, however. These limitations are largely the result of the resistance of the P5 and some other countries to giving it a larger role.

- Addressing these challenges will be critical to maximizing the UN's long-term counterterrorism contributions and improving both horizontal and vertical multilateral counterterrorism cooperation.

- The General Assembly's first formal review of the strategy in September 2008 provides an opportunity to address some of these shortcomings.

- Lack of political leadership (and interest) from both the Secretary-General and key member states in different regions.

- Continuing differences between the P5 and much of the wider UN membership on whether the Security Council should continue to be at the center of the UN effort, with the P5 generally reluctant to consider any proposal that might lead to a diminution of its counterterrorism role.

- The tendency of reform efforts in this area to get bogged down

by differences on the definition of terrorism and the larger "General Assembly vs. Security Council" debates, rather than focusing on ways to improve the UN's (and larger multilateral) counterterrorism program.

- Lack of a serious effort to (1) identify the comparative advantages in the fight against terrorism of the UN and other multilateral bodies more than six years after September 11, 2001; (2) assess the current approach; and (3) identify the shortcomings and how reform in this area could benefit both the P5 and the wider UN membership.

- A tendency to defend existing mandates and protect existing resources.

- Failure to try to build a cross-region coalition of states to move this agenda forward.

3. **What policies and institutional renovations, including legal frameworks and financial arrangements, are needed?**

- Within the UN, there is a range of steps that could be taken to address some of the above shortcomings, none of which are mutually exclusive. These include:

  - Consolidating the different Security Council counterterrorism expert groups and/or committees into a single unit and/or body.

  - Moving the Council counterterrorism expert groups into a newly created UN department (or office) of counterterrorism, which could support both the UN Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force and the Council bodies, with the head of the department/office also becoming the head of the Task Force.

  - Establishing a new intergovernmental mechanism (perhaps in lieu of CTC) within the UN to allow for broader member-state participation in the development and oversight of UN counterterrorism activities.

    Alternatively, consideration could be given to establishing a formal or informal counterterrorism mechanism outside of the UN involving "like-minded" states. Before following such an approach, however, one needs to consider carefully

whether this will foster the sort of broad-based engagement by states that is currently lacking under the present system, but is needed.

◆ Allowing broader member-state participation in the work of the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee, perhaps following the Council's approach in the peacekeeping field.

◆ Devolving much of the UN's counterterrorism work to the regional and local levels, including by placing UN counterterrorism experts in UN regional and country offices.

◆ Strengthening the mandate and resources of the Task Force, including through UN regular budget funding; allowing participation of representatives from relevant regional and subregional bodies.

◆ The adoption of the Comprehensive Convention Against International Terrorism.

4. **What strategy is needed to achieve these renovations?**

- Establish a global counterterrorism commission comprising a group of respected leaders to conduct a comprehensive assessment of UN-led multilateral counterterrorism efforts. Among other things, this group could identify the comparative advantages of the UN (and other relevant stakeholders) in the fight against terrorism and what the UN, as an institution, using all of its political, economic, social, and diplomatic tools, can do to not only thwart future attacks but prevent today's youth and subsequent generations from wanting to use violence to address perceived or legitimate grievances. The recommendations of this commission could also provide the impetus necessary to transcend the "General Assembly vs. Security Council" debate and overcome the longstanding differences surrounding the definition of terrorism.

- Clearly articulate how a broader-based, multistakeholder approach, preferably under the auspices of the UN, would benefit not only the wider UN membership, but the P5 as well.

- Begin discussions outside of New York on possible renovations with a small, cross-region coalition of states, with a view to finding common ground on proposals that could be presented to General Assembly and/or other relevant bodies.

- In the interim, this cross-regional coalition should approach the Secretary-General and ask him to reallocate a handful of positions in his office to support the day-to-day work of the Task Force.

Eric Rosand with IPI

Annex 2: Reflections from the Opening Plenary Meeting

1. **What are the current policy and institutional shortcomings in multilateral security on countering global terrorism?**

    - The UN's work on counterterrorism has been largely ad hoc and responsive, and the organization has remained in "September 12th mode." Consequently, its counterterrorism approach has been fragmented among a large number of bodies working on separate pieces of the puzzle.

        - Twenty-four uncoordinated bodies working on counterterrorism at the UN, many of them divided between Vienna and New York.

        - Little sustained engagement or coordination with regional organizations or functional bodies on counterterrorism.

    - Lack of an agreed definition of terrorism; failure to agree on a comprehensive convention against terrorism.

    - Emphasis on paper and process; lack of measurements of effective influence of the UN's efforts in national CT work

        - Difficulty of transforming policies and ideas developed in New York into concrete action in the field and no clear understanding of what the UN is really able to deliver.

        - Preference for bilateral channels when key players want to engage member states in CT cooperation or capacity-building assistance.

        - UN's role unclear: rhetorically, UN placed at the center of counterterrorism efforts, though still no agreement on what the UN's actual role should be.

        - Too much emphasis on the Security Council making the larger membership wary of initiatives that are underlined by a Chapter VII mandate.

    - Limited engagement with national counterterrorism practitioners in capitals and inability to reflect the regional,

national, and local aspects of the evolving terrorist threat in its work.

- Limited evidence that the UN's counterterrorism work has the flexibility to shift as the methods of and the threats posed by terrorists and terrorism evolve in terms of methodology and channels of delivery (for example, into cyberspace).

2. **Why have previous attempts to address these shortcomings failed?**

- Fundamentally divergent views on who is a terrorist and what the consequent legal repercussions ought to be.

  - Lack of serious attempts to build the cross-regional coalitions needed to transcend the main political differences among membership in this area, despite many strong bilateral counterterrorism relationships that straddle various divides within the UN membership.

- Uneven capacity of states to implement necessary measures on the ground; highlighting the importance of technical capacity-building assistance.

- No real investment by the UN in counterterrorism efforts.

  - No real pressure from member states on the SG to allocate resources to counterterrorism.

  - There has been little or no leadership from the highest levels at the UN prompting member states to prioritize counterterrorism.

  - Though most states claim it to be a priority, this has not been translated into a willingness to provide more resources for the CTITF.

  - Most major players marginalize the UN and themselves prefer bilateral channels of counterterrorism assistance and capacity building.

- Disagreement on whether to pursue gradual change or dramatic reform of UN counterterrorism system.

  - Wariness and suspicion characterizing the relationship between the UNSC and the GA.

- UNGA adopted strategy with some difficulty in the hopes that the center of gravity for counterterrorism within the UN would move away from the UNSC toward the Secretariat, under the leadership of the Task Force, but the representation of Council bodies on the Task Force still worries some member states.

3. **What policies and institutional renovations, including legal frameworks and financial arrangements, are needed?**

- Greater coordination, or consolidation, of UN bodies working on counterterrorism. Possibilities include:

  - Expand membership of CTC or establish a "friends of the CTC" group to allow for broader and more regular member-state engagement with CTC.

  - Move CTED into the Secretariat to support both the CTC and the Task Force, with the head of CTED serving as the head of the Task Force.

  - Creation of a single, more representative intergovernmental counterterrorism body that draws together various UN counterterrorism activities.

  - Creation of a UN-backed multilateral forum for exchange of information between national counterterrorism coordinators.

- Need for greater field presence and analytical capacity so that counterterrorism efforts may be tailored to suit regional threat perceptions and allow for greater coordination with actors on the ground charged with implementation.

  - Move CTED or consolidated counterterrorism body into the field; twenty to thirty New York-based posts could become field posts within existing UN country offices, thereby removing the need for additional resources but reallocating staff.

  - Develop closer partnerships with regional organizations, which have a better understanding of the challenges particular to each region/state, the most effective response mechanisms and key actors.

- Adopt comprehensive convention on terrorism.

- Though this may not be a sine qua non of future counterterrorism efforts.

- Agree on a common understanding or definition of terrorism based on the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document and adopt Comprehensive Convention on Terrorism.

- If a legal definition cannot be agreed on, a "working definition" might be adopted drawing together elements from existing agreements; that way it could also be adaptive to rapidly evolving developments in counterterrorism

- Although some participants felt that the lack of a definition provided a key hurdle toward more cooperative counterterrorism efforts among state, others felt that existing agreements provide sufficient basis for action, and that the debate over the definition was overcome with the 2005 World Summit, which generated an agreed condemnation of terrorism, and that having a definition was no longer key to implementing counterterrorism initiatives.

4. **What strategy is needed to achieve these renovations?**

- It will be crucial to highlight that it is in the security interest of all states—North, South, rich, poor—to address this challenge because no state is immune to the possibility of future victimhood; various states have been threatened by terrorism and used either as target or base. For participants, this provided a strong rationale for strengthening every element in the chain to harden the "weakest links."

  - UN should be more proactive in furthering understanding of root causes and thereby link its counterterrorism activities more closely to threat perceptions and priorities, making it more likely to elicit cooperation from member states not currently prioritizing counterterrorism initiatives.

- A coalition of like-minded states might exert pressure on UN leadership to prioritize counterterrorism initiatives and allocate resources from within the system (find and trim the "fat" in the organization).

  - "Friends of CTC" group could serve this function.

- Fund the CTITF from the regular budget.

- Consolidate activities to avoid "stovepipes" or "silo-effects" in the UN which facilitate a duplication of many of its counterterrorism activities, consequently overburdening states suffering from reporting fatigue and overwhelming obligations to host/attend meetings to the detriment of national obligations.

  - Consolidate issues so that states can address similar concerns in fewer reports (UNSCRs 1373 and 1540, for example), allowing states to receive technical and other capacity-building assistance across multiple transnational challenges.

- UN leadership should strengthen the UN's norm-setting role and be more vocal on this issue, making explicit an emphasis on the importance of counterterrorism.

  - Highlight UN's comparative advantage in convening a range of specialists and representatives from multiple regions and disciplines.

  - The UN should more actively engage and convene with counterterrorism practitioners to promote greater cooperation and coordination among the counterterrorism arms of states.

  - UN should ensure that its practices live up to the standards advocated by the SG and to its rhetoric; for example, it should not be seen to violate human rights through its "listing and de-listing" processes administered by the 1267 Committee (The Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee).

- Refocus debate in General Assembly and move away from a Security Council-centric discussion to one where more member states can be included in the debates and decision-making processes.

  - Create a more inclusive counterterrorism body or increase access of member states to Security Council committees (nothing says this has to be limited to the fifteen members of the SC).

  - Some suggested the creation of a counterterrorism commission or council modeled on the PBC, with some mandate from both the SC and GA (or other principal organs).

◆ Hold mandate review debates prior to mandate extensions to include broad UN membership in the discussion *prior* to the decision making, rather than presenting it as a fait accompli.

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Annex 3: Methodology and Timeline

Four questions guided the Task Forces in helping IPI to generate policy and institutional ideas for action:

1. What are the current policy and institutional shortcomings in multilateral security capacity on these issues?

2. Why have previous attempts to address these shortcomings failed?

3. What policies and institutional renovations, including legal frameworks and financial arrangements, are needed?

4. What strategy is needed to achieve these renovations?

The Opening Symposium on Development, Resources, and Environment served as an essential backdrop to the Task Forces. By examining these critical related issues, the symposium provided a larger geopolitical and economic context for the work of the subsequent Task Forces on security challenges. The two Task Forces, convened sequentially, addressed two thematic clusters of issues, each of which were broken down into smaller roundtables, as follows:

Task Force One

Transnational Security Challenges

1. Transnational Organized Crime
2. Weapons of Mass Destruction
3. Global Terrorism
4. Small Arms and Light Weapons
5. Biosecurity

Task Force Two

Inter- and Intra-state Armed Conflict

6. Peace Operations
7. Mediation and Peace Processes
8. Peacebuilding
9. Conflict Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect

Each Task Force consisted of members drawn from UN member states, academia, and policy-research institutions. The composition of each group ensured a broad range of perspectives regarding multilateral security capacity on the issues in question. Through this intensive work process, the Task Forces constituted core groups of stakeholders with an interest in developing practical strategies for addressing the institutional and policy shortcomings in these areas.

Task Force members met in opening and closing plenary sessions, as indicated below. Experts, in collaboration with IPI, prepared a series of non-papers, serving as a basis for discussion. Smaller groups gathered between the plenary sessions in roundtables, along with invited guest experts, for more in-depth, topic-specific discussions. Following each roundtable IPI produced a summary reflecting the group's discussions that served as a guide for the closing plenary session. Likewise, IPI drew on the Task Force deliberations to produce the final reports, detailing practical and achievable steps for strengthening multilateral action in the area in question. As noted, the content of these reports is the responsibility of IPI, and does not necessarily represent the positions or opinions of individual Task Force participants.

TIMELINE

Opening Symposium "Development, Resources, and Environment: Defining Challenges for the Security Agenda"
February 7-8, 2008 [Greentree Estate, Long Island]

Task Force One: Transnational Security Challenges

Opening Plenary Meeting
April 2-4, 2008 [Greentree Estate, Long Island]

1. Roundtable on **Transnational Organized Crime**
   April 10-11, 2008 [Millennium UN Plaza Hotel, New York]

2. Roundtable on **Weapons of Mass Destruction**
   April 24-25, 2008 [IPI, New York]

3. Roundtable on **Global Terrorism**
   May 1-2, 2008 [IPI, New York]

4. Roundtable on **Small Arms and Light Weapons**
   May 8-9, 2008 [Millennium UN Plaza Hotel, New York]

5. Roundtable on **Biosecurity**
   May 21-22, 2008 [IPI, New York]

Closing Plenary Meeting
May 28-30, 2008 [Greentree Estate, Long Island]

Task Force Two: Inter- and Intra-state Armed Conflict

Opening Plenary Meeting
June 11-12, 2008 [Greentree Estate, Long Island]

6. Roundtable on **Peace Operations**
   June 16-17, 2008 [IPI, New York]

7. Roundtable on **Mediation and Peace Processes**
   June 30-July 1, 2008 [IPI, New York]

8. Roundtable on **Peacebuilding**
   July 2-3, 2008 [IPI, New York]

9. Roundtable on **Conflict Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect**
   July 8-9, 2008 [IPI, New York]

Closing Plenary Meeting
October 15-16, 2008 [Greentree Estate, Long Island]

Annex 4: Task Force Participants

Co-Chairs

H.E. Mr. Abdullah M. Alsaidi, *Permanent Representative of the Republic of Yemen to the United Nations*

H.E. Mr. Dumisani Shadrack Kumalo, *Permanent Representative of the Republic of South Africa to the United Nations*

H.E. Mr. Claude Heller, *Permanent Representative of Mexico to the United Nations*

H.E. Mr. Peter Maurer, *Permanent Representative of Switzerland to the United Nations*

H.E. Mr. John McNee, *Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations*

H.E. Mr. Vanu Gopala Menon, *Permanent Representative of the Republic of Singapore to the United Nations*

H.E. Mr. Heraldo Muñoz, *Permanent Representative of Chile to the United Nations*

H.E. R.M. Marty M. Natalegawa, *Permanent Representative of the Republic of Indonesia to the United Nations*

H.E. Mr. Christian Wenaweser, *Permanent Representative of the Principality of Liechtenstein to the United Nations*

Permanent Missions and Delegations to the United Nations

African Union

Algeria

Argentina

Australia

Austria

Bangladesh

Brazil

Canada

Chile

China

Colombia

Costa Rica

Cuba

Czech Republic

Denmark

Egypt

Ethiopia

European Union

Finland

France

Germany

Ghana

Greece

India

Indonesia

Ireland

Israel

Japan

Liechtenstein

Lithuania

Luxembourg

Malaysia

Mexico

Morocco

Mozambique

Netherlands

New Zealand

Niger

Nigeria

Norway

Pakistan

Palau

Portugal

Qatar

Republic of Korea

Romania

Russian Federation

Singapore

Slovak Republic

South Africa

Spain

Sweden

Switzerland

Tanzania

Turkey

Uganda

United Kingdom

United States of America

Uruguay

Viet Nam

Yemen

Expert Moderators and Contributors

Chronic Underdevelopment

Said Djinnit, *Commissioner for Peace and Security, African Union*

Raymond Gilpin, *Associate Vice President, Sustainable Economics, Center of Innovation, United States Institute of Peace (USIP)*

Anke Hoeffler, *Research Officer, Centre for the Study of African Economies, Oxford University*

Arvind Panagariya, *Jagdish Bhagwati Professor of Indian Political Economy, Professor of Economics, Columbia University*

John Sender, *Emeritus Professor of Economics, University of London; Senior Research Fellow in Development Studies, University of Cambridge*

Ronald J. Waldman, *Professor of Clinical Population and Family Health, Professor of Clinical Epidemiology, Columbia University*

Ngaire Woods, *Director of the Global Economic Governance Programme, Oxford University*

Energy and Resource Scarcity

Albert Bressand, *Executive Director, Center for Energy, Marine Transportation and Public Policy, Columbia University*

Nikhil Desai, *Consultant, World Bank and German Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ)*

Antoine Halff, *Adjunct Professor of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University*

Monty P. Jones, *First Executive Secretary, Forum for Agricultural Research in Africa*

Roberto Lenton, *Chair of the Technical Committee, Global Water Partnership*

Richard Matthew, *Director, Center for Unconventional Security Affairs, University of California Irvine*

Environment and Climate Change

Scott Barrett, *Professor of Environmental Economics and International Political Economy; Director, International Policy Program; Director, Global Health and Foreign Policy Initiative, Johns Hopkins University*

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Mark Goldfus, *Head of Public Policy, Merrill Lynch*

Peter Haas, *Professor of Political Science, University of Massachusetts - Amherst*

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Adil Najam, *The Frederick S. Pardee Chair for Global Public Policy, Boston University*

Cynthia Rosenzweig, *Senior Research Scientist, NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies*

Task Force One on Transnational Security Challenges

Transnational Organized Crime

Phil Williams, *Professor, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Pittsburgh* (Expert Moderator)

Peter Gastrow, *Cape Town Director, Institute for Security Studies (ISS)*

Chizu Nakajima, *Director, Centre for Financial Regulation and Crime (CFRC), Cass Business School*

Weapons of Mass Destruction

Christine B. Wing, *Senior Research Fellow, Center on International Cooperation, New York University* (Expert Moderator)

Chaim Braun, *Fellow and Affiliate, Centre for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), Stanford University*

Sue E. Eckert, *Senior Fellow, The Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University*

Alaa Issa, Fellow, *Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University*

Geoffrey Wiseman, *Acting Director, USC Center on Public Diplomacy, the Annenberg School for Communication, University of Southern California*

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Global Terrorism

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David Wright-Neville, *Associate Professor, Global Terrorism Research Centre, Monash University*

Small Arms and Light Weapons

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Cate Buchanan, *Head of Negotiating Disarmament, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue*

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Task Force Two on Inter- and Intra-state Armed Conflict

Conflict Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect

Colin Keating, *Executive Director, Security Council Report* (Expert Moderator)

Steve Crawshaw, *UN Advocacy Director, Human Rights Watch*

Nicole Deller, *Director of Programs, Global Center for the Responsibility to Protect, Ralph Bunche Institute for International Studies, CUNY Graduate Center*

Kathleen Hunt, *UN Representative, CARE International*

Juan Méndez, *President, International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ)*

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Mediation and Peace Processes

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Major General Patrick Cammaert (Ret.), *Former UN Force Commander*

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'Funmi Olonisakin, *Director, Conflict, Security and Development Group, King's College London*

Peacebuilding

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
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