POST-CONFLICT PEACEBUILDING: TOWARDS A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH IN STATE AND INSTITUTION BUILDING

SEMINAR IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE AUSTRIAN EU-PRESIDENCY

INTRODUCTION

The 2006 Vienna Seminar aimed to give definition to a concept that has achieved political prominence in the past year; that of post-conflict peacebuilding. The meeting took place against the backdrop of the recent establishment of the UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), a new intergovernmental body specifically designed to help societies make the transition from war to peace. But while 'peacebuilding' now has its own institution in New York, there remains some confusion as to the precise meaning of the term and the PBC's specific role. Moreover, 'peacebuilding' is not yet part of the operational vocabulary of the EU, European involvement in conflict-affected environments notwithstanding. The conference sought to engage members of the UN and EU communities in a discussion of the past evolution and future development of peacebuilding, addressing the multiple challenges and dilemmas currently faced by international actors. In particular, it sought to engage participants on the politics of peacebuilding, a process that creates winners and losers, occurring in a broader regional or global context of actors and threats. The seminar was co-hosted by the International Peace Academy, the Austrian National Defence Academy and the Diplomatic Academy Vienna.
1. The concept of peacebuilding

Although historical examples provide useful precedents in particular, participants pointed to Allied reconstruction efforts in Germany and Austria after World War II peacebuilding in its contemporary guise is essentially a post-Cold War phenomenon. Despite a decrease in the number and intensity of civil wars since the early 1990s, it has become apparent that societies emerging from war face a high risk of relapse to violent conflict. This recognition prompted calls for sustained international efforts to help such societies make a successful transition from war to peace. The evolution of this peacebuilding agenda can be traced in UN discourse, from Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s Agenda for Peace (1992), where the term ‘peacebuilding’ first appeared, to Lakhdar Brahimi’s report on UN peace operations (2000), to the proposals of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (2004). The past 15 years have seen a vast increase in scholarly attention to the issue of war-to-peace transitions, matched with a boom in ‘peacebuilding’ activities conducted by the UN and regional organizations. However, the record of the international community in peacebuilding is mixed, with few clear success stories to match high-profile failures such as Angola and Rwanda.

The experiences of the last 15 years have, however, now created a body of accepted ‘knowledge’ in peacebuilding. Participants alluded to several basic principles. First is the importance of national or ‘local’ ownership of the process, which has proven vital to long-term success. This requires sensitivity to local contexts, which is challenging to incorporate into the process of designing and implementing peacebuilding efforts. Second, and related, is the need for international assistance to support, and not subvert, state institutions, with the aim of establishing a basis for competent and legitimate governance. Though not uncontested, some assert that peacebuilding is essentially ‘statebuilding.’ Third is the importance of sustained attention, and in particular long-term financing, to consolidate investments in peace made by the international community in the immediate aftermath of conflict. As demonstrated by recent renewed violence in East Timor, peacebuilding’s erstwhile success story, there is often a gap between peacebuilding aims and long-term resources, as funding tends to diminish precisely at the point it is most needed to consolidate peace efforts.

Perhaps the foremost lesson, now a mantra in world of peacebuilding, is the need for a ‘strategic’ approach, one rooted in awareness of local context, balancing overall objectives against resources, establishing priorities and sequencing interventions, in contrast to the more common ‘laundry list’ approach. Seen from this vantage point, ‘peacebuilding’ does not demarcate a particular phase in the conflict spectrum, as is inherent in terms such as ‘reconstruction,’ ‘recovery’ or ‘transition,’ but reflects the need for coherence in the international community’s approach across a range of activities. By definition, peacebuilding demands integration of political, security, humanitarian and development considerations and actors from the moment a peace agreement is signed, if not before. Yet despite the clear need for ‘strategy,’ the actual end goal of peacebuilding has been a matter of debate, and participants found it easier to elaborate what peacebuilding is not than to define what it is. Most agreed, however, that the primary aim of such interventions is to ensure that wars remain ended, and the foundations are laid for sustainable peace and development in countries emerging from conflict.

2. Recent developments at the UN

Despite the depth of knowledge on peacebuilding, the challenge remains to implement this knowledge in ways that are practically and politically viable, and that translate into successful outcomes on the ground. The establishment of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) at the United Nations in December 2005 represents one attempt to address current shortfalls. This new intergovernmental body, comprising a 31 Member State 'Organizational Committee,' drawn from the Security Council, Economic and Social Council, General Assembly, major troop contributing countries and major contributors to the UN budget, will attempt to provide a coordinated, coherent and integrated approach to post-conflict peacebuilding and facilitate dialogue amongst key actors. The PBC stands to contribute most to peacebuilding though its 'country specific' configurations, which will bring together those actors most involved in a specific case, including the country itself and, where relevant, neighbouring states, regional and sub-regional organizations, financial, troop and
civilian police contributors, the senior UN representative in the field and regional or international financial institutions.

Although the PBC, with its new focus and innovative composition, was seen as an important element of the September 2005 summit outcome, it has been severely hampered by the politics of process. It took Member States over five months from December 2005 until 16 May 2006 to elect the full membership of the PBC's Organizational Committee. Before that, political haggling over the wording of the resolution that established the PBC resulted in confusion surrounding its precise role. It is now broadly agreed that the PBC will not be the author of peacebuilding strategies so much as facilitate the development of strategies that emanate from national actors in countries emerging from conflict, with the advice of UN authorities in the field. As an intergovernmental body, the PBC's primary role will be to bring key actors together, draw on relevant expertise, build consensus, and marshal resources for a peacebuilding strategy developed in partnership with specific countries. In this way, the PBC aims to contribute to the coherence of international efforts and help ensure long-term predictable financing for reconstruction efforts. Its role is often described in terms of a 'compact' between the national government and the international community, with clearly delineated responsibilities and mutual accountability, an idea already put into practice in the case of the Afghanistan Compact in January 2006.

The PBC will exist alongside two other elements of the new peacebuilding architecture at the UN. Within the Secretariat, the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) will provide a source of analysis for the PBC, including on funding and on existing mechanisms in the country in question. Moreover, it is intended to address the problem of coherence within the UN system of departments, funds, programmes and agencies; its location in the Executive Office of the Secretary-General is precisely intended to mitigate bureaucratic rivalries. The PBSO will provide system-wide strategic development, complementing operational-level mechanisms for integrated mission planning led by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. It will also be the repository of best practice within the UN system and hence the central 'phone number' for peacebuilding in a system characterized by dispersed capacities.

A multi-year standing Peacebuilding Fund is also being established, conceived as a flexible mechanism to provide funds for immediate activities or those neglected by donors. The fund will play a catalytic role to attract additional resources and will not replace more established in-country mechanisms such as multi-donor trust funds (MDTFs). Although informal pledges have been made in the amount of $120 million, questions remain as to the design of the fund, which will combine global level allocation with country level disbursement.

As the outcome of protracted negotiation in an era of deep cleavages within the UN membership, some participants felt that the PBC was already a compromised project. Whereas the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change envisioned a role for the PBC in the prevention of conflict, substantive reference to prevention was removed during the summit, having been linked to fears of interventionism. Moreover, the PBC was reduced to an advisory body without binding authority or political stature. However, other participants asserted that whether the PBC can make a difference depends on the commitment of its members and their actions to assert the credibility of the new body. Despite concerns regarding the potential of the PBC, an appeal was made to judge it by its actual performance.

The immediate tasks for the PBC are the establishment of basic working methods and rules of procedure, and the selection of cases and country-specific groups. While participants agreed this should occur rapidly, it was also acknowledged that ambiguities in the resolution could create fertile ground for further protracted procedural debates. Furthermore, the selection of cases may be contentious. While the resolution details multiple ways in which a country may be placed on the agenda of the PBC, some participants called for its members to limit its workload by focusing on only one or two cases in the first year, or even by selecting specific problems to address in these cases. Although others called for a more ambitious framework, it was argued that an incremental approach was necessary for the establishment of credibility, recognizing that there are, after all, no 'easy'
peacebuilding cases.

Key to the success of the PBC is recognition that different actors have different: comparative advantages and roles. At a functional level, external linkages are vital, especially in areas where UN capacity is weak, such as in local governance, public administration and security sector governance. At a political level, the PBC will clearly need the 'buy-in' of donors and the financial institutions in order to effect meaningful change. Despite its traditional 'development' focus, peacebuilding has become an important priority for the World Bank, which has made strides to mainstream a conflict-sensitive approach into tools for assessment, planning and implementation. However, participants pointed out that the Bank, with its own mandate and governance structure, and perennial allergies to engaging in politics, faces challenges in responding to the peacebuilding agenda. For example, the Bank's 'results-based transitional framework,' a plan based on operational goals to enable donors to track the impact of funds, remains weak in relation to security goals. The Bank has established a quick-disbursing facility to enhance its response to urgent immediate needs, but the majority of its funding mechanisms have much longer disbursement timeframes. As an institution designed to build an international compact around peacebuilding strategy, the PBC must establish genuine working partnerships that take account of these differing priorities and capacities.

3. The view from the EU

Reflecting the fact that the seminar was held within the framework of the Austrian presidency of the European Union, particular attention was given to the EU's role in peacebuilding. The Union is itself a successful exercise in consolidating peace, having contributed to stability in Western Europe from the 1950s and managed the post-communist states' transition from the Cold War to accession. Yet the EU has no coherent doctrine of peacebuilding and approaches post-conflict challenges on an ad hoc basis. This has meant that the EU has developed a very diverse range of peacebuilding activities in the last decade. Its primary focus remains on the Western Balkans, where it has combined the incentive of further enlargement with the harder security of military and police operations, in both the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Further afield, it has launched smaller-scale missions with tasks ranging from border security (as in Moldova and Gaza) to developing the rule of law (as in Georgia). In 2005, it demonstrated both geographical range and institutional flexibility in deploying civilian monitors to Ache, Indonesia, within days of the peace agreement there.

Participants noted that many of the EU's challenges are similar to those of the UN. The variety of the UN's activities, both in terms of theatres and types of deployment, often make it difficult to transfer experiences and lessons learned. Likewise, the EU faces the conceptual challenges of shifting from 'heavy footprint' operations in south-east Europe to 'lighter-footprint' missions elsewhere. In addition, the EU, like the UN, increasingly finds its most complex challenges are in Africa. It has shown itself willing to deploy troops to resolve and deter crises, as in the 2003 Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo and this year's mission to Kinshasa. But participants emphasized the importance of the EU's indirect contributions to African peace operations, including its financial support to the UN (for which it pays 40% of the annual peacekeeping budget) and the African Union. The African Peace Facility (APF), financed by the European Commission, has provided €250 million for the AU's mission in Darfur, and is now being expanded to offer another €300 million in new funds.

Some participants argued that there has been an insufficient degree of conditionality in the use of the APF and other European funding arrangements, and that this has limited their strategic impact. However, the EU's respect for 'local ownership' of peace operations by African organizations was highlighted as an important political decision. It reflects the EU's comparative advantage for peacebuilding; the perception of its preference for multilateral partnerships and its unthreatening image. Indeed, participants noted that the EU can make very good use of seeming 'bland.' Nonetheless, it was broadly accepted that the EU should develop a more strategic approach to peacebuilding, especially in light of the PBC. The EU's support for the PBC and its related
mechanisms is not only financially important but politically essential.

A key factor in developing a more strategic approach is greater coherence among the EU Member States and the European Commission. In this vein, it was noted that the Austrian presidency has developed a policy for cooperation between the Commission and European Council on PBC affairs. Within the EU system itself, coherence is also now being promoted through financial measures. In current planning for the European Commission's budget for 2007-14, it is intended to streamline assistance through a €2.1 billion Stability Fund, which will compliment the European Council’s budget for the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy. The combination should permit a less ad hoc approach to post-conflict issues. Greater EU coherence is also being promoted through developing common early warning indicators and building NGO networks, as well as recent steps to develop a common concept of security sector reform. The importance of civil society to peacebuilding has been underlined by the work of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe in the Balkans and Central Asia. The EU has applied a similar approach in Aceh, where it has set up a 'Europa House' as a focal point for civil society, and EU monitors have addressed small-scale local conflicts before they escalate.

While the EU thus appears to be achieving a more structured approach to long-term peacebuilding, and to have placed the concept of 'local ownership' at the heart of that structure, participants noted that it still needs better instruments for short-term crisis management. There is a continued shortage of rapidly-deployable civilian experts to take on the political and civil functions of the early stages of peace operations. Some participants argued that a new cadre of non-military specialists should be developed within an EU framework, while other felt that European governments should prioritise the UN's existing plans to build a capacity of 2,500 civilian peace operations specialists.

4. Peacebuilding challenges

In addition to the need for overall coherence and institutional linkages discussed above, participants engaged with some specific areas of weakness in the international community's peacebuilding approach, as well as issues that have proven to be perennial challenges. A tension that featured prominently during the seminar was that between the often technical feel of 'lessons learned' in peacebuilding and the reality that peacebuilding is an inherently messy and political process, with inevitable contradictions and tradeoffs. For example, whereas support to the security sector and long-term donor financing are widely acknowledged as crucial elements of success, participants acknowledged that donors often struggle to 'sell' such approaches to their domestic publics. Whereas all agree that long-term peace is best secured by transparent and accountable state institutions, ending a conflict often involves concessions to certain parties and even perpetuation of patronage politics. Whereas a comprehensive approach is ideal, the necessity of securing peace can engender an incremental approach, as in Sudan, where the North-South conflict and Darfur have been handled separately. Finally, peacebuilding may be further complicated by the dominance of other urgent international interests, notably counter-terrorism. In both plenary sessions and breakout groups, participants engaged with the challenges, trade-offs, compromises and choices involved in peacebuilding, and their sometimes negative effects or unintended consequences.

Bridging the security to democracy gap

Emergence from war presents multiple security challenges. International security forces can fill this gap in the short term, but over time governments need to develop the capacity to exercise a monopoly over the legitimate use of force in their territory. Security sector reform (SSR) and disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of combatants (DDR) were both discussed in detail as crucial activities in helping societies to make this transition from short-term stabilization to longer term security and rule of law capacities. Both SSR and DDR bridge the divide between security and development by pairing reform of security forces with activities to strengthen the civilian institutions that oversee them, including ministries and parliament. Civil society organizations also have a crucial role to play in helping to fill gaps and professionalize activities, particularly in consolidating rule of law, and also serving an important watchdog function.

Participants agreed that security is a basic public good and it is crucial for the overall legitimacy of
the government that the state itself been seen as providing security for its population; capacity building is key to this but an area in which international support has typically failed to yield good long term results. The discussion highlighted several basic principles to guide SSR activities. First, there is no simple sequencing between military and civilian activities; instead, the international community needs a toolkit of instruments to tackle these tasks simultaneously. An inability to conceptualize these important linkages can have practical implications on field operations. Second, participants emphasized the challenges of demilitarizing politics and the multiple tradeoffs that are often involved in transforming warring forces into viable political parties. Third, experience demonstrates the need for adequate financing and sustained commitment, particularly for the less glamorous aspects of SSR and rule of law reform, such as shoring up criminal justice and corrections; ensuring that salaries are paid; improving civilian oversight of special intelligence services; and ensuring that borders are secure so that customs revenue can be collected.

Substantively, the EU's strategies for security sector reform (SSR) are a particularly important 'work in progress,' not least because this is an area in which the UN itself is weak. A small EU security mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo has been a significant experiment in this field, ensuring that the national army receives regular and proper payment. The week prior to the seminar, the European Commission published a new SSR concept, again emphasizing the primacy of national and regional leadership in SSR processes. The Development Assistance Committee of the OECD is also working on an implementation framework for SSR, expected to be presented by the end of 2006. These are important first steps, but further work is necessary to ensure the optimal implementation of these concepts.

Donor coordination and commitment
Notwithstanding the potential of the PBC to mobilise and coordinate donors, four broad problems were discussed in relation to the financing of peacebuilding. First was the overall level of financing for peacebuilding. At the 2005 World Summit, many donor countries pledged to increase aid levels by various percentages, the EU in particular elaborating a plan to reach 0.56 percent of GDP by 2010 and 0.7 percent by 2015. But whether such increases will benefit conflict-affected environments is unclear, particularly because of ongoing debates as to whether spending on 'security' concerns comprises 'development' assistance. Participants welcomed the fact that the OECD will be reopening this discussion in 2007 and hoped that clarity would ensue. Second, there remain considerable disparities in levels of aid received by conflict-affected environments, with East Timor and the Balkans benefiting from approximately $200 per person per year, in comparison to $20 in the Democratic Republic of Congo. There was some concern that the PBC could exacerbate this tendency if it focused only on relatively 'easy' cases which already enjoy considerable attention from donors. Third, participants pondered how to encourage donors to opt for long-term funding, acknowledging that most recipients of such funds are countries in which donors have particular interests (Egypt, Georgia, and the Balkans were all cited). However, participants expressed hope that donors would follow the UK's example of ten year funding cycles for certain post-conflict countries, in recognition of the need for sustained commitment.

Finally the problem of donor coordination received much attention, in particular the tension between coherence and the need for individual donor visibility. Although the harmonising role of the European Commission was noted, participants questioned what more could be done. In particular, several participants felt that small donors should make more consolidated efforts to reduce wastage and transaction costs by consolidating their finances into larger pools with less donor visibility. However, others pointed out that small donors face the same problem of public accountability for spending as larger ones. Also discussed was the possibility of establishing mechanisms to combine bank loans with donor grants as a means to leverage bank lending and enhance the coherence of international efforts.

Women in peacebuilding
Since the Security Council passed Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security in 2000, women have achieved greater recognition both as victims of conflict and as contributors to conflict prevention, resolution and peacebuilding. Tackling the issues that disproportionately affect women involves not only gender advocacy, but the mainstreaming of a gender-sensitive approach into broader peacebuilding activity. Yet historically,
the international community has performed weakly in this area. The field of DDR, for example, is often dominated by a military mentality that fails to address issues such as the fate of women connected to combatants. More broadly, donors must move away from token responses, recognizing that injustices against women during conflict (such as rape and trafficking) are generally linked to a broader social context of gender inequality, gender-based violence, and a lack of access to opportunities, rights and resources.

In addition, there remains an unfortunate tendency to regard women as victims of conflict rather than a locus of capacity for peacebuilding, and as proponents for gender equality rather than potential leaders on broader peacebuilding issues. Participants noted that at the community level, women are often well organized and have first hand knowledge, rendering them good conduits for addressing local needs. Nationally, their inter-group peace activism may be ahead of the official peace process, making their inclusion in those processes all the more urgent. In some places, women have been emboldened by Resolution 1325 to campaign for access to these processes, as in Kosovo, where they entered into consultation with NATO forces, and in Burundi and Somalia, where they have enjoyed special negotiating status. But elsewhere women are sidelined from official processes and institutions dominated by men, and find that 'civil society' is their only arena for engaging in peacebuilding.

Unintentional consequences
Paradoxically, the very presence of international actors and funds can have consequences contradictory to the aims of peacebuilding. Participants discussed three broad types of unintentional effects. First, and as commonly reported by the media, are particularly pernicious effects such as the risk of sexual exploitation of local women and children and the spread of HIV/AIDS and other sexually transmitted diseases. On these issues, participants agreed on the necessity of a two-pronged approach, involving both awareness-raising amongst potential victims and curtailment of the perpetrators through strict codes of conduct. Second and less commonly reported are the adverse economic consequences of large international presences, including the creation of dependencies through poor use of resources, and contribution to socio-economic inequality and distortion of local labour markets. Conversely, considered use of operational resources, particularly the procurement of local goods and services, can have enormous economic benefits for the economy and national development. The third issue discussed was the broad range of adverse consequences that can result from poor attention to sequencing, for example when refugees or ex-combatants are returned to communities where they have few rights and minimal employment prospects.

Organized crime
A further challenge concerns linkages between weak and post-conflict states and the criminal networks they shelter or sustain. In addition to lawlessness and instability, which provide unregulated spaces for criminal activities and markets for smuggled goods, the sanctions and restrictions imposed by the international community may also encourage unrecorded transactions which may mutate in the post-conflict phase. In turn, criminal networks present obstacles for peacebuilding. Their commonly observed political influence may undermine confidence in new democratic institutions by weakening criminal justice and damaging access to basic services. Through their interface with the legitimate economy, they also result in longer-term market distortion, exploitation of natural resources and disincentives for investment.

A key problem addressed in the seminar was the need to balance the urgent task of tackling corruption and crime against the recognition that building effective institutions takes years and even decades. Long-term investments are needed in criminal justice and the rule of law, demanding a more concerted international effort in transitional justice and human rights, and the need to address the fragmented nature of existing rule of law capacity. Moreover, a regional or even global approach is needed to tackle the multiple points on the supply chain as in Afghanistan, where the effects of drug trafficking are felt far beyond its borders as well as the demand in developed countries for illicit goods. Notwithstanding these challenges, and the limited success so far in this area, undue pessimism is unwarranted. With enhanced information gathering and awareness, the use of preventive mechanisms built into aid dispersal tools, and targeted prosecutions to send signals to criminal groups, organised crime can be tackled.
The persistence of conflict
In cases such as Afghanistan, where the absorption of excluded actors into the political process is a continual challenge, it is clear that peacebuilding is undermined by the continuation of conflict. By targeting the Afghan and international security forces, the Taliban are not only diminishing the security of the population but also creating an extremely difficult environment for international actors. Furthermore, since it has become difficult for the government even to recruit civil servants, the processes of national reconciliation and reconstruction are being compromised. Participants agreed that in Afghanistan, the current peacebuilding approach suffers from two broad weaknesses. First is the problem of two separate mandates and commands: one pertaining to the US-led coalition forces conducting full-spectrum operations and the other to NATO and ISAF contingents leading stability and reconstruction efforts. Second is the lack of civilian crisis management capacity and a broader lack of comprehensive mission preparation. In a situation in which there is no pure military solution, the EU in particular should focus on building up such capacity. A far more difficult and less technical problem is that of cross-border influences on the conflict, particularly those emanating from Pakistan and Iran. As is often the case, where conflict persists, peacebuilding will fail without attention to the regional dimension.

Local ownership
Finally, as is widely acknowledged, international actors tend to fail when they attempt to bypass national actors. In this light, participants agreed on the need to involve local actors from the planning stage. It was also argued that more attention should be paid to alternative models of statehood, since an emphasis on creating liberal democracies can exacerbate socio-political cleavages in divided societies. However, participants also noted that the term ‘local ownership’ has evolved into a mantra used both superficially and uncritically, with little attention to who the locals are or what it means to ‘own’ a process. First, there is a tendency to associate the mere involvement or employment of local actors as local ownership, with little attention as to how they are engaged. Genuine local ownership requires capacity building, which may be extremely costly and requires long-term strategic vision and funding. Second, local ownership can be used as an excuse, either by state actors resisting foreign intervention, or indeed by international actors as justification for relinquishing their responsibilities. On this point, it was argued that states should not be allowed to conduct their own transitional justice mechanisms if they lack the genuine national capacity or legitimacy to do so, since this can undermine both justice and peace in the long term. Third, it was argued that local ownership, which emerged out of development discourse, may not be appropriate for all aspects of peacebuilding. In particular, intellectual honesty is required when it comes to the role of external actors in determining borders and territorial status, the inclusion or exclusion of particular actors in peace agreements, and in some cases the outcome of war itself.

5. Conclusion

As is demonstrated by the all too frequent resurgence of conflict, there are no ‘easy’ cases of peacebuilding. Yet participants noted that current cases, notably Afghanistan and Iraq, present the international community with particularly grave challenges, involving persistent conflict, seemingly insurmountable political cleavages, and tensions between peacebuilding goals and other interests. Nor is peacebuilding likely to get easier in the near future, as new cases emerge from processes of state formation (Palestine) and possible separation (Sri Lanka). Yet although peacebuilding presents a formidable set of challenges to the international community, tools and knowledge do exist should international actors choose to use them. In the past year, the peacebuilding agenda has been dominated by the worst kind of political battles over the procedures of the PBC. The challenge in 2006 is to create a better politics of peacebuilding, both through ongoing consolidation of peacebuilding efforts within the EU, and a broader commitment to the new peacebuilding architecture at the UN.